J. S73014/16

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: C.F., A MINOR :

:

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

:

APPEAL OF: J.B., NATURAL MOTHER : No. 609 WDA 2016

Appeal from the Order Entered April 15, 2016,

in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County

Orphans’ Court Division at No. CP-02-AP-0000075-2015

BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., LAZARUS AND JENKINS, JJ. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 14, 2016

J.B. (“Mother”) appeals from the order dated April 6, 2016, and 

entered April 15, 2016,1in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County, 

Orphans’ Court Division, granting the petition of the Allegheny County Office 

of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) and involuntarily terminating her 

parental rights to her dependent, male child, C.F. (“Child”), born in March of 

2013, pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), 

and (b).

2

 After review, we affirm.

 

1 While the order was dated April 6, 2016, notice pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 236 

was not provided until April 15, 2016. See Frazier v. City of 

Philadelphia, 735 A.2d 113, 115 (Pa. 1999) (holding that “an order is not 

appealable until it is entered on the docket with the required notation that 

appropriate notice has been given”).

2

In the same order, the trial court terminated the parental rights of Child’s 

father, D.F. (“Father”), also pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and 

(b). Father has filed an appeal at Superior Court Docket No. 674 WDA 2016.
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The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and factual history, 

in part, as follows:

The family came to the attention of CYF on the 

day of the child’s birth – [in] March [of] 2013 – when 

Mother and the infant tested positive for cocaine and 

methadone. CYF did not remove the child at that 

time. The child remained with Mother until they 

were discharged on April 1, 2013. Father was at the 

hospital when the child was born. He was listed as 

the Father on the birth certificate and acknowledged 

paternity at a later time. CYF installed in-home 

services in weeks after Mother’s discharge. CYF 

offered similar services to Father, but soon after the 

birth, Father was incarcerated. Only a couple weeks 

later, on April 18, 2013, CYF removed the child after 

allegations of further drug use. Following a shelter 

hearing, the child was returned to Mother’s care so 

long as she resided with her step-sister. The child 

remained in Mother’s care until June 6, 2013, when 

he was removed following another Emergency 

Custody Authorization. Mother had tested positive 

for cocaine, opiates, and benzodiazepines; the 

caseworker had witnessed Mother “manipulate” –

i.e., tamper – with the urine screen. On June 12, 

2013, the child was adjudicated dependent, and 

ultimately never returned to either parent’s care. 

The child has been placed in the foster home of C.D. 

and R.M. R.M. is Mother’s step[-]sister.

CYF established a Family Service Plan (“FSP”) 

to aid in reunification of the parents with their child. 

FSPs are comprised of goals. The goals are designed 

to address and resolve the conditions that led to the 

child’s removal from parental care. Mother’s goals 

included: address drug and alcohol concerns; 

address parenting concerns; address mental health 

concerns; obtain and maintain sobriety; work with 

in-home services; address lack of stable housing; 

participate in psychological evaluation; visit the 

child. Later, after it was alleged that Mother’s 

current boyfriend physically abused her, CYF added 
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another goal: address domestic violence 

concerns. . . .

Mother was largely noncompliant with her 

goals. She has not addressed her drug 

addiction, [sic] she regularly missed drug screens. 

She has not addresses [sic] the ongoing domestic 

violence in her home. With the exception of 

approximately one month in December 2014,[3] 

Mother’s visitations were never unsupervised. . . .

Trial court opinion, 6/10/16 at 1-3.

On April 5, 2015, CYF filed a petition to terminate parental rights. 

Thereafter, the trial court conducted a hearing on April 6, 2016. At the 

hearing, CYF presented the testimony of CYF caseworker, Darlene Lewis, and 

Family Resources prevention services specialist (also referred to as a 

parenting specialist), Mary Safrin. Father additionally testified on his own 

behalf. Counsel further stipulated to the submission of the psychological 

evaluations of Neil Rosenblum, Ph.D., clinical psychologist.4 (Notes of 

testimony, 4/6/16 at 130-132.) While Mother was present, she did not 

testify, and was absent from the courtroom for a lengthy portion of the 

hearing.

 

3 Mother gave birth to another child in December of 2014. This child was 

also born with drugs in his system and ultimately adjudicated dependent, as 

well. (Notes of testimony, 4/6/16 at 78-79, 104, 109.)

4 Dr. Rosenblum’s evaluations, which included individual evaluations of 

Mother and foster parents and interactional evaluations of Child with Mother 

and foster parents, were marked as Exhibit CYF 5.
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By order dated April 6, 2016, and entered April 15, 2016, the trial 

court involuntarily terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to Child. 

On April 29, 2016, Mother, through appointed counsel, filed a timely notice 

of appeal, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal

pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).

On appeal, Mother raises the following issue for our review:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a 

matter of law in concluding that termination of 

Appellant’s parental rights would serve the needs 

and welfare of the Child pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[A.] 

§2511(b)?

Mother’s brief at 5.

In matters involving involuntary termination of parental rights, our 

standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental 

rights cases requires appellate courts “to accept the 

findings of fact and credibility determinations of the 

trial court if they are supported by the record.” 

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 

2012). “If the factual findings are supported, 

appellate courts review to determine if the trial court 

made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. 

“[A] decision may be reversed for an abuse of 

discretion only upon demonstration of manifest 

unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or 

ill-will.” Id. The trial court’s decision, however, 

should not be reversed merely because the record 

would support a different result. Id. at 827. We 

have previously emphasized our deference to trial 

courts that often have first-hand observations of the 

parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re 

R.J.T., 9 A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].
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In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). “The trial court is free to 

believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to 

make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.” 

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa.Super. 2004) (citation omitted). “[I]f 

competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will affirm even if 

the record could also support the opposite result.” In re Adoption of 

T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted).

The termination of parental rights is guided by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis of the grounds for termination followed by the needs and welfare of 

the child.

Our case law has made clear that under 

Section 2511, the court must engage in a bifurcated 

process prior to terminating parental rights. Initially, 

the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party 

seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct 

satisfies the statutory grounds for termination 

delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court 

determines that the parent’s conduct warrants 

termination of his or her parental rights does the 

court engage in the second part of the analysis 

pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the 

needs and welfare of the child under the standard of 

best interests of the child. One major aspect of the 

needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and 

status of the emotional bond between parent and 

child, with close attention paid to the effect on the 

child of permanently severing any such bond.

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We 

have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, 
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weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” 

In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc), quoting 

Matter of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998).

In this case, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). We 

have long held that, in order to affirm a termination of parental rights, we 

need only agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of 

Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 

384 (Pa.Super. 2004) (en banc). Here, Mother concedes grounds for 

termination under Section 2511(a)(2). (See Mother’s brief at 10.) We, 

therefore, analyze the court’s termination pursuant to Section 2511(b) only, 

which provides as follows:

(b) Other considerations.--The court in 

terminating the rights of a parent shall give 

primary consideration to the developmental, 

physical and emotional needs and welfare of 

the child. The rights of a parent shall not be 

terminated solely on the basis of 

environmental factors such as inadequate 

housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control 

of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), 

the court shall not consider any efforts by the 

parent to remedy the conditions described 

therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511 (b).
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With regard to Section 2511(b), the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has 

stated as follows:

[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) 

are met, a court “shall give primary consideration to 

the developmental, physical and emotional needs 

and welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The 

emotional needs and welfare of the child have been 

properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as 

love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 

53 A.3d 781, 791 (Pa.Super. 2012). In In re E.M., 

620 A.2d [481, 485 (Pa. 1993)], this Court held that 

the determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” 

requires consideration of the emotional bonds 

between the parent and child. The “utmost 

attention” should be paid to discerning the effect on 

the child of permanently severing the parental bond. 

In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791. However, as discussed 

below, evaluation of a child’s bonds is not always an 

easy task.

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. “[I]n cases where there is no evidence of a 

bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond 

exists. Accordingly, the extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily 

depends on the circumstances of the particular case.” In re Adoption of 

J.M., 991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa.Super. 2010) (citations omitted).

When evaluating a parental bond, “the court is not required to use 

expert testimony. Social workers and caseworkers can offer evaluations as 

well. Additionally, Section 2511(b) does not require a formal bonding 

evaluation.” In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa.Super. 2010), citing 

In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa.Super. 2008) (internal citations 

omitted).
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As further recognized in T.S.M.:

[C]ontradictory considerations exist as to whether 

termination will benefit the needs and welfare of a 

child who has a strong but unhealthy bond to his 

biological parent, especially considering the 

existence or lack thereof of bonds to a pre-adoptive 

family. As with dependency determinations, we 

emphasize that the law regarding termination of 

parental rights should not be applied mechanically 

but instead always with an eye to the best interests 

and the needs and welfare of the particular children 

involved. See, e.g., R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1190 (holding 

that statutory criteria of whether child has been in 

care for fifteen of the prior twenty-two months 

should not be viewed as a “litmus test” but rather as 

merely one of many factors in considering goal 

change). Obviously, attention must be paid to the 

pain that inevitably results from breaking a child’s 

bond to a biological parent, even if that bond is 

unhealthy, and we must weigh that injury against 

the damage that bond may cause if left intact. 

Similarly, while termination of parental rights 

generally should not be granted unless adoptive 

parents are waiting to take a child into a safe and 

loving home, termination may be necessary for the 

child’s needs and welfare in cases where the child’s 

parental bond is impeding the search and placement 

with a permanent adoptive home.

71 A.3d at 268-269.

Instantly, in examining Section 2511(b) and finding sufficient grounds 

for termination, the trial court reasoned:

Mother’s refusal to access available drug and 

alcohol treatment is most troubling. Likewise, this 

Court cannot ignore the fact that she has placed 

herself in – and this would place the child in – a 

physically abusive environment. These dangerous 

conditions have prevented Mother from conducting 

any real parenting outside of supervised visitations. 

At the time of the termination hearing, child had not 
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been in the parents’ care for approximately 

34 months.

According to Dr. Neil Rosenblum’s 

psychological evaluation, the child is thriving with his 

pre-adoptive foster parents C.D. and C.D.’s mother 

R.M. He calls C.D. “Mom” and R.M. “Mimi.” The 

child enjoys attention from R.M.’s paramour who he 

calls “poppy” as well as R.M.’s younger children. The 

child’s speech and attention span [have] improved 

while in the foster parent’s care. Dr. Rosenblum 

found that the foster parents are strongly attached 

to the child, who is the center of attention in the 

home. He has lived with the family essentially his 

entire life. Critically, Dr. Rosenblum found that 

“removing [Child] from his present family 

environment would be not only highly disruptive to 

his developmental progress and attachment, but 

would be traumatic and likely cause severe 

emotional distress for this child.” Dr. Rosenblum 

emphasized that Mother is appropriate with the child 

and has demonstrated positive parenting instincts, 

but he concluded that “because of [Mother’s mental 

health and substance abuse concerns] there is no 

way to view her as being able to provide [the child] 

with a stable and secure family environment as her 

own personal functioning remains so fragile and 

unstable at this time.” Dr. Rosenblum further 

concluded, and this Court agreed, that given the 

child’s strong attachment to his foster parents, 

adoption is clearly the “only permanency outcome 

that would allow [the child continuity] of care and 

the opportunity to remain in a stable family 

environment capable of meeting his needs at this 

time and in the years to come.”

. . . Because the child is placed with kin, it is this 

Court’s hope that positive, healthy contact will 

remain between the child and his biological parents. 

But it is crystal clear that termination serves the 

child’s best needs and welfare. The Court feels 

strongly that the child’s pre-adoptive foster parents 

are the best judges of whether future contact is in 

the child’s best interests.
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Trial court opinion, 6/10/16 at 7-8 (citations to record omitted).

Mother, however, argues:

[n]one of the witnesses or documentary evidence 

presented by CYF referred to the emotional effect 

that termination of [Mother’s] parental rights would 

have on [Child]. Even the CYF caseworker failed to 

address issues of parent-child bonds and potential 

effects of termination of parental rights on [Child]. 

Likewise, the Opinion of the trial court in support of 

its decision fails to analyze the emotional effect that 

termination of parental rights would have on [Child].

Mother’s brief at 13 (citations to record omitted). We disagree.

This court finds that Mother’s argument regarding Section 2511(b) 

lacks merit. Upon review, as the trial court’s factual findings are supported 

by the record, and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of error of 

law or abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s order with regard to 

Subsection (b). In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).

Based on the foregoing analysis of the trial court’s termination of 

Mother’s parental rights, we affirm the order of the trial court.

Order affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 11/14/2016