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STEP OR STUMBLE: THE OBAMA

ADMINISTRATION’S PIVOT TO ASIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

DECEMBER 6, 2016

Serial No. 114–239

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

MATT SALMON, Arizona 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

PAUL COOK, California 

RANDY K. WEBER SR., Texas 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

RON DESANTIS, Florida 

MARK MEADOWS, North Carolina 

TED S. YOHO, Florida 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

REID J. RIBBLE, Wisconsin 

DAVID A. TROTT, Michigan 

LEE M. ZELDIN, New York 

DANIEL DONOVAN, New York 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GRACE MENG, New York 

LOIS FRANKEL, Florida 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois 

BRENDAN F. BOYLE, Pennsylvania

AMY PORTER, Chief of Staff THOMAS SHEEHY, Staff Director

JASON STEINBAUM, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

MATT SALMON, Arizona Chairman 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT DESJARLAIS, Tennessee 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

AMI BERA, California 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

ALAN S. LOWENTHAL, California 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

GRACE MENG, New York 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Richard J. Ellings, Ph.D., president, The National Bureau of Asian Research . 6

Derek M. Scissors, Ph.D., resident scholar, American Enterprise Institute ...... 20

Ms. Kelley Currie, senior fellow, Project 2049 Institute ...................................... 33

Mr. Barry C. Lynn, director, Open Markets Program, New America ................. 41

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Richard J. Ellings, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ..................................................... 9

Derek M. Scissors, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ..................................................... 23

Ms. Kelley Currie: Prepared statement ................................................................. 36

Mr. Barry C. Lynn: Prepared statement ............................................................... 43

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 62

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 63

Richard J. Ellings, Ph.D.: Revised prepared statement ....................................... 64

Mr. Barry C. Lynn: Material submitted for the record ........................................ 75

(1)

STEP OR STUMBLE: THE OBAMA 

ADMINISTRATION’S PIVOT TO ASIA 

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 6, 2016

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON ASIA AND THE PACIFIC,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:00 p.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Matt Salmon (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. SALMON. Good afternoon. The committee will come to order. 

The written statements will be included in the official hearing 

record. And without objection, the hearing record will remain open 

for 5 calendar days to allow statements, questions and extraneous 

materials for the record, subject to the length limitation in the 

rules. 

Today marks my final hearing as chairman of this important 

subcommittee. It is truly an honor to have served on this subcommittee with my fellow distinguished members. My time as 

chairman, focused on the world’s most dynamic region, has been 

punctuated with memories of meeting countless dedicated policy 

and business professionals, insights that I will carry with me beyond my tenure here on the grave—here on the Hill. Did I say 

grave? And hopefully, leaving a lasting mark on our Nation’s Asia 

policy. 

As the United States undergoes a notable transition, I convene 

this hearing to review the current administration’s policy toward 

Asia, and to determine what tangible accomplishments the United 

States has made. More importantly, we will also form suggestions 

for the new administration’s policy toward Asia. 

We have come to the end of an administration whose signature 

foreign policy initiative has been a rebalance to the Asia-Pacific. I 

have long championed enhancing our engagement with the AsiaPacific and our friends and our allies in the region. They have welcomed the rebalance as a strengthening of our regional relationships. But after 8 years of enhancing U.S. efforts in Asia, serious 

challenges to U.S. interests persist, and some of them have even 

grown. Today, I note that our posture in Asia is not what we hoped 

for when the pivot was introduced. 

The TPP. As we reflect on the outgoing Obama administration’s 

efforts in Asia, the Trans-Pacific Partnership may be end up being 

the administration’s most lasting failure. The administration chose 

to use this economic agreement as our strategic anchor in Asia and 

2

tried to market the deal at home by saying that it would allow us 

to write the rules for free trade. Now, the prospect of TPP ratification in the United States is effectively dead, and our closest Asian 

partners are questioning the endurance of our leadership in the region. 

This debacle endangers U.S. prestige in Asia, and it didn’t need 

to happen. The administration’s own arguments implied that China 

is now in a position to write the rules. And our national reputation 

has taken a hit, because the administration tied it to TPP without 

first establishing a national consensus by addressing deep domestic 

concerns about the potential impact on our economic viability. 

As the next administration considers its economic and trade ties 

with Asia, it may now be better to approach negotiations bilaterally, perhaps starting with Japan. If we begin the bilateral process with Japan, we may be able to add other modern economies in 

the dialog in a more feasible approach directed at a core group. 

Without a concerted economic engagement with all parts of Asia, 

China will fill the void with its willingness to fund much-needed 

infrastructure without regard to intellectual property, labor and environmental standards. China has been, and will continue to be, a 

land of contradictions, of challenges and opportunities. The need to 

strike a proper balance of working together on economic prosperity, 

with a willingness to stand firm when necessary, will continue 

under our President-elect’s tenure. 

Our business community and economy are under threat from regulations and policies designed to favor Chinese interests and domestic champions. Threats from cyber-enabled economic espionage 

and intellectual property theft continue unabated. The current administration has been more willing to make concessions and seems 

fearful of provoking China. I have been alarmed to witness the escalation of infringement on Hong Kong’s self-governance and basic 

law with little to no U.S. pushback. Many in Congress have been 

similarly unsatisfied with the administration’s halfhearted efforts 

to address Chinese human rights abuses and regional aggression, 

particularly with respect to the South China Sea. 

Our regional allies and friends continue to call for further U.S. 

engagement and assistance. And it is my expectation that the next 

administration will seek to provide substantive reassurance to the 

region. 

Taiwan. A lot of hoopla about Taiwan in the last few days. China 

has also been increasingly unreasonable toward Taiwan, which is 

in a more precarious position than ever. I was able to attend Tsai 

Ing-wen’s swearing in. That was the third president of Taiwan that 

I have been able to attend the swearing in. I attended Lee Tenghui’s, the first truly elected president of Taiwan. I then attended 

Chen Shui-bian’s, and I was able to be at Tsai Ing-wen’s, much 

over the objections of some of the folks here. I was, I think, was 

the highest ranking Member of the Congress to—actually, I think 

I was the only Member of the Congress that I attended. After completing yet another successful democratic transition, Taiwan continues to prove that a free flourishing economically successful Chinese democracy in civil society is possible. 

The surprise over President-elect Trump accepting a call from 

President Tsai Ing-wen has been an unnecessary distraction. The 

3

fact is, we are economically and militarily engaged with Taiwan as 

directed by the 1971 Taiwan Relations Act, and a phone call between principals should not garner such outrage. 

I am further dismayed that the same Washington elites and 

press corps that hailed President Obama a hero for meeting with 

Iran’s President Rouhani, a key supporter of terrorism across the 

globe, would become so distraught over a phone call. I fully expect 

that President-elect Trump and President Tsai will have a productive relationship that benefits both of our economies. 

North Korea will continue to be a challenge that we must face 

head on. This has been one of the ultimate blunders of the Obama 

administration in Asia, the so-called strategic patience approach to 

North Korea. While Kim Jong Un has conducted increasingly powerful nuclear and ballistic missile tests, we have not seen anything 

that could be described as a strategy. If the past gives any indication of what to expect, North Korea could soon conduct another 

substantial provocation to welcome the U.S. President to office. 

Congress has been vigilant about applying pressure on the DPRK, 

and I anticipate that it will continue to look forward to new levers 

to stop North Korea’s belligerent and dangerous behavior. Sanctions efforts led by Chairman Ed Royce have helped squeeze the 

DPRK from vital funding sources. Still, more can and has to be 

done, such as further cooperation and intelligence sharing between 

our allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan. 

In addition, more can be done to increase the flow of information 

into North Korea. We can do much more to assist the people of 

North Korea to understand the truth of their reality. North Korea 

and provocation should always be met with resistance, and I look 

forward to a new strategy on this front. 

This year, the administration’s relationship with a long-time ally, 

the Philippines, fell apart. Newly elected President Duterte came 

out strongly in opposition of the United States. He has appeared 

to use the media to pit the United States against China, in an effort to renegotiate the long-standing alliance structure. Despite the 

trend of late, I am heartened to see that the Philippines President, 

and President-elect Trump, have shown each other mutual respect. 

And I am hopeful that this pivotal alliance will be rekindled from 

the top down and remain the force for good that it can be. 

India. The administration halfheartedly sought to include India 

in the pivot, but the deep well of potential in our bilateral ties remains untapped. India struggles with infrastructure challenges, energy issues and difficult neighbors, but the two world’s largest democracies are natural partners. There is a strong appetite within 

the United States to encourage India to take a stronger leadership 

role within the region. Leadership does come with responsibilities. 

As India seeks to garner closer commercial and defense relations 

with the U.S., it must take steps toward important reforms that 

will lay the foundation for increased ties. 

I am skeptical that our interests in Asia have been substantially 

advanced over the last 8 years. The outgoing administration spoke 

often of intentions to refocus its efforts in Asia, but left nearly everything undone. Its landmark trade deal has failed. Being patient 

with North Korea has made us less secure. We have lost footing 

with a longtime ally in the Philippines, and our security guaranVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:05 Jan 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\120616\22865 SHIRL
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tees throughout the region have been called into question by destabilizing actors. Looking ahead, I am very optimistic that the new 

administration, along with what I hope will be a unified Congress, 

can rebuild efforts in Asia, provide for a robust regional security, 

and promote lasting U.S. prosperity. 

I am going to turn to the gentleman from California, Mr. Bera, 

to see if he would like to make an opening comment or two. 

Mr. BERA. Certainly. Mr. Chairman, I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for your work over these last 2 years. Your 

leadership, your understanding of the region, your fluency in the 

Chinese language has been great. It has been a pleasure to travel 

to India, to China and to Taiwan with you. So we are going to miss 

that expertise and we are going to miss that leadership, and it 

really has been a pleasure for this Member of Congress serving 

with you, and I look forward to—hopefully, you will stay engaged 

in the region if opportunities present themselves to continue to 

stay engaged, but the best of luck in the future, and I do hope to 

continue working with you in that. 

I will leave my further statements for the hearing. So thank you. 

Mr. SALMON. I thank the gentleman. I recognize the other gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me 

just note what an honor and pleasure it has been to work with you 

as friends and colleagues and patriots, trying to do what is best for 

our country and just—you will be missed and we hope that things 

go well. Let me just say we all are here for a short period of time. 

Our goal is—hopefully our goal has been to help make things better for the United States of America. Some people think our goal 

is to focus on making it a better world. That certainly is something 

positive, and that is, frankly, perceptions of what is good for the 

whole world is not necessarily what is good for the United States 

of America. 

And we even have a new President who has made it very clear 

that that will be his criteria, what is good for the people of the 

United States of America. In that regard, I would suggest that in 

your area, you have so ably overseen in these last few years, that 

I would give the administration a D, I wouldn’t give them an F, 

I would give them a D. And as the chairman just noted, what is 

going on with actions and hostile posturing and belligerency on the 

part of China has increased. North Korea’s threatening behavior, 

as well as its actual arrogance, in dealing with the issue of nuclear 

weapons. Again, much more threatening than it was. And then we 

have the crumbling of our long-term relationships with Malaysia 

and with the Philippines. This, overall then, this pivot to Asia, that 

has been—in and of itself, has been a failure, but overall, I give 

the administration a D. And looking forward to hopefully next year, 

even on the other side of the aisle if they want to give it a rank, 

then maybe we will have an A. Let’s see if we can all work for that. 

Mr. SALMON. The chair recognizes the former chairman the subcommittee, Mr. Chabot. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to 

begin, again, by some of my colleagues who said thanking you for 

your years of service to this House, and especially for your stewardship of this committee. And I know that you know you had big 

5

shoes to fill when stepping into this role, they were mine. But you 

handled it very, very well, and have done a great job as chair of 

this committee. So I want to thank you for that. And we wish you 

the best of luck. I am sure you are going to be very successful in 

whatever it is. Have you decided yet? Or are you going to make an 

announcement here today? 

Mr. SALMON. I don’t know, I was going to try to be Secretary 

General of the U.N. What do you think? 

Mr. CHABOT. Would you want that job? 

Mr. SALMON. Not on your life. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. See what we can do. 

Mr. CHABOT. Secretary of State Rohrabacher. But in any event, 

the pivot, to get to the topic at hand here, I think it has been one 

of the most frequently and poorly defined phrases of the Obama administration. Some experts have argued that it has been little more 

than an empty slogan. I hate to say that I tend to agree with that. 

The pivot has really been a sorry excuse for strategy. It has merely 

been a hodgepodge of contradictory ideas that is, without question, 

signaled indecision and weakness to challengers from Beijing to 

Pyongyang to Moscow. 

The past several years have been especially disconcerting, particularly the administration’s handling of China’s growing assertiveness from building islands to now militarizing them. We failed 

to effectively stand up for our allies in the region, such as Taiwan. 

And I have to say, although I know some folks have been concerned 

about that, upset about that, I say more power to him for having 

taken that call. And Chinese bullying has to stop, and it has gotten 

worse and worse in recent years, and I think this administration 

has done little to push back on that. And I don’t think you reward 

bad behavior, and I think that is what has been happening. Beijing’s behavior has been more and more reprehensible, and it has 

been not nearly enough pushback. 

And as I am sure all my colleagues believe, you know, we don’t 

want to see any sort of military action in that part of the region. 

But as Ronald Reagan believed, it is through strength that you 

continue with the peace. Weakness invites military action in war, 

and I think that is what is happening now. And so I commend 

President-elect Trump for taking that call. I look forward to hearing the witnesses’ testimony this afternoon, and I yield back. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. Did any of the other committee members wish to make an opening statement? If not, then we go to the 

panel, we are really thankful to be joined today by Dr. Richard 

Ellings, president of the National Bureau of Asian Research. Great 

to see you again. 

How is your wound from your baseball tournament? Are you 

doing better? 

Mr. ELLINGS. Broken thumb, but I’m here. 

Mr. SALMON. Well, I am glad to see you. 

Dr. Derek Scissors, resident scholar——

Mr. ELLINGS. Too much information. 

Mr. SCISSORS. I have no injuries. 

Mr. SALMON. No injuries? Good. I don’t think you would tell us 

if you did. 

Ms. Kelley Currie, senior fellow at Project 2049

6

Institute. Great to see you again. And Mr. Barry Lynn, director 

of New America’s Open Markets Program. We thank the panel for 

joining us today to share their experience and expertise. 

And I am going to start with you, Dr. Ellings. Would you go 

ahead and turn your microphone on. And you all know the drill? 

When it turns amber, it is time to wrap up. I think you have about 

a minute to wrap up. I don’t have a heavy gavel, but we don’t have 

the power of the filibuster over here in the House, so you can’t go 

on forever, so that is the drill. Thank you. 

Go ahead Dr. Ellings. 

STATEMENT OF RICHARD J. ELLINGS, PH.D., PRESIDENT, THE 

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ASIAN RESEARCH 

Mr. ELLINGS. Chairman Salmon, Congressman Bera, when he 

gets here, Ranking Member Sherman and other extraordinarily distinguished members of the committee, it is an honor to share of my 

personal observations and views that are outlined in my written 

testimony. I plan to get through them quickly before they become 

obsolete. You know, there might be a Tweet. The pivot, better 

called the rebalance, has been a policy that might be termed enhanced more of the same. 

I will make two contextual points, then assess the policy and conclude by suggesting some concrete things Congress can do working 

with the new administration. 

First contextual point. For many reasons, this period of history 

appears to be a hinge moment, as someone put it recently. It is 

akin in too many ways to the years immediately preceding World 

Wars I and II, highlighted by the industrialization and rise of dissatisfied nationalistic authoritarian powers. And yet, it differs from 

these eras in noteworthy ways as well. 

The nuances of this century’s principle rising power, China. The 

proliferation of nuclear weapons and America’s strategic engagement. The remarkable rise, power and ambitions of China comprise 

the central issue. As China watchers like to point out, the country 

has made enormous progress, but has all kinds of horrible problems. Its chief problem is that its unelected leadership under Xi 

Jinping is insecure and resorting to tighter control, repressive 

measures, and nationalistic appeals to bolster its popularity, capitalizing on historic grievances. 

Correspondingly as foreign policies have become more aggressive, 

and at the same time, remain carefully calculated and, frankly, farsighted. China has a grand strategy to maximize its wealth, space 

and global influence, and to marginalize its most serious competitors, most notably, the United States. It has an eye for weak spots. 

For many years, specialists have been predicting political crisis, 

or change, in China, they have been wrong. And yet, they are right 

about the future. But we have no ability now to protect when 

change will happen, or what kind of change. 

Second contextual point. Viewed from a global perspective, 

power, no matter how the measure it, is concentrated heavily in 

the Asia-Pacific. I characterize the balance in the region as skewed 

multipolarity. It is skewed, in part, because China has led a onesided arms buildup. 

7

Given the uneven dispersion of power, the extraordinary pace of 

change in the balance of power, uncertainty in key countries, and 

increasing questions about U.S. leadership, ambiguity also describes the strategic environment. Ambiguity is not good. When nations have a difficult time understanding their strategic environment, many feel insecure and like to expand their allies and defenses. Some nations see opportunities to pursue ambitions. 

In times like ours, nations are more prone to making calculations 

that lead to conflict. Our capacity to remain strong and committed, 

to exploit weaknesses in our competitors, and to form and sustain 

effective coalitions, will be the test of our leadership. 

A quick assessment of the pivot. The intention to place greater 

policy focus on the Asia-Pacific is great. It is terrific, imperative, 

and goes back decades to the Clinton through George W. Bush administrations. 

President Barack Obama’s high profile pivot in fall of 2011 aimed 

to strengthen our alliances and friendships, engage China, bolster 

regional multiple lateral institutions, expand trade and investment, 

add to our military presence, at least, implicitly, in North Korea’s 

nuclear program, advance democracy and human rights, a pact, 

and familiar agenda. But announced at full volume and short on 

specifics. 

After 5 years, it is fair to judge the policy. Notwithstanding, a 

senior State Department official’s recent statement that, and I 

quote, ‘‘We’re handing the next administration a success story in 

Asia.’’ Seriously, that was said. ‘‘The pivot and the predecessor policies on balance have failed to prepare us for the challenges of 

today, let alone tomorrow.’’

We have not been operating from understanding of the world as 

it actually exists. We have failed repeatedly to understand and anticipate Russian intentions and policy, North Korean intentions 

and policy, and most importantly, Chinese intentions and policy. 

Furthermore, I see no evidence that we have contemplated strategies to avoid facing some type of Sino-Russian or Sino-RussianNorth Korean-Pakistani coalition if, for example, hostilities were to 

break out in the Korean peninsula and in south Asia. 

We are being compelled to position our world-leading military 

forces farther and farther off the Asian coastline. We have not 

come up with an effective answer to China’s island-based building 

in the South China Sea. We have failed to prevent North Korea 

from achieving nuclear breakout. 

Sequestration has prevented us from investing in many of the 

systems we will need to deter—if deterrence fails, to win—a future 

conflict in the region. In fact, we do not have a military strategy 

for the Asia-Pacific. We continue to treat trade with China as normal when the country is persistently mercantilists. U.S. companies 

are increasingly twisted into pretzels trying to operate in a market 

that is now the size of America’s. Companies try to avoid upsetting 

the regime. They try to protect their IP unsuccessfully, and they 

compete with increasingly strong Chinese companies that are favored in myriad and mostly opaque ways. 

Our regional leadership is weaker in part due to the apparent 

demise in the pivot’s economic centerpiece, the Trans-Pacific Partnership. According to a smug daily, China daily article published 

8

days ago with regard to trade ‘‘China’s happy to write the rules 

with all its partners.’’

Any further faltering of our commitment to rebalancing would 

jeopardize, just to name one important example, our strategic relationship with India. The hope for a political liberalization of China 

has not developed from its accession to the World Trade Organization, or from the world otherwise engaging China. Indeed, by most 

measures, the regime is less liberal, more repressive today than 

any time since it joined the WTO. I would like to go when it is possible, when you think it is reasonable through a number of specific 

suggestions that answer each one of these issues. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Ellings follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you very much, Dr. Ellings. Dr. Scissors, 

thank you. I understand this is your second time testifying before 

the panel. Thank you for not letting us not scare you off from the 

first time. We are really thrilled to you have you here again. 

STATEMENT OF DEREK M. SCISSORS, PH.D., RESIDENT 

SCHOLAR, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE 

Mr. SCISSORS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I enjoyed the first 

time, and hope I will enjoy the second time. Thank you to the committee for having me a second time. 

My remarks are going to be restricted to economics, which is, of 

course, important in our engagement in the region, but is only a 

partial view. I want to state that at the outset. 

On the economic view, the next administration, the Trump administration, can do much better than the Obama administration 

did. However, that isn’t going to be easy. We are caught between, 

on one hand, a China that is engaged in predatory trade that 

harms the United States, and American commitments to open markets and competition that help the United States. And while there 

is plenty of scope for U.S. improvement, that does not mean we will 

be able to carry it out. So I will try to address the future more than 

the past. 

In terms of addressing the past, the Trans-Pacific Partnership is 

the obvious issue on the economic side. I have an odd view in 

America today which is, I didn’t like the treaty because it didn’t 

liberalize enough, not because it was too radical and too pro market. 

I was at the Heritage Foundation for 5 years and at that time, 

I wrote multiple pieces praising the idea of the Trans-Pacific Partnership and praising the Obama administration for initiating it. I 

thought it was a great idea. 

When I saw the text in November of last year, I changed my 

mind, because I actually read the agreement, which a lot of people 

don’t do, if I might say under my breath. Oh, there is a microphone. I’m sorry. It did not create the opportunities for American 

workers that all of us at Democrat, Republican, conservative, liberal we want, and in particular, the U.S. is the most comprehensive services exporter in the world, and there are too many exceptions in liberalizing services trade. And as a result, I, the International Trade Commission, others, do not see gains for the U.S. 

from services liberalization in the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 

I won’t spend a lot of time. The point is, the TPP doesn’t do what 

we need it to do economically. That is why President Obama began 

to start talking about writing the rules instead of economic benefits. He started talking about the diplomatic case for TPP. Those 

are all true. But the number one role of a trade agreement is to 

bring economic benefits through trade, and the TPP does not do 

that. So I will not be sorry to see it go. That is one point. 

Turning in the other direction, something that I am worried 

about, I have written about, I wrote in my written testimony, I 

don’t want the United States to swing all the way to the side of 

being protectionists. The Trump campaign cited a think tank that 

represents the labor movement, talking about how the trade defiVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:05 Jan 05, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\_AP\120616\22865 SHIRL
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cits costs U.S. jobs. That is not true. We ran trade surpluses during 

the Depression, it did not help us on the job front. 

Our trade deficit plunged in 2009, it did it not help us on the job 

front. Logically when we are rich, we buy more in the way of imports, and when we are poor, we don’t. If you force the trade deficit 

down, and my colleagues may talk about this, you are going to hurt 

America’s rivals. It is true. You are also going to hurt America’s 

friends and allies, because we trade with them and they are involved in supply chains. You are going to damage the global economic system. 

So I am going to talk in a second about sanctions against China, 

because I think there are some that are necessary. I don’t want us 

to go too far to become a protectionist country, where we think 

trade balance is good economic goal, because it isn’t. 

Let’s talk about sanctions in China. We can label China a currency manipulator; it is a currency manipulator, so it is a good 

label. It won’t actually bring back U.S. jobs, because when you try 

to connect China’s currency value to U.S. jobs, you don’t get a connection. 

Where we know the Chinese are harming us is blocking our exports. When Americans get cheap imports, at least we get a benefit 

from buying the cheap imports. It helps our consumers. 

When a Chinese or other countries block our exports, there is 

nothing for us but cost. And China does that. It is the largest trading country in the world, so it is more important when China does 

it, when Bolivia does it, for example. And they protect their stateowned enterprises from competition, and that is a serious barrier 

to U.S. exports, in particular, U.S. services exports. 

Reciprocity is a legitimate idea and a response. We shouldn’t be 

narrow minded about it, we shouldn’t be protectionist about it, but 

we should say, you are going to block our trade, we don’t have an 

obligation to allow all your trade to occur. 

Another issue that we are all familiar with is IP theft. China the 

biggest stealer of intellectual property in the world. Tens of millions of Americans have jobs supported by intellectual property; it 

is not just about high-technology, it is about any innovation. We 

need to act against companies that have stolen or—that have received stolen intellectual property, not just the thieves which the 

Obama administration did in a small way, but the companies that 

have benefited and compete against American companies because 

they have taken stolen intellectual property from whoever who 

stole it. That is a sanction that needs to go forward. 

Something that I know you all have been discussing, and will be 

discussed in the next Congress, is the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, Chinese investment in the United 

States generally is beneficial, but there are some sectors where we 

do not want Chinese investment. And so, you know, without getting into the CFIUS debate, I would say that assigning more resources to reviewing investment is a benefit for the United States, 

both economically and in terms of national security. 

I am already being warned, but I do want to talk a little bit 

about positive steps, not just sanctions against China. I would welcome the phone call, but I welcome it for a particular reason, I 

22

think the U.S. could side a FTA with Taiwan. During this administration, I think that would be a good idea. 

Japan, as the chairman mentioned, is a superb goal, much more 

complicated, much more difficult, harder politically. Taiwan is 23 

million people, they are not going to steal American jobs, so we 

have an advantage in talking to Taiwan. 

There are countries, India, Indonesia, Philippines Vietnam, these 

are very rapid growth countries. I would not call for FTAs for these 

countries, they aren’t ready, and we aren’t ready. But trying to improve trade relations with these countries would bring economic 

benefits to the United States; there the important countries in the 

region to focus on economically. 

My last point before I stop, we don’t normally think of corporate 

tax reform as bearing on the Asia-Pacific, but in this case, there 

are plans in the works that have border tax adjustments, and those 

border tax adjustments will affect our trade with the Asia-Pacific, 

they will affect our partners. Our partners will want to know what 

is going on, they will want some input, even though this is a domestic American issue. We can have pro-competitive, wonderfully 

beneficial U.S. corporate tax reform. I actually think that this committee and people interested in the Asia-Pacific should be part of 

that discussion. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Scissors follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Ms. Currie, you are also back for a second time, so welcome, and 

thank you. 

STATEMENT OF MS. KELLEY CURRIE, SENIOR FELLOW, 

PROJECT 2049 INSTITUTE 

Ms. CURRIE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I also want to echo 

the plaudits of your colleagues and your leadership of this committee—subcommittee, and note that you will be missed and your 

leadership will be missed. Thank you to all the members of the 

committee. I do want to submit my written testimony for the 

record. 

Mr. SALMON. Without objection. 

Ms. CURRIE. With one small correction that I have already noted 

to your staff. 

The views that I am presenting today are my own and not necessarily those of Project 2049 Institute or its other scholars, but I 

am, nonetheless, grateful for the opportunity to share the them 

with you today. 

Since Donald Trump’s election victory last month, there has been 

a great deal of commentary on the future of the Obama administration’s pivot to Asia. While the focus on the degree to which the 

pivot will continue under Donald Trump is important, much of this 

discussion has tended to focus on hand-wringing about Presidentelect Trump, while ignoring the serious deficiencies of the Obama 

administration’s policies, both in terms of the conceptual failures, 

and the failures of the implementation. 

The whole furor around the call nicely highlighted one the most 

serious conceptual weaknesses of the pivot. The failure to link intensified engagement in the Asia-Pacific with fundamental principles that historically have undergirded successful U.S. foreign 

policy for decades. These principles include privileging relationships with those countries that share our fundamental values; basing policy decisions on the way the world is, not how we wish it 

would be; operating based on an understanding and appreciation of 

both the importance and the limits of U.S. leadership; and making 

sure U.S. commitments are backed up with serious sense of purpose, and the resources necessary to reassure partners. 

The Obama administration was intermittent at best in its adherence to these principles in Asia. And this inconsistency was tantamount to abandonment for those who rely on American strength, 

and those who seek to undermine it. 

Asia’s un-democratic leaders seem to understand opportunities 

are created by the gap between rhetoric and reality, and showed 

a consistent willingness to step into and exploit that gap for their 

own gain. 

Looking around the region, it is hard to argue that on balance, 

there has been an improvement in terms of human rights and democracy, the subject I have been asked to speak to on today’s hearing. 

In particular, in the past 6 years, since the Obama administration launched the rebalance, China’s party state has embarked on 

the most extensive campaign of repression since the cultural revolution, and has firmly closed the door on any prospect of political 

34

liberalization under CCP rule. Even in the Obama administration’s 

poster child for the pivot, Burma, the Tatmadaw appears to be engaging in ethnic cleansing in Rakhine state, while simultaneously 

intensifying attacks on communities in Kachin and Shan states. 

Meanwhile, the Obama administration, having given away all potential leverage by prematurely lifting sanctions on the military, 

watches helplessly as Aung San Suu Kyi struggles with an 

unreconstructed Tatmadaw that has retained control over the key 

levers of power in the country. And I want to note Mr. Chabot’s excellent work on Burma, and hope that that will continue going forward. 

As the Obama administration drops serious U.S. commitments to 

support human rights and democracy across Asia in favor of an 

amorphous people-to-people pillar in the rebalance, abusive authoritarian regimes sought not only to normalize their behavior toward 

their own citizens, but engaged in broader efforts to normalize such 

abusive behavior within the international system. 

Both the U.S. and the U.N. system have utterly failed to address 

the challenge of authoritarian rights abusing regimes that are immune to criticism and international mechanisms. In the case of 

China, the U.N. essentially has given up on its human rights mechanisms, so it is little wonder China’s neighbors view U.N. criticism 

with thinly disguised disdain. 

By failing to consistently and vigorously stand up for human 

rights and liberal values in the Asia-Pacific, and within the international system, the U.S. has created an environment where authoritarians feel empowered to argue that their legal, political, and 

moral perspectives are equally valid, or perhaps even better choices 

for the countries of the region and beyond. The idea that we can 

best support democracy and human rights in Asia by not talking 

about them, or by casting our own values as just one option among 

any number of other valid choices has proven to be manifestly 

false. 

Going forward, I would like to make some suggestions on how we 

can craft a more realistic, yet also fundamentally idealistic foreign 

policy toward the Asia-Pacific and broader Indo-Pacific region. 

Such an approach would benefit not only the U.S. interest over the 

long term, but would also support a firmer foundation for regional 

peace and security. 

We should start any deliberation on our policy choices from the 

premise that our values are our interests. When faced with competing policy choices, the one that adheres most closely to our values should be weighted accordingly. I would also note that free 

trade works best with free nations. Economic freedom should be a 

two-way street, and that is impossible when one partner is an authoritarian government. And many of the points that Derek has 

raised relate directly to this premise. 

Our alliances need to move beyond the hub and spokes system 

to become truly networked in a way that revolves less around the 

U.S., and is more based on the reality of regional peace and security needs. 

Diplomacy has got to stop meaning we pretend some unpleasant 

situation will just go away on its own, or get better if we ignore 

it, or use misleading euphemisms to discuss it with our partners. 

35

The U.S. Foreign Service and our governance and democracy assistance programs need root-and-branch reforms to deal with this 

new reality. 

Finally, I would add that we need to have Congress reassert 

itself as a strong voice in support of human rights and democratic 

values and U.S. foreign policy. Several recent policy errors in Asia 

might have been avoided entirely if the administration had treated 

Congress in a less highhanded fashion, and genuinely consulted 

with its members and staff before making policy decisions. Thank 

you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Currie follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Lynn. 

STATEMENT OF MR. BARRY C. LYNN, DIRECTOR, OPEN 

MARKETS PROGRAM, NEW AMERICA 

Mr. LYNN. Thank you, Chairman Salmon, and thank you to the 

other members of the committee. I would also like to submit written testimony. 

Mr. SALMON. Without objection. 

Mr. LYNN. The Obama administration’s pivot to Asia was a grave 

mistake. I say this not because I believe we can ignore Chinese 

provocations in Asia; we cannot, either in the South China Sea or 

the East China Sea or anywhere else. The pivot was a mistake because it focused mainly on countering military power with military 

power, but ignored the complex set of threats posed by China’s use 

of trade power. China is a mercantilist nation that wields many political and economic tools to concentrate control over industrial capacity. Chinese leaders do so to provide jobs for their people, and 

to concentrate more money, hence more power in their hands. They 

do so also to be able to exert influence over nations that depend 

on that capacity, including the United States. 

Over the last 5 years the Obama administration did nothing to 

address growing U.S. dependence on China for goods that Americans need every day; things like drugs, chemicals and electronics. 

On the contrary, the administration proposed a trade deal, the 

TPP, that if approved, would only have shifted certainly vital industrial capacity further into Chinese control. 

Extreme concentration in China of vital industrial capacity exposes the United States to coercion by China, and may actually increase the likelihood of conflict by tempting Chinese leaders to take 

risks they would not otherwise take. Extreme concentration of industrial capacity by creating numerous single sources of supply, 

also raises the danger of cascading industrial crashes, much like 

the ones that crippled world production after the great Japanese 

earthquake of 2011. 

Liberal trade has served U.S. interests in many ways since the 

Second World War, but in recent years, the uncontrolled shifting 

of jobs from the United States overseas has harmed millions of 

Americans. During this period, our national trade deficit has piled 

up dangerous levels of debt, and has provided Chinese leaders with 

cash they can use to increase China’s influence in the world and 

to reduce America’s. But to understand the full extent of the danger posed the radical shift in trade policy in the mid 1990s, we 

must look also at the structure of supply chains. We should study 

what exactly is made in China, and how much of any vital good 

comes from China. Looking at supply chains is what allows us to 

map our vulnerabilities in a time of conflict, and a way to judge 

whether the pivot to Asia was well-designed. 

Twenty years ago, the United States depended on China for 

nothing that we needed day to day. But the U.S. embrace of WTO 

postnational trade policy in the 1990s freed China, often in alliance 

with large U.S. corporations to use trade power to consolidate control over many assembly activities and industrial components. This 

includes the basic ingredients for some of the Nation’s important 

42

drugs, including antibiotics and some of the most vital inputs in 

our industrial food system such as ascorbic acid. 

Given that private corporations often run their supply chains on 

a just-in-time basis in which goods are produced only as fast as 

they are consumed, there are often no backup supplies anywhere. 

The United States has long been in the practice of providing trade 

sanctions to other nations to achieve political ends. This includes, 

in recent years, North Korea, Iran and Russia. These sanctions are 

often highly effective. In 1956, the United States used trade sanctions to force Britain and France to pull their military forces out 

of Egypt after they attempted to seize the Suez Canal. 

The extreme concentration of industrial capacities in China give 

leaders in Beijing the ability to impose similar sanctions on the 

United States in the event of an actual conflict, or even in the runup to a potential conflict. What would the United States do in the 

event of such a cutoff of vital supplies? Would we try to tough it 

out? Would we cede to Chinese demands? Would we escalate to the 

use of cyber or military power? How would the public react? In 

every case, we have no idea what the answer might be. It appears 

that no agency of the U.S. Government has studied, in any depth 

whatsoever, the issue of U.S. industrial dependence on China. 

Liberal U.S. trade policy in the half century to the mid 1990s 

helped provide the foundation for a period of unprecedented peace, 

and prosperity, and stability in the world. It is now clear that the 

extreme changes to U.S. trade policy in the 1990s upset those balances, in large part, by paralyzing the United States’ ability to 

counter the mercantilist policies of China, and thereby to prevent 

a dangerous concentration of capacity, control, and power. Rather 

than waste more time on the TPP, or to attempt to treat a trade 

problem with military power, as we are largely doing with the 

pivot, the U.S. Government must figure out how to lessen our extreme and growing dependence on industrial capacity located inside 

China in ways that would make our Nation, indeed, the world as 

a whole, more politically and economically secure. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Lynn follows:]

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Mr. SALMON. Thank you. When I first came to Congress in 1995, 

Warren Christopher was the Secretary of State. And I was on this 

Foreign Affairs Committee, a brand new member, and having done 

a lot of things in China and Taiwan, I’d been a missionary for the 

Mormon Church in Taiwan, the same time Jon Huntsman was, 

back in 1977 to 1979. So I remember asking the question of Mr. 

Christopher, Secretary Christopher, what is our policy toward 

China? And he said, well, it is strategic ambiguity. I listened to 

that and I tried to understand it, and I tried to understand it. And 

I guess they came up with the idea, that we basically just say that 

if you do something, we are not sure what we are going to do, but 

we will let you know afterward. That never worked in any other 

relationship I’ve ever had. I don’t know why we think it works with 

China. But it has been the policy of multiple administrations to 

practice strategic ambiguity. 

Dr. Ellings, you said that we needed more clarity. Where can we 

be more clear on things? And has strategic ambiguity served us 

well? 

Mr. ELLINGS. I remember a Herblock cartoon when Christopher—I am giving away, I guess, our mutual ages here—but in 

any case, right after his first trip to China there was a Herblock 

cartoon in which Christopher was sitting before the President reporting, and his head was in his lap. China had basically eaten his 

shorts. But in any case—yeah, you might not be surprised, that I 

think we have a lot of specific things to do. I would start, number 

one, I mean, our credibility is everything. We need to rebalance 

truly, which means to end sequestration and make the investments 

we need to make appropriate responses to the challenges. We have 

not done a strategic assessment that is realistic, and we need one. 

Credibility, as I said, is everything. We have got to work so hard 

with our allies, and win their unambiguous alignment with us. 

I think also, we have to do something once we do the strategic 

assessment we—they are very specific things, UUVs, UAVs, more 

subs. We have to invest in these things. Burden sharing, frankly, 

has been raised by the President-elect; it is not unreasonable. I 

think our allies understand their common interest with us. I think 

as we define new things ahead, those—the burden sharing can proceed. And number one of anything else, I would put in THAAD, 

and anything else we need with regard to North Korea, and simply 

tell China, We are going to do this until you figure out that it is 

in your interest to end your support of their nuclear program. Only 

China has that capacity, and we have got to get THAAD in there 

and whatever else. It is the first leverage we really have. And so 

I am a huge, huge supporter of that. I can go on. Anyway, on the 

military side, that is what I——

Mr. SALMON. I actually share your enthusiasm for that. And one 

of my concerns is with some of the political problems that President Park is facing in South Korea that might jeopardize our deployment plans. I hope not; I hope this is something that the new 

administration really pushes, because we have done nothing to 

properly motivate China, who is the 800-pound gorilla in those Six 

Party talks with North Korea. North Korea has an overdependence 

on them for energy and food, and they could make the difference, 

47

but they have been unwilling to so far. And I think that motivates 

them in the right direction. 

Mr. ELLINGS. I totally agree with your concern about the situation domestically in South Korea is jeopardizing that deployment. 

So we need a plan B. We need the deployment. If it is not on the 

peninsula, then where is it going to be? It is our only source of leverage, and frankly, we have to defend our allies. We will not be 

credible. This is a real threat. It is not theoretical; it’s not down 

the road; it is the kind of poster child of the failure of the pivot. 

Mr. SALMON. Ms. Currie, you talked a little bit about human 

rights. I remember when I first came to Congress, one of the raging 

debates was every June, we had Jackson-Vanik, where we would 

debate most favored trading status for China. And every year, it 

was kind of the same thing. And I remember when we had to push 

for PNTR, permanent normal trade relations with China. I think 

I had a private debate with Mr. Rohrabacher, and I remember saying to him that if we passed PNTR that because of constructive engagement, we would see phenomenal improvements in human 

rights and the like. I had just attended, not long before that debate, a hand-over ceremony for Hong Kong, and I had predicted 

that that would be a smooth transition, it really would be one country, two systems. And Mr. Rohrabacher, I will say to you right now, 

with egg all over my face, I was wrong. Those changes didn’t materialize, they did for a time, under President Jiang Zemin, I think 

that he carried on a lot of the visions of Deng Xiaoping, and I think 

that he moved in the right direction. But the two presidents subsequent to him moved back the other way and they increased their 

iron grip on the people and reversed, I think, some very positive 

human rights improvements. 

And so I ask you, Ms. Currie, without putting Jackson-Vanik 

back in place, I am not sure whether that is possible, how can we 

do an adequate job focusing on the issues of Hong Kong and their 

self-determination and human rights abuse and all the other things 

we really care about; how can we do that effectively? 

Ms. CURRIE. I was a young congressional staffer during those discussions, and staffed one of your colleagues, Congressman John 

Porter, who joined you on that trip for the hand-over and engaged 

in these frequent discussions with Mr. Rohrabacher, and with you 

at that time. And there was a lot of genuine soul searching, I 

think, on both sides. I think that there was good faith belief on 

both sides, both against PNTR and in favor of it. There were many 

people who genuinely thought that their view on that was the way 

to improve the situation in Hong Kong. 

I have recently had a number of conversations with a friend of 

mine, Jim Mann, who wrote a wonderful book about 10 years ago 

called The China Fantasy, that kind of talked about how we all 

wanted to believe that economic liberalization would bring political 

liberalization in China. I think that it comports with our values 

and with our ideas about how our own country is set up, and we 

just kind of instinctively appeal to people. 

Unfortunately, we then didn’t follow up by doing any of the 

things that could have actually made that a reality. And by—and 

that the opposite has happened, that the economic liberalization 

has strengthened the regime by giving it more tools for oppression, 

48

made it more powerful and more influential in the world. And now 

we have to deal with that reality. But the tools actually remain essentially the same going forward. 

First of all, I think one of the—like I was saying before about the 

pivot, one of the fundamental mistakes was—and my colleagues 

sort of alluded to this here, that we tried to compete in the region 

in areas that are strengths for Beijing and relative weaknesses for 

us, for instance, on the economic playing field, and trying to displace China as an economic partner in the region somewhat. 

Whereas, you know, these things may or may not—we can argue 

about the relative strength of the U.S. and China and economics 

and military in the region. But one place where we clearly have an 

advantage over Beijing is on our values and our ideas. And yet, we 

abandoned that playing field for the past 8 years; we just left it 

there and didn’t do anything. 

What is remarkable when you travel around the region and get 

outside of China, within China, I just have to kind of set it on the 

side for now, but our ideals, even when we fall short of them ourselves—I am talking about human rights and democracy—are far 

more attractive to the people of the region than Beijing’s authoritarian ideals, which are only attractive to other authoritarians. 

And when we stop talking about those ideas, and we stop defending the international order, people notice. It has an effect on them 

and their willingness to defend those ideas also. And this goes to 

trade, it goes to human rights, it goes to a whole host of issues that 

then make the whole problems harder for us, and open more doors 

for Beijing to have more influence in more countries in the region. 

So I think that, kind of, as first principles, we have got to get 

back to proudly saying, yes, the United States believes in these 

ideas. And even when we don’t always live up to our ideals, they 

are still our ideals, and we are willing to defend them and fight for 

them, not just rhetorically, but by other means as necessary, and 

that is where the resources that Dr. Ellings talked about come in, 

and being able to back up or commitments to our allies, privileging 

relationships with allies that share our values, privileging not just 

military alliance relationships, but also trade relationships with 

those who share our values, which then are also easier because we 

have shared platforms for understanding how to get along with 

each other, and trade with each other, and then backing those up 

with real meaningful things, and having consequences on the other 

side for those who don’t share our values. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you very much. I recognize Mr. Bera. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As I look back on the last 8 years, there are some areas that I 

think have been pretty successful. Obviously, I am a firm believer 

in the pivot to Asia. I do think we can look at kind of the renewed 

vigor in the U.S.-India relationship as an area of opportunity, not 

necessarily a straight shot, but clearly where we are today compared to where we were 8 years ago, but the opportunities. Some 

of this is on the Indian side with the ascendancy of Prime Minister 

Modi, and some of the reforms he is trying to make domestically. 

That is clearly an area that I do think we have had some success. 

That said, it is a region fraught with challenge. And I know many 

of us sit with an open mind with the incoming administration, you 

49

know, and are very open to how they will approach the region, but 

they are going to have to hit the ground running. I mean, we have 

talked a lot about China. We have touched on the complexity in 

North Korea. The internal challenges that are facing Korea as they 

address some of their political turbulence. 

We look at a new administration in the Philippines. We still got 

major unresolved issues in the South China Sea and how to approach that from a position of strength. And that is an area that 

I have disagreed with the administration on, I think. It is much 

more difficult for us to resolve the South China Sea today than had 

we approached it much more aggressively 1 year, or 2 years ago. 

With that said, we are where we are. And going forward, I think 

there are a couple of things that we have to do and the panel has 

touched on the importance of reassuring our allies about our commitment to the region. 

Our economic commitment, our diplomatic commitment, the commitment of our military assets as well. I think it is very important 

not to be ambiguous about our commitments to our allies, but to 

be very clear that we are there with them. 

We have to understand that it is going to be a shared commitment, with countries with similar sets of democratic values, you 

know, countries like Australia, New Zealand, et cetera, that it 

won’t be the United States in this commitment by themselves. It 

will be a shared commitment. 

We also have to be—you know, the TPP is where it is at. As 

someone who supported the President’s ability to go out and negotiate the deal. We are where we are. 

And there is a lot of rhetoric on the campaign trail on both sides. 

I think we have to explain the benefits of opening up global markets to our own domestic, you know, community first, to our workers and make sure if we are negotiating these deals and moving 

forward, that we are explaining the benefits in job creation, that 

people are understanding that. And that everyone, you know, from 

the frontline workers to the shareholders are benefiting equally 

from, you know, opening up these markets. But the reality is, we 

can’t withdraw and have an isolationist policy. These are the fastest growing markets in the world. 

On a fair playing field, I will put U.S. companies and U.S. workers up against anyone. The criticism of prior deals and perhaps 

even TPP is because we weren’t always on a fair playing field. And 

that was fine maybe in the 20th century when we could be a bit 

more benevolent, we could, you know, allow countries like Japan 

and others to rebuild. But we are in a competitive global environment now. We have to make sure that the deals we are negotiating 

are fair and balanced, not just for the countries we are trading 

with, but for our own workers. 

I have taken up a lot of my time without asking a question. 

You know, maybe, Dr. Scissors, you talked about the danger of 

having an isolationist trade policy. And maybe if you could just 

touch on some that for our own domestic population, why that 

would be a bad—this would be a bad time to withdraw from the 

world. 

Mr. SCISSORS. Well, I will try to do so quickly. I think—and also 

because you touched on part of this, these are the fastest growing 

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economies in the world. The Philippines is probably number one 

now. India, because of recent internal steps is probably going to be 

number two. Vietnam is there as well. Indonesia is a little lower, 

but it is also 250 million people. That is a nice market. 

If we want opportunities for our workers beyond the American 

market, the American market is the most important in the world, 

but if we want to add to that, the Asia-Pacific is where it is at. And 

I think, you know, everybody on this committee understands that. 

So I think what you want to say is use some of the language that 

people have used so far, which is to say 1 billion more consumers. 

You have 350 million consumers in the U.S. You have three times 

that many more that you could add, to give people some idea of 

what is out there. But, and this is where we haven’t succeeded, 

couple that with the concrete steps we are actually taking to take 

advantage of it. 

I am picking on the Obama administration a little bit here, because I am trying to make a larger point, which is when you talk 

about markets and you talk about dynamism, you then don’t go 

back to talking about diplomacy and strategic gains. That doesn’t 

deliver gains to American workers. You have to say what is in the 

agreement is not a rule that we make instead of China. What is 

in the agreement is rules that open our markets and get us the following benefits. 

And I think what is missing and what might be easier, as we discussed here and as has been discussed in the campaign, it might 

be easier to do this bilaterally. It was a really difficult undertaking 

the Obama administration went to bringing such disparate countries together, Japan, Vietnam, Canada, Peru. I mean, this is really 

hard. And so maybe the way to do this both in terms of success, 

the solidity of the agreement and the communication is to say, look, 

let’s simplify it. This is one country that is growing rapidly and has 

a lot of people; there are a lot of opportunities for us, this is concretely how we are going to do it. 

I do not, as I said, fault the Obama administration at all for trying TPP. From the country’s standpoint, we need to learn why it 

didn’t work. Why both major presidential candidates opposed it. 

And my response is, we couldn’t deliver concrete economic benefits. 

We do this bilaterally, we can’t necessarily have the giant benefits 

you are talking about, but step-by-step, start with one bilateral 

agreement, add another. Who wants to negotiate with us first. 

As Kelley said, who are our best partners in terms of values? I 

think we can go back and say, look, each of these agreements are 

with good partners that have created opportunities. Each step may 

be small, but we are heading toward the Asia-Pacific being open, 

and all that potential benefit that everyone here sees. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to miss you. 

Mr. SALMON. I will miss you too. 

Mr. BROOKS. I hope things go well in Arizona. 

Recently, President-elect Donald Trump had a telephone conversation with President Tsai Ing-wen of Taiwan. And many in the 

news media and diplomatic community went apoplectic. I would 

like for you to, please, share your view on whether Donald Trump’s 

51

phone call with the Taiwan President was wise or unwise, advanced or retreated the interests of America? And I will just work 

my way across. 

Dr. Ellings? 

Mr. ELLINGS. Sure. I am very, very pleased to answer that question. As you say, it has been, I think, basically a tempest in a teapot. But, yeah, there has been a lot of hot air and so on expended 

on this. 

First of all, there are strategic as well as democratic value reasons you might want to refurbish a relationship with Taiwan. 

China has put tremendous pressure on Taiwan. It is not in an enviable strategic position. At the same time, it has developed a remarkable democracy. 

I happened to be by the way, Chairman Salmon, also at Tsai Ingwen’s inauguration. There are strategic realities that strike fear in 

many Americans’ hearts, but my view is, I think, a sober one that 

this actually—this call to a still President-elect Trump is strategically useful, justified. There is no reason we can’t have conversations while in the meantime China can act so aggressively and feel 

impervious to these kinds of things. 

Mr. BROOKS. All right. Thank you, Dr. Ellings. 

And I am going to work around a little bit. Each of you have 

about a minute. But the folks on my right haven’t had much time. 

So I am going to go to Mr. Lynn then Ms. Currie and to Dr. Scissors. 

Mr. Lynn? 

Mr. LYNN. I basically agree that the President-elect Trump’s taking of that phone call was probably a good thing. And, you know, 

one of the things that all of these nations, in that region, have not 

been talking about but need to talk about is the fact that all of 

their industrial systems are so entirely interdependent. I mean, for 

the same reason that it is dangerous for the United States to—for 

the Obama administration to pretend that there might be a military solution in the South China Sea or the East China Sea is just 

as dangerous for the Chinese to believe that there is a military solution, vis-a-vis Taiwan. 

Any military action in that zone by the United States, by the 

Japanese, by the Chinese, will create an immediate disruption of 

supply systems on which we all depend, and will, within a matter 

of days, seize up the entire world’s industrial system. 

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Lynn, thank you for your insight. I am trying 

to reserve some time for Ms. Currie and Dr. Scissors. 

Ms. Currie. 

Mr. CURRIE. Thank you. I think it was both the right thing to 

do and a smart thing to do for the reasons that my colleagues have 

indicated. And also because—you know, one of the things that 

drives me the most crazy, as a former State Department employee, 

is the tendency we have to use euphemisms and construct these, 

you know, world scaffolds around what we do that don’t have any 

connection to reality. 

And with a single phone call, President-elect Trump and Tsai 

Ing-wen together—she had agency in this, which is another thing 

that people seemed to completely miss, that she was the other 

party on the other end of the phone call who made a decision to 

52

do this as well. But, you know, this is—they kind of blew that up 

a little bit. And that was very well done and warranted, I think. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you. 

Dr. Scissors? 

Mr. SCISSORS. I will be brief. I don’t really care about the phone 

call. What I want to see is what U.S.-Taiwan relations are going 

to look like in a Trump administration. If the phone call says the 

Trump administration is going to be more active in talking to Taiwan about issues in the South China Sea, about arms sales, about 

what I would like to talk about, which is improving the economic 

relationship, that is fantastic, then it is a great idea. 

If it is just something that occurred while he is still a private citizen, and we don’t act with the Taiwanese, then it doesn’t mean 

anything and it doesn’t add up to anything. I would even say, I am 

perfectly happy talking to the mainland while we are talking to 

Taiwan. They want to be involved in the conversation, fine. As long 

as the U.S. is talking to Taiwan figuring out where we can cooperate more, that is what matters. If this was the first step, great. 

Mr. BROOKS. All right. Thank you for your insight. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for being here. 

I am going to keep my question brief, because I would like to 

hear responses. But my question is about North Korea. I represent 

Hawaii. We are in the middle of the Pacific and within range of 

North Korea’s intercontinental ballistic missiles. And obviously, the 

continued progress that they make in miniaturizing their nuclear 

weapons is deeply, deeply concerning. 

Everyone talks about how essential China is to the 

denuclearization of North Korea, but very few people have any concrete ideas on exactly how to get China to take action, to actually 

change the dynamic here. So if each of you could just comment 

briefly on that question and taking into account what is happening 

on the peninsula and the relationship between the peninsula and 

Japan and China and us. 

Mr. ELLINGS. Shall I start? 

Ms. GABBARD. Yes. 

Mr. ELLINGS. Thank you so much. Well, you just kind of asked 

me to talk about my favorite subject. I have been writing and 

thinking about this literally for 30 years. 

And so I think it boils down to this—by the way, I live in Seattle. 

And Seattle also, in those concentric rings, has JBLM, which are 

forces to reinforce the peninsula. The Bangor Trident Missile Base, 

we are just like you, a number one target. So I feel it personally. 

My view, as I stated earlier, is that the clearest thing we can do, 

in which the Chinese have obviously signaled they would like us 

least to do, is get THADD into South Korea. And I would put in 

a broader antimissile system combining Japan at sea and on the 

peninsula. We expressed earlier concern that President Park’s difficulties put at risk our ability, perhaps, next year to deploy 

THAAD there. That is a terrible development. I do worry about 

that. So we have to have plan B and C here. 

53

But we have got to do it. And I will tell you not having learned 

from the INF issue and what we did in the early 1980s, that is 

something I think we all need to study here. If we had a robust 

antimissile system in northeast Asia, I think China would do what 

is necessary to denuclearize the north. 

Mr. SCISSORS. I don’t mean to avoid your question, but it is security, so I am going to yield to my colleagues. 

Ms. CURRIE. I would add a couple of things. Go after the palace 

economy more vigorously—we have not implemented all the sanctions, the economic sanctions tools that we have in our disposal to 

go after North Korea’s palace economy and hold the Chinese to account for their role in propping up the palace economy that surrounds Kim Jong-un and the people around him, and allows them 

to live in a lifestyle that is completely attenuated from the way 

that the rest of the North Korean people live. 

So there are many things that we can do to make them more uncomfortable and put pressure on the regime in that way. And the 

Chinese don’t like it, but, again, as Dr. Ellings said, we need to just 

tell them, look, this is what we are going to do. You aren’t being 

helpful, and so we are taking these things into our own hands. 

And then the other thing that I would do is throw everything we 

have diplomatically, politically that we can behind the U.N.’s commission of inquiry on human rights in North Korea, because that 

inquiry has gotten under the skin of the Kim regime in a major 

way. They really don’t like being brought up in the U.N. on human 

rights charges, in this way, and it really bothers them. And I don’t 

think we have fully explored the limits of how we can take advantage of that process. 

The Chinese also don’t like having to defend them at the U.N. 

and having to expend diplomatic capital on the North Koreans at 

the U.N. on human rights. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Mr. LYNN. Just adding to what Ms. Currie said, is supply lines 

matter. And one of the ways to exert pressure upon the North Koreans is to really push the Chinese to become serious about putting 

pressure on the North Koreans. 

As we may remember in the run-up to the Iraq war, North Korea 

was acting in an extremely belligerent way, and there was a sentiment that they might have taken advantage of the focus of the U.S. 

military in the Middle East to engage in some kind of action in 

their area, and the Chinese cut off the supplies of a number of 

goods into North Korea, and that brought the North Koreans to 

heel. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. ELLINGS. I just wonder if I could just add something 

here——

Ms. GABBARD. Sure. 

Mr. ELLINGS [continuing]. That I think is really important? 

I think no pressure directly on North Korea will work. Direct 

pressure on North Korea, no matter how we have done it, their regime requires the nuclear weapon. And so there is no way direct 

pressure without pressure on China is going to work. 

54

And China’s interest—if we don’t put enough pressure on China, 

China’s interests are in North Korea as a buffer, and as North 

Korea as an irritant to us; it pins our troops down; it keeps our 

attention. If there is a war, it is another front. So North Korea is 

a core interest of China. And so what we have to make clear to 

China is we understand it is a core interest, but its nuclearization 

is our core interest. 

Mr. SALMON. You know, it is interesting, they say that the reason they are hesitant to jump in and do what needs to be done is 

that it would destabilize North Korea, and there would be this onslaught of refugees coming across the North Korean border into 

China. 

I think the real reason is that they fear a one Korea. They fear 

a unified Korea, and they fear an increased U.S. presence that is 

on the peninsula. So I think that is what the real issues are. And 

so I think that the provocative answers that have been given about 

motivating China are real, and they would work. 

One of the things I have been pushing for the last year is the 

deployment of THAAD, and I think, as you said, Dr. Ellings, that 

increasing that to possibly Japan as well and other ballistic defense 

systems is absolutely imperative. 

China is not going to care unless you make them care. And they 

are not going to do it out of the goodness of their hearts. They are 

only going to do it if they feel compelled to do it, because not doing 

it costs more than doing it. That is what the answer is. 

Mr. Rohrabacher—oh, have I missed you? I am so sorry. 

Mr. Perry. General Perry. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Doing, as always, a fabulous job. 

I am thinking about the conversation, initially, strategic ambiguity. And I am just wondering what appears to be—what is the 

President-elect’s propensity for unpredictability. You know, strategic ambiguity in the sense that it was described by the chairman 

was essentially—we didn’t know what the heck we were doing. But 

when you want to be ambiguous, knowing that you want to be that, 

is probably a strength, right? 

So my question is, are there specific conditions that we should 

articulate like a floor or ceiling with China? And then remain ambiguous about some other things where maybe we remain—we 

maintain some flexibility to get them to head where we want to go? 

And I just want to—I would like to, actually, start with you, Mr. 

Lynn. 

What are your thoughts on that? Are there some specific things 

that we should articulate, and what would they be? 

Mr. LYNN. Well, one of the things that we absolutely want to articulate is that we—to increase the security of both the United 

States and China, to increase the security of all the nations in the 

region and indeed of the world, we want to reduce the number of 

cases in which all key components are located in China. And that 

is going to require the cooperation of the Chinese. 

When you have all of the certain kind of chemical industry built 

up in China, the Chinese can do a lot to prevent us from moving 

any of that capacity abroad. We think of industrial activities as 

something that moves around. That is not the case. But it is in 

55

everybody’s interest that industrial capacity be much more widespread. It creates a resilient system, and it means that when mistakes are made, as they will inevitably be made in human society, 

bad things are less bad. 

Mr. PERRY. Ms. Currie. 

Mr. CURRIE. Well, I will talk about something that we continually articulate as kind of a floor in the region with China, which 

is our statement that we will not accept China changing the status 

quo on Taiwan or militarizing the South China Sea by force or coercion. And we make these statements all the time, but then we 

don’t actually do anything to back them up. 

So I think we have floors. I think we have articulated them over 

time, but the Chinese don’t actually see them as floors. It is not 

the problem that we don’t have floors, it is just that they are very 

holey and not very stable and not very sturdy and not viewed by 

the Chinese as meaningful. 

And so I think, again, being consistent, being public about what 

these basic things are is one thing, but then having meaningful 

consequences when the Chinese start to push on them and stomp 

on them and try to poke holes in them and making sure that we 

are doing things to push back. 

And whether it is strengthening Taiwan’s defenses, deploying 

THAAD, being more active in our regional diplomacy within 

ASEAN about the South China Sea issues, to push back on the salami-slicing tactics, negotiating more bilateral investment treaties, 

more bilateral trade agreements to encircle China with more open 

economic freedom, any and all of these things. You know, it is not 

an either/or we need to——

Mr. PERRY. Do you think that our inability as maybe you describe it—and so if I am describing it incorrectly let me know—but 

our ability to stand firm on how we articulate the barriers or the 

constraints that we have, is that a function of our governance, our 

form of governance, that we say one thing but we have a hard 

time—it requires legislation; it is not something the executive could 

do unilaterally? Is that what the deal is, or is that we talk big but 

then we don’t follow through? 

Mr. CURRIE. I think it is the latter. We have all the legislative 

tools in place. You have the Taiwan Relations Act, you have a Tibet 

Policy Act; you have a raft of legislative pieces over the history of 

the past 25 years. 

Mr. PERRY. So it would be your opinion that the executive can 

make all the difference in this instance? 

Ms. CURRIE. I think forceful leadership that is principled and 

consistent and actually has a plan for when things don’t work out 

according to the fiction they have created in their head——

Mr. PERRY. Okay. 

Dr. Scissors? 

Mr. SCISSORS. Yes, I have two specific answers. And one is, I 

think we have already provided the ceiling. America’s commitments 

to open markets have helped. It is not the main thing, but it has 

helped raised hundreds of millions of Chinese out of poverty. We 

have played our role in helping China’s development for the past 

35 years. So I don’t think whatever we do going forward—anyone 

can doubt that the U.S. has tried to accommodate China and done 

56

well for the Chinese people in our policies to now. Where I would 

put the floor is to enforce American law. The Chinese steal intellectual property. They are breaking our law. 

I will give you a small case but one that infuriated me. We had 

a Federal court a few months ago say the Chinese vitamin C makers can violate U.S. antitrust law, but they were told by the Chinese Government to do it, so they have sovereign immunity. That 

is outrageous. I am not a lawyer. I have no idea about the legal 

foundations of the decision. I am saying as a matter of policy, so 

the Chinese Government can tell Chinese companies to break U.S. 

law and it is okay? 

I think our credibility on accommodating China to this point is 

extremely high. I can’t imagine another country that would have 

run the global economy the way we did that would have helped the 

Chinese. 

And the floor comes from, we have laws. You have to obey them, 

and I don’t want to hear excuses about the government told you or 

not. 

Mr. PERRY. Quickly, Dr. Ellings, with the chair’s indulgence. 

Mr. ELLINGS. Yeah, two quick comments. On the question of IP 

theft, the Congress and the President signed a bill that provided 

the power to respond with all the powers that the President has 

to stop terrorists in using the banking system and so on. The President has the power to stop IP thieves overseas and has not done 

it, so we have no credibility. 

Number two. This is really a kind of the most important, I think, 

strategic point to make. Ambiguity is never what you want to have 

in a strategic situation, ever, unless you are forced into it out of 

weakness. 

And so what my concern is, since we have not decided on a military strategy in Asia, we have not figured out what, in my view 

is, a plan to show unambiguously that with our allies we can win 

a battle in the commons without striking China directly, that is 

credible. If we have to strike China directly, then we are raising 

the specter of them striking back at our homeland. So we need unambiguous capacity to win over the commons, and that is the critical strategic issue facing us today. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. SALMON. Thank you. 

Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. This ambiguity stuff, I will tell you that—

let’s face it, when you talk about ambiguity, what they really mean 

is they don’t know what the hell they are going to do. And it is not 

we don’t know what our reaction are or we have a reaction that we 

don’t want the enemy to know. We don’t know. 

I have been saying that for a number of years, and no one has 

ever come forward and say, well, let me tell you the secret plan. 

No one has ever done that. 

It is fitting from the last hearing of this subcommittee that we 

note one thing, that we have been talking about the Pacific today 

and very little reference has been made to Japan. And Japan is the 

most important player in the region. And Japan, if there is going 

to be peace and prosperity, the United States has got to maintain 

its incredibly positive relation with Japan. And let us not end this 

57

hearing without reaffirming that because—and let me just note, 

and how could we actually send messages, then, in terms of China 

or North Korea? Well, I bet if we decided to aggressively and publicly support the rearming of Japan and the reintroducing of the 

Japanese Navy into the Pacific rather than putting that entire burden on the American taxpayers, I think there would be a message 

there, and it would be a message they would pay attention to. 

So basically, perhaps as well, when the Chinese start stealing all 

of our technology, maybe then we could go to Japan and have a 

very open and—how do you say—mutually beneficial treaty that 

would then show that these other people are being left out because 

the Japanese are playing honestly with us now and are trying their 

very best to be good friends. So recognizing the role of Japan, I 

think, is essential when we try to plot out what is going on in the 

future. 

Mr. Scissors, I certainly agree with you totally about the TPP. 

And let me just ask you whether or not you have looked at the patent section of the TPP? I was told over and, again, oh, no, there 

is nothing in there that would change the patent law of the United 

States. 

Is it still in there, the provision that eventually I saw there, that 

said that we will endeavor to change our patent law, which right 

now means that when an inventor files for a patent, that patent 

is secret, until that—that patent application is secret until it is 

issued, until the patent is issued? 

The TPP that I read said we will endeavor to change that rule, 

and after 18 months, we are going to publish for the whole world 

to see our patent applications even before the patent is granted, 

which I would label the Steal American Technologies Proposal. Is 

it still in there? 

Mr. SCISSORS. Well, so—the answer—there is an overarching answer, which is the Congress can always override our trade agreements. There is a clause in all of our trade agreements that this 

will not infringe on the Congress’ ability. 

Now, what you are—I think this is still a real issue. If the default changes, if the Congress must do something to change American law to a certain area instead of just do nothing, that has an 

impact on the U.S. 

I think the big issue in data protection is most of our partners 

in the TPP and around the world don’t protect data in exactly the 

way you are talking about, the way we would like, and the TPP 

doesn’t solve that problem. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Mr. SCISSORS. And I don’t want it to set a precedent of not solving the problem going forward. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Well, let me accept that. But let me 

also accept that anybody—because I fought—as my colleagues 

know, I have fought these efforts by multinational U.S. corporations to change the patent law for the last 25 years. And one of the 

first things, fights, I was in was to make sure American inventors 

wouldn’t have to publish their patent applications until they got 

their patent issued. And we won that here, and I see no reason for 

it to be in the TPP whatsoever. 

58

In terms of what we need to do in terms of China and such—

and thank you very much for noting that over these years I have 

actually been very aggressive in talking about predicting what 

would happen is if we would treat China as if it was any other 

democratic state. 

Japan has a great democracy. They protect people’s rights. China 

doesn’t do any of that. But, yet, at times we end up with trade policies and treating China better than we do Japan. How ridiculous 

is that? And what has it resulted? It has resulted in—because, 

again, others were making the argument, and thank you for acknowledging that, that if we just really treat China well, they are 

going to come out and be friendly to us, and they are going to become liberals. I call that the hug-a-Nazi-make-a-liberal theory, 

which has been disproven over and over again. 

So I think that what we are doing now is we have to be very realistic. I think we have a new President that is basically not going 

to be seen as someone—as a faint-hearted leader. This is not what 

Donald Trump is going to be. He is going to be a strong leader. He 

is also going to appreciate friends. It is little simple things like 

that. And like, if it is not in the interest of the American people 

specifically, I am not going to do it. These are simple principles 

but, basically, they are pragmatic moves by a person of principle 

and of courage as well. So I am actually very optimistic. 

I remember when everybody went crazy over this Taiwan phone 

call. I was saying, they are sending the exact message to Beijing 

that we want to send them. We are no longer a bunch of pushovers 

here. We have people—we have a strong leader, and we are going 

to make sure the world is a safer place, and that the gangsters and 

dictators of this world better understand that. 

And so with that said, one of the other things that has made this 

a safer world is the hard work of people like you, Mr. Chairman. 

And we are all very grateful. And I am very pleased now to be the 

last witness before you take off. We started well over 20 years ago. 

And I don’t know how much longer I am going to be here, I don’t 

know where I am going to be, but I may end up surfing in California, just drinking tequila for the rest of my life, who knows. But 

the fact is the two of us started out a long time ago, and you have 

done a great job for our country. And I know this isn’t the end of 

it. This is the end of this phase of that. 

So thank you very much. God bless you. There we go. 

Mr. SALMON. Well, let me just say that in many ways, this last 

hearing for me was very cathartic. I kind of started out my China 

experience as a missionary in 1977 to Taiwan. And I was there for 

2 years. I was there when Jimmy Carter severed diplomatic ties 

with Taiwan, and I remember the reaction of the people there. 

I remember my heart being broken at the time, because I grew 

to love and respect the people of Taiwan so very much. And in the 

time since then, they have gone from an autocratic regime to a 

thriving democracy. At the time it was Chiang Kai-shek’s son that 

was the president of Taiwan, and there weren’t freely held elections. Since that time, there have been—become one of the more robust democracies in the entire world. 

And I was there at the swearing in for Lee Ten-hui, and I remember at the time China lobbying missiles in the Taiwan strait. 

59

With our policy of strategic ambiguity, it was frustrating. It was 

very, very frustrating. But to be able to have a panel of experts 

such as yourself sit there and talk about credible, thoughtful solutions to moving forward and making that region of the world a 

prosperous place and a unified place was very cathartic for me. So 

I thank you from the bottom of my heart. 

This committee hearing was planned long before the infamous 

phone call over the weekend. But to hear virtually everybody on 

the panel say it was a good idea, it was a good thing, or it can be 

a good thing if the policy moves in the right direction, I think is 

a good message. And I hope that the press corps and this country 

is picking up on it, because I don’t think there are any more talented people in their expertise on China, in fact, probably most are 

far beneath your realm. 

So thank you for your great ideas and your thoughts and your 

comments, and I greatly appreciate it. 

And with that, this committee is now adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:30 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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