NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION

File Name: 18a0471n.06

Case No. 18-5123

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

ELLA FAYE BLACKBURN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 

Defendant-Appellee.

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ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED 

STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR 

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF 

KENTUCKY 

BEFORE: GIBBONS, SUTTON, and McKEAGUE, Circuit Judges.

SUTTON, Circuit Judge. In 2008, Ella Blackburn fell down some stairs and broke her 

arm. She stopped working as a payroll clerk and filed the first of four applications for Social 

Security disability insurance benefits. Although she chose not to appeal her first three denied 

claims, she appealed the fourth to the district court, which affirmed the Social Security 

Administration. Because the administrative law judge correctly consulted a vocational expert to 

determine how many jobs Blackburn could perform and permissibly relied on the expert, we 

affirm. 

I.

Ella Blackburn claims that injuries from her 2008 fall and other medical conditions left her 

with pain in her back, hip, neck, leg, and shoulder. On top of that, she has depression and becomes 

anxious when her ailments prevent her from doing things.
Case No. 18-5123, Blackburn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

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Blackburn first applied for disability benefits under the Social Security Act in 2008. An 

administrative law judge denied the application in September 2009. A few days later, she applied 

again and was denied again in October 2010. She applied a third time in November 2010, receiving

yet another denial on May 10, 2012. She did not appeal any of these decisions to federal court. 

In September 2013, Blackburn filed a fourth time and continued to argue that her disability 

began in 2008. Because final administrative proceedings had already found Blackburn not 

disabled from January 2008 through May 10, 2012, the administrative law judge considered only 

whether Blackburn qualified as disabled starting on the earliest date not previously adjudicated, 

May 11, 2012.

In reviewing Blackburn’s fourth and most recent application, the administrative law judge 

did not quarrel with her listing of injuries. But the judge found her statements regarding the 

“intensity, persistence and limiting effects of [her] symptoms” not “entirely credible.” R. 5-1 at 

33. Finding that Blackburn still could do some light work, the judge consulted a vocational expert. 

Based on the expert’s testimony, the judge concluded that there were several jobs that Blackburn 

could perform, precluding eligibility for benefits. 

The Administration’s Appeals Council affirmed. And the district court rejected her claim

as well. This appeal followed.

II.

We review the administrative law judge’s application of legal standards with fresh eyes 

and factual findings for substantial evidence. Wright-Hines v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 597 F.3d 392, 

395 (6th Cir. 2010).
Case No. 18-5123, Blackburn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

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III.

The Social Security Act provides disability insurance benefits to those who cannot perform 

their prior job or engage in other “substantial gainful work.” 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B). In 

assessing claims, administrative law judges gauge a claimant’s “residual functional capacity”—

the work, in other words, an individual still can do. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545. If the individual cannot

do her prior job, the administrative law judge considers whether she can do (1) sedentary, (2) light, 

or (3) medium work. Id. § 404.1520(a)(4)(iv)–(v). The administrative law judge takes this 

information and plugs it into a grid that accounts for other factors—age, education, and previous 

work experience—and that determines whether the claimant may be able to handle substantial 

gainful work. Id. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2.

But not all individuals fall into single categories. Sometimes a claimant falls between two 

“ranges of work,” such as when someone “can perform more than light but less than medium 

work,” id. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2 § 200.00(d), making the individual potentially eligible in one 

direction but not the other. For these in-between situations, the grids provide all they can—general 

guidance—and an administrative law judge consults vocational experts with “specialized 

knowledge” to make an informed decision about what jobs a claimant can do. SSR 83-12, 1983 

WL 31253, at *2–3 (Feb. 26, 1979).

In Blackburn’s case, the administrative law judge correctly followed this process: The 

judge first determined her residual functional capacity. The judge concluded that Blackburn could

work on her feet for four hours in an eight-hour workday, with a break each hour. She also could

sit for six hours, with breaks every two hours. The judge also found that her limitations prevented

her from returning to her prior employment.
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Based on her residual functional capacity, Blackburn fell somewhere between the 

sedentary and light work categories. She could do some but not all light work, which can involve

“a good deal of walking or standing.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). Given Blackburn’s age, prior 

work history, and education, the sedentary work grid would grant her benefits. The light work

grid would not. The administrative law judge consulted a vocational expert, who testified that

many “light and sedentary jobs” existed in the national economy that Blackburn could perform. 

R. 5-1 at 54. The expert provided four examples: a routing clerk (light work with 28,000 positions 

in the nation); a price marker (light work, 55,000 positions); an inspector (sedentary work, 75,000 

positions); and a sorter (sedentary work, 48,000 positions). The administrative law judge credited 

this testimony and found that Blackburn could adjust “to other work that existed in significant 

numbers in the national economy” and denied the claim. R. 5-1 at 37. 

Blackburn challenges this conclusion on three grounds, each unconvincing.

First, Blackburn argues that the administrative law judge should have used the grid for 

sedentary work rather than consulting a vocational expert. Blackburn points to a Social Security 

ruling that defines “the full range of light work [as] requir[ing] standing or walking, off and on, 

for a total of approximately 6 hours of an 8-hour workday.” SSR 83-10, 1983 WL 31251, at *6 

(Feb. 26, 1979) (emphasis added). Because Blackburn cannot stand or walk for six hours a day, 

she claims that she can do only sedentary work. 

But Blackburn mixes the minimum requirements needed to perform all light work with the 

ability to do some light work. The ruling also states that walking and standing in sedentary jobs

“generally total no more than about 2 hours” a day. Id. at *5. Because she can work on her feet

for four hours a day, Blackburn falls in the middle between the requirements for all sedentary work

(two hours) and all light work (six hours). That is just what vocational experts are for. 
Case No. 18-5123, Blackburn v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

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Nor can Blackburn succeed on the slightly different ground that her ailments prevent her 

from performing certain types of seated light work involving “pushing and pulling of arm-hand or 

leg-foot controls.” Id. That reality does not change the fact that her residual capacity falls between

the definitions for all sedentary and all light work.

Blackburn adds that she cannot do managerial or professional jobs, leaving a “gloomy 

prospect for the substantial number of jobs that remain.” Appellant’s Br. 6. But that risk explains

why administrative law judges consult a vocational expert: to determine how many jobs Blackburn 

can perform. The judge did just that.

Second, Blackburn maintains that the vocational expert’s testimony proves that “a less than 

substantial number of jobs” exist in the national economy. Id. at 18. Blackburn takes issue with 

the fact that the vocational expert identified more examples of sedentary jobs (123,000) than light 

jobs (83,000). According to Blackburn, if the sedentary grid “already determined that the [total]

available sedentary jobs . . . is insubstantial,” that means the identified light jobs must be 

insubstantial as well. Id. at 7. 

That does not follow. Someone like Blackburn who can do some light work can also do 

all types of sedentary work. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1567(b). This means that Blackburn can do more 

total jobs in the national economy than a comparable person with the same age, education, and 

work history who can perform only sedentary work. And the 83,000 light jobs that the vocational 

expert identified provided the administrative law judge substantial evidence to deny Blackburn’s 

claim. See, e.g., Taskila v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 819 F.3d 902, 906 (6th Cir. 2016) (“[S]ubstantial 

evidence supports the conclusion that [claimant] could perform at least two jobs that are 

meaningfully available locally (200 jobs) and nationally (6000).”).
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Third, Blackburn claims that the administrative law judge should have exercised her 

discretion to place Blackburn in an older age category, which would have made her eligible for 

benefits. She argues that the administrative law judge should have exercised this discretion when 

she initially “filed back in 2008”—through her first application. Appellant’s Br. 8. But Blackburn 

had sixty days to appeal that decision, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)–(h), and she did not. Claim preclusion 

prevents her from relitigating that same period today. See Earley v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 893 F.3d 

929, 933 (6th Cir. 2018).

To the extent Blackburn means to contest her age classification for the period pressed in 

her fourth claim, that is no more helpful. At the point when her eligibility for disability insurance 

ended, Blackburn was 54, placing her in the “closely approaching advanced age” category. 20 

C.F.R. § 404.1563(d). She was a little over six months away from the “advanced age category,”

defined as 55 and over. Id. § 404.1563(e). An administrative law judge need “not apply the age 

categories mechanically in a borderline situation.” Id. § 404.1563(b). If a claimant is “within a 

few days to a few months of reaching an older age category,” and the older age category would 

lead to an award of benefits, the judge may “consider whether to use the older age category after 

evaluating the overall impact of all the factors of [the] case.” Id. 

When asked to bump a claimant to a higher age category, the administrative law judge 

considers whether a claimant possesses an “additional vocational adversity,” such as marginal 

command of English or a history of unskilled work in an isolated industry. Soc. Sec. Admin.,

Hearings, Appeals, and Litigation Law Manual II-5-3-2 (1993). Blackburn does not identify any

additional vocational adversities, instead focusing on her “limited . . . ability to stand,” a need for 

“breaks,” and an inability to “engage[] in sustained or overhead work.” Appellant’s Br. 8. But 

the judge considered those limitations when determining her residual functional capacity. They
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are not additional vocational adversities that vault her into the next age category. As a result, the 

administrative law judge did not err in using Blackburn’s actual, chronological age. See Bowie v. 

Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 539 F.3d 395, 401 (6th Cir. 2008).

We affirm.