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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37 

T.R. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF 

PENNSYLVANIA 

F.A.M., 

v. 

Appellant No. 2746 EDA 2016 

Appeal from the Order Entered August 2, 2016 

In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County 

Civil Division at No(s): 2016-PF-0767 

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and SOLANO, J. 

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED MAY 09, 2017 

Appellant, F.A.M., appeals from the August 2, 2016 Final Protection 

from Abuse Order, which restricted contact between Appellant and his ex - paramour, T.R. Upon careful review, we reverse. 

Appellant and Appellee have two children together and are currently 

involved in a custody dispute. On June 20, 2016, Appellee filed a Petition for 

Protection from Abuse ("PFA") Order against Appellant pursuant to the PFA 

Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§6101-6117 alleging that Appellant "keeps threatening my 

adult son over the phone and me too, to kill us and take away our house." 

PFA Petition, filed 7/20/16, at 3. On the same day, the trial court entered a 

Temporary PFA Order against Appellant pending a hearing. 

On August 2, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on Appellee's PFA 

Petition where both parties appeared pro se. At the hearing, Appellee 
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testified that on July 18, 2016, Appellant called her adult son on the 

telephone and said that he was going to kill Appellee. N.T., PFA Hearing, 

8/2/16, at 4. Appellee presented an additional witness, her adult son, 

G.A.V.C., who testified that Appellant and Appellee were in an argument 

regarding their 14 -year -old son when Appellant called G.A.V.C. on the 

telephone and threatened to kill Appellee during the course of their 

conversation. Id. at 6-7. 

In contrast, Appellant testified that he did speak to G.A.V.C. over the 

telephone, but he did not threaten Appellee and hasn't talked to Appellee in 

"five, six years." Id. at 8, 11. Appellant presented testimony from 

Appellant's aunt, G.S., who testified that, to her knowledge, Appellant had 

not spoken to Appellee in over five years and did not threaten Appellee. Id. 

at 10. 

On August 2, 2016, after the hearing, the trial court granted Appellee's 

PFA Petition and entered a Final PFA Order prohibiting Appellant from 

contact with Appellee for a period of three years, with the exception of 

discussing custody issues. This timely appeal followed.' 

Appellant raises the following issues on appeal: 

' On September 1, 2016, Appellant filed a notice of appeal. The trial court 

did not order Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). The trial court issued an opinion 

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on September 26, 2016. 

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1. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the evidence 

presented showed that [Appellant] was under reasonable fear of 

immediate serious bodily injury? 

2. Whether the trial court erred in accepting that the testimony of 

[G.A.V.C.] as [sic] credible when the witness continually 

admitted he was paraphrasing and offered statements counter to 

what he had testified to in the same hearing. 

3. Whether [Appellant]'s due process was violated when he was not 

permitted to cross[-]examine the witness who claimed the 

defendant threatened [Appellee]. 

4. Whether the trial court erred in determining that a final PFA 

should be issued for three years without any evidence that three 

years was necessary for the protection of [Appellee]. 

Appellant's Brief at 8-9 (some capitalization omitted). 

In his first issue presented, Appellant claims that the evidence 

presented was not sufficient to rise to the level of abuse as defined in the 

PFA Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6117. Appellant specifically avers that the 

evidence presented was insufficient to prove that Appellee was under 

reasonable fear of immediate serious bodily injury. Appellant's Brief at 14. 

We agree. 

Our standard of review is well settled: 

When a claim is presented on appeal that the evidence is not 

sufficient to support an order of protection from abuse, we 

review the evidence in the light most favorable to the petitioner 

and granting her the benefit of all reasonable inference, 

determine whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain the 

trial court's conclusion by a preponderance of the evidence. . . . This Court defers to the credibility determinations of the trial 

court as to witnesses who appeared before it. 

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Karch v. Karch, 885 A.2d 535, 536-37 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citations 

omitted). This Court has defined the preponderance of the evidence 

standard as "the greater weight of the evidence, i.e., to tip a scale slightly is 

the criteria or requirement for preponderance of the evidence." Raker v. 

Raker, 847 A.2d 720, 724 (Pa. Super. 2004). 

When a petitioner files a PFA Petition, the trial court has an obligation 

to schedule a hearing within ten days. 23 Pa.C.S. § 6107(a). At the 

hearing, the petitioner "must prove the allegation of abuse by a 

preponderance of the evidence." Id. The PFA Act defines the term "abuse" 

in pertinent part as: 

The occurrence of one or more of the following acts between 

family or household members, sexual or intimate partners or 

persons who share biological parenthood: 

* * * 

(2) Placing another in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily 

injury. 

23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a). When hearing evidence in a PFA case, "the court's 

objective is to determine whether the victim is in reasonable fear of 

imminent serious bodily injury[.]" Raker, supra at 725. The intent of the 

alleged abuser is "of no moment." Id. 

In the instant case, after viewing the evidence in the light most 

favorable to Appellee, we are constrained to find that there is insufficient 

evidence to justify the entry of a PFA Order. The record is devoid of any 

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evidence indicating that Appellee was in reasonable fear of imminent serious 

bodily injury as required by 23 Pa.C.S. § 6102(a). Appellee did not testify 

that she was fearful of Appellant or that she believed Appellant was going to 

harm her. Furthermore, neither Appellee nor G.A.V.C. testified as to how or 

when Appellee learned of Appellant's threat. Likewise, neither witness 

testified as to how Appellee reacted upon learning of the threat. There was 

simply no evidence presented that Appellee was in reasonable fear of 

imminent bodily harm. See Raker, supra at 725. 

The trial court opined: 

We found and still find Appellee's witness credible because of the 

manner and content of his testimony. We found and still find 

Appellant and his witness not credible as contrasted to Appellee's 

witness. Based upon these credibility findings, we find that 

Appellant did state to Appellee's son that he was going to kill 

Appellee. Thus, Appellant committed abuse as defined in 23 

Pa.C.S. § 6102. 

Trial Court Opinion, filed 9/26/16, at 3 (actual page 2). 

We defer to the credibility determinations of the trial court. See 

Karch, supra at 536-37. We recognize and are troubled that Appellant 

threatened to kill Appellee. However, absent any evidence that Appellee 

was in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury, we are constrained 

to reverse. In light of our disposition, we decline to address Appellant's 

remaining issues. 

Order reversed. 

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Judgment Entered. 

J seph D. Seletyn, 

Prothonotary 

Date: 5/9/2017 

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