In the 

United States Court of Appeals 

For the Seventh Circuit ____________________

No. 16‐1051

MICHAEL A. WHITE, et al.,

Plaintiffs‐Appellants,

v.

STEVEN L. HEFEL, et al.,

Defendants‐Appellees.

____________________

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.

No. 12 C 7853 — Charles R. Norgle, Judge.

____________________

ARGUED SEPTEMBER 6, 2017 — DECIDED NOVEMBER 7, 2017

____________________

Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and SYKES, Circuit

Judges.

WOOD, Chief Judge. Shortly after 9:00 in the evening on Sep‐

tember 30, 2011, Semajay Hyles charged uninvited into the

White family’s Chicago home. No more than a few minutes

later, police officers pushed past Michael White, Sr., and fol‐

lowed Hyles into the house. They found Hyles huddled in a

basement room and arrested him, but they did not leave the

house right away. Instead, they spent some time searching it
2 No. 16‐1051

before finally departing. The Whites did not appreciate the in‐

trusion, and so they brought this suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,

seeking damages related to the entry and search of their

home. The district court ultimately denied cross‐motions for

summary judgment, but at trial, it granted judgment as a mat‐

ter of law for the defendant officers on three claims. The jury

ruled forthe defendants on the remaining four claims, and the

Whites now appeal. We can find no reversible error, and so

we affirm the district court’s judgment.

I

It is easy to understand why the district court thought that

a trial was necessary in this case. The parties’ accounts of what

happened differ significantly. The plaintiffs—Michael White,

Sr., his wife Linda, and their three children—testified that just

before the events in question, Michael Sr. was escorting some

visitors outside. He had gotten as far as the street when an

unknown teenager (Hyles) ran up to the unlocked door,

opened it,ran in, and locked it behind him. Police officers who

were chasing the teenager quickly arrived and began to kick

down the door. Michael Sr. tried to let them know that he had

a key to the house, but before he could get that message

across, one of the officers shoved him down the stairs, injur‐

ing him. With their guns drawn, the officers kicked down the

door, went into the house, and found Hyles. After Hyles was

secured, they thoroughly searched the house even though

they had no warrant and the urgency had passed. The police

claimed that Linda gave her consent for the search, but Linda

denied that. Instead, she said, they pushed some forms in

front of her in the waning light, and she thought that she was

signing only a complaint for criminal trespass.  
No. 16‐1051 3

The police painted quite a different picture. As they por‐

trayed the evening’s events, the encounter began when six

Chicago Police Department (CPD) officers spotted Hyles on a

nearby street corner. When one of the officers tried to speak

with him, Hyles fled. The officers pursued him, partly in their

squad cars, partly on foot. Some of the officers saw Hyles

drop a baggie, which (when it was eventually retrieved)

turned out to contain crack cocaine. The route that the squad

cars took was recorded on the GPS systems in the cars; we

discuss this further when we consider the Whites’ argument

that some of the testimony from the police describes physi‐

cally impossible events. The police wound up in the vicinity

of the Whites’ house. One officer observed Hyles unsuccess‐

fully try to open the gate of a nearby home; other witnesses

testified that he approached several places. He got lucky at

the Whites’ home, where the door was unlocked. An officer

testified that Hyles kicked the door open. When the officer

tried to follow Hyles, the officer accidentally collided with

Michael Sr. and both fell down. The officers arrested Hyles,

and then, with Linda’s consent, they searched the home and

obtained her signature on complaints against Hyles.  

Approximately a year after these events, Michael Sr.,

Linda, and the three children brought this suit under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983 and state common law. In it, they raised a host of theo‐

ries arising out of the Hyles incident. The critical ones for pre‐

sent purposes are Counts I and III, which raise claims of the

use of excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment;

Count XI, asserting a failure on the part of some officers to

intervene; and Counts V, VII, and VIII, which raise unconsti‐

tutional seizure and detention, entry, and search claims, also

under the Fourth Amendment. (For those who would like a
4 No. 16‐1051

comprehensive list of the counts and their disposition, we in‐

clude a table showing who made which claims, and how they

were resolved, in an appendix to this opinion.)  

Jurisdiction over the federal claims was proper under 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343; the state‐law claims fell within the

court’s supplemental jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Before the

trial, the court denied the plaintiffs’ motion for summary

judgment on Counts VII, VIII, and XI. The Whites’ argument

was that the police account of the chase was incredible as a

matter of law because the GPS units in the squad cars contra‐

dicted the officers’ testimony. The court granted judgment as

a matter of law to all of the individual defendants on the

claims of illegal seizure, illegal entry of the home, illegal

search of the home, and indemnification. (For reasons that are

unclear, the court also instructed the jury on Count XI, though

it had previously granted judgment as a matter of law.) The

excessive‐force and failure‐to‐intervene claims went to trial

before a jury, which ruled in the defendants’favor. This appeal

followed.

II

A

We can dispose of one part of this appeal easily. The

Whites sought summary judgment in their favor on Counts

VII, VIII, and XI, but the court found disputed issues of fact

that warranted a trial. The Whites would like us to review that

issue, but they have overlooked the rule against revisiting

summary judgment after trial. See Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180,

184–85 (2011); see also Chemetall GMBH v. ZR Energy, Inc., 320

F.3d 714, 718 (7th Cir. 2003). There are good practical reasons
No. 16‐1051 5

for this rule. Once a trial has taken place, we have an authori‐

tative decision by a jury resolving whatever disputes of fact

existed. If the jury behaved irrationally, there are two safe‐

guards built into the system: first, the losing party can file a

motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 and seek a

new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the manifest

weight of the evidence; second, the party that believes that a

claim should not reach the jury is free to file timely motions

under Rule 50(a) and (b) for judgment as a matter of law. In

the latter instance, the moving party will seek to persuade the

court that the case should not go (Rule 50(a)) or never should

have been sent (Rule 50(b)) to the jury. Going back to the ear‐

lier summary judgment stage and plugging one’s ears to the

actual evidence that the jury heard would be, at a minimum,

wasteful, and at worst, would fail to take account of the actual

trial that took place and the jury’s response.  

When they were seeking summary judgment, the Whites

argued that the GPS data from the squad cars conclusively

showed that the officers’ chase of Hyles could not have hap‐

pened as they said it did. The district court decided, however,

that the officers’ account was not incredible as a matter of law

(in contrast, for instance, to an assertion that someone drove

in an ordinary car the roughly 1,100 miles from Chicago to

Houston in just three hours). Instead, the court ruled that the

differing accounts required “credibility determinations ...

best suited for a jury.” This was a reasonable assessment of the

evidence. But even if the district court’s assessment had been

unreasonable, the jury has now resolved all credibility dis‐

putes, and Ortiz holds that a party may not appeal an order

denying summary judgment after a full trial on the merits.

That rule requires us to refrain from revisiting the district

court’s summary judgment ruling.
6 No. 16‐1051

B

Trying another tack against the GPS evidence, the Whites

also argue that the district court erred by refusing at the trial

to admit the GPS evidence and some exhibits related to it. The

GPS charts themselves contained coordinates that correspond

to points on a map. The Whites wanted to use two sources of

evidence: first, testimony from Captain Martin Ryczek based

on deposition testimony he had given in a different case about

the GPS system that CPD used in 2012; second, some demon‐

strative maps and exhibits that a paralegal had created by

plugging the GPS information from the squad cars into

Google Maps, PowerPoint, and Synfig, in an effort to recreate

for the jury the path that the cars took. The district court ex‐

cluded Ryczek’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence

403, which permits exclusion of relevant evidence if its proba‐

tive value is substantially outweighed by the danger of con‐

fusing the issues. That was the situation here, the court con‐

cluded. It was undisputed that the police first spotted Hyles

some distance from the Whites’ house, and that they wound

up at the house after pursuing him. The court regarded the

risk of confusing the jury with marginally relevant details

about the GPS system used by the Chicago police as too great,

and the utility of this evidence too small, to require its admis‐

sion.  

And those were not the only problems with Ryczek’s pro‐

posed testimony. The court concluded that it was expert testi‐

mony for purposes of Rule 702. This meant that the Whites

had a duty to disclose it to the defendants, FED. R. CIV. P.

26(a)(2), and they had done no such thing. The Whites argue

that Ryczek was not an expert, because he was simply ex‐

plaining the GPS charts and how the data could be used. Yet
No. 16‐1051 7

at trial the Whites said that Ryczek would “authenticate and

interpret and explain the records.” We have looked at the rec‐

ords, which are quite dense. The district courtreasonably con‐

cluded that the role the Whites wanted Ryczek to play was

that of an expert. Finally, Ryczek’s deposition addressed the

GPS system CPD was using as of a year after the Hyles inci‐

dent. While we understand the Whites’ position that there

was no material change from 2011 to 2012, this discrepancy is

also a strike against them.  

The Whites also insist on appeal that the court should have

allowed the jury to see the computer re‐creation of the chase

prepared by their paralegal. They emphasize that all the par‐

alegal did was to take GPS coordinates, plug them into a big‐

ger map, and deduce the route that each squad car must have

taken. Charts and summaries are admissible to demonstrate

extensive data that cannot easily be examined in court. FED.

R. EVID. 1006. The proponent of the summary, however, must

show that the underlying records are accurate and would be

admissible. United States v. Oros, 578 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir.

2009). The Whites ask, rhetorically, how anyone could object

to their maps, when all they did was take a certain set of

points on a small map and put them on a larger map. But that

overlooks the larger problem, which is that the routes driven

by the various patrol cars tell us very little about which offic‐

ers were driving, which ones were on foot, when the cars were

stopped, and why it matters what route, and by what means

(running or driving) the officers made it to the Whites’ front

door immediately behind the fleeing Hyles. The paralegal’s

map, the court reasonably concluded, slid over these ques‐

tions and could have diverted the jury’s attention from the

central issues in the case. In so ruling, the court did not abuse

its discretion.
8 No. 16‐1051

C

This brings us to the entry and search of the Whites’home.

They begin by arguing that the district court erred when it

found that the police had probable cause to enter the house.

That finding lay behind the court’s decision to grant judgment

as a matter of law on several of the claims.  

The police first spotted Hyles at night, on a street corner

in a high crime neighborhood known for significant gang

presence and a flourishing drug trade. When an officer ap‐

proached Hyles to talk to him—something the police are en‐

titled to do without any degree of suspicion, see United States

v. Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 950 (7th Cir. 2002) (en banc)—Hyles did

not stand still and answer. He turned on his heels and sped

off. This mirrors what happened in Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S.

119 (2000), where some police officers spotted a man in “an

area known for heavy narcotics trafficking” and decided to

talk to him. Id. at 121. Without any provocation, the man ran

away. As in our case, the police pursued him and then

stopped him. Id. At that point in Wardlow, the police con‐

ducted a protective patdown, found a weapon, and arrested

the man. Id. The Supreme Court held that the stop did not vi‐

olate the Fourth Amendment. Id.

Crediting the officers’ account, as the district court was en‐

titled to do for purposes of suppression of evidence, the police

did not lose track of Hyles for any significant time. An officer

was thus able to observe him try to open a gate, without suc‐

cess. They saw him run into the house, on the way passing the

people at the Whites’ front door. Michael Sr. told them that

Hyles did not live there. No reasonable person could have

thought that Mr. White had just invited Hyles into his home.  
No. 16‐1051 9

Looking at all the circumstances, the police at that point

had probable cause to believe that Hyles was committing the

crime of trespass. We therefore do not need to resolve the

question whether any of the officers could have seen him drop

the baggie of cocaine that was later recovered. Nor do any

statements made by the officers relating to the cocaine make

a difference: as the Supreme Court reiterated in Devenpeck v.

Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004), the test for probable cause is an

objective one, and so it does not matterif the offense for which

probable cause exists is not closely related to the offense iden‐

tified by the arresting officer. Id. at 154–55. What matters, and

all that matters, is whether the facts known to the arresting

officers at the time they acted supported probable cause to ar‐

rest. As we have said, the officers pursuing Hyles had proba‐

ble cause to believe that he was committing criminal trespass.

The question remains whether they should have procured

a warrant before they rushed into the Whites’ home, but on

these facts, that question answers itself. See United States v.

Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976) (no warrant needed when

police in hot pursuit are acting on probable cause). The offic‐

ers were in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. They were hardly

going to shout into the house and ask Hyles to mark time

while they checked in with a state judge. Moreover, they had

good reason to conduct a protective search of the house. They

had no idea, as they ran in, whether Hyles had a weapon, if

he did whether he had dropped it on his way to the back room

where he was found, whether anyone else in the house was in

danger, or whether Hyles would resist arrest.  

In their brief, the Whites also hint at the idea that the police

did not leave the house within a reasonable time, but instead

stayed for more than an hour and conducted a thorough
10 No. 16‐1051

search. But this theory was not developed in their brief; it ap‐

pears only as part of the argument that there was no probable

cause to enter the house in the first place. The defendants thus

never had the chance to counter it with their own evidence.

The undue‐duration argument is therefore forfeited.

III

There are some troubling parts to this trial, to be sure. The

Whites assert that the district court erred when it allowed

Hyles’s guilty plea in the criminal proceeding related to his

break‐in to be introduced, and worse, when it took judicial

notice of the factual allegations in the plea transcript for pur‐

poses of bolstering its finding of probable cause to enter the

house.  

The facts with respect to the transcript of the guilty‐plea

proceedings are unusual, to say the least. The Whites had filed

a motion in limine “[t]o bar all evidence, testimony, and argu‐

ments that defendants had probable cause to enter the White

home to arrest Semajay Hyles because he pled guilty to pos‐

session of a controlled substance or because he was ‘a felon.’”

The defendants countered that the guilty plea was an “admis‐

sion of facts” and thus relevant to the reason why the officers

entered the house. The Whites rightly replied that the guilty

plea had little or no relevance to what the officers knew as

they pursued Hyles. At trial, the defendants produced both

Hyles’s certificate of conviction and the transcript.  

That was when things took a strange turn. The district

court properly noted that “later learned evidence does not es‐

tablish that there was earlier probable cause.” The court thus

ruled that “the defendants will not be permitted to argue to

the jury that there was probable cause on the issue of whether
No. 16‐1051 11

the male possessed narcotics as established by his judgment

of conviction entered against him.” At trial, however, in his

opening statement, the Whites’ counsel repeatedly argued

that the police could not have seen anything amiss. During

the case‐in‐chief, Linda White testified that when Hyles ran

into the house, she did not see any weapons and Hyles said

he had nothing. At that point the court ruled that the Whites

had opened the door to the question of Hyles’s guilt, and that

evidence of his conviction could come in. Even then, the de‐

fendants planned to introduce only the certified judgment of

conviction and pages 2–3 of the guilty‐plea transcript, which

contained the court’s recitation of the charge and Hyles’s

acknowledgement that his plea was voluntary. It was plaintiffs

who insisted that if that much of the transcript was coming in,

the whole thing should be read. The court acquiesced.  

Once the transcript was in, the court took the position that

it could take judicial notice of the factual allegations that un‐

derlay Hyles’s guilty plea. This was mistaken. Under Federal

Rule of Evidence 201, a court may take judicial notice only of

facts that are beyond reasonable dispute. Gen. Elec. Capital

Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1083 (7th Cir.

1997). Far from satisfying this requirement, the factual allega‐

tions in the plea transcript, which purported to describe the

events of September 30, 2011, were hotly contested: they lay

at the heart of the dispute in this case. The only question that

matters is whether this error was one that requires reversal.

We think not. A party who invites error cannot later complain

of it, even if the error is plain. United States v. Addison, 803 F.3d

916, 919 (7th Cir. 2015). Here, just as the court initially recog‐

nized, Hyles’s guilty plea had little or nothing to do with what

the officers knew as they were chasing Hyles. We conclude

that the court’s error in attempting to take judicial notice of
12 No. 16‐1051

the statements in the plea transcript was either harmless or

waived.  

The Whites also touch on several other alleged errors at

the end of their principal brief, including (1) that the court

should have permitted Michael Sr. to introduce evidence of

his medical bills (according to him, $4,610.37), which he in‐

curred as a result of injuries he suffered when he was pushed

down the stairs by the police; (2) that the court erred by in‐

structing the jury that it had to find that the Whites were

harmed in order to recover on their excessive‐force claims;

and (3) that it gave the jury the option of finding nominal

damages of $1, over the Whites’ objection.  

The reason the court gave for excluding the medical‐bill

evidence was that Michael Sr. had not yet paid the bills. In

Illinois (to whose law we look for guidance on this point),

whether a medical bill is paid is the touchstone for whether

the expense is reasonable. Barreto v. City of Waukegan, 478

N.E.2d 581, 589 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985). Payment is not the exclu‐

sive way to demonstrate reasonableness, however. It is also

acceptable for a “person having knowledge of the services

rendered and the usual and customary charges for such ser‐

vices” to testify that the charges are “fair and reasonable.” Ar‐

thur v. Catour, 833 N.E.2d 847, 853–54 (Ill. 2005). The problem

here is that the Whites never called the medical record‐keep‐

ers they had included on their witness list, and so the jury

never heard the necessary evidence. This was simply a failure

of proof, not a ruling that unpaid medical bills can never be

used at a trial.

The Whites’ second point is well taken: the key inquiry in

an excessive‐force case is the amount of force used, not the
No. 16‐1051 13

degree of harm that was inflicted on the victim. Thus, in Hud‐

son v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992), in the course of addressing

an Eighth Amendment claim, the Supreme Court had this to

say:

When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use

force to cause harm, contemporary standards of de‐

cency always are violated. ... This is true whether or

not significant injury is evident.

Id. at 9 (citation omitted); see also Wilkins v. Gaddy, 559 U.S.

34, 37–40 (2010) (vacating dismissal of excessive‐force claim

because the district court erroneously focused on extent of in‐

jury rather than nature of force applied). Wilkins noted, how‐

ever, that the extent of injury might shed light on the question

whether the degree of force used could plausibly have been

thought necessary by the officer. Id. at 37.  

To the extent that the instructions failed to convey these

nuances, however, we conclude that any error was harmless.

The Whites were allowed to, and did, argue in closing that

harm need not be physical. This was enough to alert the jury

to Linda’s distress as a source of harm. And the jury was well

aware of Michael Sr.’s testimony that he had been thrown

down a flight of concrete stairs—something that easily could

lead to more than de minimis injury. The question before the

jury was whether the police, in hot pursuit of Hyles, pushed

past Michael Sr., inadvertently causing him to lose his balance

and fall, or if they deliberately pushed him aside in an exces‐

sive use of force. The evidence could have supported either

conclusion. As it was entitled to do, the jury chose to believe

the police.  
14 No. 16‐1051

IV

The Whites have raised several other points as well, but it

is enough to say that we see nothing that requires discussion.

The judgment of the district court is therefore AFFIRMED.

  
No. 16‐1051 15

Appendix

Count Theory Plaintiffs Defendants Disposition

I Exc. force – 4th am. Michael Sr. Hefel Jury for defendant

II Battery Michael Sr. Hefel, City Vol. dismissal

III Exc. force – 4th am. Linda and Michael Jr. Hefel, Homer, Ramag‐

lia, Laurie, Suing,

O’Keefe (“Individual

Defendants”)

Vol. dismissal of Michael

Jr.’s claim; jury for Hefel

IV Assault Linda and Michael Jr. All defendants Vol. dismissal

V Illegal seizure and

detention – 4th am.

All plaintiffs All defendants JMOL for all defendants

VI False imprisonment All plaintiffs Individual defendants Vol. dismissal

VII Unconstitutional

entry – 4th am.

All plaintiffs Individual defendants No sum. jdgt. for plaintiffs;

JMOL at trial for defendants

VIII Unconstitutional

search – 4th am.

All plaintiffs Individual defendants No sum. jdgt. for plaintiffs;

JMOL for defendants

IX Trespass and illegal

search

All plaintiffs All defendants Vol. dismissal

X Damage to prop‐

erty

Michael Sr. and Linda All defendants Sum. jdgt. for some defend‐

ants; dismissed in a pre‐trial

ruling for others

       XI Failure to intervene

– 4th am.

All plaintiffs Homer, Ramaglia, Lau‐

rie, Suing, and O’Keefe

No sum. jdgt. for plaintiffs;

jury for defendants

      XII Indemnification

from City

All plaintiffs City JMOL for defendant