## In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas

at Fort Worth

___________________________ No. 02

- 17

- 00374

- CR

___________________________

On Appeal from the 431st District Court Denton County, Texas Trial Court No. F16

- 2748

- 431

Before Sudderth, C.J.; Kerr and Birdwell, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Kerr 

### C HAD 

### H AYNES 

### , Appellant

V


### . T HE 

### S TATE OF 

### T EXAS2 MEMORANDUM OPINION A jury convicted Chad Haynes of family

- violence assault with a previous
conviction a nd sentenced him t o three years in the penitentiary

. See Tex. Penal Code
Ann. § 22.01(b)(2)(A). In one issue, Haynes contends that the evidence is insufficient to prove that he committed the offense. Specifically, he argues that the complainant’s story was not corroborated; nothing showed that he was at the complainant’s
apartment, as the complainant asserted; the complainant waited about twelve hours before going to the police; and the police department “conducted no real investigation.” We affirm.
Evidence The complainant described her relationship with Haynes, the assault, and he r trip to the police station to make a report. Testifying at the October 2017 trial, Ruby Johnston said that she and Haynes had started dating in late 2014 , dated for about 18 months, and

— at the time of the
assault

— had a child together

. Although they “ne ver really officially broke up,” their relationship “was just, kind of, in the air a lot of times , ” and they continued to see each other romantically but sporadically

. In the spring of 2016, Haynes came over on a weekly basis to help her with their child.
Late on the evening of May 25, 2016, around midnight, Haynes went to Johnston’s apartment in Lewisville , looked through messages on her phone , and
“didn’t like what he saw”

— Johnston had been sending messages to another man. At3

that time, Johnston stated that she and Haynes were “kind of” together. “It was always up in the air,” she added, “so I just kind of assumed.” Angry about the messages , Haynes hit Johnston’s face multiple times with his hand; she testified that it hurt and caused her ears to ring. Haynes then threw her phone and her 11

- year

- old son’s phone on the ground, breaking both. 1 When red
marks began to appear on Johnston’s face , Haynes had her p ress frozen vegetables to her face for a couple of hours. Although Johnston asked Haynes to leave, he stayed until 8:00 a.m., when she left to take her other children to school. After dropping her children off at school , Johns t on then went to her mother’s house, where the y discussed what had happened. Johnston wanted to make a police report, but she was afraid to do so because she had an outstanding ticket in Grapevine

. S o she first paid that ticket and then , around 11:00 a.m., w ent to the
Lewisville P olice D epartment and told a n officer what had happened. Th at officer photographed her and the broken phones

. Johnston acknowledged later telling the police that she did not want to prosecute Haynes. After this incident, in fact, she and Haynes had another child together. Even on the stand, she asserted that she did not want to testify against Haynes “b ecause [she had] two kids with him.”

1 Johnston had two children from a previous relationship when she a nd Haynes began dating.4

Officer George Nichols recalled Johnston’s making a written statement and how her injuries and the damage to two phones were consistent with her account of what had happened. Officer George Nichols remembered Johnston ’s coming into the police department regarding an assault on May 26, 2016

. The two talked , and s he gave a
written statement. He observed red marks on her face that were consistent with her description of what had happened. Re viewing the photographs he had taken that day , Officer Nichols said at trial that he believed Haynes had assaulted Johnston with his
hand because the bruising was shaped like a handprint

. Johnston also showed Officer Nichols the two broken phones

. He elaborated : “Ms. Johnston told me that Mr. Haynes had broken them after reading some texts in one of them and looking through the phone.” One , he said, appeared to have been thrown on the ground several times, and the other one looked like it had been bent and broken apart. He did not thin k either phone was operable. During Officer Nichols’s 18 years as a police officer, he had frequently seen victims become reluctant to cooperate , explain ing that “ afterwards they feel that there [are] going to be repercussions for .

. . wanting help.”
Af ter Officer Nichols took Johnston’s report, he had no further dealings with the case: “I’ll do the report, I’ll take the photographs, I’ll .

. . upload them into evidence, and the case is forwarded to a detective.” He did not check Johnston’s background or talk to any other witnesses.5

Detective Scott Austin investigated, but Johnston did not want the case prosecuted, and Haynes avoided him. Detective Scott Austin was assigned to the domestic

- violence unit , where his primary job was to investigate family

- violence cases. He explained that sometimes

v ictims ask that charges be dropped for various reasons : they might fear retaliation,
there m ight be financial considerations , there m ight be children, and “things like
that.” “A lot of times,” he added, “victims will want to drop the charges due to pressure from the suspect.” R egardless of t he victim ’s wishes , Detective Austin would
continue to investigate the case. He also explained that m ost family

- violence cases

occur red in the home , so normally there were no surveillance videos or other
witnesses. In Johnston’s case, although she made her report on May 26 and although
Detective Austin was assigned her case the next day, he did not try to contact her until
about three or four weeks later. After two unsuccessfu l attempts, he talked to her on June 24, but “she told me [that] she did not want to pursue the case.” Johnston did not deny that the incident had occurred, but she woul d not give him an account of what had happened. Detective Austin stated that the reason s Johnston gave for not wanting to pursue the charges were consistent with reasons other victims had given6

him before. Despite Detective Austin ’s telling Johnston that he was not going to drop the charges, Johnston did not change her story or deny that the assault had occurred. 2
Next , Detective Austin asked Johnston to talk to Haynes about contacting the police and about turning himself in , but Johnston reported back that Haynes had no desire to speak with him . Detective Austin procured an arrest warrant f or Haynes on June 29 and tried, without success , to contact Haynes on June 30 and July 1

. Haynes

was ultimately arrested on July 3.
On cross

- examination , Detective Austin admitted that he did not go to Johnston’s neighbors to determine if they had heard a nything strange and did not set up surveillance on the complex. Nor d id he ask anyone about Johnston’s reputation
for truthfulness , look into her background , or check her mental

- health history.
B ut b ased on his entire review, he nevertheless thought that the domestic

violence offense had occurred. For one thing, t he photographs corroborated Johnston ’s story : Detective Austin noticed that “ the side of her face was red [,] and [the redness] appeared to have the outline of a hand and fingers.”

2 Detective Austin dropped the criminal

- mischief charge against Haynes at Johnston’s request. Detective Austin estimated the value of the two broken iPhones to be about $1,400. The difference between the two offenses , he explained, was that one was a property crime and the other was a “persons crime.” “ When she asked me to drop [the] criminal mischief charges, I have to,” he explained, but “[i] n a domestic violence case, I don’t have to drop the charges.”7 Standard of Review Federal due process requires that the State prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged. Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 316, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2787 (1979); see U.S. Const. amend. XIV. In our due

- process evidentiary

sufficien cy review, we view all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational factfinder could have found the crime’s essential elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Queeman v. S tate , 520 S.W.3d 616, 622 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017). This standard gives full play to the factfinder’s responsibility to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts. See Jacks on , 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Queeman , 520 S.W.3d at 622. The factfinder alone judges the evidence’s weight and credibility. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.04; Queeman , 520 S.W.3d at 622. Thus, when performing an evidentiary

- sufficiency r eview, we may not re

- evaluate the evidence’s weight and credibility and substitute our judgment for the factfinder’s. Queeman , 520 S.W.3d at 622. Instead, we determine whether the necessary inferences are reasonable based on
the evidence’s cumulative force when viewed in the light most favorable to the
verdict. Murray v. State , 457 S.W.3d 446, 448 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015 ); see Villa v. State , 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017) (“The court conducting a sufficiency review must not engage in a ‘divide an d conquer’ strategy but must consider the cumulative force of all the evidence.”). We must presume that the factfinder resolved8

any conflicting inferences in favor of the verdict and defer to that resolution. Murray , 457 S.W.3d at 448

– 49.
Discussion
At its core, Haynes’s complaint is not that the State failed to prove each
element of the offense but that the jury chose to believe Johnston’s testimony

. But a s the sole judge of the evidence’s weight and credibility, t he jury was free to believe Johnston , who never recanted despite her later unwillingness to press charges

. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Queeman , 520 S.W.3d at 622 ; Murray , 457
S.W.3d at 448

– 49. The jury was also free to discount any perceived lack of corroborating witness es , th e absence of any other witness placing Haynes at her apartment, and any shortcomings in Officer Nichols’s or Detective Austin’s investigation s . See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Queeman , 520 S.W.3d at
622 ; Murray , 457 S.W.3d at 448

– 49. And v iewing the evidence in the verdict’s most favorable light, the jury presuma bly reconciled Johnston’s failure to contact the police
sooner with the fact s that Haynes had broken both her and her son’s phones, that Haynes remained at her apartment for eight h ours after the assault , and that Johnston
wanted to pay her outstanding ticket in Grapevine before reporting the assault in
Lewisville to avoid being arrested herself

. See Jackson , 443 U.S. at 319, 99 S. Ct. at 2789; Queeman , 520 S.W.3d at 622; Murray , 457 S.W.3d at 448

– 49.
A single witness ’s testimony can support a conviction. See Hernandez v. State , No. 04

- 17

- 00340

- CR, 2018 WL 1176371, at *1 (Tex. App.

— San Antonio Mar. 7,9

2018 , no pet. ) (mem. op., not designated for publication); Shah v. State , 403 S.W.3d 29, 35 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. ref ’ d); Davis v. State , 177 S.W.3d 355, 359 (Tex. App.

— Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (citing Aguilar v. State , 468 S.W.2d 75, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971)); see also Lee v. State , 239 S.W.3d 873, 878 (Tex . App.

— Waco 2007, pet. ref

’ d) ( “As the sole judge of the weight and credibility of witness testimony, the jury was entitled to disregard [the defendant’s] testimony and accept [the complainant’s].” ). Here, we hold that Johnston’s testimony sufficiently sup ports the conviction.
Conclusion We overrule Haynes’s issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

/s/ Elizabeth Kerr Elizabeth Kerr Justice
Do Not Publish Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: April 4, 2019