Rel: May 3, 2024

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter. 

Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue, 

Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections 

may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

OCTOBER TERM, 2023-2024

_________________________

CR-2023-0008

_________________________

Trevor Lynn Cofer 

v.

State of Alabama

Appeal from Lee Circuit Court

(CC-20-761)

KELLUM, Judge.

Trevor Lynn Cofer was convicted of four counts of voyeurism in the 

first degree. See § 13A-11-41, Ala. Code 1975. For Counts I, II, and III 

of the indictment, the trial court sentenced Cofer to 10 years' 

imprisonment, split the sentences, and ordered Cofer to serve 117 days 
CR-2023-0008

2

in confinement, followed by 8 years on probation. For Count IV of the 

indictment, the trial court sentenced Cofer to 10 years' imprisonment, 

split the sentence, and ordered Cofer to serve 1 year in confinement 

followed by 8 years on probation.

The evidence adduced at trial indicated the following. On October 

13, 2019, around 9:30 or 9:45 p.m., Jonathan Squadrito went to visit E.H., 

then a 19-year-old student at Auburn University, at a house she shared 

with three roommates, one of whom was Valerie Tarazi. The evidence 

indicated that Cofer lived in the house next door to E.H., that E.H.'s 

bedroom window was on the side of the house facing Cofer's house, and 

that there was about 15 feet between the two houses. Because the 

parking area in front of E.H.'s house was full, Squadrito parked a short 

distance away. As he walked toward E.H.'s house, he saw a man at the 

side of the house, whom he identified at trial as Cofer, standing outside 

E.H.'s bedroom window; Cofer "had what looked to be a phone in his hand 

recording her through her window" (R. 132), "where there was a break in 

her ... blinds." (R. 133.) Squadrito telephoned E.H., but she did not 

answer so he telephoned Tarazi and "told her that there was somebody 

outside of [E.H.'s] room, to get her out of the room." (R. 133.) 
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3

Tarazi turned on her bedroom light, which startled Cofer, who then 

tried to hide in the bushes. Squadrito approached Cofer to detain him. 

Cofer tried to run away but Squadrito gave chase and caught him, 

holding him "on the ground to make sure that he couldn't get up and try 

and run away again." (R. 139.) While he was on the ground, Cofer asked 

Squadrito not to call the police. Squadrito asked Cofer for his cellular 

telephone, and Cofer gave him the phone as well as the password to 

unlock it. Squadrito searched the phone and found several videos of E.H. 

He also checked what he termed the "hidden tab" in the photo section of 

the phone and found additional videos of E.H. where she was partially 

nude. (R. 141.) Squadrito kept Cofer's phone in his possession until 

police arrived. 

E.H. testified that, as she was waiting for Squadrito to arrive at her 

house the night of October 13, 2019, she checked her phone and noticed 

several missed calls from him. At about the same time, Tarazi came into 

her room and told her that she should answer her phone. E.H. then called 

Squadrito, who made her aware of the situation happening outside the 

house. E.H. and her roommates remained inside the house until police 

arrived. When E.H. went outside, Squadrito informed her that Cofer had 
CR-2023-0008

4

on his phone several videos of her in various stages of undress dating 

back to September. In addition, the officers at the scene showed her one 

or two of the videos on Cofer's phone and she identified herself in those 

videos. In one of the videos, E.H. said, she "did not have any clothes over 

[her] breasts ... [and] was very clearly naked." (R. 165.) In another video, 

she "was not fully dressed," though she could not remember exactly what 

she was wearing in the video. (R. 167.) 

E.H. testified that she had plastic blinds over her bedroom window, 

but "[t]hey had a few holes in them." (R. 168.) She also said that 

sometimes she opened the blinds, but that she never thought someone 

could see into her bedroom. She also said that, after the incident, she 

was more security conscious and she determined that no one could see 

into her bedroom from the parking area in front of her house. E.H. 

testified that she did not know that she was being recorded and that she 

did not consent to anyone watching or recording her in her bedroom. She 

also stated that she "expected privacy" in her own bedroom "whether the 

window is open or closed or the blinds are open or closed." (R. 191.) 

Jonathan Gaither, a patrol sergeant with the Auburn Police 

Department, testified that the night of October 13, 2019, he responded to 
CR-2023-0008

5

a call about a "peeping Tom." (R. 195.) When Sgt. Gaither arrived at 

E.H.'s residence, Cofer was sitting on the curb and several people were 

standing around him. Squadrito informed Sgt. Gaither about what had 

happened and gave Sgt. Gaither Cofer's cell phone. Sgt. Gaither then 

detained Cofer, placing him in the back of the patrol car of another 

responding officer. After speaking with E.H., Sgt. Gaither advised Cofer 

of his Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), rights, and Cofer admitted 

that he had been recording E.H. with his phone through her bedroom 

window since "sometime in September." (R. 209.) Cofer later gave 

another statement to police, in which he again admitted to recording E.H. 

several times. He said, however, that the day he was caught was the only 

time he had been right outside E.H.'s window when he recorded her; the 

rest of the videos, he said, were recorded from inside his own home 

looking through his own window. Cofer gave Sgt. Gaither permission to 

look through his phone and told him the password to unlock it. Sgt. 

Gaither looked at the videos on the phone and, in "a couple," he could not 

tell whether it was E.H., so he showed those videos to E.H. and E.H. 

verified that she was the one depicted in the videos. (R. 210.) According
CR-2023-0008

6

to Sgt. Gaither, the videos were made through "cracks" in the blinds 

covering the window. (R. 211.) 

The State introduced into evidence 21 videos that were extracted 

from Cofer's cell phone. This Court was unable to open three of the 

videos. The quality of the remaining videos is beyond poor, and many of 

them depict only a blank, black screen, or are so distorted that nothing is 

visible. In the video labeled IMG0002, recorded on September 26, 2019, 

and giving rise to the charge in Count I of the indictment, E.H. is seen 

from the waist up through partially closed blinds; she appears to be 

changing clothes and her bare breasts are visible. This Court was unable 

to open the video labeled IMG0007, recorded on October 2, 2019, and 

giving rise to the charge in Count II of the indictment, but as the State 

correctly points out, Cofer concedes in his brief that E.H. is "partially 

nude" in that video.1 (Cofer's brief, p. 13.) In the video labeled IMG0020, 

one of two videos recorded on October 5, 2019, and giving rise to the 

charge in Count III of the indictment, the blinds are pulled up and E.H. 

is seen standing in her bedroom; she appears to be wearing a sweatshirt 

1In addition, during closing argument, Cofer argued that this video 

depicted E.H. "standing nude or partially nude" in front of her window. 

(R. 365.) 
CR-2023-0008

7

and her bare buttocks are visible. In the video labeled IMG0037, one of 

several videos recorded on October 13, 2019, and giving rise to the charge 

in Count IV of the indictment, E.H. is seen through a small gap in the 

blinds walking from her bedroom into what appears to be a bathroom; at 

one point, she stands in front of a mirror in the bathroom and the 

reflection from the mirror shows her breasts covered with a sports bra. 

In the video labeled IMG0038, also recorded on October 13, 2019, E.H. is 

again seen in the reflection of the mirror wearing a sports bra. In the 

video labeled IMG0040, also recorded on October 13, 2019, E.H. is seen 

standing in her bedroom in profile. She appears to be topless, and the 

video shows her from the top of her head down to about two inches below 

the top of her left shoulder.

Chelsea Williams, a sergeant in the investigations division of the 

Auburn Police Department, testified that, in addition to the videos of 

E.H., Cofer's phone contained numerous Internet searches. According to 

Sgt. Williams, on September 23, 2019, three days before he first videoed 

E.H., Cofer conducted searches on the Internet using the following 

phrases: "Pretty Girl Strips at Home," "Beautiful 19 Year Old Strips on 

Cam," and "Young College Girls." (R. 288.)
CR-2023-0008

8

After both sides rested and the trial court instructed the jury on the 

applicable principles of law, including the lesser-included offense of 

voyeurism in the second degree, the jury found Cofer guilty of four counts 

of voyeurism in the first degree as charged in the indictment. After 

sentencing, Cofer filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied by 

operation of law. See Rule 24.4, Ala. R. Crim. P. This appeal followed.

I.

Cofer first contends that the trial court erred in allowing the State, 

over his objection, to present evidence about the Internet searches 

extracted from his cell phone. As he did at trial, Cofer argues that the 

searches were irrelevant and inadmissible under Rule 404(b), Ala. R. 

Evid., that the State did not give him pretrial notice of its intent to 

introduce the searches as required by Rule 404(b), and that the searches 

were more prejudicial than probative. 

The record reflects that, in his discovery motion, Cofer requested 

that the State provide notice of its intent to present collateral-act 

evidence under Rule 404(b). The State did not provide Cofer with specific 

notice of its intent to introduce evidence of the Internet searches, but the 

record reflects that, as part of discovery, the State provided Cofer with 
CR-2023-0008

9

all the data extracted from his cell phone, which included the Internet 

searches. When the State sought to introduce the evidence during trial, 

Cofer objected on the same grounds he now raises on appeal. With 

respect to notice, Cofer's counsel specifically argued that, although the 

prosecutors had provided him with the data extracted from Cofer's cell 

phone, they did not provide him with the software application necessary 

to read that data. The prosecutors responded that Cofer's counsel had 

never notified them that he was unable to read the data. The trial court 

found that most of the searches were irrelevant and inadmissible, but 

concluded that the few searches made only three days before Cofer 

recorded E.H. for the first time that contained search terms closely 

aligned with the facts of the crimes were admissible. Concerned about 

the possible lack of notice, however, the trial court instructed the State 

to wait until the next day before introducing the evidence about the 

searches so that Cofer would have the overnight recess to review the 

evidence. The following day, the State offered to question Sgt. Williams 

about the searches rather than introduce a report containing information 

about the searches, and Cofer indicated he "would rather" the State 

present testimony than documentation. (R. 282.) The State then 
CR-2023-0008

10

questioned Sgt. Williams about the Internet searches, over Cofer's 

"continuing objection." (R. 287.)

At the time of Cofer's trial in May 2022, Rule 404(b) provided:2

"Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not 

admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 

action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 

admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 

opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or 

absence of mistake or accident, provided that upon request by 

the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide 

reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the 

court excuses pretrial notice on good cause shown, of the 

general nature of any such evidence it intends to introduce at 

trial."

With respect to notice, there is no question that the State did not 

provide Cofer with specific pretrial notice of its intent to introduce 

evidence of the Internet searches, but Cofer did receive, as part of 

discovery, all the data extracted from his cell phone, which included the 

Internet searches. Although it appears Cofer did not receive the software 

application necessary to read that data, he failed to inform the prosecutor 

of that fact before trial. In addition, the trial court gave Cofer an 

2Rule 404(b) was amended effective May 1, 2023, to, among other 

things, require the State to provide pretrial notice of its intent to 

introduce collateral-acts evidence regardless of whether notice is 

requested by the defendant.
CR-2023-0008

11

overnight recess so that he could familiarize himself with the evidence. 

Under these circumstances, any error in the State not providing pretrial 

notice was harmless. Cf. Ex parte Davis, 875 So. 2d 276, 278 (Ala. 2003) 

("Davis agreed that he had knowledge of the evidence contained in the 

State's file; therefore, even if we were to hold that the State erred in 

failing to respond officially to the Rule 404(b) notice request, the error 

was at most harmless."). 

As for the admissibility of the evidence, we conclude that it was 

relevant and admissible to show Cofer's motive and intent.

" '"Motive is an inducement, or that which 

leads or tempts the mind to do or commit the crime 

charged." Spicer v. State, 188 Ala. 9, 26, 65 So. 

972, 977 (1914). Motive is "that state of mind 

which works to 'supply the reason that nudges the 

will and prods the mind to indulge the criminal 

intent.'" C. Gamble, Character Evidence[: A 

Comprehensive Approach], at 42 [(1987)]. 

"Furthermore, testimony offered for the purpose of 

showing motive is always admissible. It is 

permissible in every criminal case to show that 

there was an influence, an inducement, operating 

on the accused, which may have led or tempted 

him to commit the offense." (Emphasis in original, 

citations omitted.) Bowden v. State, 538 So. 2d 

1226, 1235 (Ala. 1988).'"

Towles v. State, 168 So. 3d 133, 143 (Ala. 2014) (quoting Ex parte 

Register, 680 So. 2d 225, 227 (Ala. 1994)). In addition, an element of 
CR-2023-0008

12

voyeurism in the first degree is that the crime is committed "for the 

purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of any person." § 13A11-41(a), Ala. Code 1975.

As the State points out, the Texas Court of Appeals recently 

addressed a very similar issue in Mays v. State, (No. 05-21-01033-CR, 

Nov. 20, 2023) (Tex. Ct. App. 2023) (not reported in the Southwestern 

Reporter). There, the defendant was charged with continuous sexual 

abuse of a child, specifically, his daughter. Data extracted from the 

defendant's cell phone included "internet searches for 'dad' and 'daughter' 

pornography, 'teasing daddy' video views, and a 'frequently visited site' 

of 'free daughter' pornography." The Court upheld the admission of the 

Internet searches under the motive and intent exceptions to Rule 404(b), 

explaining:

"Mays was charged with continuous sexual abuse of a 

child. See TEX. PENAL CODE § 21.02(b), (c). 'Intent to 

arouse and gratify sexual desire' is an element of the predicate 

offense of indecency with a child, with which the trial court 

charged the jury. Id. § 21.11(a)(1), (c). The State may prove 

intent through circumstantial evidence. See Guevara v. 

State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Thus, the 

internet searches and frequently visited site history directed 

at 'dad,' 'daughter,' and 'free daughter porn,' were admissible 

under Rule 404(b)[, Texas R. Evid.,] because they tended to 

show Mays's intent or motive to arouse or gratify his sexual 

desire with his daughter. See Sarabia v. State, 227 S.W.3d 
CR-2023-0008

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320, 324 (Tex. App. -- Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref'd) (in 

defendant's trial for aggravated sexual assault of a child, 

images depicting child pornography compiled from 

defendant's computer discs were admissible under Rule 

404(b) because they tended to show intent or motive to arouse 

or gratify his sexual desire with underage boys); Wooley v. 

State, No. 05-09-00455-CR, (Tex. App. -- Dallas Dec. 30, 2010, 

no pet.) (not designated for publication) (child pornography 

photos found on defendant's computer were relevant 

circumstantial evidence of defendant's intent to arouse or 

gratify his sexual desire in trial for aggravated sexual assault 

of a child and thus admissible under Rule 404(b))."

Cofer's Internet searches on September 23, 2019, using the phrases 

"Pretty Girl Strips at Home," "Beautiful 19 Year Old Strips on Cam," and 

"Young College Girls" clearly evidence an inducement for Cofer, only 

three days later on September 26, 2019, to begin recording, in various 

stages of undress, the 19-year-old college student living next door to him, 

and create a reasonable inference that Cofer's purpose in making the 

recordings was to arouse or satisfy his sexual desire. Moreover, after 

thoroughly reviewing the record, we have no trouble concluding that the 

probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect. 

Therefore, the trial court did not err in allowing evidence of the Internet

searches.
CR-2023-0008

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II.

Cofer also contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion 

for a judgment of acquittal because, he says, the evidence was insufficient 

to sustain his convictions.

" '"In determining the sufficiency of the evidence to 

sustain a conviction, a reviewing court must accept as true all 

evidence introduced by the State, accord the State all 

legitimate inferences therefrom, and consider all evidence in 

a light most favorable to the prosecution."' Ballenger v. State, 

720 So. 2d 1033, 1034 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), quoting 

Faircloth v. State, 471 So. 2d 485, 488 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984), 

aff'd, 471 So. 2d 493 (Ala. 1985). '"The test used in 

determining the sufficiency of evidence to sustain a conviction 

is whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable 

to the prosecution, a rational finder of fact could have found 

the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."' Nunn v. 

State, 697 So. 2d 497, 498 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997), quoting 

O'Neal v. State, 602 So. 2d 462, 464 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992). 

'"When there is legal evidence from which the jury could, by 

fair inference, find the defendant guilty, the trial court should 

submit [the case] to the jury, and, in such a case, this court 

will not disturb the trial court's decision."' Farrior v. State, 

728 So. 2d 691, 696 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998), quoting Ward v. 

State, 557 So. 2d 848, 850 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990). 'The role of 

appellate courts is not to say what the facts are. Our role ... 

is to judge whether the evidence is legally sufficient to allow 

submission of an issue for decision [by] the jury.' Ex parte 

Bankston, 358 So. 2d 1040, 1042 (Ala. 1978)."

Gavin v. State, 891 So. 2d 907, 974 (Ala. Crim. App. 2003).

Section 13A-11-41(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides:
CR-2023-0008

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"A person commits the crime of voyeurism in the first 

degree if, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual 

desire of any person, he or she knowingly photographs or films 

the intimate areas of another person, whether through, 

under, or around clothing, without that person's knowledge 

and consent and under circumstances where the person has a 

reasonable expectation of privacy, whether in a public or 

private place."

"Intimate areas" are defined as "[a]ny portion of a person's body, whether 

or not covered by undergarments, that are traditionally covered by 

undergarments to protect that portion from public view, including 

genitals, pubic areas, buttocks, and female breasts." § 13A-11-40(a)(1), 

Ala. Code 1975. "Undergarments" are defined as "[a]rticles of clothing 

worn under clothing that conceal intimate areas from view." § 13A-11-

40(a)(3), Ala. Code 1975.

With respect to Counts I, II, and III of the indictment, Cofer argues 

that the State failed to prove that E.H. had a reasonable expectation of 

privacy in her bedroom. Specifically, he argues that the videos giving 

rise to these three charges were recorded from inside his own home, and 

the blinds in E.H.'s bedroom window were fully open, leaving her 

bedroom in plain view. According to Cofer, there was a clear line of sight 

into E.H.'s bedroom from the public parking area in front of the houses, 

and no reasonable person would "believe that a person had a reasonable 
CR-2023-0008

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expectation of privacy standing in front of an open window that was 

completely visible by a busy public parking lot." (Cofer's brief, p. 12.) 

This argument is meritless.

"The expectation of privacy reaches its zenith in the home." United 

States v. McKenzie, 13 F.4th 223, 235 (2nd Cir. 2021). "The very fact 

that a person is in his own home raises a reasonable inference that he 

intends to have privacy," United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138 (2d 

Cir. 1980), and the "ability to observe through open windows what 

happens inside a home does not altogether extinguish the homeowner's 

otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy in the home itself." United 

States v. Wells, 648 F.3d 671, 678 (8th Cir. 2011). In State v. Moser, 179 

Wash. App. 1040 (2014) (not reported in the Pacific Reporter), the 

Washington Court of Appeals found sufficient evidence to support a 

conviction for voyeurism under a statute similar to Alabama's where the 

victim had the lights on, the blinds open, and Christmas decorations 

around one window. The Court held that "leaving blinds open, leaving 

lights on, and decorating a window do not negate [one's] privacy interests 

in any material way." We are not required "to live in windowless 

mausoleums to preserve our privacy interests, and the mere existence of 
CR-2023-0008

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a window does not give license to anyone ... to peep through ... blinds or 

curtains." Holt v. Commonwealth, (No. 2015-CA-000985-MR, January 6, 

2017) (Ky. Ct. App. 2017) (not reported in the Southwestern Reporter). 

We agree.

Here, E.H.'s bedroom window was not at the front of the house, 

where anyone walking or driving by could see into her bedroom. Rather, 

it was on the side of the house, facing an area where people were not 

likely to congregate. Although her window faced the side of Cofer's house, 

which was about 15 feet away, a person does not forfeit the expectation 

of privacy simply by living next door to someone. In addition, we point 

out that, in the video giving rise to the charge in Count I of the 

indictment, E.H.'s blinds were partially closed, not fully open as Cofer 

contends. Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, as 

we must, we conclude that there was sufficient evidence from which the 

jury could have reasonably concluded that E.H. had a reasonable 

expectation of privacy in her bedroom, regardless of whether the blinds 

were open or closed. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Cofer's 

motion for a judgment of acquittal as to Counts I, II, and III of the 

indictment.
CR-2023-0008

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With respect to Count IV of the indictment, Cofer argues that the 

State failed to prove that he recorded E.H.'s intimate parts. According to 

Cofer, "[i]n the video, the alleged victim is seen twice and the only portion 

of her body visibly seen was her head and left shoulder." (Cofer's brief, 

pp. 13-14.) This argument fails to recognize that the charge in Count IV 

of the indictment was based on multiple videos recorded on October 13, 

2019, not just one. Although in one of the videos, only E.H.'s bare 

shoulder and neck are visible, two other videos depict E.H.'s breasts 

covered by a sports bra. As noted above, voyeurism in the first degree 

requires recording "the intimate areas of another person, whether 

through, under, or around clothing," § 13A-11-41(a), and "intimate parts" 

include "female breasts," "whether or not covered by undergarments."

§ 13A-11-40(a)(1) (emphasis added). Because two of the videos giving rise 

to the charge in Count IV of the indictment depicted E.H.'s breasts 

covered by a sports bra, the State proved that Cofer recorded E.H.'s 

intimate parts. Therefore, the trial court properly denied Cofer's motion 

for a judgment of acquittal as to Count IV of the indictment.
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III.

Although not mentioned by either party, we take notice that the 

probationary terms of Cofer's split sentences are illegal. It is well settled 

that "[m]atters concerning unauthorized sentences are jurisdictional." 

Hunt v. State, 659 So. 2d 998, 999 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994). Therefore, this 

Court may take notice of an illegal sentence "at any time and may do so 

even ex mero motu." Moore v. State, 40 So. 3d 750, 753 (Ala. Crim. App. 

2009). See also Ex parte McGowan, 346 So. 3d 10, 13 (Ala. 2021) ("This 

Court has routinely held that the imposition of a sentence in a criminal 

case that is not authorized by statute creates a jurisdictional defect that 

is nonwaivable and that can be raised at any time.").

Voyeurism in the first degree is a Class C felony. See § 13A-11-

41(b), Ala. Code 1975. At the time of the crimes, § 15-18-8(b), Ala. Code 

1975, provided,3 in relevant part:

"(b) Unless a defendant is sentenced to probation, drug 

court, or a pretrial diversion program, when a defendant is 

convicted of an offense that constitutes a Class C or D felony 

offense and receives a sentence of not more than 15 years, the 

judge presiding over the case shall order that the convicted 

defendant be confined in a prison, jail-type institution, 

3Generally, "[a] defendant's sentence is determined by the law in 

effect at the time of the commission of the offense." Davis v. State, 571 

So. 2d 1287, 1289 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990). 
CR-2023-0008

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treatment institution, or community corrections program for 

a Class C felony offense or in a consenting community 

corrections program for a Class D felony offense, except as 

provided in subsection (e), for a period not exceeding two years 

in cases where the imposed sentence is not more than 15 

years, and that the execution of the remainder of the sentence 

be suspended notwithstanding any provision of the law to the 

contrary and that the defendant be placed on probation for a 

period not exceeding three years and upon such terms as the 

court deems best."

(Emphasis added.) Although both the base sentences -- 10 years' 

imprisonment -- and the confinement portion of the sentences -- 117 days' 

and 1 year's imprisonment -- were legal, the 8-year probationary terms 

exceeded the maximum authorized by § 15-18-8(b).

Based on the foregoing, we affirm Cofer's convictions for four counts 

of voyeurism in the first degree. However, we remand this cause for the 

trial court to conduct another sentencing hearing, at which Cofer is 

entitled to be present and represented by counsel, and to impose 

probationary terms in accordance with § 15-18-8(b) as it read at the time 

of the crimes. Because both the base sentences and the confinement 

portions of the sentences were legal, they may not be changed. Due 

return shall be filed within 63 days of the date of this opinion and shall 

include a transcript of the sentencing hearing conducted on remand and 

the trial court's amended sentencing order.
CR-2023-0008

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AFFIRMED AS TO CONVICTIONS; REMANDED WITH 

INSTRUCTIONS AS TO SENTENCES.

Windom, P.J., and McCool, Cole, and Minor, JJ., concur.