Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 

VANGUARD OF VALOR

General Editor 

Donald P. Wright, Ph. D.

Small Unit Actions in Afghanistan

Vanguard of

Valor

Small Unit Actions in Afghanistan

General Editor 

Donald P. Wright, Ph. D.

Afghan Study Team

Anthony E. Carlson, Ph. D.

Michael J. Doidge

Scott J. Gaitley

Kevin M. Hymel

Matt M. Matthews

John J. McGrath

Lieutenant Colonel John C. Mountcastle

Ryan D. Wadle, Ph. D.
ii

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Vanguard of Valor: Small Unit Actions in Afghanistan / General Editor, 

Donald P. Wright; Afghan Study Team, [Et Al.].

 P. Cm.

1. Afghan War, 2001---Campaigns. 2. United States. Army--History-

-Afghan war, 2001- 3. United States. Army--Civic Action. 4. United 

States--Armed Forces--Stability Operations. 5. Afghanistan--History, 

Military--21st Century. Wright, Donald P., 1964- II. Title: Small Unit 

Actions in Afghanistan. 

 DS371.412.V36 2012

 958.104’7420973--dc23

 2011052370

Second printing

Combat Studies Institute Press publications cover a 

wide variety of military history topics. The views 

expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of 

the author(s) and not necessarily those of the 

Department of the Army or the Department of 

Defense. A full list of CSI Press publications, many 

of them available for downloading, can be found at 

http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/index.asp.

The seal of the Combat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an 

official publication of the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official seal on any 

republication without the express written permission of the Director of CSI.
iii

Foreword

Since 2001, the US Army in Afghanistan has been conducting 

complex operations in a difficult, often dangerous environment. Living in 

isolated outposts and working under austere conditions, US Soldiers have 

carried out missions that require in equal parts a warrior’s courage and a 

diplomat’s restraint. In the larger discussions of the Afghanistan campaign, 

the experiences of these Soldiers—especially the young sergeants and 

lieutenants that lead small units—often go undocumented. But, as we all 

know, success in Afghanistan ultimately depends on these small units and 

their leaders, making their stories all the more important. 

In 2010, as the scale and tempo of Coalition operations in Afghanistan 

increased, so did the need for historical accounts of small-unit actions. 

As commander of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), I 

commissioned the Combat Studies Institute to research and write the cases 

collected in this volume and in those that will follow. By capturing key 

insights from both lethal and non-lethal operations, I hoped these accounts 

would be of immediate utility to sergeants and lieutenants at the center of 

future operations. 

The eight actions described in these pages take the reader through 

a wide range of platoon-level operations, from an intense firefight near 

Kandahar to an intricate civic action project in Kunar Province. Drawing 

from dozens of Soldier interviews, these accounts vividly depict the actions 

themselves and offer critical insights of greatest benefit to the small-unit 

leaders of today and tomorrow. 

The US Army always has prided itself as an institution of constant 

learning, strongly committed to drawing lessons from its past. This 

volume from the Combat Studies Institute is an excellent example of that 

long and honorable tradition. I hope that you will find the actions related 

in Vanguard of Valor to be both instructive and compelling. I am sure that 

you will find them to be inspirational.

 David H. Petraeus

General, United States Army (Retired)

Director, Central Intelligence Agency

v

Acknowledgements

In late 2010, the Commander of the International Security Assistance 

Force (ISAF), General David Petraeus, asked the Combat Studies Institute 

(CSI) to publish a series of historical accounts focused on tactical-level 

operations in Afghanistan. For General Petraeus, the use of history in the 

course of an ongoing campaign had immediate utility. His goal was to 

make recent operations in Afghanistan relevant to our junior leaders who 

were soon to conduct similar operations, often on the same terrain. This 

volume is the first in a series that should do just that.

In making General Petraeus’ vision a reality CSI had a great deal of 

assistance. US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) provided the initial funding 

for the establishment of the Afghan Study Team at CSI and later the US 

Army Center of Military History (CMH) provided funding to continue this 

important work. The USFOR-A Staff offered guidance and coordinated 

the research effort that allowed for the collection of data. Historians from 

CMH, as well as those in several Military History Detachments (MHDs) 

that operated in Afghanistan, gathered the lion’s share of the documents 

we used. I extend a special thanks to the numerous Soldiers who sat for 

interviews thus enabling us to weave first-hand accounts of the various 

actions into the studies.

Finally, I want to acknowledge the writers and editors that comprise 

the Afghan Study Team. As a group, they quickly established techniques 

and norms that allowed them to write contemporary military history 

that is lively, relevant, and meets the high expectations of the historical 

profession. These studies will be of great use to our Army’s officers and 

NCOs who are currently conducting operations around the world; and, they 

will well serve tomorrow’s leaders who will likely face similar challenges 

in conflicts that are yet to appear on the horizon. 

CSI – The Past is Prologue!

 Roderick M. Cox

Colonel, US Army

Director, Combat Studies Institute

vii

Contents

Foreword.................................................................................................iii

Acknowledgements ................................................................................. v

Contents................................................................................................. vii

List of Figures......................................................................................... ix

Geographical Key to Operations.......................................................... xi

Chapter 1. Firefight above Gowardesh

 by Lieutenant Colonel John C. Mountcastle........................................ 1

Chapter 2. Ambushing the Taliban

 A US Platoon in the Korengal Valley

 by Scott J. Gaitley.............................................................................. 27

Chapter 3. Flipping the Switch

 Weapons Platoon Movement to Contact in Zhari District

 by Michael J. Doidge ......................................................................... 49

Chapter 4. Forging Alliances at Yargul Village

 A Lieutenant’s Struggle to Improve Security in Kunar Province

 by Anthony E. Carlson, Ph. D............................................................ 73

Chapter 5. Operation STRONG EAGLE

 Combat Action in the Ghakhi Valley

 by John J. McGrath............................................................................ 91

Chapter 6. Disrupt and Destroy

 Platoon Patrol in Zhari District

 by Matt M. Matthews....................................................................... 131

Chapter 7. Trapping the Taliban at OP Dusty

 A Scout Platoon in the Zhari District

 by Kevin M. Hymel ......................................................................... 157

Chapter 8. Objective Lexington

 Cougar Company under Fire in the Ganjgal Valley

 by Ryan D. Wadle, Ph.D. ................................................................. 179

Glossary ............................................................................................... 203

About the Authors............................................................................... 205

ix

List of Figures

Chapter 1.

Figure 1 - Northeast Afghanistan................................................................... 3

Figure 2. TF Titan Area of Operation, 2006 .................................................. 5

Figure 3. Gremen Valley Area ..................................................................... 10

Figure 4. View of Mountain 2610................................................................ 16

Figure 5. Scheme of Maneuver during Firefight, Gowardesh ..................... 17

Chapter 2.

Figure 1. A Korengal Valley reference map................................................. 28

Figure 2. 2d Platoon Soldiers on the Kandlay Trail..................................... 34

Figure 3. The Chichal-Donga Trail looking north ....................................... 34

Figure 4. Patrol Base and enemy route of travel into the ambush............... 38

Figure 5. Location of patrol base and enemy elements............................... 40

Chapter 3.

Figure 1. Movement to Contact in Zhari District ........................................ 54

Figure 2. The Taliban Attempt Disengage .................................................. 60

Figure 3. Captured Enemy with their Equipment........................................ 66

Chapter 4.

Figure 1. The culvert denial grate outside of FOB Wright .......................... 74

Figure 2. The aqueduct near Yargul............................................................. 74

Figure 3. Asadabad and surrounding area.................................................... 78

Figure 4. Yargul villagers collecting needles on the banks of the Kunar .... 82

Chapter 5.

Figure 1. Marawara District in Relation to Afghanistan.............................. 93

Figure 2. The Ghakhi Valley........................................................................ 96

Figure 3. The Ghakhi Valley between Sangam and Daridam...................... 98

Figure 4. The Plan...................................................................................... 105

Figure 5. Troop Locations at the Start of the Action ................................. 107

Figure 6. Looking east down the Ghakhi Valley Road.............................. 108

Figure 7. Situation on the Ghakhi Valley road........................................... 111

Figure 8. The Assault on Daridam, 29 June 2010, 0100-0700 .................. 117
x

Chapter 6.

Figure 1. First Platoon embarking on its first combat patrol south

 of Highway 1 in the Zhari District........................................................ 131

Figure 2.Kandahar Province, Zhari District .............................................. 132

Figure 3. First Platoon Patrol to Tiranan ................................................... 137

Figure 4. First Platoon Standoff Positions................................................. 148

Chapter 7.

Figure 1. Operation NASHVILLE I, 26 September 2010......................... 159

Figure 2. Scout Platoon Defends OP Dusty............................................... 163

Figure 3. Senior Airman Nathan Archambault watches from the

 edge of the compound roof as a laser-guided bomb explodes.............. 172

Chapter 8.

Figure 1. Sarowbay Objective Lexington.................................................. 182

Figure 2. Objective Lexington, 29 March 2011......................................... 189
xi

Geographical Key to Operations Recounted in this Work.

1

Firefight above Gowardesh

by

Lieutenant Colonel John C. Mountcastle

In the early evening hours of 21 June 2006, 16 American Soldiers from 

the 3d Squadron, 71st Cavalry (3-71 CAV) of the US Army’s 10th Mountain 

Division engaged in a desperate fight against enemy insurgents high on a 

mountain ridge overlooking the Gremen Valley in the northeast corner of 

Afghanistan. After 30 minutes of intense combat, two American Soldiers 

were dead and one more was critically wounded. The enemy element that 

attacked the US force withdrew after suffering significant casualties. What 

happened on this ridgeline high above the small village of Gowardesh 

that evening demonstrated the daunting tactical and operational challenges 

facing the US Army in the mountainous terrain along the border between 

Afghanistan and Pakistan. These challenges were persistent and would 

define operations in the region for years to come. The engagement also 

demonstrated the capability of Coalition forces to meet and defeat a wellequipped, trained, and determined enemy on his home terrain. 

Three years after the firefight, one of the leaders of the American 

detachment, Sergeant First Class Jared C. Monti, was posthumously 

awarded the Medal of Honor for his actions in the battle but the heroism 

and valor he demonstrated during the engagement were showcased by all 

of the Soldiers that fought for one another that evening. In order to gain a 

better appreciation for what they endured, this study offers the details of 

the events leading up to, during, and after the engagement. It also examines 

a number of important operational and tactical decisions that shaped the 

events leading up to the insurgent attack on the American “kill team” from 

3-71 CAV. In doing so, this study illustrates the complex and challenging 

nature of conducting counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, and in particular, 

the mountainous region of Nuristan and Kunar Provinces that serves as the 

primary corridor to Pakistan for Taliban and other foreign fighters. These 

are the types of tactical and operational challenges American Soldiers can 

well expect to encounter in the near future. 

Background

In April of 2006, Combined Joint Task Force 76 (CJTF-76), under the 

leadership of the 10th Mountain Division, initiated Operation MOUNTAIN 

LION in eastern Afghanistan aimed at defeating insurgent operations and 

establishing Coalition control in the region. A key aspect of the operation 

was the utilization of a “clear-hold-build-engage” approach which a former 
2

G3 of the 10th Mountain Division referred to as a “score with four essential 

parts.”1 As a part of a counterinsurgency effort, the “clear” step focused 

on using lethal military operations to clear targeted areas of any enemy 

presence or control. The next step of “hold” entailed creating a lasting 

security by establishing Coalition presence in the cleared area. The last 

two parts of the approach of “build” and “engage” centered on improving 

infrastructure and facilities for local communities and establishing a 

working relationship with the people based on communication and a 

shared trust. With Operation MOUNTAIN LION, CJTF-76 planners 

hoped to defeat the resurgent Taliban and other enemies of the fledgling 

Government of Afghanistan that had recently increased their attacks in 

the provinces of Kunar and Nuristan. In the months that followed, CJTF76 forces, which included the 3rd Infantry Brigade Combat Team from 

the 10th Mountain Division, pushed into a number of suspected enemy 

strongholds establishing contact with the local civilians and building 

combat outposts to sustain the Coalition’s gains. The most notable of these 

was the establishment of the Korengal Outpost in the heavily-contested 

Korengal Valley in early May. Fighting with the insurgents was intermittent 

as most of the enemy chose to avoid the clearing operations and wait for 

the Coalition forces to return to their bases. 

By June 2006, the majority of effort for what remained of Operation 

MOUNTAIN LION was focused on the “hold” portion of the operation 

with the transition to “build” and “engage” just beginning. In the latter 

phases, the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), organizations 

composed of both military and civilian officials dedicated to assisting the 

local population with building new infrastructure and establishing a new 

government, would take the lead.2

 However, the security situation in 

northeast Afghanistan was still unstable. To facilitate the transition to the 

next phases, the 3d Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regiment (3-71 CAV) of the 

3d BCT, 10th Mountain Division operating out of the newly established 

Forward Operating Base (FOB) Naray, established new checkpoints and 

outposts in the northeastern tip of Afghanistan once MOUNTAIN LION 

officially ended on 15 May 2006. FOB Naray was the northernmost US 

outpost in Afghanistan at the time and, according to one account, Naray 

District was “a clutch of mud-brick and stone villages inhabited by 30,000 

Pashtun tribes people” who had not seen outsiders since the Soviet Army 

departed the region in 1989.3

 In 2006, 3-71 CAV became known as Task 

Force (TF) Titan after the squadron added key attachments to its organic 

force of four company-sized maneuver elements. The task force’s mission 

was to secure the major population centers in Nuristan and Kunar by 

clearing areas suspected of harboring insurgents and targeting insurgent 
3

Figure 1 - Northeast Afghanistan.

infiltration routes into the region. In June 2006, CJTF-76 planned to launch 

a new operation named MOUNTAIN THRUST which aimed to eliminate 

remaining centers of enemy activity across northeast Afghanistan. The 

CJTF assigned TF Titan the mission of separating what was left of the 

enemy in southeastern Nuristan Province from the local population and 

preventing further enemy infiltration into the region from Pakistan. The 

task force operation, known as GOWARDESH THRUST, became CJTF76’s main effort.

For Operation GOWARDESH THRUST, TF Titan planned to execute 

an operation to clear the Gremen Valley (also known as the Gowardesh 

Valley). GOWARDESH THRUST would feature two company-sized units 

moving into the valley using both ground maneuver and air assault. Before 

launching the operation however, the task force needed to establish 

surveillance on target areas and named areas of interest (NAIs), locations in 

the valley where the TF Titan staff believed activity would reveal insurgent 

organization and intent. During OPERATION MOUNTAIN LION, the 

squadron leadership developed a new and somewhat unorthodox platoon-
4

sized unit just for this type of reconnaissance and observation mission. 

The squadron combined a Combat Observation and Lasing Team (COLT) 

section with its sniper section to create a 16-man formation that would have 

enhanced observation, fire direction, and security capabilities. This unique 

formation, which became known to the Soldiers of 3-71 CAV as a kill 

team, was described by the squadron operations officer (S3) as a tactically 

flexible unit that could “maximize the capabilities” of the squadron and 

defend itself against enemy attack. The kill team was comprised of 16 

hand-picked Soldiers and NCOs who were, in the S3’s words, “the most 

skilled...the best of the organization.”4

 The kill team for GOWARDESH 

THRUST was placed under the leadership of two noncommissioned 

officers, Staff Sergeant Christopher Cunningham, who oversaw the 

sniper section, and Staff Sergeant Jared Monti, a section leader from the 

squadron’s COLT platoon. Cunningham and Monti were charged with 

establishing an observation post (OP) close to the top of Mountain 2610, 

which made up the western wall of the Gremen Valley. From this position, 

they were to observe a number of NAIs and to assist in directing artillery 

fires and close air support for the task force as it conducted its move into 

the valley. In addition, the kill team was supposed to watch for “squirters,” 

a term for insurgents attempting to flee the valley, and engage them as 

targets of opportunity.5

 In all, the mission was not overly complex. It 

was to climb the mountain, establish the OP, monitor the action below, 

and call for fires if necessary. 21 June 2006 was the planned date for the 

GOWARDESH THRUST main effort movement into the valley. The kill 

team would begin its move on 18 June, infiltrating by climbing up to their 

planned observation position on the ridgeline which was located just three 

miles northwest of the village of Gowardesh. 

On the eve of the operation, the enemy situation in the vicinity of 

the Gremen Valley was largely unknown to the task force. The 3-71 CAV 

staff utilized what limited information on the enemy it could gather based 

on interviews with US Special Forces detachments that had operated in 

the region previously and interviews with the local population. Being 

the first battalion-sized American element to establish a presence in the 

area, the squadron had no existing pattern of analysis for the enemy. 

According to Captain Ross Berkoff, the squadron’s Intelligence Officer 

(S2), “the historical data necessary for charting trends in enemy response 

time, organizational capabilities, aggressiveness, and marksmanship” was 

simply not available. Therefore, it was uncertain what kind of opposition 

TF Titan elements, including the kill team, would face as they pushed into 

the Gremen Valley. Based on what little information was available,
5

Figure 2. TF Titan Area of Operation, 2006.

Captain Berkoff determined that the enemy’s most likely course of action 

would be to simply observe the Americans, to include the kill team. An 

organized enemy attack on the kill team was deemed the most dangerous 

course of action but was seen as much less likely.6

 The squadron staff 

planned for the kill team to have indirect fire support from 105mm 

howitzers and 120mm mortars during their climb and while in position 

and anticipated that this would be sufficient to counter any unexpected 

engagement with the enemy. As long as the staff’s assessment of enemy 
6

intent was correct, the kill team had the right size, composition, and fire 

support to make the mission a success. As one of the members of the 

squadron’s battle staff later claimed, “From the aspect of planning and not 

knowing, based on the INTEL that we had, that was the best plan we could 

come up with.”7 Although the staff did not know it at the time, this plan 

would soon face a significant test. 

Burdened with double the normal combat load which included just 

enough food and water for the three-day infiltration up the mountain, 

the 16 Soldiers were trucked from FOB Naray near the village of Kamu 

to a task force mortar position near the Gowardesh Bridge, located just 

south of the Gremen Valley. Each team member carried more than 50 

pounds of equipment with them, not including their personal weapon. 

Early on the morning of 18 May, the team began its walk up the ridgeline 

toward Mountain 2610. The Soldiers knew they had three days to get into 

position. They did not know however, exactly what awaited them up on 

the mountain. For Staff Sergeant Cunningham, the mission was clear but 

prospects for success were uncertain. “Something didn’t feel right about 

it,” he said later.8

 The infiltration plan did not worry him. Cunningham 

was instead slightly apprehensive about the plan to extract the team once 

the mission was complete. “I don’t like going into a place where I don’t 

have a way out,” he said later, “and I don’t like having to come out the 

way I came in.” Two courses of action had been developed for the kill 

team’s extraction. The first entailed airlifting the team out once a landing 

zone (LZ) was created on the ridgeline by advancing TF Titan elements 

during GOWARDESH THRUST. The second course of action involved 

the team walking down the mountain using a different route, one that ran 

directly into the village of Gowardesh.9 Both of these courses of action 

were contingent TF Titan’s movement into the valley going according to 

plan. All Cunningham and the other members of the kill team could do was 

hope that it did. 

The Climb

The kill team’s ascent over the next three days was typical of the difficult 

ground maneuver in northeastern Afghanistan. Navigating the steep, rocky 

terrain while carrying a combat load and enough provisions for 72 hours 

was challenging enough but the rapid increase in altitude only added to the 

difficulty and prevented the team from moving quickly. The squadron’s 

actions during Operation MOUNTAIN LION had introduced the Soldiers 

to the challenges offered by the mountainous terrain so the physical trials 

came as no surprise. This familiarity however, did not make the task any 

less demanding for the kill team. Indeed, in compiling their end of tour 
7

after action review (AAR), the Soldiers of the 3d Brigade emphasized the 

severe effects of the physical environment on their operations: 

The entire Kunar/Nuristan experience was impacted by terrain and 

weather. Heat injuries [occurred] due to the weight of full kit and 

foot movement over rugged terrain. We were also affected by cold 

weather or exposure injury due to operations in a mountainous 

environment. If it wasn’t the heat it was the mountains, if wasn’t 

the mountains it was the cold and or rain and snow.10

The AAR did not exaggerate. The terrain was so treacherous that the 

brigade suffered significant Soldier injuries and even deaths from falls 

in mountains. Seeing fellow Soldiers die as a result of the terrain was not 

likely something the unit anticipated when it prepared for its deployment 

to Afghanistan.

In an effort to negate the effects of the early summer heat, the kill team

made frequent stops on their climb up the ridgeline of Mountain 2610 and 

moved during the night as much as possible. They took both short and 

long halts, taking time to observe the valley below and keep a watch for 

enemy in the area. During a number of these halts the kill team began to 

detect a significant amount of movement in the valley. “We observed a 

bunch of guys going up and down...huge groups of guys,” Staff Sergeant 

Cunningham recalled, “Things just didn’t seem normal, all of these people 

are moving into and out of the valley.”11 They reported these findings to 

the task force HQ over the radio and continued their climb. When they 

finally arrived at their planned position on the ridgeline it was after dark on 

the night of 20 June. Even with the lack of light, it was clear to them that 

they were not the first people to occupy that spot. Evidence of heavy foot 

traffic, perhaps recent, marked the site. To the east, what appeared to be a 

wide, well-used footpath ran along the ridge and dipped down toward the 

valley below. “This ain’t good,” Cunningham remembered thinking. The 

task of remaining undetected suddenly seemed much more challenging. 

The team radioed back their findings again and prepared to establish a 

perimeter. 

Despite the evidence of foot traffic, the position they now held was 

suited to accomplishing the mission. They were perched atop a bump in 

the ridgeline with relatively flat ground immediately around them with a 

number of trees and rocks for cover and concealment. To the east they had 

a good view of the Gremen Valley to include a number of the operation 

NAIs. One of these was the suspected residence of a well-known insurgent 

leader, Hadji Usman, who was high on the Task Force target list. The 
8

position of the patrol base was such that the portion of the valley directly 

below was difficult to observe as it stretched further to the north. The kill 

team could identify suspected insurgent trail networks. For the observation 

requirements set forth in the task force mission, the kill team was where it 

needed to be. According to an official Army account of the engagement, 

“The position the patrol now occupied was in a known enemy sanctuary 

and near the Urstan Pass, a major trafficking route used to smuggle foreign 

fighters, weapons, IED [Improvised Explosive Device] making materials, 

and other supplies into the region from Pakistan.”12 If the task force sweep 

during GOWARDESH THRUST caused any movement in the valley, the 

team would likely see that movement from where its Soldiers were now 

standing. 

Directly above the team’s position, the mountain ridge continued its 

upward slope to the north and a group of large rocks with a small clearing 

beyond made up the southern boundary of the position. On either side 

of the ridge, the ground dropped off at a sharp angle. As such, the kill 

team was faced with the typical tactical constraint of a ridgelines such as 

that if they needed, they could only maneuver in two directions, up the 

ridge to the north or back down to the south. While not an ideal situation, 

the terrain offered no viable alternative. As most US Soldiers conducting 

operations in Kunar and Nuristan would learn, the terrain was seldom if 

ever ideal. Perhaps thankfully, the kill team’s time in this position was 

supposed to be short. The original plan for the 16 Americans now taking up 

positions in the dark was for them to begin their overwatch within the next 

hours. As a result, they did not immediately begin to prepare deliberate 

fighting positions or conduct other preparations associated with a lengthy 

static defensive position. Another factor contributing to their actions that 

evening was physical exhaustion. The three day climb in temperatures 

often in excess of 100 degrees, had taken its toll and most of the Soldiers 

were almost out of food and water. For the remainder of the night, the team 

recovered from the movement up the ridgeline and kept watch on the NAIs 

in the valley below.13

Before daybreak on 21 June, the kill team received the news that 

Operation GOWARDESH THRUST was on a three day hold. TF Titan

would not be entering the Gremen Valley that day. The night before, a 

convoy from Charlie Company had suffered an IED attack while traveling 

to a meeting with local officials at a border crossing. A number of Soldiers 

were wounded and the vehicle sustained significant damage. The attack 

immediately raised questions about the security of the main route of 

advance into the Gremen Valley. The 3-71 CAV leadership decided to 
9

delay the operation in order to conduct route clearance and to inspect the 

counter-IED equipment on all the squadron’s vehicles.14 

When Staff Sergeant Cunningham learned of the delay, he remembered 

thinking to himself, “That is not good.” 15 Indeed, it left the team in an 

uncertain position. Most of the Soldiers were in significant need of food 

and water and what little they had left would not last another 24 hours. 

Originally, the squadron planned to deliver an aerial resupply package to 

the kill team in conjunction with the air assault into the valley scheduled 

for 21 June with the assumption that the amount of air activity over the 

area would mask a single UH-60 dropping off supplies to the team. Now, a 

separate aerial resupply would have to be conducted during the day which 

would more likely alert the enemy to the team’s location. 

Perhaps more importantly, the 16 Americans would need to find a 

way to remain undetected by the enemy for three days. During Operation 

ANACONDA in March 2002, US Special Operations forces were 

deployed in a similar fashion to provide overwatch of the Shahikot Valley 

in Afghanistan. Those teams however, were smaller, highly-trained, 

and well-equipped for such a mission. Even with their training, Special 

Operations observation teams were sometimes discovered by insurgent 

enemies, as was the case with a four-man SEAL team during Operation 

RED WINGS in Kunar Province almost a year prior. Once discovered by 

a group of local Afghan goat herders, the SEAL team decided to release 

them rather than hold them captive or kill them. Less than two hours later, 

the team was attacked by a large force of Taliban fighters and all but one of 

the SEALs were killed. There was no question in the mind of the surviving 

team member that the Taliban fighters had been informed of their presence 

by the goat herders.16 The Soldiers within the TF Titan kill team on 

Mountain 2610 were not Special Operations Soldiers nor were they well 

equipped for an extended stay in the mountains. These facts were not lost 

on the members of the team and according to at least one report, several of 

the Soldiers “had gut feelings that something wasn’t right.”17 Nevertheless, 

the word came from FOB Naray that the team was to remain in position. 

The task force staff reached this decision after considering the fact that the 

kill team had immediate fire support available from the 105mm howitzers 

and 120mm mortars in case of an enemy engagement. Another critical 

factor was the larger operational schedule. GOWARDESH THRUST was 

imminent and there was not enough time to pull the team off the mountain 

only for it to turn around immediately and hike up the mountain again. 

Given these considerations, the staff was “pretty comfortable” with the 

decision to leave the kill team in place.18 It was the first of three important 

decisions that would impact the kill team that day. 
10

Figure 3. Gremen Valley Area including Mountain 2610 and Kill Team Position.

By 0800 on 21 June, it was clear to the members of the kill team and 

to the TF Titan staff that the team needed resupply of food and water that 

day. Although the resupply posed an increased risk of enemy detection, 

the team’s critical need for water was deemed paramount and the task 

force’s leadership felt it had little choice but to conduct the resupply as 

soon as possible.19 This was the second important decision that day. The 

planned delivery point for the aerial resupply was several hundred meters 

to the northwest of the patrol base. When the kill team received word that 

a UH-60 was inbound with resupply, the team leaders split up the group 

of 16, taking the majority of them to the resupply landing zone (LZ) to 

provide security and carry the water and food back to the patrol base. The 

remainder of the team stayed at the patrol base and watched the valley. 

At approximately 1330 hours, a single UH-60 flew in low over the 

Gremen Valley, directly over one of the suspected enemy structures that 

the kill team was monitoring. Cunningham could barely believe it. “This 

[pilot], he didn’t talk to me, he just came around...right over the bad 

guy’s house,” he recalled, “He flew right to me, stopped right above me, 

and dropped the stuff.”20 The squadron staff had initially planned for the 

resupply UH-60 to approach Mountain 2610 from a different azimuth and 

to fly over the delivery point and drop the resupply bags without stopping. 

This would make it more difficult for any enemy watching to pinpoint 

the kill team’s whereabouts. “That didn’t happen,” the squadron fire 

support NCOIC later noted, “The aircraft hovered over them, which we 

think gave away their positions. We are still upset about that.”21 Once the 

helicopter deposited the large white bags of food and water, it departed 
11

for FOB Naray. The weather on the ridge was clear, permitting full view 

of the UH-60 from the ridgeline above and valley below. The drop had 

actually occurred very close to the kill team’s patrol base rather than at 

the designated LZ. This fact made a number of the Soldiers uneasy.22 The 

Soldiers at the drop point gathered the food and water bags and began 

moving them the short distance back to the base. 

Meanwhile, Specialist Max Noble, who was pulling security at the 

team observation point, identified what appeared to be an Afghan male 

watching the resupply operation through a pair of binoculars. The man 

was located approximately 1,500 meters to the east in the valley and was 

intently observing the Americans’ location. Minutes later, the majority 

of the team arrived back at the patrol base with the resupply. Specialist 

Noble, the team medic, alerted Staff Sergeant Cunningham to the observer 

in the valley. Both Cunningham and Monti watched the man for several 

minutes as he continued to observe their position on the ridgeline and 

then disappeared. “He was clearly looking at us,” Cunningham recalled.23

Although there was the unlikely chance that the local man was not a threat, 

one thing that seemed clear to the Soldiers on the ridge was that the kill 

team’s position had been compromised. 

The Fight

Monti and Cunningham now faced a tough tactical decision of whether 

to move or stay in position. The dilemma was strikingly similar to that of 

SEAL team during Operation RED WINGS. They believed their position 

had been compromised, but it was uncertain what that would mean for 

their mission. For the SEAL team, discovery by a local Afghan had led 

to an attack by a large enemy force. Conventional tactical wisdom might 

have suggested finding a new location for the patrol base but there was 

nothing conventional about conducting operations on a narrow ridgeline 

in the mountains of Afghanistan. Back at FOB Naray, the TF Titan battle 

staff was not overly concerned with the situation. After all, the intelligence 

assessments had predicted that the enemy would indeed attempt to watch 

the kill team while suggesting that a direct attack was less likely. Thus, the 

team’s situation had been anticipated to a degree. The TF S2 recalled “no 

discussion” within the staff on moving the team to a new location at that 

point.24 During the intense planning and coordination for the upcoming 

operation, the team’s report of the Afghan with the binoculars was not 

interpreted as an emergency at FOB Naray. 

Up on the mountain, the kill team leaders discussed their tactical 

options. Staff Sergeant Cunningham later described the conversation 
12

between himself and another team NCO, Sergeant John Hawes, regarding 

their situation:

We can’t go any further up [the ridgeline]. If we go any further 

we’re possibly going to get ambushed on the way up there. So 

we’re either going to hold this position or move back down. If we 

move back down, we’re going to give them the high ground...so 

we decide to hold the high ground, pull security on what we’re 

supposed to be watching.25

In addition to the possibility of being attacked, there was no assurance that 

the team would find a vantage point further north up the ridge or further 

down it that would allow them to accomplish their mission. 

Given this uncertainty, Staff Sergeant Cunningham and Staff Sergeant 

Monti decided that the team would stay in position. Unaware of the large 

group of insurgents that was moving toward them from the north as the 

late afternoon turned into evening, Monti and Cunningham informed the 

rest of the team that they would remain where they were and directed them 

to continue their observation of the NAIs in the valley. The Soldiers crossleveled supplies, began guard shifts, and took time to eat and drink. The 

decision to remain at the patrol base was the third of three fateful decisions 

leading up to the deadly engagement.

Six of the kill team members were positioned at the northern side of 

the patrol base, facing a line of thick vegetation. Three Soldiers continued 

to monitor the valley on the eastern side of the position. To the south, the 

team leaders formed what they called an “Alamo,” or “a place you can 

fight back to,” near a group of large rocks and trees.26 There, Cunningham, 

Monti, and Hawes continued to discuss the security plan for the night and 

the next day. Although the members of the kill team were alert and vigilant, 

they had no indicators of enemy activity in the vicinity of their position. 

At 1845, almost five hours after the resupply UH-60 departed the 

ridgeline, Specialist Franklin Woods suddenly heard the sounds of people 

approaching through the wooded area to the north of the patrol base and 

seconds later, a heavy barrage of Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) rounds 

and machine gun and small arms fire burst from the wooded area. Round 

after round slammed into the ground and rocks around the patrol base, 

sending the Soldiers scrambling for cover. It was clear from the sheer 

amount of fire striking the position that the attackers were numerous and 

very well equipped. Staff Sergeant Cunningham later recalled the intensity 

of the initial barrage by stating, “I’ve been in a bunch of firefights. That 

was probably one of the most intense.”27 Specialist Daniel Linnihan 
13

remembered being amazed by the “ridiculous” volume of RPG fire. Now 

well aware that the enemy group maneuvering against them was not just 

a few insurgents with AK-47s, but something much larger, Linnihan 

recalled, “They clearly came up there to kill every one of us.”28 After 

several minutes of intense fire coming from the woods to the north, it 

became clear to the Soldiers on that end of the perimeter that approximately 

50 insurgents were coming toward them and attempting to flank the patrol 

base. The enemy had established two support-by-fire positions to the north 

and northwest and continued to pour machine gun fire into the patrol base. 

After the initial shock of the sudden attack wore off, the Soldiers of 

the kill team began to fight back. Those positioned closest to the enemy 

advance on the northern edge of the perimeter returned fire into the tree 

line but realizing that they were too exposed, began to fall back to the 

“Alamo” and the cover of the rocks. Specialist Shawn Heistand fired a 

burst from his assault rifle in the direction of the enemy and then got up and 

darted for the southeast corner of the team’s position. Private First Class 

Brian Bradbury, a squad automatic weapon (SAW) gunner, followed right 

on Heistand’s heels but was struck by enemy fire almost immediately and 

went down in the clearing badly wounded. The three other team members 

on the northern end of the perimeter sought to put some distance between 

themselves and the enemy. In unison, they rushed to the southeast, diving 

behind the cover of the rocks as small arms fire and RPG rounds whizzed 

by. In the dash, Private First Class Mark James was wounded but was able 

to make it to the rocks, where Specialist Matthew Chambers grabbed him 

and began to treat his wounds.29 The fight was just two minutes old and 

the Americans already had two Soldiers wounded, one of them critically 

and out in the open. 

While Soldiers were repositioning themselves at “Alamo” at the 

southern end of the perimeter, Sergeant Patrick Lybert laid down a 

continuous cover fire with his assault rifle. The enemy fighters could be 

heard shouting to one another in the woods ahead as they tried to maneuver 

closer to the Americans. Lybert continued to fire steady bursts at the sounds 

of the enemy, trying to buy time for the other members of the kill team as 

they formed a new perimeter behind the rocks. Minutes later, Sergeant 

Lybert was struck by enemy fire which mortally wounded him. Other 

members of the team saw Lybert’s head slump forward, and when they 

called to him, he did not answer or move. The kill team had suffered its 

first fatality.30 Initial attempts to get to Lybert were repulsed by the steady 

stream of incoming fire. Specialist Linnihan, who was positioned closest 

to Lybert, could not get to him but during one of his several attempts, he 
14

was able to secure Lybert’s weapon and hand it to one of the other Soldiers 

behind the rock barrier. 

As the kill team quickly reformed a tight perimeter to the south of 

the rocks, Staff Sergeant Cunningham directed the team’s fire against the 

enemy while Staff Sergeant Monti initiated a call for fire over the task 

force fire support radio network. In his situation report, he expressed the 

severity of the team’s situation and the possibility that it might be overrun. 

The fire support coordinator on the other end of the radio remembered 

Monti’s “very calm, very clear” voice on the radio despite what was 

an increasingly grave situation.31 In his normal measured tone, Monti 

provided the grid coordinates for mortars and artillery support, specifying 

the need for “danger close” fires or rounds that would land approximately 

200-300 meters from the team. One thing that many Soldiers operating 

in northeastern Afghanistan would learn is that the steep inclines in the 

mountainous terrain greatly influenced the effectiveness of indirect fire. 

Where one might be afforded a little leeway in coordinating fires for a 

relatively flat target area, there was no such leeway in the mountains. 

Calculation errors of only a few meters could render an artillery or air 

strike completely ineffective. Within seconds, task force mortar fire began 

slamming the woods to the north but further off than the team needed. 

Unknown to the Soldiers of the kill team, the crews manning the 120mm 

mortar position at Gowardesh Bridge came under attack at almost the 

same time as the Soldiers on the ridgeline, albeit from a smaller enemy 

force. While fighting off the attack on their own position, the mortar 

platoon at the bridge continued to answer Monti’s call for fire. As the 

mortar rounds landed in the trees, enemy RPG and RPK fire decreased. 

That fire however, was still intense enough to keep the Soldiers pinned to 

the ground and unable to maneuver or get to Sergeant Lybert or Private 

First Class Bradbury. 

At the TF Titan tactical operations center (TOC) at FOB Naray, the 

squadron staff was reacting to the initial reports of contact with the enemy. 

Two units were simultaneously defending themselves from unexpected 

insurgent attacks. This was the first indication that the enemy operating 

in Nuristan was much more sophisticated, organized, and aggressive than 

previously thought. For Staff Sergeant Cunningham, the coordinated 

attacks proved that the enemy consisted of “pretty smart guys.”32 As the 

radio reports of the engagement continued, not much could be gathered 

about the composition or the exact disposition of the enemy. Staff Sergeant 

Monti was pinned down by the enemy’s RPGs, unable to provide the details 

the squadron staff wanted. It was clear to those in tactical operations center 
15

or TOC however, that the kill team was up against a sizable enemy force. 

The squadron S2 recalled, “We were surprised with the number of enemy 

fighters reportedly involved since it constituted the most dangerous course 

of action.”33 

The first reaction of many in the TOC was to assume that the helicopter 

resupply had indeed alerted the enemy to the kill team’s presence allowing 

them to organize an attack. Given that the attack occurred approximately 

five hours after the resupply drop, it is also possible that the enemy force 

was already positioned on the mountain and aware of the Americans’ 

location when the UH-60 hovered over them. The coordinated attack 

against the mortars also supported the notion that what the kill team was 

facing was much more of a planned organized attack than a rapid reaction to 

the helicopter sighting. As the squadron S3, Major Timmons, commented, 

“You don’t consolidate that number of people with that much armament 

that fast without significant preparation.”34 In all likelihood, the enemy 

force of 50-70 fighters was already moving toward the kill team planning 

an attack. The resupply mission of that afternoon might have served the 

insurgents as confirmation of the kill team’s location. If true, the enemy had 

likely observed the kill team as they entered the valley near the Gowardesh 

Bridge and began their infiltration. Thinking back on the event, Captain 

Berkoff made an apt observation, “Since we underestimated the enemy’s 

organizational capabilities, we should certainly not underestimate their 

degree of situational awareness on their own mountain tops.”35 Whether 

the attack on the kill team was triggered by observation of the team near the 

bridge or by the aerial resupply remains unclear. What is evident however 

is that the enemy in Nuristan in 2006 was capable of maneuvering a large 

well-equipped force to within a hundred meters of the team’s position 

undetected and launching a coordinated attack that took both the team and 

the task force by complete surprise. 

While continuing its supporting RPG and machine gun fire and 

perhaps spurred on by the incoming mortars, the enemy began to attempt 

to flank the kill squad’s position from both the northeast and western sides. 

To the northeast, Private Sean Smith had been able to secure a sniper rifle 

while falling back to a position behind the rocks and now used it with 

great effect. In a spot hidden from enemy view, he engaged a number of 

insurgents trying to use the footpath to skirt the eastern side of the team’s 

position, killing a number of them. Remembering Smith’s effective
16

Figure 4. View of Mountain 2610 with US Kill Team and Enemy Support By Fire 

Position Shown.

defense of their eastern flank, Staff Sergeant Cunningham recalled, “Every 

guy that would come across that trail would get dropped.”36 Meanwhile, 

Monti maintained communications with the mortar platoon in an attempt 

to adjust the fires closer to his position. He paused long enough to engage 

an advancing group of insurgents just 20 meters away with his M4 carbine 

and a grenade, forcing them back. The kill team fought in three directions, 

directing fire to the north, east, and west. For the moment, the enemy’s 

flanking attempts had been checked but the steady insurgent fire from the 

woods continued. Adjusted rounds from the mortars began to hit their 

mark to the north but the enemy persisted. Outnumbered and outgunned, 

the Americans needed more firepower to turn the tide. 

At this time, Staff Sergeant Monti and Sergeant Hawes turned 

their attention to the wounded Private First Class Bradbury who lay 

approximately 60 feet away in the open. Although partially hidden from 

enemy observation, Bradbury was still very much in danger of being hit 

with indirect fire. He could weakly communicate with the others behind the 

rocks but his wounds were such that he could do little else. Staff Sergeant 

Monti quickly decided that he had to retrieve Bradbury and get him to 
17

Figure 5. Scheme of Maneuver during Firefight Above Gowardesh.

safety behind the rocks.37 He turned control of the squad radio over to 

Sergeant Christopher Grzecki and prepared to make a rush into the open. 

His first attempt carried him a few feet away from the rocks before a hail 

of enemy small arms fire forced him to take cover behind a small rock wall 

skirting the edge of the perimeter. Here, Monti found himself next to the 

body of Sergeant Lybert. After waiting another minute, he jumped over the 

wall and tried again to make his way to Bradbury only to be forced back 

again by withering fire. Before making what would be his final attempt to 

save Bradbury, Staff Sergeant Monti yelled to the other members of the 

kill team that he needed covering fire from their M203 Grenade Launcher. 

Sergeant Hawes fired a number of 203 rounds into the tree line to the north 

and the rest of the team opened up with a barrage of supporting rifle fire. 

At this point, Monti sprinted into the open toward Bradbury and within 

seconds was mortally wounded when an RPG round slammed into the 

ground a few feet from him. Minutes later, just as the sun dropped behind 

the ridgeline, Staff Sergeant Monti died from his wounds. 

At this point in the battle, the kill team was holding out for darkness 

and close air support both which arrived simultaneously. A B-1 bomber 

circling overhead delivered a number of 500 and 2,000 pound Joint Direct 

Attack Munitions (JDAM) which slammed into the woods on the northern 
18

stretch of the ridgeline. The bombs shook the ground and covered the team’s 

position in a cloud of dust. Numerous 105mm artillery and mortar rounds 

also found their mark in the woods, forcing the enemy fire to wither. One 

squadron Fire Support Officer (FSO) remembered, “We used nearly every 

mortar round they had out there.”38 The kill team emptied their magazines 

in the direction of the attack, although in the increasing darkness, they 

were relying more on sound than sight to target the enemy. Less than ten 

minutes later, the enemy fire ceased and only the sounds of circling aircraft 

and American voices shouting to one another could be heard. The firefight 

was over. Two noncommissioned officers from the team were dead and 

another Soldier was critically wounded but alive. Later estimates would 

place the number of enemy killed at 26 and the number of wounded at 17. 

The entire engagement lasted less than 60 minutes.39

Aftermath

The fight on Mountain 2610 may have been over but the members of 

the kill team would not know it until the next morning. They spent the rest 

of night of 21-22 June on 100 percent security anticipating another attack. 

Nervousness and fatigue combined with the painful grief at the loss of 

their two fellow Soldiers to make the wait for sunrise a harrowing task. 

While many of the Soldiers would have taken the chance to withdraw 

from the mountain in the dark, to do so with two KIAs and one critically 

wounded Soldier presented too much of an obstacle. Immediately after the 

fight, a medical evacuation aircraft (a UH-60 Black Hawk) from the 159th 

Medical Company flew up to the ridgeline to extract the wounded. Tragedy 

struck the team once more as Bradbury and a medic, Staff Sergeant Heath 

Craig, were being hoisted up to the helicopter. The litter basket in which 

they sat began to oscillate rapidly causing the winch to pinch the lifting 

cable against the side of the helicopter. As a result, the cable snapped, 

sending Bradbury and Craig plummeting hundreds of feet to the ground 

below. Both were killed.40 It was another devastating blow to the team as 

it sought to regroup from the jarring events of that evening. 

As much as the battle staff of TF Titan wanted to get the kill team off 

the mountain that night, the proposition seemed too risky, particularly after 

the MEDEVAC accident. It is also important to note that just six weeks 

prior, on the night of 5 May 2006, the task force suffered a catastrophic 

crash of a CH-47 that was extracting Soldiers from a small landing zone 

perched on a ridge above the Chawkay Valley. Ten Soldiers were killed, 

including the 3-71 CAV Commander Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Fenty. 

The emotional and psychological toll of the crash still weighed heavy on 

the squadron. Major Richard Timmons, the Squadron S3 stated, “People 
19

were very hesitant to place helicopters in dangerous positions” after the 

accident.41 Captain Berkoff agreed, remembering that “No one wanted to 

risk another bird.” 42 The 3-71 Commander Lieutenant Colonel Michael 

Howard, reported the decision to leave the kill team in position until the 

next day up to the 3rd BCT and CJTF-76. All agreed that attempting a 

helicopter extraction that night was simply too dangerous.43 Instead, the 

task force ensured that they had continuous aerial surveillance and fire 

support coverage for the team’s position for the duration of the night. 

When morning broke on 22 June, the kill team was more than ready to 

return to FOB Naray. They had fought hard against a determined enemy 

that outnumbered them and beat them back, but nearly 25 percent of the 

team did not make it off the ridgeline alive. It was not a definitive defeat, 

but also not a victory of any kind. The team made a quick descent from the 

mountain during the day on 22 June and was back at FOB Naray before 

nightfall. Fellow TF Titan Soldiers met the tired members of the team as 

they entered the main gates of the FOB and assisted them in removing 

and securing their equipment. The story of the fight spread through TF

Titan and Staff Sergeant Monti’s heroism quickly became apparent to all 

in the command. That day, the task force commander initiated Monti’s 

posthumous promotion to the rank of Sergeant First Class.44 Two days 

later, a patrol from the squadron’s Charlie Company returned to the site of 

the firefight to secure the small amount of tactical gear that the kill team

was forced to leave behind. One of the officers on the patrol expressed 

his amazement at the amount of blood present at the site, uncertain if it 

was enemy or friendly. He later commented to a friend, “If death had 

a smell that was it.”45 No enemy remains were discovered at the site. 

The squadron pushed into the Gremen Valley on 24 June, establishing a 

presence that they would not relinquish. From September to November 

of 2006, TF Titan manned a combat outpost (COP) on a ridgeline just east 

of Mountain 2610 and named it in honor of Sergeant Patrick Lybert. From 

there, the Soldiers of TF Titan built relationships with the local population 

and monitored activity in the valley for the remainder of their deployment. 

Over three years later, Sergeant First Class Monti was awarded 

the Medal of Honor, the second recipient of the award from the war 

in Afghanistan. Indeed, the story of Monti’s performance under fire 

dominated the news of the Gowardesh fight in the years following. The 

events of that night however, offered a number of insights for US forces 

fighting in Afghanistan well beyond the acts of a single individual. When 

Sergeant Daniel Linnihan was asked what advice he would offer to other 

Soldiers based on his experience on Mountain 2610 that night, he stated 
20

simply, “complacency kills.”46 The attack had occurred so suddenly, that 

according to Linnihan, it served as a sobering reminder that insurgent 

ambushes, particularly in the mountains of northeastern Afghanistan, are 

rarely detectible. “I never took my gear off again,” for the remainder of the 

unit deployment, he later claimed.47 For Staff Sergeant Cunningham, the 

enduring lesson was simple. “More vigilance” was needed in dealing with 

an enemy that was both elusive and bold. 48 This message would prove 

prophetic two years later in a spot that was immediately adjacent to the 

scene of the Gowardesh firefight. The units that replaced TF Titan in the 

Gremen Valley area continued to man COP Lybert and experienced little to 

no enemy activity for months at a time. In May of 2008, a Stars and Stripes

reporter visiting US Soldiers operating near Gowardesh reported, “The 

chances of a well-coordinated and successful [enemy] attack are pretty 

slim... The biggest enemy they [US Soldiers] face, at least for the moment, 

is the boredom.”49 Two months later, Soldiers from the 3d Brigade Combat 

Team, 1st Infantry Division were enjoying what they perceived as a lowthreat environment at COP Lybert, with one Soldier describing the mission 

as “a normal day-to-day life” and others expecting “a quiet deployment.” 

On 11 September 2008, insurgents attacked the COP without warning and 

a two-hour firefight ensued. In the end, support from Apache helicopters 

and A-10 aircraft was needed to drive off the attackers, leaving one US 

Soldier dead.50 

If nothing else, the firefight of 21 June 2006 demonstrated that US 

forces could easily underestimate the enemy. The insurgents were more 

capable and thus more dangerous than the US Soldiers had anticipated. 

After his deployment, Captain Berkoff, TF Titan’s Intelligence Officer, 

made this point emphatically: 

As a whole, we clearly underestimated the enemy’s organizational 

capabilities. This particular engagement taught us that the enemy 

in Nuristan did not mind fighting us during the night. They were 

opportunistic fighters. They launched that attack with little prior 

planning and little thought of their own risks. It was the first time they 

ever saw American Soldiers set up in their own woods/backyards and 

they were eager to do some damage.

With this type of aggressive, organized, and motivated adversary operating 

around them, the lessons of “complacency kills” and “more vigilance” 

offered by the survivors of the engagement seem fitting indeed. It is unclear 

what role, if any, tactical complacency played in the events surrounding 

the engagement on Mountain 2610 but what is evident is that the Soldiers 
21

of the kill team and TF Titan emerged from the event much more aware 

and prepared for the type of threat they faced. 

The firefight of 21 June 2006 also highlights the critical role played 

by artillery and close air support in operations in northeast Afghanistan. 

The Soldiers of the TF Titan kill team were the first Americans to fight 

in the Gremen Valley but the outcome of the engagement was similar to 

other engagements in Nuristan and Kunar provinces. In the Korengal, 

Waygal, and Chawkay valleys, direct engagements with the enemy usually 

required both artillery and close air support to disrupt an insurgent attack. 

The extreme terrain usually prevented the basic tactical principles of 

identifying, closing with or even pursuing the enemy. Often, the exact 

location of the enemy was impossible to ascertain from the ground. As 

such, the Soldiers of TF Titan and those that arrived after 2006 came to 

rely heavily on friendly aviation assets and aerial surveillance platforms. 

If they did not arrive already prepared to coordinate fire support missions, 

the Soldiers operating in northeastern Afghanistan would have to become 

adept at directing artillery and close air support. This skill was critical 

even for Soldiers at the squad level. 

The logistical constraints of operating in northeast Afghanistan 

were also made painfully apparent as the kill team found it stuck on the 

ridgeline in need of food and water, forcing the task force to conduct a 

high-risk resupply operation in daylight. The act of climbing mountains, 

some in excess of 7,000 feet, brought with it a myriad of limitations in 

relation to the time, flexibility, and contingency of any operation. In 

the case of Operation GOWARDESH THRUST, when the mission was 

delayed, the squadron staff believed the only feasible option was to 

leave the kill team in position primarily because of the time and effort 

required to infiltrate to the position. After being accustomed to a modern 

training world where HMMWVs, trucks, and helicopters facilitated rapid 

movement on the battlefield, the Soldiers of TF Titan found the terrain 

of Kunar and Nuristan to be a stark, tactically debilitating obstacle that 

slowed logistical operations from squad to division level to a plodding 

and frustrating pace. This realization came from the hard experience of 

climbing, step by step. An interview conducted with TF Titan Soldiers and 

officers towards the end of their rotation suggested that, “no one, it seems, 

told them they would have to fight a Vietnam-style war at high altitudes.” 51

In such an environment, the type of food and water shortage experienced 

by the kill team on 21 June, something rare in the training world, became 

a more common occurrence throughout TF Titan’s rotation that year. 

One squadron officer stated, “We’ve gone on mission after mission after 
22

mission where we’ve gone black on food and water,” adding, “We end up 

stuck on a mountain top for two weeks. If you can’t get us off a mountain, 

don’t put us there.”52 These logistic and operational frustrations defined 

much of TF Titan’s year on the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan 

and would remain defining factors for follow-on units as well. 

Despite the numerous challenges offered by the environment, the 

Soldiers and leaders of TF Titan found a way to wage a counterinsurgency 

in Kunar and Nuristan. The enduring message they offered their successors 

was that this war was very much a process of trial and error both tactically 

and logistically. It is true that the Soldiers of TF Titan were not totally 

prepared for the challenges that awaited them in the mountains. This fact 

is neither surprising nor unexpected given that it was the first American 

battalion to operate in the region. The firefight above Gowardesh was 

one of the first of many poignant examples of American Soldiers facing 

significant adversity in the mountains of northeast Afghanistan and fighting 

through it. When they were attacked by an enemy with superior numbers 

and sufficient firepower, the members of the kill team stood their ground 

on challenging terrain and fought off the attack. They did not withdraw or 

permit themselves to be overrun. They were able to successfully integrate 

artillery and close air support into the fight, a critical task in this war. 

Although a number of tactical decisions could have been made differently, 

it is impossible to know how different actions would have changed the 

outcome of the engagement, if at all. The events of that night above 

Gowardesh have up to the publication of this study served as the context 

for one of the war’s few Medals of Honor. The greater significance of the 

firefight of 21 June 2006 however, lay in its indication of the campaign to 

come. The units that followed TF Titan into northeast Afghanistan over 

the four years that followed their deployment would continue to face 

serious difficulties created by the unforgiving terrain, harsh weather, and 

a committed insurgent enemy. Ultimately, the story of TF Titan kill team

on Mountain 2610 is the story of all US Soldiers finding a way to wage a 

complex counterinsurgency in a very challenging operational environment. 
23

Notes

1. Michael A. Coss, “Operation Mountain Lion: CJTF-76 in Afghanistan, 

Spring 2006,” Military Review (Jan-Feb 2008): 23.

2. Company Operations History for June 2006, Charlie Company, 3d 

Squadron, 71st Cavalry Regiment, dated 15 July 2006; Company Operations 

History for June 2006, Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, 3d Squadron, 71st 

Cavalry Regiment, dated 15 July 2006. 

3. Associated Press, “U.S. Forces Push further into Afghanistan,” 8 August 

2006. www.military.com/NewsContent/0,13319,109103,00.html. (Accessed on 

13 March 2011.) 

4. Lieutenant Colonel Richard Timmons, Interview by Lieutenant Colonel 

Clay Mountcastle, 12 April 2011. Timmons served as the Squadron XO and S3 

during the unit’s deployment to Afghanistan in 2006-2007.

5. Official US Army Narrative, Congressional Medal of Honor for SFC Jared 

C. Monti. Accessed at www.army.mil/medalofhonor/monti/narrative.html on 21 

February 2011; Zimmerman, Dwight J. and John Gresham, Uncommon Valor: 

The Medal of Honor and the Six Warrior who Earned it in Iraq and Afghanistan

(New York: St. Martin’s Press), 250.

6. Captain Ross Berkoff, Interview by Lieutenant Colonel Clay Mountcastle, 

15 April 2011. 

7. Sergeant First Class Hunsacker, Interview by Douglas Cubbison, 

Operational Leadership Experience (OLE) Project Team, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 January 2007, 7. 

8. Staff Sergeant Christopher Cunningham, Interview by Douglas Cubbison, 

Operational Leadership Experience (OLE) Project Team, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 13. 

9. Cunningham, interview, 13-14. 

10. 3d Infantry Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division, US Army, TF 

Spartan AAR, May 2007, 9-30 to 9-31.

11. Cunningham, interview, 14.

12. Official US Army Narrative, Medal of Honor for SFC Jared C. Monti.

 13. Monti MOH narrative; Interview with SGT Daniel B. Linnihan, conducted 

by author on 22 March 2011. 

14. Timmons, interview.

15. Timmons, interview; Cunningham interview, 14.

16. Marcus Luttrell and Patrick Robinson, Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness 

Account of Operation Red Wing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10 (New 

York: Little, Brown, and Company), 200-220; Andrew North and Tony AllenMills, “Downed US SEALs may have got too close to Bin Laden,” The Sunday 

Times (London), 10 July 2005. 

17. Elizabeth M. Collins, “ ‘Soldiers’ NCO’ earns Medal of Honor for heroic 

deeds in Afghanistan,” Army News Service, 14 September, 2009. www.us.army.

mil/news/2009/09/14. (Accessed on 20 March 2011.) 
24

18. Timmons, interview.

19. Zimmerman, Uncommon Valor, 252; Army CMH narrative for SFC 

Monti. 

20. Cunningham interview, OLE, 14.

21. Hunsacker interview, OLE, 13.

22. Collins, “ ‘Soldiers’ NCO’ earns Medal of Honor,” 2. The author reported 

that SGT Hawes “was chagrined to see large white packages dropping less than 

150 meters from them in broad daylight.” 

23. Monti MOH Narrative; Cunningham interview, 14.

24. Berkoff, interview.

25. Cunningham, interview, 15.

26. Cunningham, interview, 14.

27. Cunningham, interview.

28. Sergeant Linnihan, Interview by Lieutenant Colonel Clay Mountcastle.

29. Zimmerman, Uncommon Valor, 255. 

30. Monti MOH narrative; Zimmerman, Uncommon Valor, 258. 

31. Hunsacker, interview, 13. 

32. Cunningham, interview, 16.

33. Hunsacker, interview, 14; Berkoff Interview.

34. Timmons, interview.

35. Berkoff, interview.

36. Monti MOH narrative; Interview with Cunningham, 17. 

37. Zimmerman, Uncommon Valor, 260. 

38. Interview with First Lieutenant Jorgensen, Interview by Douglas 

Cubbison, Operational Leadership Experience (OLE) Project Team, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS., 22 January 2007, 13.

39. TF Spartan AAR, May 2007, 6-17. The AAR inexplicably described 

the enemy attack as “lasting 18 hours,” but all other accounts suggest it lasted 

between 25-40 minutes. 

40. Company Operations History for June 2006, Charlie Company, 3-71 

CAV, dated 15 July 2006.

41. Timmons, interview

42. Berkoff, interview. 

43. Timmons, interview; Berkoff interview. 

44. Company Operations History for June 2006, Headquarters and 

Headquarters Troop, 3-71 CAV, dated 15 July 2006; Monti MOH Narrative. 

45. Jorgensen, interview, 14-15. 

46. Linnihan, interview.
25

47. Linnihan, interview.

48. Cunningham Interview, 18.

49. Drew Brown, “Soldiers Battle Boredom in Afghan Valley,” Stars and 

Stripes, Mideast Edition, 4 May, 2008.

50. Michael Gisick, “Fateful Day brings Post Back to War’s Reality,” Stars 

and Stripes, Mideast Edition, 25 September 2008. 

51. Matthew Cole, “Watching Afghanistan Fall.” www.salon.com/news/

feature/2007/02/27/afghanistan. (Accessed on 10 March 2011.)

52. Cole, “Watching Afghanistan Fall”.

27

Ambushing the Taliban

A US Platoon in the Korengal Valley

by

Scott J. Gaitley

It was near twilight and they had just finished eating and saying their 

evening prayers. Gathering their weapons and personal items, the men 

departed the village of Chichal on what they believed to be an uneventful 

journey. As they strolled down the darkened mountainous trails, quietly 

chatting with one another, those leading the column suddenly heard a 

distinctive metallic click. Not knowing what this noise was, the column 

stopped abruptly. Little did they know, many of the men who began this 

nighttime journey would not make it home that fateful night. 

On 10 April 2009, 2d Platoon, Bravo (Viper) Company, 1st Battalion, 

26th Infantry (1-26 IN) “Blue Spaders,” killed 15 insurgents in a modified 

linear-style ambush along the Sawtalo Sar Ridgeline in the Korengal 

Valley. At 1925 hours, 26 enemy personnel traveling down the Chichal/

Donga Trail, roughly two and a half kilometers east of the Korengal 

Outpost (KOP), unknowingly walked into the waiting firepower of 2d 

Platoon. This was an extraordinary and rare opportunity for the Soldiers to 

see their intended targets close-up and in such notable numbers. Members 

of the platoon were concealed and tactically positioned alongside the 

trail, providing them with superior fields of fire. The successful ambush 

enabled 2d Platoon to interdict a sizeable and heavily armed insurgent 

force moving freely throughout the Korengal Valley (see Figure 1). 

Background

The Korengal Valley is a mountainous region approximately 10 

miles in length and is comprised of narrow and towering rugged rock 

walls ascending to 3,000-7,500 feet in elevation which sharply descends 

toward the stream and its flood plain.1

 The Korengal Valley is considered 

one of the deadliest and most highly contested locations within the 14 

provincial areas under the authority of Regional Command East (RCEast), the Coalition’s military command in charge of operations in eastern 

Afghanistan. Located 25 miles west of Asadabad, the capital city of Kunar 

Province, the Korengal has earned the unpleasant reputation as the “Valley 

of Death” due to the 35 Americans killed there from 2005 to 2010.2

 

The Korengal stream courses through this arduous terrain in a northerly 

direction into the Pech River which runs east to west across the Pech
28

Figure 1. A Korengal Valley reference map.

District (one of 12 districts within Kunar Province). The population resides 

in villages randomly scattered near the valley floors and built among the 

steep mountainsides along the narrow valley. Areas between the villages 

are predominantly desolate and uninhabitable. For the villagers visiting 

and trading with one another, beaten dirt paths are the customary routes 

of travel. The region is inhabited primarily by Pashtuns from the Safi tribe 

who are mixed with ethnic Nuristanis. The dominant language spoken 

throughout the valley is Korengali, otherwise referred to as Pashai. 

Lacking a developed road system connecting the valley to other provincial 

areas, Korengal residents are isolated and normally distrustful of outsiders 

including other Afghans. The inhabitants of the Korengal are considered 

to be a fiercely inward society with a longstanding grievance against 

those trying to impose control over them. This attitude helps explain why 

Afghan forces and government personnel assisting the Coalition efforts 

with modernization projects and aiding the populace have often been 
29

ineffective.3 The mixture of lush trees, rugged mountains, cross-border 

sanctuaries, and distrustful mountain residents have all contributed to 

creating a volatile mixture making the Korengal Valley a breeding ground 

for the insurgency.4

Task Force Duke

Soldiers from the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, 

known as Task Force Duke, under the command of Colonel John M. Spiszer, 

deployed to the northeastern portion of Afghanistan along the Pakistan 

border from July 2008 to June 2009. Their area of operation specifically 

included Nangarhar, Nuristan, Kunar, and Laghman provinces. Executing 

Spiszer’s counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy within their designated 

locations, TF Duke attempted to expand security and develop and train 

Afghan security forces while simultaneously enhancing the governance 

and economic expansion within their designated regions.5

Commanded by Captain James C. Howell, Bravo Company of 1st 

Battalion, 26th Infantry (1-26 IN) and hereafter known as Viper Company, 

attempted to attain Colonel Spiszer’s COIN mission in the Korengal 

Valley.6 Realistically, Viper Company’s goal was “To keep the enemy tied 

down in the Korengal so that our battalion could make progress in the Pech 

River Valley.”7 This was anything but an easy task for roughly 150 Soldiers 

sparsely dispersed among several Combat Outposts (COPs), Firebases 

(FB), and Observation Posts (OPs) throughout the Korengal Valley. 

COPs and FBs differed mainly by the fact that combat outposts usually 

included the larger 120mm mortars while firebases might feature 82mm 

or 60mm mortars. Viper Company Headquarters (HQ) and the majority of 

2d Platoon, a squad from the Battalion Scout Platoon, a 120mm Mortar 

section, Afghanistan National Army (ANA) Company HQ, and two ANA 

Rifle Platoons were located at the Korengal Outpost (KOP) nearly two 

kilometers west of Kandlay. A squad from 2d Platoon was located at OP 

Dallas, south of Aliabad. On the eastern side of the valley, 3d Platoon 

occupied COP Vegas and OP Rock, both less than a kilometer northeast of 

the village of Kandlay. Members of 1st Platoon were dispersed amongst 

three different locations: A fire team at OP 1 about a half kilometer west 

of the KOP. A quick reaction force (QRF) comprised of six men and two 

vehicles at the KOP and the remainder were assigned to FB Restrepo, 

northwest of Aliabad (see Figure 1 for map references).8

Viper Company’s objectives were complicated by poor weather 

conditions that often plagued the valley and consequently limited available 

air assets. Convoys generally delivered supplies monthly to the KOP, 
30

Firebase Vimoto (occupied by an ANA Rifle Platoon), and OP Dallas, the 

only three bases accessible by ground vehicles. Convoy replenishment 

required a “company-level effort” and Apache helicopters to ensure safe 

passage down Route Victory which was the only passable road through 

the valley.9

 On many occasions, the road was laced with mines and 

exposed to insurgent ambushes. Without the necessary supplies, especially 

ammunition, Viper Company sometimes discontinued combat patrols and 

remained in a defensive posture within their assigned outposts. Sometimes 

supplies were dropped by parachute requiring Herculean efforts to locate, 

gather, and protect the desperately needed materials and getting it safely 

back to the awaiting platoons. Occasionally, the cargo was dropped 

erratically into impenetrable sections of the valley or into the hands of 

the insurgents. Despite these imposing challenges, Captain Howell was 

determined to carry out his mission. 

Enemy forces traveled freely throughout the valley allowing them to 

appear as normal persons, stashing caches of weaponry and supplies in 

designated areas. Many of these insurgents were born and raised in the 

Korengal Valley which only enhanced their ability to maneuver and attack 

incessantly. Firefights with the enemy occurred almost daily. “I’ve never 

understood how they can move in and set up on us without us knowing 

they were there,” said Sergeant Craig Tanner, 3d Squad Leader.10 Limited 

intelligence resources restricted Viper Company’s ability to identify the 

locations of weapons caches and detained insurgents offered only sketchy 

details. However, Viper Company knew that the insurgents routinely used 

the same routes of travel.11

By sending out routine patrols, attempting to conduct weekly and 

monthly ambushes, and visiting neighboring villages, Captain Howell 

hoped to disrupt the elusive enemy and to gain some valuable intelligence 

on its operations in the valley. However, this task proved more difficult 

than initially expected. There were an inadequate number of Viper

Company Soldiers to search the entire valley for weapons caches and 

high-value targets (HVT). Typically, the patrolling squads were unable to 

ambush insurgent forces since their route of travel was carefully observed 

by a “spotter,” who notified enemy personnel over hand-held radio 

communication devices about the presence of US patrols.12 However, this 

situation changed on 10 April 2009 when Second Lieutenant Justin R. 

Smith, leading his first combat patrol in Afghanistan, wreaked havoc upon 

the enemy. 
31

Movement up the Ridge

For the mission that day, the Sawtalo Sar Ridge located approximately 

two and a half kilometers east of the KOP was chosen for 2d Platoon’s 

objective because it was a favorite enemy site for routine attacks using 

DShK heavy and PKM general-purpose machine guns, rocket propelled 

grenades (RPGs), and AGS-17 automatic grenade launchers on the nearby 

Coalition outposts within the valley. Taking fire from multiple locations, 

Viper Company personnel assumed that there was only a team or squad 

sized insurgent element in the vicinity.13 Captain Howell anticipated that 

by sending Lieutenant Smith on a clearing operation of 20 hours duration 

to the top of the ridge, he could identify the location from which the enemy 

fired these weapons, search for weapons caches, and disrupt any enemy 

operations throughout the night. Captain Howell neither gave Lieutenant 

Smith a specific location to establish a patrol base nor expected him to 

ambush the enemy. However, because no friendly forces had been up 

on this ridge in quite some time, Howell planned on having 2d Platoon 

conduct a lengthy patrol along Sawtalo Sar Ridge for half of the designated 

period and patrol back to the west for the other half. The plan included an 

overnight stay at a patrol base and, at first light the following day, a return 

to the KOP.

As a new Viper Company replacement officer with barely a week 

as 2d Platoon Leader, Lieutenant Smith, an honor graduate of the Army 

Ranger School, took his first assignment in Afghanistan quite seriously. 

Not wanting to disappoint either his platoon or his commanding officer, 

he prepared extensively for this mission. First, he studied several books 

pertaining to tactical instruction for Soldiers engaging in counterinsurgency 

operations including The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat 

Tactics in Afghanistan. He also carried the Ranger Handbook which 

emphasized the five principles of patrolling: planning, reconnaissance, 

security, control, and common-sense tactics.14 Second, Smith visualized 

the rugged terrain by standing on a bunker at the KOP where he scanned 

and planned his avenue of approach up the steep mountainside. Four days 

prior to the assigned mission, First Lieutenant John Rodriguez, Executive 

Officer for Viper Company, accompanied 2d Platoon on a reconnaissance 

patrol to familiarize Lieutenant Smith with the area and route of travel. 

This endeavor enabled Lieutenant Smith the opportunity to determine the 

estimated time it would take his platoon to reach the patrol base position, 

conduct map checks, and identify safe locations for water breaks. Then 

Smith factored in the anticipated time 2d Platoon needed for returning to 

the KOP. Third, Smith had a long discussion with his Non-Commissioned 
32

Officers (NCOs) and discussed the mission itinerary, the social dynamics 

of the local villagers, and potential threats in the area. At this time, Smith 

was pleased to learn that his men were familiar with the Ranger Handbook 

since they were required to use it for their training.15 Fourth, he rehearsed a 

number of “what if” scenarios repeatedly with his platoon. These included 

potential attacks by the enemy before crossing the Korengal stream and 

after, actions if sub-elements were separated, defense of the patrol base, 

and how the unit would employ its limited air assets.16 Fifth, the platoon 

members conducted “rock drills” which provided them with the position 

and actions of each man throughout the duration of the patrol and placed 

particular emphasis on how to occupy the patrol base.17 Because the 

company had not established a triangular patrol base since leaving the 

United States for its deployment, it was imperative for Smith to explain 

how he planned to set it up. Last, Smith continually consulted with his 

senior leadership to ensure that there was nothing that he had overlooked. 

After extensive preparation, the 31 Soldiers of 2d Platoon headed 

out on the assigned mission. Included were six men from platoon’s 

headquarters, nine from 2d Squad, eight from 3d Squad, and eight Viper

Company Scouts assisting the platoon with its latest mission. On this 

patrol, 2d Platoon had a vast array of weaponry including three Mark 48 

7.62mm light machine guns (a lighter version of the M-240), three Mark 46 

5.56mm squad automatic weapons (SAW) which is a lighter version of the 

M-249, five 40mm grenade launchers (M-203s), an M-110 sniper rifle, one 

M-14 rifle, and 20 M-4 personal assault rifles. The lighter-weight weapons 

were test models given to Viper Company from the Asymmetric Warfare 

Group (AWG). Each Soldier wore his personal body armor, carried his 

assigned weapons with a combat load of ammunition (700 rounds for the 

M-4), transported sizable quantities of water, carried two to four grenades 

each, and hauled a wide variety of other gear required for the mission. This 

included personal radios, shovels, rations, etc.

They departed the KOP at 1130 with 2d Squad leading the way and 

3d Squad bringing up the rear of the column. They began their lengthy 

trek down the “Stairway to Heaven” (villager carved steps into the 

mountainside in an attempt to ease travel) and crossed over the Korengal 

stream to the Kandlay Trail (see Figure 2) where they began an ascent 

up the steep ridgeline. Meanwhile, they stopped to sweep for weapons 

caches every 100 meters or 20 to 30 minutes walking distance apart. This 

operation required some Soldiers to take a “knee and post” security while 

others commenced their search. The procedure also allowed the men to 

take a much needed break, evaluate their surroundings for threats, and 
33

reduce the likelihood of heat exhaustion as they ascended up the steep 

ridgeline. Using spotting scopes, Viper Company Soldiers back at the KOP 

were able to monitor the progress of 2d Platoon as they took their breaks 

and kept an eye out for enemy observers and other potential threats.18

Throughout this journey, Lieutenant Smith and his men were routinely 

observed by local villagers who watched and reported every move to the 

insurgency. Even though this was a common occurrence in the valley, this 

time it favored 2d Platoon. For unknown reasons, the enemy spotters lost 

track of the Soldiers during their ascent up the ridge and reportedly assumed 

that they had already turned back towards the KOP. This constituted a 

fatal mistake. Prior to this patrol, Viper Company normally established 

their ambushes and patrol bases during daytime hours. Departing before 

dawn and setting up their ambush before the sun rose, the Soldiers waited 

throughout the day in hopes of spotting the enemy. If no enemy appeared 

before nightfall, they packed it up and departed. This time though, they 

mixed things up a bit and remained on the Sawtalo Sar Ridge throughout 

the night. This deviation from the standard operating procedure (SOP) 

greatly contributed to 2d Platoon’s successful mission.19

While walking along the Kandlay Trail, the Soldiers discovered a 

smaller trail that intersected with the nearby Chichal/Donga Trail (see 

Figure 3) which ran north to south across the Sawtalo Sar Ridgeline. It 

was on this spur that 2d Platoon noticed signs of personnel traffic through 

the area such as food remnants, discarded batteries, prints from varying 

footwear, and empty water containers dropped haphazardly along the trail. 

Lieutenant Smith radioed Captain Howell informing him of their findings 

and confirming that no other friendly units had been in the area. After 

alleviating his concerns, Smith decided to modify his pre-planned patrol 

base location near a landing zone on top of Sawtalo Sar. He believed that 

the enemy crossed from one side of the valley to another at this point. 

With this recent discovery, Smith opted for a better position to monitor this 

portion of the heavily used trail. After marching uphill for six and a half 

to seven hours, 2d Platoon finally reached the objective rally point (ORP), 

roughly 1900 meters in elevation and two and a half kilometers away from 

the KOP.20
34

Figure 2. 2nd Platoon Soldiers on the Kandlay Trail.

Figure 3. The Chichal-Donga Trail looking north. (Left to Right) Staff Sergeant 

Little, Lieutenant Smith, Sergeant Reese, and Sergeant Nightingale.

Photo courtesy of Captain Justin R. Smith Photo courtesy of Sergeant Zachary A. Reese
35

NOTE: Sergeants Reese and Nightingale are wearing the Plate Carrier type 

ballistic vests with their Modular Lightweight Load-carrying Equipment 

(MOLLE) gear while Staff Sergeant Little and Lieutenant Smith are wearing 

the heavier and more restrictive Improved Outer Tactical Vest (IOTV). At the 

time of this photo on 10 April 2009, the Plate Carriers were not authorized but 

completely essential for the work of a Scout/Sniper. The Plate Carriers are now 

standard issue for those military personnel in Afghanistan not typically riding in 

vehicles.21

By this time, the sun had nearly set. The platoon was approximately 

100 meters from the new patrol base location. Smith led a patrol that 

included a scout and three Mark 48 gun teams comprised of a gunner and 

his assistant to establish the patrol base by placing the gun teams in the 

apexes, 9, 3, and 6 o’clock positions of his triangular patrol base. Once 

these were set in place, the remaining Soldiers took their positions. The 2d 

Squad situated itself southeast looking towards the trail and the enemy’s 

approach. The bulk of 3d Squad was positioned on the southwest side of 

the patrol base facing a ravine. The majority of the Scouts faced northwest 

and conducted rear security within the patrol base. Each Soldier knew 

who was on his left and who was on his right prior to settling in. Once in 

place, some men began digging in while others could only modify their 

gun positions because parts of the ridge were solid rock. 

As the men prepared their fighting positions, squad and team leaders 

established firing sectors and further improved their fighting positions.22

Three claymore anti-personnel mines were concealed in strategic 

locations. One was positioned near the 6 o’clock apex designed to cover 

the backside of the patrol base. Sergeant Thomas Horvath and Private First 

Class Richard Dewater positioned a second claymore facing southeast to 

cover a portion of the trail. The third mine covered the only remaining 

route for the enemy’s escape to the north. This claymore was manned by 

two Scouts, Specialists Joseph Raynal and Matthew Spencer, who were 

also providing rear security for the patrol base. 

At this time, Lieutenant Smith led a scout recon team up the Sawtalo 

Sar Ridge to identify a favorable place for setting up the observation 

post/listening post (OP/LP). Smith determined that the OP/LP would 

be positioned nearly 75 meters from the top of the ridge and 80 to 100 

meters from the patrol base. Several Scouts, including the squad leader 

Staff Sergeant Christopher Little, senior sniper and team leaders Sergeant 

Philip Nightingale and Sergeant Zachary Reese, and the grenadier 

Specialist Jordan Custer joined Lieutenant Smith in this endeavor. In 

addition, communication specialist Private First Class Stuart Healey from 

the company headquarters joined the recon team and assisted in collecting 
36

Global Positioning System (GPS) grid positions every 20 meters along the 

trail. This provided precise trail coordinates in latitude and longitude for 

use as targeting reference points for incoming artillery and mortar rounds.23

Around 1830 hours when dusk turned into night, the Soldiers went 

on “stand-to” alert, a period when all personnel are awake and focused on 

their assigned sectors watching and listening for any signs of movement. 

Using the cover of the night and setting up the patrol base in a bushy wellconcealed area, 2d Platoon’s position was hidden from insurgents using the 

trail. An hour later, Lieutenant Smith sent Sergeants Reese and Nightingale 

and Specialist Custer to the OP/LP position southeast of the patrol base 

and west of the newly discovered trail. Carrying their equipment bags 

with them, the Scouts walked the short distance in approximately three 

minutes. Originally, they planned on digging in and constructing a place 

to hide so that they could monitor the trail but the approaching enemy 

interrupted this plan.24

Ambush

Shortly after arriving at the OP/LP, Sergeant Reese noticed movement 

on the trail. At first, Reese thought the shadowy figures were goats but 

immediately realized his error. He radioed Lieutenant Smith and advised 

him of a “large group of armed males” walking down the trail from the 

east. The insurgents had come over the top of the ridgeline and followed 

the Chichal-Donga trail to the north.25 Due to the darkness, Reese was 

unsure of the exact number of insurgents, until the second or third man 

in the column switched on and off a small LED-type flashlight, allowing 

Reese to initially count eight individuals at the front of the column.26 As 

the insurgents headed toward the patrol base, Staff Sergeant Little upon 

hearing Sergeant Reese’s radio transmission, repositioned himself to better 

observe the enemy heading his way. At first Lieutenant Smith thought 

something was wrong when Sergeant Reese radioed him as it had been 

less than 15 minutes since the OP/LP was emplaced. In the meantime, 

the OP/LP trio went prone and hid behind a felled tree. They were there 

to observe and only shoot when absolutely necessary or upon command. 

Smith, once told the enemy’s location, pulled Soldiers from other positions 

to reinforce the new kill zone south to southeast of the triangle between 

the 9 and 3 o’clock positions. The patrol base had now become a modified 

linear ambush position.

After counting 26 insurgents within three meters of the OP/LP site, 

Sergeant Reese was unable to communicate the enemy’s increased 

numbers to Lieutenant Smith without jeopardizing his position. Once the 
37

enemy came into view, Smith was perplexed. There were three or four 

spread out but a large group of them were all bunched together, strolling 

down the trail as if they just departed a shura in the local village. “I’m 

like, oh man, what is going on? Are the villagers lost up here?” Smith 

wondered.27 He was reminded of a recent statement from Captain Howell, 

“There’s nobody who’s going up there at that time of night for anything 

good.”28 The Platoon Leader scanned the group of men for signs of 

weapons. The entire US platoon was wearing night-vision equipment 

providing them a significant advantage over the enemy. Sergeant Little 

used an AN/PEQ-15 Advanced Target Pointer Illuminator Aiming Light 

(ATPIAL) infrared device which provides a beam of infrared energy that 

helps illuminate targets. Lieutenant Smith was able to positively identify 

15 men congregated within a 40-meter section of the trail carrying weapons 

and wearing ammo pouches entering the 50-meter wide kill zone.29 In this 

zone, Smith had maximized his firepower with a claymore mine, four 

machine guns (two Mark 48s and two Mark 46s), an extra M-203, and 

other personal weapons.

By this time, Sergeant Reese’s warning, “Enemy personnel 

approaching,” had already been transmitted or passed down the line. 

Many of the Soldiers had never seen the enemy this close and in such 

great numbers. Private First Class Brad Larson, 2d Squad grenadier, 

recalled, “My heart started pounding and I was scared shitless just 

waiting for them to get in sight.”30 As the men of 2d Platoon mentally and 

physically prepared for the impending attack, they trained their weapons 

on the insurgents coming into view. Sergeant Joshua Trudel, 2d Squad 

Leader, could hear the enemy talking and prepared to fire his weapon.31

The impatient but trained men were awaiting the command to open fire but 

because of the trees that obstructed his view, Smith still could not see the 

end of the enemy column. 

The enemy walked down the crest of the Sawtalo Sar Ridgeline 

following the Chichal/Donga Trail northwest until it opened up into a 

small clearing. At this point, the trail doglegged to the right changing to a 

southwesterly direction. This meant the insurgents were moving into the 

kill zone at an acute angle crossing from left to right (see Figure 4).

As Lieutenant Smith readied to trip the claymore, the nearest machine 

gunner to his right “hit the switch on his Mark 48,” making a metallic 

clicking sound.32 Sergeant Trudel said the enemy point man stopped about 

six feet away upon hearing the noise and he had a “confused look on his 
38

Figure 4. Patrol Base and enemy route of travel into the ambush.

face.”33 The insurgents began bunching up when the lead man heard the 

noise and looked toward Smith’s position. Fearing that the element of 

surprise had been lost, the lieutenant gave the command to open fire. 

Approximately 15 insurgents were within the kill zone many of which 

were only three to six feet away from 3d Squad machine gunner Specialist 

Robert Oxman who was in the 3 o’clock apex position of the triangle 

along with his assistant gunner, Private Troy Pacini-Harvey.

“Within seconds of the last person walking by our OP/LP, the patrol 

base initiated contact,” said Sergeant Reese.34 Lieutenant Smith whispered 

over the radio, “Fire, fire, fire.”35 Four of the enemies were directly in front 

of Trudel’s location. At this point, every Soldier facing the trail opened up 

on the insurgents who attempted to fight back, died trying, or ran away. 

Smith blew one claymore sending shards of shrapnel into the enemy 

column. Private First Class Larson, nearest to the southern ravine, noticed 

two enemy heading in his direction but their close proximity prevented 

him from firing his 40mm grenades which require a minimum of 15 meters 

to arm. So he used his rifle instead. One fell within six feet of his position 

and Larson remembered, “The other fell and rolled down the cliff.”36
39

When the wounded insurgent at Larson’s feet attempted to reach for his 

weapon, Larson killed him with a shot to the head. Sergeant Tanner saw 

three or four insurgents from the back of the enemy column head toward a 

draw that contained a claymore and yelled to his men to blow the mine and 

throw grenades. Sergeant Christopher Thompson, A Team Leader for 2d 

Squad, launched a 40mm grenade from his M-203 on a group of the enemy 

hitting three to five of them. Lieutenant Smith saw an arm flying off one of 

them. Private First Class Arturo Molano, a machine gunner for 2d Squad, 

hit one fleeing insurgent as he fell down into a ravine (see Figure 5).

When Captain Howell and Lieutenant Rodriguez at the KOP received 

the first reports from Specialist Steven Halase, 2d Platoon’s radio 

telephone operator (RTO), they were unsure who was ambushing who. 

As the firefight dwindled, more details filtered into Viper Company HQ. 

Soldiers at the KOP saw tracer rounds piercing the night sky at the ambush 

location. Simultaneously, 3d Platoon Soldiers at OP Rock and COP Vegas 

witnessed flashlights frantically moving eastward over the ridge towards 

the village of Chichal. After action reports suggest that these were the 12 

enemy personnel who had not yet reached the kill zone when Lieutenant 

Smith’s men opened fire. However, once 2d Platoon’s location was 

determined, as a safety precaution 3d Platoon opened fire on the escaping 

insurgents with their M-240s nearly a kilometer away. 

The enemy, caught totally by surprise, continued running in all 

directions during the deadly onslaught. In fact after the cease fire, platoon 

members discovered a right shoe and a left shoe about four meters apart 

with a blood trail leading towards a cliff edge. Apparently, one insurgent 

was either blown out of his shoes or ran right off a cliff. 37 At the OP/LP, 

the Scouts remained prone as friendly fire flew over their heads. As soon as 

they noticed several insurgents running in their direction, they too joined 

in the fray. Sergeant Nightingale shot two of the enemy with his silenced 

M-4 potentially saving Sergeant Reese from harm because the enemy was 

within a few feet of Reese’s location. Nightingale then threw a grenade at 

another insurgent heading south down the trail. Specialist Custer used both 

his M-4 and M-203 to fire on the fleeing men. Reese shot another insurgent 

with his M-110 Sniper rifle and threw a hand grenade in his direction.

After approximately 10 minutes, the men of 2d Platoon ceased fire and 

began looking for enemy survivors, collecting the dead, and conducting 

a sensitive site exploitation (SSE) by searching the dead insurgents.38

Platoon members also checked to see if any of their team had been
40

Figure 5. Location of patrol base and enemy elements on Sawtalo Sar Ridge.

wounded or killed and reconsolidated their ammo. Aiding in this search, 

the KOP fired 120mm illumination mortar rounds turning night into day. 

Private First Class Larson found a box of animal crackers, some hashish, 

and typical military paraphernalia on one body. Sergeant Trudell, who 

had his camera with him, took photographs of the bodies for intelligence 

purposes while his men searched and cataloged items from four dead 

insurgents in front of their position.39 Two or three of the enemy were 

obviously hit by the shrapnel from a claymore mine due to the peppering 

of metal in their faces and riddled holes in the AK-47 automatic rifles.40

The Scouts began their SSE near their OP/LP as well. Sergeant 

Nightingale moved two bodies to the collection point while Sergeant 

Reese and Specialist Custer provided security. After Nightingale returned, 

Reese began cutting away the rack system (ammo pouches) from another 

insurgent who appeared to be dead. He wasn’t. The wounded insurgent 

suddenly grabbed Reese. The sergeant then swiftly plunged his knife into 

the man’s eye socket. Platoon HQ directed the three Scouts to return to 

the patrol base because air support was arriving. Lieutenant Smith needed 

to ensure that all of his men were accounted for prior to the use of any 

air assets on the ridge. Running back to their base, the Scouts shouted 

the password “Budweiser, Budweiser,” to prevent being shot at by other 

members of the platoon. 41

Courtesy of Captain John P. Rodriguez
41

Captain Howell had called in a pair of F-15 Strike Eagle aircraft for 

combat air support (CAS) as soon as the ambush started and they arrived 

approximately 20 minutes later at 1945 hours. Soldiers from COP Vegas 

noticed flashlights from suspected insurgents maneuvering through a deep 

ravine just south of Chichal heading toward the ambush site, an apparent 

attempt to assist their ambushed comrades nearly one kilometer away. 

Howell directed an F-15 fighter to drop a 2,000 pound bomb on the alleged 

enemy reinforcements. Members of 3d Platoon sent out a patrol to conduct 

a bomb damage assessment but were unable to get to the bomb site at the 

bottom of a creek bed.42

For the next hour or so, the surviving insurgents attempted to evade 

the platoon. An Air Weapons Team (AWT) comprised of two Apache AH64 helicopters arrived and joined the search north and south of the patrol 

base. Lieutenant Smith remembers that, “There were still a couple of bad 

guys out there shouting to each other delta rasha or ‘come to me’” and he 

used this to his advantage when trying to find them.43 Whenever the enemy 

voices were heard, the Soldiers fired their weapons and threw grenades in 

the direction of the sounds in hopes of eliminating potential threats. After 

two or three incidences of this, the insurgents remained silent.

The Apaches equipped with thermal imagers assisted in the nighttime 

search. Several insurgents attempted to hide in a small cave on the north 

side of the cliff. Smith requested an Apache to make a 30mm gun run on 

this group because the infantrymen could not readily locate them. The 

helicopter succeeded in killing three insurgents. Captain Howell believed 

that a HVT might have been within the enemy column and ordered the 

2d Platoon to collect the bodies. Two Scouts, Staff Sergeant Little, and 

Sergeant Reese along with Forward Observer Specialist Kyle Stephenson 

accompanied Lieutenant Smith who attempted to maneuver down the 

precarious ridge. While sliding down the treacherous cliff however, Reese 

lost his footing on a steep slope and tumbled nearly 50 meters before 

hitting his head knocking himself unconscious. Smith, fearing that Reese 

was dead, joined Stephenson in a frantic climb down to the fallen Soldier’s 

body. Cradling Reese in his arms, Smith asserted, “Reese, wake up, Reese, 

wake up.” Finally Reese awoke in puzzlement, looked up at the lieutenant 

and queried, “Why are you holding me?” Relieved that Reese was okay, 

Smith ordered the sergeant to take a few moments to collect his senses.44

Around 2100 hours, Viper Company Soldiers from FB Restrepo 

using thermal imaging devices identified a lone insurgent attempting to 

rendezvous with his imperiled cohorts on the ridge. He apparently departed 

the village of Donga and was heading up the Donga Trail towards the 
42

ambush site when he was spotted. Lieutenant Rodriguez at the KOP called 

in the Apaches. Using a long-range infrared laser pointer/illuminator, an 

IZLID, he guided the Apaches to the insurgent who was crouched down 

near a rock along the trail. The Apaches opened fire with 2.75mm rockets 

and 30mm rounds. Some 3d Platoon Soldiers at FB Restrepo reported that 

the insurgent did not appear to be moving. Not sure if the man was dead or 

just pretending, the Apaches were ordered to make another gun run on the 

target blowing the insurgent to pieces.45 

Ultimately, the ambush killed 15 enemy personnel. The 2d Platoon 

recovered 13 bodies and two more were confirmed at the bottom of a steep 

ravine. The platoon also confiscated 10 AK-47 assault rifles, one RPG 

launcher, two RPG rounds, five ammo pouches, 30 ammo magazines, 

and two grenades. Initially, three RPG rounds were found but one was 

considered as too unstable for transporting back to the KOP and was 

destroyed at the scene. The US Soldiers also discovered five hand-held 

radios, one cell phone, two cassette tapes, one radio, one calculator, 

religious materials, Pakistan currency, flashlights, and mirrors. Many 

of the insurgents were wearing battle dress uniforms (BDU) and black 

military boots. Others were wearing the traditional shalwar kameez “man 

jammies” with tennis shoes or sandals.46

No Soldiers were wounded or killed during the engagement. Only two 

members of the platoon had minor injuries. Sergeant Reese received a 

concussion from his fall and Private First Class Larson twisted his ankle 

sliding down another steep ridge. Due to the precipitous terrain, the long 

walk back to the KOP, and the unsteadiness of the two injured men, 

Lieutenant Smith had Reese and Larson evacuated by a UH-60 Black 

Hawk helicopter to Jalalabad Air Base for medical treatment.47 

Once the ambush occurred, 2d Platoon’s original mission was 

compromised and there was no point in staying in the area. So the 

remaining members of the platoon departed the ambush site around 0230 

hours and began their arduous journey back to the KOP. In an attempt 

to avoid any possibility of retaliation, Apache helicopters flew overhead 

watching the area with their thermal imagers. Moving down a mountain 

during daytime was strenuous enough but 2d Platoon took on the task 

in absolute darkness. They arrived at the KOP 10 to 12 hours later, both 

mentally and physically exhausted. Captain Howell welcomed them back 

by having the cooks prepare hot food and congratulating them on a job 

well done.48
43

The next morning, elders from the villages where the dead insurgents 

lived, requested a shura with Howell at the KOP. The elders were told of 

the ambush and given permission to collect their dead from the Sawtalo 

Sar Ridge. The elders claimed that the men who died were nothing more 

than a rescue team searching for a kidnapped village girl. Sergeant Reese 

recollected Howell’s response to the elders, “That is outrageous! Who 

takes RPGs and hand grenades to rescue a little girl?”49 The men of 2d 

Platoon watched from the KOP as the local villagers headed to the ambush 

site to collect their dead. Using the dead men’s beds as litters, the villagers 

wrapped the bodies in cloth and carried them back for a funeral later that 

day. As they descended along the Kandlay Trail, the locals split off to 

nearby villages. All of the dead insurgents were from neighboring villages 

in the Korengal Valley. The men of Viper Company witnessed the funerals 

from the KOP but had no remorse for the deceased.50

Aftermath

The success of 2d Platoon’s mission on the ridge was based on several 

critical factors. The first of these was the leadership of Second Lieutenant 

Smith who personally planned and conducted pre-mission rehearsals, 

ensuring that each Soldier knew his position and duties automatically. 

Second was the change in operational pattern that led to the enemy 

observer’s assumptions about the platoon returning to the KOP. This shift 

was vital to Viper Company’s success in launching the ambush. Third was 

the timing of the platoon’s movement. If the platoon had been an hour or 

so later in arriving, there is a good chance that they would have walked 

into an ambush or at least found themselves in a lengthy firefight with 

the enemy. Fourth was the flexibility displayed by the men of 2d Platoon. 

Initially, 2d Platoon planned on establishing a patrol base that would 

allow them to monitor the trail. However, the unexpected presence of the 

enemy insurgents forced the platoon to rapidly convert their patrol base to 

a modified linear ambush position. Sergeant Reese said, “Operations can 

change at a moment’s notice for any number of reasons...you will stay 

alive by keeping it simple and using your common sense.”51 Fifth, was 

the operational discipline with which 2d Platoon operated. “If it wasn’t 

for them [2d Platoon Soldiers] having the discipline that they had and 

trust within each other, then things could have turned out a lot different 

that night,” said Smith.52 This last factor was perhaps the most critical 

given the historical importance of noise and light discipline in small unit 

ambushes.
44

Observers may note that the ambush on Sawtalo Sar Ridge did not 

rigidly follow Army templates for ambush operations. According to the 

Ranger Handbook and other Infantry manuals, flank security should be 

posted on either side of an ambush position. Second Lieutenant Smith did 

not have the manpower to do this. He had chosen to beef up the ambush 

line and man other crucial positions instead. The ambush on the ridge 

was less than perfect in other ways as well. After all, 12 insurgents did 

manage to escape the trap but after the operation, Smith noted that the 

terrain restrictions limited the length of the kill zone. Further, 2d Platoon 

had an insufficient numbers of Soldiers to spread further along the trail 

without compromising safety and security. The first 15 insurgents entered 

the kill zone at an angle when the last enemy element in the column had 

just passed the OP/LP nearly 80 to 100 meters away. This created a gap 

that was not covered by fire. According to Smith, he would have needed 

twice the number of Soldiers to cover the area sufficiently. In the end, 

however, the platoon leader’s decisions and the professionalism of his 

Soldiers allowed for one of the most successful small-unit actions in the 

history of US operations in the Korengal Valley.

Five days after the ambush on 10 April 2009, Private First Class 

Dewater was killed by an improvised explosive device (IED) as he crossed 

the Korengal stream between the villages of Aliabad and Laniyal. The 

other members of 2d Platoon then came under a brutal barrage of small 

arms fire from multiple locations, forcing the Soldiers to take cover until 

a pair of A-10 Thunderbolt II ground attack aircraft were able to quell 

the heavy enemy fire. Captain Rodriguez and Lieutenant Smith noted that 

insurgent use of IEDs along trails and near villages was an uncommon 

occurrence and strongly believed these were acts of retaliation for the 

successful ambush on Sawtalo Sar Ridge.53
45

Notes

1. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency. Afghanistan Country Atlas Series 

Volume 4: Badakhshan, Kabul, Kapisa, Kunar, Laghman, Logar, Nangarhar, 

Nuristan, Paktiya, Parwin, Scale 1:50,000. National Geospatial Intelligence 

Agency, 2009.

2. C.J. Chivers. “Pinned Down, a Sprint to Escape Taliban Zone.” New 

York Times, 20 April 2009. Info Note – The 35 KIAs depict those that actually 

died in the Korengal Valley from hostile fire according to the Military Casualty 

Information website. Media sources annotate higher numbers of deaths ranging 

from 40-42 Soldiers. However, these include non-hostile fire deaths like (vehicle 

accidents, health, & suicide, etc.) and some are inaccurately identified to specific 

villages, mountain tops, and military bases within the Korengal Valley.

3. Michael Moore and James Fussell. Afghanistan Report I: Kunar and 

Nuristan: Rethinking US Counterinsurgency Operations. (Washington DC: 

Institute for the Study of War, July 2009), 7; Elizabeth Rubin. “Battle Company is 

Out There.” New York Times Magazine, 24 February 2008, 1-2.

4. Williams, Brian Glyn. “Afghanistan’s Heart of Darkness: Fighting the 

Taliban in Kunar Province.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point - Sentinel 

1, no. 12 (November 2008): 11.

5. Colonel John M. Spiszer. Teleconference from Afghanistan by Colonel 

Gary Keck, 18 November 2008. News Transcript. US Department of Defense, 

Washington, DC, 3.

6. Colnel John M. Spiszer, interview by Steven E. Clay, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 November 2010, 2.

7. Captain John P. Rodriguez, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 May 2011, 3. 

8. Rodriguez, interview, 10; Captain John P. Rodriguez. Journal Entries 5 – 6 

April 2009. Copied and sent to Scott J. Gaitley. 

9. Captain John P. Rodriguez, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 May 2011, 3.

10. Sergeant Craig W Tanner, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5 July 2011, 13.

11. Major James C. Howell, e-mail to Scott J. Gaitley, 14 April 2011, Combat 

studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

12. Bing West. The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of 

Afghanistan. (New York: Random House, 2011), 34.

13. Rodriguez, interview, 9.

14. Department of the Army. SH 21-76, Ranger Handbook. (Fort Benning, 

GA: Ranger Training Brigade, July 2006), 5-1.
46

15. Tanner, interview, 12.

16. Captain Justin R. Smith, interview by Scott J. Gaitley, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 July 2011, 5.

17. Smith, interview, 4-5; Tanner, interview, 4.

18. Rodriguez, interview, 12.

19. Rodriguez, interview, 12.

20. Rodriguez, interview, 10; Smith, interview, 6.

21. Zachary Reese, e-mail to Scott J. Gaitley, 3 August 2011, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1.

22. Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-21.8, The Infantry Rifle 

Platoon and Squad. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2007), 8-20; 

Smith, interview, 9.

23. Reese, e-mail, 6 July 2011, 1; Tanner, interview, 9.

24. Reese, e-mail, 6 July 2011, 1.

25. Reese, e-mail, 7 July 2011, 1.

26. Reese, e-mail, 6 July 2011, 1.

27. Smith, interview, 11.

28. Smith, interview, 11.

29. Smith, interview, 14.

30. Brad Larson, e-mail to Scott J. Gaitley, 7 July 2011, Combat studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2.

31. Staff Sergeant Joshua R. Trudel, e-mail to author, 14 July 2011, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 1.

32. Smith, interview, 14.

33. Trudel, e-mail, 1.

34. Reese, e-mail, 6 July 2011, 1.

35. Tanner, interview, 5.

36. Larson, e-mail, 2.

37. Smith, interview, 19.

38. US Department of the Army. Field Manual 3-90.15, Site Exploitation 

Operations. (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2010), 1-1.

39. Trudel, e-mail, 2.

40. Smith, interview, 12.

41. Reese, e-mail, 6 July 2011, 2.
47

42. Exhibit 1 (2/B Storyboard), “Sawtalo Sar Ridgeline Patrol,” 10 April 

2009, 2; Rodriguez, interview, 16.

43. Smith, interview, 14.

44. Reese, e-mail, 6 July 2011, 2; Smith, interview, 18.

45. Exhibit 1 (2/B Storyboard), “Sawtalo Sar Ridgeline Patrol,” 10 April 

2009, 3; Rodriguez, interview, 17; Rodriguez. Journal Entries 10 April 2009, 1.

46. Smith, interview, 19.

47. Larson, e-mail, 2.

48. Trudel, e-mail, 2.

49. Reese, e-mail, 3 August 2011, 1.

50. Exhibit 1 (2/B Storyboard), “Sawtalo Sar Ridgeline Patrol,” 10 April 

2009, 3; Rodriguez, interview, 18; Tanner, interview, 16.

51. Reese, e-mail, 6 July 2011, 2.

52. Smith, interview, 20.

53. Smith, interview, 30; Rodriguez, interview, 30.

49

Flipping the Switch

Weapons Platoon Movement to Contact in Zhari District

by

Michael J. Doidge

Background

Speaking before a class of West Point cadets in December of 2009, 

President Barack Obama announced his plan to dramatically increase 

US forces in Afghanistan. Known informally as “the surge,” the influx of 

military manpower palpably represented the strategic reorientation of US 

military efforts, a signal that the United States was placing Afghanistan 

back to the forefront of its war on terror.

Likening the war to a fight against cancer, President Obama, in 

coordination with his military advisors, sought to gradually introduce 

the surge forces throughout Afghanistan to fight the Taliban’s spreading 

influence in key locations. For its part in the surge, the US Army’s 2d 

Brigade Combat Team (2BCT), 101st Airborne Division drew the Zhari 

district as its area of operation. Situated in Kandahar province just west 

of Kandahar City, Zhari was a mujahedeen stronghold during the Soviet 

occupation in the 1980s. During the 1990s, the Taliban protected it with 

successive belts of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) as well as a 

nebulous and far-reaching shadow government that enjoyed complete 

subservience from the local populace. The Soviets’ nickname for Zhari 

was appropriate: “The Heart of Darkness.” The three battalions comprising 

2BCT, the 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry Regiment (1-502 IN), the 2d 

Battalion, 502d Infantry Regiment (2-502 IN) and the 1st Squadron, 75th

Cavalry Regiment (1-75 CAV), were tasked with shattering the Taliban’s 

hold on the area, preventing future incursions from Pakistan, and clearing 

the southernmost area’s “green zone” in order to reintroduce farmers to the 

land. Given the vast mission objectives and limited time with which 2BCT 

had to work, the task before it was nothing short of monumental.

When the 1-502 IN arrived in theater in May of 2010, it assumed 

control from the 1st Battalion, 12th IN, 4th Infantry Division (4ID). The 

sizeable area of operations stretched the 1-12 IN thin. Now however, the 

surge was about to relieve a battalion with a brigade. This expanded mission 

capabilities for US forces in Zhari and the 1-502 IN’s first month in theater 

reflected this change accordingly. Tasked with developing situational 
50

awareness for the rest of the brigade and expanding upon previous tactical 

infrastructure, of the three battalions, the 1-502 IN possessed the most 

population-centric mission in the brigade. Recognizing this, the battalion 

assigned Delta Company to collect information on the town of Senjaray. 

From there, the 1-502 IN’s operations would shift south across Highway 

1, a paved road that ran east-west through 2BCT’s area of operations. 

Everything south of Highway 1 was under strict Taliban control. For 3d

Platoon of Delta Company, 1-502 IN, the shift south began on 23 June 

2010.

Flipping the Switch

From a bridged intersection just southwest of Senjaray on Old 

Highway 1, or Route RED STRIPE as it was called by the Soldiers of 

the 1-502 IN, local Taliban forces ran an extortion operation aimed at 

intimidating Senjaray’s population of 10,000 into subservience. Whether 

the toll came in the form of money or goods mattered little, everyone 

paid. Delta Company witnessed it daily from Combat Outpost (COP) 

Senjaray. Located at COP Senjaray was a Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile 

Defense Elevated Netted Sensor (JLENS), an aerostat carrying a camera 

with precision zoom. The Soldiers of Delta Company used the camera 

to identify the Taliban, their weapons, and their shakedowns.1

 In terms 

of physical distance, the space between the JLENS and the intersection 

was easily measurable in a few short kilometers. Yet the camera may as 

well have been looking into another world. No US Soldiers had stepped 

foot near this Taliban stronghold since 2005 and the brazenness of Taliban 

efforts in the area reflected their belief that US troops would not be back 

anytime soon. If the battalion’s counterinsurgency efforts in Senjaray 

held any hope of winning over popular support, they needed to end local 

extortion, return to the population the freedom to sell their goods with 

impunity, and eliminate the Taliban’s iron grip over the local population. 

The 1-502 IN planned to engage the Taliban through both lethal and 

non-lethal means. Before the battalion could conduct lethal operations, 

it needed situational awareness over the population in the small city of 

Senjaray. That meant conducting “white pages” missions. First Lieutenant 

Evan Peck of 3d Platoon referred to “white pages” as “a door-to-door 

assessment, kind of soft knock, where we try to gather the pictures of 

everybody there, get a grid to their door, and try and get an assessment of 

the population as to how many males and females live in each compound.”2

At 0500, 3d Platoon set out on 23 June to perform what was by now a daily 

ritual. Peck stated “White pages sends a good [information operations] 

message...It lets the people know that we care about them...that we 
51

recognize who lives in this community.”3 The battalion’s information 

operation objective in Senjaray was to create a mutually shared stake in 

the community between US troops and the local population. The effort 

linked the people of Senjaray to friendly US forces tasked with building 

infrastructure, keeping the population safe, and improving quality of life. 

US forces hoped to reap results at the tactical level in the form of popular 

support for community projects that would erode the Taliban’s influence.

By familiarizing the platoon with the most important aspects of 

Senjary’s religious and social life, platoon members came to know and 

remember familiar faces, patterns of life, and how Senjaray’s inhabitants 

made their living. Conducting repetitive white pages missions protected the 

people of Senjaray and the platoon by identifying abandoned compounds 

and singling out hostile persons. Examining the population of Senjaray’s 

patterns of life also enabled battalion to root out the enemy within. The 

S2 battalion intelligence officer took 3d Platoon’s findings and created 

spider webs of social networking data replete with information on city 

inhabitants who held legitimate jobs as well as those who made their living 

through unidentifiable means. Repetition was the key to successful white 

pages operations and 3d Platoon believed this day’s mission would not be 

any different. Then an unexpected explosion south of Senjaray alerted the 

platoon that something big was going down.

The blast was the result of an A-10 strike called in by a US Special 

Operations Task Force whose purpose was to track high-value targets 

across Afghanistan’s Southern Provinces. 4 Before the explosion, 1-502 IN 

Command Post (CP) had been alerted that an airstrike could be conducted 

in the area south of Senjaray and was told to stay out of the area to avoid 

alerting the enemy.5

 On 23 June 2010, suspected Taliban leaders were 

identified meeting in a known homemade explosive (HME) factory in the 

area. The A-10 attacked the building. Despite warning the 1-502 IN CP, 

Peck’s Platoon was surprised by the explosion.

Immediately following the strike, the platoon rapidly moved south to 

Highway 1 to get eyes on the blast site. In so doing, 3d Platoon placed 

themselves closest of any US unit to the strike location. By virtue of 

their location and 3d Platoon’s organic resources, the Delta Company 

Commander decided that 3d Platoon was capable of conducting a battle 

damage assessment (BDA) and ordered them to do so. Moving across 

Highway 1, Peck radioed the company CP and visited the local Afghanistan 

National Police (ANP) to see if they had any information on the strike. The 

platoon leader was on good terms with the police chief. Because of this, 

the chief assigned Peck four ANP policemen to travel with the platoon. 
52

While Peck spoke with the ANP, Sergeant First Class Michael Calderaro, 

the Platoon Sergeant, fixed the location of the strike and developed an 

approach route to the site. Third Platoon also contacted Delta Company 

to coordinate reinforcements and fire support for their movement south. 

The Delta Company Commander designated 4th Platoon as the mission’s 

Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and also arranged for two OH-58 Kiowa 

helicopters and one AH-64 Apache to provide close combat attack (CCA) 

support.

Third Platoon, Delta Company, was a weapons platoon comprising 16 

Soldiers for its mission on 23 June. Peck’s headquarters element included 

the platoon radio telephone operator (RTO), Private First Class Joshua 

Keck, and the unit medic, Private First Class Robert “Doc” Rankin. To that 

Peck added two interpreters and four ANP personnel. Sergeant Matthew 

Hetrick aided Calderaro, serving as an assistant platoon sergeant who 

would augment the HQ element in any combat scenario that might evolve, 

and shifting resources during the battle as necessary to adapt to conditions 

on the ground. As the platoon prepared to move, Hetrick and Calderaro 

conducted troop leading procedures, rehearsed the route, and ran precombat checks. Hetrick located himself with 3d Platoon’s first squad 

led by Sergeant Daniel Bartlett while Calderaro located himself with the 

second led by Sergeant Nicholas Hays. The platoon was ready. They had 

“flipped the switch” as Hetrick later stated. “The 23rd of June started as a 

regular old, you know, knock on the peoples’ door, be nice to them, patrol, 

and then there’s an air strike and 30 minutes later each and every guy had 

his switch turned on.”6

 At 0500 3d Platoon had set out to conduct a routine 

white pages mission. By 0900 they began their move south to become the 

first US unit to set foot on Route RED STRIPE since 2005.7

Once 3d Platoon moved south, they did so with the knowledge that 

they would not have indirect fire support. If 3d Platoon were cut off or 

surrounded by enemy forces, they could potentially call for fire from two 

sites: the 81-mm mortars at COP Senjaray under the control of A Company 

and the 120-mm mortars at COP Ashoque under control of Headquarters 

Company (HHC). However, Senjaray was a heavily populated area and 

the battalion wanted to limit use of mortar fire for fear of causing civilian 

casualties.8

Third Platoon set out south in wedge formation from the ANP station.

As they moved through a nearby cemetery, it granted them freedom of 

movement. The platoon spread out to 10 to 15 meters between individuals 

and approximately 50 meters between squads. As Peck’s platoon made its 

way south, it used simple but effective techniques designed to lessen the 
53

possibility of IED detonations. Those techniques included placing Soldiers 

who had previously served in Iraq and Afghanistan in the lead element 

to use their experience in identifying potential hazards. The majority of 

IEDs in Eastern Zhari were triggered by pressure plates placed on foot 

paths or chokepoints where people were forced to walk. Tapping into the 

enemy’s psyche, Sergeant Hetrick argued, “The enemy took advantage of 

human nature and placed [IEDs] on paths of least resistance.”9 Wagering 

that Soldiers would naturally move through a break in a wall rather than 

climb over it, the enemy would place them in the walls near the gap. As 

a counter-measure, the platoon stayed away from footpaths, maintained 

spacing between Soldiers, and refused to move through choke points 

choosing instead to climb walls, walk uneven terrain, and generally 

pursue the more difficult routes of approach. The platoon walked through 

waterways and flooded canals whenever it could because water offered a 

natural countermeasure to any electrical/powder-triggered explosive. The 

canals also provided the platoon a means of cooling, a fact that would 

become vital after the day’s heavy fighting had finished. 

The Battle

Immediately following their emergence from the cemetery, the platoon 

noted a small stream east of and adjacent to their position. The stream 

ran south and filtered into an east-west canal roughly 25 meters south of 

their location. A walled grape field sat directly west and adjacent to the 

platoon. With the knowledge that the location of the airstrike was still a 

good distance south and west of their position and understanding that the 

banks of the stream formed a natural path for IED placement, 3d Platoon 

pivoted west and began making their way through the densely vegetated 

and walled grape field north of the canal. The westward shift forced the 

platoon to adjust to a linear formation and pushed Bartlett’s and Peck’s 

lead elements between 75 and 100 meters ahead of Hays’ squad. 

Bartlett’s squad and Peck’s headquarters element emerged west from 

the grape field 25 meters north of the canal when the first shots rang out 

from a point approximately 100 meters south of their position, just north 

of Route RED STRIPE. Sergeant Hetrick and Private First Class Jacob 

Brock turned south toward the initial shots when a hail of machine gun fire 

and RPG blasts filled the air. The Soldiers’ training immediately kicked in. 

They got down and dispersed using individual movement and fire-team 

bounding. Hetrick and Brock were the first into the canal. Squad automatic
54

Figure 1. Movement to Contact in Zhari District.

weapon (SAW) gunner Private First Class James Campbell was close 

behind. Bartlett and the remainder of his squad shifted west and Peck 

opened fire on everything south. Once Hetrick and Brock hit the canal, 

Bartlett’s squad followed suit.

Hetrick and Brock returned fire as they slogged across the canal, 

scanning south to locate the enemy machine gun and RPG positions. From 

50 meters southeast of their position, hidden in a well-concealed wadi

situated between an open field and a pomegranate orchard, two enemy 

teams engaged the Soldiers with mostly inaccurate machine gun and RPG 

fire. Fire from the west was deadlier and it came from two directions. 
55

The first location comprised two teams of four insurgents armed with 

light machine guns and RPGs firing from behind a mud wall at the most 

northern and eastern portion of an open field. From the second location 

20 to 30 meters south of the first group, a four-man team of Taliban lay 

concealed in a pomegranate orchard. Unknown to the platoon, this team 

possessed one of the most accurate RPG gunners the 3d Platoon had ever 

encountered. Both Hetrick and Brock made it across the canal to a small 

mud wall and ducked for cover just as an RPG exploded directly behind 

them. The blast knocked both Soldiers over. Brock took the brunt of the 

blast. From his position, Bartlett witnessed the RPG. He later recalled, “We 

realized that they were pretty frigging accurate with their RPGs...and from 

what I saw, I thought [Hetrick and Brock] were dead. They survived, they 

were good.”10 Dazed, Hetrick and Brock steadied themselves, performed a 

quick check, and continued moving west along the mud wall. As Bartlett 

and his squad crossed the canal, Hetrick set the men up behind the mud 

wall’s cover. Once set up, Bartlett’s squad consisted of himself, Hetrick, 

Brock, Private Nicolas Haight, Specialist Samuel Poff, and Campbell. The 

squad let loose a fury of lead toward the insurgents to the south. 

Peck witnessed the action south of his location and shifted west, 

moving parallel to Hetrick’s southern elements. As he moved, the platoon 

leader attempted to radio his commander and describe the engagement 

that was developing. Staying north of the canal, Peck and his men “were 

covering distance farther west to make sure no one was coming from [that 

direction]...At that time, they were unable to raise [Delta] company...

due to the terrain.”11 While he was still unable to raise Delta Company, 

Peck maintained his movement, attempting to overcome the terrain’s 

disabling effect on radio communication. Still in the grape field to the 

east, Calderaro was also unable to make contact with the Delta Company 

CP. Situated with Sergeant Hays’ squad, Hays’ men and Calderaro moved 

west through the grape field unseen by the enemy.

With possession of the initiative firmly in the insurgents’ grasp, the 

enemy determined the time and place of battle. From the moment the 

enemy fired its first volley, 3d Platoon was thrust into a fight in which 

the enemy also had a large amount of control over the tempo and nature 

of the battle. The Taliban could initiate combat and withdraw from an 

engagement when it suited them — not necessarily when the battle 

reached a natural endpoint. This aspect of combat in Afghanistan was a 

fact of life for coalition forces facing an insurgent forces. Calderaro put it 

succinctly, “Especially with the enemy we were fighting over there...the 

enemy is going to do what they think they can win at.”12 When the five 

Taliban teams opened up with RPG and machine gun fire, they trained 
56

their sights on nine US Soldiers and their two interpreters and four ANP 

personnel. Given the conditions, the odds favored the insurgents. Firmly 

entrenched behind cover, the enemy maintained a definitive two-to-one 

numerical advantage, knew the terrain, held the element of surprise, and 

had preplanned their disengagement routes.

From the Taliban’s perspective, every facet of the battle favored 

them. Every facet save one. The Taliban were unaware that 3d platoon 

possessed uncommitted forces in the grape field. Because of the field’s 

size and dense vegetation, Hays’ squad of six had shifted its maneuver 

formation, falling 75 meters behind the platoon’s lead element. When the 

enemy opened the battle, the grape field shielded Hays’ squad from the 

enemy. Calderaro stated, “When [the enemy] made the initial contact with 

Bartlett’s lead team, there was a whole other six or seven guys back there 

that weren’t receiving fire.”13 As Bartlett’s squad established a support-byfire position at the west flank, Hays’ squad moved uncontested east of the 

enemy positions. From their vantage point north of the canal, Hays’ squad 

saw the most likely avenues of enemy withdrawal on Route RED STRIPE 

to the south and east. While Hays’ squad began crossing the canal to take 

position on the eastern flank and with Bartlett’s squad already positioned 

in the west, the platoon shifted its focus toward recapturing the initiative. 

The men of 3d Platoon were of a single mind: cut off the enemy’s retreat, 

then close with and destroy the insurgents. 

In the west, the battle became one of two seasoned boxers jockeying 

for position. The enemy had opened with a haymaker and nearly connected. 

Once US Soldiers had crossed the canal and taken cover, the fight briefly 

slowed to occasional jabs. Describing the situation, Hetrick stated, “we 

got on the wall and we were just like looking at guys popping up, shooting 

at us, we’d shoot back at them.”14 With the enemy so firmly entrenched 

and directing fires at the squad on the west flank, Bartlett’s men needed to 

maneuver to within hand grenade range in order to dislodge the insurgents. 

Yet, in addition to the intense incoming fire, the squad faced terrain that 

was potentially mined. Hetrick stated, “We’re just moving along the canal 

you know, pretty slow because no one had been down there. We weren’t 

sure what was around the next corner. We’re also thinking about IEDs 

because it’d be a perfect place for dismounted IEDs along that canal.”15

Their advance was understandably methodical.

The squad’s attempt to maneuver served as a catalyst. Aware that 

Bartlett’s men were advancing, the enemy responded like a stirred hornet’s 

nest, unleashing a torrent of machine gun fire and RPG explosions to pin 

the Americans in place. The Taliban were fighting Bartlett’s squad for 
57

every inch of terrain. Hetrick recognized that the enemy force possessed 

fire superiority and outnumbered his element. He said, “They had about 

eight guys and very accurate RPG fire. We started to take multiple RPGs. 

I’d say like one coming in every 15 to 30 seconds. It seemed like every 

time you would move up, they would respond with an RPG.”16 Against 

the oppressive rain of fire, Bartlett and his men threw smoke grenades to 

advance. When those ran out, they threw fragmentary grenades.17 Beyond 

the fragmentary grenades’ masking potential, the successive explosions 

forced the enemy to keep their heads low, decreasing their rate of machinegun and RPG fire. Additionally, the grenades pinned the enemy in place, 

preventing them from displacing to take up better firing positions. As 

Bartlett’s squad inched along the western edge of the wall, they pivoted 

around the wall’s edge and raced to a nearby small hut on the wall’s south 

side. Still attempting to push the enemy back, a few of the Soldiers threw 

grenades which arced perfectly toward their targets. The northern Taliban 

teams were forced to withdraw south, racing across an open field to link 

up with the team in the pomegranate orchard. 

The time was 0945. It was just 15 minutes into the battle and 

the Taliban were down two teams. With their retreat, the enemy lost a 

significant amount of suppressive firepower including small arms, RPGs, 

and light machine guns. The character of the fight now decidedly shifted 

in favor of US forces. Hetrick recognized this fact later, stating, “I do 

not believe that we really gained the upper hand in the firefight until 

myself and Sergeant Bartlett’s squad had fully pushed south of the canal 

and maneuvered to within hand grenade range of the Taliban.”18 For the 

enemy, their situation was grimmer than even the US forces realized. 

The northern teams withdrew not only because Bartlett’s squad had 

compromised their position but also because they had suffered significant 

casualties. Their morale broken, the Taliban teams were actively looking 

to disengage even as their sister team fought on. Little did the enemy know 

the battle’s dynamic was about to shift in even greater favor of the US 

platoon. Calderaro had made radio contact with Delta Company. He was 

told that the 4th Platoon’s assets were on their way to the battlefield and 

CCA would be on station soon thereafter.

With the northern enemy teams retreating before Hetrick and Bartlett, 

the fury of battle briefly dimmed. The first phase of battle came to a close 

as both sides collectively caught their breath. Hetrick and Bartlett’s squad 

moved and cleared the small structure. Calderaro crossed the canal just 

north of the enemy’s central position. Hays’ squad crossed as well, coming 

to a halt adjacent to Calderaro. From behind the cover of a small mud wall 
58

north of an open field, they examined the eastern portion of the battlefield 

for a route of maneuver to cut off the enemy’s eastern withdrawal. On the 

other side of the canal north of Bartlett and Hetrick’s position, Peck was in 

communication with the QRF vehicles. 

Third platoon did not have to wait long. At 1000 the vehicle element 

of the QRF force arrived directly west of Peck’s position. Carrying 4th 

Platoon, the QRF consisted of four mine-resistant armored vehicles. A 

fearsome sight, the vehicles brought a total of 18 infantryman and were 

armed with one MK-19 grenade launcher, two M-2 .50-caliber machine 

guns, and one M240 machine gun, respectively.19

The QRF’s show of force broke the Taliban’s will to resist on the 

western side of the battlefield. Taking advantage of the temporary lull 

in combat, the RPG team dashed east as fast as possible, moving to the 

central pomegranate orchard south of Calderaro’s position to link up with 

the remaining enemy teams and take cover in a well-concealed, lean-to 

shelter in the orchard. Injured, the northern teams disengaged and withdrew 

south to Route RED STRIPE, moving west toward the town of Kandalay. 

Though their heart was no longer in the fight, Hetrick noted that the men 

still disengaged in a manner advantageous to them, “From my fighting 

position at the time, I could see them moving from cover to cover south 

and then once they reached Route RED STRIPE, they almost all turned 

and fired a long burst, perhaps the rest of their ammo. They [withdrew] in 

good order, always covering their moves with fire, not simply just running 

away.”20

Emptying their clips and tossing or stashing their weapons in hidden 

caches, within minutes, the Taliban were able to transform from combatant 

to non-combatant. To complete the transformation, the enemy kept caches 

of farming clothes nearby to quickly change from insurgent to civilian.21

Additionally, the Taliban stored wheelbarrows and motorcycles nearby 

for the wounded and weapons, respectively. Ultimately, the Taliban 

understood that if they could create situations where doubt persisted in the 

minds of US Soldiers, the latter would honor the rules of engagement and 

grudgingly permit the Taliban fighter his escape. 

Hetrick and Bartlett owned the western flank and with the southern RPG 

team moving east into the center position, they sensed that Calderaro and 

Hays’ positions were about to come under fire. Peck was communicating 

with the QRF force but would soon be moving his element to link up with 

Bartlett for a joint push south to cut off any further retreat west along Route 

RED STRIPE. This gave Hetrick the opportunity he had been waiting for, 
59

to provide the hammer to Hays’ anvil. Hetrick would shift east, link with 

Calderaro and, secure in the knowledge that the enemy’s eastern escape 

route was cut off by Hays’ squad, he and his grenadiers would provide 

yellow smoke for the QRF to pound the pomegranate orchard with enough 

explosives to litter the orchard with corpses. Should that fail, Hetrick 

was prepared to supply the necessary firepower himself. To achieve 

this objective and in preparation for linking up with Calderaro, Hetrick 

gathered grenadiers Brock and Haight and the SAW gunner Campbell, 

leaving Bartlett with rifleman Poff.

As Hetrick began his eastward movement to Calderaro’s position, 

Bartlett patiently waited for Peck’s squad to join with him and Poff so 

they could begin their move south to Route RED STRIPE in the west. 

With Hetrick acting as the hammer and Bartlett closing the western avenue 

of retreat to the enemy, the only way for the enemy to escape from the 

pomegranate orchard south of Calderaro was to the east, covered by 

Hays’ squad. Possessing an innate talent to read the battlefield and having 

traversed to his position largely unnoticed by enemy forces, Hays began 

to shift his squad east of Calderaro to take control of the eastern flank. 

In addition to himself, Hays’s squad consisted of his machine gunner 

Specialist Brook McQuay, riflemen Private Brian Dickson and Private 

First Class Ethan Bowe, and grenadier Private Delton Graves. Setting his 

men up on line facing south, Hays prepared to close the enemy’s sole 

remaining avenue of retreat. Always generous in his praise of his NCOs 

and their men, Peck stated, “Having the aggressive NCOs that I had was a 

huge asset and I try very hard never to reign them in too much.”22 

Peck’s willingness to trust in his NCOs to develop the situation paid 

dividends in the platoon’s maneuver. While Peck communicated with the 

QRF vehicles, Calderaro stated that Hays saw “on the south side of the 

creek...three big open fields that...were flat fields. So [Hays] pushed to the 

far east of it and then [Calderaro] set the machine gun up in the middle.”23

From his vantage point, Hays possessed a clear line of sight across open 

fields south to Route RED STRIPE, the road that the western Taliban 

elements had made their withdrawal on moments earlier. Immediately to 

the east of the orchard ran a north-south creek with walled grape fields 

immediately across it. With those walls serving as effective obstacles and 

with Hays’ concentration of firepower aimed south over the open fields 

and creek, Hays’ position created a no-man’s land guaranteeing that any 
60

Figure 2. The Taliban Attempt Disengage.

east-ward retreating enemy would run straight into a killing zone. As it 

turned out, this is precisely what happened.

Ready to drop the hammer, Hetrick, Brock, Haight, and Campbell 

maneuvered east toward Calderaro. Sensing the noose was tightening 

around the pomegranate orchard, the three remaining Taliban teams 

unleashed a torrent of machine gun and RPG fire toward Calderaro, Hays, 

and Hetrick’s positions. The entire 3d Platoon responded in unison. While 
61

Hays’ squad returned fire in the east from Peck’s position northwest, Tate 

and “Doc” Rankin poured fire into the orchard. At Calderaro’s position, 

Hays’ machine gunner McQuay sent a wall of suppressive fire down 

the center. Meanwhile, Hetrick, Brock, and Haight responded with an 

onslaught of their own, firing successive volleys of grenades from their 

M-203s into the orchard. By the end of the firefight, the grenadiers had 

fired roughly 80 40-mm rounds, most from this position.24 Against the 

barrage of ordnance, enemy fire fell significantly. 

The Taliban scurried for cover along intersecting wadi lines, searching 

the area for safe haven against the rush of incoming fire. When Calderaro 

saw the enemy take up positions behind 12-foot mud walls, he called 

Hetrick to adjust the grenadiers’ fire to target the mud walls themselves.25

The grenadiers continually tried to keep the enemy off balance, homing in 

on fixed enemy positions and engaging them in order to kill them, break 

their cover, or force them to adjust their positions. Hetrick and Peck both 

assessed the grenadiers’ performance as vital to the fight with Hetrick 

stating that the M-203 was the most pivotal weapon the platoon had.26

For his part, Peck argued that the grenades caused the enemy to keep their 

heads down and prevented them from moving against the platoon.27 Once 

Hetrick made the face-to-face linkup with Calderaro, Calderaro ordered 

Hetrick to have his grenadiers fire yellow smoke into the pomegranate 

orchard in order to mark locations for the QRF’s vehicle mounted weapons. 

Hetrick dashed back to his men, throwing several hand grenades while on 

the run. There he instructed his men to fire yellow smoke from the 203s. 

Unfortunately for the 3d Platoon, from the moment the QRF vehicles 

set up north of the canal, radio malfunctions and poor positioning caused 

significant difficulties. The problems began when someone within the 4th 

Platoon’s QRF force held down the talk button on their handset creating 

a “hot mic” situation, a condition in which all message traffic is blocked 

by the open handset. When it became clear that he would be unable to 

communicate with the vehicles over the radio, Peck sprinted through what 

he later referred to as “ineffective machine-gun fire” in order to relay the 

message calling for the fire he wanted.28 Hetrick and his grenadiers had 

already marked the enemy positions in the central pomegranate orchard 

with yellow smoke but the machine gun and the MK-19 gunners on the 

vehicle could not see the smoke. Peck made a second run for the QRF 

vehicles to see if there was any way he could adjust the vehicles or their 

fires to support his platoon, but it was to no avail. The vehicles would be 

of no further use in the battle. 
62

At 1015, two key events occurred while Peck was on his second run 

back to the QRF vehicles. The first was notification that two OH-58 Kiowas 

and one AH-64 Apache helicopter were on station. Possessing superior 

sensors to the Kiowas, the Apache floated above the fray, ready to serve 

solely as the 3d Platoon’s eyes in the sky while the Kiowas, which were 

equipped with .50-caliber machine guns and 2.75mm rockets, provided 

direct fire support to the platoon. Recognizing that the QRF vehicles were 

going to be of no use to the platoon from their current position, Peck asked 

the Kiowas to switch to the platoon net so that he could communicate 

directly with the pilots. He was about to return to his headquarters element 

when he ran into Sergeant James Brafford, the company RTO. Isolated 

from the QRF by the series of microphone miscommunications, Brafford 

asked Peck if he could use some help. Peck grouped Brafford with his own 

element and immediately set off to find Bartlett and Poff. Brafford then 

took point as Bartlett began moving south to Route RED STRIPE to cut 

off the enemy’s western route of withdrawal.29 Peck later offered Brafford 

accolades, stating that he was a “great adaptive Soldier that integrated 

in with my guys and ran himself into the ground with the rest of us to 

capture the bad guys.”30 True to Peck’s words, Brafford remained with the 

3d Platoon for the entire action.31

Within the lean-to, the Taliban RPG team now considered the battle 

lost. There can be little doubt that the team’s attempt to escape was largely 

influenced by the sight of Peck’s headquarters element crossing the canal 

northwest, the enormous rush of firepower from Hetrick, Calderaro, and 

Hays’ positions, and the whirring of US helicopters overhead. The RPG 

team used the wadi lines north of the orchard for as long as possible before 

emerging east from the pomegranate orchard. Once in the open, they made 

a dash for the creek bed and to the walled grape field beyond when they 

were engaged by McQuay’s machine gun and Hays’ squad. From Hays’ 

position, Bowe zeroed in, took aim, and pulled the trigger. The bullet 

entered the RPG gunner’s cheek and exited the back of his head, taking 

a significant portion of his brain with it. He died instantly.32 Though the 

US Soldiers did not know this at the time, Bowe had just killed the local 

enemy leader. The three remaining team members dragged him into the 

adjacent grape field. Still under fire, the insurgents abandoned their efforts, 

scattered the team’s weapons, and hid underneath a bunch of grape vines 

at the southernmost point of the grape field closest to Route RED STRIPE. 

Demoralized and disorganized by the loss of their leader, they intended 

to escape east along Route RED STRIPE as soon as the right moment 

presented itself.
63

That moment never came. As soon as the Kiowas came on station, 

Calderaro sent out a message platoon-wide for everyone to pull out their 

VS17 panels to mark their positions.33 The men of 3d Platoon reacted by 

placing the six-foot bright red and orange panels in front of their positions. 

Speaking with Calderaro on the platoon net, the Kiowas began their attack 

runs. Vectoring in .50-caliber and 2.75mm rockets on the lean-to and the 

northern wadi lines, the Kiowas pummeled the pomegranate orchard with 

a storm of steel and explosives. 

For both the Taliban hiding in the grape field and those being battered 

in the orchard, retreat was now exceedingly difficult. Calderaro knew 

Route RED STRIPE was the Taliban means of escape. In addition to the 

Kiowas’ gun runs he had the helicopters patrolling the Taliban routes of 

withdrawal, boxing them into the orchard. Nevertheless with casualties 

mounting, the two remaining teams of Taliban had to chance escape or 

face extinction. With wheelbarrows, motorcycles, and in one insurgent’s 

case, a comrade’s shoulders at the ready, the two remaining teams prepared 

to beat a hasty retreat.

From their vantage point, the helicopters witnessed the withdrawal 

but were unable to engage as the insurgents possessed no visible weapons. 

Before the remaining Taliban withdrew south and east down Route 

RED STRIPE, they placed their weapons in a covered wheelbarrow and 

laid a sprawled comrade in the other. Given the blood markings on the 

man’s shirt and the way that he was positioned in the wheelbarrow, the 

helicopters concluded the man was dead. Still another Taliban held tightly 

onto an insurgent’s back as he carried him off the battlefield. Whether 

because he believed that he had placed enough distance between himself 

and US forces or because he simply could not bear the man’s weight any 

longer, the insurgent placed the unconscious man underneath a tree on the 

side of the road.

The helicopters relayed to 3d Platoon that this insurgent showed no 

movement. As with the man in the wheelbarrow, he was determined to be 

dead.34 Peck requested permission from Delta Company to give pursuit 

and retrieve the possible dead insurgent but was denied. Even given the 

short distance, the threat of IEDs along Route RED STRIPE was too great. 

The 3d Platoon had won the day without a single casualty and had inflicted 

what the battalion S2 later estimated were three enemy killed in action 

and seven wounded in the process. That would have to do for the day’s 

fighting. Following the action, a rash of funerals in the area suggested that 

the initial tally for enemy casualties may have erred on the conservative 

side.
64

After the Battle

With fighting over by 1100, the platoon began the process of site 

exploitation on the pomegranate orchard and picking up the dead Taliban. 

In so doing, the Soldiers also accomplished a rare and dramatic feat in the 

action’s waning hours, the capture of three insurgents. Hetrick, Calderaro, 

Bowe, and Campbell approached the orchard from the west while Hays, 

Dickson, and Graves approached from the east. Still wary of potential 

hazards, US forces moved to the orchard using fire teams in alternating 

bounds. Upon arriving at the lean-to, Hetrick placed Campbell in the 

northwest corner on overwatch south while Hetrick and Bowe entered 

from the east. The Taliban had placed dried grass and grapevines on top of 

the lean-to, giving them excellent concealment from aerial surveillance.

Further south, 3d Platoon discovered a large bed-down area complete 

with partially eaten meals and unpoured hot chai tea. The evidence was 

clear that the Taliban were surprised by the 3d Platoon’s initial approach. 

Even more surprising was the size of the bed-down site. It was spacious 

enough for more than 30 insurgents, contained perfect fields of fire, and 

was littered with components used in the creation of HME and booby traps 

to surround the field at night while the men slept. This location likely 

provided crucial support to the illegal Taliban checkpoint and most likely 

served as an insurgent command and control node. With the pomegranate 

orchard, the bed-down site, and the bomb making caches in US hands, 3d 

Platoon moved to pick up the insurgent Bowe had slain.35

At 1120, 3d Platoon picked up the dead Taliban’s body. The evidence 

found on him indicated that he was a local Taliban commander. In addition 

to the Pakistani cash and ICOM hand-held radio found on his corpse, he 

was also older than his fellow insurgents, wore a load-bearing vest, and 

fought with greater RPG accuracy than the platoon had ever seen. For 

propaganda purposes, he also had scraps of paper with Koranic verses 

sewn into his clothing. Third Platoon strongly believed that the insurgent 

had been trained in Pakistan. In the platoon’s eyes, this was likely a 

hardened Taliban fighter sent to command local insurgent forces. 

The helicopters had tracked the three insurgents hiding in the grape 

field. Though the Kiowas had lost visual contact, they gave Peck’s platoon 

an idea where to look. Bartlett, Hetrick, Poff, Brafford, and Graves were 

moving through the grape fields, each man taking a single row, when 

Bartlett and Hetrick made brief visual contact with an insurgent and gave 

chase.36 Though running on adrenaline, the Soldiers also ran with more 

than 100 pounds of equipment on their bodies. The temperature was 
65

an unrelenting 135 degrees and to this, the grape field added excessive 

humidity. Inasmuch as the day’s combat was an exercise in physical 

exhaustion, Hays later remarked that “the biggest smoker was actually 

running through the fields.”37 Despite the severe climate and terrain 

conditions, a far greater danger lurked within the sinuous foliage. Dug 

into deep eight-foot trenches, the plant grew at the base of huge dirt 

rows, producing a dense vegetation wall not unlike the hedgerows US 

Soldiers found in northwestern France during World War II. As in Europe 

in 1944, the vines in the grape fields easily concealed fighting positions 

and explosive devices and, in this case, provided the enemy a safe haven 

to hide for possible retreat. As the fleeing insurgents bobbed and weaved 

to elude US troops, Bartlett, Hetrick, and Poff lost visual contact for what 

was no more than five to ten seconds. This was all the time the insurgents 

required to disappear. Watchful that they might be about to walk into 

their second ambush of the day, the men spread out and began a slow and 

deliberate search.

The grape rows limited the pursuing US troops to three and a half 

feet wide corridors with spacing between the vines even narrower still. 

The area was so constrictive it prevented US Soldiers from training their 

weapons on the enemy. Hetrick believed the Taliban had successfully 

withdrawn when he spotted two AK-47s leaning against the grape wall 

and promptly called out, “We got weapons up here!”38 As he continued 

walking forward, Hetrick spotted underneath the foliage the whites of two 

pairs of Taliban eyes staring in petrified shock back at him. Falling back 

on training and instinct, he pulled the one insurgent out, subdued him, and 

pulled the other out for Bartlett and Poff to detain. As the troops moved to 

the next grape row, they spotted and subdued the final insurgent who was 

hiding with his PKM. 

In addition to the three men captured, 3d Platoon also captured two 

AK-47s, one pistol, one RPG with rocket, one PKM with an empty 200 

round drum, two magazines, and two chest racks. They had in their 

possession numerous IED manufacturing and intelligence materials to 

include pressure plate materials, four sim cards, a motorcycle title and 

receipt, a prescription note from a Pakistani hospital, and two Arabic 

Koran verse sheets among other items.39

After detaining the insurgents, the ANP, according to Hetrick, “seemed 

to show up out of nowhere, where they began speaking with the [enemy 

prisoners of war].”40 In spite of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, 

the ANP, after speaking for a brief time with the captured insurgents, 

contended that the detainees were not insurgents but local farmers. Peck’s 
66

interpreters were put to good use questioning the three detainees. When 

the interpreters relayed to Bartlett, Hetrick, Brafford, Poff, and Graves that 

the ANP claimed the captured enemy were armed farmers, all five men had 

a good laugh. The platoon ignored the ANP and had them assist in moving 

the detainees to a more secure location. 

Figure 3. Captured Enemy with their Equipment.

Lieutenant Peck placed the captured Taliban along a bend in the creek 

and assigned his men to positions where they could provide security. 

From their position, 4th Platoon briefly maneuvered their vehicles west 

before heading south toward Route RED STRIPE to provide additional 

overwatch. The vehicles moved methodically because 4th Platoon was 

warned that Route RED STRIPE was a heavily mined road. By this point 

the radio network was working and again and Peck called his commander, 

requesting assistance with the detainees. He received word that 1stPlatoon 

was dispatched to secure the detainees and bring them to FOB Wilson for 

processing. For Peck and the 3d Platoon, the greatest threat now lay in the 

fact that the platoon was “black” on water, meaning the Platoon’s water 

supply was now below 25 percent. Peck asked that 1st Platoon bring with 

it a resupply of water rations immediately. Emphasizing the severity of the 

situation, Peck stated, “I mean no one had any water.”41

Technically, Peck’s platoon still was committed to conducting the 

BDA mission. Yet while Peck, Bartlett, Calderaro, and Hetrick performed 

site exploitation, picked up the dead Taliban, and captured the enemy, Photo courtesy of Lieutenant Evan Peck
67

Hays watched as the adrenaline wore off the remainder of the platoon and 

fatigue set in. Speaking with Peck, both men agreed that the combination 

of continued operations and the elevated temperature took a serious toll on 

the men in the platoon.

Peck then ordered that the small amount of water remaining be 

redistributed. He also issued power bars and granola to try to put salt back 

in the men’s system. Additionally, he had men set up security in the shade 

and rest neck deep in the canals, taking off as much of their gear as possible. 

However, after the weight of a seven hour patrol and a two and a half 

hour firefight, fatigue carried the day. Peck assessed the platoon combat 

ineffective.42 According to Bartlett, Peck “was requesting people to come 

out and replace our Soldiers because at least 95 percent of the platoon was 

throwing up, [had] heat cramps, and just couldn’t go no more. Everybody 

was going down.”43 Peck had four severe heat casualties requiring an IV 

or a rehydration salt packet.44 Always glib, Calderaro stated that “if [the 

Taliban] decided to counterattack us at this time, we would have been 

some screwed frigging puppies.”45 All told, even though Peck’s platoon 

had stayed within a two kilometer radius, they estimated that they had 

traversed somewhere between 8-10 kilometers that day.

War is never short on irony. Before the Kiowa helicopters left to 

refuel, the pilots radioed Peck and asked if he and his platoon needed 

any more assistance. Peck replied that if they had any water, he could 

use it. This exchange led to a lighter moment fitting for the 3d Platoon, 

in that it still involved an element of grave danger. The Kiowas flying 

some 60 feet overhead began runs to drop heavy bundled packages of 

water bottles to the ground at excessive speeds. Physics took hold of the 

packages and the bundles hurtled to the earth with tremendous force. Few 

water bottles survived. Sergeant Nicholas Hays was standing underneath a 

tree when one of the packages plummeted toward him. Luckily for Hays, 

the package smashed near the tree top. The resulting explosion provided 

Hays with a deathly scare and a welcome shower. One of the water bottles 

survived the ordeal and Hays picked it up. According to Brafford, “Hays 

got a bottle of water out of the deal. He came back with his bottle of water, 

his eyes all big and white and hands shaking, he was like, ‘I got water, but 

I almost died.’”46

As 1st Platoon arrived to take away the detainees, 4th Platoon 

dismounted their vehicles to take over the task of performing the battle 

damage assessment for 3d Platoon, who would now take 4th Platoon’s 

vehicles and head back to COP Senjaray once their site exploitation was 

complete. Giving the platoon over temporarily to Sergeant First Class 
68

Calderaro, Peck traveled with 4th Platoon to conduct the BDA. While on 

foot to the airstrike location, 4th Platoon received sporadic harassing fire 

but found no major resistance. When they finally reached the location, 

4th Platoon found the HME factory destroyed. Carnage around the 

site indicated six to eight individuals once worked there. There was an 

extremely strong chemical smell that caused some members of the platoon 

to vomit and their eyes to burn. They pulled back and took pictures from 

a safe distance.47 When Peck finally reunited with his men for the ride 

back to COP Senjaray, his driver’s legs were so badly cramped that Peck 

had to use the barrel of his M4 to hit the gas and brakes. In effect, the 

dull thudding sound of Peck’s M4 against the vehicle’s pedals served as a 

final exclamation point to the day’s action, a powerful indicator of the 3d 

Platoon’s exhaustion.48

Aftermath

After the firefight, 3d Platoon’s members stated that they were “never 

tested again at the same level” as they were on 23 June.49 Their tenacity in 

the face of heavy firepower, their willingness to maneuver, to close with, 

to pursue, and even to hunt down the Taliban quietly garnered a reputation 

with the enemy. During the 1-502 IN’s last two and a half months in 

Afghanistan, 3d Platoon, Delta Company received intelligence reports that 

the Taliban were targeting a group of individuals led by a man with a big 

knife on his body armor. Peck was the only Platoon Leader in the 1-502 IN 

to carry a machete on his body armor. He took the news in stride proudly 

stating, “I had a bounty on my head.”50

Yet for all its boldness on the battlefield, the platoon remained versatile 

in the face of the dynamic complexities that Afghanistan presented. 

Competent leadership from perceptive and adaptive NCOs expanded the 

platoon’s capability tremendously and formed the foundation underneath 

the success that day in Zhari. Their engagement in daily “white pages” 

missions led them to embrace the adaptability required for a COIN effort 

with Peck noting the need to be ready to take the fight to the enemy even 

within an environment dominated by non-lethal operations. 

When engaged in lethal operations, US units are accustomed to 

having a variety of munitions and fires at their disposal. Yet on 23 June, 

3d Platoon operated without mortar or artillery support and without the 

immediate fires that the QRF was supposed to bring to bear. The presence 

of the OH-58 Kiowas was a welcome addition but they did not arrive until 

3d Platoon had already shifted the battle in favor of US forces. Victory 

on that day was a result of the platoon’s leadership’s ability to understand 
69

the battlefield and use maneuver decisively. The platoon’s aggressive and 

perceptive leaders made contact with the enemy, developed the situation, 

and gained the initiative, allowing for an almost complete defeat of the 

insurgent force they faced. Also critical to this success was the platoon’s 

collective conditioning, mental toughness, and endurance which proved 

equally as important as any weapon system. In summation, decisiveness 

and adaptability are two of the qualities most needed for the US Soldier to 

be successful on the modern battlefield.

Third Platoon embodied these sentiments. For them, it was the 

equivalent of flipping a switch, to be able to shift immediately from 

security operations to the attack. As Sergeant Bartlett stated, “we’d have to 

flip that switch. You know, one second you’re just calm, you’re just pulling 

security, you’re not showing you’re a hard target and you just flip that 

switch, and it’s frigging on, you’re ready to go.”51 On 23 June 2010, 3d 

Platoon flipped that switch and every Soldier survived unharmed. It was 

a process they would repeat for the remainder of their stay in Afghanistan 

and to their credit this method produced the same result each and every 

time. During their time in Afghanistan, 3d Platoon suffered no combat 

related injuries. Everyone from the unit returned home safely. 
70

Notes

1. Sergeant Michael Calderaro, quoted in 3d Platoon, Delta Company, 

1-502 IN IN group interview by Michael Doidge, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 28 June 2011, 25.

2. Lieutenant Evan Peck, quoted in 3d Platoon, Delta Company, 1-502 IN IN 

group interview by Michael Doidge, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth 

KS, 28 June 2011, 2.

3. Peck, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 44.

4. Sergeant Matthew Hetrick, email to Michael Doidge, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 28 July 2011.

5. Hetrick, email, 18 July 2011.

6. Sergeant Matthew Hetrick, quoted in 3d Platoon, Delta Company, 1-502 

IN IN group interview by Michael Doidge, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 28 June 2011, 52.

7. Calderaro, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 7-8.

8. Lieutenant Evan Peck email to Michael Doidge, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 July 2011.

9. Hetrick, email, 18 July 2011.

10. Sergeant Daniel Bartlett, quoted in 3d Platoon, Delta Company, 1-502 

IN IN group interview by Michael Doidge, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 28 June 2011, 9.

11. Peck, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 14.

12. Calderaro, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 57.

13. Calderaro, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 10.

14. Hetrick, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 13.

15. Hetrick, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 13.

16. Hetrick, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 13.

17. Peck, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 14.

18. Hetrick, email, 18 July 2011.

19. Peck, email, 23 July 2011.

20. Hetrick, email, 18 July 2011.

21. Sergeant James Brafford, interview by Michael Doidge, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 4 August 2011, 18.

22. Peck, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 56.

23. Calderaro, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 15.

24. Hetrick, email, 18 July 2011.
71

25. Hetrick, email, 18 July 2011.

26. Hetrick, email, 18 July 2011.

27. Peck, email, 23 July 2011.

28. Peck, email, 23 July 2011.

29. Brafford, interview, 4.

30. Peck, email, 23 July 2011.

31. Peck, email, 23 July 2011. Brafford, interview, 32.

32. Brafford, interview, 10.

33. Calderaro, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 16.

34. Hetrick, email, 18 July 2011.

35. Peck, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 28.

36. Calderaro, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 26. Hetrick, quoted 

in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 32. Bartlett, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group 

interview, 32.

37. Sergeant Nicholas Hays, quoted in 3d Platoon, Delta Company, 1-502 

IN IN by Michael Doidge, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 28 

June 2011, 54.

38. Hetrick, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 32.

39. 2d Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne Division, “BDA/SSE 

Assessment of Airstrike, CTF Talon D/1-502, 23 June 2010,” After Action Report, 

23 June 2010, slide 5.

40. Hetrick, email, 18 July 2011.

41. Peck, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 37.

42. Peck, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 40.

43. Bartlett, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 40.

44. Peck, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 54.

45. Calderaro, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 55.

46. Brafford, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 31.

47. 2BCT, 101st Airborne Division “BDA/SSE Assessment of Airstrike,” 23 

June 2010, slide 1, 3.

48. Peck, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 54.

49. Peck, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 56.

50. Peck, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 60.

51. Bartlett, quoted in 3/D/1-502 IN group interview, 52.

73

Forging Alliances at Yargul Village

A Lieutenant’s Struggle to Improve Security

by 

Anthony E. Carlson, Ph. D.

In March 2010, Sher Khan, the tribal elder of Yargul village, stormed 

onto Forward Operating Base (FOB) Wright on the outskirts of Asadabad, 

Afghanistan. Upon arriving at FOB Wright, Sher complained to the Kunar 

Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), a military-civil unit dedicated 

to improving Afghan governance and stability, that recurrent flooding 

damaged Yargul homes, crop fields, and roads. The source of the flooding 

was a small aqueduct. Originating in the lower Pech River valley, the 

aqueduct delivered water to Asadabad, Yargul, FOB Wright, and nearby 

irrigated farms. As part of an effort to reduce improvised explosive device 

(IED) casualties, the US military had installed steel grates over canal, 

road, and aqueduct culverts throughout Kunar.1

 “If someone stuck an 

IED in [the canal], where the kids play,” observed Sergeant First Class 

Christina LeMond, the PRT Civil Affairs Team’s (CAT) purchasing officer, 

“a lot of people would be hurt.”2

 The culvert denial grates disrupted the 

concealment of IEDs. Yet because Afghans discarded trash and other debris 

into waterways, garbage flowed into the grates during heavy rainstorms. 

At Yargul, which was located literally next to FOB Wright, trash flowed 

into the grate during downpours, creating a makeshift dam and causing a 

crest of water that submerged the village.

During his meeting with the Kunar PRT Chief US Navy Commander 

Mark Edwards, Sher argued that it was the PRT’s responsibility to oversee 

the removal and disposal of trash from the aqueduct. “We’re flooded. You 

didn’t clean the grate...Now we’ve lost farmland. Our houses are filled 

with water,” Sher bristled. “It’s your responsibility to come down and 

clean this thing because it’s part of the base.”3

 Edwards sympathized with 

the plight of Yargul farmers.

Given the proximity of Yargul to FOB Wright, it behooved coalition 

forces to cultivate goodwill with Sher avoid alienating his villagers, and 

deter them from supporting the Taliban insurgency. As a result, Edwards 

directed the Kunar PRT CAT to study the problem and recommend a 

solution.

Kunar PRT CAT Project Manager First Lieutenant Joseph Ladisic 

assumed responsibly for solving the flooding problem. Acting with 
74

initiative and a sense of urgency, Ladisic evaluated a diverse range of 

solutions before implementing a cash-for-work program funded by the 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). Administered by 

Figure 1. The culvert denial grate outside of FOB Wright

(note the trash accumulation on top of the grate).

Figure 2. The aqueduct near Yargul. 

Photo Courtesy of First Lieutenant Joseph Ladisic Photo Courtesy of First Lieutenant Joseph Ladisic
75

US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), CERP was a Department of Defense 

program that distributed money to US military commanders for urgent 

reconstruction, relief, and humanitarian projects in support of overseas 

stability operations.4

 Utilizing CERP funds, Ladisic hired Sher to pay 

villagers to remove the trash, dispose of it properly, and keep the grate 

unobstructed. By authorizing the program, Ladisic intended to eliminate 

flooding, provide an infusion of cash into Yargul, elevate Sher’s status 

as a local powerbroker, and prevent security incidences at FOB Wright. 

Endorsing the cash-for-work program, Major Brian Elliott, the PRT 

CAT’s civil-military operations center (CMOC) officer in charge (OIC), 

explained that “the effect that we were trying to achieve had nothing to do 

with the clean grate. Ultimately, what we wanted was to make sure that the 

people that lived next to the wall weren’t going to throw a grenade over...

we really really don’t want to upset these guys that live right next to our 

wall.”5

The three month program, which lasted from April to July 2010, 

yielded mixed results. Although the program reinforced Sher’s prestige 

and power, it also fostered tension, jealousy, and acrimony among rival 

villages along the aqueduct that were not invited to participate. It also 

failed to persuade Yargul residents to assume responsibility for flood 

control. Once the program concluded in July, trash began to accumulate 

over the grate again. Nevertheless, the cleanup program contributed to the 

stable security situation around FOB Wright in the first half of 2010. The 

stability resulted from Ladisic’s purposeful leadership and adeptness at 

forming partnerships with Afghan elders to institute small development 

programs that, however well intentioned, encountered unanticipated 

consequences and uneven results.

Background

Kunar Province is located in northeastern Afghanistan alongside the 

mountainous and porous Pakistan border. Encompassing 1,900 square 

miles, Kunar is approximately the size of Rhode Island. Given the harsh 

terrain and absence of integrated roads, Kunar’s narrow river valleys 

serve as arteries of commerce, transportation, and settlement. Rising in 

the Hindu Kush mountain range in northwestern Pakistan, the Kunar River 

and its tributaries constitute the major river system of the province. The 

river enters Afghanistan in Kunar’s Nari District before turning southwest, 

flowing parallel to the Pakistan border, and merging with the Kabul River 

east of Jalalabad. With a population of 11,000 residents, the provincial 

capital of Asadabad lays at the confluence of the Kunar and Pech Rivers 

in east central Kunar Province. The remaining 390,000 Kunar residents, 

approximately 96 percent of the population, are scattered throughout 
76

the rural river valleys, with the main concentrations distributed south of 

Asadabad. Agriculture is the primary source of revenue for three quarters 

of Kunar families.6

Kunar’s rugged and towering terrain, isolated valleys, location as an 

insurgent smuggling route into Afghanistan, and inward looking tribes 

contributed to a strong and resilient insurgency that found a sanctuary in 

the province. The valley of the Korengal River for instance, has been one 

of the bloodiest places in Afghanistan. Daily clashes between US Soldiers 

and Taliban insurgents in the six-mile long valley, known as the “Valley of 

Death,” accounted for 20 percent of all combat incidents in Afghanistan 

before the United States abandoned the valley in April 2010.7

 Ten months 

later, US forces temporarily withdrew from the Pech River valley, a 

strategic east-west trade corridor, because of uneven progress, a hostile 

local populace, and the deaths of 103 US Soldiers since the initial invasion 

of Afghanistan in 2001. The poor provincial security situation and the 

population’s indifference towards the Government of the Islamic Republic 

of Afghanistan (GIRoA), throughout 2010, defied simple solutions.8

The Kunar PRT was responsible for expanding and deepening the 

legitimacy of GIRoA in the restive province. The PRT concept emerged 

in late 2002 as part of the coalition campaign transitioning from military 

operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda to a modified effort that 

focused on building a new Afghanistan. Emphasizing political stabilization, 

economic development, reconstruction, and the legitimization of Afghan 

governing institutions, the new coalition campaign introduced PRTs.9

The teams traced their origins to Coalition Humanitarian Liason Cells, 

also known as “chiclets”. These were groups of Special Forces and 

military civil affairs personnel. In early 2002, chiclets functioned in major 

provincial towns and areas of strategic significance. They launched small 

development projects, assessed humanitarian needs, forged alliances with 

local powerbrokers, and cooperated with nongovernmental organizations 

(NGOs) and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan 

(UNAMA).10 PRTs borrowed from the chiclet model and assumed many 

of its objectives. Comprised of military and civilian personnel such as 

representatives of the United States Agency for International Development 

(USAID), State Department officials, and Department of Defense civilian 

employees, PRTs sought to improve security, expand GIRoA’s authority, 

and promote economic opportunities. In November 2002, the first PRT 

was established in Gardez, the provincial capital of Paktia. By the summer 

of 2004, a dozen PRTs operated throughout Afghanistan with the highest 

concentrations occurring in southern Afghanistan.11 In October 2006, the 
77

International Security Assistance Force or ISAF, which is the NATO-led 

coalition authority, took control of all PRT operations.12

In order to respond to diverse local conditions, PRTs enjoyed flexibility, 

adaptability, and autonomy. Using CERP and US Overseas Humanitarian, 

Disaster, and Civic Aid (OHDACA) funds, PRTs launched development, 

infrastructure, water, electrical, sanitation, agriculture, animal husbandry, 

and governance projects tailored to achieve specific local outcomes. By 

2011, 27 PRTs operated throughout Afghanistan.13

Genesis of the Cash for Work Cleanup Program

Sher Khan’s visit to FOB Wright, in early 2010, presented an 

opportunity for the incoming Kunar PRT CAT to promote stability and 

security in the southern hinterland of Asadabad. Composed of US Navy 

Sailors, US Army Reservists, National Guard Soldiers, and four US 

government civilians, the Kunar PRT was an ad hoc organization. The CAT, 

which consisted of seven US Army Reservists and one National Guard 

Soldier (First Lieutenant Ladisic), served as the PRT’s “clearinghouse” 

for project development and exercised oversight responsibilities for 

governance issues. Under the leadership of Major Elliott, the 2010 Kunar 

PRT CAT defined its primary mission as “help[ing] increase the capacity 

of the host nation government ... [by] effectively employ[ing] CA assets 

in Kunar Province.”14

The Kunar PRT, along with USAID, had invested large sums improving 

the quality of life, infrastructure, stability, and economic opportunities 

available to Kunar inhabitants. Since 2008, the Kunar PRT built schools, 

repaired roads, constructed bridges, opened a three story courthouse in 

Asadabad, erected a new 100 cell provincial prison, and paved the Pech 

River valley road that links Asadabad with Nuristan Province directly to 

the north. The PRT also promoted agriculture. In late 2008, for instance, 

the PRT distributed 300 pounds of sugar to Kunar beekeepers in order 

to help feed the bees and assist with the spring pollination of crops. The 

PRT also launched a 30 minute call in agricultural radio show in which 

Kunar farmers asked questions related to fertilizer application, livestock 

husbandry, irrigation, and other related topics. Seeking to improve food 

preservation skills, the PRT’s Female Engagement Team hosted workshops 

in 2008 on fruit and vegetable pickling techniques.15

In 2010, the Yargul flooding crisis was one of the incoming PRT 

CAT’s first assignments. Commander Edwards worried that the situation, 

if left unresolved, promoted discontent and undermined base security. 

Surrounded by cornfields, wheat fields, and tree lines, the culvert denial 
78

grate provided the ideal setting for a Taliban ambush. If insurgents observed 

the PRT visiting the aqueduct after every rainstorm and performing grate 

maintenance, they could launch an ambush from concealed positions and 

inflict heavy casualties. Edwards was unwilling to jeapordize US Soldiers

Figure 3. Asadabad and surrounding area.
79

to clean the grate. Yet he did not want to alienate Yargul villagers by 

ignoring their grievances. 

Edwards instructed the PRT CAT to identify potential solutions.16

Ladisic took the lead in devising a flood control program. As an armor 

officer in the Pennsylvania National Guard, Ladisic had little formal 

experience with civil affairs or Afghan culture before his deployment. 

In general, National Guard Soldiers received theater briefs on regional 

culture, ethnicity, language, and religion before deployment. Those 

interested in obtaining more detailed briefings sometimes requested 

additional information from the unit they replaced. Yet Ladisic did not 

have this opportunity. In the weeks leading up to his deployment, he 

expected to serve in Laghman Province as an operations officer with the 

1st Battalion, 178th Field Artillery Regiment (1-178 FA) from the South 

Carolina National Guard. Confusion and uncertainty filled Ladisic’s 

final days before deployment. At the last minute, the 1-178 FA received 

a change of mission and was ordered to take over security at the Kabul 

International Airport. Ladisic’s orders also changed. On the day before he 

departed the United States, he learned that his new assignment was as the 

CAT project manager for the Kunar PRT. With essentially no preparation 

for his insertion into Kunar politics and culture, Ladisic knew that he faced 

a steep learning curve.17

Arriving at FOB Wright on 22 February 2010, Lieutenant Ladisic 

began his duties. Seeking to devise a flood control and garbage disposal 

solution, he gathered information and consulted with Major Elliott and 

Sergeant First Class LeMond. Although the PRT CAT understood that the 

cleanup program was a marginal, temporary, and inexpensive development 

project, they hoped to forge a friendly relationship with Sher, eliminate the 

source of grievances between Yargul and the US military, and resolve a 

thorny environmental problem. In the absence of legitimate and effective 

local governing institutions, the PRT CAT also intended to inspire Yargul 

residents to take responsibility for their village’s welfare. 

Considering a broad range of options, Ladisic walked himself through 

every potential solution in order to determine the best course of action. 

His creative, resourceful, and exhaustive consideration of solutions was 

a testament to his adeptness at adapting to challenging and unfamiliar 

circumstances in which he had little formal training or instruction.

The first solution he considered was to do nothing. Even though this 

option was appealing because the culvert denial grate was outside of FOB 

Wright, doing nothing risked estranging the Afghans that lived just outside 
80

of the base. Furthermore, Yargul teenagers worked in a variety of roles 

at FOB Wright, and Sher, a key local powerbroker, was friendly toward 

coalition forces. If Sher’s complaints about the flooding went unanswered, 

his villagers might question the authority and influence he wielded with 

the PRT and display hostility towards US Soldiers. Given these grim 

assumptions, Ladisic concluded that doing nothing constituted an illadvised and counterproductive strategy.

Ladisic’s second option involved hiring Yargul teenagers to keep 

the grate unobstructed. This plan was attractive because it offered an 

opportunity to put money into the pockets of Yargul’s young men deterring 

them from joining the insurgency and demonstrating the PRT’s solidarity 

with the small village. Unfortunately, it also presented unwieldy logistical 

and supervisory issues. Ladisic wondered how the PRT CAT would 

supervise the cleanups, reimburse the workers, and ensure that no one was 

injured. Uncertainty about oversight and supervisory responsibilities led 

him to reject this proposal in favor of other strategies.

Hiring a local contractor constituted the third possible solution. Yet 

security concerns also made this option unappealing. If the contractors 

arrived at the grate after every rainstorm, they too might be vulnerable 

to an ambush. Since contractor safety and security were the PRT’s 

responsibility, employing contractors would divert scarce resources and 

assets away from other urgent reconstruction and development programs. 

In addition to safety concerns, Ladisic also frowned on the idea of paying 

an outside contractor when the money could be used to benefit Yargul 

residents or politically empower Sher. Small wonder he also dismissed the 

contractor option.

The final alternative proved most advantageous. After rejecting all 

of the other options, Ladisic authorized a cash-for-work program. The 

structure of the program was simple and straightforward. Ladisc would 

reimburse Sher for hiring Yargul villagers to clean the grate and remove 

the trash on a periodic basis. There were many benefits to this arrangement. 

The cash-for-work program promised to reduce flooding, remove debris 

from the aqueduct, provide an infusion of cash into Yargul, elevate Sher’s 

status, and solidify a political alliance between the PRT CAT and Sher. 

Due to Yargul’s proximity to FOB Wright, establishing solidarity with the 

village’s elder was critical to preserving base security.18

On 5 March 2010, Ladisic formally submitted a request for bulk 

CERP funds in order to initiate the cash-for-work program. As the PRT 

CAT awaited a funding decision, Ladisic convened a series of meetings at 
81

Sher’s home and invited him to lead the cleanup effort. They agreed that 

the elder would pay his workers seven to nine dollars per day to keep the 

grate unobstructed. This pay exceeded the Afghanistan national average 

by three times. Ladisic also approved the purchase of tools, rakes, and 

wheelbarrows to haul away the trash. The PRT CAT also identified a 

second cleanup site. The hospital in Asadabad, five miles north of Yargul, 

carelessly discarded hypodermic needles onto the floodplain of the nearby 

Kunar River. Since Afghan children enjoyed playing on the river’s banks, 

the contaminated needles represented a major public safety menace. In 

instructing Sher to remove the needles from the banks of the Kunar River, 

he intended to eliminate a public health hazard and cultivate goodwill by 

demonstrating the PRT CAT’s commitment to improving the quality of life 

for Asadabad families.

Six weeks later, on 12 April, the PRT CAT was awarded $2,100 in 

CERP funds to initiate the program.19 “Everything we did,” Ladisic 

emphasized, “was...to give people confidence in their leaders and their 

government.”20 Elevating Sher to a leadership role legitimized his political 

status and reinforced his right to employ power in his own village. On 16 

April, Ladisic invited Sher to FOB Wright. Finalizing the terms of the 

cash-for-work program, Ladisic told him to return the next day with a list 

of trustworthy and responsible villagers who he hired to clean the grate, 

dispose of the trash, and collect the contaminated needles scattered near the 

Kunar River. He also laid out the PRT CAT’s expectations. Allegations of 

fraud, corruption, or the misuse of funds would not be tolerated. Since the 

primary purpose of the CERP funds was to empower Sher and enhance his 

political standing and prestige, Ladisic insisted that he exercise complete 

autonomy and supervision. The success, or failure, of the cash-for-work 

program rested on the elder’s integrity. As Sher departed FOB Wright, 

Ladisic felt confident that he had enlisted an elder of unimpeachable 

integrity and character to administer the undertaking. The cleanup program 

was set to begin.21

The next morning Sher brought a list of names, a cleanup schedule, and 

an estimate of how much he intended to pay each worker. Satisfied with 

the elder’s preparations, Ladisic again demanded strict accountability. The 

PRT CAT would evaluate progress by making unannounced visits to the 

grate and the needle cleanup site. Unsatisfactory results might lead to the 

program’s early termination. Nevertheless, before the meeting concluded, 

Ladisic gave Sher the full $2,100. In an attempt to foster accountability, 

the PRT CAT also mandated that he collect the signature or fingerprint of 

every worker each time he paid them.22
82

The Clean Up Commences

Sher tackled his new responsibilities with enthusiasm and eagerness. 

On 18 April 2010, he organized the first culvert denial grate cleanup. 

Using rakes, wheelbarrows, and other tools purchased with bulk CERP 

funds, the Yargul villagers, mostly teenage boys aged 12-19, removed 

trash and other debris from the grate.23 After the initial grate cleanup, the 

villagers proceeded to the Asadabad hospital. Under Sher’s direction, they 

picked up used hypodermic needles from the banks of the Kunar River. 

Afterward, he reimbursed his workers the predetermined rate, returned 

to FOB Wright, and submitted a receipt containing the signatures and 

fingerprints of paid workers.24

The cash-for-work program yielded immediate results. By May, rain 

runoff and snowmelt from the Pech River watershed flowed through the 

aqueduct unimpeded. For the first time since the implementation of the 

culvert grate denial program, Yargul homes, crop fields, and roads were 

not submerged after downpours.25 The program initially attained its goals 

for the local economic impact, Sher’s status, and his relationship with 

coalition forces. According to Ladisic, Sher was “appreciative of the PRT 

CAT supporting his village and empowering him in front of his villagers.”26

Figure 4. Yargul villagers collecting needles on the banks of the Kunar River. 

Photo Courtesy of First Lieutenant Joseph Ladisic
83

Despite the initial successes, the cash-for-work program soon triggered 

tension between Ladisic and Sher. During a routine patrol to check on 

the culvert denial grate in late May, Ladisic discovered Sher’s workers 

sitting idly on a nearby retaining wall even though garbage covered the 

grate. The discovery irritated Ladisic. It demonstrated that the villagers, 

without strict supervision, were willing to take advantage of American 

generosity. Hoping to persuade Sher to adopt a more assertive supervisory 

role, Ladisic visited the elder’s home. Employing a combination of praise 

and criticism, the lieutenant commended Sher for keeping the grate 

unobstructed for five weeks yet he emphasized that he would no longer 

tolerate lazy or unaccountable workers. He asked Sher to personally visit 

or send his financial adviser to check on the workers every day that they 

were dispatched to clean the grate. The tense encounter had the desired 

outcome. Receptive to criticism, Sher became more active in ensuring that 

workers did not take advantage of the program.27

Ladisic’s hands-on leadership also improved the results of the 

hypodermic needle cleanup. On 18 April, Sher and the Yargul villagers 

had launched the needle cleanup outside of the Asadabad hospital. Three 

weeks later during a scheduled patrol, Ladisic discovered that only half 

of the needles had been picked up. Discarded hypodermic needles littered 

the banks of the Kunar River where children played and families retrieved 

water. Disappointed but undeterred, Ladisic instructed to Sher accompany 

him to the hospital the next day. As the pair walked along the beach, the 

Yargul elder agreed to have his workers return and complete the cleanup. 

A few weeks later, Ladisic discovered the beach completely devoid of 

trash, hypodermic needles, and other medical garbage.28 Afghan children 

were finally free to play near the Kunar River without the threat of injury 

by contaminated needles.

Ladisic next attempted to secure the permanent success of the needle 

cleanup. After Sher’s workers removed the final batch of needles from 

the beach, he visited the hospital and requested a meeting with Dr. Fazli, 

the hospital director. Once the two men exchanged customary greetings, 

Ladisic explained the purpose of the PRT CAT’s cleanup project, 

emphasized the dangers of not properly disposing used needles, and asked 

Dr. Fazli to eliminate the reckless dumping of medical garbage near the 

river. Unaware of the PRT CAT’s cleanup program or the needle disposal 

problem, Dr. Fazli altered the hospital’s disposal method. Ladisic was 

pleased by Fazli’s demeanor, response, and positive attitude. The beach 

near the Kunar River remained free of needles for the remainder of 

Ladisic’s deployment.29
84

Unintended Consequences

As the cash-for-work program entered its second month in midMay, major unanticipated difficulties developed. Faiz Muhammad Khan, 

a tribal elder from Dam Kalay, an Asadabad suburb north of Yargul, 

visited the Kunar governor’s compound.30 Hostile and animated, Faiz 

angrily accused the PRT of subverting his political and social authority by 

selecting Sher to head the cleanup program. Yargul village, he explained, 

was part of the Dam Kalay grand shura. In Afghan tribal culture, shuras

are temporary advisory councils that mediate local conflicts and exercise 

civic responsibilities for law and order, justice, security, humanitarian 

needs, and reconstruction. Faiz argued that the PRT CAT destabilized the 

local political hierarchy by appointing Sher, rather than himself or one of 

his family members, to head the cash-for-work program.31

Faiz’s criticism caught the Kunar PRT CAT off guard. During 

Ladisic’s organizational meetings with Sher, the Yargul elder never 

mentioned his village’s subordinate social relationship to Dam Kalay. 

Nevertheless, the brewing controversy demanded a swift and amicable 

resolution. By intensifying tribal rivalries and tensions, the program 

was becoming counterproductive. Looking to defuse the tense situation, 

Ladisic met on several occasions with Faiz. During the discussions, the 

Dam Kalay elder stated how he would have used the CERP funds to enrich 

his family. Ladisic was stunned. On the one hand, the lieutenant admitted 

that the PRT CAT exercised poor judgment by selecting Sher rather than 

Faiz to lead the program. Yet Ladisic also concluded that Faiz was only 

interested in supervising the cleanup to line his own pockets. He wanted 

something for nothing. Taking a firm stance, Ladisic admonished Faiz. 

He emphasized that the purpose of cash-for-work was to economically 

empower the entire community of villages and not his family. “Look,” 

Ladisic instructed him, “that’s not what these programs are about. It’s not 

about helping your family. If you don’t understand that, I’m sorry but it’s 

about helping everybody.”32

Despite Ladisic’s stern rebuke, Faiz escalated the conflict. Over the 

next month he visited the governor’s compound on several occasions 

claiming that he also served as the local “ditch and canal director.” 

Ratcheting up his rhetoric, he angrily denounced the PRT CAT and 

demanded that Ladisic turn control of the cleanup program over to his 

family. The episode revealed the significance of cultural awareness in all 

US Army operations in Afghanistan. Navigating Afghanistan’s tangled 

maze of competing political factions and rival tribes was a prerequisite for 

forging meaningful political alliances with relevant local powerbrokers. 
85

The cash-for-work program, rather than building harmonious political 

alliances between coalition forces and village elders in the vicinity of 

Asadabad, instead provoked intertribal discord, tension, and jealousy. The 

controversy undermined the PRT CAT’s relationship with communities in 

the volatile Asadabad area.33

The PRT CAT eventually decided to mollify Faiz. In July, Ladisic, 

First Lieutenant Vinodhini Darmarajah, and other CAT members 

approached the Dam Kalay village elder about initiating a CERP project 

under his sponsorship in Asadabad. They agreed to build a railing on a 

steep set of stairs behind the provincial governor’s compound. According 

to Darmarajah, the $1,500-project promoted safety, provided jobs for 

Asadabad and Dam Kalay residents, demonstrated that the PRT did not 

favor Yargul at the expense of other communities, and helped “smooth 

things over” with Faiz.34 The CERP funded railing project took eight weeks 

to complete and employed local workers. Darmarajah identified the railing 

project as a key reason why the tension between the PRT CAT and Faiz 

slowly subsided over the course of the summer. Cash, if properly used, 

proved an effective tool to solve problems and reconcile feuding parties.35

As the cleanup program entered its final month in mid-June, additional 

cultural misunderstandings hampered success. In launching the cleanup 

program, the PRT CAT anticipated that Sher’s workers would collect, 

remove, and dispose the garbage that accumulated on the culvert denial 

grate. This assumption was based on the faulty premise that Afghans, 

like western people, identified trash as an expendable and disposable 

material. Rather than hauling trash away from the aqueduct, however, 

Sher’s workers simply moved it to the area adjacent to the grate. Heavy 

downpours washed the garbage back onto the culvert denial grate. When 

questioned by Ladisic about the worker’s strategy, Sher responded that the 

landfill concept was alien to Kunar Province. Afghans reused trash as fuel 

and building supplies. According to Sher, it was foolish, shortsighted, and 

irresponsible to bury garbage so that it could never be salvaged or burned 

as a fuel source. His villagers would keep the grate unobstructed but they 

did not intend to transport the trash away from the aqueduct.36

On 17 July, the cleanup program ended. Over the next several weeks, 

the PRT CAT watched with curiosity whether the cash-for-work program 

fostered a sense of community responsibility in Yargul about flood control 

and garbage removal. Unfortunately, when the bulk CERP funds dried up, 

Sher and his villagers lost interest in the aqueduct. As soon as the rains 

returned, so too did the floods.
86

Aftermath

The Kunar PRT CAT culvert grate denial cleanup program exemplified 

the daunting challenges faced by US Army Soldiers in navigating 

Afghanistan’s complex labyrinth of local political hierarchies, cultural 

traditions, and competing powerbrokers. One anthropologist described the 

fragmented nature of Afghanistan’s social and political culture by stating 

that “the outstanding feature of social life in Afghanistan is its local tribal 

or ethnic divisions. People’s primary loyalty is respectively to their kin, 

village, tribe, or ethnic group.”37 Incoming PRT leaders had to obtain a 

comprehensive awareness of Afghan politics, culture, and society in order 

to efficiently operate in this difficult environment. In a fragmented society, 

cultural awareness was a prerequisite for forging and sustaining productive 

alliances with local and provincial powerbrokers. The Kunar PRT CAT 

cleanup program proved counterproductive because team leaders were 

unaware of the long standing social and cultural relationships that defined 

everyday life and the interaction of villages in Asadabad’s hinterland. 

In hindsight, the PRT CAT’s assumption that money alone could alter 

longstanding cultural understandings of waste was shortsighted.

Ultimately, feelings of disillusionment and bitterness overwhelmed the 

PRT CAT. Despite the US Army’s noble and well intentioned efforts, the 

cleanup and flood control program failed to inspire Yargul villagers to seize 

the initiative and take responsibility for their own welfare. “[The villagers 

were] not going to go above and beyond unless they’re getting paid for it,” 

Ladisic concluded.38 Elliott shared his subordinate’s sentiment. Compared 

to other CERP projects authorized by the Kunar PRT CAT, the cleanup 

program, in Elliott’s words, was a “sideshow,” a “drop in the bucket,” and 

“a waste of time.”39 The program’s major shortcoming was that it attacked 

the symptom of the flooding problem (the clogged grate) rather than the 

ultimate source (Afghan cultures’ proclivity towards discarding trash in 

waterways). Nevertheless, the PRT CAT’s responsiveness to unanticipated 

and adverse events such as the chronic garbage problem and intertribal 

friction was a testament to creative, proactive, and engaged leadership by 

company grade officers.

The program did lead to notable successes and promoted a stable 

security environment. During the past decade, a growing body of 

scholarship argued that contemporary insurgencies sometimes sabotage 

critical energy and water infrastructure in order to destabilize and 

undermine the credibility of local governments.40 A US Army study 

argued that during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, the insurgency based 

in Sadr City lost momentum once basic sanitation, electrical, and water 
87

services were restored and protected.41 Elliott contended that the cash-forwork program, by reducing floods attributed to the American construction 

project, probably promoted base security by deterring Yargul villagers 

from sympathizing with the Taliban. Throughout 2010, no major security 

incidences occurred at Yargul. The PRT discovered that it was difficult 

to enhance the authority and prestige of national governing institutions 

in such a parochial and fragmented society but Elliott applauded his 

PRT CAT’s record of promoting base stability. Security concerns always 

trumped the flooding and trash problems. “The effect that we were trying 

to achieve had nothing to do with the clean grate. Ultimately, what we 

wanted was to make sure that the people that lived next to the wall weren’t 

going to throw a grenade over...So, did the project fail? Well, we didn’t 

solve the trash problems...but did it achieve the effect in that we created 

some goodwill with the Yargul villagers that lived next door to us? Yeah, I 

think so and that, in my mind, is probably good enough.”42
88

Notes

1. First Lieutenant Joseph Ladisic, interview by Anthony E. Carlson, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 24 June 2011, 10-11.

2. Second Lieutenant Amy Abbott, “Cash for Work program employs local 

Afghan villagers,” 24 April 2010, http://troopscoop.posterous.com/daily-afghaniraq-update4-24 (accessed 21 June 2011).

3. Ladisic, interview, 10.

4. Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, 

“Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Laghman Province Provided 

Some Benefits, but Oversight Weaknesses and Sustainment Concerns Led 

to Questionable Outcomes and Potential Waste,” www.sigar.mil/pdf/audits/

SIGARAudit-11-7.pdf (accessed 1 August 2011), ii, 1.

5. Major Brian P. Elliott, interview by Anthony E. Carlson, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 30 June 2011, 20, 16.

6. Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team: Observations, Insights, 

and Lessons (Ft. Leavenworth: Center for Army Lessons Learned, 2011), 93-

4; Michael Moore and James Fussell, “Kunar and Nuristan: Rethinking US 

Counterinsurgency Operations,” Institute for the Study of War, Afghanistan 

Report 1 (July 2009): 6-7.

7. Moore and Fussell, 20; Christopher Bodeen, “US Troops Withdraw 

from Korengal Valley,” Army Times, 14 April 2010, www.armytimes.com/

news/2010/04/ap_afghanistan_korengal_041410/ (accessed 8 August 2011).

8. J. Chivers, Alissa J. Rubin, and Wesley Morgan, “US Pulling Back in 

Afghan Valley it Called Vital to War,” New York Times, 24 February 2011, www.

nytimes.com/2011/02/25/world/asia/25afghanistan.html (accessed 8 August 

2011).

9. Donald P. Wright, James R. Bird, Steven E. Clay, Peter W. Connors, 

Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Scott C. Farquhar, Lynne Chandler Garcia, and 

Dennis F. Van Wey, A Different Kind of War: The United States Army in 

Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF), October 2001-September 2005 (Fort 

Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 2010), 3, 254-55.

10. Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team, 1-3; Moses T. Ruiz, 

“Sharpening the Spear: The United States’ Provincial Reconstruction Teams in 

Afghanistan,” Applied Research Projects, Texas State University-San Marcos 297 

(Spring 2009), 57.

11. Kenneth Katzman, “Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, 

and US Policy,” (n .p.: Congressional Research Services, 2010), 49-50; Katzman, 

“Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and US Policy,” (n. p.: 

Congressional Research Services, 2011), 27-8; Provincial Reconstruction Teams: 

An Interagency Assessment (n. p.: USAID, 2006), 8-9; Wright et. al., 254-59.

12. Afghanistan Provincial Reconstruction Team, 3.
89

13. North Atlantic Treaty Organization, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

(PRTs),” 8 November 2010, http://www.nato.int/isaf/topics/prt/ (accessed 22 

August 2011).

14. For an organizational chart of the Kunar PRT CAT, see Elliott, First 

Lieutenant Vinodhini Darmarajah, Ladisic, Master Sergeant Donald David, 

Sergeant First Class Christina LeMond, Sergeant Anthony Didonato, Corporal 

Toan Q. Pham, and Tony Unite, “Provincial Reconstruction Team Kunar: Civil 

Affairs Best Practices,” unpublished paper, 2010, 7. See also Elliott, e-mail 

to Anthony E. Carlson, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 6 

September 2011.

15. Lily J. Lawrence, “Road Improves Life for Pech Valley Communities,” 

17 July 2008, Central Asia Online, http://centralasiaonline.com/cocoon/caii/

xhtml/en_GB/features/caii/features/2008/07/17/feature-03 (accessed 7 September 

2011); Second Lieutenant Neil Myers, “PRT Supports Agriculture in Konar 

Province,” 16 August 2008, Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System, 

http://www.dvidshub.net/news/printable/22571 (accessed 7 September 2011); 

Soraya Sarhaddi Nelson,“Westerners Play Pivotal Role in Afghan Rebuilding,” 

National Public Radio, 20 May 2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.

php?storyId=90599416 (accessed 7 September 2011); Lieutenant Junior Grade 

James Dietle, “Afghanistan Department of Agriculture, PRT Work to Expand 

Beekeeping in Konar Province,” 1 January 2009, Regional Command-East, 

http://www.rc-east.com/en/regional-command-east-news-mainmenu-401/1530-

afghanistan-department-of-agriculture-prt-work-to-expand-beekeeping-inkonar-province.html (accessed 7 September 2011); “Kunar PRT Attends Prison 

Opening,” 23 December 2010, Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System, 

http://www.dvidshub.net/news/printable/62713 (accessed 7 September 2011); 

“Kunar PRT Helps Young Women Learn Food Preservation Skills,” 31 May 

2011, Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System, http://www.dvidshub.net/

news/printable/71331 (accessed 7 September 2011); First Lieutenant Nicholas 

Mercurio, “US Ambassador, PRT Inaugurate New Courthouse in Kunar,” 13 

May 2011, Regional Command-East, http://www.rc-east.com/ar/press-releasesmainmenu-326/4502-us-ambassador-prt-inaugurate-new-courthouse-in-kunar.

html (accessed 7 September 2011).

16. Ladisic, interview, 10-11.

17. Ladisic, interview, 39-40; and Ladisic, e-mail to Anthony E. Carlson, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 August 2011.

18. For a description of all of the strategies Ladisic and the PRT CAT 

considered, see Ladisic, interview, 14-5.

19. Ladisic, interview, 12-3, 15, 36.

20. Ladisic, interview, 16.

21. Ladisic, interview, 11-13.

22. Ladisic, interview, 11-13.

23. Ladisic, e-mail to Anthony E. Carlson, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 15 August 2011.
90

24. Ladisic, interview, 16-18.

25. Ladisic, interview, 18.

26. Ladisic, interview, 31.

27. Ladisic, interview, 18.

28. Ladisic, e-mail, 15 August 2011.

29. Ladisic, interview, 35.

30. The name of the Dam Kalay elder was given in Darmarajah, e-mail to 

Anthony E. Carlson, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 18 August 

2011.

31. Ladisic, interview, 27. On the history of Afghan shuras, see Lynn Carter 

and Kerry Connor, A Preliminary Investigation of Contemporary Afghan Councils

(Peshwar, Pakistan: Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief, 1989), 2-10; 

and Ali Wardak, “Jirga – A Traditional Mechanism of Conflict Resolution in 

Afghanistan,” United Nations Online Network in Public Administration and 

Finance, 2003, unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/.../apcity/unpan917434.pdf 

(accessed 17 August 2011).

32. Ladisic, interview, 29-30.

33. Ladisic, interview, 30; Ladisic, e-mail to Anthony E. Carlson, Combat 

Studies Institute, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 12 July 2011.

34. Darmarajah, e-mail to Anthony E. Carlson, Combat Studies Institute, Ft. 

Leavenworth, KS, 26 July 2011.

35. Darmarajah, e-mail, 26 July 2011; and Darmarajah, interview by Anthony 

E. Carlson, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 29 June 2011, 14-15.

36. Ladisic, interview, 33.

37. Thomas Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2010), 18.

38. Ladisic, interview, 41.

39. Elliott, interview, 16-22.

40. Chad M. Briggs, “Environmental Change, Strategic Foresight, and 

Impacts on Military Power,” Parameters 40 (Autumn 2010): 81-82.

41. Colonel Timothy E. Hill, Reducing an Insurgency’s Foothold: Using 

Army Sustainability Concepts as a Tool of Security Cooperation for AFRICOM 

(Arlington: Army Environmental Policy Institute, 2008), 11-14. On the importance 

of water in conducting counterinsurgency operations, see Department of the 

Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Headquarters, Department 

of the Army: Washington, DC: 2006), 1-9, 2-2, 3-11, 5-23, 6-2.

42. Elliott, interview, 20-21.
91

Operation STRONG EAGLE

Combat Action in the Ghakhi Valley

by

John J. McGrath

In the summer of 2010, Coalition forces in eastern Afghanistan faced 

a mounting insurgent threat in districts along the border with Pakistan. In 

order to contest this rising menace, in June 2010 the 2d Battalion, 327th 

Infantry (2-327th IN) (Task Force (TF) No Slack), conducted Operation 

STRONG EAGLE in the Marawara District of Kunar Province. The goal 

of the operation, the first major offensive conducted by the newly arrived 

1st Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 101st Airborne Division (TF Bastogne), 

was to reduce enemy presence in the heavily-populated Kunar River 

Valley region of Kunar Province. 

At the time of the operation, General David Petraeus was awaiting 

Senate confirmation of his appointment to the post as head of the 

Afghanistan Theater of operations based out of Kabul. Petraeus would 

assume command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 

several days after the conclusion of STRONG EAGLE replacing General 

Stanley McChrystal. ISAF was a NATO post. As the senior American 

officer in Afghanistan, Petraeus also headed the US Forces in Afghanistan 

(USFOR-A) command, a headquarters established in 2008 to oversee 

the activities of all American troops in the theater. Under Petraeus was 

the International Joint Command (IJC), led by Lieutenant General 

David M. Rodriguez since its establishment in 2009. Rodriguez, whose 

headquarters was at the Kabul airport, controlled ISAF’s operational 

forces. In 2010 these included six regional commands. Three of the regional 

commands were led by and predominately staffed with American forces. 

One of these headquarters, Regional Command East (RC-East) based at 

Bagram Airfield, controlled operational units in northeastern Afghanistan. 

In June 2010, Headquarters, 101st Airborne Division, called Combined 

Joint Task Force 101 (CJTF-101) while deployed and commanded by 

Major General John Campbell, functioned as the RC-East Command. 

The division controlled its own 1st and 3d BCTs based at Jalalabad and 

Khowst respectively along with the 173d Airborne BCT (Logar), the 

Vermont Army National Guard’s 86th BCT (Bagram), a French brigade, 

and a Polish brigade. The 1st BCT, 101st Airborne Division (TF Bastogne), 

located at the Jalalabad Airfield (Forward Operating Base [FOB] Fenty) 
92

and with Colonel Andrew Poppas commanding, was responsible for the 

four northeastern provinces of Nangahar, Laghman, Nuristan and Kunar. 

Poppas controlled four maneuver battalions. One of these units, the 2d 

Battalion, 327th Infantry, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joel Vowell, 

had responsibility for the eastern portion of Kunar Province, including the 

southern portion of the Kunar River Valley and Marawara District.1

Special operations forces (SOF), composed of a mix of US Army 

Special Forces teams, Navy SEALS, and other SOF elements functioned 

under a separate chain of command directly under Petraeus. US Army 

Brigadier General Austin Miller commanded the Combined Forces Special 

Operations Component Command (CFSOCC) at Kabul. Under Miller was 

Colonel Donald Bolduc’s Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force 

(CJSOTF). Bolduc oversaw four regionally based battalion-sized SOF 

task forces. One of these task forces had responsibility for the area covered 

by RC-East. In addition to conducting special operations in RC-East, the 

SOF were the advisors for several elite Afghan commando and other units 

that often fought alongside American troops and non-elite elements of the 

Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).2

Background

STRONG EAGLE was the culmination of a long series of operations 

in Kunar Province since the beginning of Operation ENDURING 

FREEDOM (OEF) in 2001. Coalition presence was minimal in northeastern 

Afghanistan for the first two years of OEF. The Taliban forces in the area 

withdrew under minimal local pressure in November 2001 concurrent with 

their withdrawal from the city of Jalalabad in Nangarhar Province just to 

the south of Kunar. Subsequently, US forces obtained control of a former 

Soviet and Afghan military compound south of Asadabad and established a 

small firebase there to coordinate the future activities of special operations 

forces (SOF) in the region. This outpost, originally called simply Firebase 

Asadabad and later Camp Wright, supported a company of paratroopers 

from the 82d Airborne Division in 2002. Special Forces elements also 

established another outpost farther north along the Kunar River at Naray, 

a post later redesignated Forward Operating Base Bostick. From these 

outposts, SOF elements initially conducted operations to engage the 

local populace, primarily through the conduct of medical civic assistance 

programs (MEDCAP) and missions designed to capture high value targets 

(HVT) enemy leadership cells. These types of operations predominated in 

the region through mid-2006, even after the introduction of conventional 

forces which either augmented the activities of the SOF units or operated 

temporarily in the region to conduct a specific operation.3

 
93

Figure 1. Marawara District in Relation to the Rest of Afghanistan.

In 2003 and 2004 light infantry forces from the 10th Mountain 

Division and later the 82d Airborne Division provided small security 

elements for the Kunar Valley bases at Asadabad and Barikowt north of 

Naray on the Pakistani border. When intelligence sources indicated that 

important insurgent leaders were meeting in the Waygal Valley region of 

Nuristan, just north of Kunar, US forces executed Operation MOUNTAIN 

RESOLVE in early November 2003. MOUNTAIN RESOLVE involved 

elements of two infantry battalions from the 10th Mountain Division, 

Army Rangers and Special Forces operators and Navy SEALs. In the 

operation, US troops were inserted by helicopter into the Waygal Valley 

and conducted area sweeps up to the town of Aranas in central Nuristan 

Province. The most enduring result of MOUNTAIN RESOLVE was the 

creation of a new firebase near the village of Nangalam in the Pech Valley. 

This site later became known as Camp Blessing.4

After MOUNTAIN RESOLVE, the number of conventional units in 

Kunar Province gradually increased. From November 2003 to June 2006, a 

series of US Marine infantry battalions on seven-month rotations stationed 
94

elements in Kunar Province. Eventually the Marines maintained a company 

at Asadabad with one of its platoons at Camp Blessing. SOF operations 

continued in the area and the Marines at times massed forces for particular 

operations. The most significant of these efforts were Operations RED 

WINGS and WHALERS in 2005 in which the 2d Battalion, 3d Marine 

Regiment (2/3d Marines), sent converging columns into the Korengal 

valley south of the Pech River.5

Conventional Army forces moved into Kunar Province in large 

numbers for the first time beginning in April 2006 as a result of Operation 

MOUNTAIN LION. Elements of two different battalions (1-32d IN and 

3d Squadron, 71st Cavalry) from the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 10th 

Mountain Division along with part of the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines (1/3d 

Marine Regiment) again converged on the Korengal Valley. However, 

at the conclusion of operations there, as the Marines departed for their 

home station in Hawaii, the Army elements then moved to permanent 

garrison locations in Kunar and Nuristan provinces, establishing a series 

of small outposts along the major river valleys. From June 2006 to January 

2009, this two-battalion force, through three unit rotations, conducted 

counterinsurgency operations throughout Kunar Province. One battalion 

had responsibility for all but the two northernmost districts of Kunar and 

for the three central districts of Nuristan Province. The other, a series of 

cavalry squadrons, had responsibility for the two northernmost Kunar 

districts and the two easternmost districts of Nuristan Province.

In order to increase the coalition presence along the Pakistani border 

area, commanders in the Coalition added another maneuver battalion 

to the forces in northeastern Afghanistan (the RC-East area) in January 

2009. To provide this reinforcement, the incoming 1st Battalion, 32d 

Infantry (1-32d IN) was detached from its parent brigade and assigned to 

the 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division, the unit responsible 

for Kunar Province. The new battalion had previously served in Kunar 

in 2006 and 2007. With the 1-32d IN’s arrival, the sector formerly the 

responsibility of a single battalion ( in January 2009 the 1st Battalion, 26th 

Infantry) was divided in half with the new unit assuming responsibility 

for the ten Kunar districts closest to Pakistan. Further complicating things 

was the fact that 1-32d IN was on a different rotation cycle from the other 

units in Kunar. Accordingly, midway through the battalion’s one year 

tour, all the other units in the province returned to their home stations 

and the 4th BCT, 4th Infantry Division, replaced the 3d BCT, 1st Infantry 

Division as the responsible brigade headquarters. In late 2009, 1-32d 

IN itself departed Afghanistan being replaced in Kunar, (for the second 
95

consecutive time in OEF) by the 2d Battalion, 503d Infantry (2-503d 

IN). The 2-503d IN was detached from its parent unit, the 173d Airborne 

Brigade Combat Team to the 4th BCT, 4th Infantry Division. When the 

1st BCT, 101st Airborne Division, replaced the 4th BCT in Kunar in early 

2010, Major General Campbell, the 101st commander, preferred to retain 

all his organic maneuver battalions under his control for the unit’s full 

tour. Therefore the 2-503d IN was sent back to its parent brigade and 

replaced in eastern Kunar by the 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry (Task Force

No Slack). Operation STRONG EAGLE was the new battalion’s first 

major operation upon assuming responsibility for this region.6

Per one of the components of US Army counterinsurgency doctrine, 

the primary mission of all these eastern Kunar battalions was to interdict 

enemy movement and lines of communication from across the border out 

of Pakistan. This was chiefly accomplished through the posting of troops 

in outposts centered on population centers and conducting routine and 

continuous patrols throughout specific company sectors. Occasionally the 

battalions would mass forces for larger operations and periodically, troops 

were dispatched to areas of increased insurgent activity out of sector such 

as Barg-i-Matal, in Nuristan in 2009 and 2010.7

The Ghakhi Valley

The Kunar River Valley runs northeast from the Kabul River Valley near 

Jalalabad for about 60 miles through the Afghan provinces of Nangarhar 

and Kunar before flowing into Pakistan. Within Kunar Province, the river’s 

course flows parallel to and roughly 10 kilometers (five miles) west of the 

Pakistani border (the famous Durand Line). The border is demarcated by 

the peaks of the Hindu Raj range, a southern extension of the Hindu Kush. 

There are numerous passes through this ridgeline. The one closest to the 

provincial capital of Asadabad is the Ghakhi Pass in Marawara District. 

Marawara District is located directly across the Kunar River from 

and to the east of Asadabad, the largest town in the province. The main 

geographical feature of the district is the Ghakhi Valley (Figure 2), which 

extends for roughly 11 kilometers (six miles) from the district capital, 

Marawara village on the Kunar River, to the Ghakhi Pass located on the 

Pakistani border. A newly built bridge across the Kunar River connected 

Marawara village with the Kunar Valley road running north from Asadabad 

on the west side of the river. A major unpaved road ran from Marawara 

to the Ghakhi Pass through the villages of Sangam, Daridam, and Chinar. 

Intelligence analysts believed that Chinar, the most easterly of these 

settlements, was the headquarters of the Taliban commander for Kunar. 
96

Figure 2. The Ghakhi Valley.

Marawara District’s population consisted entirely of Mohmand Pashtuns, 

who also live in nearby Pakistan and had settle the region east of the Kunar 

River in the early nineteenth century.8

Coalition forces had long conducted humanitarian and development 

projects in Marawara District. In 2008 the Kunar Provincial Reconstruction 

Team (PRT), a US run Coalition agency for economic development, 

issued a contract to build the previously mentioned bridge across the 

Kunar River near the village of Marawara. This small bridge, once it was 

completed in November 2009, allowed the local inhabitants access to the 

markets and bazaars of Asadabad. Prior to this, most residents crossed 

the Ghakhi Pass into Pakistan for such resources. Economic aid to the 

district continued in 2009 and 2010. A new district center was built and an 

Army National Guard Agribusiness Team frequently visited the district to 

assist local farmers. Since 2004, the National Solidarity Project (NSP), an 

Afghan governmental development agency, had built a series of surface 

level aqueducts along the floor of the Ghakhi Valley to facilitate irrigation. 

The Kunar PRT also assisted in rebuilding these watercourses in 2008 and 
97

2009. The aqueducts were a boon to local agriculture but also provided 

natural fighting positions alongside the road.9

Mountainous ridgelines dominated the Ghakhi Valley road to both the 

north and south. The valley floor was at an elevation of slightly less than 

1,000 meters, or six-tenths of a mile above sea level. That was the low 

ground. The surrounding peaks rose to heights as high as 1,800 meters 

(over a mile above sea level). A wadi through which flowed the intermittent 

Ghakhi stream formed a gorge that paralleled the road in the lowest land 

in the valley. Past Sangam, the west-east valley road paralleled the wadi

to the south, eventually crossing it between Sangam and Daridam (Figure 

3). Coming from the west, the road angled to a northeasterly direction and 

plunged down 50 meters into the wadi fording the usually dry streambed of 

the Ghakhi creek. Continuing to the northeast, the road then reclimbed the 

50 meters to the valley floor before turning east again to travel to Daridam. 

In the 1980s, the Soviets called this area the Marawara Pass as the road 

was particularly dominated by high ground on all sides as it crossed the 

wadi. In the valley, the inhabitants conducted agricultural activities based 

on artificial terraces, a characteristic feature of northeastern Afghanistan. 

Just west of Daridam there were pomegranate orchards built on such 

terraces both to the north and south of the road. 

During their campaigns in Afghanistan, Soviet forces conducted 

military operations in Marawara District in order to close insurgent access 

to sanctuary areas in nearby Pakistan. Large Soviet forces conducted forays 

into the Ghakhi valley in May 1983 and in April 1985. The latter action was 

more significant. On 20 April 1985 the 334th Spetsnaz Battalion based at 

Asadabad, conducted a battalion-sized operation to clear the Ghakhi Valley. 

One spetsnaz company advanced down the Ghakhi Valley road while two 

other companies covered its movement from the high ground to the north 

and south of the valley. The mujahideen managed to advance down the 

large wadi in the center of the valley behind the Soviets from the west 

and surround the company advancing along the road in separate groups 

in the villages of Marawara, Daridam, and Sangam. The commander of 

the company covering the movement from high ground to the north of the 

road observed this movement but thought the enemy forces were friendly 

reinforcements and held fire until it was too late. The Soviet command 

sent a column of BMP armored fighting vehicles and tanks from the 2d 

Battalion, 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade to relieve the trapped 

Spetsnazi. This column advanced along the Ghazi valley road eastward 

until a radio-controlled mine emplaced at the point where the road cut
98

through the wadi (the Maravar or Marawara Pass) disabled the lead tank 

and stalled the whole relief column for over four hours.10

Figure 3. The Ghakhi Valley between Sangam and Daridam.
99

During this delay, the mujahideen were able to destroy over half of 

the trapped Spetsnaz elements. The company commander, Captain Nikolai 

Tsebruk, was killed in Daridam. Eventually the reinforcements were able 

to rescue the survivors and evacuate the wounded. The Soviets suffered 

31 men killed in action and over 100 wounded. For its heroic defense, 

the 1st Company, 334th Spetsnaz Battalion, thereafter carried the informal 

honorific title of “Marawara Company.” Several months later, the Spetsnaz

battalion commander, feeling the mujahideen had used sanctuary areas in 

Pakistan to assemble for the fight at the Marawara Pass and had received 

material, if not direct aid from the Pakistanis, conducted an unsanctioned 

cross border incursion south of Marawara District. While the incursion 

was successful, the commander was relieved of his post.11

Years later, during Operation ENDURING FREEDOM, Marawara’s 

location astride the Pakistani border continued to affect conditions in the 

district. When the Pakistani military conducted operations against insurgent 

sanctuary areas in the Bajaur Agency district opposite Kunar Province 

in the summer of 2008, thousands of refugees fled to Afghanistan. In 

Marawara, 748 families sought refuge from the fighting in Pakistan. Most 

stayed with relatives in the Afghan district. Marawara remained a center 

of conflict in 2009 and early 2010. In November 2009, the insurgents 

attempted to overrun the Marawara District Center, just east of the village 

of Marawara. The district center also served as the district police station. 

The 2-503d Infantry conducted several operations in the Ghakhi Valley 

in March and April 2010. While these operations reportedly killed a lot 

of insurgents, the Americans were unable to eject the enemy permanently 

from the valley or provide a long term presence there.12

By 2010, most intelligence sources recognized Qari Zia Rahman 

(QZR) as the Taliban military commander for Kunar Province. Rahman’s 

base of operations was the Ghakhi Valley. He was a Mohmand Pashtun

from the village of Barawolo Kalay located in Marawara District south 

of the valley on the Pakistani border. Rahman, in his mid-thirties in 

2010, had operated on both sides of the Pakistani-Afghan border for a 

number of years. He claimed connections to Arab Islamic scholars and alQaeda. In January 2010, press reports indicated that a Predator strike had 

killed Rahman in Pakistan’s Mohmand Agency. However, Rahman soon 

reemerged in public.13

Rahman controlled a force of an estimated 300 fighters in the Ghakhi 

Valley. Some of these forces were trainees from other areas as QZR had 

a reputation as a master teacher of insurgents. By 2010, Qari Zia Rahman 
100

and his supporters dominated the central and eastern portions of Marawara 

District. This dominance was very conspicuous. The village elder of 

Chinar told an American commander, “I am Taliban. My government is the 

Taliban. Don’t ask me to support you because we’re with the Taliban.”14

Any combined American/Afghan operation in the Ghakhi Valley could be 

expected to face fierce resistance. Previous forays there had been opposed 

tooth and nail. Most American observers expected that any future operation 

in the valley would be fiercely resisted by up to 300 of Rahman’s fighters.15

While Marawara remained Rahman’s stronghold, there were 

indications that he was preparing to expand his sphere of influence. In 

May and June 2010, daily reports indicated that the Marawara District 

Center was about to be attacked by a large Taliban force. On 7 June, five 

American Soldiers were killed by an improvised explosive device (IED) 

north of Asadabad. On 21 June, at a checkpoint along the Kunar River 

several miles northwest of Marawara, a female suicide bomber killed two 

more Americans. Coalition intelligence credited Rahman with these attacks 

as well as the operation of a terrorist cell that fabricated and distributed 

suicide bomb vests. The latter group was subsequently eliminated by the 

Afghan National Directorate of Security (NDS).16

The 2d Battalion, 327th Infantry, also known during its deployment 

as TF No Slack, part of the 1st BCT, 101st Airborne Division (TF 

Bastogne) and commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Joel Vowell, arrived in 

Kunar Province in May 2010. TF No Slack replaced the 2-503d Infantry, 

a battalion which then shifted to Wardak Province and reverted to the 

control of its parent 173d Airborne Brigade Combat Team. TF No Slack

had responsibility for eastern Kunar Province, including the Kunar River 

Valley as far north as Asmar, the Chowkay Valley in the southwest and 

the border passes into Pakistan. The battalion headquarters was located at 

Camp Joyce outside of Sarkani, on the east side of the Kunar River about 

eight kilometers south of Asadabad.

Vowell immediately assessed the importance of Marawara District and 

planned to do something about the enemy threat there as soon as possible. 

Intelligence reports indicated that the Ghakhi Valley had been an insurgent 

stronghold for over two years. Vowell viewed such a sanctuary area so 

close to Asadabad and the Kunar Valley as unacceptable. “This tumor 

was big. This tumor had the potential of killing the entire province.”17 He 

intended to strike at Rahman’s base as his first major action upon assuming 

responsibility for the eastern Kunar area. “Nothing like a battalion operation 

has been done [in the Ghakhi Valley].”18 As early as 1 June, only days 

after the battalion assumed responsibility for its sector, Vowell received 
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approval to plan the operation from his brigade commander, Colonel 

Poppas. Vowell originally scheduled the operation, codenamed STRONG 

EAGLE, to start in the second or third week of June 2010 but the mission 

was delayed for two reasons. The first delay was operational. ISAF tasked 

the 1st Brigade, 101st Airborne Division, to support the Afghan defense of 

Barg-i-Matal in Nuristan. This mission temporarily limited the availability 

of resources, particularly aviation support. The mission approval process 

in Afghanistan provided a second reason for delay. An operation of this 

scope with its need for external aviation support required division (RCEast) approval. This approval took some time and it was not until 23 June 

that RC-East endorsed the operation. Accordingly, STRONG EAGLE was 

scheduled to begin on 27 June.19

The Plan

STRONG EAGLE was designed to initially secure the village of 

Sangam, which was in a no-man’s land between the opposing sides and 

then to seize the village of Daridam. Daridam was considered an insurgent 

stronghold. These objectives were considered modest, reflecting the 

freshness of the unit in the country and the resistance expected. A followon operation (STRONG EAGLE II), tentatively scheduled for July, would 

clear Chinar, believed to be Rahman’s headquarters. In planning, the 

operation was highly choreographed in order to place supporting elements 

into overwatch positions at the start of the operation, followed by a main 

advance down the valley road to Daridam. Vowell did not possess enough 

strength to provide a blocking force to cover any enemy retreat towards 

Pakistan. To make up for this deficiency, the TF No Slack commander 

coordinated with Pakistani authorities several hours before the start of 

the operation. The Pakistanis readily promised cooperation. Rahman 

was considered a state enemy. The Pakistani border guards prepared to 

interdict any insurgent movement across the border. Vowell also planned 

to use air strikes to attack any large bodies of insurgents seen retreating 

from the battle.20

The key element in the operation was a task-organized Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company (HHC), 2-327th Infantry, commanded by Captain 

Steven Weber. Weber’s command was not a tactical unit by organization, 

but upon deployment to Afghanistan, HHC had been reinforced with three 

infantry platoons from other companies, while Weber retained part of 

his organic heavy weapons and scout platoons. For STRONG EAGLE, 

Vowell designated Weber as the ground force commander. Weber would 

directly control about 100 American Soldiers and an equivalent number of 
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Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan Border Police (ABP) forces. 

His force was codenamed Team Wolverine.

21

For its Afghan deployment, the usually light 2-327th Infantry received 

a fleet of armored trucks called, generically, Mine Resistant Ambush 

Protected (MRAP) vehicles. The MRAPs came in a variety of models. 

The most common type in Weber’s force was the Mine Resistant Ambush 

Protected-All Terrain Vehicle (M-ATV), a state-of-the-art, lighter, more 

mobile MRAP designed to ultimately replace the up-armored M1114 

HMMWV in counterinsurgency operations. The M-ATVs were fresh off 

the assembly line, the first models having been produced less than six 

months before. These vehicles provided Weber with a truck that could 

take RPG and IED hits with high crew survivability and provide heavy 

firepower through turret-mounted weapons systems. The M-ATVs were 

equipped with a combination of M2 .50 caliber machine guns, Mk19 

automatic grenade launchers, and Common Remotely Operated Weapon 

Station (CROWS) systems equipped with .50 caliber machine guns. The 

CROWS system allowed gunners to remotely fire a variety of vehiclemounted weapons from within a vehicle. However, the newness of the 

system often proved a hindrance. The CROWS had just been fielded and 

the 2-327th infantrymen operating them lacked detailed training on the 

system. Because of an interlinked system design, minor operator errors 

often shut the system down and when the CROWS went down, so did the 

whole vehicle. Still, the M-ATVs would be key to a successful advance 

down the valley road to Daridam.22

One unit attached to Weber’s command that was equipped with 

specialized MRAPs was the Route Clearance Package (RCP). The RCP 

was a hybrid engineer-infantry element containing road clearing equipment 

including the Husky and the Buffalo. The Husky was a metal detecting and 

marking vehicle capable of finding and marking metal bombs and mines. 

The Buffalo was a MRAP designed specifically to clear passage lanes 

on roads containing mines and boobytraps. Once Weber’s dismounted 

infantrymen secured the road and cleared obvious tripwires, boobytraps, 

and close-in ambush sites, the RCP was designated to lead and clear the 

way until Daridam was reached. There Afghan troops would take over in 

an area where civilians were expected to be found.23

Because Coalition policy was that Afghan Soldiers would be the first 

to interface with the civilian population, Afghan elements played a key 

role. Platoon-sized elements of ANA and ABP were attached to Weber’s 

force. The Afghans had the mission of leading the advance into civilian 

population centers. Additional Afghan forces, including a platoon of 
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commandos from Asadabad known as the “Tigers” and a US-sponsored 

special counterterrorism commando force called “Omega” also supported 

the operation. Finally, an elite company-sized Special Forces trained 

Afghan force, codenamed “Zombie” and based out of Jalalabad, was 

available to support the operation by acting as a clearing force in the later 

stages of the operation. The Afghan troops were generally mounted in 

HiLuxes, small pick-up trucks which mounted heavy machine guns.24

Vowell wanted surprise for the operation, so that the insurgents would 

not flee ahead of time and wait for the Americans to leave. Ultimately, 

he not only wanted to seize Daridam but he also wanted to defeat and 

disrupt the insurgent network in the valley. Vowell needed to have the 

enemy stand and fight so that they could be destroyed. This was the main 

reason he poised his main effort to advance straight down the road: to force 

Rahman to fight. Since experience from previous tours had taught him that 

telling the Afghan forces too early about an operation often resulted in 

the enemy learning about it in advance, Vowell notified the supporting 

Afghan elements as late as possible. Accordingly, this need for operational 

security slightly disrupted preparations for STRONG EAGLE. The exact 

composition of the Afghan forces in support was not clear until the start of 

the mission. Marshalling the Afghans slightly delayed the beginning of the 

movement. Additionally, since the Afghans were not briefed thoroughly 

on the mission, once the action started, they were unable to respond to 

battlefield conditions clearly. Nevertheless, after STRONG EAGLE 

Weber maintained that “[operational security] was more important than 

Partnership... If we had to do it again, we’d still do it the same way.”25

Lieutenant Colonel Vowell and Colonel Poppas provided for an array 

of reserves and support elements for the operation. Task Force No Slack

retained three reserve forces: two US Army platoons and an ANA platoon 

ready to be airlifted into the battle on short notice. In terms of Army 

aviation, a scout weapons team (SWT) of two OH-58 Kiowa helicopters, 

and an attack weapons team (AWT) of two AH-64 Apache helicopters 

were scheduled to be overhead from dawn to noon. The Air Force would 

provide on station F15 Eagle close air support during the same period. The 

Air Force also provided various platforms to provide aerial intelligence, 

surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and electronic warfare (EW) 

support to the operation. 

Operation STRONG EAGLE had five phases (see Figure 4):26

1. Team WOLVERINE (Weber) and the ANA/ABP elements would 

move from Camp Joyce and secure the district center on the outskirts of 

Marawara. The district center was the marshalling point for the collection 
104

of vehicles moving into the Ghakhi Valley. At the same time, the followon force of Tigers and the RCP would consolidate at a tactical assembly 

area (TAA) located at the junction between the north- south eastside Kunar 

River road (Alternate Supply Route [ASR] Beaverton) and the Ghakhi 

Valley road.27

2. A platoon each from A and B Companies would be flown by 

helicopter under the cover of darkness to occupy dominating positions 

to the north and south of the valley. The A Company force, codenamed 

Team Gator and coming from FOB Monti located near Asmar about 

18 miles north of Asadabad on the Kunar River, would occupy LZ Owl 

(later OP Shaw). The B Company platoon, designated Team Bayonet and 

reinforced with the company tactical command post, was to come in from 

the southern Kunar Valley, and occupy LZ Hen (later OP Thomas). These 

positions were between 1000 and 1500 meters from the valley floor. An 

important part of the plan was that these forces had sufficient firepower 

with them. The platoons, accompanied by ANA troops, would carry heavy 

weapons with them —M2 .50 caliber machine guns and MK19 grenade 

launchers. Vowell hoped to use the two OPs to deny the enemy the ability 

to emplace heavy machine guns to fire down onto the troops advancing in 

the valley.28

3. A platoon from B Company, 1st Battalion, 327th Infantry, a company 

attached to Task Force No Slack for the duration of the deployment, 

along with the company tactical headquarters (Team Bushwacker), would 

conduct a dismounted tactical movement from the TAA to secure OP 

Kahler, a position which overwatched the initial movement of Weber’s 

force along the axis of the valley road from a mountaintop 500 meters to 

the south. The Kahler position dominated the area around the Marawara 

District Center, which was the line of departure for Weber’s main force.29

4. The battalion Scout Platoon, led by Captain Kevin Mott, and 

reinforced with elements of the Omega force, would be placed by helicopter 

atop a high hill (Landing Zone [LZ]Hawk/ Attack by Fire Position 1 [ABF 

1]) overlooking Daridam. ABF 1 was approximately 700 meters above the 

valley floor, 500 meters southwest of Daridam. Mott’s force was placed to 

block the insurgent route of retreat from Daridam to the south. LZ Hawk 

dominated these southerly routes out of the village.30

5. Weber’s main force would advance down the valley road to 

Daridam, using a combination of mounted and dismounted movement. 

Before approaching each populated area (Sangam and Daridam), Weber 

would place his force into overwatch and allow Afghan forces to lead. The 

operation’s final objective was the clearance of Daridam.31 
105

Figure 4. The Plan.

Team Wolverine, under Weber, consisted of two infantry platoons, each 

equipped with four M-ATVs and augmented with Afghan forces, and his 

headquarters group. The platoons contained about 40 Soldiers each. Each 

platoon was divided into a mounted and a dismounted element. Roughly 

15 men from each platoon served in the mounted element as drivers and 

gunners. The headquarters group included several M-ATVs and a 60-

mm mortar. The company fire support officer, First Lieutenant Spencer 

Propst, would coordinate the fires of the Kiowas and Apaches overhead, 

along with the mortar accompanying Weber and the 155-mm howitzers 

supporting the operation from Camp Wright in Asadabad.32 

Weber’s two infantry platoons would lead the way. First Lieutenant 

Douglas Jones’s platoon, attached to HHC from B Company, would 

advance on the left (north) of Weber’s axis of advance. Moving 

dismounted along the northern edge of the wadi north of the road, Jones’s 

force, reinforced with Afghan Border policemen, would clear the hamlet 

of Warsak northeast of Sangam. He would also cover the left of the force 
106

advancing down the road to Daridam. Jones’s M-ATVs remained on the 

road attached temporarily to Weber’s headquarters during his dismounted 

advance.33

The other platoon, attached from A Company and led by First 

Lieutenant Stephen Tangen, with attached ANA elements, was Weber’s 

main effort. Tangen’s platoon would move directly down the valley road, 

advancing dismounted along the southern wall of the valley, to the right of 

the road. Tangen would be overwatched by his own M-ATVs and those of 

the group under Weber’s direct control. This vehicular force would advance 

down the road led by the RCP element. The two platoons would move in 

a bounding manner, with the vehicles supporting Tangen’s dismounted 

element, while Jones would divide his force into two dismounted elements, 

which would support each other’s movements. Tangen’s dismounted force 

would move up to 200 meters in front of the vehicles. After subtracting his 

mounted element, Tangen had about 25 Americans and 60 ANA Soldiers 

in his dismounted group. Jones initially had a similar-sized force including 

ABP attachments. However, after the beginning of the firefight, the ABP 

troops left and joined their commander who was with Weber on the valley 

floor, leaving Jones with only the American element. Jones’s mission was 

to cover Tangen’s left flank and remove any close-in insurgent threats on 

the northern edge of the valley, Tangen had the job of clearing the southern 

part of the valley, including the road, and support the Afghans while they 

cleared any populated areas, primarily Sangam and Daridam.34

The operation was projected to run from about midnight on 27 June 

to about midday, approximately 12 hours. Vowell wanted to use the cover 

of darkness to execute his aviation-based maneuvers and so timed the 

operation so that it would conclude before the midday heat had set in. The 

attack itself was to begin at dawn. Vowell later commented, “We tried to 

respect the population there and we did not want to create any problems, 

so we were going to attack at first light.”35 A daylight move would find 

the locals already up and at work, and would lessen the possibility of 

inadvertent civilian casualties.

The Execution

As in most military operations, things did not go according to plan 

almost from the start. As previously mentioned, there were delays at the 

beginning of the operation due to the need to marshal the ANA forces 

participating in the operation. After assembling his units at Camp Joyce, 

Weber led his convoy north up ASR Beaverton to Marawara village and 

the district center at about 0230. Enemy ICOM radio intercepts had begun 
107

chattering with news of the anticipated attack as early as 0100. With Weber 

in place at his start position, Captain Thomas Whitfield’s platoon-sized B/ 

1-327th Infantry contingent, Team Bushmaster, could begin moving to Figure 5. 0715, 28 June 2010. Troop Locations at the Start of the Action.
108

Figure 6. Looking east down the Ghakhi Valley Road at the tree that marked the 

start of the Ghakhi Valley battle on 28 June 2010. The orchard which was the 

main insurgent defensive position can be seen off in the distance just under the 

tree branches in line with the road.

OP Kahler. Whitfield’s dismounted force started its climb at 0300. Under 

normal circumstances the trek to the peak summit that was Kahler took 

45-minutes. Weber’s advance was contingent on Whitfield being in place 

to overwatch his initial movement.36

The helicopter borne over-watching forces were established at LZs 

Owl and Hen at the same time Bushmaster started its movement. With 

these forces in place, and Bushmaster’s movement taking longer than 

expected, Vowell felt safe to let Weber begin his movement even without 

Whitfield’s occupation of OP Kahler. After a delay waiting for the ANA 

elements to come forward, Weber began his movement around 0615. The 

initial advance through the village of Sangam was rapid and virtually 

uneventful. The Afghans quickly cleared each building as there was no 

opposition and no civilians were present. On the left, Jones’s group, 

moving through rough, hilly terrain, cleared Warsak without any contact. 

As at Sangam, there were no civilians in Warsak. The local population 

had received enough advance warning to flee to the mountains before 

the operation started. This warning was undoubtedly spread by wordof-mouth from those villagers in the west who saw the assembly of the 

Coalition forces near the district center. 37

Photograph taken on 9 August 2010by Dianna Cahn (Stars and Stripes)
109

The quiet was deceptive. While still in Sangam, Tangen heard a 

report that ICOM intercepts indicated that a force of at least 40 insurgents 

awaited him in Daridam. Weber and Tangen felt that they had sufficient 

firepower and supporting elements to deal with this force if it materialized. 

In addition, the Kiowas of the SWT, which were flying overhead, had 

already begun to take sporadic AK-47 rifle fire from positions near 

Daridam. Followed by Weber and the RCP, Tangen’s group cleared 

Sangam by 0700. Lieutenant Colonel Vowell planned to observe the initial 

movements via a command and control helicopter over the battlefield. 

Once the initial movements were completed, he then intended to dismount 

and join his forward elements on the ground. However, the mountainous 

terrain hindered radio communications and Vowell was forced to stay aloft 

to act as a relay station between Weber and the battalion tactical operations 

center (TOC) at Camp Joyce.38The action started in earnest at 0715 when 

Tangen’s dismounted group passed a large tree hanging across the road 

beyond Sangam (Figure 6). Weber later speculated that the tree marked 

the trigger line for the enemy forces. The tree was at a point in the road 

just before it crossed the wadi. Here there was no shoulder to the south, 

as the slope began right at the road. Tangen advanced on foot with Staff 

Sergeant Eric Shaw’s squad leading, followed by Tangen and the squad of 

Staff Sergeant Robert Livingston. The firefight began as soon as Tangen’s 

men passed the tree. Two RPG rounds exploded nearby, followed by 

PKM machine gun fire. Both fusillades came from Tangen’s front in the 

direction of Daridam. Despite the positioning of forces on the flanks, the 

insurgents still retained excellent positions on the high ground around 

Daridam and fiercely resisted the American attack. Tangen’s force was 

trapped with nowhere to go, as there was no cover on the side of the road. 

The ANA troops, who were in the lead, took immediate casualties. Squad 

Leader Shaw ran forward to assist the ANA commander in responding to 

the contact. Meanwhile the initial volley had also wounded Private First 

Class Stephen Palu. Livingston and Corporal Joshua Frappier bandaged 

Palu’s wounds. 39

Jones’s group to the north also came under fire, but the fire was of 

a lesser intensity than that facing Tangen. Neither Jones nor Weber 

could easily discern the source of the enemy fire. This lack of positive 

identification of enemy firing positions hindered the use of supporting 

and direct suppressive fires. Nevertheless, carrying the wounded ANAs 

and Palu with them, Tangen’s element was able to bound back to the 

vehicles, which had advanced as far as the tree. The RCP element pushed 
110

forward to meet Tangen’s men halfway. The vehicles covered the retreat 

of the dismounted group with suppressive fires. Tangen’s men then used 

the trucks as cover while directing the fires of the mounted weapons at 

suspected enemy positions.40

At this time, before he could reach safety behind one of the M-ATVs, 

Staff Sergeant Shaw received a fatal wound to the head. In the meantime, 

Captain Weber had gone back to Sangam to get a HiLux truck from the 

Tiger element to use for MEDEVAC. The bed of the truck and its heavy 

machine gun made it a good choice for this role. The HiLux arrived to 

evacuate the casualties. The tally at this point was one American killed in 

action (KIA) and one wounded in action (WIA), four ANA WIAs and one 

ANA KIA. Concurrent with the casualty evacuation, the remaining ANA 

troops with Tangen and Weber withdrew and retreated with their wounded 

to Marawara. The Afghan Border Police element remained with Weber. 

The first phase of what would become an all-day firefight was over.41

Weber, now located back in Sangam, worked to reorganize his force 

in preparation for continuing the advance as the day started to warm 

up. There was a traffic jam of vehicles along the valley road stretching 

back from Sangam to Marawara. The HHC commander had to get the 

most important vehicles to the front of the column. These included the 

specialized vehicles of the RCP, additional M-ATVs with their armored 

protection, and the Tiger force’s HiLuxes with their heavy DShK machine 

guns. He tried to get the bulk of the RCP forward to support Tangen, with 

mixed results, as the RCP had problems on the rocky road. Then as the unit 

advanced up the road to the front, an RPG hit one vehicle. At this point 

the RCP platoon leader felt his unit was combat ineffective and decided 

to withdraw to Marawara. Weber and his subordinates had to use all their 

powers of persuasion to keep the RCP in the fight. 42

To reduce the enemy pressure on the lead unit, Propst, the Fire Support 

Officer, had the 155s at Asadabad drop smoke rounds between Tangen’s 

group at the tree and Daridam. At the same time, Apaches from the Aerial 

Weapons Team began conducting gun runs against insurgents entrenched 

in a pomegranate orchard located north of the road. The Apache runs 

continued for over two hours through mid-morning. The heat began 

affecting the troops as much as the enemy fire. As the day went on, most of 

the company leadership, including Weber and Propst, needed intravenous 

(IV) infusions to quell the effects of dehydration.43

While Weber paused, the forces on the ridgelines to the north and south 

also found themselves in firefights with insurgent forces attempting to 
111

outflank the units on the valley floor. The enemy seemed surprised to find 

Americans high on the mountains. To the north, the A Company platoon at 

LZ Owl ambushed an enemy element trying to move to the location of the 

overwatch position, unaware that the Americans were there. After this 

success, the enemy kept the position under heavy fire. Similarly, the B Figure 7. Situation on the Ghakhi Valley road between 1000 and 1300, 28 June 2010.
112

Company position, (LZ Hen) to the south of Sangam was heavily engaged. 

The Team Bayonet commander later felt that the position, although on the 

highest ground in the area, still had some weaknesses that allowed gave 

the insurgents some advantage. “Positions on highest points [often] result 

in lots of dead space.” 44 The amount of firepower the insurgents were able 

to place on LZ Hen resulted in the death of Sergeant David Thomas by 

gunshot wounds. Eventually, the Aerial Reaction Force (ARF), a platoon 

under the C (Cougar) Company commander, reinforced, then relieved the 

Bayonet forces at LZ Hen.45

To the northeast of B Company’s position, the Scout/ Omega force at its 

attack by fire position (LZ Hawk) overlooking Daridam from 1500 meters 

was in trouble. That group, under Captain Mott, was surrounded and cut 

off from support even from the relatively nearby B Company position. In 

the midst of heavy enemy fire Mott received a grazing gunshot wound to 

the head and then fell 100 to 200 meters down steep ground. Miraculously 

he survived. Mott’s group had had a tough go so far in STRONG EAGLE. 

Initially the helicopter had dropped the group off on the wrong ridgeline. 

In the darkness the scouts trudged as near to the correct position as they 

could reach under the cover of darkness. Mott divided his force in half, 

placing each on mutually-supporting hilltop positions. He led one of the 

elements, his platoon sergeant, Sergeant First Class John Howerton, the 

other. Eventually, commandos from the Omega element joined Mott and 

took up positions in the middle between the two scout sections, providing 

a unified defensive position. When the action started in the valley, Mott’s 

group began receiving effective fire from every direction.46

After Mott fell, his men soon realized he was still alive. In fact the 

platoon leader managed to drag to cover under a tree. For anyone to try 

and reach him at the time would have been suicidal given the intensity of 

the enemy fire and the angle of the slope. Mott could not be evacuated until 

later. Meanwhile Howerton assumed leadership of the force overwatching 

Daridam.47It was now around 1000. From listening to the radio traffic, 

Weber realized the forces on the high ground were being pressured by the 

enemy. He felt it was imperative to push forward to decrease this pressure. 

Given the open nature of the ground in front of Tangen, where the road 

crossed the wadi, Weber decided a mounted advance was proper. Four of 

Weber’s M-ATVs had snaked their way through the column and reached 

him at Sangam. These he sent forward to Tangen’s position near the tree. 

Weber himself followed dismounted, joining Livingston’s squad near the 

big tree and positioning himself inside a nearby house from which he could 

see and control the movements of both Tangen’s and Jones’s groups.48
113

Tangen began moving forward with the bulk of his dismounted force 

now mounted in four vehicles. The group crossed the wadi and took the big 

bend in the road that turned east towards the orchard and Daridam beyond. 

Meanwhile, Jones began moving towards the open area beyond the end 

of Warsak. Afghan HiLux trucks supported the advance from the vicinity 

of the tree with their heavy machine guns. Smoke fired from the 155s at 

Camp Wright covered this movement. When Jones reached the outskirts of 

Warsak, he was confronted with a large open area. He paused in the shelter 

of the last few buildings, expecting that the actions of Tangen’s group and 

supporting ground and aerial fires would cause the enemy fire to slacken.49

 Weber began advancing dismounted toward the big bend in the road 

with his command group and Livingston’s squad. He realized that his 

group was now taking sporadic fire from a group of insurgents positioned 

to the south along the aqueduct at the southern edge of the wadi. Suddenly 

Tangen’s lead M-ATV was hit in the engine by one or more RPGs fired 

from the orchard to the left front of the road and a compound located just 

beyond the trees. The armored plating on the vehicle allowed the crew to 

survive with no injuries. However, the vehicle was disabled along with its 

CROWS weapons station.50

It was now about 1100. At this point Command Sergeant Major 

Chris Fields, the battalion command sergeant major, approached Weber’s 

position with a small MRAP convoy. Weber was showing the effects 

of little sleep and the extreme heat. Nevertheless he felt he had to push 

forward to keep the advance moving. Fields volunteered to take on that 

mission and advised Weber to establish a stationary command post and 

recover from the effects of the heat. Weber accepted the advice and Fields 

moved forward to join Tangen. Time passed as Tangen and Fields tried 

to get the M-ATV off the side of the narrow road or set it up to be towed. 

In the meantime, the firefight continued with several of Tangen’s NCOs 

killing with hand grenades some insurgents who had crept close to their 

position.51

As Tangen and Fields sought to clear the narrow road, Jones’s men 

remained at the edge of Warsak. At about 1300 it seemed that the effects 

of Apache gun runs and other supporting fires would allow Jones to move 

forward and assault the orchard to his front. Apaches were also firing 

Hellfire missiles danger close to Jones’s men, into the orchard and the 

compound behind it. Jones began moving his element forward. The platoon 

was divided into two groups. Jones personally led one force, which he 

advanced across some open ground over a spur to a house laying beyond 

the edge of Warsak. The other half of his platoon covered this move from 

a house at the edge of the hamlet. Before Jones could bring the trailing 
114

element up to his location, Weber called him and warned him that a danger 

close air strike was about to hit in the nearby orchard.52

This air strike surprised Weber as much as it did Jones. For the 

STRONG EAGLE Operation, Task Force No Slack had numerous 

nonstandard attached units. Some of these forces were elite Afghan units 

supported by or partially staffed with American advisors. Although he 

had overall tactical command of the forces in the operation, Vowell had 

designated Weber as the ground-force commander. As such, Weber, with 

his unique situational awareness, controlled the supporting fires. He knew 

where his men were and would not have called in fire so close to his own 

forces. It is possible that one of the adviser teams with the Afghan units 

in the valley made the call without precise knowledge of where US troops 

were at the time.

Both Jones and Tangen were accustomed to the danger close Hellfire 

missile strikes impacting on nearby enemy positions. But the GBU12, carried by supporting US Air Force F-15 jets, with its 500 pounds 

of explosive, was a much larger ordnance package. The GBU had a 

bursting radius of about 170 meters. This was fairly close to both Jones’s 

and Tangen’s groups. Weber warned both officers on the radio and the 

lieutenants quickly barked orders to their subordinates to take cover. Jones 

was initially concerned about Tangen’s men, who were out on the road with 

little cover to protect themselves from the shrapnel effects of the pending 

airstrike. Tangen’s men were also closer to the orchard target. Both groups 

took cover. Tangen’s men went inside vehicles and into a small ditch along 

the south side of the road. The 15 men in Jones’s rear element huddled in 

the ruined house at the edge of Warsak. Jones and his contingent used the 

protection of the nearby building they had just reached.53

In spectacular fashion, the GBU exploded and rocked the terraces 

north of the valley road in front of the orchard strongpoint. The bomb 

landed between Jones’s two groups, closer to the rear element. A post 

battle investigation revealed that the grid coordinates called for the air 

strike were only six meters east of the rear detachment’s position. Jones 

himself was 70 meters east of the impact. He feared he had lost half his 

platoon in one stroke. Fortunately, the modest protection provided by the 

ruins was enough to protect the men from the full effects of the bomb. Five 

Soldiers were wounded, three requiring immediate evacuation. The other 

two would be eventually evacuated, but initially assisted in bringing the 

others down to Weber’s position for medical evacuation.54
115

The air strike effectively halted American operations for the rest 

of the day. Both Jones and Weber became consumed with the medical 

evacuation (MEDEVAC) of Jones’ wounded men. Weber used a helicopter 

already scheduled to drop a resupply of water to the forward positions for 

the MEDEVAC mission. The flat ground next to the road near the wadi 

provided a convenient landing zone. Jones first evacuated the three badly 

wounded men. They were on their way to medical facilities in Asadabad 

within 25 minutes. Afterwards, the helicopter was recalled to evacuate 

the other two men. During the second MEDEVAC, enemy fire began to 

increase. Soon insurgent machine gun fire knocked out a second M-ATV 

in Tangen’s group, striking the radiator and causing the engine to overheat. 

Weber made the decision to abandon the damaged vehicles. The Soldiers 

quickly removed sensitive items from the damaged vehicles and pushed 

them to the side of the road. Tangen’s men then withdrew to the wadi 

where they joined with Weber’s group and set up a defensive position. 

From this location they could overwatch and cover the abandoned vehicles 

with fire. No one attempted to approach them. Following the disabling of 

the second M-ATV, insurgent fire again slackened. This decrease showed 

the effects of the cumulative hours of Apache and field artillery strikes. 

After the completion of the MEDEVAC missions, the increasing effects of 

the fatigue of combat and the heat forced Weber to halt his men where they 

were. It was at this time that Weber himself had to receive intravenous 

infusions to keep from becoming a heat casualty. HHC had a total of one 

KIA and six WIAs in the day’s action so far. Weber told his commander, 

Lieutenant Colonel Vowell, that he estimated that his men would need 

three or four hours to get ready for renewed operations.55

Battalion commander Vowell had been aloft all day. He realized that 

Weber’s force was exhausted and needed rest and refitting. If he expected 

to capture Daridam, he needed to come up with a new plan. He landed 

at the district center outside of Marawara and, after ordering Weber to 

hold his current positions, he contacted the brigade commander, Colonel 

Poppas. Poppas had been following the battle from his headquarters in 

Jalalabad and had already come up with a solution. The brigade commander 

committed the Jalalabad-based Zombie force to the battle. The Zombies, a 

group of about 80 elite Afghan commandos advised by a US Army Special 

Forces Operational Detachment A (ODA) would fly up to Marawara on 

three Chinook helicopters and assume the mission of the main effort from 

Weber.56

The new plan (Figure 8) directed the Zombie element to attack after 

midnight, supported by Weber’s men. The attack would begin after an Air 
116

Force AC-130 Spectre gunship arrived to provide fire support. Vowell met 

the Zombies when they landed and provided them with a brief situation 

update. The Zombies moved up the road to Weber’s position in the wadi, 

arriving there before midnight. Initially the Afghans thought the recumbent 

Soldiers were casualties and were pleasantly surprised to see that they 

were just resting. Weber still believed that he needed a little more time 

before his men would be ready to go. Unlike the ANA that he had dealt 

with earlier in the day, Weber found the Zombies eager to go forward. 

They did not want to wait for the Americans to recover fully.57

Accordingly, Weber drew up a hasty plan for the attack on Daridam. 

Instead of advancing along the road, the commandos would move down 

the wadi into the town, which they would then clear. Jones and Tangen 

would support the advance by fire from their current positions then 

follow up by clearing the orchard and road. The distance to Daridam from 

Weber’s position was about 600 meters. There was some confusion as 

Weber thought the Zombies intended to clear the whole village, but from 

his later actions, it was clear that the Zombie commander only intended to 

gain a foothold in the village.58

The commando force began moving easterly down the wadi at about 

0030 on 29 June. Almost immediately enemy forces in the orchard and in 

several compounds north of the road opened fire on the attackers. Vowell 

had placed the Spectre gunship on alert. He felt free to do this because 

he had numerous indicators that there were no civilians in Daridam, just 

as there had been none in Sangam or Warsak. After spotting targets, the 

aircraft began firing on the insurgent positions, providing Weber’s men 

with a spectacular light show. 59

The Spectre fire was so obviously effective that Weber decided to send 

his Soldiers forward immediately. He sent a mounted detachment under the 

company first sergeant down the road while simultaneously setting Jones 

and Tangen in motion dismounted. Tangen had orders to clear the orchard. 

Jones would advance on Tangen’s left and clear the compound beyond 

the orchard that had been an insurgent stronghold. The operation was 

successful. By dawn the Americans joined the Zombies at their foothold 

on the western edge of Daridam. At this time it became readily clear that 

the Zombie commander did not intend to clear the rest of the village.60

Vowell arrived on the scene with the ANA and ABP forces that had 

been part of the original operation. At this point it was readily clear that the 

enemy had evacuated Daridam. The Afghan forces were now eager to 

collect war booty. In this, competition between the ANA and the ABP 
117

emerged. The two Afghan elements immediately began searching the 

village. Tangen and Jones followed in support. Although there was no 

actual fighting in Daridam, several remaining insurgents fled the village 

only to be engaged by the Kiowas of the SWT.61

Figure 8. The Assault on Daridam, 29 June 2010, 0100-0700.
118

TF No Slack had faced an adversary in what was the worst case 

scenario devised by the battalion staff. Post-battle estimates were that 

at least 250 insurgents faced the Coalition force in the Ghakhi Valley. 

Rahman had committed virtually his whole force. Although only a few 

bodies were found in the orchard, estimated enemy KIAs, based on aerial 

observation and blood trails, were at least 125.Vowell considered that his 

S2 (intelligence) staff section had done a great job anticipating Rahman’s 

reactions. The tough fights faced by the units on the hilltops north and 

south of the valley demonstrated this. Despite the accurate projections, the 

fight was still harder than expected. The rugged terrain compartmentalized 

the battle, transforming it, at least initially, into a series of smaller, separate 

actions, each opposed by a determined enemy force. The fierce resistance 

made the battle last longer than anticipated and the 115 degree temperature 

exhausted the attackers, requiring reinforcement and rest in the midst of 

combat.62

The Aftermath and Strong Eagle II

Marawara remained a dangerous place for non-combatants. On 28 

June, while Weber’s forces were fighting it out with the insurgents on the 

outskirts of Daridam, the Marawara District intelligence chief was killed 

when his vehicle struck an IED. The 2-327th battalion TOC displaced 

directly into Daridam on 29 June. The Americans stayed in Daridam for 

four days, before handing over control of the village to the Afghan police. 

American troops continued to man LZ Hen, renamed OP Thomas, along 

with ANA Soldiers, in preparation for the continuation of the advance to 

Chinar. The observation post was fortified. The valley below however, 

remained unoccupied by the enemy. 63

In the immediate aftermath of STRONG EAGLE, tribal leaders from 

the district held a meeting in Asadabad where they pledged support to the 

government, while requesting a permanent security presence throughout 

the valley. The civilians gradually returned to the eastern valley and the 

Kunar PRT started or renewed reconstruction and development projects. 

The chain of command quickly recognized the valor and fighting abilities 

of the American Soldiers in the battle. Six Silver Stars and a Bronze 

Star Medal were awarded to members of 2-327th Infantry personally by 

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in December 2010. US Afghan theater 

commander General David Petraeus awarded an additional Silver Star and 

two Bronze Star medals for the operation on 6 January 2011.64

In the days immediately after STRONG EAGLE’s completion, 

insurgents attacked Coalition outposts at Asmar (FOB Monti), Camp Joyce 
119

and several other places in Kunar Province. The attack on FOB Monti was 

particularly unusual as that area was usually quiet. Vowell later reflected 

that these attacks were an effort by Rahman to draw forces away from 

Marawara in the aftermath of STRONG EAGLE. With his main force 

bloodied in the Ghakhi Valley, these attacks were seemingly conducted 

by local forces, not those under Rahman’s direct command. Nevertheless 

the attacks suggested that the enemy commander had the ability to control 

forces throughout the Kunar Valley, even in the midst of a battle at his 

front door.65

After a respite of several weeks, in order to keep the pressure on 

Rahman, Task Force No Slack executed Operation STRONG EAGLE II, 

a limited objective attack designed to capture the village of Chinar on 

19 and 20 July 2010. Chinar was east of Daridam and was considered 

to be Rahman’s stronghold, even during the June battle. Company B, 

1-327th Infantry, attached to Task Force No Slack and based at Asadabad, 

led the new advance. The second offensive was patterned on the first, 

with synchronized overwatch forces and readily available reserves. One 

lesson Vowell had learned from the original operation was the usefulness 

of a night attack. With the civilian population showing an ability to flee 

before any combat action, he felt that the fear of civilian casualties in a 

night move was minimal. Accordingly, the STRONG EAGLE II assault 

began in the middle of the night, not at dawn. Vowell advanced a force of 

approximately 450 Americans and Afghans against the village. After the 

fierce resistance encountered previously, the Americans expected more of 

the same. However, the enemy either did not want to take similar losses, 

or no longer had the available strength to oppose the Americans. Rahman’s 

force withdrew from Chinar before the Americans arrived. The attackers 

encountered only minor resistance. 66

Redevelopment and reconstruction in Marawara was uneven. 

Immediately following STRONG EAGLE II, the village elders participated 

in a district shura held in Daridam in which they promised to support 

Coalition redevelopment efforts in the district. But this promise depended 

on continued security in the valley. In this regard, some of the weaknesses 

in the Afghan forces shown during the battle persisted afterwards. On 28 

July US forces handed over security in the valley to the Afghan National 

Police. However, the Afghans were fearful of staying in the valley without 

American forces. Accordingly, US forces occasionally returned to the area. 

In early August US and Afghan forces conducted raids aimed at capturing 

or killing Rahman. The elusive Rahman escaped, although up to 30 of his 

fighters were killed in the actions.67
120

With Marawara relatively quiet after the beating Rahman’s force had 

taken in STRONG EAGLE, Vowell needed to use his forces elsewhere. 

In the restive Ganjgal Valley just outside Camp Joyce, the 2-327th IN 

conducted a series of operations (EAGLE CLAW I and II) in the fall 

and winter of 2010. US forces returned to Marawara in force in October 

2010. In the aftermath of the unsuccessful rescue operation for kidnapped 

British aid worker Linda Norgrove, which took place to the west in the 

Pech region, US Special Forces fought the kidnappers in Marawara as they 

attempted to retreat into sanctuary areas in Pakistan.68

Conclusions

Vowell’s battalion had just arrived in Afghanistan when STRONG 

EAGLE was executed. The success of the operation shows that in the 

ninth year of the War in Afghanistan, Army leadership and Soldiers were 

so experienced and well trained that while 2-327th Infantry was new to 

the country, most of its leaders and many of its Soldiers were familiar 

with the country and the enemy. Vowell had served previously elsewhere 

in Afghanistan and had talked to officers and read reports from his two 

predecessor units in the Kunar Valley. Based on this pre-deployment 

preparation, he was able to plan and execute a large operation in a vital 

district almost as soon as he assumed responsibility for eastern Kunar. 

The enemy no longer could depend on a respite when new units arrived in 

theater were still unfamiliar with the area of operations.69

Despite the heavy fighting, US casualties were relatively light. This 

was a tribute to both planning and technology. Lieutenant Colonel Vowell’s 

seizure of the high ground with significant forces prevented the enemy 

from pounding Weber’s men from positions with clear fields of fire. The 

use of night air assaults into the mountains surprised the enemy who were 

ambushed in several places while trying to move against Weber’s force. 

Rahman’s supporting elements were forced to fight the troops on the high 

ground instead of those in the valley. These fights were as fierce as those 

below and played an equal part in the success and destruction of the enemy 

force that resulted in the later success of STRONG EAGLE II.

As mentioned previously, the positioning of the observation posts in 

the high ground proved effective. In fact, American forces were located at 

LZs Owl and Hen surprised the insurgents. In the case of Owl, the enemy 

walked into an ambush. However, the insurgents soon recovered from 

their surprise and fought hard to eliminate the positions. As also previously 

discussed, the foresight in bringing heavy weapons to the hilltop positions 

proved to be decisive as the defenders were able to gain and maintain fire 
121

superiority over the attacking enemy. The enemy forces tied down on the 

heights were unable to participate in the battle on the valley floor.

70

In terms of general combat verities, the battle outside Daridam 

displayed once again the importance of fresh reserves and the general 

exhaustion troops can suffer in extended firefights, particularly in a hot 

environment. Despite an accurate assessment of enemy capabilities and 

intentions, and, despite the execution of a plan designed to account for 

these capabilities and intentions, the fight was still tough. Success still 

required the commitment of fresh reserves. Vowell showed flexibility 

during the action in modifying his plan once it broke down under enemy 

resistance and weather conditions. The TF No Slack commander watched 

the battle without directly interfering until necessary to ensure that the 

reinforcements were used properly. Both Vowell and Weber realized that 

exhaustion had overcome the advanced troops and that these men required 

a period of regrouping and reinforcement to continue the attack. 

 Technologically, the MRAP concept proved its worth. Clearing the 

road in the teeth of an entrenched enemy defense that was less than 200 

meters away, the advance guard of Weber’s force suffered only one KIA 

despite being in the presence of the enemy for over 12 hours. The ability 

of the Army logistical system to rapidly field newly produced M-ATVs 

to frontline units in Afghanistan was remarkable. The newness of the 

equipment resulted in some familiarity difficulties during the action, which 

were more than balanced by the ability of the vehicle system to survive 

enemy fire. The M-ATVs that were disabled were knocked out because of 

RPG and small arms hits against the engine. Future developments of the 

vehicle need to account for this and make it easier for troops under fire to 

recover from engine failures or more easily tow the vehicle off a narrow 

road.

The use of the MRAPs in STRONG EAGLE is reminiscent of the 

use of tanks in support of infantry in other conflicts. Despite the stigma of 

large numbers of Soviet tanks operating ineffectively in Afghanistan, this 

does bring up the question of whether the deployment of main battle tanks 

to Afghanistan may have some utility in certain areas and for certain types 

of operations. Tanks could have surely operated on the Ghakhi Valley road 

and would have been more survivable than the MRAPs. An RPG would 

not stop an M1 tank by a hit to an exposed engine. Tanks also would have 

had tremendous on board direct firepower to use against personnel and 

point targets. While tanks may have had limited mobility in certain parts 

of Afghanistan, the Ghakhi valley was not one of those places.
122

Despite the success of the MRAP, technology is not a panacea for 

modern combat. Coordination between a mix of forces from various 

governmental agencies and nations is complex and ripe for confusion 

and mistakes. The air strike that landed close to Jones’s men showed the 

importance of fires being approved by the commander on the ground that 

has direct knowledge of the location of the most forward friendly forces. In 

the last several decades, American forces have developed digital systems 

that provide virtual complete situational awareness for American forces. 

However, the terrain in Afghanistan often hinders digital communications. 

Additionally, most actions are combined operations with Afghan forces 

that are not equipped with the new technology. STRONG EAGLE also 

employed several elite Afghan units (Tiger, Omega, and Zombie) which 

did not operate under the usual chains of command. This characteristic 

of the force increased the complexity of command and control in spite 

of technological advances. Vowell himself spent much of the battle in a 

command and control helicopter coordinating communications. Weber, 

the designated ground forces commander, found himself in the frontline 

at various times and, while this gave him visual situational awareness of 

his dismounted elements, it also forced him to do necessary coordination 

under duress. Coordination remains difficult at best under combat 

conditions. Even with an Omega liaison officer by Weber’s side, this did 

not prevent an Omega observer on the OP overlooking Daridam from 

calling in an uncoordinated air strike. This event was a direct result of 

the incorporation of forces outside the typical chain of command into the 

operation. Commanders at all levels need to train, plan and coordinate for 

such eventualities. 

Sometimes the simplest technology is still the most effective. For much 

of the action, Afghan Tiger forces supported American forward elements 

by fire with DShK heavy machine guns mounted on the beds of Toyota 

HiLux pick-up trucks. While the HiLuxes did not have the survivability 

of the MRAPs, they were able to travel in the most rugged of Afghan 

terrain and bring to bear large amounts of firepower rapidly. There were 

numerous HiLuxes on hand as the vehicle was ubiquitous in Afghanistan, 

not only in the military forces, but also among the civilian populace. 

Other types of supporting fires were also key ingredients to the 

success of STRONG EAGLE. The stationing of SWT and AWT helicopter 

patrols over the Ghakhi Valley continuously during the operation meant 

that direct fires were readily available to Weber and his subordinates. 

A two gun platoon of 155mm field artillery from nearby Asadabad was 

most useful in providing smoke to screen movements at key times and 
123

places. Most critical was the use of the nocturnal AC-130 Spectre gunship. 

Although employing essentially 1960s era technology, updated with 1990s 

era targeting equipment, the Spectre was able to accurately place a large 

volume of fires onto enemy positions under the cover of darkness. The 

sheer amount of firepower revitalized the American forces and resulted in 

the rapid clearance of Daridam. So much fire support was available that 

Weber never used the 60mm mortar he brought with him.71

The use of supporting fires was initially tempered by a fear of 

civilian casualties. Once Vowell and his subordinates discovered the local 

residents had fled their homes, this support was used based primarily on 

military considerations, rather than being restricted in its use out of a fear 

of inadvertently causing civilian casualties. A combination of aerial and 

ground fires allowed Coalition forces to withstand close-in defensive 

firepower in the valley and direct attacks on the hilltop positions with a 

relatively small number of casualties.72

STRONG EAGLE showed the enemy at his best and at his worst. 

According to intelligence estimates, which Vowell considered to be 

remarkably accurate, Qari Zia Rahman committed all of his forces to the 

battle outside of Daridam. Resistance was fierce. The insurgents fought 

well from pre-prepared positions that were able to withstand the pressure 

of American fire support for several hours. They were able to use the 

irrigation/aqueduct system in the valley to both remain supplied with 

water, and to provide concealed fighting positions.73

However, Rahman followed a pattern familiar to those who conducted 

previous forays in the Ghakhi Valley. While defending the valley in front of 

Daridam from entrenched positions, he also planned to occupy dominating 

hilltop sites to surround the forces advancing down the road and destroy 

them with firepower coming from all sides. This very design had worked 

well against the Soviets in 1985.Vowell was able to successfully counter 

this typical blueprint with a night insertion onto the high ground that 

surprised the enemy. 

Additionally, while enemy fire was intense, it was not particularly 

accurate. When the action opened, Tangen’s group was caught dismounted 

along the road in a predetermined kill zone where the terrain provided no 

cover. Nevertheless, he and his men were able to retreat up to 200 meters 

to the protective cover of the trailing vehicles while suffering only one 

KIA and one WIA. The 155mm smoke rounds helped to screen effectively 

these and later movements. All forward coalition elements spent long 

periods of time at close to medium direct fire range of enemy fighters and 

did not lose their ability to maneuver and did not incur heavy casualties.
124

Perhaps the most difficult aspect of STRONG EAGLE was the 

achieving of military objectives within or near a civilian population. 

Fighting battles among a civilian population without incurring unnecessary 

civilian casualties is difficult. Vowell initially planned his operations to 

minimize such collateral damage. While initial movements were planned 

for darkness, the advance was slated for dawn, when civilians could be 

readily recognized and would be awake and going about their business. 

A daylight fight also offered a defending enemy certain advantages, 

especially the ability to see Coalition forces as they approached. Vowell 

saw this as a tradeoff to save civilian lives. Once the battle started however, 

it was clear that the local population had enough advance warning to flee 

the area ahead of time. Both Sangam and Daridam were deserted. The only 

people in the area were insurgent fighters.74

Vowell also showed flexibility in the later stages of STRONG EAGLE 

and in STRONG EAGLE II once he realized that civilians were not a 

factor. The final assault and the close air support provided by the Spectre 

took place at night as did the initial assault in STRONG EAGLE II. In 

counterinsurgency operations, while the presence of a civilian population 

puts certain restraints on combat operations, commanders have to be able 

to recognize when these restraints are not necessary and act primarily 

based on military considerations.

STRONG EAGLE displayed the ability of American commanders 

to mass forces for specific combat operations in the midst of a 

counterinsurgency campaign and to take the fight to places which the 

enemy felt were safe from Coalition interference. In later operations 

(STRONG EAGLE II and STRONG EAGLE III), TF No Slack shifted the 

battle farther to the east in Marawara District, almost to Pakistan border as 

US and Afghan forces eventually fought to clear Rahman’s hometown of 

Barawolo Kalay and the neighboring village of Sarowbay. Both villages 

are located on the slopes of the Hindu Raj Range, one north-south valley 

west of Pakistan. The orchard outside Daridam has now become a Coalition 

agricultural project.75 

Despite the ongoing efforts by the Coalition, the counterinsurgency 

campaign in Marawara District is not yet complete. However, the vigorous 

offensive action by a fresh unit in Operation STRONG EAGLE meant that 

the next time the enemy stood and fought in the district, it would be at its 

far eastern edge, against the Pakistani border and in sanctuary areas long 

felt to be out of the reach of Coalition forces. 
125

Notes

1. Wesley Morgan, “Afghanistan Order of Battle, August 2010,” Institute for 

the Study of War, www.understandingwar.org/files/AfghanistanOrbatAug10.pdf 

(accessed on 14 April 2011); “US Contributions and OEF/ISAF C2 in Afghanistan 

2001-2010,” PowerPoint briefing, 16 November 2010.

2. Morgan. 

3. For a detailed discussion of operations out of Asadabad during this period 

see Master Sergeant Michael D. Coker, interview by Major Doug Davids, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 9 August 2007, http://cgsc.cdmhost.

com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll13&CISOPTR=665&C

ISOBOX=1&REC=19 (accessed on 9 February 2011); and Lieutenant Colonel 

Anthony Shaffer, Operation Dark Heart (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2010).

4. For more information on conventional operations in Kunar Province 

during this period, see Major Rich Garey, interview by Laurence Lessard, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 5 November 2007, http://cgsc.cdmhost.

com/cdm4/item_viewer.php?CISOROOT=/p4013coll13&CISOPTR=996 

(accessed on 9 February 2011). The outpost at Barikowt was closed in 2003. 

For more information on MOUNTAIN RESOLVE, see SGT Greg Heath, “10th 

Mtn. Div. Shows its Mettle in Operation Mountain Resolve,” Defend America, 

17 November 2003, http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/nov2003/a111703e.

html (accessed on 10 February 2011) and http://www.defendamerica.mil/articles/

nov2003/a111703f.html (accessed on 10 February 2011).

5. The Marine battalions were 2/8th Marine Regiment (November 2003-May 

2004); 3/6th Marine Regiment (April-December 2004); 3/3d Marine Regiment 

(October 2004-June 2005); 2/3d Marines (June 2005-January 2006); and 1/3d 

Marine Regiment (January- June 2006). For an account of the operations of the 

2/3d Marines see Ed Darack, Victory Point: Operations Red Wings and Whalers-

-The Marine Corps’ Battle for Freedom in Afghanistan (New York: Berkley 

Caliber, 2009).

6. Kent Harris, “2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment: New Deployment, 

New Plan of Action,” Stars and Stripes (10 December 2010), http://www.stripes.

com/news/2nd-battalion-503rd-infantry-regiment-new-deployment-new-planof-action-1.128192?localLinksEnabled=false# (accessed on 22 March 2011); 

Lieutenant Colonel Joel Vowell, interview by Captain Sterling L. DeRamus, 

2010; Bing West, The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Afghanistan (New York: 

Random House, 2011), 52, 91, 127.

7. West, 52; Interdiction of enemy forces as a function of counterinsurgency 

operations is discussed in Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, 

Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2006), pages 

5-19, 5-29, 8-5, and E-5.

8. Ghakhi itself is a village east of the pass in Pakistan.

9. Tony Wickman, ‘Building a Road and Bridging a Gap in Kunar Province, 
126

“ PRT-Kunar website, 22 October 2009, http://prt-kunar.blogspot.com/2009/10/

building-road-and-bridging-gap-in-kunar.html (accessed on 29 March 2011); 

Nicholas Mercurio, “PRT Awards Marawara Bridge Contract,” CJTF-101 

website, 10 March 2011, http://www.cjtf101.com/en/regional-command-eastnews-mainmenu-401/4244-prt-awards-marawara-bridge-contract.html (accessed 

on 29 March 2011); Vowell interview; Brian Boisvert, “The Dirt Boys of ADT,” 

PRT-Kunar website, 24 November 2009, http://prt-kunar.blogspot.com/2009/11/

dirt-boys-of-adt.html (accessed on 29 March 2011); Vowell interview; Charles 

Brice, “Team Works to Improve Irrigation in Afghanistan,”American Forces Press 

Service, 30 December 2008, http://terrorism-online.blogspot.com/2008/12/teamworks-to-improve-irrigation-in.html (accessed on 4 April 2011). After STRONG 

EAGLE, summer rains in 2010 caused flooding that damaged the bridge. This 

forced its reconstruction in 2011.

10. Russian General Staff , The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower 

Fought and Lost, trans. and ed. Lester Grau and Michael Gress (Lawrence, KS: 

University Press of Kansas, 2002), 195-6; Vladimir Grigoriev, “Facts of War 

History: Marawara Company,” Art of War, http://artofwar.ru/g/grigorxew_w_a/

text_0080.shmtl (accessed on 23 March 2011). The Soviets called Asadabad by 

its old name of Chigha Sarai.

11. Grigoriev; Lester A. Grau and Ali Ahmad Jalali, “Forbidden CrossBorder Vendetta: Spetsnaz Strike into Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan War,” 

Journal of Slavic Military Studies (December 2005): 1.

12. A. Hakimi, “Nearly 4,000 Families Flee Pakistan for Kunar,” Trend 

News, 4 October 2008, http://en.trend.az/news/politics/1310888.html (accessed 

8 February 2011); Sterling L. DeRamus, “Operation Strong Eagle,” Unpublished 

manuscript, 2010, 1-2; Vowell interview.

13. Vowell interview; Syed Saleem Shahzad, “A Fighter and a Financier,” Asia 

Times, 22 May 2008, http://article.wn.com/view/2008/05/22/A_fighter_and_a_

financier/ (accessed on 29 March 2011); Bill Roggio, “Taliban commander Qari 

Zia Rahman Denies Reports of his Death,” The Long War Journal, 14 April 2010, 

 http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2010/04/taliban_commander_qa_1.

php#ixzz1I0pcpFHZ, (accessed on 29 March 2011).

14. DeRamus, “Operation Strong Eagle,” 1-2; Vowell interview.

15. Vowell, interview.

16. DeRamus, “Operation Strong Eagle,” 2; “Kunar Province Sees Second 

Full Day of Successful Combined Operations,” Defense Video and Imagery 

Distribution System website, 29 June 2010, http://www.dvidshub.net/news/52133/

kunar-province-sees-second-full-day-successful-combined-operations (accessed 

on 30 March 2011).

17. Vowell, interview.

18. Vowell, interview.
127

19. Vowell, interview.

20. DeRamus, “Operation Strong Eagle,” 2-3.

21. Captain Steven Weber, First Lieutenant Stephen Tangen, First Lieutenant 

Douglas Jones and First Lieutenant Spencer Propst, interview by Major Donald 

Loethan, 4 August 2010; TF No Slack, “Strong Eagle AAR,” (unpublished 

document, 10 July 2010).

22. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview; Kate Brannen, “M-ATV 

Production Nears End; Future Contracts Loom,” Defense News, 22 September 

2010, http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4786889&c=AME&s=LAN 

(accessed on 29 March 2011); PEO Soldier, “CROWS Surge to Afghanistan 

Along with Troops,” army.mil, 23 February 2010, http://www.army.mil/-

news/2010/02/23/34867-crows-surge-to-afghanistan-along-with-troops/ 

(accessed on 29 March 2011).

23. “200th Buffalo MRAP Delivered to Military,” UPI.com, 6 June 2008,

http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2008/06/06/200th_

Buffalo_MRAP_delivered_to_military/UPI-15781212771850/ (accessed on 29 

March 2011); Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview.

24. Vowell, interview; Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview.

25. “Strong Eagle AAR;”Vowell interview; Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst 

interview.

26. Vowell, interview; Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview.

27. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview.

28. Vowell, interview.

29. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview.

30. Vowell, interview.

31. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview.

32. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst.

33. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst.

34. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst.

35. Vowell interview; Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview; DeRamus, 

“Operation Strong Eagle,” 3.

36. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview.

37. Vowell, interview.

38. DeRamus, “Operation Strong Eagle,” 5-6.

39. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview.

40. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst.
128

41. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst.

42. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst.

43. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst.

44. “STRONG EAGLE AAR.”

45. “STRONG EAGLE AAR.”

46. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview; Dianna Khan, “’A Tough 

Lesson on Who Wants It More,’” Stars and Stripes, 21 September 2010, http://

www.stripes.com/news/a-tough-lesson-on-who-wants-it-more-1.119045 

(accessed on 30 March 2011). LZ Hen was later redesignated OP Thomas after 

the Soldier killed there.

47. Khan, “A Tough Lesson on Who Wants it More.” 

48. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst.

49. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst.

50. Dianna Khan, “’I Don’t Know if Discipline is Something You Can 

Teach,’” Stars and Stripes, 21 September 2010, http://www.stripes.com/i-don-tknow-if-discipline-is-something-you-can-teach-1.118919 (accessed on 30 March 

2011); Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview.

51. Khan, “’I Don’t Know if Discipline is Something You Can Teach; ’” 

Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview.

52. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview.

53. JFIRE: MULTI-Service Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures For The 

Joint Application Of Firepower, FM 3-09.32/ MCRP 3-16.6A/NTTP 3-09.2/

AFTTP(I) 3-2.6, (Fort Monroe, VA: US Army, 2007), 108, 110.

54. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview; Khan, “’I Don’t Know if 

Discipline is Something You Can Teach.’”

55. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview.

56. Vowell, interview; Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview.

57. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview.

58. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst.

59. Vowell, interview; Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview.

60. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview.

61. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst.

62. Khan, “A Tough Lesson on Who Wants it More;” Vowell interview.

63. Albert L. Kelly, “Manning of Outpost Thomas,” cjtf-1001.com, 20 

July 2010 http://www.cjtf101.com/en/regional-command-east-news-mainmenu401/3031-manning-of-outpost-thomas-.html (accessed on 13 April 2011); Khan 

Wali Salarzai, “Residents Support Military Operation in Kunar,” Pajhwok Afghan 
129

News, 3 July 2010, http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2010/07/03/residents-supportmilitary-operation-kunar (accessed on 30 March 2011); Vowell interview. 

64. Khan Wali Salarzai, “Residents Support Military Operation in Kunar,” 

Pajhwok Afghan News, 3 July 2010, http://www.pajhwok.com/en/2010/07/03/

residents-support-military-operation-kunar (accessed on 30 March 2011); Vowell 

interview. “Gates Awards Bastogne Valor,” Fort Campbell Courier, 9 December 

2010, http://www.fortcampbellcourier.com/news/article_98b9208c-03da-11e0-

9dec-001cc4c03286.html (accessed on 4 April 2011); “‘No Slack’ Soldiers 

Fight Relentlessly, Repel Insurgent Attacks,” Bagram Media Center, 7 January 

2011, http://www.clarksvilleonline.com/2011/01/07/no-slack-Soldiers-fightrelentlessly-repel-insurgent-attacks/ (accessed 4 April 2011). The awardees were: 

Silver Star, CPT Steven Weber, 1LT Steven Tangen, SFC John Fleming, SSG 

Brent Schneider, SSG Daniel Hayes, CPL Joshua Busch, PFC Richard Bennett; 

Bronze Star, 1LT Douglas Jones, SFC John T. Howerton , CPL Joshua M. 

Frappier.

65. Vowell, interview.

66. Vowell, interview; “Task Force No Slack Continues Clearing the 

Ghakhi Valley,” Clarksville Online, 1 August 2010, http://www.clarksvilleonline.

com/2010/08/01/task-force-no-slack-continues-clearing-the-ghakivalley/#more-42212 (accessed on 30 March 2011).

67. Albert L. Kelley, “Marawara District Shura After Strong Eagle 

II,”cjtf82.com, 21 July 2010, http://www.cjtf82.com/en/regional-commandeast-news-mainmenu-401/3034-marawara-district-shura-after-operation-strongeagle-ii.html (accessed on 30 March 2011); Khan, ’A Tough Lesson on Who 

Wants it More;’” Bill Roggio, “Afghan, Us Forces Hunt Al Qaeda, Taliban in 

Northeast,” Long War Journal, 2 August 2010, http://www.longwarjournal.org/

archives/2010/08/afghan_us_forces_hun.php#ixzz1IYYFTbiv (accessed 4 April 

2011). 

68. Praveen Swami “Linda Norgrove: US Forces Hunting Down Kidnap 

Group,” The Telegram [London], 13 October 2011, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/

news/worldnews/asia/afghanistan/8061282/Linda-Norgrove-US-forces-huntingdown-kidnap-group.html (accessed 4 April 2011).

69. Vowell, interview.

70. “STRONG EAGLE AAR.”

71. Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst interview.

72. Vowell; Weber, Tangen, Jones and Propst.

73. Vowell, interview.

74. Vowell, interview.

75. Combined Joint Task Force 101, “Joint Forces Continue Marawara 

Operations,” Defense Video and Imagery Distribution System website, 3 April 

2011, http://www.dvidshub.net/news/68199/joint-forces-continue-marawara-
130

operations (accessed on 4 April 2011); Scott Rottinghaus, “Wednesday Warfighter: 

Progress and Pitfalls in Marawara,” DOD Live, 30 March 2011, http://www.

dodlive.mil/index.php/2011/03/wednesday-warfighter-progress-and-pitfalls-inmarawara/# (accessed 4 April 2011).
131

Disrupt and Destroy

Platoon Patrol in Zhari District, September 2010

by

Matt M. Matthews

On the morning of 5 September 2010, 1st Platoon, Headquarters and 

Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 75th Cavalry Regiment (1/HHT/1-75 

CAV) of the US Army’s 2d Brigade Combat Team (2BCT), 101st Airborne 

Division (Air Assault) embarked on its first combat patrol south of 

Highway 1 in the Zhari District, Kandahar Province. The mission would 

take 1st Platoon into the heart of Taliban territory as part of the initial 1-75 

CAV effort to dismantle the enemy infrastructure and force its withdrawal 

from Zhari. As the HHT commander pointed out afterwards, “The fight in 

Tiranan set the tone for the rest of the year and let the Taliban know that the 

unit they were fighting would not withdraw under sporadic or even heavy 

fire.” To be sure, the enemy was taken aback by the aggressive character 

of the operation and immediately realized that its Zhari stronghold was 

not impenetrable. The mission proved a learning experience for the 

platoon leader and his young Soldiers and demonstrated what a well led, 

highly motivated, extremely competent platoon can accomplish against an 

entrenched and determined foe.1

 

Figure 1. First Platoon embarking on its first combat patrol south of Highway 1 in 

the Zhari District, Kandahar Province.

Background

By the early summer of 2010, a resurgent Taliban had enveloped 

Kandahar Province. Across large swaths of the province, explosions and 

billowing plumes of smoke revealed the presence of a determined and Photo courtesy of Captain Riley E. McEvoy
132

resilient enemy. Indeed, by the beginning of the spring fighting season of 

2010, the Taliban had assembled a formidable force around Kandahar City. 

In a series of offensive actions dating back to 2003, they had captured key 

terrain around the city which allowed them to intimidate the population 

and launch attacks against the International Security and Assistance 

Force (ISAF) and Afghan security forces. A relative paucity of Soldiers in 

Kandahar Province during the period 2003-2010, significantly restricted 

the efforts of ISAF and its Afghan partners who had endeavored for years 

to destroy the Taliban in the Province.2

As the Taliban increased its attacks in the province, ISAF in early 

2010, prepared to strike back with a hard hitting and wide ranging 

counteroffensive to drive the Taliban away from the city. This action, made 

possible by the recent troop surge, aimed to strike directly into several 

crucial districts in Kandahar Province. One of the targeted districts, Zhari, 

dubbed the “heart of darkness” by apprehensive Soviet troops sent there in 

the 1980s, was also the birthplace of the Taliban. One specialist in the field 

pointed out the importance of the operation when she stated, “To strike at 

the heart of the insurgency, strike at the historical and spiritual home of 

the Taliban sends a very clear message – with the resources we have, we 

are on the offensive.”3

Figure 2. Kandahar Province, Zhari District.

By 1 September 2010, two infantry battalions and one cavalry 

squadron of 2BCT, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) had occupied 
133

positions in Zhari along Highway 1. The 1-75 CAV occupied 2BCT’s 

center sector moving into Forward Operating Base (FOB) Wilson in 

early September. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Thomas 

McFadyen, the unit was responsible for a sizable portion of Zhari. As a 

Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition (RSTA) unit, 1-75 

CAV was not as large as the infantry battalions in 2BCT and its Modified 

Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) differed greatly. Alpha and 

Bravo Troops of 1-75 CAV were, for the most part, made up of cavalry 

scouts while Charlie Company (also known as “Chaos” Company), was 

an infantry element.

Prior to deploying to Afghanistan, Chaos Company’s 1st Platoon 

trained with HHT. The Platoon Leader, First Lieutenant Riley E. McEvoy, 

wrote that, “During JRTC [Joint Readiness Training Center] they made the 

decision that HHT needed a maneuver element.” Halfway through their 

training at JRTC, McEvoy’s platoon was assigned to HHT but at the end 

of the training program they were sent back to their own company. Within 

weeks of the Squadron’s arrival in Afghanistan however, 1st Platoon was 

reassigned to HHT and given the unit designation 1st Platoon, Headquarters 

and Headquarters Troop, 1st Squadron, 75th Cavalry (1/HHT/1-75 CAV).4

There were two important reasons for attaching McEvoy’s Platoon 

to HHT. The first object was the need for four maneuver companies 

as partners with the Afghan National Army (ANA) Kandak (Afghan 

Battalion) which was attached to the 1-75 CAV. There were four ANA 

companies and without the attachment of 1st Platoon to HHT there 

would be only three maneuver elements to partner with the Kandak. First 

Platoon was also assigned to HHT because the Squadron Commander 

wanted a maneuver force which could work with his Intelligence Officer 

(S2). McEvoy recalled that McFadyen sought “to have a maneuver force 

partially controlled by the Squadron S2 and himself to action high-value 

intelligence targets and time-sensitive targets.” The S2, Captain Matthew 

A. Crawford, described 1st Platoon’s mission as “unique.” They were used 

“to specifically disrupt, target HVIs (high-value individuals), and destroy 

known insurgent infrastructure. Their mission statement almost always 

had the words ‘disrupt’ and ‘destroy’ in them.” McEvoy used few words to 

explain why his platoon was chosen, simply stating, “We were the best.”5

McEvoy’s Platoon contained some of the most experienced NonCommissioned Officers (NCOs) and enlisted men in the US Army. His 

Platoon Sergeant, Sergeant First Class Derek Leach, was a solid combat 

veteran and a superb leader, so much so that McEvoy pointed out their 

relationship “was perfect.” The Platoon Leader wrote that Leach, “brought 
134

a fresh attitude and perspective to the platoon. He was...gung-ho and ready 

to train and fight.” The Squad Leaders, Staff Sergeant Timothy McKinnis 

and Sergeant Victor Faggiano, were also first rate combat veterans. McEvoy 

stated that McKinnis was “just a wealth of experience, [an] amazing NCO, 

and it was a great mix between Sergeant Faggiano ...a young fire breather, 

ready to go at all times and then Sergeant McKinnis... [an] old crusty 

NCO that has so much perspective about everyone in the squad, and just so 

much experience and intelligence to share, and just a great, calm combat 

leader.” McKinnis’ 2d Squad also contained two excellent Team Leaders, 

Sergeant Jesse Hattesohl and Sergeant Zachary Fraker. In Faggiano’s 1st 

Squad, Team Leaders Specialist Joseph Lee and Specialist Cody Chandler 

imparted a wealth of knowledge, skill, and leadership. Chandler was also 

one of the most popular Soldiers in the platoon. McEvoy’s weapons squad 

was led by Staff Sergeant Robert Singley who had just returned from drill 

sergeant duty. Like the others, he was a solid combat veteran and leader.6

The Mission

By 1 September 2010, Crawford had produced intelligence packages 

on numerous enemy compounds, fighting positions, meeting locations, 

and bed-down locations. He had also accumulated a massive amount 

of intelligence material on Taliban Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 

caches and IED production facilities. All of the sites had been identified 

either by historical reporting or other intelligence, surveillance, and 

reconnaissance (ISR) means. With the addition of full-motion video shot 

by Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), it did not take Crawford long 

to indentify certain enemy patterns. “So we had a...patterned enemy in 

Zhari...he was so comfortable with the terrain and the fact that they owned 

it that they just...became almost lazy in their movement patterns,” the S2 

remarked.7

The Squadron’s initial objective was to force the enemy away 

from Highway 1 and Route SUMMIT in order to set conditions for an 

impending 2BCT operation dubbed Operation DRAGON STRIKE. “We 

wanted to shape the AO, so once DRAGON STRIKE started we could go 

in and not have to slug it out,” Crawford recounted. The entire operation 

was intelligence-driven, targeting Taliban compounds, cache sites, and 

bed-down locations near Highway 1 and Route SUMMIT. “We wanted to 

open up those two major routes in our AO...and we were running patrols 

750 meters in, 1,000 meters in, making contact, and then trying to kill the 

enemy with artillery and UAV strikes,” Crawford recalled.8

 
135

Early in the first week of September, McEvoy received orders to 

prepare his platoon for a mission south of Highway 1. The operation would 

take place on the morning of 5 September. Although they had performed 

combat patrols north of the highway, 1st Platoon had yet to conduct 

operations to the south. It would be an extremely dangerous mission. The 

Taliban owned the ground, and the terrain which was a jumble of dense 

grape fields, wadis, tree lines, and open grassland and this only served 

to increase the strength of the enemy. As Crawford pointed out, “you 

couldn’t get 300 meters south of that highway without getting attacked.” 

Crawford wanted McEvoy’s platoon to check a possible IED cache site 

west of Route SUMMIT. The S2 was also convinced that the enemy was 

using at least one building along Route ST. JOHN’S, a dirt road running 

north of Tiranan, as a Command and Control (C2) point.9

As soon as they received the warning order, McEvoy and his NCOs 

began their pre-combat checks (PCCs) and pre-combat inspections (PCIs). 

They received reliable intelligence on possible routes and the locations of 

recent IED attacks. “We actually got really deep into finding intelligence 

about this area,” Hattesohl recalled. First Platoon would be supported 

for this mission by UAVs, 155mm howitzers, and 120mm mortars from 

FOB Wilson and Close Combat Attack (CCA) aircraft. With all necessary 

preparations in place, McEvoy’s platoon and their ANA counterparts were 

fully prepared by the night of 4 September.10

The Patrol

At approximately 0700 on 5 September, 1st Platoon and the ANA 

platoon started moving south from FOB Wilson. The patrol should have 

moved out earlier but the ANA contingent arrived late. Hattesohl, the 2d 

Squad A Team Leader, led the dismounted platoon through the Afghan 

National Police (ANP) gate. Following behind Hattesohl were his two 

team members, Private First Class Steven Craythorn and Private First 

Class Joseph Arvizu. Hattesohl’s team advanced south toward Highway 1 

in a staggered road-march formation. They were followed by about half of 

the ANA platoon along with 2d Squad Leader McKinnis and Fraker, the B 

Team Leader. Fraker was the lone man in B Team, as two of his Soldiers, 

Specialist Ryan Johnson and Private First Class Yeng Her, were on leave.11

Toward the center of the column, McEvoy maintained a watchful eye 

on the balance of the ANA intermingled with the rest of the patrol. “It was 

one of our first patrols,” McEvoy recalled, “so controlling the ANA was 

a bit difficult.” With the platoon leader was Captain Michael Krayer, the 

HHT Commander, who had come along as an observer and Private First 
136

Class Mark Drake, the forward observer (FO). Private First Class Anthony 

Surrett also traveled with McEvoy serving as his radio telephone operator 

(RTO). 

Behind this element, the 1st Squad A Team Leader, Chandler, advanced 

with Private Michael Iacoviello and Private First Class Kyle Hall. In the 

center, 1st Squad Leader Faggiano and attached HHT Medic Sergeant 

Timothy “Doc” Peterson moved forward. Behind Faggiano, 1st Squad 

B Team Leader Lee and his two Soldiers, Private First Class Anthony 

Thompson and Private First Class Hector Bonilla, followed their squad 

leader through the front gate. Also moving with Faggiano was Weapons 

Squad Leader Singley and his M240G gun team members, Private First 

Class Spencer Harris, Private First Class Rigoberto Soto and Private First 

Class Corey Doty.12 

Bringing up the rear of the patrol was Platoon Sergeant Leach, Medic 

Private First Class Robert Kruse and the designated marksman and ammo 

bearer (AB) from Weapons Squad, Specialist Andrew Ingram. Ingram 

carried an “assault pack” of 500 rounds of 7.62 ammunition for the gun 

team and he also carried an M14 rifle. As the platoon began to stretch 

out between the front gate and Highway 1, Leach and Kruse, along 

with Ingram, began moving toward the front of the long column. “As 

usual,” Leach stated, “we would patrol up and down between everyone 

ensuring everyone was good and also for my situational awareness and 

coordination with the platoon leader and squad leaders.” As his platoon 

marched through the ANP gate, McEvoy called the command post (CP) 

to announce their departure. He remembered the day as “hot, over 100 

[degrees], sunny [and] cloudless.”13

At Highway 1, 1st Platoon set up left and right security, stopping all 

traffic and quickly moving across to the south side of the highway. Once 

there, the platoon changed from a staggered road-march formation into a 

squad wedge formation and headed west through an open field toward 

Route SUMMIT. Hattesohl remained on point during this phase of the 

movement. Crossing Route SUMMIT McEvoy’s Soldiers cautiously 

approached the rural community of Pasab. “We continued with this 

movement until we made it closer to the village of Pasab where we set in 

security watching every avenue of approach and especially Highway 1,” 

Leach recalled. Ever mindful of the threat from IEDs, Hattesohl continued 

to select the “hardest and safest route possible” for the platoon. Moving 

north of Pasab, Leach remembered that, “Once we started moving between 

buildings we switched to a bounding and traveling overwatch [formation] 
137

Figure 3. First Platoon Patrol to Tiranan.

to ensure security was set with one element while still being able to push 

on with the other element.” McEvoy stated that he gave few instructions 

up to this point. “The squad leaders knew their route and what they were 

supposed to do.”14

The patrol moved west past Pasab about 600 meters and then turned 

south toward the first wadi line. When Hattesohl approached the wadi, he 

called a halt to check for “danger zones.” He recalled that there was little 

water in the wadi but there were “a lot of trees a lot of bushes” and “You 

couldn’t see more than maybe 15 [or] 10 feet in front of you.” After the 
138

brief pause, the platoon began crossing the riverbed. “For this mission we 

came up to the wadi [and] walked through the water roughly 100 meters 

or so,” Leach stated. “For this movement we were in single file, but spaced 

well enough apart and mutually supporting each other. We would push a 

team up, find the crossing, set in security while bringing up a gun team, 

[and] then move everyone else up.”15

While the rest of the platoon made its way across the first wadi line, 

Hattesohl and his team moved farther south into an open field about 100 

meters long. About halfway through the field, Hattesohl noticed a small 

piece of plastic. Believing it could be an IED the team leader called another 

halt and moved to clear it. “Everything’s a hazard for us,” he later stated. 

After checking the piece of plastic Hattesohl declared, “It was nothing,” 

and his team moved out once more in the direction of a tree line to the 

south.16

Making their way past the tree line, Hattesohl’s team proceeded about 

200 meters to the next wadi line. The team leader described this obstacle as 

a “creek wadi.” Entering the creek, McKinnis’ 2d Squad, with Hattesohl’s 

team on point, moved northeast toward a large mud hut with an oval roof. 

While 2d Squad moved on the structure, Faggiano’s 1st Squad set the gun 

teams to provide security for the other squad. “We had learned from [past 

experience] the terrain is so dense that a machine gun [placed] in [a] grape 

orchard can’t really cover anybody,” Faggiano noted. The gun teams and 

Faggiano’s 1st Squad provided overwatch for McKinnis’ 2d Squad as 

they approached a large mud hut with a small open courtyard surrounded 

by damaged walls. As 1st Squad moved up to the structure, Faggiano’s 

Soldiers and the gun crews continued to provide overwatch. McKinnis’ 

squad found nothing at the house. McEvoy recalled “visually” cleaning 

the house. “Nothing was really there,” Hattesohl reported. “Our leadership 

talked with the locals that were living in that village...we asked them 

questions like where have the Taliban been...has there been any activity 

in the area?” It was all for naught. The platoon received no actionable 

intelligence from the local population. Finding neither IED caches nor 

IED production facilities in the vicinity, McEvoy made the decision to 

move south to the objective.17

Once again, Hattesohl led the way for McKinnis’ 2d Squad, south 

toward the third wadi line and the objective. At the same time, Faggiano’s 

1st Squad headed in a southwesterly direction toward the third wadi line. 

Making their way through the dense underbrush, Faggiano’s Soldiers 

emerged on the south side of the wadi. “Just south of me, it was wide open, 

there was tall grass, and then a village just off to the south,” the 1st Squad 
139

Leader recalled. Faggiano’s squad quickly set up an overwatch position 

to cover 2d Squad as they worked their way toward the third wadi line. 

Lee and his team faced north to provide security for 2d Squad. McKinnis 

stated that 1st Squad’s mission was “to overwatch movement and deny 

the enemy use of the wadi line to the west while my squad went to the 

objective to confirm or deny it as a cache site.”18

After working their way through the wadi, McKinnis’ men emerged 

onto an open field near the objective, which McEvoy remarked, “turned out 

to be a well.” With 2d Squad were McEvoy, the FO Drake, Leach, Krayer, 

his security element, as well as 10 ANA Soldiers and the gun teams. A 

quick search of the well turned up nothing. “[The] primary objective was 

the well, which was believed to have been a cache site,” McKinnis recalled. 

“After discovering that the objective was not a cache site, we moved about 

50-75 meters further southwest to the northern corner of the grape field 

in order to set a small perimeter.” Hattesohl and his A Team, along with 

Harris and his M240G from the gun team, took up an overwatch position 

in the southwest corner behind a wall near the grape field. Fraker also took 

up a position behind the wall. Other Soldiers in the element pulled security 

to the northwest and east. Hattesohl was soon joined by McKinnis who 

crouched behind the wall. While this was taking place, the other gun team 

which included Singley, Doty and Soto, set up rear security on the north 

side of the wadi.

19

The Fight

As McKinnis’ men took up their positions, an ANA Soldier fired a 

warning shot at an Afghan “farmer” in the grape field. The farmer turned 

and fled whereupon several ANA Soldiers bolted into the grape field after 

him. At this point, McEvoy decided to wait and to keep pulling security 

until the ANA returned from pursuing the man. The ANA soon led the 

farmer out of the grape field. Hattesohl remembered talking to the man, 

tactfully questioning him about the Taliban presence in the area. Seated 

nearby on a haystack, McEvoy recalled McKinnis and the ANA chatting 

with the farmer. To the west, Faggiano stated that his squad was “kind of 

obsessing over what was going on” in the 2d Squad area.20

About five to eight minutes into the questioning of the farmer, Hattesohl 

heard another gunshot. “I heard a snap. I thought it was one of the ANAs 

shooting again but it sounded a little bit different. Then it was on. It was 

game on from there. I called the direction and distance. I saw that there 

were two lone buildings just to my southwest, about...300, 350 meters and 

that’s where we were taking the fire from.” Fraker also heard the gunfire 
140

from behind the wall north of the grape field. “We heard a couple pop 

shots and then everything broke loose,” he stated. From their rear security 

position north of the third wadi, Singley, Soto, and Doty could hear the 

rounds going over their heads. Kruse recalled that the fire was so intense 

that “we were pinned down.” He remembered being exposed to the initial 

enemy fire and sprinted to the wall north of the grape field under a hail of 

bullets. “There [were] rounds hitting the grape field in front of us [and] 

behind us,” he later stated. Although under a storm of small arms fire, 1st 

Squad, the gun team, and the headquarters element struck back swiftly 

against the enemy. Hattesohl and Harris with his M240G were the first to 

return fire from north of the grape field.21

Sergeant Fraker could see about 20 enemy fighters in and around 

two buildings to his southwest. He recognized instantly that the squad’s 

weapons could not fire effectively on the Taliban locations. Under a 

withering barrage of bullets from enemy small arms and machine guns, 

Fraker and Hattesohl moved from their defensive position behind the wall 

about 25 meters into an open field. As they moved forward, other members 

of the squad laid down a suppressive volley with their M4s and M249Gs. 

Once in the open field Hattesohl put down suppressive fire while Fraker 

fired his M320 at the enemy to his front. As Fraker’s 40mm high explosive 

grenades burst around the Taliban defensive positions, Hattesohl continued 

to direct his team and coordinate its fires.22

To the west, Faggiano’s 1st Squad also came under a torrent of gun fire. 

He immediately called up a contact report to McEvoy and began to study 

the situation. “There was really nowhere to maneuver,” he later noted. 

“These guys were the masters of their terrain. They knew we weren’t 

going to come at them. They knew we were going to have to slug it out 

with them, from wadi line to wadi line.” Faggiano quickly discerned that 

he needed to gain fire superiority over the enemy and began coordinating 

with his team leaders Chandler and Lee.23

Most of the fire was coming from the wadi line directly to the south of 

1st Squad and from two buildings on the north side of Route ST. JOHNS. 

Faggiano recalled listening to McEvoy on the radio. The platoon leader 

had already called in a contact report to the troop command post (CP). 

He thereupon assisted the FO Drake in coordinating his radio calls to 

the squadron for Close Combat Attack (CCA) aircraft (OH-58 Kiowas), 

along with indirect fire support. For now, McEvoy was determined to let 

his squad leaders “fight for a while” until he could acquire more air and 

artillery. Faggiano remembered McEvoy saying, “All right, we’re going to 

get CCA. Let’s hold up right here.” Bolstered with the knowledge of the 
141

enemy’s locations, McEvoy determined to bring air and artillery down on 

them while his squads attempted to gain fire superiority.24

As Faggiano’s 1st Squad fired back, they immediately drew added 

attention from the enemy to their south. “They obviously were the ones 

that the Taliban saw first so they took most of the rounds,” Hattesohl noted 

after the fight. “Then when 1st squad opened up, that’s when the enemy 

shifted fire towards them.” Indeed, Faggiano’s squad was engulfed in a 

hail of small arms fire which whizzed over their heads, ripped into the dirt 

and sliced through the vegetation along the wadi line. The enemy fire was 

so intense that Faggiano was not certain he could maintain fire superiority. 

The squad leader now called on Lee, who with Thompson and Bonilla, had 

been covering the rear on the north side of the wadi. “I wanted to bring 

more [M]320’s and team leaders...I wanted to bring more of their gunners 

over, so Lee jumped over and we left two guys facing north,” Faggiano 

stated.25

Although the enemy was outside the range of the M320, Lee recalled 

firing HE rounds as a scare tactic. On the east side of Faggiano’s line, 

Chandler, Iacoviello, and Hall laid down a steady stream of fire with 

their M203s, M320s, and the SAW. Chandler could see large groups of 

the enemy running in and out of a building directly south of his position. 

As the enemy ran out of the structure, they would try to establish firing 

positions and then duck back into the house. As the firefight grew in 

intensity, Lee began rotating his team from rear security to the firing line 

in order to conserve ammunition. To Lee’s great consternation, the enemy 

continued their withering assault on 1st Squad. “They weren’t trying to 

bound back and leave. They were actually sticking there and fighting with 

us. They just had all the buildings that they could hide in where we had a 

berm with trees and basically a couple walls, nothing major to really stop 

anything,” Lee remembered.26

In the east, 2d Squad continued to fire back at the buildings to the 

southwest. From his position in the open field, Fraker noticed about 10 

enemy fighters attempting to move east along Route ST. JOHNS. Realizing 

the Taliban was attempting to flank 2d Squad’s position, Fraker instantly 

reoriented a portion of the squad’s fire on the enemy’s flanking party. The 

intense gunfire quickly halted the flanking movement. While this was 

taking place, Hattesohl continued to move back and forth between the 

open field and his team’s defensive position. Hattesohl alternated between 

these two positions in order to engage the enemy with the squad’s highestcaliber weapons. He also continued to provide his team with tactical 

instructions and direct their fires, as the tempo of the fight increased.27 
142

Remarkably, a few of the ANA Soldiers at McEvoy’s location were 

wandering around approximately 30 meters in front of 2d Squad’s fighting 

positions. With bullets flying everywhere, the platoon leader promptly 

ordered an ANA officer to take all of his men back to a small bike trail 

about 50 meters north of 2d Squad’s position. By this time, Drake had 

already fired several indirect fire missions on enemy positions to the 

south. As he called in these missions, CCA arrived overhead. While Drake 

coordinated with the OH-58 Kiowas, McEvoy informed McKinnis that he 

was concerned about the proximity of the artillery fire and that he planned 

to pull the platoon back to the bike trail. McEvoy recalled that this was 

their first real combat patrol and he was greatly concerned about having 

enough stand-off room. He remembered that during later deployments they 

called artillery in with less stand-off range, “but this time...we backed off 

a full 100 meters, which is way more than we should.”28

As the platoon leader continued to coordinate the planned movement, 

Faggiano’s squad faced new tribulations. The struggle continued to rage 

on the 1st Squad firing line. Through the heat and uninterrupted enemy 

fire, Faggiano’s squad fought back with skill and determination. The 

squad leader worked his way up and down the line, repeatedly exposing 

him to enemy gunfire as he directed his squad’s defenses. As 1st Squad 

fired back at the enemy to their south, Faggiano noticed a slackening in 

the fire from Lee’s team. Bonilla’s SAW had malfunctioned and he was 

unable to correct it. Faggiano rushed to Bonilla’s position and attempted 

to fix it. After feverishly attempting to correct the problem with the SAW, 

the squad leader discovered that the firing pin was broken. Scrambling 

back down the wadi line, Faggiano learned that Thompson’s M203 had 

also malfunctioned, the result of a broken plunger. Although confronted 

by this adversity, 1st Squad remained calm and continued to fight back. 

“Two weapons systems down and they were completely inexperienced at 

the time, completely inexperienced in the sense of a firefight...they did 

amazing...everyone kept their cool,” Faggiano recalled.29

As 1st Squad took stock of its situation, their adversaries maintained a 

deadly barrage of machine-gun and small-arms fire. In spite of everything, 

1st Squad kept up a blistering fire on the enemy. On the left, Chandler, 

Iacoviello, and Hall fought back with a vengeance while on Faggiano’s 

right, Lee, Thompson, and Bonilla put up the same determined resistance. 

Looking down the line and shouting out fire commands, Faggiano saw an 

enemy bullet bounce off the ground and fly right between Thompson’s 

arms as he fired his M-4. The squad leader watched in amazement as 

Thompson momentarily slid back behind cover and then quickly popped 
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back up to engage the enemy. “They did a great job,” Faggiano stated 

afterward.30

Both Faggiano and Chandler could still see a large group of fighters 

running in and out of the building southwest of their position. Neither 

Soldier knew it at the time but Captain Crawford, the Squadron S2, had 

already confirmed that the structure was in fact, a hardened Taliban fighting 

position and a command and control point. Crawford had amassed data on 

the building dating back to 2007. Now, with one Predator UAV and one 

Reaper UAV flying overhead, along with other fixed-wing aviation assets, 

the TOC could clearly see numerous 5-10 man enemy elements moving 

forward from south of Tiranan and Route ST. JOHNS. The fighters were 

clearly reinforcements.31

The building was certainly a lucrative target and Chandler yelled to 

Faggiano, “Hey, see where they’re shooting from?” The squad leader saw 

the fire coming from the building and shouted over the deafening gunfire, 

“Go and shoot the SMAW-D [Shoulder Launched Multipurpose Assault 

Weapon-Disposable]. Wreck that building!” Chandler immediately 

clutched the SMAW-D, brought the weapon to his shoulder, aimed and 

fired. As the round careened toward the building, Chandler thought the back 

blast from the weapon would clearly expose his position. Unfortunately 

the round missed the target. Turning to grab his M203, he continued to fire 

HE rounds toward the enemy. As Faggiano started to move down the line 

in order to help Lee spread his team out along the brim of the wadi, the 

squad leader turned to tell Chandler where he was going just as the team 

leader closed the breech on his M203. At that moment, a bullet slammed 

into Chandler’s left arm as another struck his lower abdomen. “It sounded 

like an explosion,” he recalled. The blow knocked the young team leader 

down into the wadi. “I just remember trying to climb back up to the berm 

to get my weapon and to get back to where I was at but my legs just gave 

out on me and I collapsed into the wadi.”32

In an instant, “Doc” Peterson, the headquarters medic, ran down into 

the wadi to help Chandler. Lee quickly followed. Faggiano, the 1st squad 

leader, was next on the scene. Doc told the squad leader that one bullet had 

gone through Chandler’s arm and the other through his lower abdomen. As 

Peterson applied pressure on the wounds, he told Faggiano that Chandler 

was “urgent surgical” and gave the squad leader a hasty 9-Line MEDEVAC 

request. Wasting no time, the squad leader called the report up to Leach. 

“Chan’s shot. Urgent surgical,” he told the Platoon Sergeant.33
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McEvoy heard the MEDEVAC call and directed Leach to handle it. 

McEvoy recalled later that the order was unnecessary because Leach and 

the platoon medic, Kruse, were already in motion. Running through a 

gauntlet of small arms fire, Leach and Kruse hurriedly made their way to 

Chandler. “We had to run through the field to the tree line,” Kruse noted. 

When they reached Chandler, Kruse remembered a torrent of enemy 

gunfire going over their heads. He could also hear the bullets hitting the 

trees around them.34

With Leach, Peterson, and Kruse treating Chandler, Faggiano and 

Lee returned to the fight. With two weapons systems down and one team 

leader out of action, the squad leader knew he needed every weapon on 

the firing line. Climbing back up to the berm, Faggiano saw Iacoviello 

firing away at the enemy. Iacoviello asked Faggiano about Chandler and 

then “turned and started shooting again,” the squad leader stated. Enemy 

bullets continued to hit the trees and dirt around them but Faggiano’s 

squad fought back with a renewed vigor.35

With the MEDEVAC helicopter on its way, McEvoy grew concerned 

about the amount of enemy fire on 1st Squad’s position. The MEDEVAC 

would be forced to land in a large meadow just behind their location. As the 

helicopter approached, the platoon leader told Leach to mark the landing 

zone (LZ) with smoke and directed his Soldiers to lay down a sheet of fire 

as soon as the Black Hawk came into view. “I just need everyone to lay 

down cycling, just pretty much hold the trigger down toward the enemy 

so they keep their heads down while we evac[uated] Specialist Chandler,” 

McEvoy reported. With the MEDEVAC on its way, Drake had the artillery 

stop firing. “I had the guns go cold as I was using the birds,” he later 

pointed out.36

As the MEDEVAC approached the LZ, 1st and 2d Squads, along with 

the weapons teams, laid down a sheet of fire on the enemy positions to the 

south. However, as the Black Hawk set down in the meadow, the enemy 

fire increased. Lee noted that, “They picked up the rate of fire and so did 

we.” When the Black Hawk landed, enemy rounds smacked into the trees 

and several bullets kicked dirt into Thompson’s face. Lee recalled that 1st 

Squad “was pretty much pinned down.” Chandler stated afterward that, 

“once the bird started coming in, all hell just broke loose. The Taliban just 

started shooting at the bird.” As soon as the MEDEVAC landed, the crew 

chief jumped off and helped “Doc” Peterson, Leach, Kruse, Hall, and Lee 

carry Chandler to the waiting aircraft. While placing him in the Black 

Hawk, enemy rounds cut through the fuselage. “They loaded me into the 

bird and as we were taking off, I just started hearing bullets hit the bird 
145

and at that point, I just thought, I’m going down. We are going down and 

I was actually very surprised that they even landed that bird where they 

did.” Chandler recalled.37

With the MEDEVAC airborne and heading north, McEvoy could now 

pull 2d Squad back to the bike trail and call for more artillery fire. Drake 

and McEvoy called in 155mm howitzers and 120mm mortars on enemy 

locations north of Route ST. JOHNS as McKinnis’ Squad and part of the 

gun team hurried north to the bike trail. As the rounds exploded around 

the Taliban positions, 2d Squad took up positions along the bike trail 

with their ANA counterparts. “We pulled back [and] called for rounds,” 

Hattesohl stated. He remembered the bike trail as “a very small ditch,” 

that “provided...little cover but the concealment was great, there was 

lots of vegetation, there was no way they could have seen us.” While 

McKinnis’ Soldiers took up their new positions along the trail, Singley’s 

other gun team continued to provide rear security on the north side of the 

wadi. Enemy fire slackened as 2d Squad secured its position along the bike 

trail. “The rounds weren’t coming toward us anymore, they were all going 

towards 1st squad,” Hattesohl pointed out.38

Around the enemy-occupied buildings, howitzer and mortar rounds 

landed with thunderous flashes. At the same time, Kiowas returned to 

the area searching for targets. Drake called a halt to the indirect fire and 

the platoon waited for the helicopters to strike. Armed with rockets and 

.50-caliber machine guns, the Kiowas were prepared to attack. However, 

they were not sure of the Taliban’s precise locations and needed someone 

to mark the targets. Hattesohl recalled, “Kiowas having a really tough 

time finding the enemy position.” Although 2d Squad was able to see the 

enemy locations from the bike trail, their M320s and M203s were about 

150 meters out of range. Hattesohl turned to Fraker and told him that they 

would have to go and mark the target. Rushing to McKinnis’ position, 

Hattesohl asked his squad leader for permission to mark the target with 

smoke with the M203 grenade launcher and said he would be taking Fraker 

with him. The request was quickly granted. As Hattesohl and Fraker ran 

south toward their former position, McKinnis ordered the rest of his squad 

to lay down cover fire.39

Running about 250 meters into an open field in front of the bike trail, 

Hattesohl and Fraker found themselves in a freshly tilled field of black 

dirt. “I laid down, Sergeant Fraker shot the smoke, and I was just shooting 

explosive grenades,” recalled Hattesohl. The two team leaders were 

quickly “pinpointed” by the enemy and bullets immediately flew around 

their heads and into the dirt. After firing two or three smoke grenades with 
146

the M203, Hattesohl and Fraker fell back to the bike trail. Unfortunately, 

the smoke quickly dissipated. Fraker later pointed out that M203 “smoke 

doesn’t stay up long.” As the Kiowas came back around they told the 

Soldiers on the ground “we don’t see it yet, mark it again.” Once again, 

the two Soldiers ran back into the open field under enemy fire. Fraker 

fired again and this time the helicopters identified the smoke and began 

engaging the targets. Fraker recalled the Kiowa’s repeatedly “laying waste 

to that area.”40

As the Kiowa’s continued their gun runs, McEvoy and Drake ran from 

the safety of the bike trail into the open field to place a VS-17 marker 

panel to help the pilots identify 1st Platoon’s location. While they rushed 

forward under a barrage of enemy bullets, 2d Squad laid down a blistering 

cover fire. Placing the marker panel at about the spot from which Hattesohl 

and Fraker had fired their smoke grenades, McEvoy and Drake hurriedly 

moved back toward the trail as enemy bullets zipped past their heads. 

“I remember him [McEvoy] calling ... ‘All right; were getting ready to 

come in,’ ” McKinnis stated. With 2d Squad laying down heavy cover 

fire McKinnis recollected, “He didn’t want to get shot.” In a display of 

conspicuous bravery and leadership, McKinnis also ran out into the open 

field under Taliban fire to lay down another marker panel. With the smoke 

and marker panels in place, the Kiowas blasted the enemy positions. “It 

was really a release of pent up tension when they started hitting them...

there were some cheers going on,” McKinnis remarked.41

At this point in the fight, McEvoy decided to pull back farther north 

to a better defensive position. The entire platoon would re-cross the wadi

and take up positions in a nearby meadow that, surrounded by a wall, 

appeared to be a rock solid location. McKinnis remembered the meadow 

had “a three or four foot wall around it where we could make a pretty good 

[defensive] position while they dropped the rounds.” Second Squad and 

the gun teams pulled back first. They were followed by Faggiano’s 1st 

Squad that sprinted in from the west under the cover of Kiowas. For the 

first time in hours, the entire platoon was consolidated at the same location 

in a 360 degree defensive position.42

Although the new position was first rate, the platoon was still under 

fire. Hattesohl said the enemy rounds coming closer and the noise getting 

louder. He also noticed that the Taliban’s fire was becoming much more 

accurate. Soon, enemy grenades started landing close to the platoon’s 

position. Indeed, the enemy’s familiarity with the terrain had allowed a 

few fighters to press in closer to 1st Platoon’s new location.43
147

Drake soon realized that he could not properly call for or adjust fires 

from the new location and requested permission to move forward to 

the wadi. On receiving the go ahead from McEvoy, Drake, along with 

Faggiano, Hall, and Iacoviello, scrambled back to the wadi line. Although 

enemy fighters were clearly close by, Faggiano recalled Hall jumping 

right into the wadi line, “ready to fight those guys wherever they were and 

they were just right on the other side.” As they moved forward, McKinnis 

lobbed several grenades over to the southern side of the wadi. A few 

seconds later, Faggiano heard an enemy fighter close by. “I think he had 

crept up and was just throwing pot shots, trying to follow us down the 

wadi line,” he later stated. The squad leader quickly tossed a grenade at the 

man and heard nothing more from him.44

In the thick underbrush along the wadi, Drake could not find a suitable 

position to determine targets and told Faggiano he couldn’t see from that 

location. “This isn’t a good spot,” he said. With Drake unable to see and 

with more enemy fighters pressing in on their flanks, Faggiano decided to 

fall back to the meadow. As they moved back north, McEvoy decided to 

move the entire platoon out of the meadow. He would move further north 

to the little mud hut the platoon had searched that morning and turn it into 

a strongpoint. The new position would also provide the FO with a better 

view of the enemy positions to the south.45

“We all peeled back to the house,” Faggiano said. While his squad 

set up security on the western side of the building, McKinnis’ 2d Squad 

took up positions to the east and south. “It was a mud hut and it was 

actually pretty big,” Hattesohl remembered. He said a family had been 

living in the hut with their dog. Wasting little time, McEvoy placed Ingram 

with his M-14 and Doty, Harris, and Soto with their M240Gs on the roof 

along with Drake. Faggiano remained close by to provide command and 

control. Using his 10-power scope on his M-14, Ingram could clearly see 

Taliban fighters firing from numerous locations about 700-800 meters 

to his south. He also saw enemy reinforcements rushing forward south 

of Route ST. JOHNS. He quickly relayed the information on the enemy 

targets to McEvoy, Drake, and the gun teams. While Doty and Harris fired 

their M240Gs at enemy targets, Drake began calling in Kiowa and 155mm 

howitzer missions.46

Much of the enemy activity seemed centered around one structure. 

As Captain Crawford had predicted, 1st Platoon was clearly engaged with 

a significant enemy command and control point. To the Soldiers on the 

roof, the enemy appeared determined to hold the position at all cost. The 

willingness of the Taliban to stand and fight however, was a benefit to the 

Americans and their ANA counterparts. From his new strongpoint, 
148

Figure 4. First Platoon Standoff Positions.

McEvoy had achieved an excellent standoff distance from the enemy while 

still maintaining the ability to observe their movements. While the Taliban 

appeared resolute; McEvoy and his platoon were equally unwavering in 

their determination to kill as many of the enemy as possible.47

Within minutes, Drake brought down a curtain of steel on the enemy 

targets. As Ingram observed the fire through his scope, he relayed the 

battle damage assessment (BDA) to Drake and McEvoy. Ingram also 

helped Drake adjust his fire. Taliban casualties began to mount as the two 

Soldiers continued their team effort and the howitzer rounds slammed into 
149

their targets. While the fight continued, Drake also directed rotary-wing 

firing, alternating these tasks between the indirect-fire missions. A US 

Army officer would report after the fight that Drake was “an invaluable 

asset with his calm and effective actions that brought an immediate and 

deadly result to the enemy.” In fact, ISR sources had already picked up 

enemy communications in which a Taliban fighter told his comrades, “It’s 

raining really bad, we’ve got to go.”48

As the artillery barrage intensified, Ingram managed to hit several 

enemy fighters with shots from his M-14. The gun teams on the roof 

also kept up a steady stream of fire against the Taliban fighting positions. 

“We were firing at them as best we can...just kind of walking the rounds 

down as best we can,” Doty said after the engagement. While 1st Platoon 

continued to fire, enemy rounds occasionally whizzed past their heads.49

Peering into the scope of his M-14, Ingram could plainly see the 

artillery impacting on the enemy positions. As he continued to scan the 

sector, he was surprised to see a Taliban open top truck with approximately 

12 fighters in the back drive through the smoke and debris. Careening 

down a small dirt path, the truck abruptly stopped next to one of the 

enemy occupied buildings. The young marksman continued to watch in 

amazement as the Taliban fighters, armed with rocket propelled grenades 

(RPGs), heavy machine guns, and AK-47s jumped down from the truck 

and scattered in different directions. Ingram managed to hit one of the 

fighters as he ran for cover. He directed the M240G gun teams onto the 

other scurrying targets.50

The truck promptly sped away. As the dust cleared, Ingram spotted one 

of the enemy fighters brandishing a white Taliban flag. The man “started 

waving it at us, you know, taunting us,” Ingram said. McEvoy thought the 

fighter was “just flipping us off, like, ‘all right, come and get it.’ ” Ingram 

fired at the man but couldn’t hit him. When Drake attempted to adjust fires 

on to the area, he received no response. Irritated, Drake asked, “Hey what 

happened to those rounds?” To their great consternation, McEvoy and 

Drake realized that the Squadron TOC was shifting its fires to other targets 

in the area. “I remember there being a lot of contention between me and 

the TOC on when and where to fire,” McEvoy said. “From my viewpoint, 

I was shooting at the biggest threat to myself and my guys. Every once in 

a while, I’d jump on fires [network] to voice my concern over how targets 

were being prioritized.”51

The TOC was indeed directing fire on other targets. Crawford would 

later write that, “The focus in the TOC was on moving elements coming 
150

to and from the fight. We utilized the ISR platforms to then call for fire 

with Apaches and Kiowas serving as forward observers. We also used the 

UAVs as observers for several fire missions.” After the fight, McEvoy 

fully understood what the TOC was trying to do. “I later found out they 

were shooting at reinforcements, squirters, and other targets they could 

see with ISR. They also had a better view of the whole battlefield and the 

town of Tiranan,” McEvoy wrote afterward. In the end, McEvoy came 

to understand the process but during this engagement he grew especially 

irritated over his inability to direct fire at what he considered the biggest 

threats to his platoon.52

Through the use of numerous ISR assets, the squadron TOC killed 

and wounded many enemy fighters that McEvoy and his Platoon could not 

see. As Taliban reinforcements rushed forward to protect their command 

post, their movements and signals allowed the TOC to capture prodigious 

amounts of intelligence. In fact, the longer 1st Platoon remained in contact, 

the more intelligence Crawford captured through his ISR sources. “What 

they wanted us to do,” McEvoy said, “ was go out there and just hold 

the enemy, engage the enemy...long enough so that they could develop 

the situation, and then they could call higher assets onto it while we’re...

fighting [them]. We held [them] for three hours there and they developed 

a lot of information about Tiranan.”53

First Platoon was exhausted after three to five hours of intense combat. 

Ammunition and water were also running dangerously low. As he gazed 

at his tired and mud spattered Soldiers scattered around the hut, McEvoy 

decided to head back to FOB Wilson. “After a three-hour firefight, your 

adrenaline’s just completely flat lined, you’re out of water, out of energy,” 

he said. “The dudes were just burnt,” McKinnis recalled. Pulling out his 

map, McEvoy promptly picked out a route back to FOB Wilson as the men 

gathered their gear and prepared to move. Although the unit pulled away 

from the hut as if they were breaking contact, fire from the enemy had long 

since ceased, testimony perhaps to the devastating effects of the artillery 

and Kiowas.54

The platoon and the ANA moved north in a bounding overwatch 

formation. As they slogged back toward FOB Wilson, the NCOs maintained 

discipline, keeping everyone sharp. “They did a really good job,” McEvoy 

said. Undoubtedly, many of the Soldiers thought about Chandler and 

speculated about his condition. After crossing north of Highway 1, the 

platoon turned east. Hattelsohl recalled that the north side of the highway 

was “known to be a lot safer.”55
151

The Soldiers of 1st Platoon and their ANA complement arrived back at 

FOB Wilson without incident. As they walked through the gate they were 

greeted by the squadron command sergeant major and their first sergeant, 

who informed 1st Platoon that Chandler would be fine. As an added bonus, 

the 1st Platoon soon learned that intelligence sources had picked up enemy 

communications which indicated the “Taliban were surprised that the new 

unit showed teeth.” It was the first of many disrupt-and-destroy missions 

the 1st Platoon would perform during its yearlong tour and it did, in fact, 

set the tenor for future operations.56

Aftermath

The combat at Tiranan proved the largest and longest fight of 1st 

Platoon’s entire tour. The precise number of enemy casualties proved 

impossible to calculate. However, intelligence would later indicate that 

at least three Taliban fighters were killed and approximately five were 

wounded. Exact numbers are hard to determine. Even though it was their 

first encounter with the enemy, McEvoy’s Soldiers performed courageously 

and skillfully. The platoon leader would later assert that although this was 

his first firefight, all of his NCOs were veterans of numerous combat tours. 

From the first enemy shots, McEvoy was determined to allow his NCOs 

to develop the fight. “Every squad leader did what they had to do for...

five minutes, whatever it took to get the advantage, [and] report up to me,” 

he stated. McEvoy was convinced that a Type A leader trained to make 

every decision “does not translate to a good infantry platoon, or a good 

maneuver platoon of any kind. I was a platoon leader for over a year and 

a half before I even went to Afghanistan,” he pointed out. “I had worked 

with these guys, these guys respected me but you have to let them do their 

job. You need to know what they’re doing, you need to know what they’re 

supposed to do but don’t do their job for them as it’s [going to] end up 

having poor results or disastrous results for the platoon and Soldiers.”57

The fight at Tiranan also reinforced several leadership principles for 

McEvoy’s NCOs. “Just go slow, deliberate, do everything deliberately and 

slowly,” McKinnis pointed out. Faggiano believed it was all about the 

basics and training. “It’s all about basic skills...basic Soldier discipline 

and basic soldiering skills.” Hattesohl would later state, “Never take the 

same route twice...Never take an easy route...If you see a trail, if you 

have to cross it, clear it, cross it, don’t walk on it. It’s too easy.”58

The tactical gains accomplished by McEvoy’s patrol were truly 

impressive. “The major result of this action was our ability to show the 

Taliban we would stand and fight rather than withdraw back to the COPs 

at the first sound of gunfire,” wrote the Squadron S2, Matthew Crawford. 
152

“McEvoy and his Platoon conducted a sustained five-hour firefight and 

never showed any sign of tactical impatience or concern. This shook 

the courage and morale of the local Taliban fighters who were used to 

dominating the battlefield by pushing patrols back to the safety of the 

COPs...The key result of this five-hour firefight was that we kicked 

the Taliban’s ass in their own backyard.” Without a doubt, the fight at 

Tiranan established a successful formula for 1-75 CAV and helped lay 

the groundwork for larger operations. The action also solidified the 

bond between the Soldiers of 1st Platoon and demonstrated their skilled, 

unwavering dedication in eradicating the Taliban in the Zhari District.59 

For their actions, Mckinnis, Faggiano, Fraker, Hattesohl, Drake, and 

Chandler were awarded The Army Commendation Medal for Valor. For 

the duration of their tour in the Zhari District, 1st Platoon would continue 

conducting disrupt-and-destroy missions against the insurgents and their 

infrastructure. Many of 1st Platoon’s “special missions” remain classified. 

The HHT commander however, would later suggest that McEvoy’s 

platoon “conducted more missions than the rest of the squadron combined 

and more missions than any other element in RC South.” Without doubt, 

1st Platoon contributed significantly to eradicating the Taliban in the Zhari 

District.60
153

Notes

1. Carl Forsberg, “Counterinsurgency in Kandahar: Evaluating the 2010 

Hamkari Campaign” Institute for the Study of War, December 2010, Afghanistan 

Report, 6, 23; Captain Matthew A. Crawford, e-mail to Matt M. Matthews, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 30 June 2011; Captain Riley E. McEvoy, 

e-mail to Matt M. Matthews, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 

July 2011.

2. Forsberg, 7, 12, 14.

3. Nick Schifrin and Matt McGarry, “Battle for Kandahar, Heart of 

Afghanistan’s Taliban Country,” ABC news, 25 May 2010, 1, http://abcnews.

go.com/International/Afghanistan/battle-kandahar-heart-taliban-country/

story?id=10729732 (accessed 6 April 2011); Emma Graham-Harrison, 

“Why the Military Plays Down Vital Afghan Battle,” Reuters, 31 October 

2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/10/31/us-afghanistan-kandaharidUSTRE69U0EI20101031 (accessed 11 April 2011).

4. McEvoy, e-mail, 14 July 2011.

5. McEvoy, e-mail, 14 July 2011; Crawford, e-mail, 30 June 2011.

6. Captain Riley E. McEvoy, interview by Matt M. Matthews, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 June 2011, 30-31; McEvoy, e-mail, 

5 August 2011.

7. Captain Matthew Crawford, interview by Matt M. Matthews, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 April 2011, 10-11.

8. Crawford, interview, 15, 17.

9. Crawford, interview 17.

10. Sergeant Jesse Hattesohl, interview by Matt M. Matthews, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 June 2011, 2.

11. Sergeant First Class Derek Leach, e-mail to Matt M. Matthews, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 July 2001; Leach, e-mail, 5 July 

20011; Hattesohl, interview, 3; Leach, e-mail, 6 July 2011.

12. McEvoy, e-mail, 11 July 2011; Leach, e-mail, 11 July 2011.

13. Leach, e-mail, 11 July 2011.

14. Leach, e-mail, 5 July 2011; McEvoy, e-mail, 11 July 20011.

15. Hattesohl, interview, 3-4; Leach, e-mail, 5 July 2011.

16. Hattesohl, interview, 4.

17. Hattesohl, interview, 4; Staff Sergeant Victor Faggiano, interview by 

Matt M. Matthews, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 June 

2011, 11-12. McEvoy, e-mail, 12 July 2011.

18. Faggiano, interview, 22 June 2011, 10, 13-14; McEvoy, e-mail, 12 July 

2011; Staff Sergeant Timothy McKinnis, email to Matt M. Matthews, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 12 July 2011.
154

19. McKinnis, e-mail, 12 July 2011; McEvoy, e-mail, 12 July 2011.

20. McKinnis, e-mail, 12 July 2011; McEvoy, e-mail, 12 July 2011; Hattesohl, 

interview, 23 June 2011, 5, Faggiano, interview, 14.

21. Hattesohl, interview, 6; Sergeant Zachary Fraker, interview by Matt M. 

Matthews, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 June 2011 4; 

Specialist Corey Doty, interview by Matt M. Matthews, Combat Studies Institute, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 June 2011, 3; Specialist Robert Kruse, interview by 

Matt M. Matthews, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 June 

2011, 3; Specialist Andrew Ingram, interview by Matt M. Matthews, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 22 June 2011, 4-5; McKinnis, e-mail to 

Matt M. Matthews, 12 July 2011.

22. Narrative Page, Narrative To Accompany The Award Of The Army 

Commendation Medal For Valor To Sergeant Zachary Fraker, no date; Narrative 

Page, Narrative To Accompany The Award Of The Army Commendation Medal 

For Valor To Sergeant Jesse Hattesohl, no date.

23. Faggiano, interview, 15.

24. McEvoy, e-mail, 13 July 2011; Faggiano, interview, 15-16.

25. Hattesohl, interview, 6; Faggiano, interview, 16. 

26. Sergeant Joseph Lee, interview by Matt M. Matthews, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 22 June 2011, 15; Chandler, interview, 4.

27. Narrative To Accompany The Award Of The Army Commendation 

Medal For Valor To Sergeant Zachary Fraker, no date; Narrative To Accompany 

The Award Of The Army Commendation Medal For Valor To Sergeant Jesse 

Hattesohl, no date.

28. McEvoy, interview, 17; Specialist Mark Drake, interview by Matt M. 

Matthews, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 22 June 2011, 5.

29. Narrative to Accompany the Award Of The Army Commendation Medal 

For Valor To Sergeant Victor Faggiano; Faggiano, interview, 16-17, 20.

30. Faggiano, interview, 20.

31. Faggiano, interview, 17; Crawford, e-mail, 14 July 2011.

32. Faggiano, interview, 17-18; Chandler, interview, 5-6.

33. Faggiano, interview, 18-19.

34. Kruse, interview, 3; McEvoy, e-mail, 13 July 2011.

35. Faggiano, interview, 20-21; McEvoy, interview, 19.

36. McEvoy, interview, 19.

37. Lee, interview, 18-19; Chandler, interview, 7-8.

38. McEvoy, interview, 21; Hattesohl, interview, 8-9. 

39. Hattesohl, interview, 10-11; McKinnis, interview, 2.

40. Hattesohl, interview, 11-12; Fraker, interview, 11; McKinnis, interview, 

2.
155

41. McKinnis, interview, 2-3; Narrative To Accompany The Award Of The 

Army Commendation Medal For Valor To Staff Sergeant Timothy McKinnis, no 

date.

42. McKinnis, interview, 3-4.

43. Hattesohl, interview, 14-15.

44. Faggiano, interview, 22-23.

45. Faggiano, interview, 23.

46. Faggiano, interview, 23; Hattesohl, interview, 15; McEvoy, e-mail, 11 

July 20011 and 12 July 2011; Crawford, e-mail, 28 July 2011; Ingram, interview, 

6.

47. Crawford, e-mail, 19 July 2011; Hattesohl, interview, 24.

48. Drake, interview, 5; Ingram, interview, 6; Narrative Page, Narrative to 

Accompany the Award Of The Army Commendation Medal For Valor To Private 

First Class Mark Drake, no date; McKinnis, interview, 5.

49. McEvoy, interview, 22; Doty, interview, 5.

50. Ingram, interview, 7; McEvoy, interview, 23.

51. Ingram, interview, 8; Drake, interview, 6; McEvoy, e-mail, 14 July 2011.

52. Crawford, e-mail, 14 July 2011; McEvoy, e-mail, 14 July 2011.

53. McEvoy, interview, 23-24; Crawford, e-mail, 14 July 2011.

54. McEvoy, interview, 25-26; McKinnis, interview, 5.

55. McEvoy, interview, 26; Hattesohl, interview, 19.

56. McEvoy, interview,26; Hattesohl, interview, 19. 

57. McEvoy, interview, 32.

58. McKinnis, 6; Faggiano, interview, 27; Hattesohl, interview, 21.

59. Crawford, e-mail, 31 August 2011.

60. McEvoy, e-mail, 2 August 2011; Crawford, e-mail, 30 June 2011.

157

Trapping the Taliban at OP Dusty

A Scout Platoon In Zhari District

by

Kevin M. Hymel

The Black Hawk helicopter kicked up huge clouds of dust as it slowed 

to approach Observation Post (OP) Dusty. The men below, members of a 

scout platoon that had fought all day in an isolated mud-walled compound 

surrounded by insurgents, desperately needed ammunition. Soldiers on the 

compound’s roof provided suppressing fire but the enemy still managed to 

target the hovering chopper, forcing its crew to grab rifles and return fire. 

The Soldiers had laid out markers for two drop spots. The Black Hawk just 

had to move a few feet over the western wall to drop the supplies. Instead, 

to the horror of the ground troops, the crew tossed the ammo packages 

outside the compound’s walls. The scouts cut loose with a long string of 

curses, knowing they would have to leave the safety of the OP to replenish 

their supplies.1

The men in OP Dusty were there on a special mission to occupy an 

isolated compound before sunrise and fight the enemy until relieved by 

friendly forces. They were the linchpin to Operation NASHVILLE I, an 

attack by the 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry Regiment (2-502 IN), where they 

acted as the blocking force for the battalion. 

Background

In 2010, Southern Afghanistan’s Zhari District, 33 kilometers west of 

Kandahar City, was an insurgent hotbed filled with munitions caches and 

bomb making factories, all defended by a complex system of reinforcing 

defensive positions and belts of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). 

Taliban insurgents repeatedly attacked International Security Assistance 

Forces (ISAF) vehicles traveling Highway 1, the main east-west route 

between Gereshk and Kandahar City. The Americans understood Zhari’s 

importance. “The Taliban in Pakistan have said that if they lose Zhari 

they’ll be forced out of Kandahar,” Lieutenant Colonel Peter Benchoff, 

the 2-502 IN battalion commander told his men. “So goes Zhari, so goes 

Kandahar City.”2

American surge forces began arriving in southern Afghanistan in the 

end of 2009. By September 2010, the 2d Brigade Combat Team (2 BCT), 

101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) assembled in Zhari north of Highway 
158

1. The brigade consisted of the 1st Battalion, 502d Infantry Regiment (1-

502 IN), the 2d Battalion, 502d Infantry Regiment (2-502 IN) and the 

1st Squadron, 75th Cavalry Regiment (1-75 CAV). The Soldiers of 2-502 

IN were surprised at what they found around Forward Operating Base 

(FOB) Howz-e Madad north of Highway 1. “The enemy was completely 

unfazed by our presence,” said Lieutenant Colonel Benchoff. “They were 

primarily targeting private security convoys that moved up and down the 

highway.” The enemy controlling the area had been threatening the locals 

with bodily harm, “chopping off heads and ears” Benchoff said. Captain 

William Faucher, the 2-502d’s scout platoon leader put it more concisely, 

“It literally was the wild west. No civilians resided in the buildings south 

of Highway 1. Every house was a potential enemy bunker.”3

Unlike the mountainous regions of eastern Afghanistan, Zhari’s 

topography was flat. Grape, marijuana, and poppy fields covered the 

terrain with wadis (dry river beds) cutting through the landscape. The 

Taliban used the terrain to build defensive positions and belts of IEDs. 

Americans referred to the district’s dense vegetation as “the Green Zone.”4

The Plan

Operation NASHVILLE I was part of Operation DRAGON STRIKE, 

the brigade’s effort to drive the enemy away from Highway 1. In a series of 

consecutive, mutually supporting attacks, the goal of DRAGON STRIKE 

was to force the enemy as far south as the Arghandab River which is 

13 kilometers south of Highway 1. Benchoff designed NASHVILLE I, 

scheduled for 26 September 2010, as a simultaneous attack from multiple 

directions against Taliban occupied areas south of Highway 1. He planned 

to fly one of his companies over the enemy’s IED belts and other defenses 

while two other companies assaulted the enemy’s flanks.5

Bravo Company would air-assault one kilometer directly south from 

FOB Howz-e Madad and attack the town of Baluchan, the main objective. 

Then two platoons of Alpha Company would attack dismounted from 

the town of Paultercon, to Bravo Company’s west while Delta Company 

attacked with armored vehicles and heavy equipment from Spin Pir to 

Bravo’s east. The three companies would conduct their operations with 

partner Afghan National Army (ANA) companies. Delta Company would 

also cut a road as it advanced with the help of a British Engineer company. 

The six companies would converge around Baluchan where Alpha and 

Bravo, with their Afghan allies, would “Back Clear”—turning north 

and systematically clearing the area of the Taliban, IED, and weapons 

manufacturing—while Delta and its ANA counterpart company continued 
159

to drive south. “We wanted to seize the ground so we could hold it and see 

what we could trap,” explained Benchoff.

Figure 1. Operation NASHVILLE I, 26 September 2010.

Bravo Company would be isolated in Baluchan while the other 

companies fought from the east and west toward it. To assist Bravo, 

Benchoff decided to air-assault a platoon 1,500 meters east/southeast of 

Baluchan to interdict Taliban reinforcements that might move toward 

Bravo Company. In addition, the platoon would prevent the enemy from 

flanking Delta Company. As Delta pushed south, Benchoff hoped the 

platoon would trap the enemy between itself and Delta, a classic hammeranvil maneuver or what Benchoff called “a mini kill sack.”6

Benchoff picked a compound for his platoon and named it OP Dusty 

after Route DUSTY, the north-south road next to it. If the enemy decided 

to attack or retreat from Bravo Company’s position, Route DUSTY was 

the obvious path and OP Dusty was the ideal blocking position. Benchoff 

chose to insert his scout platoon near the OP and occupy the compound 

before sunrise, hoping to trick the Taliban into thinking the route was 

open. The scouts would land at helicopter landing zone (HLZ) BLUE JAY 

and maneuver to the OP. Positioned on the eastern edge of the maneuver 

area more than 500 meters south of Highway 1, the scout platoon would 

be isolated, much like Bravo Company. “It’s kind of like putting in your 

paratroopers in Normandy,” Benchoff said. “You secure the outer perimeter 

and then you can take your time getting off the beach.”7 

Scout platoons normally conduct reconnaissance and security missions 

for infantry battalions but Benchoff wanted his scouts to do more. He 

had trained them in ambushes, sniper work, and operating the M240B 

medium machine gun. Benchoff had also used his scouts before in similar 

roles. “Don’t limit yourself by what doctrine says,” explained Benchoff 
160

about his approach to tactical problems. For NASHVILLE I, he would 

have continuous daylight air coverage for the operation so he attached 

the battalion’s Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC), Air Force Senior 

Airman Nathan Archambault, and the battalion Joint Forward Observer 

(JFO), Staff Sergeant Jason Thompson8

 to the platoon. 

The scout platoon consisted of three reconnaissance teams of five 

or six Soldiers and a sniper section of nine men divided into teams of 

three including a sniper, a spotter, and a security man. A seven-man 

reconnaissance platoon of ANA Soldiers, entering combat for the first 

time, would accompany the unit. The platoon leader, Captain William 

Faucher, had served with the battalion for three years and had deployed to 

Iraq in 2007. His platoon sergeant, Sergeant First Class Justin Bosse, had 

been on four combat tours including Afghanistan in 2002. Staff Sergeant 

James Spear led the 1st Recon Squad and Sergeant Eric Ammerman, a 

former Marine, led the 2d Recon Squad. The two men complemented 

each other. “I’m just kind of carefree,” Ammerman said, “Spear is very 

meticulous about every detail but when you put the two of us together, 

we work extremely well.” Ammerman had served three tours in Iraq, 

while Spear had served two, both with the 2-502 IN. Staff Sergeant Chris 

Spoerle, the 3d Recon Squad leader, also had two tours in Iraq. Faucher 

described him as a “quiet guy, somewhat reserved but all action when the 

time came.” Staff Sergeant Sterling Stauch, whom Faucher described as 

a blond-haired, blue-eyed “surfer boy,” led the sniper squad. He had also 

served two tours of Iraq.9

Each scout packed 32 20-ounce bottles of water, eight MREs (Meals 

Ready to Eat), and 20 empty sandbags. Most were armed with M4 rifles 

with attached M203 grenade launchers. Some had M14 Enhanced Battle 

Rifles and three men were equipped with M249 Squad Automatic Weapon 

(SAW) machine guns. Squad leaders used M320 grenade launchers while 

the snipers carried either the M107 Barrett or M24 sniper rifle. To provide 

extra firepower, Faucher had two of the sniper teams each carry an M240B 

medium machine gun with tripod and ammunition. He also added four 

AT4 anti-armor weapons to the platoon’s arsenal. Each man also had 

between 240 and 270 rounds of rifle ammunition. “We had a lot of extra 

ammunition;” said Faucher, “because I had a feeling it was going to be a 

fight.”10

Air Assaulting to OP Dusty

Three hours before sunrise on 26 September, a US Army CH-47 

Chinook helicopter touched down in HLZ BLUE JAY. The rear ramp 
161

lowered and the scouts hustled out, each man slinging a 100-pound 

rucksack on his back. The first men out formed a defensive perimeter. 

Staff Sergeant Thompson, the JFO, twisted his ankle as he stepped off the 

ramp. “Man, I’m sorry,” he told Sergeant Eric Ammerman, “I’m sorry, I’m 

sorry.” He knew the ankle was bad but he also knew he was the platoon’s 

only trained JFO. His skills would be needed for the coming operation. He 

decided to, “Suck it up and do this.”11 

Once the helicopter took off, Sergeant Damon Sawyer took point. 

Knowing that the most direct or easiest path would be mined, Sawyer led 

the scouts over the worst terrain he could find: across an eight foot canal, 

through thick grape fields, and over various mud walls. Men fell down, 

muddied their weapons, but got up and struggled on. The entire journey 

took about three and a half hours.12

Thompson carried his own rucksack despite his painful ankle. He 

twisted it four more times during the journey. “You just keep moving,” 

Thompson recalled, “you keep your body going forward.” He dropped his 

rucksack only once during the difficult climb out of the canal. “It’s almost 

like spinning your wheels and getting your truck stuck.” Captain Faucher 

knew that if Thompson could not walk, four scouts, already carrying 100 

pound rucksacks, would have to carry him on a liter while another Soldier 

would have to lug two rucksacks, “which would have been a level of pain 

that I could hardly imagine,” said Faucher.13

The chosen compound stood in the middle of grape fields overlooking 

Route DUSTY, the expected enemy avenue of movement. The scouts’ new 

OP was approximately 25 square meters, surrounded by a four meter high 

mud brick wall with an entrance in the southeast corner. A line of four twostory buildings made up the northern wall, tall enough to give gunners a 

360 degree view of the surrounding terrain. The roofs were arched, giving 

the look of numerous bumps and making for excellent fighting positions. 

The center of the compound contained a large courtyard with a storage hut 

on the southern wall. Unfortunately, a two story grape hut stood just a few 

meters north of the compound blocking the platoon’s fields of fire in that 

direction. Around the OP trees, grape huts, compounds, and mud walls 

dotted the terrain.14

The platoon arrived at the compound before sunrise. Sergeant First 

Class Bosse led three men through the entrance and, using flashlights, 

made sure all the rooms were unoccupied. They then tossed blocks of 

C-4 demolition charges into every room to neutralize any IEDs. Twelve 

explosions followed. Two of the explosions caved in two roofs along the 
162

north wall. Charges were also detonated in the grape hut, caving in the 

eastern part of its roof. Once the dust settled, the team made a secondary 

sweep and then the entire platoon entered into the compound.15

Once in, the scouts dropped their rucksacks. The 1st Recon Squad 

used the collapsed buildings to climb to the roof on the northern wall and 

prepare defenses. Below, most of the scouts began filling sandbags while 

others dragged a tractor plow from the compound to block the entrance. 

The platoon medic, Sergeant Jason McMillan, treated Thompson’s ankle.16

The Attacks Begin

About half an hour later, as the sun cracked the horizon, a single shot 

rang out. The scouts on the roof tried to locate the shooter while the men 

in the compound worked to fortify their positions. A few minutes later, a 

second round cracked overhead. About 15 minutes after that, the enemy 

opened fire from the south with AK-47 assault rifles. Then every compound 

and hut surrounding OP Dusty seemed to come alive with fire. The scouts 

had been taught that in combat there were two fights, a 15-second fight and 

the actual fight. If they could dominate the first 15 seconds, they would 

set the tone for the rest of the engagement. The scouts knew they had 

to dominate the enemy, beat them back, and prevent them from moving 

against Bravo Company.17

Sergeant Ammerman and Staff Sergeant Spear were on the rooftop 

scanning for targets when the enemy fire intensified. Ammerman called for 

someone to throw the SAW up to him. Once he got it, he stood and sprayed 

the area suppressing the enemy fire. Specialist Jason Savant climbed onto 

the roof with his M240B medium machine gun and pulled the trigger. 

Two rounds fired before the weapon jammed. During the infiltration, it had 

become fouled with dirt and brush. Spear and Savant quickly opened the 

weapon, lubricated it with oil, and soon had it firing.18

The scouts fired their M203s and M320 grenade launchers at insurgent 

locations. As the firing intensified, Captain Faucher ordered more men to 

the roof. Everyone wanted to be part of the firefight but Staff Sergeant 

Stauch knew there was plenty of work elsewhere. He ordered Specialist 

McMillan to gather anyone he could to fill sand bags. The completed bags 

were then passed to the men sprawled on the roof. For the rest of the day 

Soldiers fought while simultaneously building up their positions. Spear 

made sure everyone was staying down. “I did not want anyone to get their 

head [shot],” he later said. “I was a stickler.”19

When the enemy opened fire from a grape hut to the east, Specialist 

Savant ran across the roof and began firing with his M240B. “You could 
163

actually see [the insurgents] moving in the grape hut,” he recalled but 

his weapon could not penetrate the hut’s thick walls. An ANA Soldier 

nicknamed “The Russian”, also opened fire. “He started spraying to the 

east right off the bat,” said Staff Sergeant Stauch. “[He] didn’t care. [He 

didn’t have] doubt or fear or anything.”20

Figure 2. Scout Platoon Defends OP Dusty.

Thompson radioed the mortar men back at FOB Howz-e Madad and 

gave them target coordinates but enemy fire pinned down both him and 

Faucher before they could detect where the rounds had landed. Neither he 

nor Thompson could “physically move onto a knee and poke our heads 

over to observe fires,” said Faucher. Instead, they relied on Ammerman and 

Savant who were covering each other. While Savant laid down fire with 

his M240B, Ammerman stood up, fired his SAW, and watched the mortar 

rounds explode. Ammerman then shouted their location to Thompson 

who adjusted for the next round. As the rounds came in, Thompson yelled 
164

“Splash!” warning Ammerman and Savant to duck. After each explosion, 

Ammerman and Savant repeated the process. 

Thompson called for mortar rounds to impact within 200 meters of 

his location, well within the defined Danger Close distance for 120mm 

mortars. One of the rounds fell a little too close at 70 meters. “Hey!” 

Thompson shouted into his radio, “the last round was pretty short, just 

check yourselves again.” No other rounds came in short. The first six 

rounds used delayed fuses, penetrating the ground before exploding. The 

next rounds used proximity fuses for air bursts. Finally, the 20th round 

impacted right on the enemy. The explosion propelled an arm and a torso 

into the air. “It split him in half,” said Ammerman. The men cheered. After 

15 minutes, the initial attack died down.21

Once the engagement concluded, Faucher organized the platoon’s 

squads into shifts with the 2d Squad on the roof from 0700 until 1100 

followed by the 1st Squad from 1100 until 1500 and the 3d Squad from 

1500 until 1900. The rotation cycle allowed one squad to pull security on 

the roof for four hours, another to fill sandbags or pass ammunition to the 

Soldiers on the roof, while the third rested. Sandbag duty preceded roof 

security, ensuring the men would be fully awake by the time they faced 

the enemy.22

The enemy’s attack had surprised the platoon’s veterans. Normally, 

the insurgents waited to determine what the Americans were doing before 

attacking. This time they started shooting once they saw helmets on the 

compound’s roof. Soon the enemy attacked again. The attacks blurred 

together. There would be eight that day but the scouts noticed certain 

patterns. The enemy began firing from the south drawing the platoon’s 

fire, then fired from the east, west, and eventually north, using suppressing 

fire while closing on the OP. Major attacks lasted about 30 minutes and 

increased in intensity and when the enemy disengaged, they waited 

approximately 40 minutes before attacking again. The scouts used these 

lulls to prepare for the next attack.23

Heavy vegetation, trees, and canals provided ample cover and 

concealment for the insurgents. Compounds, grape huts, and walls also 

allowed them to pop up, fire a few rounds, and disappear. The scouts could 

only spot the enemy briefly as they ran along the tree lines making the 

snipers’ job difficult. “It was impossible to get a lock on with a sniper 

rifle and take a clean shot with all that vegetation,” recalled Staff Sergeant 

Stauch. The scouts also had trouble spotting tracer fire and instead relied 

on the smoke from the enemy weapon’s discharge. They called the smoke 

“tossed salad” and shouted it out to pinpoint a shooter’s location.24
165

The Soldiers on the roof continuously exchanged fire with the enemy. 

“We had to expend a lot of ammo,” Specialist Marvin Speckhaus said. 

“We didn’t see where they were coming from.” Some of the scouts worked 

in teams. On the east wall, Sergeant Ryan Spinelli and Specialist Erik 

Howes alternated firing M203 rounds while the other reloaded. Later at 

the compound entrance, Howes directed some ANA Soldiers to return 

fire. Sergeant Mike Brilla and Specialist Joseph Wilhelm took turns firing 

an M107 Barrett sniper rifle while the other spotted. Brilla used it to 

shoot holes in a wall concealing an insurgent gunman. The .50-caliber 

bullets penetrated the wall but Brilla had no idea if he scored any hits. 

He later spotted an insurgent holding a radio and alerted Wilhelm, but 

before Wilhelm could fire, the man disappeared. Even if the insurgent had 

presented a target, Wilhelm could not have shot him. “If he only has a 

radio, you can’t pop him,” said Brilla. The rules of engagement prevented 

the scouts from firing on anyone without a weapon. “They’ll shoot at you,” 

said Brilla, then “they drop their weapons and they just walk away.”25 

On the rooftop, scouts fired at the insurgents until they disengaged, 

only to pop up firing in another location. “It was really hard to pin them 

down which you almost couldn’t do,” said Specialist Savant. The air filled 

with enemy fire. Specialist Alex Hull was scanning his sector with his 

M14 when enemy rounds started whizzing by his head but he held steady, 

searching for the enemy until Staff Sergeant Stauch pulled him down.26

The Taliban also fired rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) at the OP 

throughout the day. They initiated one of their attacks by firing an RPG 

from the southeast which zipped just over Staff Sergeant Thompson’s 

head. “If I could have frozen time,” said Thompson, “I could have just 

reached up and probably touched it.” When Sergeant Brilla saw an RPG 

flying at him and Wilhelm, he told Wilhelm to duck. Wilhelm asked why 

as the RPG whooshed over his head. “That’s why,” Brilla explained. The 

round ricocheted off the corner of the grape hut but failed to explode. 

Another insurgent fired an RPG from the northeast, which skipped off the 

wall beneath a scout, leaving a rooster tail of smoke. “They must have 

been close enough that it didn’t arm,” said Sergeant Sawyer, “or maybe it 

was just a bad rocket.”27

Captain Faucher spent most of the day on the roof directing machinegun and sniper fire along with mortar, close air support from fixed-wing 

aircraft, and close combat attack (CCA) missions from Army helicopters. 

As the men shot smoke grenades at targets, he called in gun runs by OH58 Kiowa and AH-64 Apache helicopters, Air Force A-10 Thunderbolt 

IIs, and Navy F/A-18 Hornets. Faucher worked well with Senior Airman 
166

Archambault, Sergeant Thompson, and radio telephone operator (RTO) 

Specialist Aaron Jonas who helped Thompson call in the aircraft. 

“Thompson, I want fire over there,” Faucher would call out, or “Jonas, tell 

the Apache I want a Hellfire missile on that building.” When Faucher saw 

the enemy fire an RPG from a tree line, he ordered Archambault to call 

in the A-10s to strafe the area. The pilots spotted four insurgents moving 

west and strafed them twice with their 30-millimeter cannons. The enlisted 

men’s skills allowed Faucher to focus on the fight and decide where to 

place fires.28

Thompson and Archambault spent the day close to Faucher. Neither 

had ever served in combat nor had they worked together but they 

coordinated all of the captain’s fire. “Luckily, both of us were confident 

enough in our abilities and we were confident in each other’s abilities,” 

Thompson said. “I’m dropping mortar rounds [and] he’s talking aircraft 

on the targets. I’m stopping one mission, he’s coming in doing strafes 

or dropping bombs with A-10s, then I’m bringing the CCA.” Jonas also 

helped out by updating pilots on the ground situation so they were ready 

when Archambault contacted them. Thompson spent the whole day in 

pain. His ankle made it difficult to move around the compound and roof. 

“No matter what I took or what I did,” said Thompson, “it just hurt.” 29

When Sergeant First Class Bosse was not in the compound directing 

the improvement of defensive positions, he was on the roof coordinating 

fire, making ammunition counts, and helping anyone who needed it. He 

didn’t hesitate to stand up on the roof to point out targets. At one point 

when he felt the air assets weren’t responding quickly enough to requests 

he shouted into the radio, “Can I get some goddamn air down here? We’re 

getting shot at!” Thompson standing nearby thought, “All right. That’s the 

way to request it!”30

By late afternoon the enemy’s tenacity began to impress the scouts. “This 

is ridiculous,” thought Thompson. Insurgents kept on attacking despite the 

scouts’ volume of fire and Afghanistan’s 110 degree temperatures. Scouts 

were firing so rapidly that their weapons burned their hands through their 

gloves. At one point the enemy attacked from every direction and closed 

within 125 meters. “These people are getting close,” Spear told Faucher. 

“You know this is getting bad.” The men were confident in their fighting 

ability and their air assets but they were concerned about their dwindling 

ammunition supply as the enemy crept closer. “We were either going to 

go down fighting,” recalled Sergeant Spinelli, “or we were going to send 

them off.”31
167

Resupply

The platoon was dangerously low on 40-millimeter smoke grenades, 

vital to marking enemy targets and 40-millimeter high-explosive rounds. 

The M240B ammunition was down to 200 rounds. Bosse had radioed 

battalion at about 1000 for an aerial resupply but the battalion RTO relayed 

that with all the platoon’s air support, resupply was unnecessary. Bosse 

continued to make requests and kept getting the same answer from the 

battalion RTO. By early afternoon, he was fed up and demanded to talk to 

the battalion leadership directly. He soon reached the battalion commander 

and told him, “We need this aerial resupply.”32

Finally, around 1600, a Black Hawk helicopter flew toward OP Dusty. 

Ammunition was packed into crates and body bags (speedball packages) 

for easy handling. The helicopter slowed as it approached drawing 

enemy fire as the scouts on the roof attempted to suppress the insurgents’ 

positions. Faucher had no radio contact with the helicopter as it hovered 

over the west section of the compound. “They were so close,” he recalled 

“If I jumped, I could have probably made it into the Black Hawk.” That’s 

when the Black Hawk crew threw the ammo packages outside the OP’s 

western wall and into a grape field.33

As the Black Hawk flew away, Bosse picked a retrieval team of six 

men and led them out of the compound while scouts on the roof laid down 

suppressing fire and launched smoke grenades to obscure their movement. 

The retrieval team exited the southeast entrance and worked its way along 

the northern wall until turning south to find the supplies. Some of the 

speedballs had split open, littering the grape field with ammunition. Bosse 

set up a perimeter while the rest of the team tossed ammunition over the 

wall. Men on the other side caught it, wiped off the mud and threw it up 

to the roof. The retrieval team also stuffed their pockets with magazines 

and rounds and carried what they could, either in crates or body bags, back 

into the compound. They man handled one torn body bag back to safety. 

“It took about three of us to drag the portion of it that was still together,” 

said Sergeant McMillan. After collecting as much as they could for about 

20 minutes, the men made it back safely into the compound.34

Sundown

Before sundown, teams of Soldiers left the compound again to set up 

Claymore mines in dead space and possible avenues of approach around 

the perimeter. The teams placed the mines roughly 100 meters from the 

compound walls. “Some were pretty close, but they needed to be,” said 

Sergeant Sawyer. “As long as you got good cover, you could stay 15 meters 
168

behind them.” Bosse and Spinelli were placing their Claymore when a 

shot rang past. They charged back into compound as a scout covered them 

with the SAW.35

As evening approached, Staff Sergeant Thompson began calling in 

smoke rounds in hopes of burning down some of the surrounding brush 

and keeping the enemy out of previously occupied areas. The effort proved 

fruitless. Nothing caught fire and the enemy reoccupied the area the next 

day. “They definitely did not want to give up that terrain,” said Thompson, 

who no longer limped when he walked.36

The enemy broke off its final attack around 1800 as the sun sank in 

the west. The roof and compound were strewn with empty shells from the 

constant fighting and sandbags were shredded from enemy fire. The men 

were covered in sweat and dust. The adrenaline rush that had sustained 

them through the last 12 hours of combat finally wore off and they found 

themselves exhausted. “I was like comatose,” said Staff Sergeant Spear.37

None of the scouts had experienced such intense fighting in previous 

combat deployments. Sergeant Brilla thought the day’s combat was more 

severe than any he had endured in Iraq. Two-tour veteran Staff Sergeant 

Stauch later said, “It was definitely the most contact I’ve ever taken.” 

Thompson thought the fighting was worse than Iraq’s Sunni Triangle, 

“Nothing that I have ever done will compare to [OP Dusty].” Specialist 

Eric Howes added, “I’ve never had so many bullets shot over my head in 

one day.” Amazingly, despite eight enemy attacks with heavy volumes of 

fire and RPG rounds, none of the scouts had even been wounded.38

Captain Faucher needed a break from the non-stop action. He took 

off his helmet, sat down and decompressed for a little while. After eating 

an MRE, he huddled with Bosse to evaluate the enemy’s patterns of 

attack. Then, while Faucher planned targets for the next day with Sergeant 

Thompson, Bosse took expenditure reports from the men. He wanted to 

minimize security and maximize the rest plan but after the intensity of the 

day’s fighting, he decided to keep about 12 men on the roof at all times.39

During the night, the men replaced torn-up sandbags, distributed 

ammunition and cleaned their weapons. Most managed about four hours 

of sleep. Faucher received combat update briefs from battalion while 

some of the men listened in. Thompson spent the night calling in random 

illumination rounds, letting the enemy know that the scout platoon was 

awake and alert. Ammerman made the rounds all night, making sure the 

men on guard duty stayed on guard.40
169

The Second Day of Battle

As the sun rose the next morning, the enemy opened fire again. “It’s 

like they were punching in a time clock at work,” said Sergeant McMillan. 

Instinctively, the Soldiers began looking for targets asking, “Where’s it 

coming from, where’s it coming from?” Fire came from a compound with 

a red door to the southwest. The scouts laid down suppressing fire with an 

M240B machine gun as M-203s and sniper rifles added to the fray. “We 

let them have it,” said Spear. The second fight for OP Dusty had begun.41

Hearing the commotion, Specialist Howes woke up, grabbed his rifle, 

and climbed up to the roof where he found Captain Faucher directing fire. 

By this time, the enemy was firing from various locations. “Hey, we’re 

taking small arms fire from over here,” shouted one of the scouts while 

pointing north. Rounds started flying over everyone’s head. Spear fired his 

M320 at the location while Howes fired a number of red smoke grenades 

to mark targets for the helicopters that had been circling since dawn.42

Enemy fire intensified just as it had the day before. At the OP’s 

entrance, Sergeant Brilla fired his M4 from behind the tractor plow until 

an RPG round flew in and bounced off the wall behind him, leaving a fourinch hole without exploding. “It really scared the hell out of me,” he said.43

After two hours of action, the enemy’s activity died down. The 

morning’s first firefight was over. During the lull, Sergeant Brilla and 

Specialist Howes left the compound to set up additional Claymores. They 

placed two mines along the western wall before hurrying back inside 

without incident.44 

The enemy attacked again 40 minutes later. Other attacks followed. 

Just like the previous day, the scouts lost track of the attacks as they 

waited on Delta Company’s approach from the northeast. At one point, 

the fighting became so intense that Faucher did something platoon leaders 

were normally not supposed to, he fired his weapon. “I was told that if I 

was shooting, I was wrong.” but when Sergeant Spear needed suppressing 

fire to shoot his M320, Faucher shouldered his M4 and fired. “I was kind 

of mad,” he admitted, knowing that if he was shooting, the situation was 

dire. During one of the lulls, Spear returned the favor. He noticed Faucher 

standing, scanning for targets. Spear pushed him down. “I just saved your 

life,” Spear told him. “No big deal.”45

The men improvised when needed. With no sandbags to spare, 

Specialist Howes laid on the roof as Specialist Wilhelm slid his M110 

sniper rifle over the small of Howes’ back. The two men formed a “T” 

and timed their breathing to keep the rifle steady while Wilhelm shot at 
170

the elusive enemy. Elsewhere, Specialist Savant saw insurgents closing to 

about 25 meters from the compound walls. He fired down at them with his 

M240B. “By that time you could actually see them just sprinting away,” 

Savant recalled. The enemy never pushed any closer to the OP.46

The compound with the red door was a constant nuisance. Sergeant 

Brilla thought a gunman there had specifically targeted him. “Whoever 

was in that compound had a pretty good bead on me,” he recalled. When 

Brilla could get his head up, he fired M203 rounds at the compound 

without much effect. Captain Faucher called in repeated air strikes on 

the structure but the enemy continued to fire. “I think I put four or five 

100-pound bombs in it,” explained Faucher. “It would just not fall down. 

It was driving me nuts.” He also had Archambault call in air strikes on a 

grape hut to the southeast. A-10s repeatedly strafed the building but, just 

like the compound with the red door, the enemy remained active.47

When insurgents started taking potshots at one of the Kiowa 

helicopters circling above, Staff Sergeant Stauch and Specialist Kenyon 

Jackson paid special attention to the tracers to determine their point of 

origin. After the fourth round, Stauch opened up with a SAW. He then fired 

a grenade followed by red smoke. The round landed short but bounced 

about 50 meters to the right spot. The Kiowa pilots spotted it and swooped 

down to engage two insurgents running through a tree line. Stauch was not 

sure if the enemy survived the gun run. “I know they were in really deep 

vegetation by the time the birds got eyes on.” At least the enemy no longer 

fired on the Kiowa. 48

At one point, the enemy fired an RPG that arced just above the 

Soldiers and impacted into the northern grape hut. Within seconds, Spear 

propped himself up, exposing himself, and prepared to fire an AT4 rocket 

launcher at the base of the smoke trail. Before pushing the trigger, he 

shouted “Backblast area clear!” Unfortunately, Captain Faucher did not 

hear Spear’s call as he climbed up to the roof with Jonas, Thompson, and 

Archambault. All four men were caught in the backblast and temporarily 

lost their hearing. The blast also threatened to cave in a roof below where 

members of 1st Squad were resting. The men sprinted out of the room. 

Spear’s shot silenced the shooter. No more RPGs were fired at OP Dusty.49

Responding to enemy fire from a tree line to the south, Senior Airman 

Archambault lined up a flight of US Navy F-18s armed with joint direct 

attack munitions (JDAMS). The first JDAM hit right on target but the 

second one fell within 125 meters of the compound. “It’s incoming,” 
171

shouted Archambault. “Get down!” Everyone dropped as the explosion 

rocked the compound. The blast almost threw Faucher off the roof. “It was 

like being hit with a brick in the chest,” he explained. Shrapnel sprayed the 

compound and a piece smacked Specialist Howes in his rear, but did not 

penetrate.50 The roof of the only remaining room caved in. The men resting 

there charged out, never to return. 

As the smoke cleared, the scouts looked at Archambault. Some 

thought that he deliberately dropped the bomb short. “Are we about to 

get overrun and I just don’t know it yet?” thought Staff Sergeant Stauch. 

“That was not me,” Archambault immediately defended. That’s all it took. 

The men recognized and trusted his abilities. Stauch called the pilot and, 

in his California accent, shouted, “Whoa! Whoa! Whoa! Like what are you 

doing?” His words brought a little humor to a tense situation. The Navy 

held up the next run to reconfirm their coordinates.51

By afternoon the scouts could hear and then see Delta Company 

approaching from the northeast. Delta Company employed M58 Mine 

Clearing Line Charges (MICLICs) to blast through IED fields and clear 

the enemy, sometimes firing the MICLICs over buildings to collapse them. 

“[The MICLICs] pretty much crush everything,” said Sergeant First Class 

Bosse. As Delta drew near, Spear, concerned about friendly fire, warned 

the men on the roof, “Only fire 40-millimeter rounds. Don’t exceed that.” 

After that warning, if anyone used a rifle to engage the enemy, the men 

around him would shout, “Hey! Do not engage with the M4!”52

The Soldiers of Delta Company pressed close enough to trap some 

insurgents in a tree lined ditch between them and the northern section of 

OP Dusty. Instead of pressing their attack on the scouts, the enemy turned 

and directed their guns north. One of Delta Company’s M-ATVs [MRAP] 

(Mine Resistant Ambush Protected All Terrain Vehicle) retaliated with 

blasts from a .50-caliber machine gun, sending rounds over scout heads 

and smacking into the compound walls. “Hey,” shouted Sergeant Brilla, 

“that’s a M-ATV out there. I can see them!” Some of the men thought the 

insurgents possessed a .50 cal. “What should we do?” someone shouted. 

Faucher yelled back, “Stay down dumb ass!” The scouts draped VF17 

identification panels over the compound walls while Faucher quickly 

contacted Delta’s commander, Captain Tim Price, and told him to 

immediately cease firing. The enemy in the ditch were finally suppressed 

by a combination of small arms fire and Apache helicopters firing Hellfire 

missiles and 30mm rounds.53
172

Figure 3. Senior Airman Nathan Archambault watches from the edge of the 

compound roof as a GBU-12, laser-guided bomb explodes on a grape hut 

outside of OP Dusty.

The compound with the red door had survived numerous attacks thus 

far but now Captain Price came on the radio net, asking Faucher, “Are 

you guys taking fire from that compound? It’s going down.” With that, an 

M1128 Mobile Gun System (MGS), a Stryker armored fighting vehicle 

with a 105mm cannon, sped up to the compound, braked to a dead stop, 

and started firing point blank. By the time it stopped, recalled Spear, “you 

could hear crickets.” Soon after the MGS silenced the compound, British 

Trojans (armored engineer vehicles) rolled into the area bulldozing a road 

as they came. Once the Trojans reached the OP, they began using their 

hydraulic excavator arms to tear down the northern grape hut. While the 

Trojans provided the scouts a better field of fire, their endeavors brought 

an unexpected problem, “They stirred up a bunch of bees,” said Sergeant 

Sawyer. “We asked them to stop.”54

The scouts had spent the previous 48 hours battling a tenacious enemy 

but it wasn’t until Delta Company showed up with its armored vehicles 

that the insurgents abandoned the battlefield. “We killed them with bombs 

and small arms,” said Sawyer, “but they were not intimidated by us. They 

got very shook once those tanks [sic] rolled in.” Sergeant First Class Bosse 

agreed with the importance of Delta’s presence, “Once [Delta Company] 

got down there, all the fun was over.” Around 1600 that afternoon, Photo courtesy Captain William Faucher, US Army
173

Delta finally linked up with the scout platoon. Captain Price entered the 

compound and shook hands with Faucher. The two men then discussed the 

situation and made tentative plans for their next action.55

With Delta Company securing the area, it was time for the scouts 

to leave OP Dusty but with so many aircraft involved in combat around 

the district, no helicopters were available to take the men back to base. 

So, after two solid days of fighting, the scouts walked home. At least the 

kilometer march to the north would be on the dusty road of Route DUSTY 

instead of the terrain they had passed over two nights ago. Before they 

left, Bosse wryly joked that for two days the scout platoon had owned 

about 95 percent of the air assets in all of Afghanistan. Thompson slung 

his rucksack on his back. His ankle felt good enough for the trek out. As 

he walked out of the OP, Senior Airman Archambault turned to him and 

said, “The scout Platoon was not as fun as I thought it was going to be.”56

Aftermath

The scout platoon had successfully prevented the enemy from attacking 

Bravo Company in strength and simultaneously lured the insurgents into a 

violent killing zone. Intelligence later reported that the two day fight had 

resulted in 15 to 20 insurgents dead. Enemy casualties might have been 

higher but a more definitive count was impossible because the Taliban, as 

usual, quickly removed their dead and wounded from the battlefield. No 

scouts had been wounded during the battle. They had served as the perfect 

blocking force for the battalion. “They were having the exact effect of 

what the design was,” said Lieutenant Colonel Benchoff, “which was to 

get these guys [the enemy] to roll off them and roll into Delta Company. 

Then they got chewed up by Delta Company, which was entirely what 

was planned.” Benchoff greatly appreciated what the scouts had done, 

stating, “That was probably the highest density of enemy attacks that we 

had [during the deployment].” 57

NASHVILLE I was also a success. In one week, 2-502 IN had cleared 

Highway 1 and eliminated the enemy’s ability to conduct an organized 

fight. “We had essentially achieved what was the brigade’s primary 

objective for us for the entire operation,” said Benchoff. For the rest of 

DRAGON STRIKE, the enemy never again fought as hard as they did at 

OP Dusty. The insurgents would only fire a few rounds at Soldiers or shoot 

an RPG and run. The intensity of battle never again matched those two 

days around OP Dusty.58

The scouts were understandably pleased with their performance. 

Faucher was particularly glad that the JFO, Staff Sergeant Thompson, 
174

despite his ankle injury, was able to call in Danger Close fire missions 

throughout the fight. The talents of both Thompson and the JTAC, Senior 

Airman Archambault, gave the platoon a critical advantage over the 

insurgents and helped hold the initiative during much of the battle. The 

four-tour veteran Bosse, told the men that with the exception of Operation 

ANACONDA, a brigade-sized operation back in 2002, this was the most 

intense combat he had experienced.59 Thompson told the platoon RTO, 

Specialist Jonas, “I’ve never seen someone who’s not a JFO handle aircraft 

the way that you did.” Coming from an experienced forward observer, 

Jonas felt reassured.60 When asked what they would have done differently, 

the scouts said only small things. Brilla and Spinelli would have packed 

more sandbags, Spear would have inserted right on top of the OP negating 

the tough trek and allowing the men to bring more ammunition, Thompson 

said he would not have twisted his ankle.61

Captain Faucher had clearly directed both the establishment of 

the position and the subsequent fight by placing teams around the OP, 

directing fire, and calling in support fires. He listened to suggestions from 

his noncommissioned officers and implemented them as he saw fit. The 

young officer’s demeanor during the battle, and his placement of Soldiers 

on the roof impressed Staff Sergeant Bosse who explained that it was, 

“actually kind of rare for somebody who’s only 23 or 24 to be that calm, 

cool, and collected through it all and make those good decisions.” 62

Through it all, the platoon worked like a well oiled machine. “Everybody 

knew their part, everybody had their part,” said Bosse, “everybody stayed 

in their lane.” Whether it was teaming up to cover a section of the roof, 

serving as a sniper rifle platform, or calling in continuous support fire, the 

scouts performed their mission with professionalism and esprit de corps. 

Faucher also credited simple fundamentals for the platoon’s performance, 

“Every man did his job without fear or hesitation.” 63
175

Notes

1. Specialist Marvin Speckhaus, interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 29 July 2011, 12; Sergeant Damon Sawyer, 

interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

20 June 2011, 17; Staff Sergeant Jason Thompson, interview by Kevin Hymel, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 21 June 2011, 28; Captain Bill 

Faucher, interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 15 June 2011, 33, 34; Staff Sergeant James Spear, interview by Kevin Hymel, 

Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 17 June 2011, 22; Sergeant 

Eric Ammerman, interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 20 June 2011, 26.

2. Anthony Loyd, “The Surge is Working—So Far,” Standpoint, December 

2010, http://standpointmag.co.uk/dispatches-december-10-the-surge-is-workingso-far-anthony-loyd-afghanistan-zhari, accessed May 14, 2011.

3. Lieutenant Colonel Peter Benchoff, interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 June 2011, 10, 12; Faucher, interview, 

3, 6.

4. Major Sean Brown, interview by Michael Doidge, Combat Studies Institute, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 June 2011, 14; Carl Forsberg, “Counterinsurgency in 

Kandahar: Evaluating the 2010 Hamkari Campaign” Institute for the Study of 

War, December 2010, Afghanistan Report, 6, 23.

5. Forsberg, 23.

6. Lieutenant Colonel Peter Benchoff, interviewed by Kevin Hymel, 23 

August 2011, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 August 2011, 

1.

7. Benchoff, 16 June 2011, interview, 6, 36-39; Faucher, interview, 13, 14, 

17.

8. Benchoff, interview, 23 August 2011, 1; Faucher, interview, 18; Department 

of the Army, Field Manual (FM) 3-21.20,The Infantry Battalion (Headquarters, 

Department of the Army: Washington, DC, 2006) 1-8, 1-9.

9. Ammerman, interview, 46; Faucher, interview, 59; Captain William 

Faucher, e-mail to Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 16 August 2011.

10. Spear, interview, 5,6; Faucher, interview, 16, 29, 30, 37; Sergeant First 

Class Justin Bosse, interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 15 June 2011, 7.

11. Bosse, interview, 2; Faucher, interview, 15, 19; Thompson, interview, 2, 

5; Ammerman interview, 47.

12. Ammerman, interview, 4, 5; Sawyer, interview, 5; Faucher, interview, 9.
176

13. Thompson, interview, 6, 7; Faucher, e-mail.

14. Captain William Faucher, e-mail to Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 12 July 2011; Bosse, interview, 3; Thompson, 

16.

15. Spear, interview, 7, 8; Thompson, interview, 9; Sergeant Ryan Spinelli, 

, interviewed by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

28 June 2011, 5; Sawyer, interview, 16.

16. Jonas, interview, 17; Sawyer, interview, 22; Sergeant Jason McMillan, 

interviewed by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

29 June 2011, 8.

17. Jonas, interview, 35; Ammerman, interview, 8; Faucher, interview, 22.

18. Specialist Jason Savant, interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 23 June 2011, 9.

19. Specialist Eric Howes, interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies 

Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 20 June 2011, 7; Spear, interview, 18; Specialist 

Aaron Jonas, interviewed by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS, 20 June 2011, 4; Staff Sergeant Sterling Stauch, interviewed 

by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 29 June 2011, 

12, 52; Ammerman, interview, 9, 10.

20. Savant, interview, 10, Stauch, interview, 36.

21. Savant, interview, 20; Thompson, interview, 13, 14, 15, 45; Ammerman, 

interview, 19, 20, 21, 40; Faucher, 56, 57.

22. Stauch, interview, 13, 32.

23. Faucher, interview, 29; Jonas, interview, 9; Ammerman, 18; Stauch, 

interview, 34.

24. Stauch, interview, 21, Sawyer, interview, 11; Spinelli, interview 24, 25; 

Sergeant Mike Brilla, interviewed by Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS, 29 June 2011, 11, 12.

25. Speckhaus, interview, 10; Howes, interview, 28; Brilla, interview, 12.

26. Savant, interview, 12; Stauch, interview, 16. 

27. Thompson, interview, 21; Sawyer, interview, 21; Spear, interview, 14, 15, 

24, Brilla, interview, 12, 13, 24, 36. 

28. Speckhaus, interview, 6, 9; Thompson, interview, 21; Faucher, interview, 

27, 30, 58; Jonas, interview, 10.

29. Thompson, interview, 18, 19; Staff Sergeant Jason Thompson, e-mail to 

Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 19 August 2011.

30. Thompson, interview, 60; Ammerman, interview, 48; Sawyer, interview, 

41; Savant, interview, 40; Howes, interview, 33.
177

31. Thompson, interview, 20; Spear, interview, 19; Ammerman, interview, 

52; Spinelli, interview, 13.

32. Bosse, interview, 14; Spear, interview, 19; Ammerman, interview, 27, 28, 

49; Faucher, interview, 25, 30.

33. Speckhaus, interview, 12; Sawyer, interview, 17; Thompson, interview, 

28; Faucher, interview, 33, 34; Spear, interview, 22; and Ammerman, interview, 

26.

34. Spear, interview, 21, 22; Stauch, interview, 27, 30; Sawyer, interview, 19; 

Ammerman, interview, 26; McMillan, interview, 22.

35. Spinelli, interview, 10, 11; Sawyer, interview, 25, 26.

36. Thompson, interview 31, 32; Thompson, e-mail.

37. Faucher, interview, 41, 42; Bosse, interview, 23; Jonas, interview, 5; 

Sawyer, interview, 12; Spear, interview, 27.

38. Brilla, interview, 20; Stauch, interview, 35; Thompson, interview, 35; 

Howes, interview, 20.

39. Bosse, interview, 14; Ammerman, interview, 33; Faucher, interview, 46.

40. Spinelli, interview, 26; Faucher, interview, 46; Ammerman, interview, 

33.

41. Thompson, interview, 39; McMillan, interview, 29; Spinelli, interview, 

20; Spear, interview, 31.

42. Howes, interview, 22; Spear, interview, 16, 17.

43. Brilla, interview, 25; Sawyer, interview, 22.

44. Brilla, interview, 18.

45. Faucher, interview, 27, 28.

46. Savant, interview, 16; Howes, interview, 10, 23, 24.

47. Brilla, interview, 26; Howes, interview, 24, 25; Faucher, interview, 49.

48. Stauch, interview, 20, 32, 40.

49. Faucher, interview, 37, 61; Bosse, interview, 29; Thompson, interview, 

42; Savant, interview, 28; Ammerman, interview, 22; Speckhaus, interview, 29.

50. Howes, interview, 25.

51. Faucher, interview, 52, 53; Jonas, interview, 26; Thompson, interview, 

50, 51; Savant, interview, 26; Ammerman, interview, 41; Stauch, interview, 42, 

43, 44.

52. Jonas, interview, 28; Bosse, interview, 34; Spear, interview, 35.

53. Jonas, interview, 23, 24; Faucher, interview, 54; Ammerman, interview, 

37; Brilla, interview, 29, 30; Spear, interview, 36, Bosse, interview, 36.
178

54. Spear, interview, 37; Brilla, interview, 27; Sawyer, interview, 33, 35.

55. Sawyer, interview, 33; Bosse, interview, 49; Jonas, interview, 29.

56. Thompson, interview, 57; Savant interview, 42, 43; Brilla, interview, 23.

57. Faucher, interview, 68; Lieutenant Colonel Peter Benchoff, interview by 

Kevin Hymel, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 June 2011, 35.

58. Lieutenant Colonel Peter Benchoff, interview by Kevin Hymel, Combat 

Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 16 June 2011, 31; Thompson, interview, 

56; Sawyer, interview, 30.

59. Thompson, interview, 34, Jonas, interview, 14, 32; Ammerman, interview, 

34.

60. Faucher, interview, 44, 45; Jonas, interview, 32.

61. Howes, interview, 33; Spear, interview, 39; Jonas, interview, 32;Thompson, 

interview, 61; Faucher, e-mail.

62. Bosse, interview, 8.

63. Faucher, interview, 69.
179

Objective Lexington

Cougar Company under Fire in the Ganjgal Valley

by

Ryan D. Wadle, Ph.D.

In late March 2011, the men of Cougar Company, 2d Battalion, 327th 

Infantry Regiment (2-327 IN), also nicknamed Task Force No Slack, 

had nearly completed their year-long deployment to Kunar Province, 

Afghanistan. Over the past year, 2-327 IN conducted numerous operations 

throughout the province with several focusing on the rugged and remote 

regions of Kunar along the border with Pakistan. By the end of March, 

some Soldiers from the battalion had already returned to the United 

States and within the next three weeks, the remaining men would also 

leave Afghanistan. Still, the unit was ordered to launch a major offensive 

against insurgents concentrating in the Ganjgal Valley near the Pakistani 

Frontier. Some of the men of TF No Slack disliked the notion of starting 

a new operation so near to the end of their deployments but in spite of 

these reservations, they understood the necessity of continuing to pressure 

insurgent forces in their Area of Operations (AO). This final push against 

the enemy, Operation STRONG EAGLE III, would take the men of No 

Slack deeper into the remote and insurgent held Kunar Province than any 

American unit had operated before. 

Background

The plan for Operation STRONG EAGLE III entailed nothing less than 

a direct assault on the home areas of insurgent leader Qari Zia Rahman and 

his subordinate, a man known only as Tamidullah. Since 2001, Coalition 

forces had only rarely entered the Ganjgal Valley. In 2009, insurgents had 

ambushed and killed four Marines and nine Afghan National Army (ANA) 

Soldiers at the head of the valley. Rahman, known by the abbreviation 

“QZR,” used the area as a base of operations from which he dispatched 

fighters and weapons to other parts of Kunar Province. QZR had also 

established a clandestine radio station managed by Tamidullah through 

which he communicated with the local populace to discredit coalition 

activities. No Slack’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Joel B. Vowell, 

hoped that neutralizing the insurgent headquarters in the Ganjgal would 

grant No Slack’s replacement, 2d Battalion, 35th Infantry Regiment (2-

35 IN) - dubbed Task Force Cacti - time to fully establish itself in Kunar 

without facing the prospect of a major summer offensive from QZR’s 
180

forces.1 No Slack had engaged QZR’s insurgents at several points during 

its deployment, most prominently during Operation STRONG EAGLE I 

in June 2010, but STRONG EAGLE III aimed to deal the deathblow to 

QZR’s command group and establish coalition control over the Ganjgal 

Valley and the southern reaches of the nearby Ghakhi Valley, an area 

collectively codenamed Objective VIRGINIA. 

To neutralize an isolated and hostile area such as Objective VIRGINIA 

required a complex operation involving all four of the battalion’s maneuver 

companies. No Slack planners devised a deception operation to the north 

in the Sholtan Valley in order to draw fighters out of the key villages of 

Barawalo Kalay (Objective RICHMOND) in the southern Ghakhi Valley 

and Sarowbay (Objective LEXINGTON) at the eastern end of the Ganjgal. 

The battalion’s Alpha Company would establish a blocking position to 

the north of the two villages to intercept and destroy any fighters who 

attempted to re-enter the main objectives. Meanwhile, one company would 

search and clear each of the villages, hoping to seize QZR, his leadership, 

and the radio station. The plan tasked Cougar Company with clearing 

Sarowbay. To manage the operation, planners placed a command and 

control node called the Black Tactical Command Post (TAC) and platoonsized blocking positions on the ridgeline separating the two objectives. 

The size of the operation and the physical remoteness of the AO required 

the marshalling of extensive aviation assets for lift and support drawn 

from other areas of Afghanistan. An Afghan commando unit advised by 

an American special operations detachment served as the only official 

reserve force for STRONG EAGLE III.2

To complete his portion of the operation, Captain Tye Reedy, Cougar 

Company’s commander, had only two organic rifle platoons at his disposal 

to maneuver on Objective LEXINGTON. No Slack’s Headquarters and 

Headquarters Company (HHC) had received its own battle space for the 

duration of the deployment, a decision that resulted in the transfer of 

Cougar Company’s 1st Platoon to HHC. That move reduced the number 

of “trigger-pullers” in Cougar Company to approximately 43 men, not 

including the company HQ element of Captain Reedy, a Radio Telephone 

Operator (RTO), the Fire Support Officer (FSO), and a Joint Terminal Air 

Controller (JTAC). The 2d Platoon counted 22 infantrymen and 3d Platoon 

had 21. Each platoon had two Mk48 machine guns, three M249 Squad 

Automatic Weapons (SAWs), and three M320 grenade launchers. To 

provide immediate indirect fire support, Captain Reedy also had a 60mm 

mortar crew led by Staff Sergeant Jason McDaniel. Although down one 

platoon, Cougar Company received a number of assets to ensure mission 
181

success. First and foremost, the company partnered with a full platoon 

of 25 Soldiers from the Afghan National Army (ANA). Sensitivity to the 

local population and the lack of a Government of the Islamic Republic of 

Afghanistan (GIRoA) presence required that the ANA platoon take the 

lead while searching for weapons and insurgents in Sarowbay. In addition 

to the ANA Soldiers, Captain Reedy also received 15 additional personnel 

that included three interpreters, a military working dog, a combat camera 

crew, a Low Level Voice Intercept (LLVI) team, and an eight-person squad 

of Military Policemen. The large number of support personnel led Captain 

Reedy to remark that, “There were more attachments than I had trigger 

pullers, it seemed like.”3

The village of Sarowbay is located in the narrow Ganjgal Valley running 

from west to east with high ridges on every side (see Figure 1). A small 

creek bed runs through the valley to the south and west of the village itself. 

Sarowbay sits in a U-shape with significant elevation changes and terracing 

within the village itself. Reedy’s plan called for Cougar Company to be 

inserted at a helicopter landing zone (HLZ) called Bee Eater approximately 

500 meters from Sarowbay. Both infantry platoons would then traverse the 

steep mountainsides and move into the valley. The 3d Platoon, led by First 

Lieutenant Jacob Sass, would then ascend into an overwatch position on 

the ridgeline to the south of Objective LEXINGTON. Reedy believed that 

securing the ridgeline would accomplish the dual purpose of keeping it out 

of enemy hands while affording 3d Platoon a position from which it could 

cover the entire village with supporting fire. The plan left the ridgeline 

to the east unoccupied because its distance from most of the qalats (clay 

houses) in Sarowbay meant that it was far less important than other terrain.

Reedy ordered 2d Platoon, led by First Lieutenant Jason Pomeroy, 

to clear the village. For 2d Platoon’s maneuver, Staff Sergeant Jonathan 

Wray’s Weapons squad would bound ahead of the rest of the platoon to 

assume a second support-by-fire position on the northern ridgeline with 

its two Mk48 machine guns and other weapons. From its position, Wray’s 

10-man squad could also monitor the movements of the villagers during 

the operation. Intelligence estimated the enemy strength in Objective 

LEXINGTON at two squads of approximately six insurgents each and 

potentially two additional enemy weapons teams of approximately 10 

insurgents as reinforcements. This gave Reedy’s company a significant 

numerical advantage over projected insurgent manpower. Captain Reedy 

decided to place McDaniel’s mortar crew at HLZ Bee Eater, where First 

Lieutenant Andrew Rinehart’s 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, assumed the 

task of securing both the landing zone and Cougar Company’s mortar 

crew.4
182

Figure 1. Sarowbay Objective Lexington.

The Operation

Operation STRONG EAGLE III officially began just after midnight 

on 29 March as CH-47 Chinooks with helicopter gunship escorts began 

transporting coalition troops to the various HLZs on Objective VIRGINIA. 

Cougar Company’s 3d Platoon with Reedy’s headquarters element arrived 

first on HLZ Bee Eater, approximately half a kilometer to the southwest of 

Sarowbay. These first landings were delayed by several minutes because 

gunships had spotted approximately 15 individuals in the vicinity of the 

landing zone. Later flights by the Chinooks brought in 2d Platoon and the 

additional assets needed to the clear the village. After the insertion of 1st 

Platoon, Bravo Company, on HLZ Bee Eater, 3d Platoon set off down the 

mountainside. Since Sass’ platoon had the farthest distance to travel, it left 

the HLZ first so it could reach its elevated support-by-fire position before 

dawn. Sass and Specialist Brett Kadlec, the point man, attempted to find a 
183

suitable path down the ridge but the terrain proved a significant challenge 

for the platoon. The steep and rocky landscape made it difficult for Soldiers 

to get their footing. Often, the only available handholds for Soldiers to 

grab onto consisted of limbs and roots from the moderately sized trees in 

the area. The extremely low levels of nighttime illumination in the valley 

further complicated their movements as the Soldiers’ night-vision goggles 

only partially compensated for the darkness. In addition, each Soldier 

carried more than 50 pounds of equipment including extra ammunition for 

their personal weapons as well as ammunition for the platoon’s machine 

guns. The combination of these problems forced Soldiers to noisily “slide 

on [their] butts” as they moved down the mountainside. Although the 

straight line distance was perhaps 300 to 400 meters, it took 3d Platoon 

approximately two hours to complete the move.5

 

Unbeknownst to the Soldiers of Cougar Company, enemy forces 

quickly detected the American presence and began converging on their 

positions. The 3d Platoon’s Sergeant Dana O’Connor and Specialist Rick 

Jacobs reported seeing flashlights moving through the trees lower down 

the ridgeline even before his unit had left HLZ Bee Eater. Meanwhile, 

officers in orbiting helicopters as part of Vowell’s airborne command 

post first spotted three and then five suspected insurgents leaving from 

the northwest side of Objective LEXINGTON. Believing one of the 

unknown men to be Tamidullah, Vowell radioed Reedy and ordered him 

to take 2d Platoon and intercept the men before they fled the objective area 

entirely. By this time, Captain Reedy and 2d Platoon had already moved 

off HLZ Bee Eater heading north toward the southern end of Objective 

LEXINGTON. Reedy quickly returned to HLZ Bee Eater to drop off the 

MPs and the other support assets so that the platoon had a better chance to 

catch up to the fleeing figures. As 2d Platoon set back out in the darkness, 

AH-64 Apache gunships flying in support of 3d Platoon’s movement to 

the east came off their stations and began to aid Reedy in the interception.6

 At approximately 0230 hours, 3d Platoon reached the creek bed at the 

valley floor. Lieutenant Sass did not immediately see a suitable crossing 

point so he called a short halt to confer with Sergeant Bryan Burgess, the 

leader of the 3rd squad. After a brief discussion, Sass decided to move 

northward parallel to the creek bed and search for a better crossing where 

they could begin their climb up the opposite ridgeline. The Soldiers moved 

through a series of terraces west of the creek bed and flanked to the left by a 

densely wooded area. During the movement, the point man, Kadlec, began 

hearing hushed voices speaking in a foreign language. Kadlec considered 

the possibility that a portion of their ANA detachment was close by, so he 
184

radioed Sergeant Burgess to move to his position. At this point, Kadlec 

stood at the head of the formation followed by Specialist Dustin Feldhaus 

and Sergeant Dana O’Connor, the latter of whom was situated five meters 

behind Kadlec. 

Just before Burgess reached Kadlec, gunfire erupted from the 

treeline. Enemy fighters had climbed into the trees and opened fire almost 

immediately hitting Burgess, Feldhaus, and O’Connor. The insurgent 

rounds struck Burgess in his thigh and Feldhaus received multiple gunshot 

wounds on the left side of his body. The fighters engaged at such short 

ranges that O’Connor, who took a gunshot wound to his stomach, later 

found rounds poking through his individual body armor. Several other 

Soldiers in the ambush zone later reported finding bullet holes through 

their pant legs that miraculously missed hitting flesh.7

 

Almost instantaneously, someone yelled, “They’re in the trees!” 

and the remainder of the platoon opened fire on the suspected insurgent 

locations. Even with this knowledge, the poor illumination levels made 

it difficult for Private First Class Bryan Smith to spot the enemy with 

his night optics device (NOD). In the darkness, Kadlec helped O’Connor 

move to an impromptu command post several meters from the ambush 

site. Meanwhile, Smith focused his efforts on tending to Burgess’ wound.8

Using its small arms, 3d Platoon quickly neutralized the insurgents 

who had unleashed the ambush but survivors from this same element 

of fighters regrouped and were spotted preparing to attack the platoon 

from the east. In fact, these insurgents appeared in the same area where 

3d Platoon intended to establish its support-by-fire position later that 

morning. Lieutenant Sass, farther to the rear, radioed Captain Reedy 

that enemy fighters had opened fire on 3d Platoon from positions to the 

north and east and requested support from 2d Platoon. Simultaneously, 

Sergeant Jonathan Prins, the Fire Support Non-Commissioned Officer, 

requested support from Close Combat Aviation (CCA) to secure the area. 

Immediately, Captain Reedy ended the interception mission and took 2d 

Platoon back to HLZ Bee Eater for a second time and ordered his men to 

drop their rucksacks so that they could move more rapidly. In anticipation 

of their arrival, the leader of 3d Platoon’s Weapons Squad, Sergeant James 

T. Schmidt, ordered his and another squad to take up positions to the 

west and the southeast of 3d Platoon’s position while awaiting the linkup. 

Sergeant Eric North, the leader of 2d Platoon’s 3d Squad, found it very 

difficult to locate Sass’ trail down the ridgeline but he and the rest of the 

platoon rapidly closed the distance with 3d Platoon by taking a direct route 

and foregoing standard noise and light discipline. As 2d Platoon moved, 
185

Apache gunships arrived on station to the east of 3d Platoon’s position and 

made several runs firing their 30mm chain guns that blunted the enemy 

advance and killed 15 insurgents. The 2d Platoon arrived at the ambush 

site as the gunships attacked, and Sergeant North reported that he could 

clearly hear the ejected brass cartridges from the helicopters’ cannons 

falling all over the area.9 

Approximately 10 minutes after the initial ambush while the Apaches 

were making their gun runs, Specialist Rick “Doc” Jacobs arrived to tend 

to the three wounded Soldiers. Burgess drifted in and out of consciousness 

but Jacobs managed to stop the bleeding from his thigh wound. Feldhaus, 

despite having sustained several gunshot wounds, remained conscious 

and alert throughout the brief engagement. O’Connor’s stomach wound 

appeared stable and non-critical. Unfortunately, it took considerable time 

for the MEDEVAC helicopters to arrive at the scene. Before the operation, 

Cougar Company was briefed that MEDEVACs could reach their 

objective in approximately five minutes from Forward Operating Base 

(FOB) Joyce. Instead, it took nearly 30 minutes before the MEDEVAC 

helicopter arrived to evacuate the wounded. As the now linked up 2d and 

3d Platoons provided security, the UH-60 MEDEVAC hoisted the three 

casualties aboard and immediately set off for the hospital.10 

With the tree line cleared and the casualties evacuated, Captain 

Reedy reconstituted the company at approximately 0400 hours and briefly 

conferred with Lieutenant Sass to decide how to proceed with the mission. 

Sass’ 3d Platoon had only 18 riflemen remaining, and the casualties 

significantly reduced its capability to hold its planned overwatch position 

on the southern ridgeline. Reedy also believed that the loss of three men, 

including Sergeant Burgess, whose experience as a squad leader made him 

a key leader in the unit, would have negative psychological and morale 

effects upon the remaining Soldiers. With those two factors in mind, 

Reedy altered his initial plan for clearing Sarowbay. He still planned 

for 2d Platoon to clear the village with Staff Sergeant Wray’s weapons 

squad providing local support-by-fire on the ridgeline above Sarowbay. 

The biggest change to the plan affected 3d Platoon. The unit would now 

provide local-support-by-fire from the ridgeline to the southwest of 

Sarowbay during the initial phase of clearances. Reedy believed that the 

risk of leaving an under-strength unit in isolation outweighed the threat 

posed by potential enemy control of the surrounding terrain.11

With the new plan in place, Captain Reedy and his men set out once 

again for Objective LEXINGTON. Cougar Company marched back up the 

ridgeline and recovered both their dropped rucksacks and support units. 
186

The military working dog and its handler stayed on the LZ due to concerns 

over the security situation following the ambush of 3d Platoon and the 

ability of the dog crew to keep up with the fast moving company as it 

maneuvered towards the objective. By 0700 hours, the company reached 

a position above Sarowbay. The 3d Platoon assumed a support-by-fire 

position near a graveyard below HLZ Bee Eater while 2d Platoon and the 

support assets set about clearing the western end of Sarowbay. When dawn 

broke on the morning of 29 March, Cougar Company was poised to clear 

its primary objective.12

As the initial clearing operations proceeded during the morning, the 

women and children of Sarowbay set about accomplishing their daily chores 

seemingly oblivious to the fighting that occurred just a few hours prior. 

The Soldiers of 2d Platoon found neither significant caches of weapons 

nor military aged males, who had presumably fled long before the arrival 

of American Soldiers. They did, however, find much evidence confirming 

an insurgent presence in Sarowbay. Most significantly, the Soldiers 

discovered that the local civilians tuned their radios to the frequency of 

Tamidullah’s propaganda radio station that the scout platoon of TF No 

Slack had found and destroyed on the northern ridgeline that morning. One 

house in particular yielded significant items of interest. Intelligence had 

located the home that they believed belonged to Tamidullah or at the very 

least, functioned as his hiding place. When searching the qalat, Soldiers 

discovered an elderly Afghan later identified as Tamidullah’s father. They 

also located some weaponry in the structure, including Light Anti-Armor 

Weapons (LAWs) and other US issued equipment carried by the Marines 

killed in the Ganjgal Valley in 2009. To the insurgents, these reminders 

of battlefield success conferred respect in war torn Afghanistan where 

victory against foreigners constituted a means of attaining prestige and 

social mobility.13 

As the morning progressed, 2d Platoon cleared the western end of the 

village and began circling the U-shaped turn towards the qalats on the 

south side of the northern ridgeline. The village of Sarowbay contained 

between 150 and 200 qalats, enough to potentially house hundreds of 

Afghans, although it was not clear how many were occupied at any given 

time. Additionally, Reedy and his men had discovered earlier in their 

deployment that clearing operations in Afghanistan took much longer than 

similar operations in Iraq. Reedy therefore decided that morning to begin 

scouting potential locations for his troops to rest during the night. One 

elderly Afghan woman offered to let Lieutenant Pomeroy and 2d Platoon 

stay in her home for the evening but Reedy decided to press on to a series 

of qalats further to the east.14
187

Once 2d Platoon reached this group of qalats, the Soldiers of 3d Platoon 

left their support-by-fire position near the graveyard to the southwest and 

began moving toward qalats at the bottom of the valley beneath those 

previously searched by 2d Platoon earlier in the morning. While these 

searches were underway, Reedy received a radio message from Major 

William Rockefeller, the TF No Slack executive officer, asking him to turn 

on his Thuraya satellite phone so they could have a conversation off the 

battalion communication channels. Dreading what Rockefeller would tell 

him, Reedy picked up the phone and was informed that Sergeant Burgess 

died from the wounds he sustained in the morning ambush. Reedy decided 

that the men of 3d Platoon deserved to know this news as quickly as 

possible, so the company commander, his JTAC, and his RTO, left 2d 

Platoon’s position and went to the valley floor at approximately 1000 

hours. After gathering 3d Platoon together, Reedy told them of the death 

of their respected squad leader. “You could immediately feel the impact of 

losing him,” Reedy said adding, “I told the men they had five minutes to 

pray, think, cry, or punch a wall.”15 

At this point in the morning, just before 1100 hours, the men of Cougar 

Company were separated into three groups. The 3d Platoon was at the 

bottom of the valley, 2d Platoon occupied a multi-room qalat above and to 

the east of 3d Platoon’s position, and Wray’s weapons squad was farther 

up the northern ridgeline (see Figure 2). The 2d Platoon’s strongpoint 

qalat was larger than nearly all of the other structures in the village but 

the structure was built directly into the side of the ridgeline and had no 

clear view northward up the ridge. Wray’s squad had shifted positions 

throughout the morning to maintain their support-by-fire position over 2d 

Platoon and now they focused their attention on protecting the flank of 

the strongpoint qalat. To accomplish this task, Wray’s squad took up a 

position on the ridgeline above and to the east to guard the trail through 

the objective.16 

The clouds gathering in the skies above posed yet another problem for 

Captain Reedy. The mountains of eastern Afghanistan caused erratic weather 

patterns with significant temperature swings and the rapid appearance of 

thick clouds and precipitation, particularly during the afternoons. The 

mountainous terrain interfered with communications systems and the bad 

weather threatened to force Close Air Support (CAS) and CCA out of the 

area thus depriving Cougar Company of one of its most important sources 

of fire and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) support. 

Reedy, still with the men of 3d Platoon at the bottom of the valley, decided 

to consolidate the company at 2d Platoon’s position to prevent the enemy 
188

from cutting off a portion of his force if weather conditions deteriorated 

further. Unfortunately for 3rd Platoon, the terrain prevented the men from 

moving directly towards 2d Platoon’s qalat. Instead, the terraces within the 

village forced 3d Platoon to move in a U-shaped pattern thus stretching the 

walking distance between the two halves of the company to approximately 

500 meters.17 

At approximately 1100 hours, Cougar Company’s CAS and CCA 

assets left their stations over Sarowbay because of the drop in visibility. 

The thickening clouds brought heavy rain and hail into the valley. This 

same weather system affected every TF No Slack position on Objective 

VIRGINIA from Alpha Company’s position eight kilometers to the north 

to HLZ Bee Eater at the southern end of the objective. With the departure 

of the aircraft, Cougar Company’s fire support was reduced to its 60mm 

mortar on HLZ Bee Eater and the 105mm howitzers stationed at FOB 

Joyce approximately nine kilometers to the west. Insurgents, many of 

whom likely moved out of Sarowbay once they detected the American 

presence, had covertly occupied fighting positions on the surrounding 

ridgelines over the previous several hours. The enemy had monitored the 

movements of Cougar Company from the ridgelines and clearly understood 

that the departure of the aviation assets left the Americans exposed. Taking 

advantage of this sudden drop in the Americans’ fire support, they decided 

to strike.18

Almost immediately after the aircraft left the area, Reedy and the men 

of 3d Platoon heard sporadic fire to the south aimed at HLZ Bee Eater as 

they were moving toward 2d Platoon’s position. Knowing that the enemy 

would soon direct their fire at the exposed 3d Platoon as it moved through 

open ground, Reedy and his men broke into a trot or the “airborne shuffle” 

as they described it, in hopes of reaching the strongpoint before that could 

happen. However, by the time 3d Platoon traversed roughly half of the 

500-meter distance, enemy insurgents had opened fire with RPK and PKM 

machine guns on the platoon from multiple locations on the ridgelines 

to the north, east, and south. The volume of fire suggested the presence 

of far greater numbers of insurgents than previously anticipated. Prior to 

the start of the operation, intelligence estimates pegged enemy strength 

in and around Objective LEXINGTON as approximately squad-sized. 

Unfortunately for Cougar Company, the actual number of insurgents 

on the objective likely numbered between 100 and 150 fighters. Given 

Cougar Company’s losses sustained during the ambush before dawn, 

the insurgents now held an approximate two to one advantage over the 

Americans in numerical fighting strength.19 
189

Figure 2. Objective Lexington, 29 March 2011, Terrain features and timelines.

When the enemy opened fire, 2d Platoon’s Corporal John R. Nesse 

and his team left the cover of the qalat and laid down suppressing fire. 

With Nesse’s team providing cover, Reedy and the trailing third of 3d 

Platoon picked up the pace and managed to scurry up the ridgeline into 

the strongpoint qalat. Meanwhile, the leading two-thirds of 3d Platoon 

had pushed forward on the trail forcing them to take cover behind a twometer high rock wall 100 meters due south and two terraces below the 

strongpoint. Sergeant Joshua Bostic, along with Private First Class Jeremy 

Faulkner and Specialist Joseph Kintz, positioned at the eastern end of the 

wall and returned fire against the enemy positions to the east. Meanwhile, 

toward the rear of the group of Soldiers strung out along the rock wall, 

Lieutenant Sass found himself almost completely exposed to enemy fire. 

He, Specialist Jacobs, and Specialist Matheson moved back a few meters 

to a small defilade position in hopes of finding more cover. The enemy fire, 

extremely heavy at this point, poured onto this position and left the bulk of 

3d Platoon with few options.20 
190

At the strongpoint qalat, the Soldiers of 2d Platoon worked to return 

fire against the many enemy positions. With all of 2d Platoon, the ANA 

Soldiers, and the support assets inside the structure, crowding quickly 

became an issue. Making matters worse, the qalat only had one window 

from which the Soldiers could effectively return fire. From this window 

facing the south, 2d Platoon’s Soldiers returned fire as best they could but 

many of the known enemy positions were outside of the field of fire offered 

by the window. Because the trapped elements of 3d Platoon lay to the 

south, the Soldiers in the qalat directed their fire carefully in an attempt to 

avoid any friendly-fire incidents. Unfortunately, these precautions further 

limited the platoon’s freedom of action. In spite of this, the Soldiers in 

the qalat managed to restore some measure of fire superiority over the 

insurgents, thanks due in part to Nesse and his team leaving the cover of 

the qalat to return fire. Inside the qalat, Specialist Michael Patterson fired 

his M4 rifle and M203 grenade launcher through the window at enemy 

positions on the ridgeline to the southeast. The volume of fire increased 

when 2d Platoon brought an Mk48 machine gun into action.21

For the trapped Soldiers of 3d Platoon, the situation had worsened. 

The enemy PKM positions to the north, south, and east kept the Soldiers 

under heavy fire and within a few minutes the enemy increased the pressure 

when another machine gun suddenly opened fire from the west. Lieutenant 

Sass assessed his position as no longer tenable and began plotting his 

movement to the strongpoint. By this time, 2d Platoon had regained fire 

superiority from the qalat above. Over the radio, Sass told his men to 

wait for the cloud cover to thicken further to provide cover for a rapid 

movement up the ridgeline. When the weather cooperated a short time 

later, a group of Soldiers including Sass, Kadlec, Jacobs, Matheson, and 

Sergeant Clint Lyons, made a mad dash to the strongpoint. All of the men 

from this group reached the qalat safely but their relief quickly dissipated 

when they realized that several Soldiers including Bostic, Kintz, Faulkner, 

Smith, and Specialist Enrique Gonzalez remained trapped behind the 

rock wall farther down the slope. For some reason, this element had not 

received the order to move to the building.22 

With most of the platoon now in the strongpoint, the remaining Soldiers 

trapped outside took the brunt of enemy fire. As the men of 3d Platoon 

sat crouched behind the wall, a bullet which his fellow Soldiers initially 

believed hit his arm, struck Faulkner and expended its energy against his 

armor plating. Moreover, Bostic sent a radio message to Reedy reporting 

that Faulkner’s wound was not serious. Unfortunately, the enemy round 

actually struck just above Faulkner’s plating and pierced his chest. Kintz 
191

and Bostic realized that Faulkner had suffered a serious wound and tried to 

provide medical care while still exposed to enemy fire. Despite their best 

efforts, Faulkner died on the battlefield barely 30 seconds after being hit. 

While Bostic tried to perform first aid on Faulkner, an enemy round struck 

him in the buttocks.23

The situation in the strongpoint had improved somewhat while 3d 

Platoon endured its hellish ordeal on the terraces below. The Soldiers in 

the qalat continued to bring their own weapons to bear against insurgent 

positions. Enemy rounds hit and sometimes entered the qalat, but no 

members of 2d Platoon suffered any wounds. These rounds, however, 

made it easier to determine the enemy’s positions by allowing First 

Lieutenant Steven Craig, the company’s Fire Support Officer, to perform 

some back azimuth calculations. They relayed this information on the 

enemy positions via TacSat (tactical satellite) back to Sergeant McDaniel’s 

mortar crew on HLZ Bee Eater which began dropping rounds on the 

insurgents. The mortar, however, remained the company’s sole source of 

fire support because communications difficulties prevented Reedy from 

making continuous contact with FOB Joyce. In any case, the beleaguered 

company had no access to the 105mm howitzers at the FOB because the 

sheer volume of fire mission requests coming from every unit in TF No 

Slack had overwhelmed the battery.24 

While all of these events transpired below, Staff Sergeant Wray’s squad 

found itself undergoing its own trial farther up the ridgeline. Wray had 10 

Soldiers under his command and his squad carried two Mk48 machine 

guns, a SAW, and M14 sniper rifle. At his squad position to the northeast 

of 2d Platoon’s strongpoint, Wray had deployed his machine guns to cover 

the eastern and southern approaches respectively with the SAW protecting 

the rear of the squad’s position to the west. When the insurgents opened fire 

at approximately 1100 hours, Wray initially ordered his squad to maintain 

concealment so that they could better determine the origins and the targets 

of enemy fire. He quickly realized that his squad’s position was receiving 

heavy fire from the tree line across the valley to the east/southeast. The 

squad then began responding to the enemy fire with Wray moving between 

his Soldiers’ positions to help them more accurately aim their fire. The 

insurgents proved extremely aggressive, maneuvering in the open to 

take clear shots at the squad, causing Wray to shift his men’s position 

to maximize their cover. Wray attempted to radio Lieutenant Pomeroy to 

share information, but he encountered the same communication problems 

bedeviling the rest of Cougar Company and could only maintain sporadic 

contact.25 
192

During the firefight, the squad’s designated marksman, Specialist 

Frederick Hutterli, took notice of a spotter a few hundred meters away 

and across the valley gesturing to his rear and pointing directly at the 

squad’s position. Although not a formally trained sniper, Hutterli relished 

the chance to fire on a target from long range and sighted his M14 on the 

spotter. Just as he fired, Wray dropped a magazine near Hutterli, causing 

him to miss the target. Fortunately, the shot still had a deterrent effect and 

the spotter slipped inside a nearby qalat and gave up his mission.26

At approximately 1140, the SAW gunner, Specialist Travis Bland, 

noticed a pair of enemy fighters manning a machine gun and trying to 

outflank the squad’s position from farther up the ridgeline. After receiving 

word from Lieutenant Pomeroy that there were no friendlies anywhere 

on the ridge, Wray asked for two volunteers to help him neutralize the 

machine gun. Specialists William Dempsey and Matthew Neal answered 

the call and the three Soldiers began maneuvering towards the enemy 

position with Bland covering them with his SAW. During the maneuver, 

a second machine gun on a nearby hill opened fire, pinning Dempsey and 

Neal down. With Bland trying to suppress both machine guns, Wray closed 

on the first machine gun. He never laid eyes on the enemy position but he 

lobbed a grenade in the vicinity which, after it exploded, caused the gun 

to stop firing. The most significant action occurred when Wray’s squad 

brought an enemy PKM crew under fire. Lieutenant Pomeroy informed 

Wray via radio that at least eight insurgents were on the ridgeline near 

Wray and ordered him to gather his squad and move toward the 2d Platoon 

strongpoint. As Wray carried out these movements, the second insurgent 

machine gun crew continued to pour fire onto the squad.27 

While Wray protected 2d Platoon’s northern flank, the Soldiers inside 

the strongpoint qalat in the village worked to relieve 3d Platoon’s Bostic, 

Gonzalez, Kintz, and Smith farther down the ridgeline. As the Soldiers 

organized a rescue mission, a large blast knocked everyone to the ground. 

The qalat occupied by the old woman who had tried to persuade Lieutenant 

Pomeroy to bunk there that night exploded when an improvised explosive 

device with a cell phone trigger detonated inside the structure. Fortunately, 

the blast was too distant to cause any Coalition casualties. Everyone picked 

themselves up and resumed their focus on their besieged comrades.28 

Lieutenant Pomeroy organized a small rescue team comprised of 

himself, Specialist Nathan Allen, Specialist Jordan Anderson, and Nesse to 

provide cover so that the trapped men from 3d Platoon could scramble up 

the ridgeline to safety. Pomeroy’s rescue team darted from the strongpoint 

and made for a group of smaller qalats to the west but his group quickly 
193

ran into trouble. Barely 15 meters outside the door, enemy fire struck Allen 

when a round penetrated a small rock wall that he tried to use as cover, 

piercing Allen’s arm and lodging in his liver. Seeing Allen wounded, 

Pomeroy halted the rescue mission and focused the team’s efforts on 

saving the wounded Soldier. Pomeroy tore apart the rock wall to reach 

Allen and Pomeroy and Nesse dragged their wounded comrade to safety. 

In order to allow Pomeroy’s men to return to the cover of the strongpoint, 

Sergeant James Nichols gathered two MPs and left the safety of their qalat

to provide covering fire. In spite of his wound, Allen moved quickly under 

his own power back to the strongpoint. His uninjured comrades also made 

it back to the strongpoint safely.29 

Once the team returned to the qalat, Reedy made yet another 

wrenching decision and cancelled any further rescue missions until CAS 

and CCA could help the company suppress enemy fire surrounding the 

village. The situation outside was too dangerous and the hail of insurgent 

gunfire too heavy for Soldiers to risk exposure to an enemy force superior 

in both numbers and tactical position. In spite of these problems, the 

men of Cougar Company worked systematically to suppress enemy fire 

emanating from locations that could also threaten Bostic’s group below. 

Bostic, Gonzalez, Kintz, and Smith had by this time endured a constant 

fusillade of fire focused on their position for the better part of an hour. 

With cover provided by the men in the qalat, the four Soldiers darted from 

their meager cover and made their way as a group up the ridgeline to the 

strongpoint. Unfortunately, the need for haste prevented the group from 

taking Faulkner’s body or any of his gear with them.30 

With the surviving members of the company now consolidated in the 

qalat, recovering Faulkner’s body became their priority. At this point in 

the fight, Wray’s squad had completed their move down the ridgeline and 

quickly cleared and occupied a qalat 100 meters to the west of the 2d 

Platoon strongpoint. Only now as the communication problems began to 

ease did Wray learn of the ordeal endured by the rest of Cougar Company. 

He volunteered his squad to try and recover Faulkner’s body but Reedy’s 

edict against further rescue missions stood. The men of Cougar Company 

continued to defend their position and wait. Finally, after more than an 

hour of rain and hail, the cloud cover began to dissipate enough for CAS 

and CCA to return to their stations over Sarowbay. Almost immediately, 

CCA initiated gun runs against enemy positions scattered across the 

various ridgelines surrounding Sarowbay. 

With an exponential increase in the amount of fire support, the men 

of Cougar Company formed a new team to retrieve Faulkner’s body. 
194

Specialist Kintz left the strongpoint qalat and provided suppressing fire 

for the rest of the team that included Nesse, Sergeant James Nichols, and 

Patterson. The four made their way down to the terrace where Patterson 

assumed the task of recovery. In spite of the attacks from the aircraft 

overhead, the enemy continued to fire on the American Soldiers. Patterson 

briefly searched the area where 3d Platoon had found cover to retrieve 

any essential equipment left behind before the different groups of Soldiers 

made their mad dashes for the strongpoint. After completing this first task, 

Patterson picked up Faulkner’s body and, while protected by the rest of the 

team’s suppressing fire, made his way back to the strongpoint.31

Soon after the recovery of Faulkner’s body, a MEDEVAC helicopter 

finally arrived to bring the wounded off the battlefield. Patterson brought 

Faulkner’s body to the helicopter and then helped the wounded Allen 

climb aboard. With Faulkner and Allen extracted, the Soldiers of Cougar 

Company could remain sheltered in their qalats until the security situation 

improved outside. Enemy fire continued throughout the day but slackened 

enough for Sergeant Wray and another Soldier to collect ammunition from 

the strongpoint qalat. Noticing the crowded conditions in the strongpoint, 

Wray decided to keep his squad at their current location and Reedy sent a 

fire team led by Sergeant Nichols to reinforce their position. The enemy 

still continued to press into the evening hours and one enemy element 

ventured close enough to the qalat that the JTAC called in a bomb strike 

that neutralized the insurgent force.32

That night, Captain Reedy spoke with Lieutenant Colonel Vowell about 

the status of Cougar Company’s mission. The clearing operations that 

morning had only accounted for a roughly 50 of the qalats in Sarowbay and 

Reedy estimated that between 50 and 100 dwellings remained. The status of 

3d Platoon’s men also weighed heavily in Reedy’s thoughts. Third platoon 

had lost three killed and two wounded and sustained all of the company’s 

casualties on Objective LEXINGTON. In addition to these physical losses, 

at least two of the other Soldiers showed signs of significant mental strain. 

The combined effect of the predawn ambush and the midday ordeal had 

rendered the platoon unable to function as a maneuver element for the 

remainder of the operation. The firefights had also left the company short 

of water and ammunition. Reedy had two options. These were to continue 

the mission with his company crucially short on combat power or ask for 

reinforcements that could complete the clearance of Sarowbay. With all of 

these factors in mind, Reedy made a decision that he characterized as the 

“hardest but easiest” choice. He requested that Vowell dispatch additional 

forces to Objective LEXINGTON. Early on the morning of 30 March, 
195

the battalion commander sent Charlie Company, 1-327 IN also nicknamed 

Cold Steel, to HLZ Bee Eater. Once the helicopters completed their lifts, 

Cold Steel moved down and secured the western end of Sarowbay more 

than doubling the number of Coalition forces and promising to improve 

the security situation in the village.33

Even though the new units dramatically reduced Cougar Company’s 

burden, the second day still proved dangerous. At 0700 hours, Reedy 

learned that Feldhaus had succumbed to the wounds sustained during the 

ambush coming off of HLZ Bee Eater. Just as he had done when notified of 

Burgess’ death, Reedy gathered the men in the strongpoint qalat and gave 

them several minutes to reflect. That morning, Cougar Company fortified 

their strongpoint by building makeshift walls with rocks and sandbags. 

Soldiers in the qalat heard a mysterious noise behind a closed door and 

discovered several women and children hiding in the small space behind 

it. These villagers had stayed in the house throughout the chaotic events of 

the previous day and managed to escape detection. After the lone female 

military policeman searched the women and children, they were allowed 

to go about their daily routines unobstructed.34

Like the first day on Objective LEXINGTON, the weather began 

to turn against Cougar Company that afternoon. Heavy clouds reduced 

visibility to less than 10 meters and brought rain and hail that drove 

aviation assets away from the area. This provided a new window for 

enemy fighters to attack. Unlike the first day however, no American unit 

lay completely exposed to enemy fire. Since Wray’s flanking element no 

longer guarded the northern flank of the strongpoint qalat, the Soldiers 

of Cougar Company fired and lobbed grenades up the ridgeline to disrupt 

enemy movements. They hoped that using their stock of grenades would 

conserve ammunition for Sergeant McDaniel’s mortar on HLZ Bee Eater, 

their most consistent fire support element throughout the operation. In 

fact, the rules of engagement for the mortar expanded on the second day 

when the men of Cougar Company noticed enemy fighters occupying 

qalats at the far eastern end of the village. After some of McDaniel’s 

mortar rounds struck near the occupied qalats, the insurgents responded 

by trying to gather civilians in qalats occupied by their spotters. By doing 

so, insurgents hoped that Americans would withhold their fire rather than 

risk inflicting civilian casualties. In any case, the mortar rounds caused 

these insurgents to stop firing on Coalition forces for the remainder of the 

engagement.35

Later that afternoon, weather patterns held course and the cloud cover 

dissipated, allowing for the return of aviation assets. That night, Cougar 
196

Company received even more reinforcements when an ANA commando 

element arrived on the objective to resume clearance operations to the 

east of the strongpoint. On the morning of the third day, Reedy linked up 

with the leaders of the commandos to give them a situation report and 

information on suspected enemy positions on the surrounding ridges. As 

the Afghan Commandos moved to the east, 2d Platoon left the strongpoint 

qalat and assumed a support-by-fire position during the clearances. At 

some points, the presence of CAS and CCA allowed Captain Reedy to 

dispatch small patrols into the surrounding area. The situation did not 

allow for an extended battle damage assessment but the men of Cougar 

Company discovered several destroyed enemy positions that demonstrated 

the accuracy of their CAS, CCA, and indirect fires. Although the exact 

number of enemy casualties remained unknown since the insurgents often 

removed their dead to hide their numbers, Cougar Company estimated that 

they inflicted between 50 and 100 casualties on the enemy surrounding 

Sarowbay. Cougar Company also detained two military aged males and 

sent them back to FOB Joyce for processing.36

These missions allowed for some breaks in Cougar Company’s 

routine but the bulk of the unit spent most of their time from 30 March 

into the evening of 1 April occupying the strongpoint. The presence of 

the support assets kept conditions in the qalat crowded and the ANA unit 

present for the mission provided little additional combat power. The ANA 

proved extremely useful during the initial clearing operations but when the 

weather turned poor and the insurgents attacked, they had done nothing to 

defend the coalition positions in Sarowbay. In fact, during the afternoon 

firefights, the Soldiers of Cougar Company almost invariably appropriated 

ammunition from their ANA counterparts because, as Corporal Nesse put 

it, “we figured we could use their ammo better than they could.” Cougar 

Company received only intermittent resupply during the four days on the 

objective, and the US Soldiers began to view the Afghans as a drain on 

their stocks of water and ammunition.37

Finally, on the night of 1 April, after four days out in the field, TF 

No Slack’s mission changed. What had started as an effort to neutralize 

QZR’s command and control structure in Kunar Province turned into an 

active manhunt for prominent insurgent leaders. As a result, the focus of 

the action shifted southward and Lieutenant Colonel Vowell retasked most 

of the company to accommodate the changing mission requirements. The 

Soldiers of Cougar Company had recovered from the ordeal of the first day 

and became stir crazy within the strongpoint qalat. As Reedy himself put 

it, he was willing to do anything to “get me the f--- out of this house.”38 
197

Despite a significant loss of effective strength during the previous four 

days of fighting, Cougar Company soldiered on through the remainder 

of STRONG EAGLE III. After the company walked back to HLZ Bee 

Eater, CH-47s transported the Soldiers to HLZ Mallard which overlooked 

the village of Shirugay, codenamed Objective NORFOLK-EAST. For 

the remaining four days of the operation, Cougar Company provided 

overwatch while the ANA commando detachment cleared the village. At 

no point did the men of Cougar Company make contact with the enemy. 

On the night of 5 April, Operation STRONG EAGLE III came to an end 

and the Soldiers from the company boarded the Chinooks and returned to 

FOB Joyce. By the time they returned, Sergeant O’Connor had resumed his 

duties after his stay in the hospital. Over the next three weeks, the Soldiers 

of Cougar Company ended their deployments and left Afghanistan.39

Aftermath and Conclusions

Reedy and his men believed that STRONG EAGLE III destroyed 

QZR’s command and control node and made border crossing by enemy 

fighters much more dangerous. Unfortunately for Cougar Company, their 

imminent departure from Afghanistan meant that they would not see the 

results of their work. Reedy hoped that the lethal and aggressive nature 

of the operation would serve as a model for “continuous disruption” and 

shape future operations conducted in the border regions of Afghanistan. 

To Reedy, only the destruction of insurgent networks would allow the 

government of Afghanistan to expand its influence and ensure the security 

of the local population.40

The fight for Objective LEXINGTON clearly highlighted the 

difficulties of operating in mountainous eastern Afghanistan. More than 

any other single factor, terrain influenced the conduct of the operation. 

The rugged natural landscape significantly slowed troop movement and 

the high altitudes caused the sudden onset of weather that eliminated the 

American advantage in aerial fire support for hours at a time. The location 

of villages, such as Sarowbay, at the bottom of valleys dominated by 

high ridgelines presented military leaders with operational and tactical 

challenges. Captain Reedy tried to forestall enemy control of the high 

ground by establishing one of his platoons in an elevated support-byfire position. The enemy, however, inadvertently disrupted this plan 

by successfully executing the pre-dawn ambush. Inside the village, the 

man-made terraces complicated movements between qalats. The loss of 

Private Faulkner during the midday firefight on 29 March demonstrated 

the extreme to which the mountains and weather can effect military 

operations but Cougar Company successfully employed their own small 
198

arms to neutralize the enemy’s positional advantage on the ridgelines long 

enough for the remainder of 3d Platoon to reach cover. 

Cougar Company showed remarkable resiliency and adaptability 

throughout STRONG EAGLE III in the face of a tough and determined 

enemy which knew the terrain well. Much of this success came from the 

able leadership of the company at all levels. At several points on the first 

day of the operation alone, circumstances dictated complete revisions to 

Cougar Company’s plan for clearing Objective LEXINGTON. When the 

early morning ambush of 3d Platoon reduced its combat capability, Reedy 

quickly changed his plan for clearing the village that took this into account 

yet still provided 2d Platoon with the appropriate support-by-fire. The 

weather completely disrupted the clearance of Sarowbay and resulted in 

more harrowing moments for much of 3d Platoon. The unknown strength 

of the enemy in the Ganjgal area disrupted the fires priority for the entire 

battalion and resulted in Cougar Company not receiving the desired artillery 

support at crucial moments of the engagement. As Lieutenant Craig joked, 

“We’re still waiting on word from some suppression missions.” In spite 

of these complications, Cougar Company successfully established a 

strongpoint in the village, defended it from determined enemy attacks, and 

provided the necessary suppressing fire to allow the exposed Soldiers of 3d 

Platoon to reach safety. Reedy himself displayed remarkable loyalty and 

respect twice by personally informing his men when one of their comrades 

had died. He further displayed courage and integrity when he requested 

reinforcements after recognizing that the mission had grown too large for 

his under strength and battle weary company to complete alone. Through 

it all, even after four days of contact with the enemy, Cougar Company 

accepted the change in mission and remained in the field for the duration 

of the operation.41 

The Soldiers of Cougar Company believed that Operation STRONG 

EAGLE III proved the hardest of all of the operations they conducted during 

a very active deployment. The company made a significant contribution to 

the operation’s success but realized that they had survived a dangerous 

ordeal. As Corporal Nesse said, “I saw more action in the [Ganjgal] valley 

over ten days than I did in an entire year. I’ve seen, you know, things that 

will put you in the fetal position and make you cry. I saw some amazing 

things in ten days.”42
199

Notes

1. Lieutenant Colonel Joel B. Vowell and Command Sergeant Major Chris 

Fields, interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS, 11 July 2011, 2-5, 50. 

2. Major Eric Anderson, Major Phillip Kiniery, Major William Rockefeller, 

interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 11 

July 2011, 4-15. 

3. Captain Tye Reedy, quoted in Charlie Company, 2-327 IN, group interview 

by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 14 July 2011, 

6. Captain Tye Reedy, “Operation Strong Eagle III – The “Other Objective”: The 

Fight on Objective Lexington, Cougar Company, 2d BN, 327th IN Regiment,” 

unpublished paper, 2011, 3; Captain Tye Reedy, e-mail to Ryan Wadle, Combat 

Studies Institute, 12 September 2011.

4. Reedy, “The Other Objective,” 2-3; Staff Sergeant Jonathan Wray, 

interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, 23 September 2011, 11-3.

5. Specialist Brett Jacobs, quoted in 3d Platoon, Charlie Company, 2-327 IN, 

group interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 

14 July 2011, 6. 3/C/2-327, group interview, 5-7; Wray, interview, 7-8; C/2-327, 

group interview, 20-1; Reedy, e-mail, 12 September 2011. 

6. 3/C/2-327, group interview, 17; Reedy, group interview, 22; First 

Lieutenant Jacob Sass, “Tactical Decision Scenario,” unpublished paper, 2011, 1. 

7. C/2-327, group interview, 23, 26; 3/C/2-327, group interview, interview, 

9-10. 

8. Sergeant Dana O’Connor, quoted in 3/C/2-327, group interview, 9. 3/C/2-

327, group interview, 11, 13. 

9. 3/C/2-327, group interview, 10-14; Reedy, “The Other Objective,” 4; C/2-

327, group interview, 24-31; Wray, interview, 9. 

10. 3/C/2-327, group interview, 12, 14; Reedy, “The Other Objective,” 4; 

C/2-327, group interview, 29, 31.

11. C/2-327, group interview, 32; Reedy, “The Other Objective,” 4; Captain 

Tye Reedy, e-mail to Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, 26 August 2011. 

12. C/2-327, group interview, 32; 3/C/2-327, group interview, 16.

13. Wray, interview, 13-4; C/2-327, group interview, 32-3; Joseph Holliday, 

interview by Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, Fort Campbell, KY, 13 July 

2011, 12-5.

14. C/2-327, group interview, 18-9, 34-5, 60.

15. Reedy, “The Other Objective,” 4. C/2-327, group interview, 36-8; 3/C/2-

327, group interview, 16.

16. C/2-327, group interview, 36, 44.
200

17. C/2-327, group interview, 38-9.

18. C/2-327, group interview, 34, 38. 

19. C/2-327, group interview, 39-40, 61.

20. Narrative to Accompany the Award of Bronze Star Medal with Valor 

to Specialist John R. Nesse, no date; Reedy, e-mail, 12 September 2011; C/2-

327, group interview, 40-1; 3/C/2-327, group interview, 21; Reedy, “The Other 

Objective,” 5. 

21. C/2-327, group interview, 43; Narrative to Accompany the Award of 

Bronze Star Medal with Valor to Specialist Michael G. Patterson, no date; Captain 

Tye Reedy, e-mail message to Ryan Wadle, Combat Studies Institute, 31 August 

2011. 

22. C/2-327, group interview, 41; 3/C/2-327, group interview, 22.

23. C/2-327, group interview, 42; Narrative to Accompany the Award of 

Bronze Star Medal with Valor to Specialist Joseph M. Kintz, no date; 3/C/2-327, 

group interview, 23; Reedy, e-mail, 26 August 2011.

24. C/2-327, group interview, 52; Reedy, “The Other Objective,” 5. 

25. Wray, interview, 2-3, 16-7, 24.

26. Wray, interview, 23-4.

27. Narrative to Accompany the Award of Army Commendation Medal with 

Valor to Private First Class Travis C. Bland, no date; Wray, interview, 18-21, 25.

28. C/2-327, group interview, 49.

29. C/2-327, group interview, 46, 48; Narrative to Accompany the Award of 

Bronze Star Medal with Valor to Specialist Nathan M. Allen, no date; Narrative 

to Accompany the Award of Bronze Star Medal with Valor to Nesse; Reedy, “The 

Other Objective,” 5; Narrative to Accompany the Award of Bronze Star Medal 

with Valor to Sergeant James W. Nichols. 

30. C/2-327, group interview, 47-8; Reedy, e-mail, 26 August 2011.

31. Wray, interview, 22, 26-7;C/2-327, group interview, 48; 3/C/2-327, 

group interview, 25; Narrative to Accompany the Award of Bronze Star Medal 

with Valor to Kintz; Narrative to Accompany the Award of Bronze Star Medal 

with Valor to Nesse; Narrative to Accompany the Award of Bronze Star Medal 

with Valor to Nichols; Narrative to Accompany the Award of Bronze Star Medal 

with Valor to Patterson. 

32. 3/C/2-327, group interview, 26; Narrative to Accompany the Award of 

Bronze Star Medal with Valor to Patterson; C/2-327, group interview, 52-3; Wray, 

interview, 28.

33. Reedy, “The Other Objective,” 7. Reedy, e-mail, 12 September 2011; 

C/2-327, group interview, 54-5; Tye Reedy, e-mail, 26 August 2011.

34. C/2-327, group interview, 56, 60; 3/C/2-327, group interview, 27. 
201

35. Reedy, “The Other Objective,” 7; C/2-327, group interview, 62-3, 65-7; 

Wray, interview, 30-2.

36. C/2-327, group interview, 55-8, 83; Reedy, “The Other Objective,” 8. 

37. Corporal John Nesse, quoted in C/2-327, group interview, 15. C/2-327, 

group interview, 12-5.

38. Reedy, quoted in C/2-327, group interview, 68. 

39. C/2-327, group interview, 68-9, 73; 3/C/2-327, group interview, 34-5. 

40. Reedy, quoted in C/2-327, group interview, 91-4. 

41. First Lieutenant Steven Craig, quoted in C/2-327, group interview, 91.

42. Nesse, quoted in C/2-327, group interview, 87.

203

Glossary

ANA Afghan National Army

ANP Afghan National Police 

ANSF Afghan National Security Forces

ARF Aerial Reaction Force

ASR Alternate Supply Route

ATPIAL Advanced Target Pointer Illuminator Aiming Light

AWG Asymmetric Warfare Group

BCT Brigade Combat Team

C2 Command and Control

CAT Civil Affairs Team

CAV Cavalry

CCA Close Combat Attack 

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program

CFSOCC Combined Forces Special Operations Component 

Command

CJSOTF Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force

COIN Counterinsurgency

COP Combat Outpost 

CP Command Post 

CROWS Common Remotely Operated Weapon Station

FA Field Artillery Regiment

FO Forward Observer 

FOB Forward Operating Base

HLZ Helicopter Landing Zone

HVT High Value Targets

IED Improvised Explosive Device

IJC International Joint Command

IN Infantry

IOTV Improved Outer Tactical Vest

ISAF International Security Assistance Forces

ISR Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance 

JDAMS Joint Direct Attack Munitions

JLENS Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile Defense Elevated 

Netted Sensor 
204

JRTC Joint Readiness Training Center

JTAC Joint Terminal Attack Controller

KIA Killed In Action

LP Listening Post

LZ Landing Zone

M-ATV Mine Resistant Ambush Protected-All Terrain Vehicle

MEDCAP Medical Civic Assistance Programs

MEDEVAC Medical Evacuation 

MGS Mobile Gun System

MICLIC Mine Clearing Line Charge

MOLLE Modular Lightweight Load-Carrying Equipment

MRAP Mine Resistant Ambush Protected

MREs Meals Ready to Eat

MTOE Modified Table of Organization and Equipment 

NAIs Named Area of Interest 

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer

NGO Nongovernmental Organizations

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OHDACA Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster, and Civic Aid

OP Observation Post

PCI Pre-Combat Inspection

PRTs Provincial Reconstruction Teams

QRF Quick Reaction Force

RC Regional Command

RCP Route Clearance Package

RPG Rocket-Propelled Grenades

RTO Radio Telephone Operator 

SAW Squad Automatic Weapon

SOF Special Operations Forces

TAA Tactical Assembly Area

TF Task Force

TOC Tactical Operations Center 

UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UNAMA United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan

USAID United States Agency for International Development

WIA Wounded in Action
205

About the Authors

Anthony E. Carlson holds a Ph.D. in History from the University 

of Oklahoma. He currently serves as an historian on the Afghan Study 

Team at the Combat Studies Institute and an adjunct Assistant Professor 

of History for the US Army Command and General Staff College. His 

publications include works on Progressive Era US water and flood control 

policy, public works, and the antebellum Army Corps of Topographical 

Engineers.

Michael J. Doidge is a Doctoral Candidate at the University of 

Southern Mississippi, where he co-edited Triumph Revisited: Historians 

Battle for the Vietnam War. In addition to writing his dissertation, Michael 

currently serves as an Army historian on the Afghan Study Team at the 

Combat Studies Institute and an adjunct Assistant Professor of History for 

the US Army Command and General Staff College.

Scott J. Gaitley holds a BA in History from Park University. He has 

served as an Air Force Wing Historian in both Iraq and Afghanistan and 

more recently as a staff historian at the Air Force Reserve Command 

Headquarters. He currently serves as an historian for the Afghan Study 

Team at the US Army Combat Studies Institute.

Kevin M. Hymel holds an MA in History from Villanova University. 

He is the author of Patton’s Photographs: War As He Saw It and coauthor 

of Patton: Legendary World War II Commander, with Martin Blumenson. 

Before serving on the Afghan Study Team at the Combat Studies Institute, 

he worked for a number of military and military history magazines as a 

researcher, editor and writer. 

Matt M. Matthews has worked at the Combat Studies Institute since 

July 2005 and is currently a member of the Afghan Study Team. He is the 

author of numerous CSI publications. Mr. Matthews has also coauthored 

various scholarly articles on the Civil War in the trans-Mississippi. He 

is a frequent speaker at Civil War Roundtables and the former Mayor of 

Ottawa, Kansas.

John M. McGrath holds an MA in History from the University 

of Massachusetts at Boston and is a Ph.D. candidate at Kansas State 

University. He is a retired Army officer and has worked as a US Army 

historian since 1998 at the Center of Military History and CSI. He is the 

author of nine books on military history. 
206

Lieutenant Colonel John C. Mountcastle holds a Ph.D in History from 

Duke University. He has served as an Assistant Professor of History at the 

US Military Academy at West Point and more recently as an historian at the 

US Army Combat Studies Institute. He currently serves as the Professor of 

Military Science at the University of Washington in Seattle.

Ryan D. Wadle received a Ph.D. in History from Texas A&M 

University. He currently serves as an historian on the Afghan Study Team 

at the US Army Combat Studies Institute. In addition to his official duties, 

he is currently working on an article-length study of joint Army-Navy 

training and doctrine in the interwar period. 

Combat Studies Institute Press

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