1

SYLLABUS

This syllabus is not part of the Court’s opinion. It has been prepared by the Office of the 

Clerk for the convenience of the reader. It has been neither reviewed nor approved by the 

Court. In the interest of brevity, portions of an opinion may not have been summarized.

In the Matter of John J. Robertelli (D-126-19) (084373)

February 1, 2021 -- Decided September 21, 2021

ALBIN, J., writing for a unanimous Court.

The issue in this attorney disciplinary case is whether Respondent John Robertelli 

violated Rule of Professional Conduct (RPC) 4.2, which prohibits a lawyer from 

communicating with another lawyer’s client about the subject of the representation 

without the other lawyer’s consent. That ethical prohibition applies to any form of 

communication with a represented party by the adversary lawyer or that lawyer’s 

surrogate, whether in person, by telephone or email, or through social media. The Office 

of Attorney Ethics (OAE) brought disciplinary charges against Robertelli, asserting that 

he violated RPC 4.2 when his paralegal sent a Facebook message to, and was granted 

“friend” status by, Dennis Hernandez, who had filed an action against Robertelli’s client. 

The charged violation occurred more than a decade ago, when the workings of a newly 

established social media platform -- Facebook.com -- were not widely known.

In November 2007, Robertelli represented the Borough of Oakland and an 

Oakland police sergeant in a personal-injury lawsuit filed by Hernandez. In preparing a 

defense, Robertelli requested that Valentina Cordoba, a paralegal, conduct internet 

research into Hernandez’s academic and employment background, and any criminal 

history. As part of that research, Cordoba gained access to Hernandez’s private 

Facebook page when Hernandez designated her as a “friend.” At that time, Hernandez 

did not know that Cordoba was working for the law firm representing the parties he was 

suing.

Cordoba downloaded postings from Hernandez’s Facebook page that included a 

video showing Hernandez wrestling. The defense believed that the wrestling episode 

may have occurred after Hernandez’s accident. Robertelli forwarded to Hernandez’s 

attorney, Michael Epstein, the Facebook postings downloaded by Cordoba. In a letter to 

Robertelli, Epstein accused him of violating RPC 4.2.

In May 2010, Hernandez filed a grievance with the District Ethics Committee. 

The Secretary of the Committee, with the concurrence of a non-lawyer public member, 

concluded that Hernandez’s “grievance, even if proven, would not constitute unethical 

conduct,” and therefore declined to docket the grievance for full review.
2

In July 2010, Epstein wrote to ask the OAE Director to investigate the “unethical 

conduct” of Robertelli. The OAE conducted an investigation and filed a complaint 

against Robertelli alleging that he violated several RPCs. At an April 2018 hearing 

before a Special Master, the testimony highlighted that Facebook in 2008 was unknown 

terrain to many attorneys.

Cordoba testified that she had a Facebook page, which did not identify her as a 

paralegal at Robertelli’s firm. She monitored Hernandez’s Facebook page, which at first 

was open to the public, and she reported to Robertelli about the public postings. But 

Hernandez’s Facebook page later turned private, and she told Robertelli she no longer 

had access without sending a “friend” request. Cordoba claimed that Robertelli 

eventually gave her the green light to send Hernandez “a general message” and to 

proceed to monitor Hernandez’s Facebook page. She believed, however, that despite her 

efforts to explain Facebook to Robertelli, he did not grasp the significance of a “friend” 

request. Cordoba, via Facebook, then forwarded Hernandez a message stating that he 

looked like one of her favorite hockey players, and Hernandez sent her a “friend” request.

Hernandez testified that his Facebook page was private -- and never public --

during the lawsuit and that Cordoba sent him a “friend” request, which he accepted. 

Because Hernandez deleted his Facebook page during the lawsuit and before he filed his 

ethics grievance, his Facebook records were not produced at the hearing to credit either 

Cordoba’s or Hernandez’s version of events.

Robertelli testified that in 2008 he had been practicing law for approximately 

eighteen years and did not know much about Facebook. He did not know that a 

Facebook page had different privacy settings or what it meant to be a Facebook “friend.” 

He believed that the information posted on the internet, including Facebook, was “for the 

world to see.” He denied directing Cordoba to “friend” Hernandez or to contact or send a 

message to him. He recalled advising Cordoba to monitor whether Hernandez was 

placing information about the lawsuit on the internet. He said he had no understanding 

that Cordoba was communicating directly or indirectly with Hernandez.

The Special Master concluded that the OAE failed to prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that Robertelli violated the RPCs. The Special Master determined

that Robertelli, “an attorney with an unblemished record and a reputation for integrity and 

professionalism,” reasonably believed that his paralegal was merely exploring “publicly 

available information for material useful to his client” while his young paralegal, 

experienced in social networking, “was unaware of potentially applicable ethical 

strictures.” In concluding that Robertelli “proceeded at all times in good faith,” the 

Special Master dismissed in their entirety the charges in the disciplinary complaint.

Following a de novo review of the record, six members of the Disciplinary Review 

Board (DRB) determined that Robertelli violated the RPCs.
3

HELD: *After conducting a de novo review of the record and affording deference 

to the credibility findings of the Special Master, the Court concludes that the OAE has 

failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Robertelli violated the RPCs. 

The disciplinary charges must therefore be dismissed.

*Attorneys should know that they may not communicate with a represented 

party about the subject of the representation -- through social media or in any other 

manner -- either directly or indirectly without the consent of the party’s lawyer. Today, 

social media is ubiquitous, a common form of communication among members of the 

public. Attorneys must acquaint themselves with the nature of social media to guide 

themselves and their non-lawyer staff and agents in the permissible uses of online 

research. At this point, attorneys cannot take refuge in the defense of ignorance. The 

Court refers this issue and any related issues to the Advisory Committee on Professional 

Ethics for further study and for consideration of amendments to the RPCs.

1. As of early 2008, Robertelli did not know how Facebook functioned, did not know 

about its privacy settings, and did not know the language of Facebook, such as 

“friending.” And no jurisdiction had issued a reported ethics opinion giving guidance on 

the issue before the Court -- whether sending a “friend” request to a represented client 

without the consent of the client’s attorney constitutes a communication on the subject of 

the representation in violation of RPC 4.2. The absence of ethical guidance at that time 

evidently reflected that Facebook had yet to become the familiar social media platform 

that it is today in the legal community. Further, the Court gives due regard to the Special 

Master’s credibility findings based on his careful observation of the witness testimony 

unfolding before his eyes. In the end, based on an independent review of the record, the 

Court finds that the OAE has not met its burden of proving the disciplinary charges

against Robertelli by clear and convincing evidence. (pp. 26-32)

2. Robertelli may have had a good faith misunderstanding about the nature of Facebook 

in 2008, but there should be no lack of clarity today about the professional strictures 

guiding attorneys in the use of Facebook and other similar social media platforms. When 

represented Facebook users fix their privacy settings to restrict information to “friends,” 

lawyers cannot attempt to communicate with them to gain access to that information, 

without the consent of the user’s counsel. Both sending a “friend” request and enticing or 

cajoling the represented client to send one are prohibited forms of conduct under RPC 

4.2, as other jurisdictions have determined under their own rules of court. (pp. 32-35)

3. Lawyers should now know where the ethical lines are drawn. Lawyers must educate 

themselves about commonly used forms of social media to avoid the scenario that arose 

in this case. The defense of ignorance will not be a safe haven. And the Court reminds

the bar that attorneys are responsible for the conduct of the non-lawyers in their employ 

or under their direct supervision. Under RPC 5.3, attorneys must make reasonable 

efforts to ensure that their surrogates -- including investigators or paralegals -- do not 
4

communicate with a represented client, without the consent of the client’s attorney, to 

gain access to a private Facebook page or private information on a similar social media 

platform. (pp. 35-36)

4. The Court refers to the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics, for further 

consideration, the issues raised in this opinion. After its review, the Committee shall 

advise the Court whether it recommends any additional social media guidelines or 

amendments to the RPCs consistent with this opinion. (p. 36)

The disciplinary charges against Respondent are DISMISSED.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, 

FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE 

ALBIN’s opinion.
1

SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY

D-126 September Term 2019

084373

In the Matter of

John J. Robertelli, 

an Attorney at Law

On an order to show cause why respondent

should not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined.

Argued

February 1, 2021

Decided

September 21, 2021

Steven J. Zweig, Deputy Ethics Counsel, argued the 

cause on behalf of the Office of Attorney Ethics (Steven 

J. Zweig, on the briefs).

Michael S. Stein argued the cause on behalf of 

respondent (Pashman Stein Walder Hayden, attorneys;

Michael S. Stein and Janie Byalik, on the briefs).

JUSTICE ALBIN delivered the opinion of the Court.

Our Rules of Professional Conduct (RPCs) generally prohibit a lawyer 

from communicating with another lawyer’s client about the subject of the 

representation without the other lawyer’s consent. RPC 4.2. That ethical 

prohibition applies to any form of communication with a represented party by 

the adversary lawyer or that lawyer’s surrogate, whether in person, by 
2

telephone or email, or through social media. Although it is fair game for the 

adversary lawyer to gather information from the public realm, such as 

information that a party exposes to the public online, it is not ethical for the

lawyer -- through a communication -- to coax, cajole, or charm an adverse 

represented party into revealing what that person has chosen to keep private.

The issue in this attorney disciplinary case is the application of that

seemingly clear ethical rule to a time, more than a decade ago, when the 

workings of a newly established social media platform -- Facebook.com --

were not widely known. In 2008, Facebook -- then in its infancy -- had 

recently expanded its online constituency from university and high school 

students to the general public. A Facebook user could post information on a 

profile page open to the general public or, by adjusting the privacy settings,

post information in a private domain accessible only to the universe of the 

user’s “friends.”

Respondent John Robertelli represented a public entity and public 

employee in a personal-injury action brought by Dennis Hernandez. During 

the course of internet research, Robertelli’s paralegal forwarded a flattering

message to Hernandez, and Hernandez unwittingly granted her “friend” status, 

giving her access to his personal private information.
3

As a result, the Office of Attorney Ethics (OAE) brought disciplinary 

charges against attorney Robertelli for a violation of RPC 4.2 and other RPCs. 

The matter proceeded before a Special Master, who heard three days of 

testimony in 2018. Robertelli testified that he had little knowledge or 

understanding of Facebook at the time and never knowingly authorized his 

paralegal to communicate with Hernandez to secure information that was not 

publicly available. The Special Master found that the conflicting testimony 

between Robertelli and his paralegal about the exact nature of their

conversations a decade earlier was the product of the natural dimming of 

memories due to the passage of time. The Special Master, in particular, found 

that Robertelli in 2008 did not have an understanding of Facebook’s privacy

settings or Facebook-speak, such as “friending.” The Special Master held that 

the OAE did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that Robertelli 

violated the RPCs and dismissed the charges.

The Disciplinary Review Board split, with six members voting to sustain 

the charges against Robertelli (four in favor of an admonition and two in favor 

of a censure) and three members voting to dismiss the charges.

After conducting a de novo review of the record and affording deference 

to the credibility findings of the Special Master, we conclude that the OAE has 
4

failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Robertelli violated the 

RPCs. The disciplinary charges must therefore be dismissed.

We add the following. Attorneys should know that they may not 

communicate with a represented party about the subject of the representation --

through social media or in any other manner -- either directly or indirectly

without the consent of the party’s lawyer. Today, social media is ubiquitous, a 

common form of communication among members of the public. Attorneys 

must acquaint themselves with the nature of social media to guide themselves 

and their non-lawyer staff and agents in the permissible uses of online 

research. At this point, attorneys cannot take refuge in the defense of

ignorance. We refer this issue and any related issues to the Advisory

Committee on Professional Ethics for further study and for consideration of 

amendments to our RPCs.

I.

A.

We rely on the record developed before the Special Master. We begin 

with the facts that are not in dispute.

In November 2007, Robertelli, a partner at the law firm of Rivkin 

Radler, LLP, represented the Borough of Oakland and an Oakland Police 

Department sergeant in a personal-injury lawsuit filed in Superior Court by 
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Dennis Hernandez. Hernandez claimed that while he was doing push-ups in 

the police station’s parking lot, the sergeant’s vehicle struck him, causing

permanent physical injuries and the loss of an athletic scholarship.

In preparing a defense, Robertelli requested that Valentina Cordoba, a 

paralegal in the firm, conduct internet research into Hernandez’s academic and

employment background, and any criminal history. As part of that research, 

Cordoba gained access to Hernandez’s private Facebook page when Hernandez 

designated her as a “friend.” At that time, Hernandez did not know that 

Cordoba was working for the law firm representing the parties he was suing. 

Cordoba downloaded postings from Hernandez’s Facebook page that included 

a video showing Hernandez wrestling with his brother. The defense believed 

that the wrestling episode may have occurred after Hernandez’s accident.

With that information in hand, Gabriel Adamo, an associate at Rivkin 

Radler, deposed Hernandez. Afterwards, Robertelli forwarded to Hernandez’s 

attorney, Michael Epstein, the Facebook postings downloaded by Cordoba. In

a letter to Robertelli, Epstein accused him of violating RPC 4.2 by 

communicating with his client, through Facebook, without his consent about 

the subject of the representation. Hernandez would later testify that the 

wrestling video downloaded by Cordoba predated his accident and had been 

posted by a “friend.”
6

The Superior Court judge assigned to the case barred the use of the 

Facebook postings because the information was disclosed after the end date for 

the completion of discovery but made no finding of an ethical violation, as 

urged by Epstein.

In May 2010, Hernandez filed a grievance with the District II-B Ethics 

Committee, alleging that Robertelli and Adamo violated the RPCs by having 

their paralegal directly contact him through Facebook without the consent of 

his counsel. The Secretary of the District Ethics Committee, with the 

concurrence of a non-lawyer public member, concluded that Hernandez’s 

“grievance, even if proven, would not constitute unethical conduct,” and 

therefore declined to docket the grievance for full review by the Committee. 

See R. 1:20-3(e)(3).

By letter, on July 30, 2010, Epstein asked the OAE Director to 

investigate the “unethical conduct” of both Robertelli and Adamo. Epstein 

claimed that, during a lawsuit and without his consent, the two attorneys 

“directly contacted” his client through their paralegal who -- without 

disclosing her position -- requested that the client “friend” her, allowing her to 

access his private Facebook page.

The OAE conducted an investigation and, in November 2011, filed a

complaint against Robertelli and Adamo, alleging violations of RPC 4.2 
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(communicating with a person represented by counsel); RPC 5.1(b) and (c) 

(failure to supervise a subordinate lawyer -- charged only against Robertelli); 

RPC 5.3(a), (b), and (c) (failure to supervise a non-lawyer assistant); RPC

8.4(a) (violation of the RPCs by inducement or through the acts of another); 

RPC 8.4(c) (conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation); 

and RPC 8.4(d) (conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice).

In January 2012, Robertelli and Adamo answered the complaint, 

asserting that they acted in good faith and committed no unethical conduct. 

Robertelli admitted that he asked Cordoba “to perform a broad and general 

internet search regarding Hernandez” in defending the personal-injury action. 

But he explained that he did not “understand how Facebook worked” at the 

time and believed that “Cordoba was accessing information that was publicly 

available” by clicking “the ‘friend’ button.” Robertelli apologized for any 

error committed through inadvertence and denied engaging in any knowing or 

purposeful misconduct.

Robertelli and Adamo then requested that the OAE withdraw its 

complaint in light of the District Ethics Committee’s decision not to file 

charges. When the OAE refused to do so, Robertelli and Adamo filed an 

action in Superior Court seeking a declaration that the OAE Director lacked 

authority to review the District Ethics Committee’s decision. See Robertelli v. 
8

OAE, 224 N.J. 470, 475 (2016). The trial court dismissed the action because 

the New Jersey Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction over attorney 

disciplinary matters, and the Appellate Division affirmed. Id. at 476.

We held that, although the OAE Director does not have appellate 

authority to override a District Ethics Committee decision declining to docket 

a grievance, the Director does have the independent power, under our court 

rules, to investigate and bring disciplinary charges against an attorney -- and to 

prosecute those charges. Id. at 486-91. We added that “[w]e anticipate that 

the Director will use that power sparingly to address novel and serious 

allegations of unethical conduct.” Id. at 490. We also noted that “[t]his matter 

presents a novel ethical issue” and that “[n]o reported case law in our State 

addresses the question.” Id. at 487.

B.

In March 2017, this Court appointed Michael Kingman to serve as the 

Special Master in this case. During three consecutive days in April 2018, the 

Special Master heard testimony about the circumstances surrounding 

Cordoba’s gaining access to Hernandez’s Facebook page, about Robertelli’s 

knowledge of Facebook, and about his conversations with and supervision of 

Cordoba a decade earlier. The passage of time challenged the memories of the 
9

witnesses, and the Special Master attempted to make sense of the conflicting 

accounts.

A short primer on Facebook, its growth in the world of social media, and 

the public and private information made available by its users will be helpful 

in elucidating the issues before us.1

1.

Facebook is a social media platform on the internet that permits users to 

post and share information, including messages, articles, and other writings; 

photographs; and video recordings. Users can share information either with 

the general public or, by setting privacy restrictions, with a more limited 

audience, such as Facebook “friends.” A Facebook “friend” is not a friend in 

the colloquial sense. Any person granted access to the more privately guarded 

information by the user is deemed a “friend” in the language of Facebook. A 

person becomes a Facebook “friend” either by sending the user a “friend”

request that the user accepts by the click of a button, or by receiving a “friend” 

request from the user that the person accepts by the click of a button. 

1

 “Social media” is defined as “forms of electronic communication (such as 

websites for social networking and microblogging) through which users create 

online communities to share information, ideas, personal messages, and other 

content (such as videos).” Social Media, Merriam-Webster, https://www.

merriam-webster.com/dictionary/social%20media (last visited Aug. 4, 2021).
10

Information restricted to Facebook “friends” is not available to the general 

public.

Facebook was launched in 2004 to a limited scope of users -- college and 

university students and later high school students.2 Not until the latter part of

2006 was Facebook membership opened to the general public. 3 In July 2007, 

Facebook had 30 million users worldwide;4in August 2008, 100 million 

users;5and as of June 2021, 2.9 billion users.6

In 2008, only fifteen percent of lawyers who responded to the American 

Bar Association’s Legal Technology Survey reported personally maintaining a 

2

 Alexis C. Madrigal, Before It Conquered the World, Facebook Conquered 

Harvard, The Atlantic (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/

archive/2019/02/and-then-there-was-thefacebookcom/582004.

3

 Our History, Facebook, https://about.facebook.com/company-info (last 

visited Aug. 4, 2021).

4

 Sarah Phillips, A Brief History of Facebook, The Guardian (July 25, 2007), 

https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2007/jul/25/media.newmedia.

5

 Associated Press, Number of Active Users at Facebook over the Years, 

yahoo!news (May 1, 2013), https://news.yahoo.com/number-active-usersfacebook-over-230449748.html.

6

 Press Release, Facebook, Facebook Reports Second Quarter 2021 Results

(July 28, 2021), https://investor.fb.com/investor-news/press-release-details/

2021/Facebook-Reports-Second-Quarter-2021-Results.
11

presence on social media.7 In contrast, by 2020, seventy-seven percent of 

lawyers reported using social media for professional purposes.8

The testimony at the hearing before the Special Master highlighted that 

Facebook in 2008 was unknown terrain to many attorneys. In line with that 

assessment, Cordoba stated that “Facebook was in its infancy” in 2008, that 

Robertelli did not understand Facebook’s “terminology” or the privacy settings 

for a Facebook page, and that his overall comprehension on the subject was 

“maybe a two” out of ten.

Robertelli testified that in 2008 he did not have a social media account 

and had a “[m]inimum” understanding of Facebook. His associate, Gabriel 

Adamo, similarly stated that he did not know “what it meant to be a friend on 

Facebook” and thought Facebook was another venue for information generally 

available on the internet. Even Hernandez’s counsel, Michael Epstein,

admitted that he was “relatively unfamiliar with Facebook at that time” and did 

not recall having a Facebook profile.

7

 Reginald Davis, Getting Personal, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 2, 2009), 

https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/getting_personal.

8

 Allison C. Shields Johs, 2020 Websites & Marketing, A.B.A. (Nov. 9, 2020), 

https://www.americanbar.org/groups/law_practice/publications/techreport/

2020/webmarketing.
12

With that background in mind, we turn to the critical testimony in this 

disciplinary matter.

2.

Cordoba testified that while she did general internet research on the 

Hernandez personal-injury case for Robertelli in 2008, she had a Facebook 

page -- the same one she had before she graduated from college in 2004. The 

page did not identify her as a paralegal at Rivkin Radler. As a Facebook user, 

she monitored Hernandez’s Facebook page, which at first was open to the 

public and then turned private. She reported to Robertelli about the public 

postings. But when Hernandez’s Facebook page turned private, she told

Robertelli she no longer had access without sending Hernandez a “friend” 

request. She recalled Robertelli telling her to hold off sending the request

until he checked with the insurance adjuster. But she was uncertain whether 

Robertelli understood the mechanics of Facebook, the privacy settings for a 

Facebook page, or the meaning of a “friend” request. Cordoba claimed that, 

after Robertelli checked with the adjuster, he gave her the green light to send 

Hernandez “a general message” and to proceed to monitor Hernandez’s 

Facebook page. She believed, however, despite her efforts to explain

Facebook to Robertelli, he did not grasp the significance of a “friend” request.
13

Cordoba, via Facebook, then forwarded Hernandez a message stating 

that he looked like one of her favorite hockey players. Hernandez responded 

with some flirtatious messages -- to which Cordoba did not reply -- and sent 

her a “friend” request, which she accepted. Cordoba then gained access to

Hernandez’s private Facebook page as one of his six-hundred-plus “friends.”

Hernandez gave a different account from Cordoba’s. Hernandez 

testified that his Facebook page was private -- and never public -- during the 

lawsuit. Hernandez stated that Cordoba sent him a “friend” request, which he 

accepted. Afterwards, according to Hernandez, he messaged Cordoba, asking 

her who she was, and she replied that he looked like her favorite hockey 

player. Because Hernandez deleted his Facebook page during the lawsuit and 

before he filed his ethics grievance, his Facebook records were not produced at 

the hearing to credit either Cordoba’s or Hernandez’s version of events.

Robertelli testified that in 2008 he had been practicing law for 

approximately eighteen years and was the attorney responsible for the defense 

in the Hernandez case. According to Robertelli, at the time that he asked 

Cordoba to conduct internet research, he did not know much about Facebook. 

He did not know that a Facebook page had different privacy settings or what it 

meant to be a Facebook “friend.” He believed that the information Hernandez 

posted, or others posted, on the internet, including Facebook, was “for the 
14

world to see.” He denied directing Cordoba to “friend” Hernandez or to 

contact or send a message to him. He recalled advising Cordoba to monitor 

whether Hernandez was placing information about the lawsuit on the internet. 

He also remembered that, during a brief conversation, Cordoba told him that 

Hernandez’s Facebook “information is now in a different area that [she could]

access by the click of a button.” Cordoba described the website as “the 

equivalent of . . . posting something on a bulletin board”; she did not say that 

Hernandez’s Facebook privacy settings were changed from public to private or 

that she had to send him a “friend” request. Robertelli admitted that he told 

Cordoba at first to wait until he spoke with Dawn Mulligan, head of claims and 

risk management of the Bergen County Municipal Joint Insurance Fund,

9

and

then afterward to “[c]lick on the button and continue to monitor the site.” But, 

he said, he had no understanding that Cordoba was communicating directly or 

indirectly with Hernandez.

Only after Robertelli released the information downloaded from 

Hernandez’s Facebook page in discovery and Epstein charged him with

violating the RPCs did Robertelli learn that Cordoba had directly contacted

Hernandez. By then, Cordoba had joined another law firm in the same 

9

 The Joint Insurance Fund retained Robertelli to represent the Borough of 

Oakland.
15

building as Rivkin Radler. In the building cafeteria, Robertelli encountered 

Cordoba, and the two conversed about the Hernandez case. At that point, for 

the first time, Cordoba told Robertelli that she had sent a message to 

Hernandez.

C.

After hearing three days of testimony and reviewing numerous exhibits,

the Special Master issued a forty-eight-page report in which he concluded that 

the OAE failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that Robertelli 

violated the RPCs as alleged in the complaint.

10

 The Special Master made the 

following findings by clear and convincing evidence:

1. “[Robertelli] was ignorant as to the nature and extent of information 

available on the internet, and proceeded under the misimpression that” what 

Hernandez posted was available “for viewing by the world.”

2. “[Robertelli] had no knowledge or understanding of social 

networking privacy settings or ‘friend’ requests.”

3. Cordoba, a young paralegal, knowledgeable about Facebook from her 

days as a student, did not educate Robertelli about the new information-sharing 

10

 The OAE dismissed the charges against Adamo, Robertelli’s associate, at 

the conclusion of its case.
16

technology because -- through no fault of her own -- “she did not understand 

that to be part of her job.”

4. Cordoba engaged in what she viewed as normal research practice, 

accessed information, and reported the results to Robertelli.

5. Robertelli viewed the material supplied by Cordoba as if it had been 

taken off a “bulletin board” on which it had been posted.

6. Robertelli believed that “people sometimes published information 

about themselves on the internet for the world at large to see, and that looking 

at that information was part of the due diligence required in handling a 

lawsuit.”

7. Robertelli had “a few brief conversations” with Cordoba instructing 

her “to ‘monitor’ the Hernandez postings.”

Given the novelty of Facebook, the Special Master also could not find by 

clear and convincing evidence that “[Robertelli] knew or should have known 

what . . . ‘friending’ meant,” and concluded that the Facebook nomenclature 

“was in effect a foreign language to [Robertelli], as it would have been to most 

lawyers” at the time.

The Special Master made credibility findings as well. He expressed 

“serious doubts about the accuracy of much of the testimony at the hearing, 

particularly that of Cordoba,” primarily because of the passage of time. He 
17

noted that Cordoba’s “uncertain recollection” needed to be refreshed at various 

times and concluded that “[h]er interpretation today of a few brief 

conversations with [Robertelli]” could “hardly be relied upon to meet” the 

clear-and-convincing-evidence standard.11 Indeed, he emphasized that no 

“definitive conclusions” could be reasonably drawn “from fragments of a 

conversation partially recalled from ten years earlier.”

The Special Master observed that Robertelli’s instruction to Cordoba to

put on hold the research until he checked with the insurance adjuster logically 

suggested that Robertelli needed to secure the insurer’s financial commitment 

to cover such work. The Special Master also indicated that the failure of 

Hernandez’s counsel -- the grievant -- to preserve his client’s “Facebook 

settings and contents” hobbled the factfinding process. For example, the 

information, if not deleted, would have revealed whether Hernandez’s 

Facebook page, at first, was open to the public and whether Hernandez or 

Cordoba initiated the “friend” request.

In the end, the Special Master determined, by clear and convincing 

evidence, that Robertelli, “an attorney with an unblemished record and a 

11

 The Special Master gave Cordoba her due, stating that “she tried to be 

[truthful]” in her testimony during which “she was afflicted with laryngitis and 

a severe cold.” We do not believe that the Special Master was suggesting that 

Cordoba was not credible because she was under the weather.
18

reputation for integrity and professionalism,” reasonably believed that his 

paralegal was merely exploring “publicly available information for material 

useful to his client” while his young paralegal, experienced in social 

networking, “was unaware of potentially applicable ethical strictures.” In 

concluding that Robertelli “proceeded at all times in good faith,” the Special 

Master dismissed in their entirety the charges in the disciplinary complaint.

Last, the Special Master recommended that this Court adopt a rule “that 

attorneys may not directly or indirectly friend someone represented by counsel 

without the knowledge and consent of such counsel.”

D.

Following a de novo review of the record, six members of the 

Disciplinary Review Board (DRB) determined that Robertelli violated three 

RPCs. They concluded that the “facts” supported the findings that (1) 

Robertelli directed Cordoba to “communicate[] with a party represented by 

counsel, about the litigation, in violation of RPC 4.2”; (2) Robertelli failed to 

make reasonable efforts to ensure that a nonlawyer under his supervision acted 

in accordance with his own professional obligations and additionally

“‘ratified’ the misconduct by attempting to use the fruits of Cordoba’s 

surveillance in the underlying litigation,” in violation of RPC 5.3(a), (b), and 

(c); and (3) Cordoba’s “misrepresentation by silence or omission” to gain 
19

access to Hernandez’s Facebook page is imputed to Robertelli, constituting a 

violation of RPC 8.4(c).12

Four of those six DRB members -- the plurality -- voted to impose an 

admonition, and the other two members, writing a separate opinion, voted to 

impose a censure. Three other DRB members, in two separate opinions, voted 

to dismiss all the disciplinary charges. The four opinions issued reflect the 

different story lines accepted by the DRB members.

1.

The plurality rejected what it viewed as the Special Master’s finding that 

Cordoba was “less credible because she was sick during her testimony” or 

because she needed to have her memory refreshed with statements she made 

earlier. The plurality stated that “[t]his is the rare instance where we do not 

accept a credibility determination made by a trier of fact.”

The plurality independently determined that “Cordoba’s version” of her 

conversation with Robertelli concerning the Facebook research “is likely more 

credible than [his].” The plurality did not accept Robertelli’s reasons for 

telling Cordoba to “hold off” doing further research. According to the 

plurality, it was “a stretch to believe that, as [Robertelli] recalls, Cordoba 

12

 The DRB dismissed the RPC 5.1(b) and (c) and RPC 8.4(a) and (d) charges.
20

never used the words ‘public’ or ‘private’ to explain the change” in 

Hernandez’s Facebook settings or that “the privacy component [was] so 

esoteric that an attorney cannot fathom what it means in the context of a 

nascent technology.”

In short, in assessing credibility, the plurality rejected Robertelli’s 

account and maintained that “[i]gnorance cannot be used as a shield.”

2.

The two other members in favor of imposing discipline voted for a 

censure. In a dissenting opinion, they stated that “[Robertelli] failed to 

supervise his assistant when he knew, without question, that she was, at his 

instruction, trying to make contact with an adverse represented person.” 

(emphasis added). They clearly did not find Robertelli credible in coming to 

their conclusion.

3.

Two DRB members, who voted to dismiss the disciplinary complaint, 

were unwilling to “second guess” the conclusions of the Special Master “who 

had the opportunity to observe the testimony and evaluate the credibility of the 

witnesses.” Those two members gave great weight to three “undisputed” facts 

on which the Special Master rested his decision: Cordoba “did not explain to 

[Robertelli] the various privacy settings on Facebook or explain to him how 
21

the settings on that account changed at some point from public to quasiprivate”; Robertelli was “technologically unsophisticated,” “never had a 

Facebook page,” and primarily “communicated with his staff in person or by 

telephone”; and “Cordoba and [Robertelli] testified that [Robertelli] never 

directed Cordoba to contact Hernandez or send any kind of message to him.” 

Those DRB members highlighted (1) “the conflicting testimony [and] the 

changed recollection of witnesses” over the course of the investigation, 

(2) “Hernandez’s deletion of his Facebook page,” and (3) “the flimsy, almost 

non-existent evidence that [Robertelli] had meaningful knowledge of the 

workings of an embryonic Facebook in 2008.” In their view, the OAE failed 

to prove an RPC violation by clear and convincing evidence.

4.

Another DRB member who voted to dismiss the complaint took the 

position that Cordoba’s communication to Hernandez “did not relate to the 

subject of the lawsuit” and, on that basis alone, concluded that Robertelli did 

not violate RPC 4.2. That member questioned whether the information on 

Hernandez’s Facebook page -- shared with “600 other people with no 

confidential relationship to [him] or his counsel” -- was private. From that 

vantage point, the DRB member did not consider that a “potentially damaging 

video, placed in the public domain by a [‘friend’ of Hernandez], implicated an 
22

attorney-client communication.” He concluded that “the majority decision 

would allow RPC 4.2 and RPC 8.4(c) to function as a defensive weapon 

inhibiting the truth-seeking process.”

E.

Robertelli filed a petition for review challenging the DRB majority’s

finding that he violated the RPCs and the DRB plurality’s decision to impose 

an admonition. The OAE filed a cross-petition challenging the DRB 

plurality’s imposition of an admonition.13 We elected to review this matter on 

our own motion and issued an order to show cause “why [Robertelli] should 

not be disbarred or otherwise disciplined.” See R. 1:20-16(b) (“The Court 

may, on its own motion, decide to review any determination of the Board 

where disbarment has not been recommended.”).

II.

A.

Robertelli urges this Court to accept the credibility findings made by the 

Special Master and to dismiss the disciplinary charges that have cast a cloud 

over his professional reputation for over a decade. He claims that the DRB, in 

addition to improvidently casting aside the Special Master’s credibility 

13

 The OAE also cross-petitioned for review of the DRB’s dismissal of the 

RPC 8.4(d) charge.
23

findings, did not give sufficient weight to Facebook’s recent emergence on the 

social media scene in 2008, to Robertelli’s unfamiliarity with the nature of 

Facebook and its terminology, and to the lack of ethical guidance on the issue 

before us. What may seem obvious to many today, Robertelli implores, should 

not be imputed to his limited understanding of social media in 2008.

B.

The OAE asks this Court to follow the DRB’s decision to impose 

discipline on Robertelli for violating RPCs 4.2, 5.3, and 8.4(c) -- and, despite 

the DRB’s dismissal of the RPC 8.4(d) charge, to find that Robertelli engaged 

in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice by attempting to gain a 

litigation advantage through the use of the improperly obtained wrestling 

video. The OAE chides Robertelli for his lack of remorse and for blaming 

Hernandez for accepting Cordoba’s “friend” request. The OAE reasons that 

Hernandez had no duty to investigate the identity of Cordoba but that 

Robertelli had an ethical obligation to supervise his paralegal, regardless of the 

novelty of Facebook, and not to communicate with a represented party. The 

OAE recommends the imposition of a reprimand.

III.

The ethical charges filed against Robertelli have drawn varied responses 

from the disciplinary authorities: the District Ethics Committee declined to 
24

docket the charges; the Special Master dismissed the charges after hearing 

three days of testimony; and the DRB issued four opinions, one in favor of

imposing an admonition, another in favor of imposing a censure, and two in 

favor of dismissing the charges. As the final body to review this more-thandecade-long case, we start at a familiar place -- our standard of review.

In reviewing an attorney disciplinary determination de novo, as required 

by Rule 1:20-16(c), we must independently examine the record to determine 

whether an ethical violation is supported by clear and convincing evidence. In 

re Pena, 162 N.J. 15, 17 (1999). The DRB is governed by the same standard of 

review. See R. 1:20-15(e)(3).

The record in this case was developed during three days of testimony 

before a special master who heard from multiple witnesses, particularly those 

who played key roles in the events that led to the OAE’s filing of charges 

against Robertelli. Similar to our de novo review of a judicial disciplinary 

proceeding, here we must give “due” though “not controlling” deference to the 

Special Master’s conclusions based on his “assessment of the demeanor and 

credibility of witnesses.” See In re Subryan, 187 N.J. 139, 145 (2006) 

(quoting In re Disciplinary Procedures of Phillips, 117 N.J. 567, 579-80 

(1990)); see also In re Alcantara, 144 N.J. 257, 264 (1995) (agreeing with the 

District Ethics Committee’s determination that witnesses were credible and 
25

noting “[t]he [District Ethics Committee] observed the witnesses’ demeanor”); 

In re Norton, 128 N.J. 520, 535 (1992) (“We agree generally with the [District 

Ethics Committee’s] analysis of the events, which is based primarily on its 

assessment of the witnesses’ credibility.”). However, when the credibility 

findings are not fairly supported by the record, we owe no deference and may 

reject those findings. See Subryan, 187 N.J. at 145.

The plurality and dissenting DRB opinions acknowledged the deference 

owed to the credibility findings of the Special Master but differed on whether 

deference should be afforded to those findings in this case.

Although we are the final triers of fact in a disciplinary matter, a special 

master’s credibility findings are generally entitled to some level of deference. 

That is so because, as an appellate court, we are left to survey the landscape of 

a cold record. We recognize that a special master has “the opportunity to 

make first-hand credibility judgments about the witnesses who appear[ed] on 

the stand,” see DYFS v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 104 (2008), and “to assess their

believability” based on human factors indiscernible in a transcript: the level of 

certainty or uncertainty expressed in a vocal response, the degree of eye 

contact, whether an answer to a question is strained or easily forthcoming, and 

so many other indicia available only by actual observation of the witness, see

Jastram v. Kruse, 197 N.J. 216, 230 (2008).
26

At every point in this disciplinary process -- before the Special Master, 

the DRB, and this Court -- the OAE has had the burden of proving by clear and 

convincing evidence that Robertelli committed a violation of the RPCs charged 

in the complaint. See In re Helmer, 237 N.J. 70, 88 (2019); R. 1:20-

6(c)(2)(B), (C). To satisfy the clear-and-convincing standard, the evidence 

must produce in our minds “a firm belief or conviction” that the charges are 

true. Helmer, 237 N.J. at 88 (quoting In re Seaman, 133 N.J. 67, 74 (1993)). 

In other words, the evidence must be “so clear, direct and weighty and 

convincing as to enable [us] to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, 

of the precise facts in issue.” Id. at 88-89 (quoting Seaman, 133 N.J. at 74). 

The “high standard” of proof in an attorney disciplinary action reflects the 

“serious consequences” that follow from a finding that an attorney violated the 

RPCs. In re Sears, 71 N.J. 175, 197-98 (1976).

We now apply those precepts to the case before us.

IV.

A.

Our thorough review of the record, giving due though not controlling 

deference to the credibility findings of the Special Master, leads us to the 

conclusion that the OAE has not sustained its burden of proving by clear and 

convincing evidence that Robertelli violated the RPCs.
27

1.

Certain facts are basically undisputed. Facebook is ubiquitous today, 

but it was not in 2008. Then, Facebook had recently emerged from college 

campuses onto a world stage, transforming itself from a youth medium to a

communication/information medium for people of all ages. That swift 

transition explains the early generational divide in the understanding of that 

new social media platform. In 2008, Cordoba had recently graduated from 

college, where she had a Facebook page; on the other hand, Robertelli, then 

forty-six years old, had installed a computer on his office desk just two years 

earlier.

Robertelli was not tech savvy. He communicated mostly in person or by 

telephone. He had, at best, a primitive understanding of social media that led 

him to believe that Facebook was just another extension of the internet. Like 

many attorneys, he viewed the internet as akin to a public bulletin board or a 

public library, where information exposed to the world could be foraged, 

collected, and used to advance the interests of a client in litigation. And 

indeed, even in the realm of social media, such as Facebook, jurisdictions 

appear to universally hold that “[a] lawyer may view the public portion of a 

person’s social media profile or view public posts even if such person is 

represented by another lawyer.” N.Y. Bar Ass’n, Com. & Fed. Litig. Section, 
28

Social Media Ethics Guidelines, No. 4.A (2019); see also, e.g., N.C. Formal 

Ethics Op. 2018-5 (2019) (“Lawyers may view the public portion of a person’s 

social network presence.”); Me. Ethics Op. 217 (2017) (“Merely accessing 

public portions of social media does not constitute a ‘communication’ with a 

represented party for the purposes of [the equivalent of RPC 4.2].”).

At least, as of early 2008, Robertelli did not know how Facebook 

functioned, did not know about its privacy settings, and did not know the 

language of Facebook, such as “friending.” No one disputed at the Special 

Master hearing that Facebook was a novelty to the bar in 2008. As of 2008, no 

jurisdiction had issued a reported ethics opinion giving guidance on the issue 

before this Court -- whether sending a “friend” request to a represented client 

without the consent of the client’s attorney constitutes a communication on the 

subject of the representation in violation of RPC 4.2. The absence of ethical 

guidance at that time evidently reflected that Facebook had yet to become the 

familiar social media platform that it is today in the legal community. Many

lawyers in 2008, like Robertelli, had a “[m]inimum” understanding of 

Facebook.

Robertelli’s paralegal had retained her Facebook page from college and

knew the language of that new social media platform. One of her job duties at 

Rivkin Radler was to conduct internet research, such as background checks 
29

surveying a person’s criminal, educational, and employment history, as she did 

in the case of Hernandez. It was at that point, when Cordoba used her personal 

Facebook page to research Hernandez’s background, that recollections clashed

at the Special Master hearing about what occurred a decade earlier.

We now turn to the disputed facts.

2.

At the hearing, Cordoba testified that, at first, Hernandez’s Facebook 

page was open to the public; Hernandez testified that his Facebook page was 

always private. Cordoba stated that she forwarded Hernandez the you-looklike-my-favorite-hockey-player message, and then Hernandez sent the “friend” 

request; Hernandez stated that Cordoba sent him the “friend” request, and then 

forwarded the message. Hernandez deleted his Facebook page before the 

filing of the grievance, destroying an objective means of determining who had 

the better memory.

According to Cordoba, when Hernandez’s Facebook page turned private, 

she consulted with Robertelli and told him her only means of access was to 

send a “friend” request. But Cordoba conceded that even though she 

attempted to give a “simple” explanation of Facebook’s privacy settings, she 

did not believe Robertelli understood the significance of a “friend” request. 

The Special Master reasoned that Robertelli instructed Cordoba to hold off 
30

proceeding further until he checked with the insurance adjuster because Dawn 

Mulligan of the Joint Insurance Fund had to authorize payment for 

investigatory services. That makes sense. It is unlikely that Robertelli sought

ethical advice from the insurance adjuster.

Robertelli testified that, in explaining to him the change in Hernandez’s 

Facebook page, Cordoba told him that Hernandez’s Facebook information was 

in a different area of the internet, on the equivalent of a bulletin board but 

accessible by the “click of a button.” In Robertelli’s account, Cordoba never 

used the term “friend.” He told her to click the button and to continue to 

monitor the site.

The Special Master observed the witnesses firsthand. He found that the 

passage of time had dulled their memories. The refreshing of Cordoba’s 

memory was not done with contemporaneous notes but with memos of

Cordoba’s interviews conducted years after her brief conversations with 

Robertelli. We reject the suggestion by the DRB plurality, based on its focus 

on an isolated line in the Special Master’s forty-eight-page report, that the 

Special Master found Cordoba’s testimony unreliable because she had 

laryngitis at the hearing. The Special Master did not find Cordoba 

purposefully untruthful but rather found her struggling with an uncertain 

memory. The Special Master observed Robertelli on the stand -- an attorney 
31

who had a spotless “reputation for integrity and professionalism” -- and 

concluded that Robertelli “reasonably . . . believed” that Cordoba was 

searching for “publicly available information for material useful to his client.”

We give due regard to the Special Master’s credibility findings based on 

his careful observation of the witness testimony unfolding before his eyes. In 

the end, based on our independent review of the record, the evidence is not “so 

clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable [us] to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitancy, of the precise facts in issue,” and therefore the 

OAE has not met its burden of producing in our minds “a firm belief or 

conviction” that Robertelli violated RPCs 4.2; 5.3; or 8.4(c) or (d). See

Helmer, 237 N.J. at 88-89 (quoting Seaman, 133 N.J. at 74).

We additionally note that the evidence fell far short of establishing that 

Robertelli “engage[d] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or 

misrepresentation,” RPC 8.4(c), or “engage[d] in conduct that is prejudicial to 

the administration of justice,” RPC 8.4(d). When asserted as an independent 

basis for discipline, RPC 8.4(d) applies only “to particularly egregious 

conduct.” Helmer, 237 N.J. at 83 (quoting In re Hinds, 90 N.J. 604, 632 

(1982)). Although the better course might have been for Robertelli to accede

that the information downloaded from Hernandez’s Facebook page was 

inadmissible after he learned about the manner in which it was obtained, we 
32

cannot fault him for litigating a matter that this Court stated “presents a novel 

ethical issue.” See Robertelli, 224 N.J. at 487.

We find that the disciplinary charges against Robertelli have not been 

proven by clear and convincing evidence.

We now briefly review those charges and issue a few directives to 

remove all doubt, going forward, about a lawyer’s professional obligations in 

the use of social media.

B.

RPC 4.2 provides that “[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall not 

communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer 

knows . . . to be represented by another lawyer in the matter . . . unless the 

lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer.” The purpose of RPC 4.2 is to 

deter lawyer overreaching and unfair gamesmanship -- “protecting a 

represented party from being taken advantage of by adverse counsel.” 

Michels, N.J. Attorney Ethics 802 (2021) (quoting Curley v. Cumberland 

Farms, Inc., 134 F.R.D. 77, 82 (D.N.J. 1991), aff’d, 27 F.3d 556 (3d Cir. 

1994)); see also Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 4.2 cmt. 1 (Am. Bar Ass’n 

1983).

Robertelli may have had a good faith misunderstanding about the nature 

of Facebook in 2008, as the Special Master found; but there should be no lack 
33

of clarity today about the professional strictures guiding attorneys in the use of 

Facebook and other similar social media platforms.

When represented Facebook users fix their privacy settings to restrict 

information to “friends,” lawyers cannot attempt to communicate with them to 

gain access to that information, without the consent of the user’s counsel. To 

be sure, a lawyer litigating a case who -- by whatever means, including 

through a surrogate -- sends a “friend” request to a represented client does so 

for one purpose only: to secure information about the subject of the 

representation, certainly not to strike up a new friendship. Enticing or cajoling 

the represented client through a message that is intended to elicit a “friend” 

request that opens the door to the represented client’s private Facebook page is 

no different. Both are prohibited forms of conduct under RPC 4.2. When the 

communication is ethically proscribed, it makes no difference in what medium 

the message is communicated. The same rule applies to communications inperson or by letter, email, or telephone, or through social media, such as 

Facebook.

That is the universal view adopted by jurisdictions that have addressed 

the issue. See, e.g., N.Y. Bar Ass’n, Com. & Fed. Litig. Section, No. 4.C (“A

lawyer shall not contact a represented party or request access to review the 

non-public portion of a represented party’s social media profile unless express 
34

consent has been furnished by the represented party’s counsel.”); N.C. Formal 

Ethics Op. 2018-5 (“[R]equesting access to the restricted portions of a 

represented person’s social network presence is prohibited [by the equivalent 

of RPC 4.2] unless the lawyer obtains consent from the person’s lawyer.”); 

Me. Ethics Op. 217 (“[A]n attorney may not directly or indirectly access or use 

private portions of a represented party’s social media, because the efforts to 

access and use the private information . . . are prohibited ‘communications’ 

with a represented party . . . .”); D.C. Ethics Op. 371 (2016) (“[R]equesting 

access to information protected by privacy settings, such as making a ‘friend’ 

request to a represented person, does constitute a communication that is 

covered by the [equivalent of RPC 4.2].”); Or. Formal Ethics Op. 2013-189 

(Rev. 2016) (stating that lawyers may not request access to the social media of 

a represented party without the consent of the party’s counsel); Colo. Formal 

Ethics Op. 127 (2015) (“[A] lawyer may not request permission to view a 

restricted portion of a social media profile or website of a person the lawyer 

knows to be represented by another lawyer in that matter, without obtaining 

consent from that counsel.”); W. Va. Ethics Op. 2015-02, at 10-11 (2015) 

(“[A]ttorneys may not contact a represented person through social media . . .

nor may attorneys send a ‘friend request’ to represented persons.”).
35

What attorneys know or reasonably should know about Facebook and 

other social media today is not a standard that we can impute to Robertelli in 

2008 when Facebook was in its infancy. See In re Seelig, 180 N.J. 234, 257 

(2004) (“When the totality of circumstances reveals that the attorney acted in 

good faith and the issue raised is novel, we should apply our ruling 

prospectively in the interests of fairness.”). Although we find that Robertelli 

did not violate RPC 4.2 or the other RPCs cited in the complaint, given the 

novelty of Facebook in 2008 and for the reasons already stated, lawyers should 

now know where the ethical lines are drawn. Lawyers must educate 

themselves about commonly used forms of social media to avoid the scenario 

that arose in this case. The defense of ignorance will not be a safe haven.

We remind the bar that attorneys are responsible for the conduct of the 

non-lawyers in their employ or under their direct supervision. RPC 5.3 

requires that every attorney “make reasonable efforts to ensure that the”

conduct of those non-lawyers “is compatible with [the attorney’s own] 

professional obligations” under the RPCs. RPC 5.3(a), (b). For example, an 

attorney will be held accountable for the conduct of a non-lawyer if the 

attorney “orders or ratifies the conduct” that would constitute an ethical 

violation if committed by the attorney or “knows of the conduct at a time when 

its consequences can be avoided or mitigated but fails to take reasonable 
36

remedial action.” RPC 5.3(c)(1), (2). In short, attorneys must make

reasonable efforts to ensure that their surrogates -- including investigators or 

paralegals -- do not communicate with a represented client, without the 

consent of the client’s attorney, to gain access to a private Facebook page or 

private information on a similar social media platform.

V.

In sum, we hold that the disciplinary charges set forth in the complaint 

against Robertelli have not been proven by clear and convincing evidence and 

must be dismissed. We refer to the Advisory Committee on Professional 

Ethics, for further consideration, the issues raised in this opinion. After its 

review, the Committee shall advise this Court whether it recommends any 

additional social media guidelines or amendments to the RPCs consistent with 

this opinion.

CHIEF JUSTICE RABNER and JUSTICES LaVECCHIA, PATTERSON, 

FERNANDEZ-VINA, SOLOMON, and PIERRE-LOUIS join in JUSTICE 

ALBIN’s opinion.