alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
_________________________________________ 

 

 

 

Order Supreme Court 

Lansing, Michigan 

September 29, 2005 Clifford W. Taylor,

 Chief Justice 

Michael F. Cavanagh 127487 & (30)(31) Elizabeth A. Weaver 

Marilyn Kelly 

Maura D. Corrigan 

Robert P. Young, Jr. 

CONCERNED CITIZENS OF ACME Stephen J. Markman,

TOWNSHIP, Justices 

Plaintiff-Appellee, 

v SC: 127487 

COA: 256403

 Grand Traverse CC: 03-023264-CH 

ACME TOWNSHIP, ACME TOWNSHIP

BOARD OF TRUSTEES, and ACME

TOWNSHIP PLANNING COMMISSION,

Defendants-Appellees, 

and 

VILLAGE AT GRAND TRAVERSE, L.L.C., 

 Intervening Defendant-Appellant. 

_________________________________________/ 

On order of the Court, the motions to extend time to file reply briefs are 

GRANTED. The application for leave to appeal the October 15, 2004 order of the Court 

of Appeals is considered, and it is DENIED, because we are not persuaded that the 

questions presented should be reviewed by this Court. 

p0926 

I, CORBIN R. DAVIS, Clerk of the Michigan Supreme Court, certify that the 

foregoing is a true and complete copy of the order entered at the direction of the Court. 

September 29, 2005
 

 Clerk
osha.gov/worker

Usted tiene el derecho a:

• Un lugar de trabajo seguro y saludable.

• Protección contra peligros. 

• Denunciar condiciones de trabajo peligrosas.

Llame al 1-800-321-OSHA (6742) 

o visite osha.gov/worker.

Recomendaciones para mantenerse seguro:

• Practique el distanciamiento social cuando 

sea posible.

• Use una cubierta facial de tela y guantes. 

• Lávese las manos con frecuencia con jabón 

y agua y use un desinfectante de manos.

• Evite compartir herramientas, de ser posible. 

• Desinfecte las herramientas antes y después 

de cada uso por parte de otra persona.

Denuncie cualquier condición 

de trabajo insegura. Es confidencial.

Si le preocupa su 

seguridad y salud durante 

la pandemia del virus 

COVID-19, OSHA le 

puede ayudar.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Sol Chodorov, Appellant.

Judgment of conviction unanimously affirmed. No opinion. Concur — Breitel, J. P., McNally, Stevens, Eager and Steuer, JJ.
#### In the Matter of the Arbitration between North Queensview Homes, Inc., Appellant, and Rheinstein Construction Company, Inc., Respondent.

Order entered on August 1, 1961 granting general contractor’s motion to stay an arbitration sought by the owner unanimously affirmed, with $20 costs and disbursements to defendant-respondent. In affirming no view is expressed as to the owner’s right to recover in an action at law for any alleged breach of contract. Nor is the significance of the letter which accompanied the final payment determined except that it did not serve to extend the owner’s right to obtain arbitration of any disputes. Concur—Breitel, J. P., Valente, McNally, Eager and Steuer, JJ.
(March 23, 1978)

#### International Modular Housing, Inc., Appellant, v Atlanta Shipping Corporation et al., Respondents.

Order, Supreme Court, New York County, entered July 22, 1977, modified, on the law, without costs or disbursements, to the extent of striking all references in the decretal paragraphs thereof to the seventh cause of action stated in the complaint, and otherwise affirmed to the extent appealed from, for the reasons stated at Special Term. The order was not appealed from in respect of denial of the stay of arbitration as to the subject matter of the first three causes of action, to which the counterclaim stated in the answer was addressed. We strike the stay in respect of the seventh cause which seeks punitive damage, as against public policy *(Matter of Publishers' Assn, of N. Y. City [Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union of N. Y.],*280 App Div 500). We add that there was no voluntary waiver of arbitration, as is stated in the dissent. Demand for *942arbitration was timely, indeed virtually immediately upon service of the complaint. Assertion of the counterclaim was not a waiver of arbitration; in the peculiar context of a complaint consisting of both arbitrable and' nonarbitrable claims, the steps taken by defendant by way of protection against the nonarbitrable ones may not be deemed a waiver of arbitration as to the others. Concur—Lupiano, Lane, Markewich and Sandler, JJ.; Murphy, P. J., dissents in part in a memorandum, as follows: There is no dispute that the arbitration clause in the Liner Book Note, a maritime agreement, is governed by the provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (US Code, tit 9, § 1, *et seq.; Matter of Rederi [Dow Chem. Co.],*25 NY2d 576, 581). Under Federal case law, a party may waive its right to demand arbitration by counterclaiming for damages or seeking disclosure in an action brought by the opposing party. *(American Locomotive Co. v Gyro Process Co.,*185 F2d 316; *The Belize,*25 F Supp 663, app dsmd 101 F2d 1005.) In this proceeding, Atlanta counterclaimed on the promissory note, an item clearly not covered by the subject arbitration clause. Thus, Atlanta expressed its choice to resolve all outstanding controversies in the courts *(De Sapio v Kohlmeyer,*35 NY2d 402, 406). Likewise, by seeking disclosure, Atlanta actively participated in this action *(De Sapio v Kohlmeyer, supra;*cf. *Matter of Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. [Martin],*34 AD2d 776; cf. *Hodges Int. v Rembrandt Fabrics,*44 AD2d 77). Accordingly, the order, insofar as appealed from, should be modified by vacating so much thereof as stayed the fourth, fifth, sixth and seventh causes of action and ordered arbitration thereon, by denying Atlanta’s request for a stay of those four causes, and that, as modified, it should be affirmed.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-6022

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

HENRIETTA JAMES,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Florence. Cameron McGowan Currie, District

Judge. (CR-94-83)

Submitted: April 15, 1996 Decided: May 2, 1996

Before ERVIN and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and CHAPMAN, Senior Circuit

Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Henrietta James, Appellant Pro Se. Alfred William Walker Bethea,

Assistant United States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant appeals from the district court's order denying a

motion to reduce Appellant's sentence. We have reviewed the record

and the district court's opinion and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. United

States v. James, No. CR-94-83 (D.S.C. Nov. 8, 1995). We dispense

with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are

adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument

would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED
### T E X A S C O U R T O F A P P E A L S , T H I R D D I S T R I C T , A T A U S T I N

NO. 03-10-00557- CV

P hill ip Orlan do Jones an d Walter Lee Hall, Jr., Appellan ts
v. Deutsche Bank National T rust Com pany as truste e for the Re gistere d Hold ers of RESMAE

Asset- Backed Pass- Through Cer tificates, Series 2006- 1, Appellee

F ROM TH E CO UNTY COURT AT LAW NO . 2 O F TRAVIS CO UNTY NO. C-1 -CV- 10- 0051 64, H ONO RAB LE ERIC SH EP P ERD, JUDGE P RESIDING

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Walter L ee Hall, J r. filed a bankruptc y petition in t he U.S. Ba nkruptcy Court of the Western District of Texas on J anuar y 24, 2011. We there fore abate this appea l until a party fi l es a m o t i o n t o reinstate or a motion to sever . See Tex. R. App. P. 8.1, 8.2, 8.3. Hall is order ed to inform this Court within ten cale ndar day s of the resolution of the bankruptc y proce eding or some other

event that would a llow the appea l to be reinstated. Should Ha ll f ail to provide such notice, the appea l wi l l b e s ub j ect to dismiss al for want of prosec ution on this Court’s or another party ’s motion.

__________________________________________ David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore J ustices Pury ear , Pemberton and Rose Ba nkruptcy Filed: June 3, 2011
#### McNALLY v. ROWEN et al.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

March 8, 1905.)

Action by Robert J. McNally against Edward Rowen and another.

PER CURIAM.

Motion for leave to go to the Court of Appeals granted, and question certified as follows: “Is the plaintiff entitled to costs in this action accruing after the offer of judgment?”
#### Irving F. Krause, Appellant, v. Edith K. Krause, Respondent, et al., Defendant.

Judgment granting a separation to defendant on her counterclaim and providing for the setting up of a trust for the defendant, reversed, on the law, without costs to either party, and the ease remanded to Special Term to make findings and conclusions on the defendant’s cause of action for a separation and to enter judgment in accordance with said findings and conclusions and in accordance with the stipulation made in open court. It is clear that plaintiff-appellant consented to the terms of the stipulation and nothing contained therein is contrary to or offends public policy. The contention by plaintiff-appellant that the stipulation is invalid and unenforeible because it offends section 51 of the Domestic Relations Law is untenable. Under the circumstances of this case the provision made appears fair and equitable and not improvident. In effect the provision complained of measures and fixes the extent of the husband’s contribution for support and permits the wife to live in a manner commensurate with their standard of living while the parties were together. The stipulation, therefore, is valid. However, examination of the trust indenture reveals that it goes beyond the stipulation. For example, the investment powers of the trustees as to the trust fund under the indenture seem much broader than that contemplated by the parties in the stipulation. Moreover, no findings of fact or conclusion of law were made to support the separation decree (Civ. Prac. Act, § 440). This should have been done. Plaintiff-appellant raises several other questions on this appeal which need not be considered at length in view of our aforementioned disposition herein. Concur — Breitel, J. P., Rabin, Valente, Stevens and Eager, JJ.
### §2577. Annual Selected Acquisition Reports on certain hardware relating to defense nuclear nonproliferation

#### (a) Annual Selected Acquisition Reports

#### (1) In general

At the end of each fiscal year, the Administrator shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on each covered hardware project. The reports shall be known as Selected Acquisition Reports for the covered hardware project concerned.

#### (2) Matters included

The information contained in the Selected Acquisition Report for a fiscal year for a covered hardware project shall be the information contained in the Selected Acquisition Report for such fiscal year for a major defense acquisition program under section 4351 of title 10 or any successor system, expressed in terms of the covered hardware project.

#### (b) Covered hardware project defined

In this section, the term "covered hardware project" means a project carried out under the defense nuclear nonproliferation research and development program that—

(1) is focused on the production and deployment of hardware, including with respect to the development and deployment of satellites or satellite payloads; and

(2) exceeds $500,000,000 in total program cost over the course of five years.

(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLIII, §4311, as added Pub. L. 115–91, div. C, title XXXI, §3131(a), Dec. 12, 2017, 131 Stat. 1894; amended Pub. L. 117–81, div. A, title XVII, §1702(k)(3)(A), Dec. 27, 2021, 135 Stat. 2160; Pub. L. 117–263, div. A, title VIII, §809(c)(2), Dec. 23, 2022, 136 Stat. 2706.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

2022—Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 117–263 inserted "or any successor system," before "expressed in terms".

2021—Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 117–81 substituted "section 4351" for "section 2432".
#### § 56.9301 Dump site restraints.

Berms, bumper blocks, safety hooks, or similar impeding devices shall be provided at dumping locations where there is a hazard of overtravel or overturning.
#### DAVIDOW, Respondent, v. DAVIDOW, Appellant.

(Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department.

February 6, 1903.)

Action by Frances Davidow against Edward B. Davidow. A. Levy, for appellant. W. J. Barr, for respondent.

No opinion. Motion denied.
Order entered November 4, 2016

In The

Court of Appeals 

Fifth District of Texas at Dallas 

No. 05-16-01147-CR

VAN LEE BREWER, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 291st Judicial District Court

Dallas County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. F-89-97479-U

ORDER

Before the Court is appellant’s November 2, 2016 motion for extension of time to file pro 

se appellant brief in which he seeks a 60-day extension of time to file his brief. We GRANT the 

motion in part and ORDER appellant to file appellant’s brief on or before December 27, 2016.

/s/ ADA BROWN 

JUSTICE
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 11-6354

RICHARD E. MURPHY,

Petitioner – Appellant,

v.

BOB JONES,

Respondent – Appellee,

and

RICKY ANDERSON,

Respondent.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, 

District Judge. (5:09-hc-02119-D)

Submitted: May 31, 2011 Decided: June 14, 2011

Before MOTZ, DAVIS, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Richard E. Murphy, Appellant Pro Se. Clarence Joe DelForge, 

III, Assistant Attorney General, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Richard E. Murphy seeks to appeal the district court’s 

order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2006) petition. 

The order is not appealable unless a circuit justice or judge 

issues a certificate of appealability. See 28 U.S.C. 

§ 2253(c)(1)(A) (2006). A certificate of appealability will not 

issue absent “a substantial showing of the denial of a 

constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2006). When the 

district court denies relief on the merits, a prisoner satisfies 

this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists would 

find that the district court’s assessment of the constitutional 

claims is debatable or wrong. Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 

484 (2000); see Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 

(2003). When the district court denies relief on procedural 

grounds, the prisoner must demonstrate both that the dispositive 

procedural ruling is debatable, and that the petition states a 

debatable claim of the denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 

529 U.S. at 484-85. We have independently reviewed the record 

and conclude that Murphy has not made the requisite showing. 

Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss 

the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts 

and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
3

before the court and argument would not aid the decisional 

process. 

DISMISSED
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-6883

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

versus

ARMANDO DESPAINGNE,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of

South Carolina, at Greenville. G. Ross Anderson, Jr., District

Judge. (CR-91-342, CA-98-269-6-13)

Submitted: August 27, 1998 Decided: September 18, 1998

Before NIEMEYER and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges, and BUTZNER, Senior

Circuit Judge.

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Armando Despaingne, Appellant Pro Se. William Corley Lucius, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South Carolina, for

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

See Local Rule 36(c).
2

PER CURIAM:

Appellant seeks to appeal the district court’s order denying

his motion filed under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).

We have reviewed the record and the district court’s opinion and

find no reversible error. Accordingly, we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal on the reasoning of the district

court. United States v. Despaingne, Nos. CR-91-342; CA-98-269-6-13

(D.S.C. April 13, 1998). We dispense with oral argument because the

facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional

process.

DISMISSED
#### § 60.17 Severability.

Each section of this part, as well as sections in 30 CFR parts 56, 57, 70, 71, 72, 75, and 90 that address respirable crystalline silica or respiratory protection, is separate and severable from the other sections and provisions. If any provision of this subpart is held to be invalid or unenforceable by its terms, or as applied to any person, entity, or circumstance, or is stayed or enjoined, that provision shall be construed so as to continue to give the maximum effect to the provision permitted by law, unless such holding shall be one of utter invalidity or unenforceability, in which event the provision shall be severable from these sections and shall not affect the remainder thereof.
#### § 56.7050 Tool and drill steel racks.

Receptacles or racks shall be provided for drill steel and tools stored or carried on drills.
#### § 57.18025 Working alone.

No employee shall be assigned, or allowed, or be required to perform work alone in any area where hazardous conditions exist that would endanger his safety unless his cries for help can be heard or he can be seen.
Exhibit 32.1

Certification Pursuant to

U.S.C. Section 1350,

Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

In connection with the Quarterly Report of Devcon International Corp. (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ending June 30, 2007 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date
hereof (the Report), I, Richard Rochon, Acting Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



| | (1) | The report fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and
| | --- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Date: February 29, 2008



|                               |  | 
|------------------------------ |  | 
|/s/ Richard Rochon             |  | 
|Richard Rochon                 |  | 
|Acting Chief Executive Officer |  | 
|(Principal Executive Officer)  |  |
, J. 

725 (2012) ("[I]t is mandatory to name all parties of record in a petition for 

judicial review of an administrative decision, and a district court lacks 

jurisdiction to consider a petition that fails to comply with this 

requirement."). Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED. 

Gibbons 

PICKERING, J., dissenting: 

I agree with appellant that Washoe County v. Otto, 128 Nev. 

Adv. Op. No. 40, 282 P.3d 719 (2012), is distinguishable from the facts 

here because in Otto, the respondent taxpayers were not identified by 

name in the caption or body of the petition for judicial review or in an 

attached exhibit to the petition. Id. at 723. Here, by attaching the 

appeals officer's order to the petition, appellant clearly identified the 

proper parties to the judicial review proceedings. I believe that this is 

sufficient to meet the requirements of NRS 233B.130(2)(a), which requires 

that "the agency and all parties of record to the administrative proceeding" 

be named as respondents, but does not specifically require that the parties 

be named in the caption to the petition. See Cooksey v. Cargill Meat 

,Solutions Corp., 831 N.W.2d 94, 103-04 (Iowa 2013) (concluding that in 

evaluating the statutory naming requirement, "the contents of a petition 

seeking review of an administrative action should be evaluated in its 

entirety" and that identifying the respondents in the body of the petition 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 2 

NEVADA 

(0) 194Th (904.4 
and serving respondents with notice satisfies the requirement). It appears 

that appellant served the petition on respondents and, although appellant 

also did not expressly name the respondents in the body of the petition, 

the appeals officer's order that identified the parties to the administrative 

proceeding, attached as an exhibit, is incorporated as part of the petition. 

See Green v. Iowa Dep't of Job Serv., 299 N.W.2d 651, 654 (Iowa 1980) 

(concluding that naming the employer in an exhibit attached to a petition 

for judicial review meets the statutory naming requirement); cf. NRCP 

10(c) (incorporating an exhibit to a pleading as part of the pleading for all 

purposes). Therefore, I disagree with the majority that the language of 

Otto should be read so broadly so as to encompass the factual 

circumstances at issue here, and I respectfully dissent. 

Attar' , J. 

Pickering 

cc: Hon. Kerry Louise Earley, District Judge 

Persi J. Mishel, Settlement Judge 

Law Offices of Michael P. Balaban 

Dept. of Business and Industry/Div. of Industrial 

Relations/Henderson 

Greenman, Goldberg, Raby & Martinez 

Eighth District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

3 

(0) 1947A 794161197
EXHIBIT 32.2

WRITTEN STATEMENT

PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350

In connection with Quarterly Report of Cogo Group, Inc. and its
subsidiaries (the Company) on Form 10-Q for the period ended June 30, 2009 as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the Report), the undersigned, Frank Zheng Chief Financial Officer of the
Company certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:

(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13a-14(b) or 15d-14(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and

(2) The information
contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.



|                      |  |  |  |     |  |                 |  |                        
|--------------------- |  |  |  | --- |  | --------------- |  | -----------------------
|Dated: August 7, 2009 |  |  |  | By: |  | /s/ Frank Zheng
|                      |  |  |  |     |  | Name:           |  | Frank Zheng            
|                      |  |  |  |     |  | Title:          |  | Chief Financial Officer