I 

118TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 9766 

To establish an interagency working group to ensure the security, resiliency, 

and integrity of undersea cables, and for other purposes. 

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

SEPTEMBER 23, 2024 

Mr. PFLUGER introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce, and in addition to the Committees on 

Homeland Security, and Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently 

determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned 

A BILL 

To establish an interagency working group to ensure the 

security, resiliency, and integrity of undersea cables, and 

for other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Undersea Cable Secu5 rity and Protection Act’’. 


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1 SEC. 2. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP AND REPORT ON 

2 ENSURING THE SECURITY, RESILIENCY, AND 

3 INTEGRITY OF UNDERSEA CABLES. 

4 (a) INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP.— 

5 (1) PREPARATION OF REPORT.—Not later than 

6 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 

7 the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation 

8 with the Chairperson of the Federal Communica9 tions Commission, shall convene an interagency 

10 working group (in this section referred to as the 

11 ‘‘working group’’) to prepare the report under sub12 section (b) and provide the briefing under subsection 

13 (c). 

14 (2) CHAIRPERSON.—The Secretary of Home15 land Security shall serve as the chairperson of the 

16 working group. 

17 (3) MEMBERSHIP.—The working group shall be 

18 composed of participants with relevant background 

19 or expertise, as determined by the Security of Home20 land Security, with the approval of the head of the 

21 relevant Federal department, agency, or component, 

22 as appropriate, from each of the following: 

23 (A) The Department of Homeland Secu24 rity. 

25 (B) The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 

26 Security Agency of the Department. 


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1 (C) The United States Coast Guard. 

2 (D) The Department of Justice. 

3 (E) The Department of Defense. 

4 (F) The Federal Communications Commis5 sion. 

6 (G) The Department of Commerce. 

7 (H) Any other component of the United 

8 States Government, regardless of whether such 

9 component is an element of the intelligence 

10 community, that the Secretary, in consultation 

11 with the head of such component, determines 

12 would materially assist in the activities of the 

13 interagency working group. 

14 (b) REPORT.— 

15 (1) REQUIREMENT.—Not later than one year 

16 after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Sec17 retary of Homeland Security, in consultation with 

18 the Chairperson of the Federal Communications 

19 Commission, shall submit to the appropriate con20 gressional committees a report— 

21 (A) assessing the challenges of protecting 

22 commercial undersea telecommunications cables 

23 landing in the United States (in this section re24 ferred to as ‘‘undersea cables’’) and cable land25 ing stations in the United States from security 


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1 threats posed by the People’s Republic of 

2 China, the Russian Federation, the Islamic Re3 public of Iran, and any foreign entity of con4 cern; and 

5 (B) examining the roles and responsibil6 ities of the United States Government and the 

7 private sector to ensure the security, resiliency, 

8 and integrity of such undersea cables and cable 

9 landing stations. 

10 (2) MATTERS TO BE INCLUDED.—The report 

11 under paragraph (1) shall include a description of 

12 each of the following: 

13 (A) Past, ongoing, or planned efforts by 

14 the Department of Homeland Security, pursu15 ant to its role and responsibilities as the Sector 

16 Risk Management Agency for the communica17 tions sector in accordance with National Secu18 rity Memorandum–22, issued April 30, 2024 

19 (relating to critical infrastructure security and 

20 resilience), and the Federal Communications 

21 Commission, to protect undersea cables and 

22 cable landing stations in the United States from 

23 acts of espionage, cybersecurity threats, and 

24 from physical damage or disruption, including 

25 the cutting of such cables, and efforts to proVerDate Sep 11 2014 04:14 Oct 04, 2024 Jkt 059200 PO 00000 Frm 00004 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6201 E:\BILLS\H9766.IH H9766

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1 tect cable landing stations in the United States 

2 from vandalism, sabotage, and related terrorism 

3 threats. 

4 (B) The capabilities of the People’s Repub5 lic of China, the Russian Federation, the Is6 lamic Republic of Iran, and any foreign entity 

7 of concern to target and compromise undersea 

8 cables, or to intercept data transmissions or 

9 sensitive information originating from such ca10 bles. 

11 (C) The potential for espionage or mali12 cious cyber activity by repair vessels that are 

13 owned, controlled, or operated by state-owned 

14 entities of the People’s Republic of China and 

15 involved in the construction, maintenance, or 

16 repair of undersea cables. 

17 (D) The risks, including an associated as18 sessment, posed to undersea cables by natural 

19 causes, the lack of geographic undersea diver20 sity of cable landing stations in the United 

21 States, and accidental damage, and the extent 

22 to which United States cable operators and tele23 communications companies rely on repair ves24 sels that are owned, controlled, or operated by 


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1 state-owned entities of the People’s Republic of 

2 China. 

3 (E) Past, ongoing, or planned actions of 

4 the Department and the Commission to conduct 

5 outreach to allies and partners of the United 

6 States relating to countering the security 

7 threats posed to commercial undersea tele8 communications cables of such allies and part9 ners by the People’s Republic of China, the 

10 Russian Federation, the Islamic Republic of 

11 Iran, and any foreign entity of concern. 

12 (F) Current mechanisms in place within 

13 the Department, the Commission, and the pri14 vate sector to detect, prevent, suppress, inves15 tigate, mitigate, and respond to any acts or 

16 threats referred to in subparagraph (A) affect17 ing undersea cables or at cable landing stations 

18 in the United States. 

19 (G) The resources required for the Depart20 ment and Commission to initiate new, or ex21 pand existing, operations to protect undersea 

22 cables from acts of espionage, cybersecurity 

23 threats, or physical damage or disruption, in24 cluding the cutting of undersea cables, and to 

25 protect cable landing stations in the United 


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1 States from vandalism, sabotage, or related ter2 rorism threats. 

3 (H) Recommendations for expanding oper4 ations by the Department and the Commission 

5 to protect undersea cables from acts of espio6 nage, cybersecurity threats, or physical damage 

7 or disruption, including the cutting of undersea 

8 cables, and to protect cable landing stations in 

9 the United States from vandalism, sabotage, or 

10 related terrorism threats, including an assess11 ment of the feasibility of the following: 

12 (i) Establishing an interagency and 

13 public-private coordination and incident 

14 and threat reporting mechanism to ensure 

15 the security, resiliency, and integrity of un16 dersea cables and the protection of cable 

17 landing stations in the United States. 

18 (ii) Training a dedicated intelligence 

19 officer or analyst cadre of the Department 

20 composed of undersea cable experts to en21 sure the security, resiliency, and integrity 

22 of undersea cables and the protection of 

23 cable landing stations in the United States. 

24 (I) Recommendations for the Department, 

25 the Commission, private sector partners, and 


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1 Federal, State, local, Tribal, and territorial 

2 partners to jointly develop and establish stand3 ards, guidelines, best practices, methodologies, 

4 procedures, or processes to ensure the security, 

5 resiliency, and integrity of undersea cables and 

6 the protection of cable landing stations in the 

7 United States. 

8 (J) The benefits and drawbacks, and asso9 ciated analysis, of designating the Department 

10 of Homeland Security as the lead Federal enti11 ty responsible for ensuring the security, resil12 iency, and integrity of undersea cables and the 

13 protection of cable landing stations in the 

14 United States. 

15 (3) FORM.—The report under paragraph (1) 

16 shall be submitted in classified form, but may in17 clude an unclassified annex. 

18 (c) BRIEFING.—Not later than 30 days after the sub19 mission of the report under paragraph (1), the working 

20 group shall provide to the appropriate congressional com21 mittees a briefing on the findings and recommendations 

22 contained in such report. 

23 (d) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 


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1 (1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMIT2 TEES.—The term ‘‘appropriate congressional com3 mittees’’ means— 

4 (A) the Committee on Homeland Security 

5 and the Committee on Energy and Commerce 

6 of the House of Representatives; and 

7 (B) the Committee on Homeland Security 

8 and Governmental Affairs and the Committee 

9 on Commerce, Science, and Transportation of 

10 the Senate. 

11 (2) CYBERSECURITY THREAT.—The term ‘‘cy12 bersecurity threat’’ has the meaning given such term 

13 in section 2200 of the Homeland Security Act of 

14 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650). 

15 (3) FOREIGN ENTITY OF CONCERN.—The term 

16 ‘‘foreign entity of concern’’ has the meaning given 

17 such term in section 9901 of the William M. (Mac) 

18 Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for 

19 Fiscal Year 2021 (15 U.S.C. 4651). 

20 (4) INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY.—The term 

21 ‘‘intelligence community’’ has the meaning given 

22 such term in section 3(4) of the National Security 

23 Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 3003(4)). 

24 (5) MALICIOUS CYBER ACTIVITY.—The term 

25 ‘‘malicious cyber activity’’ means activities, other 


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1 than those authorized by or in accordance with 

2 United States law, that seek to compromise or im3 pair the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of 

4 computers, information or communications systems, 

5 networks, physical or virtual infrastructure con6 trolled by computers or information systems (as 

7 such term is defined in section 2200 of the Home8 land Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650)), or infor9 mation resident thereon. 

10 (6) SECTOR RISK MANAGEMENT AGENCY.—The 

11 term ‘‘Sector Risk Management Agency’’ has the 

12 meaning given such term in section 2200 of the 

13 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 650). 

Æ 


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