spread bomb the

welet

should

Edited by Henry D. Sokolski

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SHOULD WE LET THE BOMB SPREAD?

Henry D. Sokolski

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November 2016

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ISBN 1-58487-734-0

ix

CONTENTS

Foreword......................................................................xi

Introduction: Is Nuclear Proliferation Still 

a Problem? .................................................................xiii

Henry D. Sokolski

1. Getting Past Nonproliferation ................................1

Harvey M. Sapolsky

2. Why U.S. Policymakers Who Love 

 the Bomb Don’t Think “More Is Better”..............25 

W. Seth Carus

3. “At All Costs”: The Destructive 

 Consequences of Anti-Proliferation Policy.........67 

John Mueller 

4. Should We Let It All Go?.....................................111 

Victor Gilinsky

5. The Next Nuclear War.........................................137 

Matthew Kroenig and Rebecca Davis Gibbons

6. After Armageddon: Pondering 

 the Potential Political Consequences 

 of Third Use..........................................................183 

Matthew Fuhrmann

About the Contributors ...........................................213

xi

FOREWORD

Nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation no longer 

enjoy the broad support they once did during the Cold War. 

Academics and security experts now question the ability of 

either to cope or check nuclear rogue states or terrorists. 

On the one hand, America’s closest allies—e.g., Japan and 

South Korea—believe American nuclear security guarantees are critical to their survival. If the United States is unwilling to provide Tokyo or Seoul with the assurance they 

believe they need, would it then not make sense for them to 

acquire nuclear forces of their own? On the other hand, with 

more nuclear-armed states and an increased willingness to 

use them, how likely is it that nuclear deterrence will work? 

This volume investigates these questions. In it, six experts offer a variety of perspectives to catalyze debate. The 

result is a rich debate that goes well beyond current scholarship to challenge the very basis of prevailing nonproliferation and security policies.

 

 DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.

 Director

 Strategic Studies Institute and

 U.S. Army War College Press

xiii

 INTRODUCTION: IS NUCLEAR 

PROLIFERATION STILL A PROBLEM?

In 1966, Leonard Beaton, a journalist and strategic 

scholar, published a short book that asked: Must the 

bomb spread?1 Mr. Beaton’s query reflected the profound alarm with which proliferation was viewed 

shortly after the Cuban Missile Crisis. Today that 

alarm is all but absent; now, not only is proliferation 

increasingly viewed as a given (more of a fact than a 

problem), but some security experts actually see advantages in nuclear weapons spreading or, at least, 

little harm.

Cultivation of this latter view took time—nearly a 

half century—and considerable scholarship. In 1981, 

Kenneth Waltz popularized French and American 

finite deterrence thinking of the late-1950s by asking 

whether or not nuclear weapons in more hands might 

be better. His answer was yes. As nuclear weapons 

spread, he argued, adversaries would view war as 

being self-defeating, and peace would become more 

certain.2

Although this view gained a certain following, 

some pushed back, emphasizing the real limits of 

nuclear safety and security. Drawing on official documents, Scott Sagan in the early-1990s detailed many 

nuclear accidents and close calls that the U.S. military 

had with its nuclear arsenal. He and others also focused on the risks of illicit and unauthorized use, and 

the chance that one side or another might misread 

the warning signals of a possible nuclear attack and 

respond when they should not.3

After the events of September 11, 2001, the question of whether terrorists might go nuclear—a worry 

studied in the early-1970s—regained urgency.4 This 
concern, though, immediately raised yet another issue: Was nuclear deterrence, which the world’s superpowers had relied upon so much during the Cold 

War, relevant any longer for dealing with nucleararmed rogue states and terrorists?5

 Once joined with 

enthusiasm for going to zero nuclear weapons, this 

question gave rise to the notion that nuclear weapons 

were only marginally useful to deter the most likely 

forms of nuclear and nonnuclear aggression (thus, 

highlighting how dubious the possession or acquisition of nuclear weapons might be). The more radical 

nuclear abolitionists went even further. For them, the 

bomb either did not deter or hardly deterred at all.6

With this later perspective, it was but a small step to 

conclude that nuclear proliferation was neither good 

nor bad, but inconsequential.

But is it? Certainly, since 1966, the bomb has 

spread. Besides the United States, Russia, the United 

Kingdom, France, and China; Israel, India, Pakistan, 

and North Korea have all acquired nuclear weapons. 

In addition, South Korea, Sweden, Taiwan, Iraq, Brazil, Argentina, Australia, and Iran all tried but did not 

get the bomb. So far, so good. However, more proliferation in the Far and Middle East is possible (e.g., Iran, 

Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Algeria, Egypt, Taiwan, South 

Korea, and Japan). 

Meanwhile, support for nuclear use is on the rise. 

Russia and Pakistan now favor the first use of nuclear 

weapons either to deter or to de-escalate future conventional conflicts. This has prompted India and China to review their nuclear use policies. What might 

happen if any of these states fired their weapons in 

anger and some military advantage was thereby secured? At least one respected military thinker argues 

that this would likely unleash a torrent of nuclear proliferation and far worse.7

xiv
xv

For all of these reasons, nuclear deterrence no longer enjoys the almost religious support it once did. 

However, perhaps that loss of faith is misplaced. After all, America’s key allies—e.g., Japan and South 

Korea—still believe that U.S. nuclear guarantees are 

critical to their survival. If they believe this and the 

United States is unwilling to provide Tokyo or Seoul 

with the nuclear assurance they desire, would it then 

not make sense for them to acquire nuclear forces of 

their own? This question is the basis of Republican 

U.S. President-elect Donald Trump’s ruminations 

about the inevitability and possible value of Japan and 

South Korea going nuclear and UK Foreign Minister 

Boris Johnson’s speculation that we would be better 

served if Iran acquired nuclear weapons.8

With more nuclear-armed states, and even one 

or two states more willing to use them, though, how 

likely is it that nuclear deterrence and no first use will 

prevail? Is the sum of all fears—a nuclear apocalypse 

of the sort Mr. Beaton once wrote about—again in 

prospect? Getting the answers to these questions, or at 

least raising them, is this volume’s purpose. In it, six 

experts offer a variety of perspectives sure to catalyze 

further debate. 

In the book’s first chapter, Harvey Sapolsky, the 

former director of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s (MIT) Security Studies Program, makes a 

case that preventing nuclear proliferation, especially 

with nuclear security guarantees to our closest allies—

Japan, South Korea, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—is unnecessary, provocative, and 

costly. Nuclear deterrence and forensics, he argues, 

will work; and letting our allies go nuclear would be 

a safer, cheaper course than trying to prevent others 

from acquiring nuclear weapons and maintaining U.S. 

basing forces overseas.
xvi

Seth Carus, who served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Office of the Vice President, is 

now a resident at the National Defense University’s 

(NDU) Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as a distinguished fellow. He argues 

that such optimistic views are too academic. Those 

that serve in government, he notes, essentially ignore 

such arguments and with cause. Instead, he observes, 

senior policymakers worry about the destructiveness 

of nuclear weapons and the fragility of nuclear deterrence between various states. They are also eager to 

maintain U.S. power against emerging nuclear states, 

and to avoid the crisis instabilities further nuclear proliferation would prompt.

John Mueller, the author of Atomic Obsession, views 

these concerns as dangerous alarmism. Rather than 

arguing that nuclear proliferation is a positive development, Mueller makes the case that so far, nuclear 

proliferation has been far more benign than predicted 

and should be viewed as being largely inconsequential. In contrast, promoting nuclear nonproliferation, 

he argues, has produced war (e.g., Iraq), encouraged 

extortion (e.g., by North Korea), risked further wars 

(e.g., Iran), and deprived the world of the full benefits 

of civilian nuclear power.

This then brings us to former U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commissioner Victor Gilinsky’s chapter, “Should 

We Let It All Go?” Gilinsky concedes there is much 

to like about John Mueller’s argument. He spotlights 

Mueller’s questioning of the value of nuclear weapons 

threats or use, his critique of politicians and analysts 

who have been alarmist about nuclear terrorism, and 

his challenging of America’s vacuous demands and 

threats regarding Iran’s nuclear program. 
xvii

Gilinsky, however, insists that in arguing that 

proliferation hardly matters at all—that up to now its 

effects have been benign, and that efforts to restrain 

proliferation have done far more harm than good—

Mueller goes too far. The bomb has had a significant 

impact on history; there certainly have been some 

close nuclear calls (e.g., the Cuban Missile Crisis). It 

is also the case that few, if any, of the bomb’s possessors have been all that eager to give their weapons up. 

As for the harm nonproliferation has done, Gilinsky 

points out that such arguments mistakenly assume 

America’s nonproliferation policies have had real 

teeth. It certainly is wrong, Gilinsky argues, to believe 

that nonproliferation was why we invaded Iraq. Gilinsky’s conclusion: It would be unwise to relax whatever nuclear controls we still have and smarter still to 

strengthen them.

However, is the prospect for nuclear use real? Matthew Kroenig and Rebecca Davis Gibbons of Georgetown University argue that the answer is yes. In their 

chapter, the authors not only review the history of 

possible nuclear use during the Cold War, but they 

also lay out why and how Russia, China, North Korea, 

Israel, India, Pakistan, and the United States might 

nonetheless use these weapons first.

This, of course, begs the question as to what the 

consequences might be. Dr. Matthew Fuhrmann of 

Texas A&M University spells them out. They include 

igniting a catalytic war capable of dragging the nuclear superpowers in, creating massive destabilizing 

refugee crises, prompting international demands for 

regime change, encouraging the substitution of repressive rule for open forms of self-government, and 

the erosion of international norms against nuclear 

proliferation and use. 
xviii

None of these consequences are inevitable, but 

they are likely enough to encourage all states to avoid 

first use if they can. Their further spread might conceivably be beneficial, but the potential regret if their 

spread makes matters worse is easily large enough to 

recommend a less playful conclusion.

ENDNOTES - INTRODUCTION

1. Leonard Beaton, Must the Bomb Spread? London, UK: 

Penguin Books, 1966.

2. Cf. Kenneth Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May 

Be Better, Adelphi Paper, No. 171, London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981; Pierre-Marie Gallois, Stratégie 

de l’ âge Nucléaire (The Nuclear Age Strategy), Paris, FR: FrancoisXavier de Guibert, 1960; Commander P. H. Backus, “Finite Deterrence, Controlled Retaliation,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 

85, No. 3, March 1959, pp. 23-29; and David Alan Rosenberg, “The 

Origins of Overkill: Nuclear Weapons and American Strategy 

1945-1960,” International Security 7, No. 4, Spring 1983, pp. 3-71.

3. See Scott D. Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 

Press, 1995; Idem., “The Perils of Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” 

International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4, Spring 1994, pp. 66-107. 

4. Cf. Mason Willrich and Theodore B. Taylor, Nuclear Theft: 

Risks and Safeguards: A Report to the Energy Policy Project of the Ford 

Foundation, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1974; Brian M. Jenkins, 

Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 

November 1975; Idem., Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? Amherst, NY: 

Prometheus Books, 2008; and Graham T. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, New York: Holt Paperbacks, 2005.

5. See e.g., William J. Perry, “Preparing for the Next Attack,” 

Foreign Affairs, November/December 2001; and “Text of Bush’s 

Speech at West Point,” The New York Times, June 1, 2002, available 
xix

from www.nytimes.com/2002/06/01/international/02PTEX-WEB.ht

ml?pagewanted=all.

6. See e.g., Ward Wilson, “The Myth of Nuclear Deterrence,” 

The Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 15, No. 3, November 2008: pp. 

421-439; and James E. Doyle, “Why Eliminate Nuclear Weapons?” 

Survival: Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 55, No. 1, February 1, 

2013, pp. 7-34.

7. Andrew W. Marshall, “Foreword,” in Henry D. Sokolski, 

ed., Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future, Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2015, 

pp. xi-xii.

8. Maggie Haberman and David E. Sanger, “Transcript: Donald Trump Expounds on His Foreign Policy Views,” The New 

York Times, March 26, 2016, available from http://www.nytimes.

com/2016/03/27/us/politics/donald-trump-transcript.html?_r=0; Anderson Cooper, “Townhall in Milwaukee with Donald TrumpTranscript,” CNN, March 29, 2016, available from http://transcripts.

cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1603/29/acd.02.html; and Boris Johnson, 

“Give Iran the bomb: it might make the regime more pliable,” The 

Telegraph, October 12, 2006, available from http://www.telegraph.

co.uk/comment/personal-view/3633097/Give-Iran-the-bomb-it-mightmake-the-regime-more-pliable.html.

1

CHAPTER 1

GETTING PAST NONPROLIFERATION

Harvey M. Sapolsky

The nuclear nonproliferation regime has lost its 

benefits, modest though they may have been, for the 

United States. In the post-Cold War era, friends who 

happily shun the possession of nuclear weapons along 

with most of the other expensive attributes of military self-defense prefer instead our too freely offered 

nuclear security guarantees, which burden the United 

States. We offer these guarantees, known as extended 

deterrence, to discourage them from acquiring nuclear 

weapons of their own. I fear, however, we have more 

to fear as a nation from the costs of extended deterrence—the costs for providing conventional defenses 

for friends, which is, in fact, the essence of our security 

guarantees—than from the need to deter additional 

nuclear-armed enemies, which is the potential result 

of the end of the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 

when it was implemented in 1970, surely had important benefits for the Soviet Union and China because 

most of the states that might have acquired nuclear 

weapons during the Cold War—West Germany and 

Japan in particular, but Sweden, Australia, and others as well—would have targeted their weapons on 

the Soviet Union and China. The United Kingdom and 

France, fading powers that they were, probably liked 

the special status the NPT offered, and, if only for historical reasons, the fact that West Germany would not 

become a nuclear power. For the United States, the 

NPT deflected domestic attention away from the war 
2

in Vietnam with the hope of détente with the Soviet 

Union, its necessary partner in the then promising 

quest to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.1

The United States likely also wanted to avoid 

having West Germany, in particular, independently 

nuclear-armed if that meant needlessly provoking the 

Soviet Union. West Germany and Japan had by the 

mid-1960s recovered significantly from World War II 

and were seeking normal nation status. Germany was 

becoming an economic powerhouse, and Japan was 

not far behind. Nuclear-armed, they certainly would 

have been seen as more frightening to the nations they 

had so recently occupied during World War II. The 

NPT provided the easy way to avoid a mid-Cold War 

crisis. There would be no West German or Japanese 

bomb. 

There was also a post-Cold War NPT benefit for 

the United States.2 The collapse of the Soviet Union 

cleared the way for Pax Americana, the brief period 

of American triumphalism in which the United States 

became the unelected and uncompensated global 

sheriff involved in suppressing, by force if necessary, 

all sorts of international disputes, civil wars, and criminal behavior. The NPT was a facilitator for this volunteer work because only nations with nuclear weapons stood free from the sheriff’s writ. Those without 

nuclear weapons were at risk of a visit from the law 

in the form of the American military. The several unhappy experiences of the boldly defined Global War 

on Terror has lately tempered the United States’ interest in being the global sheriff and with it the special 

benefit to the United States of the NPT.3 It is now the 

costs of nonproliferation that loom large; specifically, 

the need to provide a nuclear shield in addition to the 

conventional defenses for those who have foresworn 
3

their own nuclear weapons. And because that shield 

is potentially dangerous to offer and to trust, it is buttressed by forward deployed conventional defenses 

that are quite robust, to avoid the need to escalate to 

the use of nuclear weapons if the shield is tested.

PAYING FOR NONPROLIFERATION

The costs of the treaty did not seem great to the 

existing nuclear powers at the time of its implementation. The NPT did require that they pledge their intent 

to work toward their own disarmament, though with 

no stated measure of sincerity or progress. Nuclear 

arms have in fact been reduced—thousands of American and Russian warheads have been taken out of 

service and dismantled—but this was a result of the 

wind down of the Cold War and the resulting desire 

to reap the benefits of reduced defense spending. The 

treaty also explicitly protected the nuclear weapon 

states’ commercial nuclear opportunities by assuring 

all nations access to nonmilitary nuclear technologies. 

It is through this doorway that nuclear materials flow 

globally and, some fear, proliferators step through 

claiming their peaceful desire for environmentally 

friendly nuclear energy and the understandable hope 

of medical treatment and research.4

Beyond the usual Soviet menace, Warsaw Pact 

members needed no special inducements to sign the 

NPT. The Soviet Union, after all, provided them with 

nuclear deterrence of a sort, whether they wanted it or 

not. They had no option for acquiring nuclear weapons on their own. The Pact nations were the frontier 

buffer for the Soviet state, a tank’s drive from the fearsome North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) enemy, and were treated as such. In contrast, the United 
4

States’ European NATO allies were fully aware that 

a big ocean lay between them and their protector. 

They sought constant reassurance that the United 

States would not abandon them in the face of nuclear 

threats. Acquiring nuclear weapons on their own was 

indeed an option for the allies. Right up to the NPT, 

various schemes were considered, including a NATO 

nuclear force and the basing of dual-keyed U.S. tactical nuclear weapons around Europe to head this off. 

As an inducement for Europeans to accept the NPT, 

the United States—while retaining operational control 

over the weapons—allowed West Germany, Belgium, 

the Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey to modify certain 

aircraft to be capable of carrying U.S. tactical nuclear 

weapons based in their countries. Strangely, this practice continues today, though on a reduced scale.5

In fact, extended deterrence was not a major issue 

for the United States during the Cold War.6 The United States believed that a Soviet-dominated Eurasia, 

like an Axis Power-dominated Eurasia—the threat of 

World War II—was an intolerable danger to its own 

viability and required challenge. U.S. forces were forward deployed in Europe because its allies, devastated by World War II, were unable to provide an effective barrier to potential Soviet expansion into Western 

Europe. The United States saw the Communist side as 

having a numerical, conventional warfare advantage 

and wanted any confrontation to be sobered by the 

danger of nuclear escalation. Our forces were there as 

a tripwire to guarantee that a challenge at the boundary of NATO or the borders of our Asian allies would, 

by threatening U.S. forces directly, possibly provoke a 

nuclear strike by the United States.

The Korean War seemed to American leaders like 

both the opening round of an all-out war with the 
5

Soviet Union and a diversion to take the focus off the 

main front in Europe. The Korean contest, though soon 

stalemated, was replaced by another in Vietnam that 

eventually also involved the United States. Asia during the Cold War featured the opposite of Europe—no 

direct confrontations of nuclear powers, weak alliance 

structures, and very intense land wars. However, like 

the case in Europe, the United States freely offered up 

extended nuclear deterrence guarantees for all who 

wanted them among its major friends in Asia.7

Much has changed since the enactment of the NPT. 

The United States’ allies in Europe and Asia are now 

among the richest nations in the world. Japan has the 

world’s third-largest economy, while the now united 

Germany has the fourth and is the leading economy in 

the European Union. The main threats to our security 

are attacks on American soil by non-state entities, none 

of which possess nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union 

has collapsed into a smaller, less important, less powerful Russia. China is now a major American trading 

partner and growing rapidly, but is mainly focused on 

the domestic stability impacts of that growth and not 

on international expansion. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan confirm the difficulty in America acting as 

the sheriff in distant lands where effective, representative, non-corrupt local governments are unknown and 

seemingly impossible to create.8 The need for forward 

deployment of U.S. forces has greatly diminished.

OVEREXTENDED

Absurdly, extended deterrence remains a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy. The United States still 

promises to exchange Washington for Berlin and San 

Francisco for Tokyo. And even more absurdly, the 
6

nuclear guarantee now extends to former Warsaw 

Pact states and former Soviet republics that have 

become NATO members, making their borders the 

West’s frontier. In Asia, North Korea, having withdrawn from the NPT, has acquired nuclear weapons;9

and China, now more militarily powerful and politically assertive, is pressing claims for islands administered by other nations, including our friends.10 It is 

now Boston for Riga and Seattle for Seoul that is at 

risk. The cries for reassurance on the part of allies are 

more persistent given how implausible the promise is 

now to provide nuclear deterrence for allies.

In order to never have to contemplate such a deal, 

the United States provides its allies with conventional 

defenses. We guard Eastern Europe from a Russia still 

fuming about its lost empire and East Asia from the 

growing power of China. Our allies are fully capable 

of affording their own defenses, but provide neither 

sufficient conventional defenses nor their own nuclear 

shield. Worse, our allies tempt our fate by being cavalier about their relations with their status-sensitive, 

nuclear-armed neighbors. The European Union plays 

footsie with Ukraine, once Russia’s breadbasket and 

still home to many Russians; meanwhile, Japan and 

others have their coast guards sail dangerously close 

to Chinese vessels in jockeying over rocky outcrops.

Extended deterrence is no longer nuclear deterrence at a distance, but rather a conventional defense 

of our allies’ borders. We do not see our forward deployed forces as a tripwire for nuclear escalation as 

they were viewed during the Cold War. Instead, they 

are intended to have the capability of winning the conventional fight so as to either deter it from occurring or 

keep it from escalating to the nuclear level. The means 

for gaining conventional warfare dominance has been 
7

the precision revolution, which is the development of 

systems that can precisely detect, target, and destroy 

opposing forces—in great numbers if necessary—with 

little or no collateral damage, most particularly no civilian casualties.11 Nuclear weapons were essentially 

compensation for the inability of conventional bombing, even conducted on a massive scale, to destroy enemy capabilities because of its inaccuracies. Close was 

good enough with nuclear weapons. Now precision 

weapons are, in essence, the way to avoid the massive 

and indiscriminate destruction of nuclear weapons. 

They represent warfare coming full circle. First small 

bombs, then bigger and bigger bombs, until their destructive capability is so enormous that the target cannot be missed, and now back to small bombs, but ones 

so precise that the target is certain to be destroyed. 

Nevertheless, weapons technology diffuses, nuclear or conventional. The sensors, guidance, networks, 

and missile systems that lie at the heart of the precision 

weapons revolution are spreading to potential opponents across the globe.12 The cost of protecting towns 

bordering Russia or islands near China is extraordinarily high and is certain to increase as their militaries 

modernize, acquiring more and more precision weapons. Trying to be the dominant conventional military 

at the border of big power opponents, but thousands 

of miles from our own shores, is a formula for creating a huge military and ultimate bankruptcy. Our best 

policy, as it was in the world wars, is to put great distance between enemy forces and our own forces until 

enemy forces are heavily eroded, preferably through 

contact with our allies or other opponents. Such a policy today would encourage allies to both stiffen their 

conventional forces and acquire nuclear weapons. 

One comes with the other.
8

The so-called pivot to Asia is to provide reassurance to our Asia allies who worry about our ability 

to meet the challenge of a rising China.13 They fear 

that we will abandon them as we are pushed aside 

in the Western Pacific by the increasing might of an 

ever-richer China, one that has a long memory about 

its supposed humiliations at the hand of colonizers 

and empire builders, including Japan and the United 

States. They wonder whether or not we will fulfill 

pledges to save them from Chinese intimidation, including increased Chinese efforts to assert claims over 

waters known to be rich in fishing, and likely oil as 

well. All of this is taking place within the first island 

chain, the half ring of island nations that border China 

on its coastal frontier and that could help block its access to the open seas—and thus the global resources 

needed for its continuing economic growth.14

The Asian pivot has so far brought with it only 

modest troop deployments and the repositioning 

of minor air and naval assets. Marines will be rotating through a training facility in Australia. American forces will have increased access to bases in the 

Philippines. Additional forces are being assigned to 

Guam. But the real challenge lies in operating within 

the first island chain, which is subject to China’s ever 

increasing anti-access/area-denial capabilities—accurate cruise and tactical ballistic missiles, sophisticated 

mines, integrated air defense systems—that greatly 

threaten any serious attempts to protect allies from 

Chinese moves to assert territorial claims.15

Meeting the Chinese anti-access/area-denial (A2/

AD) challenge has become an obsession with elements 

of the American military, particularly the Air Force 

and the Navy, which are eager for new missions to 

champion after their relative fade post-9/11 when we 
9

fought less technologically sophisticated enemies. It 

is possible to imagine the combination of advanced 

intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities, long-range conventional strike weapons, stealthy 

aircraft, submarines, anti-radiation missiles, agile missile defenses, and robust command and control systems that U.S. forces could mount that would permit 

survivable military operations close to the Chinese 

shore.16 Doctrine for such capabilities is being devised 

under the rubric “air-sea battle,” as are alternatives 

such as blockades and other submarine-centric efforts.17 Supportive weapons system developments are 

underway. No estimate has been released, but the cost 

of meeting the Chinese A2/AD challenge will surely 

be hundreds of billions of dollars.18

Russia’s grab of Crimea highlights a related challenge—defending Eastern Europe.19 Of course, Russia 

is not the Soviet Union in terms of its inherent military 

power. Its population is smaller, its industrial focus 

less martial, and its military equipment less expeditionary, modern, and ready. Nevertheless, at its frontier, Russia is a formidable force, fully capable of defeating any opposition from its neighbors. Russian air 

defenses are cutting-edge, and Russia possesses significant armor and special operations forces. Nucleararmed and seeking to reclaim regional dominance, 

Russia is quite intimidating close up and happy to 

remind its neighbors that it is not to be trifled with by 

them.20 We too must be careful about Russia, if only 

because we need Russian assistance in many parts of 

the globe.21

Extended deterrence makes these military problems—the containment of potentially expansionary 

nations—not the burden of allies in their regions, but 

America’s.22 Free riding allies, wealthy though they 
10

may be, make little effort to protect themselves. Their 

defense budgets and militaries continue to decline. 

NATO’s 2 percent budgetary goal, the percentage 

of gross domestic product to be devoted to defense, 

goes unmet.23 Asian air and naval forces are slow to 

modernize. Their contributions to offset the costs of 

stationing U.S. forces forward nowhere near cover 

the true expenses—the training, equipping, and rotating of combat ready units. Worse, they tempt our fate 

by pushing at the edge. The European Union entices 

Ukraine to pull away from Russian influence while 

the ships of our Asian allies maneuver against Chinese ships near disputed islands. The question always 

is: What will we do to help them? The obligations are 

hardly ever reciprocal to any extent.

It is not just America’s military that is at risk, but 

also the American economy. Acquired through the 

underfunding of past wars and the inefficiencies of 

a patchwork social safety net, the national debt has 

reached the 18 trillion dollar mark. It is certain to increase due to rising health care costs and the retirement of the generation that was born after World War 

II. Interest on the debt is projected to soon exceed our 

current inflated defense expenditures.24 Because we invest so heavily in providing what is essentially free security to others, we lack the fine roads, the high-speed 

trains, and shiny airports of our European and Asian 

allies. Protecting the borders of these allies from the 

threat of intrusion by their militarily capable neighbors, as extended deterrence policy requires us to do, 

is a financial burden that prevents those investments 

and a trimming of the national debt. Neglected infrastructure and a mounting debt are significant threats 

to America’s future prosperity.25
11

MORE WARS TO FIGHT AND LIES TO TELL

The NPT has stopped neither wars nor, and more 

to its intended purpose, the spread of nuclear weapons. There are now nine nuclear powers instead of five 

as India, Israel, Pakistan, and North Korea have joined 

the club, though not formally. Nations fearing for their 

survival against powerful enemies think about acquiring nuclear weapons. With the NPT, their efforts have 

to be clandestine and determined, but for relatively 

rich and technologically sophisticated nations, it is a 

path that can be taken. India faces a nuclear-armed 

China allied with its rival Pakistan. Israel is surrounded by hostile Muslim nations increasingly swayed by 

jihadist ideology. Pakistan has the bigger, more powerful India to worry about. And North Korea fears the 

United States.

Nuclear-armed nations are often at war, but not 

with each other. Nuclear weapons sober regional tensions by giving great caution to aggressive actions. 

The dangers of escalation restrain the inclination to 

use even low levels of military force in disputes with 

nuclear-armed opponents. War is full of surprises, 

which makes it too dangerous for nuclear powers to 

fight one another. One miscalculation about likely 

opponent reactions could be one too many in any 

encounter. 

Ironically, nuclear nonproliferation efforts can be 

both confrontational and violent. Although not under 

the NPT banner, Israel bombed nuclear reactor sites in 

Iraq in 1981 and Syria in 2007 to prevent the acquisition of nuclear weapons by hostile nations. The United 

States invaded Iraq in 2003 claiming the enforcement 

of United Nations resolutions banning Iraqi possession of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). And 
12

today both Iran and North Korea labor under severe 

trade sanctions because of their development, and in 

North Korea’s case acquisition, of nuclear weapons. 

Iran lives on the brink of war because Israel and the 

United States have said that neither will tolerate Iran 

becoming a nuclear weapons power.26 If negotiations 

and sanctions fail to persuade Iran to limit its ambitions and accept intrusive inspections, attacks on Iran 

seem likely, and as Iran has pledged retaliation, an

expanded war as well.27

The hard treatment is only for some. Israel, India, 

and Pakistan never signed the NPT. Because Israel’s 

nuclear weapon status is unacknowledged, it is not 

subject to much discussion or any penalty. India and 

Pakistan did incur the wrath of the United States in 

the form of some unwelcomed sanctions and undelivered aid, but these penalties were lifted when their cooperation was needed in other matters. North Korea 

is an NPT signatory who renounced the treaty, but the 

animosity against it predates any North Korean interest in nuclear weapons. 

The NPT creates two kinds of sovereignty: that 

possessed by states permitted to have nuclear weapons (the original five) and that possessed by all others, which are not permitted to have nuclear weapons. 

The embarrassing arrogance of it all is compensated 

by the treaty promise of the permitted nuclear powers to work toward nuclear disarmament. In an era of 

increased interest in equality, the pledge seems inadequate at best. How can there be nearly 200 sovereign 

nations and only five virtuous enough to be allowed 

to have the bomb? Thus, there is a growing interest in 

the so-called zero option, the claim expressed by various heads of state (including U.S. President Barack 

Obama) that the goal for the permitted nuclear pow-
13

ers is the elimination of all nuclear weapons.28 Given 

that the knowledge needed to build nuclear weapons 

cannot be destroyed, and given the trust needed in 

the owner of the last weapon to be destroyed when 

all others have none, it is a goal likely never to be met 

and seems disingenuous in its offering. Anyone concerned about the likelihood of zero happening should 

be reassured to learn that all the weapon-possessing 

nations are in the process of upgrading their weapons 

and/or the platforms needed for the delivery of their 

weapons.29 Moreover, one may wonder how Israel or 

North Korea will be persuaded to take the zero pledge. 

PRO PROLIFERATION

With the treaty abandoned, not many nations will 

seek to acquire nuclear weapons. Most do not live in 

a tough neighborhood, have the technological base 

needed to carry out the task, wish to devote the resources to the cause, or welcome the responsibility of 

protecting them from accident, theft, and/or preemptive attack from worried neighbors. Ukraine may well 

regret giving up the Soviet weapons based on its territory to Russia, but the invasion risk and dollar cost 

of moving to acquire them afresh may be too much. 

Some in Libya probably regret giving up their program, as having retained it would have kept the Qaddafis in power. The Libya of today is in no condition 

to revive it.

The lesson is that if you face a serious threat from 

a nuclear power on your own and have sufficient resources, you best go nuclear quickly and quietly.30

Canada likely would not because it receives free extended deterrence in perpetuity by virtue of sharing a continent with the United States. Without the 
14

United States providing the nuclear umbrella, however, Germany and Japan likely will go nuclear. Their 

now largely self-imposed and budgetary convenient 

exemption from any serious military obligations, including their own defense, will surely evaporate without extended deterrence. South Korea and Australia 

would also likely acquire nuclear weapons. South 

Korea has twice the population of the North and 25 

times its wealth, but still claims it is not ready to manage its own defense against the nuclear-armed but impoverished North. It prefers the United States carry 

that burden. And Australia, living well in a region of 

populous and expanding nations, will recognize how 

far it actually is from the United States.

The fear, of course, is that without the NPT barrier, 

not just friendly nations in Europe or Asia but also 

hostile, unstable, and/or terrorist-supporting regimes 

in the Middle East will go nuclear. A nuclear weapon in their hands is more frightening than a nuclear 

weapon in Russian and Chinese hands. How long will 

a nuclear-armed Saudi Arabia survive as a kingdom? 

Wouldn’t Iran give some to Hezbollah or Qatar and a 

couple to Hamas? 

Deterrence and forensics work.31 Nations that 

threaten the United States will discover that they face 

a most formidable and tenacious opponent. Post-NPT 

nuclear weapons will remain difficult to obtain, costly 

to protect, and very, very risky to gift, lend, or trade. 

The extreme caution that applies to attacks on nuclear 

powers applies also to those who would hand nuclear 

weapons to their terrorist enemies, as the links are sure 

to be revealed. Often the terrorists are as much a threat 

to others as they are to the United States. The weapon 

that they steal from you may be used against you, so 

there is strong incentive to protect nuclear weapons 

from theft and against handing them to others.
15

OBSTACLES TO RELINQUISHING THE BURDEN

The biggest obstacle to getting beyond the NPT is 

the fear of terrorists using a stolen or otherwise nefariously obtained nuclear weapon to blackmail or destroy civilization. Many a blockbuster novel, movie, 

and television program has this theme as its plot.32 We 

have learned to live with Russians and Chinese, even 

those who are threatening, but not terrorists. Terrorists, we believe, have no bounds. We all are taught 

the destructive power of nuclear weapons. Just think 

what terrorists will do with them. There is an industry 

that stokes these fears, aided by reports of dropped or 

inadequately guarded weapons. If there were 15 or 20 

nuclear-armed nations instead of 5 or 10, the opportunities for disaster would surely increase.

Given that the United States has the most extensive experience with nuclear weapon accidents and 

safeguards, we should widely share that knowledge.33

Every new nuclear power, upon the revelation of its 

new status, should be offered a package of our hardwon ideas for safely maintaining, handling, and 

guarding nuclear weapons and any relevant training 

that it might require. A somewhat similar initiative 

helped protect Russian nuclear weapons in the period 

of semi-chaos that occurred after the collapse of the 

Soviet Union. Not all new nuclear powers would trust 

the friendly act, but all would recognize the importance others place on their custodial skills. 

The American military is another obstacle to giving up the NPT. The American military adheres to a 

doctrine of forward deployment that is largely supported by the conventional warfare requirements of 

an extended deterrence foreign policy. Its command 

structure is based on joint regionally focused com-
16

mands that manage deployed forces and that take as 

their mission the tempering of regional conflicts via 

partnerships and direct action to avoid the risks of escalation. Much of its force levels are justified on the 

basis of regional conventional deterrence. Without 

other nations to protect at their boundaries, the United 

States would have a much smaller military.

The NPT has a civilian domestic lobby as well—

the network of anti-nuclear weapons foundations, 

public interest groups, university programs, and proliferation monitoring agencies. The normal political 

divisions do not apply to nonproliferation advocates. 

They are on the left, right, and center. They are heard 

inside government and out. They are establishmentarian and radical. In addition, they have the public 

forum to themselves. There is no counter lobby that 

advocates the spread of nuclear weapons. There are 

no marches in the United States for the proliferation 

of nuclear weapons.34

Although all the components of the nonproliferation lobby could not possibly agree on this formulation 

of their advocacy, nonproliferation is an advocacy for 

American hegemony in the Western world defined to 

include our Asian allies. The United States provides 

extended deterrence for all. It is the grand protector. 

Britain and France are extras, at best an afterthought. 

Because the United States takes the nuclear risk, it assumes to be the manager of global security, guarding 

the borders of all. The U.S. Navy tells us that it is the 

global force for good. The U.S. Air Force boasts that 

it has global reach; and the U.S. Army is stationed in 

Europe, the Middle East, Japan, and Korea, which is 

about as global as an army can get.35
17

LEARNING TO LET OTHERS LOVE THE BOMB

The NPT was made for the Cold War world in 

which there were two clearly defined sides and a possibility that every conflict could potentially lead to a 

nuclear exchange between them. It was right, then, to 

seek to limit the number of nuclear weapons states to 

avoid alliance complications. Some conflicts, however, 

existed independently of the Cold War. It is not that 

they were unaffected by the Cold War or did not have 

an effect of their own on it, but rather that they would 

have existed whether there was a Cold War or not. 

The Arab-Israeli conflict is one; the tension between 

India and Pakistan is another. It is not surprising that 

participants in these conflicts refused to sign the NPT 

and were the first to defy the intent of the treaty. When 

your survival is at stake, nuclear weapons have a special appeal.36

North Korea broke with the nonproliferation regime after the Cold War was over when its main protectors, China and Russia, no longer cared much about 

its fate. In addition, its main antagonist, the United 

States, was at the time very much distracted by the two 

wars in which it was fighting elsewhere in the world. 

North Korea’s motives for seeking nuclear weapons 

may have been mixed, but the announcement that it 

developed such a weapon no doubt gave it a lot of 

attention, some protection, and a bit of self-respect.

Since the end of the Cold War neither Russia, as 

the successor state to the Soviet Union, nor the United 

States believes that it is in mortal danger from an unexpected strike from the other. Their nuclear forces 

stand on constant alert, and there is a concern by 

both to maintain a survivable second-strike capability, but their respective societal lives no longer hang 
18

solely on a nuclear thread. There are many disputes 

between them, but none comes close to raising nuclear 

alarms. As the strains on alert forces indicate, service 

in nuclear forces for the major powers is a backwater 

of boredom and career hibernation. 

In contrast, the United States’ Cold War friends 

have a number of contentious issues with Russia and 

China. None of these issues yet rises to the level of 

mortal danger, but the relations of American allies 

with both countries are definitely more frayed and 

volatile than those of the United States. American 

forces’ presence near China or in Eastern Europe is for 

the reassurance of allies and not for the United States’ 

own security. Similarly, South Korea and Japan want 

the United States to maintain its bases in their countries to protect them from their often hostile and always unpredictable North Korean neighbor. It is the 

North Korean bomb that worries them.37

No other nuclear power offers allies extended 

deterrence—not Russia, not France, not the United 

Kingdom, not Israel, and not India. The Chinese bomb 

protects China alone. Similarly, the Pakistani and the 

North Korean bombs guard only one country: their 

own. Nuclear deterrence, at its core, is a self-help program and never a charitable one.38

America’s offer of extended deterrence is thus a 

very strange policy, sustainable only by a willingness 

to be involved deeply in the security of distant nations, many of which have no obligation or capacity 

to reciprocate in any meaningful way.39 No wonder 

American allies constantly seek reassurance of our interest in their defense.40 It is to them, surely, an unbelievable policy both because of the risks it imposes on 

us and because of the huge subsidy it provides them 

in the form of the forward deployment of well-trained 

and equipped U.S. conventional forces.
19

It is also an unaffordable and outdated policy. 

Without the menace of the Soviet Union, the United 

States is militarily secure. Our Cold War allies are rich 

and can well afford their own defenses. We have no 

need to station significant forces in Europe or Asia. 

Instead, we have problems at home to tend to, including: mounting deficits, crumbling infrastructure, and 

too many young people who lack the skills to compete 

effectively with their global peers. These problems 

will likely be difficult to manage, but they require 

the resources that are now devoted to providing the 

frontier defenses of friends who prefer not to have 

to build and maintain their own nuclear weapons or 

even dress up in uniforms.

The bad habits of our allies are largely of our own 

making, but are buttressed by the nuclear nonproliferation regime.41 The American military leans far forward 

quite willingly on the claim that local conflicts must be 

managed in order to prevent their potential escalation. 

The NPT makes our friends permanently vulnerable 

to nuclear coercion and subtly shifts the burdens of 

their security too much onto the United States. It is the 

ultimate exemption from adult responsibility. Instead 

of trying to enforce the treaty, the United States ought 

to be trying to get rid of it. Nuclear nonproliferation 

deceives no one but the American taxpayer.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 1

1. Thomas Alan Schwartz, Lyndon Johnson and Europe: In the 

Shadow of Vietnam, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 

2003, pp. 206-222; John Dumbrell, “LBJ and the Cold War,” in 

Mitchell B. Lerner, ed., A Companion to Lyndon B. Johnson, Malden, 

MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2012, pp. 431-435; Francis J. Gavin, 

“Intelligence, Non-Proliferation, and the Shift in U.S. Policies in 

the 1960s,” paper presented at the Center for International Secu-
20

rity and Arms Control Conference, “Intelligence and Prediction 

in an Unpredictable World,” Stanford University, Stanford, CA, 

June 2003.

2. Francis J. Gavin, “How Dangerous? History and Nuclear 

Alarmism,” in Christopher A. Preble and John Mueller, eds., A 

Dangerous World? Threat Perception and U.S. National Security, 

Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 2014, p. 20.

3. Dov S. Zakheim, “Abandon Nation Building,” The National 

Interest, No.131, May/June 2014, pp. 38-45.

4. According to the Leveretts, Iran is just interested in a civilian nuclear power program in getting all those centrifuges online.

See Flynt Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, “What’s Really at 

Stake in the Impasse over Centrifuges—Hillary Mann Leverett on 

the Iran Nuclear Talks,” July 25, 2014, available from goingtotehran.com/whats-really-at-stake-in-the-impasse-over-centrifuges-hillarymann-leverett-on-the-iran-nuclear-talks. 

5. On the tactical weapons in Europe issue, see Barry Blechman and Russell Rumbaugh, “Bombs Away: The Case for Phasing Out U.S. Tactical Nukes in Europe,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, 

No. 4, July/August 2014, pp. 163-174. The renewal of these weapons is now buttressed with claims that their modernization and 

continued presence will provide needed reassurance for Europeans made fearful by Russian ventures in the Ukraine. Ralph 

Vartabedian and W. J. Hennigan, “US nuclear arsenal in Europe 

is likely to stay,” Stars and Stripes, September 21, 2014, available 

from www.stripes.com/news/europe/us-nuclear-arsenal-in-europe-islikely-to-stay-1.304222.

6. Extended deterrence hardly merited discussion in Lawrence Freedman’s masterful study of nuclear strategy. Lawrence 

Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy, 2nd Ed., New York: 

St. Martin’s Press, 1989, pp. 290, 424. 

7. New Zealand seemingly renounced its extended deterrence, though never explicitly.

8. The futility is evident in James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and 
21

Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2006, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011.

9. A. Wess Mitchell and Jan Havranek, “Atlanticism in Retreat,” The American Interest, Vol. 9, No. 2, November/December 2013, pp. 41-57, available from www.the-american-interest.

com/2013/10/10/atlanticism-in-retreat/.

10. “Banyan: Force Majeure,” The Economist, May 24, 2014, 

p. 38.

11. For a history of precision see Paul G. Gillespie, Weapons of 

Choice: The Development of Precision Guided Munitions, Tuscaloosa, 

AL: University of Alabama Press, 2006.

12. Lynn E. Davis et al., “Armed and Dangerous? UAVs and US 

Security,” RAND Report RR-449-RC, Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, 2014, available from rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/

research_reports/RR400/RR449/RAND_RR449.pdf; Lieutenant General David A. Deptula, USAF (Ret.), “A New Era for Command 

and Control of Aerospace Operations,” Air & Space Power Journal, 

July-August 2014, pp. 5-15, available from www.au.af.mil/au/afri/

aspj/digital/pdf/articles/2014-Jul-Aug/SLP-Deptula.pdf.

13. “Jittery Neighbours: Asian fears of China’s rise,” The Economist, July 19, 2014, p. 10, available from www.economist.com/news/

asia/21607869-worries-about-chinas-ascent-jittery-neighbours.

14. James R. Holmes, “Defend the First Island Chain,” U.S. 

Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 140, No. 4, April 2014, pp. 32-37; 

Milan Vego, “Chinese Shipping Could Be Risky Business,” U.S. 

Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2014, pp. 38-43.

15. Lyle Goldstein and Shannon Knight, “Wired for Sound in 

the ‘Near Sea,’” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2014, pp. 56-

61. Note also Andrew S. Erickson and Michael S. Chase, “China 

Goes Ballistic,” The National Interest, No. 131, May/June 2014, pp. 

58-64; Jacqueline Newmyer Deal, “Red Alert,” The National Interest, May/June 2014, pp. 85-96.

16. Harry Foster, “The Joint Stealth Task Force: An Operational Concept for Air-Sea Battle,” Joint Forces Quarterly 72, 1st 

Qtr. 2014, pp. 47-53.
22

17. Commander David Forman, USN, “The First Rule of AirSea Battle,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, April 2014, pp. 26-31. 

Also Colonel Robert C. Boyles, “Air-Sea Battle Disclaimers and 

‘Kill-Chains,’’’ U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 140, No. 1, 

January 2014, pp. 46-51.

18. The Marines are trying hard to get their share. See Colin 

Clark, “Marines Won’t Take The Beaches Head-On Any More; 

‘Find The Gaps,’” June 26, 2014, available from breakingdefense.

com/2014/06/marines-wont-take-the-beaches-head-on-any-more-findthe-gaps/.

19. Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen and General 

Philip Breedlove, “A NATO for a Dangerous World” The Wall 

Street Journal, August 18, 2014, available from www.wsj.com/articles/anders-fogh-rasmussen-and-philip-m-breedlove-a-nato-for-a-dangerous-world-1408317653. 

20. Alexei Anishchuk, “Don’t mess with nuclear Russia, 

Putin says,” Reuters, August 29, 2014, available from news.yahoo.com/putin-says-russia-ready-respond-aggression-123956691.html; 

Tony Osborne, “Facing Threats: Ukrainian crisis has prompted 

NATO to beef up defenses, but at what cost?” Aviation Week & 

Space Technology, Vol. 176, No. 32, September 15, 2014, p. 31.

21. Dimitri K. Simes, “Reawakening an Empire,” The National 

Interest, No. 132, July/August 2014, pp. 5-15.

22. See for example Chris Jennewein, “Top Admiral: Resource Competition, China’s Rise Threaten Pacific,” Times of San 

Diego, August 19, 2014, available from timesofsandiego.com/military/2014/08/19/top-admiral-resource-competition-chinas-rise-threaten-pacific. 

23. For NATO data see Naftali Bendavid, “Ukraine Simmers 

as Putin Digs In,” The Wall Street Journal, August 30/31, 2014, p. 1. 

24. For number by 2020, see Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, 

Congressional Budget Office, “Shifting Priorities in the Federal 

Budget,” presentation at Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, September 11, 2014; Note also, Wendy Edelberg, “CBO’s Projection of 

Federal Interest Payments,” CBO Blog, posted September 3, 2014, 

available from www.cbo.gov/publication/45684. 
23

25. Stephen D. King, When The Money Runs Out: The End of 

Western Affluence, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2013. 

26. Matthew Kroenig, A Time To Attack: The Looming Iranian 

Nuclear Threat, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2014.

27. Stopping the Iranian program is quite difficult. See Norman Friedman, “Learning to Love the (Iranian) Bomb,” U.S. Naval 

Institute Proceedings, January 2014, pp. 90-91.

28. However, see John Mueller, “Think Again: Nuclear Weapons,” Foreign Policy, December 18, 2009, available from foreignpolicy.com/2009/12/18/think-again-nuclear-weapons/. 

29. The bill is not small. The United States plans to spend 

$263.8 billion through 2024 and Congress’ watchdog, the Government Accountability Office, thinks that number is an underestimate. U.S. Government Accountability Office, Nuclear Weapons: 

Ten-Year Budget Estimates for Modernization Omit Key Efforts, and 

Assumptions and Limitations Are Not Fully Transparent, GAO-14-

373, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Accountability Office, 

June 2014; Note also William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “U.S. 

Ramping Up Major Renewal in Nuclear Arms,” The New York 

Times, September 22, 2014, p. 1. 

30. Norman Friedman, “Keeping Putin in Check,” U.S. Naval 

Institute Proceedings, Vol. 140, No. 5, May 2014, pp. 162-163.

31. The clearest on this is, as always, John Mueller. See Mueller, “Nuclear Alarmism: Proliferation and Terrorism,” in Preble 

and Mueller, eds., A Dangerous World? pp. 25-39. 

32. A recent favorite is Michael Weiss, The Bomb on the Rock: A 

Tale of Two Sons, self-published, 2013.

33. See the review of Eric Schlosser, Command and Control: 

Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety, 

New York: Penguin Press, 2013, in Gregory D. Koblentz, “Command and Combust: America’s Secret History of Atomic Accidents,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, No. 1, January/February, 2014, 

pp. 167-172. 
24

34. However, there have been some voices of reason. Note, 

Kenneth N. Waltz, “Why Iran Should Get the Bomb: Nuclear 

Balancing Would Mean Stability,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 4, 

July/August, 2012, pp. 2-5.

35. For a very useful discussion of the role of the military 

and others in “hyping” our threats see Benjamin H. Friedman, 

“Alarums and Excursions: Explaining Threat Inflation in U.S. 

Foreign Policy,” in Preble and Mueller, eds., A Dangerous World? 

pp. 281-304. 

36. For an analysis of the motives for acquiring and strategies 

for use of nuclear weapons in crises see Vipin Narang, Nuclear 

Strategy in the Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2014. 

37. Gerard Baker and Alastair Gale, “South Korea President 

Warns on Nuclear Domino Effect,” The Wall Street Journal, May 

29, 2014, available from www.wsj.com/articles/south-korea-presidentpark-geun-hye-warns-on-nuclear-domino-effect-1401377403.

38. Richard K. Betts, “Universal Deterrence or Conceptual 

Collapse? Liberal Pessimism and Utopian Realism,” in Victor A. 

Utgoff, ed., The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, 

and World Order, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000, p. 65. 

39. Thomas M. Nichols, No Use: Nuclear Weapons and U.S. 

National Security, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania 

Press, 2013.

40. Doug Bandow, “Is Poland’s Alliance with America 

‘Worthless’?” The National Interest, June 25, 2014, available from 

nationalinterest.org/feature/poland%E2%80%99s-alliance-americaworthless-10748. 

41. Senior American officials past and present continue to 

claim to worry about whether America’s allies will maintain their 

confidence in our commitment to their security. See the discussion of the recent National Defense Panel, the reviewing body of 

the Quadrennial Defense Report, in Evan Moore, “Why America 

Still Needs Nukes,” Real Clear Defense website, August 12, 2014, 

available from www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2014/08/12/why_

america_still_needs_nukes_107359.html. 
25

CHAPTER 2

WHY U.S. POLICYMAKERS WHO LOVE THE 

BOMB DON’T THINK “MORE IS BETTER”

W. Seth Carus 1

Disconnects between the academic and policy 

worlds are not unusual. Nevertheless, it still is striking 

when an academic debate, supposedly about a topic of 

vital national security concern, rages for decades but is 

totally ignored by those responsible for policymaking 

in that arena. This is certainly true for the argument 

offered by some academics that nuclear proliferation 

contributes to the stability of the international system, 

arguing that “more is better.” Yet, it would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to find any Washington policymaker accepting such a position. Indeed, during the 

past 50 years, there has been a widespread consensus 

amongst U.S. policymakers, across the political and 

ideological spectrum, that “more is NOT better” and 

that nonproliferation efforts are an essential element 

of U.S. national security policy.

The pages that follow will start by first examining 

the views of the academics who espouse the “more 

is better” argument, followed by a review of some of 

the perspectives that explain why almost all U.S. national security policymakers have ignored it. Who are 

the policymakers in question? They include executive 

branch officials, starting with the last 12 presidents 

and continuing with their immediate advisors—national security advisors, secretaries of defense and 

state, and other senior officials (deputy secretaries, 

undersecretaries, and assistant secretaries of various 

departments), as well as many members of Congress. 
26

This discussion is focused exclusively on Washington 

and the men and women responsible for creating and 

executing U.S. national security policies. It does not 

address the potentially different perspectives of officials in other countries, who may operate using different rules and perceive the world in different ways.

PROLIFERATION OPTIMISTS AND PESSIMISTS

In academic circles, nuclear proliferation “optimists” and “pessimists” argue over the dangers posed 

by the risks of the further spread of nuclear weapons. 

The proliferation optimists, represented articulately 

and starkly by Kenneth Waltz, argue that nuclear arsenals reduce the chances of armed conflict, and that 

the benefit from this reduction in conventional warfare means that “more is better” when it comes to 

nuclear proliferation.2 Waltz’s influence in this arena 

resulted in part from his towering status as a scholar 

of international relations.3 Indeed, he remains, according to a biographical account, “one of the most cited, 

and controversial, authors in the field of international 

relations.”4 He served as a President of the American Political Science Association (1987–1988); and, 

as a teacher, he influenced generations of students of 

international studies.5

In contrast to the proliferation optimists, proliferation pessimists contend that the dangers of nuclear 

proliferation are substantial and that growth in the 

number of countries with nuclear arsenals poses real 

risks to international peace and stability. Scott Sagan 

has taken a lead in representing this perspective, arguing that “more will be worse,”6

 although most other 

academic students of nuclear proliferation agree with 

him on this issue, even if not accepting any or all of his 

arguments. 
27

Waltz and Sagan have honed their disagreement 

in a short book, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, widely 

used in the classroom to teach nuclear proliferation issues. First appearing in 1995, the two authors released 

revised versions in 2002 and 2013.7

THE NUCLEAR PEACE HYPOTHESIS

At the center of the debate between the proliferation optimists and pessimists is what is sometimes 

called the nuclear peace hypothesis.8 The thesis, first 

articulated in the months after the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is an argument that the destructiveness of atomic weapons fundamentally alters international society by making warfare intolerable. In 

essence, the atomic bomb created a situation in which 

the means of warfare were incommensurate with the 

ends, such that it no longer made sense to contemplate 

general wars as a tool of policy. Bernard Brodie offered a stark statement of the concept in one of the 

seminal works of nuclear strategy:

Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief 

purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no 

other useful purpose.9

Although Brodie came to modify his views, especially 

in his subsequent work on limited warfare, this 1946 

statement is at the core of the argument offered by 

proliferation optimists. 

Proponents of the nuclear peace hypothesis argue 

that the destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes national leaders reluctant to pursue military actions that 

might escalate into a nuclear exchange. From this perspective, there are few war objectives that could justi-
28

fy risking the death and destruction associated with a 

war fought using nuclear weapons. Some have argued 

that nuclear arsenals played a central role in creating 

the so-called “Long Peace” during the Cold War, a 

reference to the absence of significant armed conflict 

between the Soviet Union and the United States despite bitter enmity and mass arms build-ups.10 Others 

also argue that nuclear weapons are responsible in 

part for the absence of major power wars in the past 

6 decades.11 While many contest the nuclear peace hypothesis, that debate will not be reviewed here.12

The focus of this chapter is on a different issue, 

closely connected, that helps explain the indifference 

of policymakers to the Waltz argument: Why do U.S. 

policymakers—meaning government officials who 

have had positions of responsibility for such matters—overwhelmingly support nuclear nonproliferation efforts, irrespective of party, ideology, or attitude 

toward nuclear weapons, even those who accept the 

tenets of the nuclear peace hypothesis? Alternatively, to reframe the question in the context of the academic debate: why are policymakers overwhelmingly 

inclined toward proliferation pessimism?

NUCLEAR OPTIMISM, PROLIFERATION 

OPTIMISM, AND PROLIFERATION 

RELATIVISM

As a starting point, there are important differences 

between “nuclear optimism,” the concept that nuclear 

weapons can prevent wars with limited danger of nuclear use, and “proliferation optimism,” the decidedly 

different argument that the spread of nuclear weapons is not accompanied by an increase in the dangers 

that they pose. Sagan, for example, implicitly assumes 
29

that those who accept the nuclear peace hypothesis 

also favor proliferation, meaning that “nuclear optimists” are the same as “proliferation optimists.”13

That is a doubtful conclusion. A “proliferation optimist” inevitably will be a “nuclear optimist,” believing that the spread of nuclear weapons will favor international peace; but a “nuclear optimist” need not 

be a “proliferation optimist.” Indeed, as will become 

evident, many “nuclear optimists” are “proliferation 

pessimists,” and even those sometimes classified as 

“proliferation optimists” often are highly selective in 

their optimism.

Distinguishing the “proliferation optimist” from 

what Peter Lavoy has called the “proliferation relativist” is critically important to understanding different 

views regarding the merits of nuclear proliferation.14

Some academics considered “proliferation optimists” 

hold positions radically different from the one advanced by Waltz, perhaps accepting the “nuclear 

peace hypothesis” but not necessarily considering all 

nuclear proliferation beneficial. 

John Mearsheimer, often identified as a “proliferation optimist,”15 is better characterized as a “proliferation relativist.” Rather than advocating “more is better,” he has supported selective proliferation. Thus, in 

the early-1990s he argued that Ukraine should retain 

the nuclear weapons that it acquired with the disintegration of the Soviet Union. In his view, international 

stability was enhanced when the major European 

powers had nuclear weapons.16 He also made clear 

that smaller countries should not get them at all. According to Mearsheimer, “Nuclear proliferation does 

not axiomatically promote peace and can in some cases 

even cause war.”17 While it is beyond the scope of this 

chapter to assess the theoretical foundations of their 
30

worldviews, it is perhaps worth noting that Waltz and 

Mearsheimer share fundamentally similar conceptions of the international system, but still seem to have 

rather different views on the role of nuclear weapons. 

While Waltz is a strong advocate of the nuclear peace 

hypothesis, Mearsheimer appears less convinced that 

a nuclear revolution has changed the fundamentals of 

international relations.18 

Indeed, what is striking is that most so-called “proliferation optimists” are actually “proliferation relativists.” Bruce Bueno de Mesquita wrote about the benefits of “selective” proliferation, arguing that in some 

instances nuclear proliferation was beneficial, even as 

he accepted that it could have profoundly negative 

consequences in other cases.19 Similarly, Dagobert L. 

Brito and Michael D. Intriligator, also often considered “proliferation optimists,” actually make a rather 

different argument. While they contend that increasing the number of nuclear weapons states may or may 

not increase the risks of deliberate nuclear war, more 

proliferation does increase the prospects for “nuclear 

war due to accidents, irrationality, or political instability.”20 While more sanguine than many others, it 

would be a stretch to identify such views as optimistic. 

The distinction between “proliferation optimism” 

and “proliferation relativism” is critical to understanding how Waltz’s views of proliferation fit within 

the broader spectrum of alternative perspectives of 

the challenges posed by the spread of nuclear weapons. Similarly, as will become clear, support for the 

nuclear peace hypothesis—what might be termed 

“nuclear optimism”—does not necessarily lead to 

“proliferation optimism.” It is these distinctions that 

help explain why policymakers, even those who may 

accept the “nuclear peace hypothesis,” dismiss Waltz 

and his optimistic views on nuclear proliferation.
31

PROLIFERATION OPTIMISM

What are the arguments justifying proliferation optimism? The following paragraphs summarize the key 

elements of Waltz’s argument, ignoring some important points he makes for the purposes of completeness 

that are relatively tangential to his core argument.

Underlying Waltz’s argument are several assumptions that are derived from his views of how the international system operates and his adherence to the 

nuclear peace hypothesis. First, he argued, “Deterrent balances are inherently stable.”21 He contended 

that nuclear deterrence did not depend on the size 

of nuclear arsenals, because there was little incentive 

to acquire more weapons once a country “securely 

established” its deterrent.22 Second, he argued that 

the resulting deterrence stability is insensitive to the 

character of regimes, essentially arguing that all states 

and all possible national leaders can be trusted to use 

their nuclear forces with prudence. For that reason, he 

argued that Libya under Muammar Qaddafi, Uganda 

under Idi Amin, or Iraq under Saddam Hussein would 

behave similarly to a United States under Dwight 

Eisenhower or a Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev. Indeed, he even argued that a nuclear-armed 

Europe would have moderated the behavior of Adolf 

Hitler.23 Third, Waltz believed that extremely small 

nuclear arsenals, perhaps consisting of only a handful 

of weapons, can establish a credible deterrent. Based 

on this belief, he argued that Israel could deter Libya 

with only two weapons, one for Benghazi, and one for 

Tripoli, while Libya need only possess enough weapons to destroy Tel Aviv and Haifa in return.24
32

Waltz believed that establishing the conditions 

for stable deterrence relationships was not difficult, 

although he did recognize that it was not necessarily 

automatic. First, he accepted that a slow pace of proliferation was essential, because “rapid changes in international conditions can be unsettling.”25 However, 

he rejected the concept of proliferation cascades, and 

so did not see this as a significant concern. From his 

perspective, only a few non-nuclear states will have 

an interest in acquiring a nuclear arsenal at any given 

point in time.

Second, Waltz also recognized that countries must 

create nuclear capabilities that could reliably mount 

retaliatory attacks. Waltz specified several requirements for such a force. It must be able to survive attack 

and have the means to deliver the surviving weapons. 

He saw these requirements as important primarily because they obviated the need for a launch-on-warning 

or under attack capability. Also essential was a robust 

command and control system, primarily to prevent 

unauthorized use.26 Waltz was convinced that it was 

not hard to satisfy these requirements, even for a small 

country with a limited nuclear arsenal. Hiding weapons and protecting them (and their delivery systems) 

from attack was simple to achieve in his view, and the 

rudimentary command and control systems required 

were within the reach of even the smallest of powers.27

He applied similar thinking to both the U.S.-Soviet 

nuclear balance and the U.S. nuclear arsenal. As a 

result, he rejected the core precepts that guided U.S. 

nuclear policy during the Cold War, whether it was 

the complicated interactions between deterrence and 

nuclear warfighting in Department of Defense nuclear 

planning, or the force structure that he saw as grossly 

oversized.28 Thus, Waltz adopted theoretical con-
33

structs that are in specific opposition to past and present U.S. nuclear policy, strategy, and operations.29 It 

is that divergence that lies at the core of the disagreement between the perspectives of Washington policymakers and academic theorists.

POLICYMAKERS AND NUCLEAR 

NONPROLIFERATION

During the past 7 decades, U.S. policymakers worried about the prospects for the proliferation of nuclear weapons, even if ultimately other considerations 

took precedence. This perspective is reflected in the 

observation of the Congressional Commission on the 

Strategic Posture of the United States that, since the 

beginning, U.S. nuclear policy has had two “imperatives”: the requirement for a strong nuclear deterrent 

and reliance on arms control and nonproliferation 

measures.30 This juxtaposition is significant, given that 

this commission was comprised of men and women 

selected to represent the views of Washington’s political elite, including amongst its members former U.S. 

Government policymakers in the U.S. Government 

who had been involved in the development or implementation of strategic nuclear policy.

Every U.S. president since the detonation of the first 

atomic bomb has articulated policies consistent with 

this dual vision, although some had little confidence 

in nonproliferation and can be justifiably criticized for 

that. Official policy from the dawn of the atomic age 

called for constraints on nuclear weapons, starting in 

the months after Hiroshima, when the leaders of the 

Western countries announced what became the Baruch Plan, which called for international, not national, control of nuclear materials. Consistent with this 
34

vision, the Atomic Energy Act prohibited transfers 

of nuclear materials and weapons information even 

to our British and Canadian allies, who had contributed substantially to the Manhattan Project. As former 

U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson asserted in 1966, 

perhaps with some overstatement, “The United States 

believed—and this is something that it is easy for everyone in the world to forget—that even one nuclear 

power was too many, and immediately after World 

War II we sought to remove nuclear energy from the 

military field.”31

In the subsequent 2 decades, until the negotiation 

of the 1969 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 

most policymakers at best tolerated nuclear proliferation and only a few actively thought it a good thing.32

Even former U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, often 

criticized by the nonproliferation community for his 

role in spreading nuclear technology through the Atoms for Peace program, opposed nuclear proliferation 

and apparently thought that his policies were consistent with that objective.33

In some respects, this consensus in policymaking 

circles is surprising; on other nuclear matters, there 

often was widespread disagreement. Yet, it is evident 

that many people who firmly believed in the strength 

of deterrence, and probably believed that nuclear 

weapons played an important (perhaps even a decisive role) in maintaining global peace during the Cold 

War, also fought to prevent the further proliferation 

of nuclear weapons. Amongst the primary intellectual 

figures of U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy were individuals closely associated with nuclear nonproliferation policies, such as Albert Wohlstetter.34

How do we know what they think? While there are 

no opinion surveys to prove the point, there is little 
35

doubt that the overwhelming majority of U.S. senior 

national security executives during the nuclear age 

opposed the proliferation of nuclear weapons, even 

when friendly countries were involved. We know this 

in several ways. First, we know what they have said 

and written. Few have adopted a position consistent 

with the proliferation optimists,35 while most have 

viewed proliferation as a serious national security 

challenge.36 Perhaps more significantly, we also can 

review what policies they have advocated and implemented.

What are some of the considerations that make 

most U.S. policymakers nuclear proliferation pessimists? This chapter explores five such considerations: 

(1) widespread ambivalence about nuclear weapons; 

(2) concerns about the stability of nuclear deterrence; 

(3) the challenges that nuclear proliferation pose to 

the U.S. global position; (4) the risks of nuclear terrorism resulting from loss of control of nuclear arsenals 

in failed states; and, (5) the complexity of crisis management. Other considerations could be added to this 

list, such as worries about the quality of intelligence 

concerning foreign nuclear programs, or the ability 

of any country to ensure the safe operation of nuclear 

arsenals.37

U.S. AMBIVALENCE TOWARD NUCLEAR 

WEAPONS

In contrast to Waltz’s comfort with a nucleararmed world, U.S. Government officials, especially 

at the more senior levels, often are more ambivalent. 

They recognize the strategic value of nuclear weapons, but also worry about their destructiveness and 

the dangers associated with their possession and 
36

potential use. This view is aptly summarized in 

another of Brodie’s writings:

All civilized people share in greater or less degree the 

desire to put the “nuclear genie back in the bottle” 

(though, like the classical genie, it has also done some 

useful service—such as critically reducing the probability of war between the United States and the Soviet 

Union).38

More importantly, most U.S. presidents have had 

such conflicted views. Almost none have been completely comfortable with nuclear weapons; many 

sought to limit or eliminate them. The views of U.S. 

President Barack Obama on the ultimate need to create a world without nuclear weapons, sometimes articulated as a new departure, also reflect the publicly 

and privately expressed opinions of most of his predecessors. Famously, then-U.S. President Ronald Reagan was willing to discuss the complete elimination 

of nuclear weapons during the October 1986 Reykjavik Summit, declaring “It would be fine with me if 

we eliminated all nuclear weapons.”39 He justified his 

support for the Strategic Defense Initiative by talking 

of “rendering these nuclear weapons impotent and 

obsolete.”40 Even former President Eisenhower, who 

of all the presidents was most attracted to the benefits 

provided by nuclear deterrence, often expressed both 

his fears of their destructive powers and the ultimate 

need to eliminate them.41

Striving for the ultimate elimination of nuclear 

weapons has never been seen as necessarily incompatible with acceptance of nuclear deterrence in the 

shorter term. Indeed, since the dawn of the nuclear 

age, official U.S. policy has been the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, even if only in the context 
37

of general and complete disarmament. This incongruity is well demonstrated with the varying views of 

nuclear weapons evident among the so-called “Gang 

of Four,” the four former U.S. senior statesmen (Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry, and George 

Shultz) who called for the revitalization of efforts to 

eliminate nuclear weapons.42 While often viewed as a 

radical break from the past, the differences are actually less obvious. All support maintaining a reliable 

nuclear deterrent.43

Such skepticism does not comport well with “more 

is better.” Why actively promote the spread of a weapon that you believe ultimately should be banned? At 

the very least, this helps explain the ambivalence that 

often attended thinking about such matters when the 

issue of nuclear assistance arose.

Many in the United States argue that nuclear weapons are essential only to deter other nuclear weapons.44 This is not official U.S. national policy, although 

the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review noted a trend to move 

in that direction:

The United States will continue to strengthen conventional capabilities and reduce the role of nuclear 

weapons in deterring non-nuclear attacks, with the 

objective of making deterrence of nuclear attack on 

the United States or our allies and partners the sole 

purpose of U.S. nuclear weapons.45

This reflected a long-standing effort to reduce the role 

of nuclear weapons by providing the president with 

conventional options. The United States has developed 

formidable advanced conventional military capabilities, involving precision strike munitions; sophisticated intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) 

systems; and complex command and control systems. 
38

Part of the impetus for the development of these systems was a desire to raise the threshold for the use 

of nuclear weapons.46 The United States currently can 

employ conventional forces to accomplish military 

objectives requiring nuclear weapons in an earlier 

era. For this reason, the United States does not rely on 

nuclear weapons to the same extent as other powers 

(and certainly not as much as Russia, which requires 

them even for defense against large-scale conventional attacks). From this perspective, so argues Harold 

Brown, the former Secretary of Defense who did much 

to encourage the development of such capabilities, 

the United States would benefit more than any other 

power, should nuclear weapons totally disappear today.47 While many of his peers would disagree with 

his ultimate conclusion, few would disagree that during the past 4 decades the United States systematically 

worked to acquire conventional weapons capabilities, 

motivated in part by a desire to reduce requirements 

for nuclear weapons.48

THE DIFFICULTIES OF MAINTAINING 

A DETERRENT

Policymakers and analysts intimately involved 

with the U.S. nuclear weapons policy were not sanguine about the ease of maintaining deterrence relationships. Indeed, most clearly accepted the view 

articulated by Albert Wohlstetter in the late-1950s 

when writing about the initial efforts to create a stable 

deterrent in a world populated both by thermonuclear weapons and intercontinental ballistic missiles 

(ICBMs): “Deterrence in the 1960s is neither assured 

nor impossible but will be the product of sustained 

intelligent effort and hard choices.”49 As Wohlstetter 

argued in his seminal article, “The Delicate Balance of 
39

Terror,” ensuring the survivability of a nuclear deterrent is complex and costly.50

From the perspective of practitioners of nuclear 

strategy, Waltz ignored the harsh realities of nuclear 

strategy development and implementation. Consider 

the comments of David Rosenberg about his seminal 

article on early U.S. nuclear strategy:

[This article] addresses nuclear strategy not as an exercise in conceptualization, but rather as a complex 

endeavor, partly intellectual and partly bureaucratic. 

It focuses specifically on the strategic and operational 

planning process for nuclear war—where concepts 

were translated into damage criteria, tactics, targets, 

and weapons—and how that process is related to dynamics such as high policy guidance, strategic theory, 

and technological development, which should have 

served to control and regulate it.51

In contrast, Waltz views deterrence “as an exercise in 

conceptualization.” Consider the difference between 

Waltz’s views and those of practitioners on two issues: ensuring the survivability of nuclear forces and 

evaluating the utility of small nuclear forces. 

Waltz contended that any state possessing nuclear 

weapons will take effective steps to ensure the survivability of its arsenal. That was not the sense of Wohlstetter and his RAND colleagues, who believed that 

the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC), focused largely on its own retaliatory capabilities, largely ignored 

its own vulnerability to a surprise attack.52 Waltz discounted such concerns by arguing that they were misguided, claiming that during the Cuban Missile Crisis 

the United States was deterred by a relatively small 

Soviet nuclear force (perhaps limited to 60-70 weapons capable of reaching the United States, contrasting 
40

with the 2,000 weapons that we had that could strike 

the Soviet Union).53 However, Waltz also apparently 

was quite comfortable retaliating against cities in response to counterforce attacks, a position that many 

American nuclear strategists found unpalatable.54

We also have some evidence to suggest that small 

nuclear powers have difficulty in maintaining the survivability of their nuclear arsenal. The South Africans 

stored their entire arsenal of six bombs in a single 

building vulnerable even to conventional air strikes, 

protected only by their ability to keep its location a secret.55 While one presumes that these weapons would 

have been dispersed in the event of a crisis, we are 

told that the Soviet Union considered preemptive attacks against the nascent South African program.56

Admittedly, we do not know if the Soviets knew the 

location of those weapons, but given known penetrations of the South African military establishment, it is 

possible that they did.57

The Pakistanis certainly seem to worry about the 

survivability of their nuclear arsenal, concerned both 

that the United States might attempt to seize control 

of it and that India might preemptively neutralize 

their deterrent forces by destroying the weapons still 

in their storage bunkers. Indeed, experts on Pakistan’s 

nuclear forces appear to believe that its arsenal will be 

dispersed in the event of a crisis due to concerns about 

its survivability.58 Clearly, the Pakistanis are not confident about the survivability of their arsenal under 

routine circumstances.

It is surprising that Waltz is so confident about the 

survivability of small nuclear arsenals. The argument 

rests largely on the confidence that any country can 

have that its greatest secrets have not been compromised. In the case of South Africa, knowledge of one 
41

location would have permitted a decisive disarming 

attack. Even in the case of Pakistan, with its larger and 

more sophisticated force structure, weapons apparently are stored at only 6 to 12 sites, according to at 

least one account.59 Much can be done to reduce the 

vulnerability of such a force by relying on hardened 

bunkers or underground facilities, but that transforms 

the arsenal into something that begins to look like a 

small version of a major power nuclear infrastructure.

As has been noted, Waltz argues that small nuclear 

forces can satisfy the requirements for a secure deterrent, contrasting the small arsenals of France and 

the United Kingdom with the vastly larger U.S. force 

structure. He seems to imply that the leaders of those 

two European countries believed that their arsenals 

comprised a self-sufficient deterrent to Soviet nuclear threats. Yet, the reality is that both countries saw 

their nuclear deterrent only in the U.S. context, not as 

totally isolated and independent forces. The British 

integrated their nuclear forces into a North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) theater and a U.S. strategic response, while the French strategy focused heavily on manipulation of U.S. responses.60

Clearly, those who had to take responsibility for 

sustaining the U.S. deterrent were far less confident 

than Waltz about strategic stability. Indeed, during 

the decades that followed publication of Wohlstetter’s article, concerns about strategic stability were 

a constant, irrespective of administration. Whether 

addressing the central strategic balance between the 

Soviet Union and the United States, or the NATOWarsaw Pact regional balance in Europe, U.S. policymakers found nothing simple or easy about the process of generating and sustaining a credible deterrent.
42

Ultimately, Waltz’s views matter rather less than 

the perspectives of several generations of practitioners who had rather different views on deterrence. For 

those responsible for the lives of tens, perhaps hundreds of millions of people, it is perhaps not surprising that they would be less inclined to take for granted 

the inherent stability of deterrence; or that they might 

be less than comfortable with the argument that we 

should view the nuclear postures of other countries 

with complacency.

CHALLENGING U.S. DOMINANCE

Many in Washington opposed nuclear weapons 

programs because the proliferation of nuclear weapons would undermine U.S. political and military power. Former President Eisenhower apparently believed 

that the United States would benefit more from the 

elimination of nuclear weapons than the Soviet Union, 

given his confidence in U.S. economic and industrial strength.61 As future Secretary of Defense James 

Schlesinger would note in the late-1960s, “Further nuclear spread would lead to a reduction of the relative 

influence of the United States on the world scene.”62

Former Secretary of State Dean Rusk made it a generalized principle when he told a Soviet diplomat in 

1963, “It was almost axiomatic that no nuclear power has any interest in seeing others become nuclear

powers.”63

The most obvious point about nuclear proliferation 

is that it may strengthen adversaries and weaken U.S. 

responses to their aggressive moves. Once it became 

clear in the 1950s that nuclear weapons, even when 

possessed in overwhelming numbers, could not prevent uses of conventional weapons peripheral to the 
43

core interests of the United States, U.S. policymakers 

had to worry that a nuclear umbrella could shield destabilizing actions by hostile countries, even if we did 

not fear the use of nuclear weapons. This was one of 

the concerns that arose from consideration of China’s 

acquisition of nuclear weapons,64 and it has been a recurring theme in connection with lesser powers (such 

as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and North Korea, openly hostile to 

U.S. interests) who might strive to use a nuclear arsenal to undermine U.S. influence and interests.

Even more intriguing is the ambivalence or hostility of the United States toward the acquisition of nuclear weapons by close allies. The U.S. theater nuclear 

weapons policy in Europe was calibrated to reduce 

incentives for NATO and even non-NATO countries 

to acquire their own independent nuclear deterrent. 

Although the British had been closely involved with 

the original Manhattan Project, it took time for the 

U.S. political establishment to accept Britain’s nuclear status and, even longer, to develop the close ties 

that eventually emerged between the two country’s 

nuclear programs.65

During the late-1950s and early-1960s, some U.S. 

Government officials thought that the United States 

benefited from the acquisition of nuclear weapons by 

allies. Thus, in 1955, then-President Eisenhower asked 

Harold Stassen to undertake arms control negotiations 

with the Soviet Union. Initially, Stassen was skeptical about the prospects for nuclear nonproliferation, 

but changed his views after concluding it was a possible area of diplomatic collaboration with the Soviet 

Union. However, some Department of Defense officials strongly opposed his efforts in part because they 

thought it would be to the U.S. advantage if France 

and Japan had nuclear weapons.66
44

Days after the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964, 

then-U.S. President Lyndon Johnson established the 

Gilpatric Committee to review the nuclear nonproliferation policy. The Committee discovered that the 

Department of Defense no longer opposed nuclear 

nonproliferation, but that the Department of State was 

strongly opposed to any policy that would overtly 

prevent certain U.S. allies from retaining the right to 

acquire nuclear weapons. In particular, some senior 

Department of State officials at the time believed 

that U.S. alliance relations depended on creation of 

the Multi-Lateral Force (MLF), which would have 

given NATO allies direct access to nuclear weapons. 

Moreover, some senior Department of State officials 

believed that we would undermine alliance relationships if we tried to deny Germany and Japan the right 

to acquire nuclear weapons.67 However, the MLF never became a reality, and the president never accepted 

the Department of State’s hostility toward nuclear 

nonproliferation.

Over time, U.S. officials came to worry that allied 

nuclear weapons capabilities posed dangers to the 

U.S.-Soviet deterrence relationship. In addition, although it may be true that the United States provided 

assistance to the French nuclear weapons program,68

it is equally clear that from the French perspective the 

United States was a huge obstacle in its development 

of an independent nuclear capability in the 1950s and 

1960s.69 Indeed, one rationale for the French nuclear 

program was to deny the United States independence 

of action in responding to the Soviet Union. Paris 

wanted to ensure that the United States took into account French security interests. Unfortunately, it also 

complicated NATO nuclear weapons planning. For 

example, the United States worried that efforts to keep 
45

a conflict limited might be derailed by French nuclear 

attacks against attacking Soviet ground forces in Central Europe.70

Ultimately, the United States exerted considerable 

pressure on other friendly countries during the Cold 

War, such as South Korea and Taiwan, to constrain 

their nuclear ambitions, and worked during the 1950s 

and 1960s—admittedly not always pursued consistently—to limit the spread of nuclear weapons in 

Europe.71

Interestingly, Waltz at one point concedes such 

worries about the negative impact of nuclear proliferation by accepting that the “limitation of America’s 

policy choices has been one of the costs” of proliferation, but finds the benefits he sees in limiting adversary choices are well worth that price.72 It is perhaps 

unsurprising that those in Washington responsible for 

U.S. policy are less sanguine about the costs of permitting reductions in U.S. relative power.

FAILED STATES AND NUCLEAR TERRORISM

A major concern for U.S. policymakers, especially 

since 9/11, has been the danger that nuclear weapons may fall into the hands of terrorists. While some 

analysts believe that the threat of nuclear terrorism is 

overstated, and others that it is irrelevant, the concern 

is not new.73 The national security community in the 

United States has discussed the issue since at least the 

early-1970s, and worries about nuclear terrorism have 

motivated much of the activity intended to control fissile material.74

For many, the most likely way in which this could 

happen is as a result of political instability in a nucleararmed country. This problem first emerged as a con-
46

cern in the early-1990s with the collapse of the Soviet 

Union at the end of the Cold War. At that time, the Soviet nuclear arsenal was divided between four countries, and security for protecting weapons and fissile 

material was uncertain at best. In addition to taking 

steps to ensure consolidation of the weapons under 

the sole control of Russia, the United States funded 

a variety of programs intended to prevent the loss of 

weapons, fissile material, or critical technology.75 

Today the primary concern is that the political collapse of North Korea or Pakistan could lead to a loss 

of control and the subsequent acquisition of nuclear 

weapons by a terrorist group. This is particularly worrying in the case of Pakistan, given the presence and 

strength of terrorist groups in that country that might 

be inclined to use such weapons.76 President Obama 

has made the risks of terrorist acquisition of nuclear 

weapons a central concern of his administration. As 

he argued in his 2009 Prague speech, “This is the most 

immediate and extreme threat to global security.”77

While the rationale differed, former U.S. President 

George W. Bush also considered nuclear terrorism as 

one of his top national security challenges.78

Recent developments in Syria also illustrate this 

point. The Syrians amassed a militarily significant 

quantity of chemical weapons, and there were widespread fears in the United States and elsewhere that 

terrorists might gain control of some of this arsenal. 

The concern was so sufficiently great that the Western 

countries were willing to work with the Assad regime, 

previously considered a pariah, in order to dispose of 

these weapons.79 Significantly, the dangers could have 

included a nuclear dimension, given Syria’s abortive 

effort to build nuclear infrastructure that was terminated in 2007 when Israel destroyed a nuclear reac-
47

tor about to become operational. As one former U.S. 

Government official notes, “Think of how much more 

dangerous to the entire region the Syrian civil war 

would be today if Assad had a nuclear reactor, and 

even perhaps nuclear weapons, in hand.”80 There are 

certainly other countries on the list of potential proliferators, which might raise similar concerns.81

In his original writings, Waltz argued that unstable states were “unlikely to initiate nuclear projects,” 

but in any case discounted the concern because he 

doubted nuclear weapons would be employed during 

internal strife. He did not address the dangers of nuclear terrorism (nor did he address the risk that loss of 

control might result in nuclear proliferation if another 

country gained access to weapons).82 Waltz addressed 

the problem in his more recent writings, but dismissed 

the concerns as either overblown or not made worse 

by the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries.83

He did not address the problem of failed states at all. 

In this sense, Waltz had a far more simplistic view 

of the terrorism problem than either those who worry 

about it or even those who are more dismissive. He is 

far more complacent than others sometimes identified 

as “proliferation optimists.” For example, Bueno de 

Mesquita, another so-called “proliferation optimist,” 

saw terrorism as a significant risk associated with 

additional nuclear proliferation.84

THE COMPLEXITY OF CRISIS MANAGEMENT

For U.S. policymakers, a nuclear crisis between 

third parties is a nightmare scenario. It is easy to assert 

that nuclear deterrence is inherently stable. It is more 

difficult to demonstrate in practice. U.S. policymakers 

knew, either from personal experience or from studies 
48

of nuclear history, that managing nuclear crises with 

the Soviet Union were fraught with danger. While 

many came to trust in the experience and wisdom of 

their colleagues and Soviet adversaries, they also realized that there was a learning curve. No one comes 

born into the world understanding the manifest complexities of policymaking in the context of a nuclear 

crisis. Hence, it is perhaps not surprising that U.S. policymakers have worried about the dangers confronting the world as policymakers in other countries climb 

the learning curve of nuclear strategy.85

Why should policymakers in Washington care 

about what happens elsewhere, especially when the 

U.S. national interest may not be at risk? One reason 

is that in the era of globalization, the United States has 

interests in most countries vulnerable to the negative 

consequences of a nuclear war. A nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan, for example, could lead to 

tens of millions of deaths, potentially including many 

U.S. citizens, even if one does not accept recent theories about the prospects for climatic impacts induced 

by a regional war involving tens of nuclear weapons.86

Such a conflict also would cause negative economic 

and political repercussions, including some specifically related to the role of nuclear weapons in international relations, such as potentially undermining 

the taboo against operational employment of nuclear 

weapons.87

Hence, it is not surprising that U.S. policymakers 

moved into high gear when there was a threat that a 

conflict between India and Pakistan had the potential 

to escalate. While such crises have been rare, there 

were two of them in a short period of time during the 

Clinton and George W. Bush administrations.

In many ways, this is an intensely personal concern for policymakers. There were two occasions, in 
49

1999 and 2001-2002, during which U.S. policymakers worried that a war might erupt between the two 

countries. The 1999 Kargil crisis started when Pakistan infiltrated forces into parts of Kashmir that the 

Indians thought belonged to them and thereby threatened Indian lines of supply. The Indians attacked the 

Pakistani positions, and, when it proved impossible 

to overcome the Pakistanis in the difficult mountain 

terrain, escalated the conflict by launching air strikes. 

All of this occurred under a nuclear shadow, with the 

two countries having tested nuclear weapons the year 

before.88

U.S. policymakers clearly took this crisis seriously, 

and viewed it in a nuclear context from the very beginning. After all, the consequences of a nuclear exchange 

were frightening. Estimates put the death toll from an 

attack on Bombay at between 150,000 and 850,000.89 It 

is thus not surprising that former U.S. President Bill 

Clinton took a personal role in trying to convince the 

Pakistanis to withdraw from the territory that they 

had occupied, and that diplomacy involved the most 

senior officials in the U.S. Government with responsibility for South Asian affairs, including from both the 

military and Department of State.90 

The same level of involvement emerged at the time 

of the 2001-2002 Twin Peaks crisis. In December 2001, 

terrorists subsequently linked to the Pakistani intelligence services attacked the Indian Parliament. The 

Indians responded by mobilizing their military and 

preparing to mount retaliatory attacks, leading the 

Pakistanis to mobilize their own military. The following May, terrorists attacked Indian military encampments near the border between the two countries, killing both soldiers and family members.91

Ongoing military operations in Afghanistan in the 

wake of our intervention following the 9/11 attacks 
50

by al-Qaeda made these events even more worrying 

to U.S. policymakers. In essence, a war between India and Pakistan, not to mention a nuclear exchange, 

would put the U.S. military forces operating in Afghanistan at risk. As happened in the previous crisis, 

the diplomacy involved senior level U.S. Government 

officials, and reflected the same degree of concern as 

the earlier crisis.

Thus, even in a situation where the United States 

had no intention of providing extended deterrence, 

nuclear weapons created a complex problem for international diplomacy. Indeed, some argue that one of 

the intended roles for Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was 

to force U.S. diplomatic interventions in crises with 

India.92

AN ARGUMENT FOR ALL PERSUASIONS

The arguments supporting pessimism about the 

consequences of nuclear proliferation cover such a 

wide range of issues that almost any U.S. policymaker 

can find one sufficiently compelling to guide his or 

her actions. A Democratic advocate of nuclear zero 

and a Republican opponent of the Comprehensive 

Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty can find common ground in 

the arena of nuclear nonproliferation, even if the arguments that they find most compelling differ fundamentally.93 Such policymakers, while convinced that 

nuclear deterrence works, and perhaps even believing that nuclear weapons make the world unsafe for 

the prosecution of large-scale conventional wars, also 

tend to believe that the workings of nuclear deterrence 

are potentially problematic and certainly have no faith 

that its sometimes Byzantine logic will work in every 

situation.
51

This is not to say that all policymakers are devotees of nonproliferation; quite the contrary. Many 

policymakers found and find nonproliferation efforts 

in tension with other policies, and it is often evident 

that those other policies take precedence. Policymakers tend toward proliferation relativism, viewing the 

problem in a broader context that takes account of 

other issues as well.94

Yet, to find nonproliferation an obstacle to other 

policy objectives is rather different from arguing its 

reverse. Most officials who tolerated or condoned specific instances of nuclear proliferation apparently did 

not do so because they thought the spread of nuclear 

weapons was a positive thing, but because they believed the available policy alternatives were even 

worse. While perhaps not provable, it seems clear 

that no senior U.S. Government official ever actively 

promoted nuclear proliferation as a general principle, 

although admittedly some did on occasion actively 

support proliferation in specific cases. 

In this sense, Waltz has done the field a profound 

disservice, because a whole debate has been defined 

by his writings. His views are widely cited in the 

academic literature to present the case for nuclear 

optimism, even though his arguments are more appropriately referred to as proliferation optimism. 

Waltz offers a straw man that presents grossly simplified versions of the complex and rich strategic 

thinking that has characterized the practice of nuclear 

strategy. While Sagan and other critics appropriately 

take Waltz to task, they are less concerned about the 

practice of nuclear strategy then they are about highlighting the very real risks from nuclear proliferation. 

The result is that the perspectives of those who have 

conceptualized, developed, or implemented nuclear 
52

policy, strategy, and operations are lost; and academic 

students refer to Waltz as though his work represents 

the depths of the subject. 

In contrast to the rich complexity and nuance of 

writings on U.S. nuclear strategy, which take into account the vagaries of the world confronting national 

leaders, Waltz offered a simple, straightforward assessment. While John Gaddis views nuclear weapons 

as one of many factors accounting for the “long peace,” 

Waltz fixated on their role. While two generations of 

nuclear policymakers worried about the limitations 

of nuclear deterrence (articulated since the mid-1950s 

in theories of limited war), Waltz adopted an absolutist position that makes former Secretary of State John 

Foster Dulles and the doctrine of Massive Retaliation 

appear subtle by comparison.

U.S. policymakers have a range of reasons for 

seeing Waltz’s arguments as irrelevant to the world 

they face.95 For them, Panglossian worldviews are no 

substitute for the potentially deadly realities of armed 

strife in the real world. Ultimately, the academic debate between proliferation optimists and pessimists is 

exactly that: academic. Thus, it is not surprising that 

few, if any, officials responsible for national security 

will find the perspectives of the proliferation optimists attractive; in fact, many will work actively to 

prevent proliferation. The only surprising thing is that 

some people seem to think that there is something to 

debate.96

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 2

1. The views expressed in this article are those of the author 

and not necessarily those of the National Defense University 

(NDU) or the Department of Defense. The author would like to 

thank his NDU colleagues, Dr. Thomas Blau, Dr. Susan Koch, and 
53

Dr. Mark Mattox, as well as the participants in the May 21, 2012, 

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC) workshop 

on “Reassessing the Assumptions Driving Our Current Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Policies,” for their comments on an earlier draft 

of this chapter. In addition, Read Hanmer, Greg Koblentz, Clark 

Murdoch, Keith Payne, and Greg Schulte all offered constructive 

criticisms, although not all of their useful and insightful comments made it into the final version of this chapter. The author 

takes full responsibility for any remaining errors. 

2. Kenneth N. Waltz presented his views in Waltz, The Spread 

of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better, Adelphi Paper, No. 171, 

London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1981; 

Idem., “Toward Nuclear Peace,” in Dagobert L. Brito, Michael 

D. Intriligator, and Adele E. Wick, eds., Strategies for Managing 

Nuclear Proliferation: Economic and Political Issues, Lexington, MA: 

Lexington Books, 1983, pp. 117–134; and Idem., “Why Iran Should 

Get the Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean Stability,” Foreign 

Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 4, August 2012, pp. 2–5.

3. Waltz’s best-known works are Idem., Man, the State, and 

War: a Theoretical Analysis, New York: Columbia University Press, 

1959, and Idem., Theory of International Politics, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979. He is most closely associated with what has come to be called the neorealist view of 

international relations, as formally presented in Theory of International Politics. For a discussion of the importance of his work, see 

Robert O. Keohane, Neorealism and Its Critics, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, pp. 15–16.

4. Robert H. Lieshout, “Waltz, Kenneth (1924—),” in Keith 

Dowding, ed., Encyclopedia of Power, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage 

Publications, 2011, pp. 701–702.

5. He was the Ford Professor of Political Science Emeritus 

at the University of California, Berkeley, but also taught at Columbia University and elsewhere during his long academic career. For a short biographical sketch, see gsas.columbia.edu/news/

kenneth-waltz,-theorist-of-international-relations,-dies-at-88/full.

6. Dr. Scott Douglas Sagan is the Caroline S. G. Munro Professor of Political Science at Stanford University and a Senior Fel-
54

low at both the Center for International Security and Cooperation, 

and the Freeman Spogli Institute. See cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/people/

scott_d_sagan. He is a prominent scholar of nuclear issues, and has 

published Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989; and Idem., 

The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons, 

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993. The first articulation of his critique of Waltz’s views was in Idem., “The Perils of 

Proliferation: Organization Theory, Deterrence Theory, and the 

Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” International Security, Vol. 18, No. 4, 

Spring 1994, pp. 66–107.

7. The version used to support this chapter is the 2002 edition, Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed: With New Sections on India and Pakistan, Terrorism, and Missile Defense, 2nd ed., New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2002.

For critiques, see Peter R. Lavoy, “The Strategic Consequences of 

Nuclear Proliferation: A Review Essay,” Security Studies, Vol. 4, 

No. 4, 1995, pp. 695–753; David J. Karl, “Proliferation Pessimism 

and Emerging Nuclear Powers,” International Security, Vol. 21, 

No. 3, 1996, pp. 87–119.

8. Some use different language to name the hypothesis. Robert Jervis, for example, called it the “nuclear revolution,” in Jervis, 

The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of 

Armageddon, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989.

9. Bernard Brodie, “Implications for Military Policy,” in Brodie, ed., The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order, New 

York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946, p. 76.

10. John Lewis Gaddis, “The Long Peace: Elements of Stability in the Postwar International System,” International Security, 

Vol. 10, No. 4, Spring 1986, pp. 99–142.

11. Robert Rauchhaus, “Evaluating the Nuclear Peace Hypothesis,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 2, April 2009, 

pp. 258–277.

12. The criticisms come from multiple perspectives, as reflected in the essays found in Charles W. Kegley, Jr., ed., The Long 

Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections, New York: 
55

HarperCollins Publishers, 1991. Another version was offered by 

John E. Mueller, who contended that changing views of war, not 

the development and deployment of nuclear weapons, was responsible for the absence of major power wars. See Mueller, Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War, New York: 

Basic Books, 1989. 

13. Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation.” 

14. Lavoy.

15. Joel Marks, “Nuclear Prudence or Nuclear Psychosis? 

Structural Realism and the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” 

Global Change, Peace & Security, Vol. 21, No. 3, 2009, pp. 325–340; 

Sagan, “The Perils of Proliferation,” pp. 66–67.

16. John J. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear 

Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 3, Summer 1993, pp. 50–

66; Idem., “Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold 

War,” International Security, Vol. 15, No. 1, Summer 1990, pp. 5–56.

17. Mearsheimer, “The Case for a Ukrainian Nuclear 

Deterrent,” p. 51.

18. An overview that distinguishes Waltz and Mearsheimer is 

Mearsheimer’s “Structural Realism,” in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, 

and Steve Smith, eds., International Relations Theories: Discipline 

and Diversity, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 71–

88. For attempts to understand their contrasting views of nuclear 

weapons, see Marks; and Zanvyl Krieger and Ariel Ilan Roth, 

“Nuclear Weapons in Neo-Realist Theory,” International Studies 

Review, Vol. 9, No. 3, Autumn 2007, pp. 369–384.

19. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and William H. Riker, “An Assessment of the Merits of Selective Nuclear Proliferation,” Journal 

of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 26, No. 2, June 1982, pp. 283–306.

20. Dagobert L. Brito and Michael D. Intriligator, “Proliferation and the Probability of War: A Cardinality Theorem,” Journal 

of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 40, No. 1, March 1996, p. 212.

21. Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 30.
56

22. Ibid., p. 31. Thus, Waltz notes that the United Kingdom 

and France built small arsenals to deter the Soviet Union, compared with the massive—and to Waltz totally unnecessary—U.S. 

nuclear force. 

23. Ibid., pp. 13–14, 28–29.

24. Ibid., pp. 21–22. This assumes, of course, that the appropriate target is a city, which has been a source of contention in U.S. 

nuclear strategy since the 1950s.

25. Ibid., pp. 3, 42–43. If deterrence is inherently stable, Waltz 

does not explain why the speed of the spread of nuclear weapons 

should make a difference.

26. Ibid., p. 20. 

27. Ibid., p. 21; Kenneth Waltz, “A Reply,” Security Studies, 

Vol. 4, No. 4, Summer 1995, pp. 802–805.

28. Kenneth Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” 

American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 3, September 1990, 

pp. 731–745.

29. Here I refer not to former policymakers, who often adopt 

positions rather different from the ones they propounded while in 

office, but only to the views of those in positions of responsibility, 

except when their positions out of government seem to comport 

with the positions they held while in government.

30. Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the 

United States, America’s Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the 

Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States

Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 2009, p. 5.

31. Statement by Secretary of State Rusk to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy: Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, 

Documents on Disarmament, 1966, Washington, DC: Arms Control 

and Disarmament Agency, February 23, 1966, pp. 41-49.

32. For a discussion of views during the Kennedy, Johnson, 

and early Nixon administrations, see Francis J. Gavin, “Blasts 
57

from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s,” International 

Security, Vol. 29, No. 3, Winter 2004-05, pp. 100–135.

33. Eisenhower advocated an International Atomic Energy 

Agency (IAEA) and a Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 

part to develop barriers against proliferation, according to George 

Bunn, “U.S. Non-Proliferation Policy,” in James E. Dougherty and 

J. F. Lehman, Jr., eds., Arms Control for the Late Sixties, Princeton, 

NJ: Van Nostrand, 1967, p. 151. For a not unsympathetic critique 

of Eisenhower’s nonproliferation record, see Shane Maddock, 

“The Fourth Country Problem: Eisenhower’s Nuclear Nonproliferation Policy,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 3, Summer 1998, pp. 553–572.

34. Albert Wohlstetter is best known for his seminal study, 

Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 

37, No. 2, January 1959, pp. 211–234. Others who expressed concern about nuclear proliferation were such prominent figures as 

Bernard Brodie, Fred Iklé, Arnold Kramish, and James Schlesinger, albeit in differing degrees. Consider the following observations in Brodie, Charles J. Hitch, and Andrew W. Marshall, The 

Next Ten Years, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1954, pp. 16–17.

This is likely to restore greater importance to other nations 

vis-à-vis the U.S. and U.S.S.R. and might significantly alter 

the present bi-polar distribution of power. Whether wider 

distribution of power will be in the U.S. interest or will enhance the chances of world peace is disputable. Certainly the 

problems of national security in a multi-polar world with 

asymptotic weapons would be very different in character.

35. A rare example of a nuclear proliferation proponent was 

General Curtis LeMay, who lambasted nonproliferation policies 

after he retired from the military. LeMay and Dale O. Smith, America Is in Danger, New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 1968, pp. 186–221.

36. James Schlesinger, “The Impact of Nuclear Weapons on 

History,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 16, No. 4, August 1993, pp. 

5–12; Harold Brown, “New Nuclear Realities,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 1, Winter 2007, pp. 7–22; Carl Kaysen, Robert 

S. McNamara, and George W. Rathjens, “Nuclear Weapons After 

the Cold War,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 4, Fall 1991, pp. 95–110. 
58

37. This is a particular concern of Sagan’s, as summarized in 

Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 72-82. 

38. Bernard Brodie, “The McNamara Phenomenon,” World 

Politics, Vol. 17, No. 4, July 1965, p. 680.

39. The passage is on page 11 of the official U.S. Memorandum of Conversation, October 11, 1986, 3:30 PM -5:40 PM, Hofdi 

House, Reykjavik, IS, archived online in Svetlana Savranskaya 

and Thomas Blanton, eds., “The Reykjavik File: Previously Secret U.S. and Soviet Documents on the 1986 Reagan-Gorbachev 

Summit,” Electronic Briefing Book 203, Document 11, National 

Security Archive website, posted October 13, 2006, available from 

www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB203/Document11.pdf.

40. See Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Nation on Defense 

and National Security,” March 23, 1983, archived online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, eds., The American Presidency 

Project, available from www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=41093.

41. David S. Patterson, “President Eisenhower and Arms 

Control,” Peace & Change, Vol. 11, No. 3, Summer 1986, pp. 3–24. 

42. George P. Shultz et al., “A World Free of Nuclear 

Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007.

43. All four authors (Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William 

Perry, and Shultz) of the original editorial have supported the recommendations of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic 

Posture of the United States, which was co-chaired by Perry. See 

Shultz et al., “How to Protect Our Nuclear Deterrent,” The Wall 

Street Journal, January 20, 2010, A17; See also, Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, America’s 

Strategic Posture. Kissinger clearly articulates the need for a robust 

deterrent in Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft, “Strategic Stability in 

Today’s Nuclear World,” The Washington Post, April 23, 2012, A13.

44. McGeorge Bundy, “The Bishops and the Bomb,” The 

New York Review of Books, Vol. 30, No. 10, June 16, 1983; Robert S. 

McNamara, “The Military Role of Nuclear Weapons: Perceptions 

and Misperceptions,” Foreign Affairs Vol. 62, No. 1, Fall 1983, 

pp. 59–80.
59

45. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2010, p. ix. 

46. Discriminate Deterrence, Report of The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Washington, DC: U.S. Government 

Printing Office, 1988, p. 8.

47. Brown, pp. 16–17.

48. This trend is reviewed in Barry D. Watts, Nuclear-Conventional Firebreaks and the Nuclear Taboo, Washington, DC: Center for 

Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2013.

49. Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” reprinted in Charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age, R-346 Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 

1960, p. 334.

50. Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” January 

1959.

51. David Alan Rosenberg, “The Origins of Overkill: Nuclear 

Weapons and American Strategy, 1945-1960,” International Security, Vol. 7, No. 4, Spring 1983, p. 8.

52. Bernard Brodie, War and Politics, New York: Macmillan, 

1973, p. 380.

53. Waltz, “Nuclear Myths and Political Realities,” p. 734.

54. Rosenberg, pp. 35–36, 58–60. 

55. David Albright, “South Africa and the Affordable Bomb,” 

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 50, No. 4, July/August 

1994, pp. 43–44.

56. Ibid., p. 42.

57. Ibid., mentions the role of Dieter Gerhardt, a South African 

naval officer who spied for the Soviets. The available evidence 

suggests that Gerhardt had access to details of the South African 

nuclear program, and it appears he gave that information to the 
60

Soviet Union. According to Gerhardt, the Soviets considered a 

strike against the South African enrichment facility in 1976. None 

of the available accounts indicates whether Gerhardt also knew of 

the location of the South African nuclear arsenal before his arrest 

in 1983. However, the storage facility was operational in 1981, so 

it is possible at least that he may have provided that information 

to the Soviets as well.

58. Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear 

Postures and South Asian Stability,” International Security, Vol. 34, 

No. 3, Winter 2009-10, pp. 38–78. 

59. Pakistan is thought to have 70 to 90 warheads in its inventory. If correct, this would imply that there are on average between 6 and 15 weapons at each location. Ibid., p. 67. 

60. French nuclear strategy and its ties to the American nuclear arsenal are reviewed in Bruno Tertrais, “Destruction Assurée 

[Assured Destruction]: The Origins and Development of French 

Nuclear Strategy, 1945-81,” in Henry Sokolski, ed., Getting MAD: 

Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004, 

pp. 51–122, available from www.npolicy.org/books/Getting_MAD/

Ch2_Tertrais.pdf; R. H. Ullman, “The Covert French Connection,” 

Foreign Policy, No. 75, Summer 1989, pp. 3–33. The earliest British nuclear strategy documents tied their deterrent to the United States, according to John Simpson, “British Nuclear Weapon 

Stockpiles, 1953–78: A Commentary on Technical and Political 

Drivers,” The RUSI Journal, Vol. 156, No. 5, 2011, pp. 74–83.

61. Patterson.

62. James Schlesinger, “The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation,” in Dougherty and Lehman, Jr., eds., Arms 

Control for the Late Sixties, Princeton, NJ: Van Nostrand, 1967, p. 

175. Schlesinger attributed the thought to William C. Foster, Arms 

Control and Disarmament Agency Director.

63. “Memorandum of Conversation, January 10, 1963,” in 

U.S. Department of State, and David W. Mabon, David S. Patterson, and Glenn W. LaFantasie, eds., Foreign Relations of the United 

States, 1961-1963: Volume 7, Arms Control and Disarmament, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1995, pp. 630-631.
61

64. William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’: The United States and the Chinese 

Nuclear Program, 1960-64,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3, 

Winter 2000-01, pp. 54–99.

65. Simpson.

66. See, Maddock, pp. 557–558. 

67. Gavin, “Blasts from the Past."

68. Ullman.

69. Tertrais.

70. Ullman.

71. The list of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 

countries and European neutrals that abandoned nuclear weapons programs—albeit, many nascent at best—is long: Germany, 

Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yugoslavia. See, Ariel Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3, Winter 

2002-03, p. 62.

72. Waltz, “A Reply,” p. 805. However, he also asserted that 

focusing on nuclear nonproliferation required the United States 

to pay an unnecessary diplomatic price using resources better devoted to other, more important concerns. See Sagan and Waltz, 

The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, p. 42.

73. Brian Michael Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? Amherst, 

NY: Prometheus Books, 2008; John Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, 

and Why We Believe Them, New York: Free Press, 2006.

74. Mason Willrich and Theodore B. Taylor, Nuclear Theft: 

Risks and Safeguards; a Report to the Energy Policy Project of the Ford 

Foundation, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company, 

1974, pp. 114–116, provides an early discussion.
62

75. Graham T. Allison et al., Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Fissile Material, CSIA Studies in International Security No. 12, Cambridge, 

MA: MIT Press, 1996.

76. Thomas Donnelly, “Bad Options: Or How I Stopped Worrying and Learned to Live with Loose Nukes,” in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War, Carlisle, 

PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008, 

pp. 347–368.

77. White House Press Office, “Remarks by President Barack 

Obama, In Prague As Delivered,” Remarks made in Hradcany 

Square, Prague, Czech Republic, April 5, 2009, available from 

www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-BarackObama-In-Prague-As-Delivered.

78. George W. Bush, National Security Strategy of the United 

States, Washington, DC: The White House, 2006.

79. Patrick J. McDonnell, “Push to Eliminate Syria’s Chemical 

Weapons May Extend Assad’s Rule,” Los Angeles Times, October 

15, 2013, available from articles.latimes.com/2013/oct/15/world/la-fgsyria-assad-20131015.

80. Elliott Abrams, “Bombing the Syrian Reactor: The Untold 

Story,” Commentary, Vol. 135, No. 2, February 2013, p. 24; Bruce 

Riedel, “Lessons of the Syrian Reactor,” National Interest, No. 125, 

May 2013, pp. 39–46, expresses similar views.

81. Certainly, it is likely that many in Washington would 

have concerns should Saudi Arabia decide to pursue a nuclear 

weapon, as some senior Saudi officials have indicated. While the 

Saudi kingdom has been remarkably stable, it also was the home 

of Osama bin Laden and has been an important recruiting ground 

for al-Qaeda and other Salafist terrorist groups. On Saudi nuclear ambitions, see Brandon Friedman, “Alternatives to U.S. Hard 

Power: The Saudi Response to U.S. Tactics in the Middle East,” 

Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Notes, available from www.

fpri.org/articles/2014/01/alternatives-us-hard-power-saudi-responseus-tactics-middle-east, accessed January 27, 2014; Mark Urban, 

“Saudi Nuclear Weapons ‘On Order’ from Pakistan,” BBC News, 
63

November 6, 2013, available from www.bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddle-east-24823846.

82. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be 

Better, p. 12.

83. The book has appeared in several editions, originally in 

Sagan and Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons, pp. 126-130.

84. Bueno de Mesquita and Riker, p. 304.

85. Michael Horowitz, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons and 

International Conflict: Does Experience Matter?” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 2, April 2009, pp. 234–257, argues 

that new nuclear weapons states are “significantly more likely to 

reciprocate militarized challenges and have their challenges reciprocated,” compared with states that have possessed nuclear 

weapons for longer periods of time.

86. Some policymakers are likely to take the environmental 

risks of a regional nuclear conflict seriously, while others may discount the concern given their views on climate change. There is 

now a small amount of literature claiming that there will be global 

environmental impacts. Owen B. Toon et al., “Consequences of 

Regional-Scale Nuclear Conflicts,” Science, Vol. 315, No. 5816, 

March 2007, pp. 1224–1225; Toon et al., “Atmospheric Effects 

and Societal Consequences of Regional Scale Nuclear Conflicts 

and Acts of Individual Nuclear Terrorism,” Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, Vol. 7, No. 8, April 2007, pp. 1973–2002; Alan 

Robock et al., “Climatic Consequences of Regional Nuclear Conflicts,” Atmospheric Chemistry and Physics, Vol. 7, No. 8, April 2007, 

pp. 2003–2012.

87. For a discussion of the range of impacts on U.S. interests 

resulting from a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan, 

based on a wargame played at the Naval War College in 1999, see 

Paul D. Taylor, “India and Pakistan: Thinking the Unthinkable,” 

Naval War College Review, Vol. 54, No. 3, Summer 2001, pp. 40–51.

88. Neil Joeck, “The Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Confrontation: 

Lessons from the Past, Contingencies for the Future,” in Sokolski, 

ed., Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Reining in the Risk, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009, pp. 19–23, 
64

available from www.npolicy.org/books/Pakistan_Nuclear_Future/

Ch1_Joeck.pdf.

89. Bruce Riedel, American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House, Philadelphia, PA: Center for the Advanced 

Study of India, University of Pennsylvania, 2002, pp. 3–4.

90. The intensity of the engagement is reflected in one statistic 

offered by Strobe Talbott, Deputy Secretary of State: between 1998 

(after the Indian nuclear test) and the end of 2000, he met 14 times 

with his Indian counterpart. See, Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004, pp. 3–4. At the time of the Kargil crisis, the diplomacy also involved the Commander, U.S. Central Command, and 

other Department of State and National Security Council officials 

in addition to former President Clinton and Talbott, according 

to Riedel, American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair 

House, pp. 4–5.

91. Joeck, “The Indo-Pakistani Nuclear Confrontation,” pp. 

29–31; Moeed Yusuf, “U.S. as Interlocutor in Nuclear Crises: Deriving Future Policy Implications from a Study of the 2001-2002 

India-Pakistan Standoff,” in A Collection of Papers from the 2009 

Nuclear Scholars Initiative, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic 

and International Studies, 2009, pp. 49–50.

92. Yusuf, p. 47; Narang, “Posturing for Peace? pp. 49–50; S. 

Paul Kapur, “Ten Years of Instability in a Nuclear South Asia,” 

International Security, Vol. 33, No. 2, Fall 2008, p. 76. 

93. Evident from the agreement shown in Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States, 

America’s Strategic Posture. 

94. Lavoy, p. 753.

95. The reaction of some former and current policymakers 

shown in this chapter is perhaps telling. They found the discussion of “more is better” so irrelevant to their own experience and 

worldview that they could not understand why anyone would 

waste their time looking at the subject. Many have read Waltz, 

only to dismiss his work as an intellectual curiosity, perhaps 
65

interesting as a pedagogic tool but not of value for someone 

engaged in shaping the world.

96. Academic students of international relations worry about 

perceived and real disconnects between their efforts to develop 

theory and the activity of practitioners. See Stephen M. Walt, “The 

Relationship Between Theory and Policy in International Relations,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 8, No. 1, June, 2005: 

pp. 23–48. Unfortunately, the work of nuclear proliferation optimists and the debate between academic optimists and pessimists 

only confirms the suspicion of policymakers: that there is little to 

be learned from those trying to build a credible theory.

67

CHAPTER 3

“AT ALL COSTS”:

THE DESTRUCTIVE CONSEQUENCES OF 

ANTI-PROLIFERATION POLICY

John Mueller

Over the decades, analysts of nuclear proliferation 

have separated themselves, or have been separated by 

others, into two camps.1

Proliferation alarmists constitute the vast majority, 

occupying a prominent position in what Bernard Brodie once called “the cult of the ominous.”2

 They argue 

that proliferation is a dire development that must be 

halted as a supreme policy priority. Thus, Graham 

Allison argues that “no new nuclear weapons states” 

should be a prime foreign policy principle, and Joseph 

Cirincione insists that nonproliferation should be “our 

number one national-security priority.”3 Of late, such 

alarmism has been sent into high relief by the apparent efforts of Iran to move toward a nuclear bomb 

capacity. In the Presidential campaign of 2008, candidate Barack Obama repeatedly announced that he 

would “do everything in [his] power to prevent Iran 

from obtaining a nuclear weapon—everything,” while 

candidate John McCain insisted that Iran must be kept 

from obtaining a nuclear weapon “at all costs.”4 Neither bothered to tally what “everything” might entail 

and what the costs might be, and both continue to 

make the same kinds of pronouncements.

The other camp, which is quite tiny, consists of 

proliferation sanguinists who maintain that, on balance, a certain amount of proliferation might actually 

enhance international stability by deterring war or 

warlike adventures.5
68

However, there is another possible approach to the 

proliferation issue that might be called “irrelevantist.” 

People in this near-empty camp stress two considerations:

First, it really doesn’t bloody well matter whether 

the bomb proliferates or not: proliferation has been 

of little consequence (except on agonies, obsessions, 

rhetoric, posturing, and spending), and no country 

that has possessed the weapons has found them useful or beneficial, nor have those who abandoned them 

suffered loss because of this. Thus, the consequences 

of proliferation that have taken place have been substantially benign: those who have acquired the weapons have “used” them simply to stoke their egos or to 

deter real or imagined threats.

Second, alarmed efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons have proved to be very costly, 

leading to the deaths of more people than those who 

perished at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined.

This chapter evaluates these two irrelevantist considerations.6

THE BENIGN CONSEQUENCES 

OF PROLIFERATION

Although we have now suffered through twothirds of a century characterized by alarmism about 

the disasters inherent in nuclear proliferation, the substantive consequences of proliferation have been quite 

limited.

Military Value.

Although the weapons have certainly generated 

obsession and have greatly affected military spending, 

diplomatic posturing, and ingenious theorizing, the 
69

few countries to which the weapons have proliferated 

have, for the most part, found them a notable waste 

of time, money, effort, and scientific talent. They have 

quietly kept them in storage and haven’t even found 

much benefit in rattling them from time to time.

There has never been a militarily compelling—or 

even minimally sensible—reason to use nuclear weapons, particularly because of an inability to identify 

suitable targets, or targets that could not be attacked 

as effectively by conventional munitions. Moreover, 

it is difficult to see how nuclear weapons benefited 

their possessors in specific military ventures. Israel’s 

presumed nuclear weapons did not restrain the Arabs from attacking in 1973, nor did Britain’s prevent 

Argentina’s seizure of the Falklands in 1982. Similarly, the tens of thousands of nuclear weapons in the 

arsenals of the enveloping allied forces did not cause 

Saddam Hussein to order his occupying forces out of 

Kuwait in 1990. Nor did possession of the bomb benefit America in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan; 

France in Algeria; or the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.7

Domination.

Proliferation alarmists may occasionally grant that 

countries principally obtain a nuclear arsenal to counter real or perceived threats, but many go on to argue 

that the newly nuclear country will then use its nuclear 

weapons to “dominate” the area. That argument was 

repeatedly used with dramatic urgency before 2003 

for the dangers supposedly posed by Saddam Hussein, and it has also been frequently applied to Iran.

Exactly how that domination business is to be carried out is never made clear.8

 However, the notion, 

apparently, is that: should an atomic Iraq (in earlier 
70

fantasies), or North Korea or Iran (in present ones), 

rattle the occasional rocket, other countries in the 

area, suitably intimidated, would supinely bow to its 

demands. Far more likely, any threatened states will 

make common cause with each other and with other 

concerned countries against the threatening neighbor. 

It seems overwhelmingly likely that if a nuclear Iran 

brandishes its weapons to intimidate others or to get 

its way, it will find that those threatened, rather than 

capitulating to its blandishments or rushing off to 

build a compensating arsenal of their own, will ally 

with others to stand up to the intimidation—rather in 

the way they coalesced into an alliance of convenience 

to oppose Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990.

It is also argued that nuclear weapons embolden 

a country to do mischief with less fear of punishing 

consequences. However, countries like Iran already 

seem about as free as they need to be to do mischief 

(from the U.S. standpoint) in the Middle East; and 

rogue states like the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), China, and North Korea do not seem to 

have stepped up their mischief after gaining nuclear 

weapons. 

Deterrence.

Although there are conceivable conditions under 

which nuclear weapons could serve a deterrent function, it is questionable whether they have yet ever 

done so. In particular, it is far from clear that nuclear 

weapons are what kept the Cold War from becoming 

a hot one.

The people who have been in charge of world affairs since World War II have been the same people, or 

the intellectual heirs of the people, who tried assidu-
ously, frantically, desperately and, as it turned out, 

pathetically to prevent World War II; and when, despite their best efforts, a world war was forced upon 

them, they found the experience to be incredibly horrible, just as they had anticipated. On the face of it, to 

expect these countries to somehow allow themselves 

to tumble into anything resembling a repetition of that 

experience—whether embellished with nuclear weapons or not—seems almost bizarre. The people running 

world politics since 1945 have had plenty of disagreements, but they have not been as obtuse, depraved, 

flaky, or desperate as to need visions of mushroom 

clouds to conclude that another world war, nuclear or non-nuclear, win or lose, could be decidedly 

unpleasant.9

Moreover, each leak from the archives suggests 

that the Soviet Union never seriously considered any 

sort of direct military aggression against the United 

States or Europe. Such as, Robert Jervis: 

The Soviet archives have yet to reveal any serious 

plans for unprovoked aggression against Western Europe, not to mention a first strike against the United 

States.10

Vojtech Mastny: 

The strategy of nuclear deterrence [was] irrelevant to 

deterring a major war that the enemy did not wish to 

launch in the first place. . . . All Warsaw Pact scenarios 

presumed a war started by NATO [North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization].11

Stephen Ambrose: 

At no time did the Red Army contemplate, much less 

plan for, an offensive against West Europe.12

71
Bernard Brodie: 

It is difficult to discover what meaningful incentives 

the Russians might have for attempting to conquer 

Western Europe.13

George Kennan: 

I have never believed that they have seen it as in their 

interests to overrun Western Europe militarily, or that 

they would have launched an attack on that region 

generally even if the so-called nuclear deterrent had 

not existed.14

As Kennan suggests, given the Soviets’ global 

game plan, which stressed revolutionary upheaval 

and subversion from within (not Hitlerian conquest), 

and given their experience with two disastrous world 

wars, another such experience scarcely made any 

sense whatsoever. That is, there was nothing to deter.

Status Symbols.

Moreover, the weapons have not proved to be 

crucial status—or virility—symbols. Then-French 

President Charles de Gaulle did opine in 1965 that “no 

country without an atom bomb could properly consider itself independent,” and Robert Gilpin concluded 

that “the possession of nuclear weapons largely determines a nation’s rank in the hierarchy of international 

prestige.”15 In Gilpinian tradition, some analysts who 

describe themselves as “realists” have insisted for 

years that Germany and Japan must soon come to 

their senses and quest after nuclear weapons.16

72
73

As Jervis has observed, however, “India, China, 

and Israel may have decreased the chance of direct attack by developing nuclear weapons, but it is hard to 

argue that they have increased their general prestige 

or influence.”17 And, as Jenifer Mackby and Walter 

Slocombe note:

Undoubtedly some countries have pursued nuclear 

weapons more for status than for security. However, 

Germany, like its erstwhile Axis ally, Japan, has become powerful because of its economic might rather 

than its military might, and its renunciation of nuclear 

weapons may even have reinforced its prestige. It has 

even managed to achieve its principal international 

objective—reunification—without becoming a nuclear 

state.18

How much more prestige would Japan have if it 

possessed nuclear weapons? Would anybody pay a 

great deal more attention to Britain or France if their 

arsenals held 5,000 nuclear weapons, or would anybody pay much less if they had none? Did China need 

nuclear weapons to impress the world with its economic growth? Or with its Olympics?

Pace of Proliferation.

These considerations help explain why alarmists 

have been wrong for decades about the pace of nuclear 

proliferation. Dozens of technologically capable countries have considered obtaining nuclear arsenals, but 

very few have done so. Indeed, as Jacques Hymans 

has pointed out, even supposedly optimistic forecasts 

about nuclear dispersion have proved to be too pessimistic.19 Thus in 1958, the National Planning Association predicted “a rapid rise in the number of atomic 

powers . . . by the mid-1960s.”20 A few years later, C. P. 
74

Snow sternly predicted, “Within, at the most, 6 years, 

China and several other states [will] have a stock of 

nuclear bombs”; while former U.S. President John 

Kennedy observed that there might be “ten, fifteen, 

twenty” countries with a nuclear capacity by 1964.21

Such punditry has gone astray, in part because the 

pundits insist on extrapolating from the wrong cases. 

A more pertinent prototype would have been Canada, 

a country that could easily have had nuclear weapons 

by the 1960s but declined to make the effort.22 In fact, 

over the decades, a huge number of countries capable 

of developing nuclear weapons have neglected to even 

consider the opportunity—for example, Canada, Italy, 

and Norway. Even Argentina, Brazil, Libya, South 

Korea, and Taiwan have backed away from or 

reversed nuclear weapons programs, and Belarus, 

Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Ukraine have actually 

surrendered or dismantled an existing nuclear arsenal.23 Some of that reduction is no doubt due to the 

hostility of the nuclear nations, but even without that, 

the Canadian case seems to have proved to have rather general relevance. Its experience certainly suggests, 

as Stephen Meyer has shown, that there is no “technological imperative” for countries to obtain nuclear 

weapons once they have achieved the technical capacity to do so.24

In consequence, alarmist predictions about proliferation chains, cascades, dominoes, waves, avalanches, epidemics, and points-of-no-return have proved 

to be faulty. Insofar as most country leaders (even 

rogue ones) have considered acquiring the weapons, 

they have come to appreciate several defects: nuclear 

weapons are dangerous, distasteful, costly, and likely 

to rile the neighbors. Moreover, as Hymans has demonstrated, the weapons have also been exceedingly 
75

difficult to obtain for administratively dysfunctional 

countries like Iran.25

Potential Dangers.

Even if nuclear weapons so far have had little 

impact, there is an array of potential (or imagined) 

dangers that alarmed anti-proliferators suggest might 

come about.

Crazy Leaders. It is sometimes said, or implied, that 

proliferation has had little consequence because the 

only countries to possess nuclear weapons have had 

rational leaders. But nuclear weapons have proliferated to large, important countries run by unchallenged 

monsters who, at the time they acquired the bombs, 

were certifiably deranged: Josef Stalin, who in 1949 was 

planning to change the climate of the Soviet Union by 

planting a lot of trees; and Mao Zedong, who in 1964 

had just carried out a bizarre social experiment that 

resulted in an artificial famine in which tens of millions of Chinese perished.26 It is incumbent on those 

who strongly oppose an Iranian bomb to demonstrate 

that the Iranian regime is daffier than these are.

Atomic Terrorism. Thus far, terrorist groups seem to 

have exhibited only limited desire and even less progress in going atomic. That lack of action may be because, after a brief exploration of the possible routes, 

they—unlike generations of alarmists—have discovered that the tremendous effort required is scarcely 

likely to be successful.27

In the wake of 9/11, however, concern about the 

atomic terrorist surged even though the attacks of that 

day used no special weapons. By 2003, United Nations 
76

Ambassador John Negroponte judged there to be “a 

high probability” that within 2 years al-Qaeda would 

attempt an attack using a nuclear weapon or other 

weapon of mass destruction (WMD). In that spirit, Graham Allison published a book in 2004—over 10 years 

ago—relaying his “considered judgment” that “on the 

current path, a nuclear terrorist attack on America in 

the decade ahead is more likely than not.”28 Allison 

has quite a bit of company in his unfulfilled alarmist 

conclusions. According to Robert Gates, former Secretary of Defense, every senior government leader is 

kept awake at night by “the thought of a terrorist ending up with a weapon of mass destruction, especially 

nuclear.”29 Moreover, in 2010, U.S. President Barack 

Obama held the atomic terrorist to be “the single biggest threat to U.S. security.”30

One route a would-be atomic terrorist might take 

would be to receive or buy a bomb from a generous, 

like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad. That 

route is highly improbable, however, because there 

would be too much risk—even for a country led by 

extremists—that the ultimate source of the weapon 

would be discovered. As prominent analyst Matthew 

Bunn puts it, “A dictator or oligarch bent on maintaining power is highly unlikely to take the immense 

risk of transferring such a devastating capability to 

terrorists they cannot control, given the ever-present 

possibility that the material would be traced back to 

its origin.”31 Important in this last consideration are 

deterrent safeguards afforded by “nuclear forensics,” 

which is the rapidly developing science (and art) of 

connecting nuclear materials to their sources even 

after a bomb has been exploded.32

Moreover, there is a very considerable danger to 

the donor that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered before delivery, or that it would be exploded 
77

in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve of—including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence.33

In addition, almost no one would trust al-Qaeda. 

As one observer has pointed out, the terrorist group’s 

explicit enemies list includes not only Christians and 

Jews, but also all Middle Eastern regimes; Muslims 

who don’t share its views; most Western countries; 

the governments of Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and 

Russia; most news organizations; the United Nations; 

and international nongovernmental organizations.34

Most of the time, al-Qaeda did not even get along 

all that well with its host in Afghanistan, the Taliban 

government.35

There has also been great worry, especially in postcommunist Russia, about “loose nukes”—weapons, 

“suitcase bombs” in particular, that can be stolen or 

bought illicitly. A careful assessment conducted by 

the Center for Nonproliferation Studies has concluded 

that it is unlikely that any of those devices have been 

lost and that, regardless, their effectiveness would be 

very low or even nonexistent because they (like all nuclear weapons) require continual maintenance.36 Even 

some of those people most alarmed by the prospect of 

atomic terrorism have concluded, “It is probably true 

that there are no ‘loose nukes,’ transportable nuclear 

weapons missing from their proper storage locations 

and available for purchase in some way.”37

It might be added that Russia has an intense interest in controlling any weapons on its territory because 

it is likely to be a prime target of any illicit use by terrorist groups—particularly Chechen ones with whom 

Russia has been waging a vicious on-and-off war with 

for decades. The Government of Pakistan, which has 
78

been repeatedly threatened by terrorists, has a similar 

interest in controlling its nuclear weapons and material—and scientists. As noted by Stephen Younger, former head of nuclear weapons research and development at Los Alamos National Laboratory, “Regardless 

of what is reported in the news, all nuclear nations 

take the security of their weapons very seriously.”38

Even if a finished bomb were somehow lifted somewhere, the loss would soon be noted and a worldwide 

pursuit undertaken.

Moreover, finished bombs are outfitted with devices designed to trigger a non-nuclear explosion that 

would destroy the bomb if it were tampered with. In 

addition, there are other security techniques: bombs 

can be kept disassembled with the components stored 

in separate high-security vaults; and security can be 

organized so that two people and multiple codes are 

required not only to use the bomb but also to store, 

maintain, and deploy it. If the terrorists seek to enlist 

(or force) the services of someone who already knows 

how to set off the bomb, they would find, as Younger 

stresses, that “only few people in the world have the 

knowledge to cause an unauthorized detonation of a 

nuclear weapon.” Weapons designers know how a 

weapon works, he explains, but not the multiple types 

of signals necessary to set it off, and maintenance personnel are trained in only a limited set of functions.39

There could be dangers in the chaos that would 

emerge if a nuclear state were to fail, collapsing in full 

disarray—Pakistan is frequently brought up in this 

context and sometimes North Korea as well. However, 

even under those conditions, nuclear weapons would 

likely remain under heavy guard by people who know 

that a purloined bomb: would most likely end up going off in their own territory; would still have locks 
79

(and in the case of Pakistan would be disassembled); 

and could probably be followed, located, and hunted 

down by an alarmed international community. The 

worst-case scenario in that instance requires not only 

a failed state but also a considerable series of additional permissive conditions, including consistent 

(and perfect) insider complicity and a sequence of 

hasty, opportunistic decisions or developments that 

click flawlessly in a manner far more familiar to Hollywood scriptwriters than to people experienced with 

reality.40

Accidental or Inadvertent Detonation. A common concern has been that the weapons would somehow go 

off by accident or miscalculation, devastating the 

planet in the process. In 1960, a top nuclear strategist 

declared it “most unlikely” that the world could live 

with an uncontrolled arms race for decades.41 Moreover, in 1979, political scientist Hans J. Morgenthau 

declared: 

The world is moving ineluctably towards a third world 

war—a strategic nuclear war. I do not believe that anything can be done to prevent it. The international system is simply too unstable to survive for long.42

In addition, Eric Schlosser remains deeply concerned 

about that danger today.43

In a 1982 New Yorker essay and best-selling book, 

both titled The Fate of the Earth, Jonathan Schell passionately, if repetitively, argued the not entirely novel 

proposition that nuclear war would be terrible, and he 

concluded ominously: 

One day—and it is hard to believe that it will not be 

soon—we will make our choice. Either we will sink 

into the final coma and end it all or, as I trust and 
80

believe, we will awaken to the truth of our peril . . . 

and rise up to cleanse the earth of nuclear weapons.44

As it happened, both options were avoided: Neither final coma nor nuclear cleansing ever took place. 

The common alarmist prognostications assuming 

that, because the weapons exist, sooner or later one or 

more of them will necessarily go off, has now failed 

to deliver for 70 years—this suggests that something 

more than luck is operating.

THE COSTLY CONSEQUENCES OF 

ANTI-PROLIFERATION POLICIES

Although the consequences of nuclear proliferation have proved to be substantially benign, the same 

cannot be said for the consequences of the nuclear 

anti-proliferation quest. The perpetual agony over 

nuclear proliferation has resulted in an obsessive effort to prevent or channel it—and it is this effort, not 

proliferation itself, that has inflicted severe costs.

The Costs in Iraq.

The war in Iraq, with deaths that have run well 

over 100,000 (and counting)—greater than those inflicted at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined—is a key 

case in point.45 It is far from clear, however, what Saddam Hussein, presiding over a deeply resentful population and an unreliable army (fearing overthrow, he 

was wary about issuing his army bullets and would 

not allow it within 30 miles of Baghdad with heavy 

equipment), could have done with a tiny number 

of bombs against his neighbors and their massively 

armed well-wishers other than seek to stoke his ego 
81

and to deter real or imagined threats. He was, then, 

fully containable and able to be deterred.46 The war 

against him was a militarized anti-proliferation effort 

substantially sold as a venture required to keep his 

pathetic regime from developing nuclear and other 

presumably threatening weapons and to prevent him 

from palming off some of these to eager and congenial 

terrorists.47 The notion that the war was designed to 

spread democracy in the Middle East did gain significance but, as Bruce Russett notes, only after the antiproliferation arguments for going to war proved to be 

empty; or, as Francis Fukuyama has put it, a prewar 

request to spend “several hundred billion dollars and 

several thousand American lives in order to bring democracy to . . . Iraq” would “have been laughed out of 

court.”48

Thus, in an influential 2002 book, Kenneth Pollack 

strenuously advocated a war whose “whole point” 

would be to “prevent Saddam from acquiring nuclear 

weapons,” which Western intelligence agencies, he 

reported, were predicting would occur by 2004 (pessimistic) or 2008 (optimistic).49 He fully recognized 

the costs of the war he advocated, costs that he felt 

might cause thousands of deaths and run into the tens 

of billions of dollars. However, war would be worth 

this price, concluded Pollack, because with nuclear 

weapons Saddam would become the “hegemon” in 

the area, allowing him to control global oil supplies.50

The nuclear theme was repeatedly applied by the administration in the run-up to the war, perhaps most 

famously in former National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice’s dire warning about waiting to have firm 

evidence before launching a war: “We don’t want the 

smoking gun to be a mushroom cloud.” As Paul Wolfowitz from the Department of Defense pointed out, 
82

nuclear weapons or WMDs were the “core reason” 

used for selling the war.51 At a press briefing on April 

10, 2003, shortly after the fall of Baghdad, former 

White House press secretary Ari Fleischer insisted, 

“We have high confidence that they have weapons of 

mass destruction. That is what this war was about and 

it is about.” And Karl Rove, one of former U.S. President George W. Bush’s top political advisers, reflected 

in 2008 that, absent the belief that Saddam Hussein 

possessed WMD, “I suspect that the administration’s 

course of action would have been to work to find more 

creative ways to constrain him like in the 90s.”52

For their part, Democrats have derided the war 

as “unnecessary,” but the bulk of them only came to 

that conclusion after the United States was unable to 

find either nuclear weapons or weapons programs in 

Iraq. Many of them have made it clear that they would 

have supported putatively preemptive (actually, preventive) military action and its attendant bloodshed if 

the intelligence about Saddam’s programs had been 

accurate.53

However, the devastation of Iraq in the service of 

limiting proliferation did not begin with the war in 

2003. For the previous 13 years, that country had suffered under economic sanctions visited upon it by both 

Democratic and Republican administrations that were 

designed to force Saddam from office (and effectively 

from life, since he had no viable sanctuary elsewhere) 

and to keep the country from developing weapons, 

particularly nuclear ones. Multiple, although disputed, studies have concluded that the sanctions were the 

necessary cause of hundreds of thousands of deaths 

in the country, most of them children under the age of 

five—the most innocent of civilians.54
83

The Costs in North Korea.

The costly alarmist perspective on atomic proliferation is also evident in policies advocated toward 

North Korea at various times. Thus, if diplomacy 

failed, as proposed by Graham Allison in 2004, a Pearl 

Harbor-like attack should be launched even though 

potential targets had been dispersed and disguised, 

and even though a resulting war might kill tens of 

thousands in the South.55

Members of the Bush administration, perhaps because they had become immersed in their own antiproliferation war in Iraq at the time, were able to contain their enthusiasm for accepting Allison’s urgent 

advice. Since then, North Korea has become something of a nuclear weapons state. In 2004, Allison had 

sternly insisted that such an outcome would be caused 

by “gross negligence” and would foster “a transformation in the international security order [that] no 

great power would wittingly accept.” We are now in 

position, then, to see if his confident predictions have 

come true: A North Korean bomb, he declared, would 

“unleash a proliferation chain reaction, with South 

Korea and Japan building their own weapons by the 

end of the decade” (that is, by 2009), with Taiwan 

“seriously considering following suit despite the fact 

that this would risk war with China,” and with North 

Korea potentially “becoming the Nukes R’ Us for terrorists.”56

Decision-makers in the Clinton administration 

showed the same mentality in 1994. The United States 

never actually sent troops into action in its confrontation with North Korea at that time, but it certainly 

edged threateningly in that direction when a U.S. National Intelligence Estimate concluded that there was 
84

“a better than even” chance that North Korea had the 

makings of a small nuclear bomb. This conclusion was 

hotly contested by other American analysts and was 

later “reassessed” by intelligence agencies and found 

to have been possibly overstated. In addition, skeptics 

pointed out that even if North Korea had the “makings” in 1994, it still had several key hurdles to overcome in order to develop a deliverable weapon.57

Nonetheless, the Clinton administration was apparently prepared to go to war with the miserable 

North Korean regime, to prevent or to halt its nuclear 

development.58 Accordingly, the United States moved 

to impose deep economic sanctions to make the isolated country even poorer (insofar as that was possible); a measure which garnered no support even 

from neighboring Russia, China, and Japan.59 The U.S. 

Government also moved to engage in a major military 

buildup in the area. So apocalyptic (or simply paranoid) was the North Korean regime about these two 

developments that some important figures think it 

might have gone to war on a preemptive basis if the 

measures had been carried out.60 The Pentagon estimated that a fullscale war on the peninsula, not perhaps without its own sense of apocalypse, could kill 

1,000,000 people, including 80,000 to 100,000 Americans; cost over $100 billion; and do economic destruction on the order of a trillion dollars.61 A considerable 

price, one might think, to prevent a pathetic regime 

from developing weapons with the potential for killing a few tens of thousands—if the weapons were actually exploded, an act that would surely be suicidal 

for the regime.

In the next years, floods and bad weather exacerbated the economic disaster that had been inflicted 

upon the country by its rulers. Famines ensued, and 

the number of people who perished reached hundreds 
85

of thousands or more, with some careful estimates putting the number at over two million.62 Although food 

aid was eventually sent from the West, there seem to 

have been systematic efforts, in the early days of the 

famine in particular, to deny its existence for fear that 

a politics-free response to a humanitarian disaster 

would undercut efforts to use food aid to wring diplomatic concessions on the nuclear issue from North 

Korea.63

Encouraging Extortion.

Due to its anti-proliferation fixation, the United 

States has often allowed itself to become a victim of 

extortion. North Korea has undoubtedly been the 

greatest winner in this somewhat tricky process, with 

the regime accepting a $4 billion energy package for 

its cooperation in 1994.64 Taiwan and South Korea 

have also essentially extorted funds from the handwringers by accepting funds and favors and then giving in to what is likely to be their own best interests. 

Israel played the game in a different way during its 

1973 war. After being attacked by Egypt and Syria, Israel made known that it might use its nuclear weapons 

in the conflict—the country may have had 20 bombs 

at the time. This move reportedly forced the United 

States to desperately initiate an immediate and massive resupply of the Israeli military, which aided in 

Israel’s subsequent victory against the invading Arab 

armies.65

The American reputation generated by this episode for being a willing victim of extortion also had 

the perverse result of fueling, or supplying a rationale 

for, South Africa’s nuclear ambitions. As one South 

African official put it:
86

We argued that if we cannot use a nuclear weapon on 

the battlefield (as this would have been suicidal), then 

the only possible way to use it would be to leverage intervention from the Western Powers by threatening to 

use it. We thought that this might work and the alleged 

Israel-USA case gave some support to our view.66

Hampering Economic Development.

Leonard Weiss notes “restrictions on nuclear trade 

and development are important elements of a nonproliferation regime.”67 Anti-proliferation efforts can 

thus hamper worldwide economic development by 

increasing the effective costs of developing nuclear 

energy. As countries grow, they require ever-increasing amounts of power. Any measure that limits 

their ability to acquire this vital commodity—or increases its price—effectively slows economic growth 

at least to some degree and thereby reduces the gains 

in life expectancy inevitably afforded by economic 

development.

In the various proclamations about controlling the 

proliferation of nuclear weapons, this cost goes almost 

entirely unconsidered. For example, one of the common proposals by anti-proliferators is that no country 

anywhere (except those already doing it) should be 

able to construct any facilities that could produce enriched uranium or plutonium—substances that can be 

used either in advanced reactors or in bombs. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) does specifically 

guarantee to signing non-nuclear countries “the fullest possible exchange of technology” for the develop-
87

ment of peaceful nuclear power. However, as Richard 

Betts points out, this guarantee has been undermined 

by the development of a “nuclear suppliers cartel” 

that has worked to “cut off trade in technology for reprocessing plutonium or enriching uranium,” thereby 

reducing the NPT to “a simple demand to the nuclear 

weapons have-nots to remain so.” Under some proposals, the cartel would be extended to fuel as well.68

Anti-proliferator Allison is among those advocating the cartelization of nuclear fuel. He further suggests that nuclear states guarantee to sell the non-nuclear ones all the nuclear fuel they need (presumably 

in perpetuity) at less than half price, but does not 

attempt to calculate the price tag for this.69 The 2008 

Graham Commission, of which Allison was a member, repeats this demand, though it suggests that nuclear fuel be made available at market prices “to the 

extent possible.” It, too, eschews cost considerations.70

There is, however, a glimmer of evidence that the 

economic cost of hampering the nuclear industry has 

been considered, at least in passing, by some dedicated anti-proliferators. In a 2007 plea that the world be 

made free of nuclear weapons, four former top policy 

officials insisted that the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) be phased out from civil commerce and 

be removed from all the research facilities in the entire world—a costly demand that was not repeated in 

their 2008 version.71

The anti-proliferation obsession has also resulted 

in the summary dismissal of potentially promising 

ideas for producing energy. Thomas Schelling points 

out that there was a proposal in the 1970s (the decade 

that experienced two major shocks in the price of oil) 

to safely explode tiny thermonuclear bombs in underground caverns to generate steam that could produce 
88

energy in an ecologically clean manner. According 

to Schelling, both arms control and energy policy 

analysts universally rejected the proposal at the time 

“without argument, as if the objections were too obvious to require articulation.”72 On closer exploration, of 

course, this scheme might have proved unfeasible for 

technical or economic reasons. However, to dismiss it 

without any sort of analysis was to blithely sacrifice 

energy needs—and therefore human welfare—to an 

anti-proliferation knee-jerk.

Something similar may now be in the cards. Though 

currently in the research phase, it may become possible in the future to radically reduce the cost of producing nuclear energy by using lasers for isotope separation to produce the fuel required by reactors.73 This, 

of course, might also make it easier, or at any rate less 

costly, for unpleasant states to develop nuclear weapons. Accordingly, a balanced assessment of costs and 

benefits would have to be made if the technique ever 

proves to be feasible. However, there is an excellent 

chance no one will ever make it: like the technology 

Schelling discusses, it will be dismissed out of hand. 

Relatedly, the anti-proliferation obsession has sometimes hampered the potentially valuable expansion of 

nuclear power to ships, particularly to icebreakers.

Enhancing Dependence on Foreign Oil.

There is also something of a security aspect to 

this process. Ever since the oil shocks of the 1970s, it 

has become common in American politics to espy a 

danger to the country’s security in allowing it to be 

so dependent on a product that is so disproportionately supplied to the world by regimes in the Middle 

East that are sometimes contemptible, hostile, and/
89

or unstable. One obvious solution would be to rely 

much more on nuclear energy. There are a number of 

reasons why this has failed to happen, but the association of nuclear power with nuclear weapons and worries about nuclear proliferation have had the result of 

making it much more difficult and expensive—often 

prohibitively so—to build nuclear reactors.74

Undercutting Efforts to Prevent Global Warming.

In addition, because nuclear power does not emit 

greenhouse gases, it is an obvious potential candidate 

for helping with the problem of global warming, an 

issue many people hold to be of the highest concern 

for the future of the planet. Since many of the policies 

arising from the nonproliferation fixation increase the 

costs of nuclear power, they, to that degree, exacerbate the problem.

Exacerbating the Nuclear Waste Problem.

The anti-proliferation focus has also exacerbated 

the nuclear waste problem in the United States. In 

the late-1970s, the Carter administration banned the 

reprocessing (or recycling) of nuclear fuel—something that radically reduces the amount of nuclear 

waste—under the highly questionable assumption 

that this policy would reduce the danger of nuclear 

proliferation.75

Encouraging Proliferation.

Moreover, anti-proliferation efforts can be counterproductive in their own terms. As Mitchell Reiss 

observes, “one of the unintended ‘demonstration’ 
90

effects” of the American anti-proliferation war against 

Iraq “was that chemical and biological weapons 

[CBWs] proved insufficient to deter America: only nuclear weapons, it appeared, could do this job.”76 This is 

likely a conclusion that North Korea has drawn.

Israel: the Potential for Self-Destruction.

I am not a fan of worst-case scenarios. However, 

one that may be worthy of consideration concerns 

the danger that, stoked by an obsession over atomic 

weapons in the hands of Iran, Israel could essentially 

destroy itself—that is, cease to exist as a coherent Jewish state—without a single Iranian bomb ever being 

developed.77

There have been extreme apprehensions in Israel 

about atomic annihilation at the hands of Iran, and 

these have sometimes inspired a sense of despair and 

desperation—and in many quarters a loss of hope.78

Indeed, Yossi Klein Halevi and Michael Oren observed 

in early 2007 that “military men suddenly sound like 

theologians when explaining the Iranian threat.” 

Moreover, some of the ponderings were downright 

spooky:

Ahmadinejad’s pronouncements about the imminent 

return of the Hidden Imam and the imminent destruction of Israel are not regarded as merely calculated for 

domestic consumption; they are seen as glimpses into 

an apocalyptic game plan. Ahmadinejad has reportedly told his Cabinet that the Hidden Imam will reappear in 2009—precisely the date when Israel estimates 

Iran will go nuclear.79

The existential danger for Israel in this arises not 

so much from Iran’s capacity (or potential capacity) 

to do harm—though judicious and balanced concerns 
91

about that danger are justified, of course—as from 

the consequences of the hype, at once apoplectic and 

apocalyptic, over the prospective Iranian bomb. The 

problem if the hysteria persists is that a considerable 

and increasing number of Israelis may be led to conclude that since there is no way to guarantee that Iran 

will never be able to obtain a bomb, the situation is 

hopeless; that Israel is ultimately doomed, and that 

it is best to live elsewhere—in a place where one can 

bring up children free from nuclear fears.

“There is nothing more regular in Jewish history 

and myth than Jews ‘returning’ to the Land of Israel to 

build a collective life,” observed Ian Lustick in 2008, 

“except for Jews leaving the country and abandoning 

the project.” Moreover, Lustick continued, “so far, 

in the 21st century more Jews have left than have arrived,” noting a survey indicating that only 69 percent 

of Jewish Israelis say they want to stay in the country.80

He also cites a 2007 poll indicating that one quarter of 

Israelis were considering leaving the country, including almost half of all young people.81 Jeffrey Goldberg 

points to another survey finding that 44 percent of Israelis say they are ready to leave if they could find a 

better standard of living elsewhere, and he notes that 

“the emigration of Israel’s most talented citizens is a 

constant worry of Israeli leaders.”82

Thus, there is some danger that by wallowing in 

its atomic obsession, Israel will scare itself into extinction.

BOMBING IRAN

President Obama’s administration is notable for 

the apparent absence of anyone (else) in a high foreign policy office who clearly and publicly opposed 

the war on Iraq before former President George W. 
92

Bush launched his invasion.83 However, due in considerable part to the subsequent disastrous experience 

in that enterprise—a disaster that continues to evolve 

and unfold—misgivings about the wisdom and consequences of launching a Pearl Harbor-like military 

strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities increased over time.

Among the considerations:

• Following from the previous discussion, if 

the rattled and insecure Iranian leadership 

was lying when it repeatedly proclaimed 

it had no intention of developing nuclear 

weapons or if it were to undergo a conversion from that position—triggered perhaps 

by an Israeli airstrike—it would likely soon 

find, like all other nuclear-armed states, that 

the bombs are essentially useless and a very 

considerable waste of time, effort, money, 

and scientific talent.

• If Iran were to seek to develop nuclear weapons, the process—contrary to intelligence 

exaggerations persistently spun out—would 

likely take years or even decades. For example, it was in March 2010 that Doyle McManus conveyed the information that “most 

experts now estimate that Iran needs about 

18 months to complete a nuclear device and 

a missile to carry it,” although it needed to 

overcome “technical bottlenecks, the exposure of secret facilities and equipment breakdowns.”84 Hymans, unlike the “experts” 

McManus consulted, goes much deeper, 

stressing the administrative difficulties of 

developing a bomb. These require “the fullhearted cooperation of thousands of scientific 

and technical workers for many years.” The 

task is “enormous,” and:
93

the key driver of an efficient nuclear 

weapons project has not been a country’s 

funding levels, political will, or access to 

hardware. Rather, the key has been managerial competence. Nuclear weapons projects 

require a hands-off, facilitative management approach, one that permits scientific 

and technical professionals to exercise their 

vocation. But states such as Iran tend to feature a highly invasive, authoritarian management approach that smothers scientific 

and technical professionalism. Thus, it is 

very likely that Iran’s political leadership—

with its strong tendency toward invasive, 

authoritarian mismanagement—has been 

its own worst enemy in its quest for the 

bomb.85

• Iran scarcely has a viable delivery system for 

nuclear weapons.86

• If Iran were to develop nuclear weapons, it 

would most likely “use” them in the same 

way all other nuclear states have: for prestige (or ego-stoking) and to deter real or perceived threats.87 Indeed, as Thomas Schelling 

suggests, deterrence is about the only value 

the weapons might have for Iran. Such devices, he points out, “would be too precious 

to give away or to sell” and “too precious to 

waste killing people” when they could make 

other countries “hesitant to consider military 

action.”88 Actually, in the wake of the Iraq 

disaster, Iran has scarcely needed nuclear 

weapons for deterrence. It can credibly deter an invasion by the Americans simply by 

maintaining a trained and well-armed cadre 

of a few thousand troops dedicated to, and 
94

capable of, inflicting endless irregular warfare on the invaders.

• The leadership of Iran, however hostile and 

unpleasant in many ways, does not consist of 

a self-perpetuating gaggle of suicidal lunatics. Thus, as Schelling suggests, it is exceedingly unlikely that Iran would give nuclear 

weapons to a substate group like Hezbollah 

to detonate—particularly on a country like 

Israel—not in the least because the non-lunatics in charge would fear that the source 

of the weapon would be detected by nuclear 

forensics, inviting devastating retaliation.

• An Iranian bomb would be unlikely to trigger 

a cascade of proliferation in the Middle East. 

Although Joseph Cirincione has held that a 

nuclear Iran could readily be deterred from 

using a nuclear weapon against its neighbors 

or the United States, and although he discounts the likelihood that it might “intentionally give a weapon to a terrorist group they 

could not control,” he has set off on an extravagant alarmist fear cascade, envisioning 

“a nuclear chain reaction where states feel 

they must match each other’s nuclear capability.” This, he concludes, “could lead to a 

Middle East with not one nuclear weapons 

state, Israel, but four or five,” and that “is a 

recipe for nuclear war.”89 However, as noted 

earlier, if Iran were to brandish nuclear weapons, it would find itself, like Iraq in 1990, confronting a coalition of convenience made up 

of countries far stronger militarily.

• The long-term negative consequences for Israel from an attack on Iranian nuclear facilities, 

either by Israel or by the United States, could 
95

surpass those that developed even from such 

ill-advised ventures as Israel’s 1982 invasion 

of Lebanon and its government-induced policy to encourage settlement in occupied territories. In addition, the casualties inflicted by 

an attack on Iran by direct action and by its 

“collateral damage” (including, potentially, 

induced nuclear radiation) could conceivably 

be considerable. Moreover, the results would 

most likely be counterproductive. Israel’s 

highly touted air strike against Iraq’s nuclear 

program in the Osirak attack of 1981, as Dan 

Reiter and Richard Betts have pointed out, 

actually caused Saddam Hussein to speed up 

his nuclear program 25-fold while decreasing 

its vulnerability by dispersing its elements—

a lesson Iran has also learned.90

• In the end, it is incumbent upon those who 

have advocated a Pearl Harbor-like attack on 

Iran to demonstrate that the rather innocuous 

history of nuclear proliferation over the last 

two-thirds of a century is irrelevant, and that 

the regime there is daffier and more threatening than, for example, the ultimate rogue in 

1964—China.91

CONCLUSION

In 1950, notes John Lewis Gaddis, no one among 

foreign policy decision-makers anticipated most of the 

major international developments that were to take 

place in the next half-century. Among these were “that 

there would be no World War” and that the United 

States and the USSR, “soon to have tens of thousands 

of thermonuclear weapons pointed at one another, 

would agree tacitly never to use any of them.”92
96

However, as discussed earlier, it could have been 

reasonably argued at the time that major war was simply not in the cards—that despite the huge differences 

on many issues, the leading countries of the world 

would manage to keep themselves from plunging into 

a self-destructive cataclysm like, or even worse than, 

the one they had just survived. This perspective was 

not, of course, the only one possible, but there was no 

definitive way to dismiss it. Thus, as a matter of simple, plain, rational decision-making, this prospect—

the one that proved to be true—should have been on 

the table.

If no one anticipated this distinct possibility in 1950, 

the irreverent might be led ungraciously to suggest 

that the United States would have been better served 

if those at the summit of foreign policy had been replaced by coin-flipping chimpanzees who would at 

least occasionally get it right from time to time out of 

sheer luck. (The chimps would have to flip coins because the animals are all too human and would likely 

otherwise fall into patterns of repetitive, and probably 

agitated, behavior.)

We seem to be at it again. Just about the whole 

of the foreign policy establishment has taken it as a 

central article of faith that the proliferation of nuclear 

weapons is an overwhelming danger and that all possible measures, including war, must be taken to keep 

it from happening.93

Concern is justified I suppose, but the experience 

of two-thirds of a century suggests that any danger 

is far from overwhelming. It would certainly be preferable that a number of regimes never obtain nuclear 

weapons. Indeed, if the efforts to dissuade Iran from 

launching a nuclear weapons program succeed, they 

would be doing it a favor—though, quite possibly, the 

Iranians will not notice.
97

The handful of countries that have acquired nuclear weapons seem to have done so sometimes as an ego 

trip for current leaders, and more urgently (or perhaps merely in addition) as an effort to deter a (supposed) potential attack on themselves: China to deter 

the United States and the Soviet Union, Israel to deter 

various enemy nations in the neighborhood, India to 

deter China, Pakistan to deter India, and now North 

Korea to deter the United States and maybe others.94

Insofar as nuclear proliferation is a response to a perceived threat, it follows that one way to reduce the 

likelihood that such countries would go nuclear is a 

simple one: stop threatening them.

More generally, any anti-proliferation priority 

should be topped with a somewhat higher one: avoiding militarily aggressive actions under the obsessive 

sway of worst-case scenario fantasies, actions that 

might lead to the deaths of tens—or hundreds—of 

thousands of people.95

“It is dangerous,” muses Hymans aptly, “to fight 

smoke with fire.”96 Nuclear proliferation, while not 

particularly desirable, is unlikely to accelerate or prove 

to be a major danger, and extreme anti-proliferation 

policies need careful reconsideration. They can generate costs far higher than those likely to be inflicted by 

the potential (and often essentially imaginary) problems they seek to address.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 3

1. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear 

Weapons: A Debate Renewed, 2nd Ed., New York: Norton, 2002.

2. Bernard Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option, Princeton, 

NJ: Princeton University Press, 1966, p. 93.
98

3. Graham Allison, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable 

Catastrophe, New York: Times Books, 2004, Ch. 7; Joseph Cirincione, 

“Cassandra’s Conundrum,” National Interest, No. 92, November–

December 2007, p. 15.

4. CQ Transcriptions, “Transcript of Barack Obama’s Remarks at the American Israel Public Affairs Committee’s Annual 

Policy Conference, Washington, DC, June 4, 2008,” The New York 

Times, June 4, 2008, available from www.nytimes.com/2008/06/04/us/

politics/04text-obama-aipac.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; Tim Reid and 

Tom Baldwin, “Nuclear Iran Must Be Stopped at All Costs, Says 

McCain,” The Times (London), January 26, 2006.

5. For example, Kenneth Walz, “Why Iran Should Get the 

Bomb: Nuclear Balancing Would Mean More Stability,” Foreign 

Affairs, Vol. 91, No. 4, July/August 2012, available from www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137731/kenneth-n-waltz/why-iran-should-getthe-bomb.

6. This chapter draws on ideas and approaches presented in 

John Mueller, Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to 

al-Qaeda, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.

7. For an extended discussion, see Mueller, Atomic Obsession, 

especially Chapters 4 and 5.

8. On this issue, see in particular Stephen M. Walt, “Containing Rogues and Renegades: Coalition Strategies and Counterproliferation,” in Victor A. Utgoff, ed., The Coming Crisis: Nuclear 

Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order, Cambridge, MA: MIT 

Press, 2000, pp. 191–226.

9. John Mueller, Quiet Cataclysm: Reflections on the Recent Transformation of World Politics, New York: HarperCollins, 1995, ch. 5; 

Mueller, Atomic Obsession, ch. 3.

10. Robert Jervis, “Was the Cold War a Security Dilemma?” 

Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter 2001, p. 59.

11. Vojtech Mastny, “Introduction,” in Mastny, Sven G. Holtsmark and Andreas Wenger, eds., War Plans and Alliances in the 
99

Cold War: Threat Perceptions in the East and West, London, UK and 

New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 3. 

12. Stephen E. Ambrose, “Secrets of the Cold War,” The New 

York Times, December 27, 1990.

13. Brodie, Escalation and the Nuclear Option, pp. 71–72.

14. George F. Kennan, “Containment Then and Now,” Foreign 

Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 4, Spring 1987, pp. 888-889. See also Robert H. 

Johnson, Improbable Dangers: U.S. Conceptions of Threat in the Cold 

War and After, New York: St. Martins, 1994, p. 29.

15. Charles de Gaulle, “The Thoughts of Charles de Gaulle,” 

The New York Times Magazine, May 12, 1968, p. 103; Robert Gilpin, 

War and Change in World Politics, New York: Cambridge University 

Press, 1981, p. 215.

16. Christopher Layne contended in 1993 that Japan by natural impulse must soon come to yearn for nuclear weapons. Layne, 

“The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 5–51. Three years 

earlier, John Mearsheimer argued that “Germany will feel insecure 

without nuclear weapons,” see Mearsheimer, “Back to the Future: 

Instability in Europe after the Cold War,” International Security, Vol. 

15, No. 1, Summer 1990, pp. 5–56.

17. Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution, Ithaca, 

NY: Cornell University Press, 1989, p. 4. For an assessment of this 

issue, see Jacques E.C. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation: Identity, Emotions, and Foreign Policy, New York: Cambridge 

University Press, 2006, pp. 211-212.

18. Jennifer Mackby and Walter Slocombe, “Germany: A Model Case, A Historical Imperative,” in Kurt M. Campbell, Robert J. 

Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why 

States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, Washington, DC: Brookings 

Institution Press, 2004, p. 210.

19. Hymans, The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, p. 5.
100

20. National Planning Association (NPA) Special Project Committee on Security through Arms Control, 1970 without Arms Control, Planning Pamphlet No. 104, Washington, DC: National Planning Association, 1958, p. 42.

21. C.P. Snow, “The Moral Un-Neutrality of Science,” Science, 

Vol. 133, No. 3448, January 27, 1961, p. 259; John F. Kennedy quoted in Sidney Kraus, ed., The Great Debates: Kennedy vs. Nixon, 1960, 

Bloomington: University of Indiana Press, 1962, p. 394. Kennedy 

reportedly considered a Chinese nuclear test “likely to be historically the most significant and worst event of the 1960s,” see William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Whether to ‘Strangle the Baby 

in the Cradle’,” International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3, Winter 2000-

01, p. 61. Actually, that designation should probably go instead to 

Kennedy’s decision to send American troops in substantial numbers to Vietnam, largely to confront the Chinese “threat” that was 

deemed to lurk there.

22. For a discussion of the relevance of the Canadian case, concluding from it that the issue of nuclear proliferation—then often 

known as the “Nth country problem”—was approaching “a finite 

solution,” see John Mueller, “Incentives for Restraint: Canada as a 

Nonnuclear Power,” Orbis, Vol. 11, No. 3, Fall 1967, pp. 864–884. 

For some early commentary suggesting that alarm about nuclear 

proliferation was unjustified, see Richard N. Rosecrance, “International Stability and Nuclear Diffusion,” in Rosecrance, ed., The 

Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons: Strategy and Politics, New York: 

Columbia University Press, 1964, pp. 293–314. 

23. William M. Arkin, “The Continuing Misuses of Fear,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 62, No. 5, September–October 

2006, p. 45; Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities, Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson 

Center Press, 1995; T. V. Paul, Power versus Prudence: Why Nations 

Forgo Nuclear Weapons, Montréal, QC: McGill–Queen’s University 

Press, 2000.

24. Stephen M. Meyer, The Dynamics of Nuclear Proliferation, 

Chicago, IL: University of Chicago, 1984. See also Hymans, Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 2-12. On the very limited impact of 

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), see Mueller, Atomic 

Obsession, ch. 9.
101

25. Jacques E. C. Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions: Scientists, Politicians, and Proliferation, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012; Idem., “Crying Wolf about an Iranian Nuclear 

Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 17, 2012, available 

from thebulletin.org/crying-wolf-about-iranian-nuclear-bomb.

26. On Stalin’s mental condition, see John Mueller, Retreat 

from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War, New York: Free 

Press, 1989, p. 123. On Mao, see Frank Dikötter, Mao’s Great Famine: The History of China’s Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–1962,

New York: Walker, 2010.

27. For an extended discussion, see Mueller, Atomic 

Obsession, ch. 12–15.

28. John D. Negroponte, “Letter Dated 17 April 2003 from 

the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to 

the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Committee,” United Nations Security Council, document S/AC.37/2003/

(1455)/26, April 22, 2003, available from www.globalsecurity.org/

security/library/report/2003/n0335167.pdf; Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, 

p. 15. He had presumably relied on the same inspirational mechanism in 1995 to predict, “in the absence of a determined program 

of action, we have every reason to anticipate acts of nuclear terrorism against American targets before this decade is out;” Idem., 

“Must We Wait for the Nuclear Morning After?” The Washington 

Post, April 30, 1995.

29. Quoted in Bob Graham, World at Risk: The Report of the 

Commission on the Prevention of WMD Proliferation and Terrorism, 

New York: Vintage, 2008, p. 43.

30. White House Press Office, “Remarks by President Obama 

and President Zuma of South Africa before Bilateral Meeting,” 

Blair House, Washington, DC, April 11, 2010, available from www.

whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-zuma-south-africa-bilateral-meeting.

31. Matthew Bunn, Securing the Bomb 2007, Cambridge, MA, 

and Washington, DC: Project on Managing the Atom, Harvard 

University, and Nuclear Threat Initiative, 2007, p. vi. See also William Langewiesche, The Atomic Bazaar: Dispatches from the Underground World of Nuclear Trafficking, New York: Farrar, Straus and 
102

Giroux, 2007, p. 20; Brian Michael Jenkins, Will Terrorists Go Nuclear? Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2008, p. 198.

32. For an excellent discussion of nuclear forensics, see Michael 

A. Levi, On Nuclear Terrorism, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 

Press, 2007, pp. 127–133.

33. Robin M. Frost, Nuclear Terrorism after 9/11, London, UK: 

International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005, p. 64; Jenkins, p. 

143. On this issue, see also Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “Why 

States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists,” International 

Security, Vol. 38, No. 1, Summer 2013, pp. 80-104. 

34. Peter Bergen, “Where You Bin? The Return of Al Qaeda,” 

New Republic, January 29, 2007, p. 19.

35. Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower: Al-Qaeda and the Road 

to 9/11, New York: Knopf, 2006, pp. 230–231, 287–288. 

36. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, “Suitcase Nukes”: A Reassessment, Monterey, CA: Monterey Institute of International Studies, 2002, pp. 4 and 12; Langewiesche, p. 19; Jenkins, pp. 149–150.

37. Anna M. Pluta and Peter D. Zimmerman, “Nuclear Terrorism: A Disheartening Dissent,” Survival, Vol. 48, No. 2, Summer 

2006, p. 56. See also Stephen M. Younger, The Bomb: A New History, 

New York: Ecco Press, 2009, p. 152.

38. Stephen M. Younger, Endangered Species: How We Can Avoid 

Mass Destruction and Build a Lasting Peace, New York: Ecco Press, 

2007, p. 93. See also, Idem., The Bomb, pp. 152–153.

39. Idem., The Bomb, pp. 153–154. On triggers, see Jenkins, p. 

141. On disassembled parts, see Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 11, 13; 

and Joby Warrick, “Pakistan Nuclear Security Questioned,” The 

Washington Post, November 11, 2007. 

40. For a discussion of the failed-state scenario, including useful suggestions for making it even less likely, see Levi, pp. 133–138. 

On the unlikelihood of a Pakistan collapse, see Juan Cole, “Obama’s 

Domino Theory,” Salon, March 30, 2009, available from www.salon.

com/2009/03/30/afghanistan_7.
103

41. Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton, NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 1960, p. x.

42. Quoted in Francis Anthony Boyle, World Politics and International Law, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1985, p. 73. See 

also Marc Trachtenberg, The Cold War and After: History, Theory, 

and the Logic of International Politics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012, p. 25.

43. Eric Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, 

the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety, New York: Allen 

Lane/Penguin Books, 2013. For commentary, see John Mueller, 

“Fire, Fire,” The Times Literary Supplement (London), March 7, 

2014, p 26.

44. Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth, New York: Knopf, 

1982, p. 231.

45. For both, estimates start at around 110,000 with many 

ranging higher, see “Casualties of the Iraq War,” Wikipedia, last 

modified March 12, 2015, available from en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Casualties_of_the_Iraq_War; “The Atomic Bombings of Hiroshima 

and Nagasaki: Total Casualties,” Atomic Archive, available from 

www.atomicarchive.com/Docs/MED/med_chp10.shtml.

46. See Mueller, Atomic Obsession, p. 133. For ammunition, see 

James Fallows, “Why Iraq Has No Army,” The Atlantic, December 2005, p. 72. For heavy weapons, see Maggie O’Kane, “Saddam 

Wields Terror—and Feigns Respect,” The Guardian, November 24, 

1998. For critical pre-war examinations of the assumption that Iraq, 

however armed, posed much of a threat, see John Mearsheimer and 

Stephen Walt, “Iraq: An Unnecessary War,” Foreign Policy, Vol. 82, 

No. 1, January/February 2003, pp. 50–59; Brink Lindsey and John 

Mueller, “Should We Invade Iraq?” Reason, January 2003. See also 

John Mueller, Overblown, New York: Free Press, 2006, pp. 131–133.

47. Olivier Roy, “Europe Won’t Be Fooled Again,” The New 

York Times, May 13, 2003.

48. Bruce Russett, “Bushwhacking the Democratic Peace,” International Studies Perspectives, Vol. 6, No. 4, November 2005, p. 

396. Francis Fukuyama, “America’s Parties and Their Foreign Pol-
104

icy Masquerade,” Financial Times, March 8, 2005. On these issues, 

see also John Mueller, War and Ideas: Selected Essays, London and 

New York: Routledge, 2011, ch. 7; Jon Western, Selling Intervention 

and War: The Presidency, The Media, and the American Public, Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2005, ch. 6.

49. Kenneth M. Pollack, The Threatening Storm: The Case for 

Invading Iraq, New York: Random House, 2003, p. 418.

50. Ibid., pp. xiv, 335, 413, 418. Pollack also estimated that another $5 to $10 billion over the first 3 years would be required for 

rebuilding (p. 397).

51. Sam Tannenhaus, “Interview with Paul Wolfowitz,” Vanity 

Fair, May 9, 2003; “Wolfowitz: WMD Chosen as Reason for Iraq 

War for ‘Bureaucratic Reasons’,” CNN.com, May 30, 2003, transcript available from transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0305/30/

se.08.html.

52. Sam Stein, “Rove: We Wouldn’t Have Invaded Iraq If 

We Knew the Truth about WMDs,” Huffington Post, December 2, 

2008, available from www.huffingtonpost.com/2008/12/02/rove-wewouldnt-have-inva_n_147923.html. Some still consider it “open to 

debate,” however, “that the war was fought primarily as a nonproliferation campaign.” Henry D. Sokolski, Underestimated: Our 

Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2015, p. 4 note 7.

53. On this issue, see also Arkin, p. 45.

54. Richard Garfield, Morbidity and Mortality Among Iraqi Children from 1990 through 1998, South Bend, IN: Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, University of Notre Dame, 1999. John 

Mueller and Karl Mueller, “The Methodology of Mass Destruction: Assessing Threats in the New World Order,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 23, No. 1, March 2000, pp. 163-187. Matt Welch, 

“The Politics of Dead Children,” Reason, March 2002, pp. 53-58. 

Pollack, pp. 138-139. Mohamed M. Ali, John Blacker, and Gareth 

Jones, “Annual mortality rates and excess deaths of children under 

five in Iraq, 1991-1998,” Population Studies, Vol. 57, No. 2, 2003, pp. 

217-226. Andrew Cockburn and Patrick Cockburn, Out of the Ashes: 

The Resurrection of Saddam Hussein, New York: HarperCollins, 1999, 
105

ch. 5. However, for the argument, based on later intelligence, that 

high estimates of a half-million or more child deaths are likely exaggerated due in particular to regime manipulation of the numbers, 

see Michael Spagat, “Truth and death in Iraq under sanctions,” Significance, Vol. 7, No. 3 , September 2010, pp. 116-120.

55. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 165-171.

56. Ibid., p. 166.

57. Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History, 

New York: Basic Books, 2001, pp. 307-308, 316. Selig S. Harrison, 

Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement, 

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002, p. 213. On this issue, see also James Fallows, “The Panic Gap: Reactions to North 

Korea’s Bomb,” National Interest, No. 38, Winter 1994/95, pp. 40-45.

58. Oberdorfer, pp. 308, 316. 

59. Ibid., p. 318.

60. Ibid., p. 329. See also Derek D. Smith, Deterring America: 

Rogue States and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, 

Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006, pp. 70-71.

61. Oberdorfer, p. 324. See also Harrison, pp. 117-118.

62. Oberdorfer, p. 399; Andrew S. Natsios, The Great North Korean Famine, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 

2001, p. 215.

63. Natsios, pp. 147-148.

64. Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 327.

65. There was also a strong perception in Israel that the United States might like to see the Arabs win some ground, something 

that might help compel Israel to negotiate a peace treaty later. The 

result of Israel’s atomic gambit seems to have undercut support 

for that approach to the degree that it existed. On these issues, see 

Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option: Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal and 

American Foreign Policy, New York: Random House, 1991, pp. 40, 
106

139, 226–39; T.V. Paul, The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons, 

Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009, pp. 127–128.

66. Peter Liberman, “The Rise and Fall of the South African 

Bomb,” International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2, Fall 2001, p. 62. See 

also Reiss, Bridled Ambition, pp. 15, 28.

67. Leonard Weiss, “Safeguards and the NPT: Early History 

Portended Current Problems,” in Henry D. Sokolski, ed., Nuclear 

Nonproliferation Treaty Missteps, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, forthcoming.

68. Richard K. Betts, “Universal Deterrence or Conceptual Collapse? Liberal Pessimism and Utopian Realism,” in Utgoff, ed., The 

Coming Crisis, p. 70.

69. Allison, Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 156–165.

70. Graham, World at Risk, pp. xx.

71. George P. Shultz, William J. Perry, Henry A. Kissinger, 

and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,” The Wall 

Street Journal, January 4, 2007; Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn, 

“Toward a Nuclear-Free World,” The Wall Street Journal, January 

15, 2008.

72. Thomas C. Schelling, “An Astonishing Sixty Years: The 

Legacy of Hiroshima,” Nobel Prize Lecture, Stockholm, Sweden, December 8, 2005, p. 369, available from nobelprize.org/nobel_

prizes/economics/laureates/2005/schelling-lecture.html. 

73. Mark Anderson, “Beware New Nukes,” Wired, October 

2008, p.182.

74. On this issue, see especially Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear 

Fear: A History of Images, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 

Press, 1988.

75. Richard L. Garwin and Georges Charpak, Megawatts and 

Megatons: A Turning Point in the Nuclear Age? New York: Knopf, 

2001, pp. 144–145.
107

76. Mitchell Reiss, “The Nuclear Tipping Point: Prospects for 

a World of Many Nuclear Weapons States,” in Campbell, Einhorn, 

and Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point, p. 12.

77. See also John Mueller and Ian S. Lustick, “Israel’s Fight-orFlight Response,” National Interest, No. 98, November/December 

2008, pp. 68-71.

78. Benny Morris, “Israel’s unhappy birthday,” Los Angeles 

Times, May 11, 2008. See also Ian S. Lustick, “Abandoning the Iron 

Wall: Israel and ‘the Middle Eastern Muck’,” Middle East Policy, 

Vol. XV, No. 3, August 2008.

79. Yossi Klein Halevi and Michael B. Oren, “Israel’s Worst 

Nightmare,” New Republic, January 30, 2007. For later, but similar, 

apocalyptic visions, see Ari Shavit, “The Bomb and the Bomber,” 

The New York Times, March 21, 2012.

80. “Israel’s Future: The Time Factor,” A Debate between 

Efraim Inbar and Ian S. Lustick, Israel Studies Forum, Vol. 23, No. 1, 

Summer 2008, pp. 6, 10.

81. Lustick, “Abandoning the Iron Wall.”

82. Jeffrey Goldberg, “Unforgiven,” The Atlantic, May 2008, 

p. 40.

83. John Mueller, “What Americans Get That the Foreign 

Policy Elite Doesn’t,” Huffington Post, May 30, 2014, available 

from www.huffingtonpost.com/john-mueller/what-americans-get-thatt_b_5420173.html.

84. Doyle McManus, “What if Iran gets the bomb?” Los

Angeles Times, March 21, 2010.

85. Jacques E.C. Hymans, “Crying wolf about an Iranian nuclear bomb;” See also Idem., Achieving Nuclear Ambitions.

86. Richard L. Garwin, “Evaluating Iran’s missile threat,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 64, No. 2, May/June 2008, p. 40; 

“Pentagon Appears to Downgrade Iran Strategic Missile Threat,” 

Global Security Newswire, July 11, 2014, available from www.nti.org/

gsn/article/pentagon-appears-downgrade-iran-icbm-threat-assessment/.
108

87. For the conclusion that these would be Iran’s sole motivations, see Colin Dueck and Ray Takeyh, “Iran’s Nuclear Challenge,” 

Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 122, No. 2, Summer 2007, p. 195.

88. Schelling.

89. Cirincione, pp. 16-17. Cirincione has much company. As 

William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova observe, “Today it 

is hard to find an analyst or commentator on nuclear proliferation 

who is not pessimistic about the future. It is nearly as difficult to find 

one who predicts the future without reference to metaphors such as 

proliferation chains, cascades, dominoes, waves, avalanches, and 

tipping points.” However, after considerable study and research 

on the issue, they finally became “convinced that the metaphor is 

inappropriate and misleading, as it implies a process of nuclear 

decisionmaking and a pace of nuclear weapons spread that are 

unlikely to transpire.” William C. Potter and Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, “Divining Nuclear Intentions,” International Security, Vol. 33, 

No. 1, Summer 2008, p. 159. 

90. Dan Reiter, “Preventive Attacks against Nuclear Programs 

and the ‘Success’ at Osiraq,” Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 12, No. 

2, July 2005, pp. 355-371. Ibid., Preventive War and Its Alternatives: 

The Lessons of History, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. 

Army War College, 2006, pp. 46; Richard K. Betts, “The Osirak Fallacy,” National Interest, No. 83, Spring 2006, pp. 22-25. Moreover, as 

Hymans, Achieving Nuclear Ambitions, also stresses, the reactor the 

Israelis bombed was not even capable of producing weapons-grade 

fissile material.

91. See Francis J. Gavin, “Blasts from the Past: Proliferation 

Lessons from the 1960s,” International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3, 

Winter 2004/05, pp. 100–135. 

92. John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life, 

New York: Penguin, 2011, p. 403.

93. Thus, it is impressive how casually the sanguinist perspective of Waltz—a plausible line of argument, whatever my reservations—has been commonly dismissed without even so much as 

an analysis or effort at refutation. As Betts notes, the argument 

cannot simply be “brushed off,” yet that is exactly what has hap-
109

pened; “surprisingly few academic strategists” have tried to refute it in detail. See Betts, “Universal Deterrence or Conceptual 

Collapse?” p. 64; Thus the generally careful and thoughtful Reiss 

worries (or did worry in 2004) that we are nearing a nuclear “tipping point” that could trigger a “proliferation epidemic.” Should 

this occur, he assures us, “few would take comfort in the assurances of some academic theorists [a double putdown if there ever 

was one] that ‘more may be better’,” directly quoting Waltz, but 

not even affording him a footnote. See Reiss, “The Nuclear Tipping Point: Prospects,” p. 4. If academics have substantially ignored the argument, policymakers have been at least as oblivious. 

For example, James Kurth simply dismisses the Waltz argument 

out of hand: “There probably has not been a single foreign policy 

professional in the U.S. government,” he noted in 1998, “that has 

found this notion to be helpful.” Kurth, “Inside the Cave: The Banality of I.R. Studies,” National Interest, No. 53, Fall 1998. But not, 

one strongly suspects, because any has spent any time thinking 

about it.

94. On China, see Mueller, Atomic Obsession, p. 144. Hymans 

puts prime emphasis on ego—with the added proviso that only 

when the ego in charge has a conception of a national identity that 

can be considered to be what he calls “of the oppositional nationalist” variety will the country really try to get nuclear weapons; 

Hymans, Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation. For somewhat related 

findings, see Etel Solingen, Nuclear Logics, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007. See also the discussion in Potter and 

Mukhatzhanova.

95. The phrase “worst case fantasies” is from Bernard Brodie, 

“The Development of Nuclear Strategy,” International Security, Vol. 

2, No. 4, Spring 1978, p. 68.

96. Hymans, Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, p. 225.

111

CHAPTER 4

SHOULD WE LET IT ALL GO?

Victor Gilinsky

The traditional criticism of U.S. efforts to stop the 

spread of the bomb has been that we cannot do much 

about it. (Decades ago former U.S. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown quipped that he could replace all 

the government’s nonproliferation experts and diplomats with two—one to announce each additional nuclear state, and the other to wring his hands over the 

increase.) However, no one questioned the bomb’s importance. John Mueller takes a different approach; he 

says the whole thing does not matter. My assignment 

is to take issue with the broad thesis of his chapter in 

this volume, “‘At All Costs’: The Destructive Consequences of Anti-Proliferation Policy.”1

 He questions 

the past and future significance of the spread of nuclear weapons, and if there is ever a compelling case 

for their use. He questions even more the efforts to 

restrain the spread; and he concludes that anti-proliferation efforts have proved exceedingly costly and—

counting in this category the 2003 Iraq invasion—have 

led to more deaths than the nuclear bombs dropped 

on Japan. In passing, he skewers prominent nuclear 

terrorism and nuclear war alarmists who have been 

purveying “worst case scenario fantasies.” He goes 

after their insistence that we immediately put their 

solutions at the top of the national security agenda, 

and their introduction of extravagant language that 

has now fed into the political discourse. Mueller calls 

then-presidential candidate Senator Barack Obama 

on his limitless promise made to an American-Israeli 
112

Public Affairs Committee conference, to do “everything” within his power to stop Iran from getting the 

bomb, and Senator John McCain matching it by saying 

it had to be done “at all costs,” with neither explaining what “everything” and “at all cost” could lead to. 

Mueller suggests that one way to reduce incentives for 

“errant regimes” to take interest in the bomb is to stop 

threatening them. 

In short, there is much to like. However, he goes too 

far, and seems to acknowledge that himself. He writes 

that no country has found the weapons particularly

useful; and the spread of the weapons is not necessarily desirable; and that further spread is unlikely to 

accelerate or prove a major danger. The trouble is that 

for most people, putting nuclear war in the “unlikely” 

category still leaves a lot to worry about. 

But Mueller goes on to dismiss such concerns and 

conclude that proliferation hardly matters at all, that 

up to now its effects have been benign, whereas efforts 

to restrain it do more harm than good. So let us focus 

mainly on that. 

HAS THE BOMB MADE A SIGNIFICANT 

IMPACT ON THE WORLD?

One is almost ashamed to ask the question. Anyone who has lived through the rough parts of the 

Cold War, or is old enough to remember jumping under his desk during what was then called an atomic 

drill, has no doubt that it did, in ways both large and 

small. I will pass over the enormous size and expense 

of the nuclear weapons enterprise to mention a few 

items related to life in the United States: The Manhattan Project was, as Annie Jacobsen recently wrote, 

“the mother of all black programs and it is the parent 
113

from which all black operations have sprung.”2 That 

precedent plus the Cold War justified the existence of 

a vast secret national security state, some aspects of 

which we are just beginning to learn about. That secret 

world required vetting the “loyalty” of large numbers 

of people, which implies unprecedented intrusions 

into their private lives. We have gotten so used to this 

we think it is normal, but it is a long way from what 

was considered normal in pre-World War II times. 

The bomb, plus means for intercontinental delivery in 

minutes, also changed the U.S. Constitution, shifting 

the power to initiate war to the president and away 

from Congress, and therefore away from the democratic process. 

We had many close calls during the decades of the 

Cold War, some of which could conceivably have led 

to nuclear war. There were quite a number of highly 

placed U.S. officials who counseled use of the bomb, 

and in fact were ready to take the president and the 

country over the cliff to achieve their Cold War aims.3

Fortunately, reason prevailed. Or the taboo against 

nuclear use was sufficiently intimidating. Adding to 

the dangers in the early days of the Cold War, there 

were no independently controlled locks on the nuclear weapons. Harold Agnew tells of visiting a U.S. air 

base in Germany and seeing nuclear-armed German 

planes lined up ready to go. U.S. physical control over 

the weapons consisted of a single U.S. sentry. The 

Strategic Air Command (SAC) was very aggressive 

during this time, flying mock nuclear attacks not only 

up to the Soviet borders, but also inside those borders 

to get data on Soviet radars. Some U.S. planes were 

shot down with loss of aircrews. We were very lucky 

to get through that time unscathed, or perhaps more 

accurately, unirradiated. 
114

We know less about how close other countries 

came to using nuclear weapons, but it appears that at 

one point in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, former Israeli 

Prime Minister Golda Meir was the only one that stood 

between Israel’s bomb and its use on the battlefield. 

There were also serious accidents with bombs; 

some were inadvertently dropped from planes. The 

most spectacular incident occurred over Goldsboro, 

NC. A plane carrying megaton bombs broke up in 

mid-air, dropping its bombs. They had multiple sequential locks to prevent unintentional or accidental 

nuclear detonation. The arming sequence on one fourmegaton bomb passed through five of its six locks on 

impact, and the bomb failed to detonate only because 

the last one held. Had the thermonuclear weapon exploded, a good part of North Carolina would have 

been flattened, and if the wind had then been blowing north, much of the Eastern coast would have been 

heavily contaminated with radioactivity. Again, we 

were very lucky. One should add that all these locks 

were put on the weapons over the considerable resistance of the Air Force, which worried more about the 

bombs failing to go off when they were supposed to 

than having them go off accidentally.

WAS THE BOMB USEFUL TO ITS OWNERS?

The usefulness of the bomb—or bombs, as others have them, too—is a more complicated question. 

The first two nuclear bombs ended the war with Japan more quickly than it otherwise would have. The 

price America paid for this was the eternal onus for 

being the first to use this new energy source to kill 

large numbers of people. Without the experience of 

the Manhattan Project, would others have developed 
115

the bomb? Once uranium fission was understood in 

1939, many scientists around the world understood 

the possibility of nuclear weapons. The Manhattan 

Project, after all, was hurried in fear of a German 

bomb. Nevertheless, without the U.S. effort, the development elsewhere probably would have been slower. 

Recall, however, that most of the World War II effort 

was in producing the nuclear explosives, highly enriched uranium (HEU), and plutonium. Commercial 

nuclear programs now make that easy for possessors 

of uranium enrichment plants and plutonium separation, or reprocessing, plants. 

The bomb did not do much for the United States in 

the few years it had a monopoly. Moreover, once the 

Soviets exploded theirs, it was pretty much a standoff. 

There was not much you could do with it, but you did 

not want to be without it if former Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin had it. In time, the weapon took on a life 

of its own. We built them, and they built them. One 

thing we know, the bomb was constantly on the mind 

of leaders.

It was U.S. policy to rely on nuclear weapons to 

overcome the disparity in manpower if the Soviets attacked Western Europe and thus to deter such an attack. Years after he was the U.S. Secretary of Defense, 

Robert McNamara told me that despite our declared 

policy, he would never have authorized use of U.S. 

nuclear weapons unless the Soviets used them first. 

(He said he told no one, including former National 

Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy and former U.S. 

President John F. Kennedy, because he didn’t want to 

be thought of as weak, which in itself says quite a lot.) 

Whether there was actually any deterrence is problematic. If the Soviets weren’t going to attack Western 

Europe anyhow, there was nothing to deter. Still, in 
116

this and other situations, the bomb owners saw (and 

see) it differently than outside observers.

The participants in the Cuban Missile Crisis 

thought that we came close to nuclear war, and subsequent disclosures about the presence of Soviet battlefield nuclear weapons only underlined that conclusion. The possibilities for disastrous mistakes were 

considerable, as top officials did not have the degree 

of control they thought they had. In the 1990s, in an 

interval between sessions of an international meeting, 

I happened to be standing with two or three others 

to whom former Secretary McNamara was explaining 

how dangerous the situation was on a particular Saturday. One of those present had been in SAC’s Omaha 

“tank,” and proceeded to tell a stunned McNamara 

what really went on there on that day. It was the first 

he had heard about it.

There is no question that nuclear weapons confer 

status, both to the countries possessing them, and to 

the individuals directly involved with them. It’s no accident that the five permanent members of the United 

Nations Security Council are nuclear-armed. Whether 

the bomb actually does them any good beyond that 

status at this point is doubtful. However, none of 

them is in any hurry to give it up. Even the Socialists 

in France and the Laborites in Britain, who when out 

of power talked of giving up nuclear weapons, quickly 

changed their mind when they gained power. In addition, bureaucratic prestige is undoubtedly a factor in 

keeping our land-based missiles still on alert.

India and Pakistan are, if anything, increasing 

their stockpiles. India has plans to outfit submarines 

with strategic missiles. Israel, too, would presumably 

insist its nuclear weapons were useful, that is, if they 

ever admitted they had them. North Korea now brags 
117

about its nuclear bombs. And, of course, the Obama 

administration is committing hundreds of billions to 

upgrade its nuclear weapons complex.4 So whatever 

we may think of the nuclear weapons situation, and 

the seeming uselessness of it all—which could also be 

said of most military expenditures—the owners are 

not about to take advice from interfering academic 

onlookers. 

HAVE THOSE WHO HAVE GIVEN UP THE 

BOMB REGRETTED IT?

In support of the unilateral divestment of nuclear 

weapons, the claim is made that countries that have 

given up the weapons have not suffered for it and do 

not regret it. A respectable argument can certainly 

be made for giving up nuclear weapons.5 However, 

the experience of countries that have done so is not 

of much relevance. In reality, only South Africa gave 

them up, and it only had a few warheads of rudimentary design that weren’t of much use in South Africa’s 

military situation—that is, the situation of the former 

white-only government. The elimination of the weapons took place in unique circumstances—moving 

from a white to black government—and was a condition for joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 

(NPT) and good standing in the world community. It 

is doubtful that the other countries sometimes listed in 

the former nuclear weapon state category—the former 

Soviet republics on whose territory nuclear weapons 

remained after the breakup of the Soviet Union—were 

ever really nuclear states. It’s true they relinquished 

the weapons on their soil, or were bribed to do so, but 

it does not appear that they ever had the ability to use 

them. 
118

HAVE NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS CAUSED 

GREAT HARM?

The Nonproliferation Efforts up to 1974.

Which brings us to the efforts, since the bomb’s 

invention, to keep it within few hands (so-called nonproliferation) and the issue of whether these efforts, 

especially recent ones, have been on balance harmful. 

A brief examination of the history of attempts at international nuclear controls shows this is not a sustainable proposition. The fact is, they have not been potent 

enough to be harmful. Rather, we have suffered from 

the lack of adequate international protection against 

militarizing nuclear energy.

The starting point in the effort to control what 

was then called the atom was the U.S. proposal based 

on the 1946 Acheson-Lilienthal Report6 for the international development of nuclear energy. The central 

idea was international ownership of what the report 

called dangerous nuclear facilities. The report grasped 

the essential problem of the dual potential of nuclear 

energy, but was unfortunately deeply flawed in its 

specific proposals.7 In any case, the U.S. proposal 

had no chance of acceptance by Stalin’s Soviet Union, 

and indeed went nowhere. The United States then 

did its best to maintain tight security over nuclear 

technology.

Once the Soviets and the British exploded bombs, 

we changed course. Former U.S. President Eisenhower launched Atoms for Peace, which amounted to a 

huge giveaway of nuclear technology to gain political 

advantage and to create a market for U.S. commercial 

nuclear reactors and fuel under minimal international 

controls.8 In fact, President Eisenhower explained 
119

that initially no “onerous” controls would be needed 

because the exported facilities would be too small to 

worry about. We sponsored the creation of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), principally 

as a distributor of our largesse. The Agency included 

an inspectorate whose real function was to provide 

a patina of legitimacy to international nuclear trade, 

the underlying notion being to avoid any need for our 

own inspection of customers and any resentment that 

might provoke. It was not a serious inspection system, 

rather more a matter of inspectors making friendly 

visits to their colleagues in the field. 

President Kennedy took the spread of nuclear 

weapons more seriously. Among other things, he 

pressed Israel to allow inspection of its French-supplied Dimona facility, already suspected of being a 

weapons facility.9 Kennedy’s observation that there 

could soon be a couple of dozen nuclear states is often described, in view of the present nine, as an example of undue alarm.10 It was not a prediction; it was 

a warning, which led to a number of steps that slowed 

the spread of the bomb, starting with the 1968 NPT. 

The draft treaty started out as an effort by states 

without nuclear weapons to protect themselves by 

mutually agreeing not to obtain them. In the lengthy 

negotiations, however, other features were added 

that changed its character, most particularly a promise, summed up in the oft-quoted phrase “inalienable 

right,” to access nuclear technology on a non-discriminatory basis, so long as they were subject to IAEA 

inspections. As the treaty was then interpreted, this 

included uranium enrichment and separation of plutonium, the technologies that offer access to nuclear 

explosives. The treaty barred countries beyond the 

original five weapons states from getting bombs, but 
120

had no explicit limits on how close such a country 

could come to a bomb without violating the treaty. 

Former U.S. President Richard Nixon, while cool 

to the treaty that had been signed by his predecessor, 

U.S. President Lyndon Johnson, nevertheless sent it to 

the Senate for ratification after deciding that it did not 

in any way reduce his freedom of action with respect 

to U.S. nuclear weapons. Most notably, that included 

sharing them with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). He gave instructions to his administration’s officials that they were not to press countries to 

sign, especially West Germany. The country did sign, 

as did Japan, and ultimately nearly all countries—but 

that was later.

The first test of U.S. application of the treaty came 

in 1969, immediately after ratification. The United 

States had been aware that Israel had been conducting a secret nuclear weapons program since the 1950s. 

It already had built some nuclear weapons, although 

the United States was not sure about this. The U.S. Departments of State and Defense wanted to withhold 

the advanced F-4 aircraft Israel wanted in return for 

restrictions on Israel’s manufacture of nuclear weapons, a position that carried over from the Johnson 

administration.11 Former U.S. National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger was still hoping to get Israel’s 

signature on the NPT. His cynical—but not entirely 

wrong—observation was that this would be worthwhile, even though he expected Israel to maintain a 

clandestine weapons program, because it would be a 

smaller one than otherwise. The Department of State 

offered to come up with a favorable legal opinion on 

treaty compliance if Israel would stay a screwdriver 

turn away. However, when it came to President 

Nixon’s September 1969 meeting with Israel’s prime 
121

minister, Golda Meir, none of this mattered. He let 

it all go. What he mainly cared about was that Israel 

would support him in the Cold War, and especially 

in Vietnam. Since it served neither party’s interests 

to publicize them, Israeli nuclear weapons became a 

non-subject in the U.S. Government, and the NPT was 

relegated to its place off to the side.

It’s worth remembering that during those years, 

nonproliferation was regarded in the foreign policy 

and defense establishments as a kind of side show 

handled by intellectual officials who were not considered weighty enough or tough enough to perform 

in the main ring—the Cold War. (To jump ahead, it 

was only after the demise of the Soviet Union that the 

U.S. Department of Defense, desperately searching for 

budget justifications, acquired more respect for nonproliferation, or rather counter-proliferation, which is 

its more expensive cousin.)

The Nonproliferation Efforts Post-1974.

There was considerable consternation after the 

1974 Indian bomb test, which turned out to be a pivotal event in U.S. nonproliferation policy.12 It became 

evident to all that a country with access to reprocessing, and thus plutonium, could easily produce nuclear 

bombs. Once a country had ready access to nuclear 

explosives—HEU and plutonium—IAEA inspections 

(optimistically labeled “safeguards”) could no longer 

be relied upon to provide warning of a shift to weapons. To prevent easy access to nuclear weapons there 

needed to be restrictions on the technologies that produced these explosives—enrichment and reprocessing. At the initiative of the United States, the main 

nuclear technology exporters formed the Nuclear 
122

Suppliers Group (NSG) in 1975 to put some brakes on 

such exports.

At first, the arrangement functioned sub rosa because on the face of it, it is at odds with the extravagant interpretation of the “inalienable right” language 

in the NPT, and the United States and other exporters 

shied away from taking on the argument. In fact, the 

opposite is true. Only with some technological controls could the IAEA inspections provide the “safeguard” protection that the treaty requires.

In this post-Indian bomb phase, the United States 

succeeded in preventing several reprocessing exports 

from Europe to Asian countries. In 1976, former U.S. 

President Gerald Ford announced that the United 

States would abide by the same nonproliferation restrictions that it asked others to abide by. It would 

not plan on the use of plutonium fuel and would not 

conduct civilian reprocessing. The nuclear energy 

community saw this, and still professes to see this, as 

a limitation on the application of nuclear power. In 

reality, reprocessing to produce plutonium fuel for 

current nuclear power plants is grossly uneconomic. 

Therefore, while avoiding wasteful expenditure was 

not the prime intention, the restriction on reprocessing saved the United States and other countries a great 

deal of money. To jump ahead, the same is true of restrictions on enrichment—these have hurt the vanity 

of some countries, but not their pocketbooks, or their 

carbon dioxide emissions. There were never any bars 

to any NPT member country importing nuclear power reactors. Quite to the contrary, the suppliers beat 

the drums for reactor sales. What held back nuclear 

power, and still holds it back, was the inability of the 

industry to turn out an economic product that met 

safety requirements. The proposition that internation-
123

al nonproliferation policies hobbled the development 

of nuclear power is therefore entirely untenable. 

India’s 1974 bomb had other delayed consequences. It became widely known that India produced the 

plutonium for its bomb in facilities that, although not 

internationally inspected, were covered by peaceful 

use pledges to Canada and the United States. India 

tried to explain this away by saying its bomb was 

peaceful.13 It was too much for Congress to swallow. It 

became an important impetus for passage of the 1978 

Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act (NNPA), which imposed nonproliferation conditions for nuclear exports, 

among them that the importer accepts IAEA inspections on all its nuclear facilities. 

HAS NONPROLIFERATION CAUSED 

LOSS OF LIFE?

John Mueller makes the claim that nonproliferation 

policy caused more deaths than the Hiroshima and 

Nagasaki explosions, by which he is referring to the 

2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. He is right about the effect 

of the 2003 invasion, but it would be a considerable 

stretch to count the invasion in the nonproliferation 

column. In an oft-cited 2003 Vanity Fair interview with 

former U.S. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz, he cites eliminating “weapons of mass destruction 

[WMD],” not as the real reason for the U.S. invasion, 

but as the politically convenient reason.14 It was, as we 

have learned, an outright lie that the Bush administration had significant evidence pointing to Iraqi nuclear 

weapons.15 In any case, the invasion was named Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, which points in a different 

direction—one relating to control of the Middle East. 
124

A related question is whether nonproliferationinspired Iraqi sanctions in the decade preceding the 

2003 invasion resulted in the deaths of large numbers 

of Iraqis, especially children. That there were many 

deaths as a consequence does not seem to be at issue, 

although there is not agreement on the numbers. In a 

famous 1996 CBS interview, Lesley Stahl asked thenU.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright about the 

effect of U.S. sanctions against Iraq: “We have heard 

that a half million children have died. I mean, that’s 

more children than died in Hiroshima. And, you 

know, is the price worth it?” Madeleine Albright’s 

chilling reply was “I think this is a very hard choice, 

but the price—we think the price is worth it.”16 Again, 

there is no denying the consequences. The question is 

whether they had much to do with nonproliferation, 

or were they simply part of an effort to hem in thenIraqi President Saddam Hussein.

Mueller raises the same point with respect to sanctions against North Korea. Here, if anything, the reasons for sanctions are even more complex than in the 

case of Iraq, as is the relationship of the sanctions to the 

misery of the non-privileged population.17 It should 

be remembered that the initial reaction of the Clinton 

administration to North Korea’s refusal in 1992 of key 

IAEA inspections (and therefore of the NPT) was to 

make the country an extraordinarily generous offer, 

which after the conclusion of negotiations in 1994 was 

known as the Agreed Framework. The North Koreans agreed to shut down their small plutonium production reactor and stop building two larger but still 

relatively small reactors; the United States agreed to 

shield them from their NPT violation by getting the 

IAEA to agree to postpone the disputed inspections. 

In the meantime North Korea would receive (from 
125

South Korea and Japan), two large light water reactors 

worth about $5 billion. In addition, the North received 

a large supply of oil. The deal did not make sense, and 

fell apart when it became obvious that North Korea 

was not keeping to its terms.18 However, the point for 

our purposes here is that U.S. nonproliferation policy 

in this instance could not have been more generous.

WHAT DOES CURRENT U.S. 

NONPROLIFERATION POLICY REALLY 

AMOUNT TO? 

U.S. nonproliferation policy is far from the strict 

system (let alone overly strict system) that it is made 

out to be by the nuclear community in its frequent 

complaints. There are two aspects to it: the first is the 

broad effort conducted mainly at mid-levels in the 

Department of State, working through the IAEA and 

other agencies, and ostensibly based on the NPT; the 

second, in many ways the more important, is conducted from the top and deals with Iran and, to a limited 

extent, with North Korea.19

The broad international effort deliberately takes an 

incremental and non-confrontational approach to the 

problem—working to get others to agree to voluntary 

improvements in the application of IAEA safeguards, 

for example, or details of export procedures. The officials involved are the ones who go to the IAEA’s conferences and meet with corresponding representatives 

from other supplier states. In practice, their activities 

amount to nibbling at the issues; and even then, they 

are subject to the condition that they not disturb the 

promotion of nuclear power and especially the possibility of U.S. sales of nuclear power plants. 
126

In this, the Obama administration has outpaced the 

footsteps of its predecessors. However, it is not widely 

known that this administration has created a “Team 

USA,” composed of officials from the Departments 

of State, Energy, and Commerce, to promote nuclear 

power abroad. In addition, there is a designated official on the National Security Council staff to shepherd 

the effort. It’s no wonder that when Congress takes 

up the nuclear export agreements with potential customers, the Department of State invariably testifies in 

favor of laxer conditions.20

To maintain friendly and especially non-confrontational relations with potential customers, the Department of State has gone along with a watering down of 

the NPT’s objectives by describing the treaty as resting 

on three pillars, only one of which is nonproliferation. 

The others are nuclear disarmament and, most importantly, the development of nuclear energy. Moreover, 

it is said that progress on any of the three depends 

on progress of the other two. In practical terms, it 

means that the offices charged with trying to rein in 

proliferation are therefore committed to supporting 

the expanded worldwide use of nuclear energy, and 

in doing so when we admittedly still do not have a 

satisfactory way of ensuring that it will not be put to 

military use.

The diplomats busy themselves with inoffensive 

solutions, however impractical; the best example being fuel banks, which have become a standard “solution” to the problems posed by national enrichment 

facilities. It is unlikely that top-level people understand that a fuel bank makes no economic or engineering sense at all, but it sounds good, and so has become 

entrenched in nuclear proliferation boilerplate.21
127

Another way in which nonproliferation has been 

soft-pedaled is by the current shift in emphasis to 

combating nuclear terrorism by nonstate actors as opposed to nuclear weapons development by established 

states. The diplomatic aspects of combatting terrorism 

are relatively easy—everyone is against it so one can 

organize security summits in total agreement.22 That 

agreement would be more difficult to obtain if we 

were talking about the necessary restrictions on the 

use of nuclear energy to keep it from spilling over into 

military applications.

The dilution of the effort to stop the proliferation 

of nuclear weapons is further effected by the nowstandard inclusion of it in the broader category of the 

proliferation of WMDs, which include biological and 

chemical weapons.23 Neither of the latter two is remotely as significant as nuclear weapons, but including them blurs the focus on nuclear weapons.

The second aspect of U.S. nonproliferation policy, 

the one that the president and top officials do take 

seriously, has to do with mainly constraining Iran’s 

potential nuclear weapons capabilities. The enmity 

between the United States and Iran goes back to the 

1979 Islamic Revolution and the deposing of the Shah. 

Iran’s nuclear program, and an interest in nuclear 

weapons, also goes back to the time of the Shah.24 The 

current U.S. concern about Iran’s nuclear capabilities has several elements. There is the obvious worry 

about Iran’s intentions in developing uranium enrichment technology that could give it ready access to 

large quantities of HEU, should it decide to develop 

nuclear weapons. However, other countries have comparable capabilities without drawing the same level of 

concern. It is difficult to justify—under the NPT, as it 

has been interpreted for decades—a separate standard 
128

for Iran than that applied to other NPT members. The 

concern over Iran’s nuclear capabilities is inextricably 

tied to fear of the political shadow such capabilities, 

even if not militarized, may cast over the Middle East 

and the influence Iran may derive from it. 

A clearer way to view what is going on in the negotiations over Iran’s nuclear program is to see it as a 

struggle by the United States and Israel to maintain Israel’s nuclear weapons monopoly in the Middle East. 

If anything sums up the major themes of U.S. nonproliferation policy, it would be protecting against the 

possibility of nuclear terrorism and protecting Israel’s 

nuclear weapons. The United States has gone so far as 

to cooperate with Israel in physically sabotaging Iran’s 

uranium enrichment activities.25 Which is more than a 

little odd, as it puts the United States in cooperation 

with a country that resists the NPT norm to enforce 

NPT discipline on an NPT member suspected of harboring intentions at odds with its treaty obligations. 

We never went this far before, but there is a long 

history to U.S. protection for Israel’s putatively secret 

nuclear weapons, a policy supported even by U.S. politicians who otherwise take a strong stand on nonproliferation. 26 The U.S. president still feigns ignorance 

about Israel’s nuclear weapons, and the subject is offlimits even within the government, as it has been since 

the Nixon administration. It is not off-limits in the rest 

of the world and we pay heavily in terms of international credibility when it comes to nonproliferation. 

In 2010, the NPT Review Conference unanimously approved a final statement and called for a conference 

on WMDs in the Middle East, to take place in 2012. 

Immediately after the vote, to which the U.S. representative agreed, President Obama trashed the notion 

of such a conference. It has still not taken place. No 

one is fooled.
129

WHERE DOES THIS LEAVE US?

Faced with a history of ineffective and hypocritical 

nonproliferation policy, should we just let it all go? It 

turns out there are things worse than fecklessness and 

hypocrisy.27

The original, perhaps simplistic, logic behind nonproliferation was that as the number of nuclear weapons states increases, the number of strategic relationships among them increases much faster, and it will 

become extremely difficult to keep the weapons from 

being used. Henry Kissinger recently reiterated his 

belief in the validity of this view:

If one imagines a world of tens of nations with nuclear 

weapons and major powers trying to balance their 

own deterrent equations, plus the deterrent equations 

of the subsystems, deterrence calculation would become impossibly complicated. To assume that, in such 

a world, nuclear catastrophe could be avoided would 

be unrealistic.28

It would be nice to think that this paints an overly pessimistic picture that, faced with the potentially awful 

consequences of the spread of nuclear weapons and 

remembering the awfulness of the large wars fought 

in the last century, people and leaders would keep 

far away from any possibility of nuclear war. However, those views conflict with history. The horrors 

of World War I did not prevent World War II from 

happening 20 years later. The lessons of Vietnam did 

not prevent our repeating the experience in Iraq and 

Afghanistan. Wars and aggression are intertwined 

with domestic politics, and politicians, no matter how 

bright, have little time or inclination to understand the 
130

issues.29 That is even truer when there is a technical 

component, or when the consequences are likely to 

be delayed, a state of affairs that is ever-present when 

dealing with nuclear issues. It is well to recall that former President Eisenhower’s Atom for Peace program 

of the 1950s set much of the configuration of presentday nuclear programs around the world. Soon after he 

announced it, former Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov 

asked former U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles 

why the United States wanted to spread nuclear weapons capabilities through the program. Dulles had no 

idea what Molotov was talking about, and when he 

returned to Washington he asked his assistant Gerard 

Smith to confirm that Molotov was talking nonsense. 

Smith had to explain to the astonished Dulles that Molotov had a point. We should not assume that today’s 

top-level politicians around the world are brighter or 

wiser than their predecessors. Moreover, in crises all 

bets are off.

Insofar as nuclear energy programs are concerned, 

the only thing that makes sense from a security point 

of view is to seek a healthy margin between nuclear 

energy activities and any possible military applications, and to maintain as best we can the taboo on 

nuclear weapon use. As tattered as it is, the NPT is 

all that we have as a rallying banner. In the end, this 

will work only if we all agree on common standards. 

Holding back the spread of the bomb—and, in fact, 

rolling back the bomb—remain important objectives. 

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 4

1. See John Mueller, “‘At All Costs’: The Destructive Consequences of Anti-Proliferation Policy,” in this volume. 
131

2. Annie Jacobsen, Area 51: An Uncensored History of America’s Top Secret Military Base, New York: Little, Brown and 

Company, 2011.

3. I recall a 1964 briefing at the Lawrence Livermore National 

Laboratory, in Livermore, CA, by the then-Director of the Livermore Lab on “civilian” use of the bomb—Project Plowshare. He 

explained that the real reason for pursuing such projects was to 

get the U.S. public used to nuclear explosions so that in wartime 

the president will release their use.

4. See William J. Broad and David E. Sanger, “U.S. Ramping 

Up Major Renewal in Nuclear Arms,” The New York Times, September 21, 2014. There is a delicious irony in this being ordered by 

a Nobel Peace Prize Laureate.

5. See, especially, Paul Nitze, “A Threat Mostly to Ourselves,” 

The New York Times, October 28, 1999. Nitze wrote:

The fact is, I see no compelling reason why we should not 

unilaterally [emphasis added] get rid of our nuclear weapons. To maintain them is costly and adds nothing to our 

security. I can think of no circumstances under which it 

would be wise for the United States to use nuclear weapons, 

even in retaliation for their prior use against us. What, for 

example, would our targets be? It is impossible to conceive 

of a target that could be hit without large-scale destruction 

of many innocent people.

I have to say I cannot think of any such circumstances, either.

6. David E. Lilienthal et al., Report on the International Control of Atomic Energy, report prepared for the Secretary of State’s 

Committee on Atomic Energy, U.S. Department of the State Publication 2498, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 

March, 16, 1946. This report is known as the Acheson-Lilienthal Report for the names of the committee and consultant chairpersons 

Dean Acheson and Lilienthal. 

7. Ibid., for example, it was based on the notion that moderately irradiated plutonium cannot be used for bombs and was thus 

in the “safe” category, which is false, and in fact was known to be 

false at the time. 
132

8. The second largest group of participating scientists and

engineers (after Britain) came from India. 

9. Under Atoms for Peace, the United States had donated a 

small research reactor to Israel and signed a peaceful uses agreement. The U.S.-supplied facility proved a useful vehicle for educating Israel’s nuclear weapons scientists.

10. “The Third Kennedy-Nixon Presidential Debate,” October 13, 1960, debate transcript archived with the Commission 

on Presidential Debates, available from www.debates.org/index.

php?page=october-13-1960-debate-transcript.

There are indications because of new inventions, that 10, 15, 

or 20 nations will have a nuclear capacity, including Red 

China, by the end of the Presidential office in 1964. This is 

extremely serious. . . I think the fate not only of our own 

civilization, but I think the fate of world and the future of 

the human race, is involved in preventing a nuclear war.

11. Just before he left office, then-U.S. President Lyndon Johnson had overridden the U.S. Departments of State and Defense to 

permit the F-4 aircraft sale. However, in allowing it the Department of Defense wrote in conditions that in effect left the final 

decision to the Nixon administration. 

12. The immediate Nixon administration reaction was rather 

different. In a cable from the Middle East, then-U.S. Secretary 

of State Henry Kissinger warned his surprised staff against any 

strong reaction. He was apparently in the process of putting together a nuclear deal of his own that he did not want upset. See 

Office of the Historian, Paul J. Hibbeln and Peter A. Kraemer, 

eds., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Volume E-8, 

Documents on South Asia, 1973-1976, Document 162, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007, available from 

https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/e8/96787.htm.

13. This was a flagrant disregard by India of the obvious 

meaning of the peaceful uses pledges. However, it is also true that 

the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission had provided some footing 

for this argument by supporting Project Plowshare to develop 

peaceful nuclear explosions (PNEs), mainly as a way of putting 
133

a friendly face on the commission’s nuclear weapons activities. 

The project was initiated in 1961 and not terminated until 1977. 

The international publicity in favor of PNEs led to the inclusion 

of article 5 in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) covering the provision of such services internationally. It has become a 

dead letter, but it caused considerable damage to nonproliferation 

along the way. 

14. “U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Interview with Sam Tannenhaus,” Vanity Fair, May 9, 2003, transcript available from www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.

aspx?transcriptid=2594.

15. A few days after the start of the March 2003 invasion, I 

found myself at a security conference held at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, in Livermore, CA, seated next to the 

visibly nervous director of the Central Intelligence Agency’s 

Weapons Intelligence, Nonproliferation, and Arms Control Center. He said if the invading force does not find any evidence of 

nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, he is going to lose his 

job. But, he said hopefully, he was sure they will find something 

in a desk drawer in Baghdad. It does not seem we had much evidence going in, or that this could have been the real reason for 

doing so. The man left his job soon after.

16. “U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Interview 

with Lesley Stahl,” 60 Minutes, originally aired May 12, 1996. Albright later said what she said was stupid, which of course it was, 

as it played badly.

17. In a strange twist, when the Clinton administration hoped 

to make headway with North Korea, the ever-enthusiastic Secretary Albright showed up in Pyongyang at an October 22, 2000, 

celebration for Kim Jong-il, and put on an embarrassingly gushing performance. See Jane Perlez, “Albright Greeted with a Fanfare by North Korea,” New York Times, October 24, 2000.

18. Aside from the questionable aspect of rewarding flagrant 

violation of the NPT, in effect submitting to blackmail, the arrangement made no sense from a technical point of view: the reactors were much too large for the North Korean grid, which could 

not sustain the power loss from disconnecting one of the large 
134

reactors. In addition, the grid was too small to protect the reactors 

from a safety point of view. Ironically, the plutonium production 

capacity of the two proposed reactors was larger than that of all 

the reactors that the North Koreans were supposed to shut down.

19. Doing essentially nothing about North Korea has 

now been dressed up in U.S. Department of State language as 

“strategic patience.”

20. The epitome of all lax agreements is the one negotiated 

with India and finalized in 2008. The 1998 U.S.–India Civil Nuclear Agreement, which was signed into U.S. law on October 8, 

2008, as the United States-India Nuclear Cooperation Approval 

and Nonproliferation Enhancement Act. India opposed the NPT 

from the beginning. India refused comprehensive International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections of its nuclear facilities 

and so was barred, by the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines, from receiving nuclear exports. This is the group whose 

formation we initiated after the 1974 Indian bomb. In the hope 

of gaining a large amount of nuclear business, the Bush administration waived the export restrictions of the 1978 Nuclear NonProliferation Act (NNPA) that were put in place in response to the 

1974 Indian bomb and pressured the NSG to waive its guidelines. 

The Bush administration thereby punched a hole in the NPT. 

Presently, there has yet to be any nuclear business for the United 

States. The Obama administration later fully supported this policy 

toward India’s nuclear activities. 

21. See, for example, an op-ed by Nuclear Threat Initiative 

co-chairman, and former senator, Sam Nunn, “Open a Nuclear 

Fuel Bank,” New York Times, July 11, 2014. There is a competitive 

market in fuel. The best guarantee of a fuel supply is a commercial 

contract. It’s easy to create one’s own stockpile of enriched uranium. A bank for manufactured fuel is impractical because there 

are many types of fuel assemblies, with different levels of enrichment, and it would be effectively impossible to stock them all.

22. The purveyors of nuclear terrorism threats have managed 

to spook top leaders by greatly exaggerating the possibilities. 

Accounts tell of this fear greatly affecting former U.S. President 

George W. Bush after he went through a nuclear bomb scare involving New York and Washington, and U.S. President Obama 

seems equally seized with the issue. 
135

23. To take things to an absurd degree, see the legal definition 

of a weapon of mass destruction (WMD), which includes explosive charges as small as one-quarter ounce [sic]. See, Definitions, 

18 U.S.C. § 921 (a)(4)(A)(iv).

24. Many of Iran’s nuclear scientists and engineers under 

the Shah, some of whom are still working in Iran, were trained 

at Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) under a special 

program specifically for Iran. 

25. Israel went beyond that to assassinate Iranian scientists, 

without any admonition from the United States.

26. Former U.S. President Jimmy Carter’s White House was 

famous for its emphasis on nonproliferation, but hid the fact of 

Israel’s 1979 nuclear test in the seas south of Africa, that was carried out in violation of the Limited Test Ban, to which Israel was 

a party. During the previous administration, I recall a 1976 dinner 

honoring Fred Iklé, then-head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Then-Senator Stuart Symington, the sponsor of the 

1976 Symington Amendment (that banned U.S. aid to countries 

that deal in nuclear enrichment technology without complying 

with IAEA inspections) spoke about the importance of nonproliferation and praised Iklé for his commitment to it. When he sat 

down, I asked the senator what he thought about nuclear weapons in Israel. He immediately replied: They have to have them, 

I’ve been telling Moshe Dayan that for years. 

27. In Chapter 1 of this volume, “Getting Past Nonproliferation,” Harvey M. Sopolsky takes a different approach. Whereas 

Mueller decries the U.S. nonproliferation policy because he thinks 

nuclear weapons do not matter, Sopolsky opposes it because he 

thinks nuclear weapons do matter. He sees nonproliferation as 

of a piece with “extended deterrence”—U.S. nuclear guarantees 

to our allies—which he does not like at all. Better, he says, to 

let them get their own nuclear weapons. However, what if this 

abandonment of nonproliferation leads to nuclear weapons in the 

hands not only of friends, but also of enemies and nonstate actors, 

including those in the Middle East? Sopolsky’s less-than-convincing answer is that “deterrence and forensics work.” In other 

words, enemy states will fear to attack the United States. Moreover, if they contemplate the risky course of handing bombs to 
136

nonstate groups who would use them against the United States, 

they would again be deterred from doing so because “the links 

are sure to be revealed.” In a way, Sopolsky is saying that if we 

just abandon nonproliferation, in fact if we encourage the opposite, we will not have to worry about nuclear weapons in the rest 

of the world. Let us just say it is a provocative argument. 

28. Henry Kissinger, “Foreword,” in Graham Allison et al. 

“Nuclear Proliferation: Risk and Responsibility,” Triangle Paper, 

Book 60, Washington, DC: Trilateral Commission, 2006, p. v.

29. In a 1968 talk at the RAND Corporation in Santa Monica, 

CA before former U.S. Secretary of State Kissinger assumed his 

role in the Nixon administration, he said, “never underestimate 

the superficiality of important people.” 
137

CHAPTER 5

THE NEXT NUCLEAR WAR

Matthew Kroenig and Rebecca Davis Gibbons1

Since the United States dropped atomic bombs on 

Japan at the close of World War II, world leaders have 

had the wisdom to avoid another nuclear war. Humanity witnessed the terrifyingly destructive power 

of nuclear weapons at Hiroshima and Nagasaki and 

vowed never to repeat the mistake. The Cold War 

superpowers set up effective international systems 

to control the spread of nuclear technology and prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional countries. While there are a handful of states 

that possess nuclear weapons today, none of them 

are run by leaders who are so irrational or suicidal 

as to intentionally launch a nuclear attack. Moreover, 

these countries have put in place prudent policies and 

technologies to prevent an accidental or unauthorized 

nuclear launch. The upshot of these developments is 

that nuclear weapons have not been used in 70 years 

and we have little reason to fear that they will ever be 

used again.

This line of thinking is certainly comforting, but 

is it correct? The fact is that nuclear weapons and 

international conflict continue to exist. The number 

of nuclear-armed states has slowly grown over time 

and, outside of the United States and Europe, nuclear powers are increasing the size and sophistication 

of their nuclear arsenals, as well as their reliance on 

nuclear weapons in military doctrine and strategy. 

Indeed, recent years have seen an increase in overt 

nuclear threats by some leaders. Political tensions 

remain among nuclear powers and in many regions 
138

of the world, and these conflicts are becoming more 

intense. In addition, poorly safeguarded nuclear material around the globe could find its way to extremist 

organizations that could use nuclear weapons as an 

instrument of terror. While the risk of nuclear war on 

any given day is low, it is not zero. Moreover, this risk 

must be multiplied across many nuclear-armed actors 

and international conflicts for years to come. In sum, 

there is a frighteningly real risk that humanity has not 

witnessed its last nuclear war.

This article will examine the prospects for the next 

nuclear war. It will begin by defining our key concept: 

nuclear use. Next, it will review the first and only instance of nuclear use, the dropping of atomic bombs 

on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in World War II, to assess whether the pathway to the first and only existing 

case of nuclear use might be repeated. It then articulates the theoretical processes that could give rise to 

nuclear war as identified in the international relations 

and nuclear deterrence literatures. Next, in order to 

identify the flashpoints that could result in the next 

nuclear exchange, it examines the most salient geopolitical rivalries between nuclear-armed actors in 

the world today. Finally, it offers concluding remarks 

regarding the steps world leaders can take to prevent 

future nuclear wars. 

DEFINING NUCLEAR USE

We begin by defining a key term: nuclear use. 

We define nuclear use as the detonation of a nuclear 

weapon against an enemy target. Some Department 

of Defense officials declare: “Nuclear weapons are 

used every day,” to emphasize that nuclear weapons 

play an important and enduring role in maintaining 

strategic deterrence and keeping the peace.2 Simi-
139

larly, scholars have explored the deterrent, coercive, 

and symbolic effects of nuclear weapons.3 We do not 

mean nuclear use in this sense. We also exclude from 

our definition nuclear tests or nuclear demonstration 

shots that could be used for political effect, but that 

do not result in death or destruction. Rather, for the 

purposes of this chapter, nuclear use is defined as a 

nuclear attack resulting in physical damage of enemy 

targets.

NUCLEAR USE IN WORLD WAR II

When considering the next use of nuclear weapons, the most logical place to begin is the last and only 

instance of nuclear use, the U.S. atomic bombing of Japan at the end of World War II. Understanding former 

U.S. President Harry Truman’s decision to employ 

nuclear weapons in warfare may shed some light on 

why leaders might consider nuclear use in the future. 

On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped an 

atomic bomb on Hiroshima; and, 3 days later, on August 9, a second weapon was used against Nagasaki. 

More than 70 years after the event, historians continue to debate the motivations behind Truman’s decision.4

 According to the traditional account, the United 

States used nuclear weapons to quickly conclude the 

war in the Pacific and save the lives of many American troops (and Japanese soldiers and civilians) that 

would have been lost if Washington had pursued the 

alternative route of a ground invasion of the Japanese 

islands. According to a more recent revisionist view, 

the nuclear weapons were not in fact necessary to 

force a Japanese surrender because Tokyo was nearly 

ready to capitulate and the Soviet Union’s impending 

entrance into the Pacific War would have been more 

than enough to force Japan to concede defeat.5 Rather, 
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according to this perspective, Truman’s use of nuclear 

weapons was aimed not at Tokyo, but at Moscow. By 

using nuclear weapons, Truman was able to end the 

war quickly enough to prevent Soviet forces from occupying large portions of East Asia, and to demonstrate America’s awesome new military capability to 

its future Cold War rival. 

Our purpose here is not to adjudicate between 

these interpretations, nor to improve upon the existing debate, but rather to ask what this historical event 

might tell us about future nuclear use. If Truman were 

motivated to end a costly conventional war quickly, 

as the traditional account would have us believe, then 

there is reason to suspect that such processes could 

reoccur. Desperate times call for desperate measures, 

and it is conceivable that a nuclear-armed state could 

be tempted to use nuclear weapons in a future attempt 

to staunch the bloodletting from a drawn-out conventional conflict. Indeed, as we will see below, some 

states in the world today actively plan to use nuclear 

weapons early in warfare as a way to offset the conventional superiority of potential adversaries. 

It is also possible that states will use nuclear 

weapons in the future in order to demonstrate their 

capabilities to potential adversaries. If Hiroshima and 

Nagasaki were primarily about revealing a revolutionary new military capability, then this case is less 

instructive as no adversary is likely to need that message again. After all, Hiroshima and Nagasaki, along 

with the hundreds of nuclear tests that followed their 

bombing, provided sufficient proof of concept. In this 

way, the first nuclear use may have been idiosyncratic 

because it was the first. 

If, however, Hiroshima and Nagasaki can be interpreted as a warning shot to a potential future enemy 

about possessing both the ability and the will to go 
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nuclear, then it may be more relevant. It is possible 

that future decisions to use nuclear weapons could 

include a consideration of secondary and tertiary effects, such as demonstrating resolve to other states or 

deterring or otherwise precluding other parties from 

intervening in an ongoing conflict. 

One must be cautious, however, about extrapolating from a single data point; this single episode, no 

matter how important, cannot be the only input into 

our study on the future of nuclear use. To broaden our 

perspective, therefore, we next turn to theory. 

THEORIES OF NUCLEAR USE

International relations scholars and nuclear deterrence theorists have identified several possible processes by which nuclear war could occur. The most 

prominent of these scenarios are reviewed here, including: irrational nuclear use, accidental nuclear use, 

inadvertent nuclear use, catalytic nuclear war, nuclear 

use against non-nuclear opponents, splendid first 

strike, use ‘em or lose ‘em, brinkmanship, and limited 

nuclear use.

Irrational Nuclear Use.

The first potential cause of nuclear use is irrationality. In practice, irrational nuclear use means a leader is 

using nuclear weapons in pursuit of goals that are so 

vastly different from our own as to be utterly unrecognizable. Political scientists tend to assume that states 

are unified rational actors that value their continued 

existence above all else, but this is a simplifying assumption, not a description of the world in which we 

actually live.6 Historically, there have been rare leaders who have been willing to destroy their own states 
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in the pursuit of broader ideological goals, including 

Adolf Hitler in World War II.7 One could similarly 

imagine a leader of a nuclear-armed state on the losing end of a major war deciding that he has nothing 

left to lose and voluntarily choosing to unleash the destructive force of nuclear weapons. For example, if the 

North Korean regime were to collapse, might North 

Korean Supreme Leader Kim Jong-un decide to use 

nuclear weapons, figuring that if he is going down he 

might as well take everyone else with him? 

Alternatively, it is at least conceivable that somewhere, someday, a leader could ascend to power with 

religious, nationalist, racist, or some other extremist 

worldview that causes him to value nuclear destruction over self-preservation. Iran’s clerical establishment, for example, contains a minority of individuals 

who genuinely appear to hold millenarian religious 

beliefs.8 If Iran acquires nuclear weapons and one of 

these leaders comes to have his finger on the nuclear 

trigger, it is at least imaginable that he might try to 

launch an unprovoked nuclear attack in an attempt 

to bring about an apocalypse. Granted, this type of 

nuclear use may be the most far-fetched of those discussed in this chapter, but many international events, 

including the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the recent 

global financial crisis, were virtually unimaginable 

until they happened. 

Accidental Nuclear Use. 

A second type of potential nuclear use can be 

characterized as accidental or unintentional. In 1982, 

the Department of Defense catalogued all previously 

known nuclear accidents from the 1950s to the 1980s.9

The list included the 1982 Titan II crisis in which a 

dropped wrench socket in a nuclear missile silo nearly 
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caused a nuclear explosion, and a number of cases in 

which aircraft carrying nuclear weapons crashed or 

dropped nuclear weapons into the ocean but that fortunately failed to detonate.10

Scott Sagan, in his book The Limits of Safety, catalogs 

a number of near nuclear accidents during the Cold 

War period, including a 1966 midair collision between 

a B-52 bomber and a KC-135 tanker that led to the release of four hydrogen bombs near Palomares, Spain.11

In 1968, a B-52 bomber on airborne alert caught fire 

over Greenland near a U.S. early warning site, causing four one-megaton thermonuclear bombs to hurtle 

toward the ground.12 The current era is not immune 

from nuclear accidents either, as evident from the 2007 

incident in which nuclear weapons were accidentally 

and unknowingly transported from Minot Air Force 

Base in North Dakota to Barksdale Air Force Base in 

Louisiana.13 Other nuclear weapons states have also 

had their share of incidents,14 and newer nuclear 

weapons states may be even more prone to accidents, 

especially as they strive to develop stable command 

and control structures.15 In none of these cases did the 

nuclear warhead detonate; however, we might not be 

so lucky next time.

Inadvertent Nuclear Use.

An inadvertent nuclear use would occur if a nuclear-capable state decided to launch a nuclear war under the incorrect belief that it is already under nuclear 

attack.16 Thomas Schelling provides perhaps the most 

sophisticated theoretical discussion of inadvertent 

nuclear war in his discussion of “reciprocal fear of surprise attack.”17 Schelling argues that when two nuclear adversaries face each other in crisis, each side may 
144

rightly worry that the other side is considering nuclear 

attack. If there is an advantage to striking first, then, 

in these difficult circumstances under intense time 

pressures, a cycle of fear could lead to nuclear war. As 

Schelling writes, “Fear that the other may be about to 

strike in the mistaken belief that we are about to strike 

gives us a motive for striking, and so justifies the other’s 

motive.”18

In the Limits of Safety, Sagan provides several examples of near-inadvertent nuclear war during the 

Cuban Missile Crisis. In one episode, an intruder—

later identified as a bear—led to the sounding of a 

“sabotage alarm,” which set off similar alarms at all 

the bases in the area. At one base, an incorrectly wired 

alarm sent pilots of nuclear-armed fighter aircraft to 

prepare for takeoff before a car raced down the runway 

to stop them.19 Also during the crisis, Vandenberg Air 

Force Base conducted a regularly scheduled ballistic 

missile test that the Soviet Union might have reasonably misread as a nuclear missile launch.20 Finally, at 

the end of the crisis, Moorestown, New Jersey radar 

operators alerted North American Aerospace Defense 

Command (NORAD) that an incoming missile attack 

was underway when a training tape simulating an 

attack was mistakenly run in their system.21

Inadvertent nuclear war nearly occurred again in 

the 1983 Able Archer incident, in which a very realistic 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) military 

exercise during a period of tension led the Soviets to 

worry that the training operation was a cover for war 

preparations. The Soviets put their own nuclear forces 

on alert in response.22 A similar scare occurred in the 

post-Cold War era in January 1995 when a U.S.-Norwegian weather balloon was launched from Norway 

to study the Aurora Borealis. A Russian early warn-
145

ing radar detected this object, leading former Russian 

President Boris Yeltsin to activate his “nuclear keys” 

for the first time. Eventually radars detected that the 

balloon was going out to sea and Russian forces stood 

down.23 Given the frequency with which countries 

have feared themselves to be under nuclear attack in 

the past, it will likely continue to happen in the future, and it is always possible that at least one of them 

could lead to a nuclear response.

Catalytic Nuclear War.

During the early Cold War era, strategists theorized about the possibility of “catalytic nuclear war.” 

They imagined that the United States could be attacked 

with nuclear weapons, and that U.S. leaders would 

assume, quite reasonably, that the Soviet Union had 

been responsible for the attack and decide to strike 

back. Both states would have been vastly weakened 

after absorbing the nuclear exchange, but what if it 

had not been the Soviets, but the Chinese who had initially attacked the United States? In the aftermath, the 

Chinese could emerge as the preeminent power. One 

party initiates the attack, but the attack is attributed 

to another party and the secret attacking state comes 

out of the conflict more powerful than the two victimstates.24 Given today’s more advanced intelligence, 

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, a 

secret attack scenario may seem less plausible, but it 

is at least imaginable that a third party could begin a 

crisis that would bring other states to nuclear conflict. 
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Nuclear Use Against a Non-Nuclear Opponent.

In an ongoing crisis or conflict with a non-nuclear 

state, a nuclear-capable state may be tempted to use 

nuclear weapons. Nuclear use could be attractive in 

this situation because there would be no danger of 

nuclear retaliation from the targeted state, although 

such use could have other ill effects, including international opprobrium. 

The only case of nuclear use, against Japan during World War II, illustrates this type of use. Nuclear 

attacks against non-nuclear states have also been considered on at least a few other occasions. Reportedly, 

the French briefly contemplated nuclear use against 

the Vietnamese in the 1954 Battle of Dien Bien Phu 

during the First Indochina War.25 Almost 2 decades 

later in the same country, former U.S. President Richard Nixon mentioned the possibility of using a nuclear 

weapon to then U.S. National Security Advisor Henry 

Kissinger, saying “I’d rather use the nuclear bomb.” 

Kissinger responded that nuclear use would be “too 

much,” to which Nixon responded, “The nuclear 

bomb. Does that bother you?” He went on to say, “I 

just want you to think big.”26

Thus far, leaders from nuclear-capable states have 

appeared to agree with Kissinger that nuclear use 

against non-nuclear weapons states is “too much.” 

However, two points are important to note. First, 

the conflicts in which nuclear states have forgone 

nuclear use against non-nuclear states—in addition to 

the above conflicts, one could add China in the Korean War, the Falklands War, and the first and second 

Gulf Wars—were not existential threats to the nuclear 

states. In future conflicts with greater stakes, nuclear 

weapons states may be more likely to consider nuclear 
147

use. Second, there is also the possibility of nuclear use 

against a non-nuclear state brandishing chemical and 

biological weapons (CBWs). The unique physical and 

psychological damage caused by these unconventional weapons have caused leaders to consider nuclear 

weapons as a potentially appropriate response and 

a stronger means of deterrence than conventional 

threats. During the 1991 Gulf War, the administration 

of then U.S. President George H. W. Bush attempted 

to threaten nuclear use to deter Iraqi President Saddam Hussein from using chemical weapons against 

U.S. soldiers.27 Similarly, during the 2003 Iraq War, officials from the George W. Bush administration again 

made veiled threats of nuclear use by claiming no options were off the table to deter Iraqi use of CBWs.28

Bush administration officials later said they would 

not have used nuclear weapons, but they must have 

thought use was credible enough to issue the threat. 

Today U.S. nuclear doctrine continues to leave 

open the possibility of nuclear use in response to unconventional attacks. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review

states, “there remains a narrow range of contingencies 

in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role 

in deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the 

United States or its allies and partners.”29 Similarly, 

the 2010 Russian nuclear doctrine reserves the option 

“to utilize nuclear weapons in response to the utilization of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass 

destruction [WMD] against it and (or) its allies.”30

Finally, there are those who argue that nuclear 

weapons should be considered in cases of cyberattack. 

In January 2013, the Department of Defense, Defense 

Science Board issued a report arguing that the United 

States should be prepared to use nuclear weapons in 

response to major cyberattacks, and Washington has 

not yet ruled out any such use in official doctrine.31
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Splendid First Strike.

A sixth potential use of nuclear weapons is the 

so-called “splendid first strike.” The purpose of this 

type of nuclear use is to destroy all of an adversary’s 

nuclear weapons in a single nuclear campaign, leaving the adversary unable to strike back with nuclear 

weapons.

No state has ever attempted a nuclear first strike, 

but such strikes have been considered. Early in the 

Cold War, it was plausible for the United States, with 

its head start in the nuclear arms race, to consider a 

splendid first strike against the Soviet Union. In April 

1950, the U.S. National Security Council rejected preventive war on the nascent Soviet arsenal “on strategic 

and moral grounds.”32 Although the decision document, NSC-68, did allow for a pre-emptive strike if the 

United States were under imminent attack from the 

Soviet Union.33 During the administration of former 

U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, military planners 

explored a preventive war option, with a Joint Chiefs 

of Staff Advance Study Group recommending the 

United States consider starting a war with the Soviets 

before their nuclear forces became “a real menace.”34

Other military leaders disagreed, in effect calling such 

an attack un-American, and this option was ruled out 

by December 1954.35 Both the United States and the 

Soviets considered a nuclear first strike against China 

in the 1960s.36

As the Soviet Union’s nuclear arsenal developed 

over time, Washington began to worry that its nuclear 

forces might themselves be vulnerable to a splendid 

first strike. RAND Corporation analyst Albert Wohlstetter argued that the balance of terror might be more 

“delicate” than previously believed and, as a result, 
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the U.S. military dispersed its air bases and took other 

measures to ensure nuclear survivability.37

Carrying out a nuclear first strike would entail 

great risk. If the strike failed to destroy every single 

nuclear weapon of the adversary, then the attacker 

would risk devastating nuclear retaliation in response. 

Even Herman Kahn, author of On Thermonuclear War,

argued that “for . . . practical reasons alone, not to 

speak of vitally important moral and political ones, 

the notion of having a Splendid First Strike Capability seems fanciful.”38 This type of nuclear use would 

be most plausible, therefore, against a target state that 

possessed relatively few weapons at known locations. 

Though there are no historical examples of a splendid first strike using nuclear weapons, the strategic 

logic underpinning this type of attack, to wipe out an 

adversary’s nuclear capability in one strike to prevent 

one’s own state from being targeted in the future, has 

been pursued by states using conventional weapons. 

In destroying Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981, for 

example, Israel attempted to take out Iraq’s developing nuclear capability, striking before it had a more 

developed weapons program. Israel took similar action when bombing the Syrian al-Kibar reactor in 

September 2007. If a country were further along in a 

nuclear weapons program and conventional weapons 

were insufficient to destroy an enemy nuclear program, it is conceivable that leaders would consider 

nuclear weapons appropriate for the task for the same 

underlying reasons.

Use ‘Em or Lose ‘Em.

In a crisis situation involving two nuclear-armed 

states, each may fear their nuclear weapons will 

be vulnerable to attack by their adversary and thus 
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decide to use them before they are wiped out. Pressure 

to “use ‘em or lose ‘em” in a crisis might be heightened 

if a country possesses a nuclear arsenal that is vulnerable to a splendid first strike or if the adversary’s nuclear posture favors the offense. For example, during 

the Cold War, each side maintained ballistic missiles 

with relatively accurate multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). With this capability, a 

single missile could target and destroy a number of 

the adversary’s nuclear weapons. Even if not all of the 

targeted state’s missiles were destroyed, it would be 

left at great numerical disadvantage vis-à-vis the attacking state. This condition meant each side felt immense pressure to launch its missiles first in the event 

of conflict, leading to the development of “launch on 

warning” postures in which weapons already on alert 

could be quickly deployed if an incoming attack were 

detected. In this situation, it might be more reasonable 

for a leader to simply back down rather than initiate a 

nuclear war from such a disadvantaged position, but 

it is possible that a future leader would prefer to use 

them than lose them. 

Nuclear Brinksmanship.

Many scholars and practitioners incorrectly believe that nuclear use is impossible, or at the very least 

irrational, once one’s adversary possesses a secure 

second-strike capability. If an adversary has the ability to absorb a nuclear attack and respond with a devastating counterattack, then one can no longer hope 

to conduct a splendid first strike and any nuclear use 

could result in unacceptable retaliation. Meanwhile, 

states would not feel the same use ‘em or lose ‘em 

pressures, because they would understand that they 
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could ride out a nuclear attack and still hit back with 

force. Since both sides understand these facts, a situation of restraint arises due to the condition of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Yet, nuclear deterrence theorists have identified several rational uses of 

nuclear weapons even in a condition of MAD.

Thomas Schelling was the first to devise a rational 

means by which states can threaten nuclear-armed 

opponents.39 He argued that leaders cannot credibly 

threaten to intentionally launch a suicidal nuclear war, 

but they can make a “threat that leaves something to 

chance.”40 They can engage in a process, a nuclear crisis, which increases the risk of nuclear war in an attempt to force a less resolved adversary to back down. 

As states escalate a nuclear crisis, there is an increasing probability that the conflict will spiral out of control and result in an inadvertent or accidental nuclear 

exchange. As long as the benefit of winning the crisis is greater than the incremental increase in the risk 

of nuclear war, threats to escalate nuclear crises are 

inherently credible. In these games of nuclear brinkmanship, the state that is willing to run the greatest 

risk of nuclear war before backing down will win the 

crisis as long as it does not end in catastrophe. It is for 

this reason that Schelling called great power politics 

in the nuclear era a “competition in risk taking.”41

This does not mean that states eagerly bid up the 

risk of nuclear war. Rather, they face gut-wrenching 

decisions at each stage of the crisis. They can quit 

the crisis to avoid nuclear war, but only by ceding an 

important geopolitical issue to an opponent. Alternatively, they can escalate the crisis in an attempt to prevail, but only at the risk of suffering a possible nuclear 

exchange. 
152

On brinksmanship, former U.S. Secretary of State 

John Foster Dulles stated, “The ability to get to the 

verge without getting into the war is the necessary art

. . . . If you try to run away from it, if you are scared to 

go to the brink, you are lost.”42 The bipolar Cold War 

conflict provides several examples of nuclear brinksmanship, with the Cuban Missile Crisis as the most 

notable. Former Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev 

initially raised the stakes by placing nuclear weapons 

in Cuba, gravely threatening the U.S. homeland and 

meddling within the U.S. sphere of influence. In response, then U.S. President John F. Kennedy escalated 

by placing a blockade around the island so Soviet ships 

could not deliver additional missiles. In the end, the 

Soviet Union withdrew its missiles from Cuba, but not 

before the risk of nuclear war was raised to, in President Kennedy’s mind, “between 1 in 3 and even.”43

Other historical examples of brinkmanship include 

Moscow’s threats against the British and the French 

during the 1956 Suez Crisis, Moscow’s threats to attack China during the Sino-Soviet border war in 1969, 

former President Nixon’s nuclear alerts in 1969 and 

1973, and finally, Indian and Pakistani threats and 

nuclear weapons movements during the 1999 Kargil 

Crisis.44 Looking to the future, as long as rivalries continue and as long as leaders are willing to initiate and 

escalate high-stakes crises in search of their geopolitical goals, the risk of war through nuclear brinkmanship will remain with us.

Limited Nuclear War.

During the course of the Cold War, nuclear strategists considered an alternative to all-out nuclear war 

between the two superpowers: limited nuclear war.45
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This is conflict “in which each side exercises restraint 

in the use of nuclear weapons, employing only a limited number of weapons on selected targets.”46 By 

launching a single nuclear weapon against a small city 

or an isolated military base, for example, a nucleararmed state could signal its willingness to escalate a 

crisis, while leaving its adversary with enough left to 

lose to deter the adversary from launching a full-scale 

nuclear response. 

U.S. proponents of limited nuclear war included 

Henry Kissinger and Robert Osgood.47 In his 1957 book 

Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Kissinger argued 

that the United States should be prepared for alternatives to “all-out” nuclear war, especially in peripheral 

conflicts.48 Limited nuclear war, he argues, cannot be 

“improvised” during the course of conflict, but it has 

“its own appropriate tactics . . . with limitations as to 

targets, areas and the size of weapons used.”49 Most 

importantly, limited nuclear war requires communicating to adversaries in advance the understandings 

of limited war, otherwise “miscalculations and misinterpretations” of intentions “may cause the war to 

become all-out even if both sides intend to limit it.”50

In the current era, there are a number of conflicts 

in which adversaries could engage in limited nuclear 

war. Because arsenal sizes vary, the defining feature 

of this type of nuclear war is not that it seeks to avoid 

all-out nuclear exchange, but that nuclear weapons 

are employed with some level of restraint, to avoid 

the widespread use of nuclear weapons on both sides. 

History provides examples of states planning to 

deploy nuclear weapons in a limited way to achieve 

limited aims. During the early Cold War when the 

United States was conventionally inferior to the Soviet Union, U.S. leaders felt they had no choice but 
154

to go nuclear to stop Soviets from overrunning Europe. This is similar to France’s approach to nuclear 

strategy during the Cold War. Vastly overmatched by 

Moscow, the French plan was also to resort to launching nuclear weapons as soon as conventional fighting 

began.51 Similarly, at present, America’s conventionally inferior adversaries have incentives to use nuclear 

weapons early in a crisis in an attempt to deter further 

escalation and ensure their own survival.52

IDENTIFYING THE NEXT NUCLEAR WAR

Having reviewed the various pathways that could 

produce nuclear war in theory, we turn to the empirics 

to examine the countries with the capabilities and political conflicts that could conceivably produce the 

next nuclear war. Nine states currently possess nuclear weapons, and a tenth, Iran, appears to be seeking at 

least a latent nuclear capability. Although nuclear use 

by any one state appears unlikely, there are a number 

of potential conflicts involving nuclear-armed states 

that could lead to nuclear use. In addition to states, a 

handful of terrorist organizations have expressed the 

desire to employ nuclear weapons. The following section examines the nuclear capabilities and doctrines of 

these actors and the geopolitical conflicts that could 

escalate into nuclear use in the future. Indeed, certain trends in nuclear force modernization, doctrine, 

and regional enmities suggest nuclear use may have 

become more, not less, likely in the coming years. 

Russia, the United States, and NATO.

Under the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 

(New START), the United States and Russia agreed 

to limit their arsenals to 1,550 deployed nuclear war-
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heads and 800 total delivery platforms by 2018. The 

United States maintains a nuclear triad, with nuclear 

warheads delivered by intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles 

(SLBMs), and bomber aircraft, and is in the early planning stages for modernizing each of these platforms. 

In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, Washington vowed 

not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against 

non-nuclear states in good standing with the Nuclear 

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and their nonproliferation commitments.53 For states not covered by this 

negative security assurance, U.S. leaders may consider 

nuclear weapons for deterring nuclear, conventional, 

biological, or even cyberattacks. The report concludes 

that the United States “would only consider the use of 

nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend 

the vital interests of the United States or its allies and 

partners.”54

Russia also maintains a nuclear triad, including 

ICBMs (some of which are road-mobile), SLBMs, and 

bombers, and it too is modernizing all of its delivery 

systems. Russia is in the process of equipping more 

of its ICBMs with MIRVs, a move that many consider 

destabilizing, especially in relation to the de-MIRVed 

U.S. ICBM force.55 In addition, Russia is working on 

new ICBMs, including a heavy ICBM with as many 

as ten warheads to replace the retiring SS-18.56 Russia is reportedly developing a new rail-mobile system, 

the “Barguzin,” that will allow it to very quickly move 

nuclear weapons around its vast territory.57 Russia is 

also developing a new stealth long-range bomber, with 

production to begin in 2020. Moscow is also modernizing the sea leg with plans for eight new Borei-class 

submarines armed with 16 Bulava missiles, containing 

six warheads each.58 In addition to the strategic force, 
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Russia is estimated to maintain between 1,000 and 

6,000 tactical or nonstrategic weapons in its arsenal.59

Unlike the United States, which has sought to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons since the end of 

the Cold War, Russia has developed a greater role for 

these weapons in the past decade. This change has 

stemmed primarily from an imbalance in conventional capabilities vis-à-vis the United States. In the postCold War period, Russia’s conventional forces have 

been vastly inferior to Western capabilities and they 

lowered their doctrinal threshold for nuclear use in an 

attempt to offset this weakness. In the 1990s, Russia 

stated that the sole purpose of nuclear weapons was 

deterrence of large-scale attacks that threaten the state 

existentially, but by 2000, Russia reserved:

the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use 

of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in response 

to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the 

Russian Federation.60

The 2010 doctrine moderated this statement somewhat, but it is clear that nuclear weapons remain central to Russian strategy as military thinkers in Russia 

argue that in the course of a large conventional conflict, nuclear weapons could be utilized as a means 

of “de-escalation.” Moreover, since 1999, nuclear 

weapons have featured prominently in Russian military exercises; and, in March 2014, Russia performed 

a large-scale nuclear exercise that was presided over 

by Russian President Vladimir Putin himself.61 Russian leaders engaged in outright nuclear saber-rattling 

over the crisis in Ukraine, beginning in 2014; and even 

threatened Denmark that it would become a target of 
157

Russian nuclear missiles if it hosted part of NATO’s 

missile defense system.62

As the successor state of the Soviet Union, Russia 

has a long history of conflict with the United States and 

the countries of NATO. For 40 years, these two powers 

teetered on the brink of nuclear war, especially during 

periods of high tension, including the Korean War, the 

1956 Suez Crisis, the 1961 Berlin Crisis, and the 1962 

Cuban Missile Crisis. Though the ideological struggle 

between the United States and the Soviet Union ended 

with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, tensions between these two states remain. Nationalism 

has grown in recent years with Russian strongman 

Vladimir Putin declaring in 2005 that the dissolution 

of the Soviet Union was the “greatest geopolitical catastrophe” of the 20th century.63 As of this writing, 

reports indicate that Russia maintains thousands of 

troops inside eastern Ukraine, with thousands more 

on the border. NATO is planning a number of military 

exercises with allies on the Russian periphery, including the March 2015 exercise in the Black Sea with Romania and upcoming military drills with Bulgaria.64

Indeed, the most likely flashpoint for U.S./NATO 

and Russian conflict today is in Russia’s periphery. 

The Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008 and the current crisis over Ukraine highlight the persistent tension between Russia and the West over NATO expansion—and what Russia perceives as encroachment 

into its traditional sphere of influence. In addition to 

Georgia and Ukraine, one can imagine future conflict 

between Russia and NATO members such as Estonia, 

Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, where Russia retains 

historical and cultural interest and may find reason 

for interference. If Russia were to use force against a 

NATO country, Washington would be obligated by 
158

the NATO charter to come to its ally’s defense. Moreover, a Russian and NATO conflict in Europe would 

take place under the shadow of nuclear war.

China and the United States.

Chinese military capabilities, including its nuclear 

arsenal, are smaller and less effective than those of 

the United States; but China is in the midst of a 3-decade process of translating its economic prowess into 

vast military power. By some calculations, its military 

budget is now almost $200 billion, second only to the 

United States.65 The Chinese have traditionally been 

comfortable with a nuclear posture that has been described as a minimal deterrent, but the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) 2005 Science of Military Strategy

calls for the development of a “lean and effective” 

arsenal, with many Western analysts noting that the 

emphasis is on the “effective.”66 Current estimates indicate China has approximately 250 warheads in its 

stockpile, and this number is expected to expand.67

Approximately 60 of these weapons are on missiles capable of reaching the continental United States.68 The 

2013 Department of Defense report to Congress on 

Chinese military capabilities recounts continued Chinese investments in ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, 

counter-space weapons, and “military cyberspace capabilities that appear designed to enable anti-access/

area-denial (A2/AD) missions.”69 In recent years, the 

PLA Rocket Force, in control of Chinese conventional 

and nuclear ballistic missiles, has added two types of 

road-mobile ballistic missiles to its arsenal, and one 

of these modifications can reach most locations in the 

United States. The 2013 report also speculated that the 

PLA Rocket Force might be developing a MIRV capa-
159

bility for a new road-mobile ICBM. MIRVs, maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs), anti-satellite capabilities, and penetration aids are all being developed 

to overcome U.S. ballistic missile defenses.70 In addition, China has built an “underground great wall,” a 

3,000-mile tunnel network in which to house and protect its mobile nuclear missiles. The Chinese Navy is 

developing a sea-based nuclear deterrent, with three 

Jin-class submarines in testing and as many as five in 

development. These submarines will eventually carry 

SLBMs. The Chinese also have bombers capable of 

delivering nuclear weapons.

If a crisis in the region were to grow into a larger 

conflict, what does Chinese nuclear doctrine suggest 

about its willingness to use nuclear weapons? Since 

detonating its first nuclear weapon in 1964, China has 

persistently claimed to follow a “no first use policy,” 

although its doctrine carves out space for exceptions. 

For example, the 2005 Science of Military Strategy document declared that China would only use nuclear 

weapons in response to a strategic attack, but that a 

strategic attack would not necessarily involve nuclear 

weapons and could even be political or psychological 

in nature.71 Moreover, China’s conventional inferiority when faced with an adversary like the United States 

may cause its leaders to consider escalation to nuclear 

weapons in a future conflict short of a “strategic attack,” just like many of the conventionally inferior 

nuclear-capable states discussed above. For the first 

time, China’s 2013 White Paper did not explicitly state 

China’s “no first use policy,” leading some to speculate that concern with U.S. conventional capabilities 

may merit the option of using nuclear weapons first.72

In the past, Taiwan has been the assumed flashpoint 

for potential U.S.-China conflict.73 The United States 

maintains a commitment to support Taiwan through 
160

the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 and has sold Taiwan 

advanced weaponry. Meanwhile, China’s military 

modernization has focused on regional contingencies, 

including a Taiwan scenario. The United States and 

China engaged in an intense crisis over the island in 

1995 and 1996, when the Chinese government test fired 

missiles near Taiwan in reaction to political developments on the island and a Taiwanese presidential visit 

to the United States. Former U.S. President Bill Clinton responded by sending two carrier battle groups 

to the South China Sea in a visible show of American 

military support for Taiwan. Relations between China 

and Taiwan have improved since 2008, but elections 

in 2016 brought a more nationalistic government to 

power in Taiwan and renewed tensions.

More recently, other regional disputes have taken 

center stage as China’s growing power has led it to 

assert a sphere of influence that overlaps with areas 

claimed by U.S. allies and partners, as well as seas in 

which the U.S. Navy has long sailed uncontested. China has ongoing disputes with Japan over the Diaoyu/

Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, and with Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines over 

islands in the South China Sea. The geography of the 

region creates many opportunities for miscalculation. 

Chinese naval ships pass within sight of Japan when 

heading to the Pacific Ocean. Fishing and shipping 

vessels regularly end up in disputed territory. Seemingly small incidents at sea could lead to crisis, which 

if not managed well, could lead to broader conflict. 

In May 2014, Japan reported that two Chinese fighter 

jets had flown dangerously close to its reconnaissance 

planes in two separate incidents in airspace both states 

claim. China appears to be literally testing the waters 

(and the skies) to illustrate its growing strength in the 
161

region, behavior that has high risk of resulting in a 

clash.

Recent Chinese military exercises also demonstrate that Beijing is preparing for hostilities beyond 

a Taiwan scenario. In Mission Action 2013, Chinese 

forces simulated an invasion of the Senkaku Islands. 

After tracking the exercise, the chief of intelligence of 

the U.S. Pacific Fleet stated:

[We] concluded that the PLA has been given the new 

task to be able to conduct a short sharp war to destroy 

Japanese forces in the East China Sea following with 

what can only be expected as a seizure of the Senkakus 

or even a southern Ryukyu [islands].74 

Chinese exercises also demonstrate China’s desire 

to break out of its geographic confines and become 

a blue water naval power. In a winter 2013 exercise 

called Maneuver 5, Chinese forces successfully fought 

through the “first island chain” into the Pacific Ocean.75

Unlike the U.S.-Soviet relationship, the United 

States and China do not enjoy a history of interaction that promotes stability. Each side may only be 

able to learn lessons about the other’s crisis signaling, 

redlines, and crisis communications through dangerous experience. For example, the United States and 

China do not have a Cold War-style hotline set up 

between their highest leadership to mitigate the risk 

that misperceptions could lead to war (a line between 

the Department of Defense and Chinese Defense Ministry has not yet been tested in a period of tension). 

China is notable for its lack of transparency, especially 

in the nuclear realm. This position is understandable 

for a power which maintains fewer nuclear weapons 

than potential adversaries, but it does mean misunderstandings or miscalculations might be even more 

likely. 
162

Russia and China.

A final great power dyad in which nuclear war 

is possible is Russia and China. Both have large and 

sophisticated nuclear arsenals, although, as described 

above, Russia maintains a clear nuclear superiority. 

However, China’s conventional and nuclear capabilities are growing and its two million-member army is 

of concern to Moscow.

The two powers have clashed over their 2,700-mile 

border throughout the decades and in 1969, during 

the Sino-Soviet Border War, the Soviet Union issued 

explicit nuclear threats against China. In the 1990s and 

2000s, the countries agreed to officially end the border 

disputes and there have even been subsequent signs 

of cooperation. Yet, despite some shared interests due 

in part to a shared perception of threat from Washington and its allies, Russia is watching China’s rise 

and military modernization warily. Indeed, Moscow 

is changing its nuclear posture in response to developments in Beijing. Over the past several years, Moscow 

has been cheating on the 1987 Intermediate Nuclear 

Forces (INF) Treaty by developing a land-based nuclear missile in the banned 300-3,400 mile range, and 

Russian officials are quite clear that the nuclear forces are a necessary response to Chinese intermediate 

range nuclear forces. While it is hard to conceive of a 

direct military struggle between these two powers in 

the near term, the rise of China will continue to pose 

an increasing threat to Russia. It is likely that relations 

between these two great powers will ebb and flow 

over time, and if and when they worsen to the point of 

another direct military confrontation, nuclear weapons will be present.
163

North Korea, South Korea, Japan, and 

the United States.

Over the past decade, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has demonstrated its growing 

nuclear and missile capabilities. It is currently estimated to possess enough fissile material for between 

13 and 30 nuclear warheads.76 It is unclear, however, 

whether Pyongyang has yet developed the capability to miniaturize weapons for delivery on missiles. 

North Korea has developed short and medium-range 

weapons that can reach South Korea and Japan, but 

has not yet successfully test launched an intercontinental-range missile.

Relations between Pyongyang and its neighbors 

are openly hostile. North and South Korea have technically been in an armistice since 1953 when fighting 

in the Korean War ended. Both states claim the right 

to the entire peninsula and they have had tense relations since the end of the war that have occasionally 

included direct military attacks. At present, Japan and 

North Korea do not maintain official diplomatic relations. They also have a long history of ill will stemming from the Japanese occupation of Korea in the 

early part of the 20th century and the kidnapping of 

Japanese citizens by North Korea in the 1970s and 

1980s.

In recent years, Pyongyang has taken provocative 

action against both South Korea and Japan, such as 

shelling South Korea’s Yeonpyeong Island in 2010, 

sinking a South Korean warship in 2010, and testfiring missiles into the Sea of Japan. In January 2014, 

DPRK leadership threatened nuclear war in the run 

up to Republic of Korea-U.S. military exercises, com-
164

plaining that these joint exercises are preparation for 

an invasion of North Korea.77

The situation in North Korea is especially volatile 

because Kim Jong-un has already demonstrated willingness to take drastic action to solidify his position 

and remain in power. Moreover, due to similar domestic pressures, he may have incentives to create a 

crisis in which nuclear use becomes possible. 

If North Korea’s erratic behavior continues or escalates, there is a potential for the United States to 

become involved in a conflict based on its treaty commitments to South Korea and Japan. Since they face 

nuclear adversaries, U.S. reassurance tends to include 

a heavy emphasis on nuclear capabilities. In the spring 

of 2013, for example, the United States flew two nuclear-capable B-2s over the Peninsula to threaten the 

North and reassure the South. 

North Korea does not publicize an official nuclear 

doctrine, although its rhetoric has been bellicose and 

has included explicit nuclear threats against the United States and South Korea in the recent past. If Kim 

Jong-un enters into an open conflict with the vastly 

superior United States, he may have incentive to use 

nuclear weapons in an attempt to bring a rapid halt 

to the conflict and to preserve his life and his regime. 

With such a small and vulnerable arsenal, Kim might 

also feel “use ‘em or lose ‘em” pressure, encouraging 

him to go nuclear early in a conflict. If Pyongyang 

were to use nuclear weapons, some analysts assume 

DPRK would employ a countervalue strategy, aiming 

its weapons at cities in neighboring South Korea or 

Japan.

If U.S. reassurances prove insufficient, it is always 

possible that Japan or South Korea could decide to 

build independent nuclear deterrent forces. Japan has 
165

considered and then rejected nuclear weapons three 

times in the nuclear age, and to this day possesses 

what is essentially a latent nuclear weapons capability. Due to its well-known “nuclear allergy,” nuclear 

proliferation in Japan seems unlikely in the near-term, 

but it remains possible. In South Korea, recent polling 

indicates that two-thirds of citizens support developing nuclear weapons.78 South Korea has also been actively seeking indigenous reprocessing technology for 

peaceful purposes, but that could help Seoul develop 

a weapons capability at some point in the future. If 

Japan and South Korea join the United States, China, 

and North Korea as nuclear powers, East Asia would 

become a poly-nuclear region, rife with geopolitical 

tensions and rivalries that would be ripe for the next 

nuclear conflict.

India and Pakistan.

If asked where a nuclear exchange is most likely 

today, many analysts would select the Indian subcontinent. The longstanding rivalry between these two 

nuclear-capable states has involved numerous crises. 

They have an ongoing territorial dispute over Kashmir, an active arms race, and the instability generated 

by a conventionally inferior and revisionist Pakistan 

armed with nuclear weapons. 

The two nuclear powers are currently engaged in 

a nuclear arms race. Pakistan has the world’s fastest 

growing nuclear arsenal.79 Currently it is estimated to 

have 110 weapons, while making enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) for 10-15 weapons per year.80

In addition, Pakistan has a growing plutonium production capability, with China agreeing to provide 

as many as three new reactors.81 Its delivery vehicles 
166

include aircraft and surface-to-surface missiles.82

Pakistan recently added a maneuverable, short-range, 

sub-kiloton battlefield nuclear missile to its arsenal, 

the Hatf IX or Nasr, allowing it to quickly use nuclear 

weapons against an advancing Indian army (and just 

as worrisome, the mobility of these missiles raises 

concerns about secure military custody of the weapons).83 Pakistan does not publish a formal nuclear doctrine, though its leaders have declared that its nuclear 

weapons exist to deter India. 

India has approximately 100 warheads in its arsenal and is in the process of developing a nuclear triad. 

India possesses nuclear-capable aircraft, nuclear-capable missiles that cover both short and long ranges, 

and is currently developing ICBMs as well as submarine-launched missiles. India has a long-held policy 

of the “no first use” of nuclear weapons. The party of 

the Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has vowed 

to “revise and update” India’s nuclear doctrine, writing that “the strategic gains acquired by India during 

the Atal Bihari Vajpayee regime on the nuclear programme have been frittered away by the Congress.”84

Thus it is possible that the doctrine will be altered 

both in response to Pakistan’s nuclear development 

and recent changes in China’s doctrine.

The two states have been in conflict since their 

founding and violent partition in 1948. They fought 

wars in 1965 over Kashmir and in 1971 when East 

Pakistan became the independent state of Bangladesh. 

In May 1998, India conducted five nuclear tests and 

within weeks, Pakistan responded with six tests of its 

own. The most dangerous period in the nuclear era 

occurred a year later in 1999, when Pakistani forces 

crossed the Line of Control in Kashmir and occupied 

part of the Kargil district, resulting in an Indian coun-
167

terattack and worldwide fears of nuclear war. A 2001 

terrorist attack on the Indian parliament in New Delhi 

and another terrorist attack in Mumbai in 2008 also 

flamed tension between the nuclear adversaries and 

raised the specter of nuclear conflict.

A terrorist attack or small conflict on the border 

between the two states could quickly escalate to the 

nuclear level. In 2004, India developed the “Cold 

Start” military doctrine, a plan to mobilize conventional forces on the Pakistani border within 48 hours 

of receiving orders. The goal of the plan is to overwhelm Pakistan quickly with limited territorial aims 

before international actors can intervene. Because of 

its conventional inferiority, however, analysts assume 

Pakistan would resort to nuclear weapons early in a 

large-scale conventional war. Its recent development 

of battlefield nuclear weapons indicates a lowering of 

the threshold for nuclear use. Indeed, former Pakistani 

Ambassador to the United States Maleeha Lodhi has 

argued that Pakistan needed to develop these tactical 

weapons “to counterbalance India’s move to bring 

conventional military offensives to a tactical level,” 

suggesting these weapons are to be deployed against 

advancing Indian troops. Once nuclear weapons are 

used, however, even if only tactical, it might be difficult to control the escalation.

Iran, Israel, and the United States.

Israel is estimated to possess approximately 75 

to 200 nuclear weapons.85 It has advanced missile 

capabilities with its Jericho ballistic missile, nuclearcapable aircraft, and may deploy cruise missiles with 

nuclear warheads on its Dolphin-class submarines, 

possibly providing it with a second strike capability.86

Because of its policy of nuclear opacity (animut) and 
168

its promise not “to be the first country to introduce 

nuclear weapons in the Middle East,”87 we know little 

about Israel’s nuclear doctrine.

Iran's nuclear program is at least temporarily halted 

under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action struck 

with the international community in 2015.88 But if the 

limits in this deal were contravened for any reason, it 

is possible that Iran could still join the nuclear club. If 

Iran acquires nuclear weapons, it is also possible that 

other states in the region, including Turkey, Egypt, or 

Saudi Arabia could attempt to acquire nuclear weapons in response.89 While fears of a rapid and complete 

nuclear cascade in the region are probably overblown, 

it is possible, if not likely, that one or two additional 

states would join the nuclear club within the course of 

several decades if Iran goes nuclear.90

The nuclear balance of power between Iran and its 

neighbors could be highly unstable and would likely 

lack many of the safeguards that existed between the 

superpowers during the Cold War, including: the absence of a direct line of communication between Iran 

and its rivals, short timelines for nuclear-armed missiles to travel between states, the lack of secure second-strike capabilities (at least initially), and in Israel, 

a lack of strategic depth and a strategic culture that 

emphasizes preemption.

Iran and Israel have viewed each other as strategic 

competitors since the Iranian Revolution in 1979; Israel 

has directly come into conflict with Iran’s proxies, Hezbollah and Hamas. Iran has also frequently clashed 

with Israel’s superpower patron, the United States. In 

1988, the United States and Iran engaged in a major 

naval battle as part of the Tanker War, the U.S. Navy’s 

largest engagement since the end of World War II. 

Iran sponsored proxy attacks that killed U.S. service 

personnel for a decade in Iraq and Afghanistan. More-
169

over, Tehran and Washington frequently exchange 

threats and counter-threats in the Persian Gulf and 

over the Strait of Hormuz.91 It is, therefore, conceivable that a future conflict involving a nuclear-armed 

Iran and Israel or the United States could result in a 

nuclear exchange. If other states in the region, such as 

Turkey or Saudi Arabia, also acquired nuclear weapons, the nuclear balance would be even less stable and 

a poly-nuclear Middle East might be the most likely 

candidate for the next nuclear war.

Nuclear Terrorism.

Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, 

scholars, analysts, and politicians have focused on the 

nexus of nuclear weapons and terrorism. In his closing 

statement at the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit, U.S. 

President Barack Obama concluded, “We’ve agreed 

that nuclear terrorism is one of the most urgent and 

serious threats to global security.”92 Though there has 

been some debate on how seriously this threat should 

be taken,93 evidence indicates that terrorist organizations have both expressed a desire for nuclear weapons and made attempts to buy or seize nuclear material. Declassified documents from the United States 

suggest that former al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden 

directed his associates to purchase uranium.94 In addition, Chechnya-based separatist groups, Lashkar-eTaiba in South Asia, and Aum Shinrikyo in Japan have 

also expressed the desire for nuclear weapons in the 

past.95

Most analysts consider it unlikely that a state 

would knowingly provide a terrorist group with a 

bomb, but it is conceivable that a group could steal 

one. This fear is especially acute in the case of Pakistan, where an unstable government with a growing 
170

nuclear arsenal exists in an area with many terrorist 

organizations. The government of Pakistan has taken 

steps in recent years to allay these fears, yet reason for 

concern remains.96

A second means by which a terrorist group could 

attain a nuclear capability is by obtaining fissile material and constructing its own crude nuclear bomb. 

The main challenge for terrorist organizations seeking this capability is finding sufficient fissile material. 

Approximately 8 kilograms of plutonium or 25 kilograms of HEU is necessary for a bomb. Since 9/11, the 

United States, Russia, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and other partners have taken on 

a number of efforts to decrease the risks of terrorists 

accessing nuclear material. United Nations Security 

Council Resolution 1540, the 2005 Amendment to the 

Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, and the 2005 International Convention for the 

Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism all seek to 

increase global cooperation to prevent nuclear terrorism. Overall, the global stocks of HEU and plutonium 

are decreasing, but the sheer volume of global fissile 

material makes this an ongoing challenge and the U.S. 

budget for these activities has recently been cut. 

Unlike nuclear-armed states, it would be relatively difficult to deter terrorists from taking action.97 In 

other words, if efforts to keep nuclear weapons out of 

terrorist hands fail even once, we may very well witness a nuclear 9/11.

CONCLUSION

This chapter examined the prospects for the next 

nuclear war. While we all hope that nuclear weapons 

will never be used again, this chapter suggests that as 
171

long as nuclear weapons and geopolitical conflict exist, there remains a nonzero risk of a nuclear exchange. 

To analyze this threat, this chapter looked to the only 

previous instance of nuclear use, presented the theoretical mechanisms by which nuclear war might transpire, and identified the nuclear-armed actors and 

related conflicts that could result in nuclear war. 

Fortunately, a next nuclear war is not preordained, 

and there are a number of steps that the United States 

can take to reduce the risk. The first and most important step is to openly recognize, understand, and acknowledge the threat. U.S. leaders rarely talk about 

nuclear war. When authorities discuss the litany of 

threats posed by the spread of nuclear weapons, a 

frank discussion of nuclear war is often absent. For 

example, in explaining why he is opposed to allowing 

Iran to develop nuclear weapons, President Obama 

said:

In addition to the profound threat that it poses to Israel, one of our strongest allies in the world; in addition to the outrageous language that has been directed 

toward Israel by the leaders of the Iranian government—if Iran gets a nuclear weapon, this would run 

completely contrary to my policies of nonproliferation. The risks of an Iranian nuclear weapon falling 

into the hands of terrorist organizations are profound. 

It is almost certain that other players in the region 

would feel it necessary to get their own nuclear weapons. So now, you have the prospect of a nuclear arms 

race in the most volatile region in the world, one that 

is rife with unstable governments and sectarian tensions. And it would also provide Iran the additional 

capability to sponsor and protect its proxies in carrying out terrorist attacks, because they are less fearful 

of retaliation.98
172

President Obama never explicitly argued that a 

nuclear-armed Iran could result in a nuclear attack 

against the United States, Israel, or other states. Perhaps the threat was meant to be implicit in the discussion. Alternatively, perhaps Obama and others like 

him do not want to be accused of hysteria for trumpeting the alarm on such a low risk, high consequence 

outcome. Regardless of the cause of this reticence, 

nuclear war is a possible, and the most severe, consequence of nuclear weapons proliferation. U.S. leaders 

should explicitly confront this uncomfortable truth 

head on. After all, if we do not accurately articulate 

the threat, it will be difficult to adequately address it.

Elites in other states are less shy about broaching 

the subject. North Korean leaders regularly threaten 

nuclear use.99 Pakistan’s leaders have boasted to British officials about how quickly they could launch a 

nuclear attack against India.100 Chinese state-owned 

media has proudly reported the death and destruction that a Chinese nuclear attack could inflict on the 

United States.101 Moreover, President Putin recently 

explained to a youth group in Russia “that Russia is 

one of the world’s biggest nuclear powers. These are 

not just words–this is the reality. What’s more, we are 

strengthening our nuclear deterrent capability.”102

Once U.S. leaders more frankly acknowledge the 

threat of nuclear war, they must work with their counterparts abroad to take the necessary steps to stop it. 

This means taking a variety of steps to stabilize relations among existing nuclear powers. Most importantly, however, it means promoting strong nonproliferation policies to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons 

to more countries. With each additional state that 

joins the nuclear club, the probability of the next nuclear war occurring in our lifetimes increases by some 
173

unknown margin. While the probabilities involved 

may be low, they might be just enough.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 5

1. Matthew Kroenig is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government and School of Foreign Service and a Senior 

Fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security. 

Rebecca Davis Gibbons is a Visiting Assistant Professor in the 

Department of Government at Bowdoin College.

2. For example, former U.S. Defense Secretary James Schlesinger makes this point in Melanie Kirkpatrick’s article, “Why We 

Don’t Want a Nuclear-Free World,” The Wall Street Journal, July 13, 

2009, available from www.wsj.com/articles/SB124726489588925407.

3. See, for example, Matthew Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority 

and the Balance of Resolve: Explaining Nuclear Crisis Outcomes,” 

International Organization, Vol. 67, No. 1, January 2013, pp. 141-

171; Glenn Snyder and Paul Diesing, Conflict Among Nations: Bargaining, Decision-Making, and System Structure in International Crises, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977; Richard Betts, 

Nuclear Blackmail and Nuclear Balance, Washington, DC: Brookings 

Institution Press, 1987; Marc Trachtenberg, History and Strategy, 

Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991; Kyle Beardsley 

and Victor Asal, “Winning with the Bomb,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 2, April 2009, pp. 278-301; Carol Atkinson, “Using nuclear weapons,” Review of International Studies,

Vol. 36, 2010, pp. 839–851; and Rebecca Gibbons, “Signals Intelligence? The Effectiveness of Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Signals in 

a Crisis,” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International 

Studies, 2012.

4. For a summary of the differing narratives surrounding 

this decision, see Barton J. Bernstein, “Truman and the A-Bomb: 

Targeting Noncombatants, Using the Bomb, and His Defending 

the ‘Decision’,” The Journal of Military History, Vol. 62, No. 3, July 

1998, pp. 547-570.
174

5. Gar Alperovitz, Atomic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Potsdam, 

New York: Simon and Schuster, 1965, is one of the most wellknown books to make this controversial claim. 

6. Kenneth N. Waltz, “Reflections on Theory of International 

Politics: a response to my critics,” in Neorealism and its Critics, Robert O. Keohane, ed., New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, 

pp. 330–331.

7. David F. Lindenfeld, “The Prevalence of Irrational Thinking in the Third Reich: Notes toward the Reconstruction of Modern Value Rationality,” Central European History, Vol. 30, No. 3 

1997, pp. 365-385.

8. See for example Jeffrey Herf, “Taking Iran’s Anti-Semitism 

Seriously,” The National Interest, June 2, 2014; or Mehdi Khalaji, “Apocalyptic Politics: On the Rationality of Iranian Policy,” 

Policy Focus 79, Washington, DC: The Washington Institute,

January 2008. 

9. Department of Defense, “Narrative Summaries of Accidents Involving U.S. Nuclear Weapons, 1950-1980,” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 1981, available from 

nsarchive.files.wordpress.com/2010/04/635.pdf.

10. Eric Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the 

Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety, New York: The Penguin Press, 2013.

11. Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 

University Press, 1993, p. 178.

12. Ibid. 

13. Associated Press, “Flight of Nuclear Warheads Over U.S. 

Is Under Inquiry,” The New York Times, September 6, 2007.

14. On British nuclear weapons accidents, see Eric Schlosser, 

“Nuclear weapons: an accident waiting to happen,” The Guardian

(Manchester), September 13, 2013.
175

15. Peter D. Feaver, “Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations,” International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3, Winter 1992-

93, pp. 160-187.

16. Bruce G. Blair discusses a number of ways in which accidental nuclear war could be launched in the post-Cold War era 

due to risks in the U.S. and Russian command and control systems. See Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, Washington, 

DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1993.

17. Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, 

MA: Harvard University Press, 1960, p. 207.

18. Ibid., p. 207.

19. Sagan, The Limits of Safety, pp. 98-100.

20. Ibid., pp. 78-80.

21. Ibid., pp. 130-131.

22. For declassified documents on the Able Archer 83 exercise, see The National Security Archive, “The Able Archer 83 

Sourcebook,” Archive collection available from nsarchive.gwu.edu/

nukevault/ablearcher/. 

23. David Hoffman, “Cold-War Doctrines Refuse to Die,” The 

Washington Post, March 15, 1998, p. A01.

24. Donald H. Kobe, “A Theory of Catalytic War,” The Journal 

of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 6, No. 2, June 1962, pp. 125-142.

25. John Newhouse, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age, New 

York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1988, pp. 99-101; Martin Windrow, The 

Last Valley: Dien Bien Phu and the French Defeat in Vietnam, Cambridge, MA: Da Capo Press, 2004.

26. “Nixon Proposed Using A-Bomb in Vietnam War,” The 

New York Times, March 1, 2002, available from www.nytimes.

com/2002/03/01/world/nixon-proposed-using-a-bomb-in-vietnam-war.

html.
176

27. Scott D. Sagan, “Realist Perspectives on Ethical Norms and 

Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in Sohail H. Hashmi and Steven 

P. Lee, eds., Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction, Cambridge: 

Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 81.

28. Wade Boese, “U.S. Issued Warning on Threat of Possible 

Iraqi WMD Use,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 33, No. 4, May 2003.

29. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, 

Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, April 2010, p. viii.

30. “The Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” approved by Russian Federation presidential edict on February 

5, 2010, translated text available from carnegieendowment.org/

files/2010russia_military_doctrine.pdf.

31. Defense Science Board, Resilient Military Systems and the 

Advanced Cyber Threat, Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, January 2013, available from www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports/

ResilientMilitarySystems.CyberThreat.pdf.

32. Scott D. Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and 

National Security, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989, 

pp. 19-20.

33. Quoted in Ibid, p. 20.

34. Quoted in Ibid, p. 21.

35. Ibid, pp. 21-22.

36. On Soviet interest in attacking Chinese nuclear facilities, see The National Security Archive, U.S. Department of State 

Memorandum of Conversation, “US Reaction to Soviet Destruction of CPR [Chinese Peoples Republic] Nuclear Capability; Significance of Latest Sino-Soviet Border Clash; . . . ,” August 18, 1969, 

Secret/Sensitive, National Archives, SN 67-69, Def 12 Chicom, 

declassified memorandum available from www2.gwu.

edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/sino.sov.10.pdf. On U.S. considerations, see William Burr and Jeffrey T. Richelson, “Whether 

to ‘Strangle the Baby in the Cradle’: The United States and the 

Chinese Nuclear Program, 1960-64,” International Security, Vol. 25, 

No. 3, Winter 2000-01, pp. 54-99.
177

37. Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” 

RAND Report P-1472, November 6, 1958, available from www.

rand.org/about/history/wohlstetter/P1472/P1472.html.

38. Herman Kahn, On Thermonuclear War, Princeton NJ: 

Princeton University Press, 1960, p. 37.

39. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict.

40. Ibid. p. 127.

41. Thomas Schelling, Arms and Influence, New Haven, CT: 

Yale University Press, 1966, p. 91.

42. John Lamberton Harper, The Cold War, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2011, pp. 117-118.

43. Quoted in Graham Allison, “The Cuban Missile Crisis at 

50: Lessons for U.S. Foreign Policy Today,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 91, 

No. 4, July/August 2012, pp. 11-16.

44. Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve, 

pp. 141-171.

45. Klaus Knorr, Limited Strategic War, New York: Praeger, 

1962. 

46. Jeff A. Larsen and James M. Smith, Historical Dictionary 

of Arms Control and Disarmament, Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press, 

2005, p. 128. 

47. Morton H. Halperin provides a helpful summary of the 

debate over limited nuclear war in the 1950s. See Halperin, “Nuclear Weapons and Limited War,” The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 5, No. 2, June 1961, pp. 146-166. 

48. Henry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, 

New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1957, p. 177.

49. Ibid, p. 185.

50. Ibid, p. 185. 
178

51. For a thorough discussion of the development of French 

nuclear strategy, see Bruno Tertrais, “Destruction Assurée [Assured Destruction]: The Origins and Development of French 

Nuclear Strategy, 1945-1981,” in Henry D. Sokolski ed., Getting 

MAD: Nuclear Mutual Assured Destruction, Its Origins and Practice, 

Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 

2004, p. 64.

52. Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Nukes We Need,” 

Foreign Affairs, Vol. 88, No. 6, November/December 2009, p. 42.

53. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, 

p. 15.

54. Ibid. p. 17.

55. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Russian Nuclear Forces, 2014,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 70, No. 2, 

March/April 2014, pp. 75-85.

56. Ibid., p. 78.

57. Ben Hoyle, “Russia’s Cold War nuclear missile train back 

on track in new arms race,” The Australian, December 2, 2014.

58.Ibid., p. 79.

59. Amy F. Woolf, Congressional Research Service Report for 

Congress: Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, RL32572, Washington, 

DC: U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, 

January 3, 2014.

60. “Военная Доктрина Российской Федерации” (“Russia’s Military Doctrine”), Утверждена Указом Президента 

Российской Федерации от 21 апреля 2000 г. N 706 (Approved 

by Presidential Decree on April 21, 2000, N. 706), available from 

www.rg.ru/oficial/doc/ykazi/doc_war.htm. An English translation of 

the doctrine is available from www.armscontrol.org/act/2000_05/

dc3ma00.

61. Ibid. p. x.; Zachary Keck, “Russia’s Military Begins Massive Nuclear War Drill,” The Diplomat, March 29, 2014; “U.S. Conducts Nuclear Response Exercises,” Global Security Newswire, May 

12, 2014. 
179

62. David M. Herszenhorn, “Russian Warns Denmark on Joining NATO Missile Defense,” The New York Times, March 22, 2015.

63. Andrew Osborn, “Putin: Collapse of the Soviet Union was 

‘catastrophe of the century’,” The Independent, April 26, 2005. 

64. See, for example, Associated Press, “6 ships arrive in Black 

Sea to take part in NATO exercises,” The World Post, March 13, 

2015; and Angel Krasimirov and Gareth Jones, eds., “Bulgaria, United States to begin military drills amid Ukraine Crisis,” 

Reuters, March 13, 2015.

65. Zachary Keck, “China’s Defense Budget: A Mixed Bag,” 

The Diplomat, March 8, 2014.

66. Peng Guangqian and Yao Youzhi, eds., Science of Military 

Strategy, Beijing, CN: Military Science Publishing House, 2005.

67. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Chinese nuclear forces, 2013,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 69, No. 6, 

November/December 2013, p. 79.

68. Ibid.

69. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2013, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 

Office, p. i. 

70. Ibid, p. 31.

71. Peng and Yao, eds.

72. James Acton, “Is China Changing Its Position on Nuclear 

Weapons?” The New York Times, April 18, 2013.

73. See for example, Kenneth Lieberthal, “Preventing a War 

Over Taiwan,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 84, No. 2, March/April 2005.

74. Sam LaGrone, “Navy Official: China Training for ‘Short 

Sharp War’ with Japan,” USNI News, February 18, 2014. 
180

75. Andrew Berglund, “‘Maneuver-5’ Exercise Focuses on Improving Distant Seas Combat Capabilities,” U.S.-China Economic 

and Security Review Commission Staff Report, December 16, 2013. 

76. David Albright and Christina Walrond, North Korea’s Estimated Stocks of Plutonium and Weapon-Grade Uranium, ISIS Report, 

Washington, DC: Institute for Science and International Security, 

August 16, 2012.

77. Associated Press, “North Korea threatens nuclear war in 

run-up to US-South Korea war games,” The Telegraph, January 

29, 2014. 

78. Martin Fackler and Choe Sang-Hun, “South Korea Flirts 

With Nuclear Ideas as North Blusters,” The New York Times,

March 10, 2013.

79. Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris, “Pakistan’s nuclear forces, 2011,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 67, No. 4, 

July/August 2011.

80. Nuclear Threat Initiative, Country Profiles, “Pakistan,” 

last updated April 2016, available from www.nti.org/countryprofiles/pakistan/nuclear/.

81. Saeed Shah, “Pakistan in Talks to Acquire 3 Nuclear Plants 

From China,” The Wall Street Journal, January 20, 2014.

82. Paul K. Kerr and Mary Beth Nikitin, Congressional Research 

Service Report for Congress: Pakistan’s Nuclear Weapons: Proliferation 

and Security Issues, Washington, DC: U.S. Library of Congress, 

Congressional Research Service, February 13, 2013. 

83. Usman Ansari, “Experts: Missile Test Firing Shows Development Complete,” Defense News, November 6, 2013. 

84. The Bharatiya Janata Party, Election Manifesto 2014, New 

Delhi, IN: Bharatiya Janata Party, 2014, available from www.bjp.

org/images/pdf_2014/full_manifesto_english_07.04.2014.pdf. 

85. The Arms Control Association provides this range. See 

“Nuclear Weapons: Who Has What at a Glance,” Arm Control 
181

Association, Fact Sheets & Briefs, posted June 23, 2014. The Federation of American Scientists put the estimate at 80 weapons. “Status of World Nuclear Forces,” Federation of American Scientists, 

posted April 30, 2014. 

86. Peter Beaumont and Conal Urquhart, “Israel deploys nuclear arms in submarines,” The Guardian, October 11, 2003, available from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/oct/12/israel1.

87. Robert S. Norris, William M. Arkin, Hans M. Kristensen, 

and Joshua Handler, “Israeli Nuclear Forces, 2002,” Bulletin of the 

Atomic Scientists, Vol. 58, No. 5, September 2002, pp. 73.

88. In congressional testimony on Iran’s nuclear program in 

April 2014, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry stated, “I think it 

is public knowledge today that we are operating with a time period for a so-called breakout of about two months.” See, Patricia 

Zengerle, “Kerry says Iran nuclear ‘breakout’ window now seen 

as two months,” Reuters, April 8, 2014.

89. James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh, “After Iran Gets the 

Bomb: Containment and Its Complications,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 

89, No. 2, March/April 2010, pp. 33-49.

90. Matthew Kroenig, A Time to Attack: The Looming Iranian 

Nuclear Threat, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

91. For example, see Rick Gladstone, “Noise Level Rises 

Over Iran Threat to Close Strait of Hormuz,” The New York Times, 

December 28, 2011.

92. White House, Office of the Press Secretary, “Remarks by 

President Obama at Opening Plenary Session of the Nuclear Security Summit,” Coex Center, Seoul, Republic of Korea, March 

26, 2012.

93. John Mueller is probably the most notable skeptic of the 

nexus between terrorists and nuclear weapons. See Mueller, Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry Inflate National Security Threats, and Why We Believe Them, New York: Free Press, 

2006.
182

94. See The National Security Archive, Documents 2 and 3 in 

“Nuclear Terrorism: How Big a Threat? Is al-Qaeda Trying to Get 

a Bomb? Documents Trace U.S. Nuclear Counter-Terror Efforts,” 

National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 388, September 2012, available from www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/

ebb388/.

95. Graham Allison, “Nuclear Terrorism Fact Sheet,” Belfer 

Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy 

School, April 2010.

96. Mark Fitzpatrick, Overcoming Pakistan’s Nuclear Dangers, 

Adelphi Series 443, London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2014.

97. For a strategy to deter terrorism, see Matthew Kroenig 

and Barry Pavel, “How to Deter Terrorism,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 35, No. 2, March 2012, pp. 21-36.

98. Jeffrey Goldberg, “Obama to Iran and Israel: ‘As President 

of the United States, I Don’t Bluff’,” The Atlantic, March 2, 2012.

99. For example, see Lucy Williamson, “North Korea ramps 

up nuclear rhetoric as UN vote looms,” BBC World News, March 7, 

2013, available from www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21698728.

100. Nicholas Watt, “Pakistan boasted of nuclear strike on 

India within eight seconds,” The Guardian, June 15, 2012. 

101. Quoted in Daily Mail Reporter, “China reveals its ability 

to nuke the US: Government boasts about new submarine fleet 

capable of launching warheads at cities across the nation,” Daily 

Mail, November 2, 2013.

102. “Seliger 2014 National Youth Forum,” Tver Region, 

Russia, August 29, 2014, transcript of Russian President Vladimir 

Putin’s visit available from eng.kremlin.ru/transcripts/22864.
183

CHAPTER 6

AFTER ARMAGEDDON: PONDERING 

THE POTENTIAL POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES 

OF THIRD USE

Matthew Fuhrmann

Nuclear weapons have thankfully not been used 

in war since 1945. The nonuse of the world’s most 

destructive weapon for 70 years makes it tempting to 

conclude that nuclear weapons are relics of a bygone 

era. The possibility of another nuclear attack, according to this line of thinking, is remote. This view may be 

correct—and hopefully it is—but there is some cause 

for pessimism. Several alarming incidents during the 

Cold War brought the Soviet Union and the United 

States to the brink of nuclear war: former Soviet leader 

Nikita Khrushchev threatened to unleash nuclear attacks if Western forces did not withdraw from West 

Berlin during crises in 1958-59 and 1961; an American 

U-2 spy plane accidently ventured into Soviet airspace 

during the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962; the United States ordered defense readiness 

condition (DEFCON) 3, thereby placing nuclear forces 

on alert, during the 1973 Yom Kippur War to deter Soviet involvement in the conflict; and a North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) exercise, known as Able 

Archer 83, caused the Soviet Union to make preparations for nuclear war in 1983. 

The world remains a dangerous place in the postCold War era. It does not take too much imagination 

to envision a scenario in which nuclear weapons could 

be used in today’s environment. India and Pakistan 

threatened nuclear escalation during the 1999 Kargil 
184

War, and again following the 2001 Indian Parliament 

attack. A future Indo-Pakistani crisis could spiral out 

of control, leading to an accidental or intentional nuclear exchange. North Korea has made multiple nuclear 

threats since its first nuclear test in 2006. If backed into 

a corner, a desperate North Korean Supreme Leader 

Kim Jong-un may carry out his threat to turn Seoul 

into a fireball. There have been three serious crises 

in the Taiwan Strait involving China and the United 

States—in 1954-1955, 1958, and 1995. A fourth crisis, if 

it occurs, could escalate to a dangerous level. 

Thinking about nuclear war scenarios is unpleasant. Indeed, it is depressing to imagine an event that 

could cause such widespread death and destruction. 

Studying this subject takes us into the “dark side” of 

international relations.1 Uncomfortable as it may be, it 

is important to consider what might happen if nuclear 

weapons are used for a third time. How might nuclear 

use change the world in which we live? 

Little scholarly literature in political science addresses this question. On one hand, it is easy to see 

why this is the case. Everyone understands that a 

nuclear attack has the potential to inflict catastrophic 

damage, possibly wiping entire countries off the map. 

Any additional political consequences seem trivial 

when compared to the human costs of nuclear war. 

Most scholarly thinking, therefore, has been devoted 

to the causes of war in the nuclear age. We seek to 

understand why wars occur and when nuclear deterrence might fail, in part, to offer guidance on how 

countries can further reduce the danger of armed conflict in the shadow of nuclear weapons.2

 This is perfectly reasonable, and I have framed some of my own 

research along these lines.3
185

However, there is value in thinking through the 

possible political effects of the third use of nuclear 

weapons. First, this exercise can help us better understand a key puzzle in international relations: Why 

haven’t nuclear weapons been used since 1945?4 Part 

of the answer has to do with the human costs of a 

nuclear attack, but this is not the full story. A nuclear 

detonation in a large city could kill several hundred 

thousand civilians, but one can also imagine a nuclear 

use scenario in which few people die. One military 

advantage of nuclear bombs is that they can destroy 

“hardened” targets more effectively than conventional weapons. The United States, in theory, could launch 

a nuclear attack against a remotely located weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD) facility in the middle of a 

desert where there are few, if any, civilians for miles.5

Such an attack may not kill any more people than a 

conventional strike would. Why have countries not 

used nuclear weapons in this type of scenario? We can 

more fully appreciate this issue by delving deeper into 

the political costs of nuclear attacks. As this chapter 

will show, the third use of nuclear weapons carries 

significant costs for the attacker, even if few people 

are killed as a result.

Second, from a policy standpoint, we risk underestimating the costs of nuclear use if we neglect the 

possible political consequences. Few credible analysts 

would suggest that a nuclear attack would not be costly. However, significant costs may be “hidden,” especially in cases where a country is not directly involved 

in nuclear use, as either the attacker or the target. The 

analysis that follows reveals that there are significant 

political risks associated with the third use of nuclear 

weapons. Once we take stock of these consequences, 

nuclear use seems even more cataclysmic than when 

we focus on the human costs alone. 
186

This chapter considers the possible political ramifications of the bomb’s third use. Lacking a crystal ball, 

it is impossible to know for sure how world politics 

might change following a nuclear attack. Reaching 

definitive conclusions about something that has not 

happened is exceedingly difficult, and this inevitably 

requires a fair amount of speculation. This chapter 

does not intend to predict the future. It instead has 

three main goals: (1) to identify some of the conceivable political consequences of nuclear use; (2) to discuss variables that are likely to shape the degree to 

which these costs materialize; and (3) to comment on 

what my analysis teaches us about the role of nuclear 

weapons in world politics. The sections that follow 

address these issues in turn.

POTENTIAL POLITICAL EFFECTS OF THE 

THIRD USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

This section considers some of the possible consequences of a nuclear attack. Before proceeding, some 

key points warrant further clarification. I focus on the 

political effects of nuclear use, largely leaving aside 

the numerous humanitarian, social, environmental, 

and economic consequences that would no doubt 

arise from a nuclear strike. Non-political issues associated with nuclear use are critically important, but they 

fall outside the scope of this particular chapter. Additionally, my analysis centers on the possible third 

use of nuclear weapons. The bomb’s third use could 

lead to unrestrained nuclear warfare, but this chapter 

is not designed to assess the consequences of nuclear 

holocaust scenarios. Nuclear escalation is one conceivable consequence of a nuclear attack, and I discuss 

this possibility below, but I do not strive to compre-
187

hensively analyze the political consequences of total 

nuclear war.

The list of political costs that could arise from 

nuclear use is practically endless. I focus on some of 

the most significant consequences, grouping them 

into four main categories: (1) military escalation and 

the diffusion of armed conflict, (2) political blowback 

toward the nuclear user, (3) damage to the nonproliferation regime, and (4) erosion of democracy. All 

of these consequences, discussed in the next section, 

could plausibly result from a nuclear attack. This does 

not imply, however, that they would automatically 

materialize.

Military Escalation and the Diffusion 

of Armed Conflict.

The third use of nuclear weapons could ignite an 

ongoing military conflict. Whether nuclear use leads 

to further military escalation depends, in part, on how 

the target state responds. If the target also possesses a 

nuclear arsenal, there would be significant pressure to 

launch a retaliatory nuclear strike. The third use of nuclear weapons, then, could quickly lead to the fourth 

use. After that, the conflict could escalate from limited 

to total nuclear war. Of course, even if the target has 

the capacity to strike back with its arsenal, nuclear retaliation is by no means guaranteed. The target may 

instead choose to launch a stiff conventional response, 

or surrender and not respond at all.6 However, there is 

a non-trivial danger that using nuclear weapons could 

lead to unrestrained military escalation. 

The level of escalation may depend on actors other than the nuclear user and the target. Nuclear use 

could pull other countries, especially powerful ones, 
188

into an ongoing war. During the Cold War, most of the 

plausible nuclear attack scenarios involved the United 

States and the Soviet Union. The situation is different 

today: many dangerous flashpoints in the world center 

on disputes between regional powers, like India and 

Pakistan. When regional powers armed with nuclear 

arsenals fight, there is often significant pressure on 

other countries to intervene. During the 1999 Kargil 

War, for example, the United States actively sought 

to prevent nuclear escalation. After U.S. intelligence 

detected the movement of Pakistani nuclear weapons, 

former President Bill Clinton warned Pakistani leader 

Nawaz Sharif not to launch a nuclear attack, and this 

may have helped bring an end to the conflict. If a regional nuclear power followed through on an atomic 

threat, it would likely be difficult for the United States 

to remain on the sidelines. Washington may decide to 

intervene militarily to deter further nuclear escalation. 

The prospect of suffering military punishment at the 

hands of a superpower may de-escalate a war, as it 

did in the case of Kargil.

Yet, superpower intervention could further escalate tensions. Should the United States join a limited nuclear war, the American arsenal could be on 

the table. Pressure might mount, especially if there 

were high casualties for U.S. forces, to launch retaliatory nuclear strikes against the initial nuclear user. 

Imagine, for the sake of illustration, that North Korea launched a surprise nuclear attack against Japan 

or South Korea. The United States may intervene to 

defend its allies. If it did, Washington would surely 

prefer to prevail using conventional military power 

only. However, if the conflict persisted, some may 

come to believe that America could not “win”—at 

least not at an acceptable cost—by continuing to fight 

at the conventional level. The end result, if this kind 
189

of thinking prevailed, could be an American nuclear 

response. Not only does this stylized example illustrate how superpower intervention could intensify an 

ongoing war, but it also underscores that the third use 

of nuclear weapons might lead to nuclear retaliation 

even if the target is nonnuclear. 

There are other, less obvious ways that a nuclear 

attack could lead to the further spread of military 

conflict. Research shows that war undermines public health.7

 Armed conflict can expose individuals to 

conditions that are conducive to the spread of disease, 

reduce the resources available for public health, and 

destroy critical infrastructure, like hospitals. One can 

imagine that the third use of nuclear weapons might 

create a severe public health crisis in the target country. Hundreds of thousands of civilians could be 

killed or injured, and medical help might not be readily available. The public health emergency that would 

likely ensue from a nuclear attack, combined with 

widespread panic in the civilian population, could 

undermine stability in the target country, potentially 

raising the risk of political violence or civil war. 

The environmental consequences of a nuclear attack could also fuel instability in the target. Rich literature suggests that environmental degradation increases the risk of conflict, in part, by causing resource 

scarcity.8 A nuclear attack would severely damage the 

surrounding environment, potentially rendering large 

portions of land uninhabitable. Moreover, food and 

water supplies could be contaminated. People may 

believe that it is unsafe to consume resources from 

the target, even if the food supply is unaffected by the 

nuclear blast, leading to further resource shortages. 

All of this could provoke a competition over scarce 

resources, potentially breeding conflict or civil war in 

the target country.
190

Chaos in the target state could have consequences 

for neighboring states too. War is known to create refugee problems. As a result of the ongoing Syrian Civil 

War, for instance, more than 2 million civilians have 

fled Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Turkey, and elsewhere. Individuals may flee conflict zones because their homes 

are destroyed or due to concerns about their future 

safety. In any case, massive refugee flows can have 

significant political consequences. Most notably, the 

presence of refugees from neighboring states increases the likelihood that a country will experience political turmoil and armed conflict.9

 A nuclear attack could 

produce a similar sequence of events on a larger scale. 

Civilians in the target country could flee to neighboring states in droves. Many would leave due to 

the belief that radioactive fallout from a nuclear blast 

makes it unsafe to remain in the country. Others may 

flee, even if they live far from the blast site, because 

they fear additional nuclear attacks. Neighboring 

countries would probably be ill-equipped to take on 

massive refugee flows. At the very least, this could 

create a major humanitarian crisis. Consider what 

happened following the March 2011 accident at Japan’s Fukushima nuclear power plant. Widespread 

radioactive contamination forced many residents to 

flee the surrounding area. Two years after the disaster, there were still 83,000 nuclear refugees who were 

unable to return home.10 The large-scale movement of 

people following a nuclear attack could raise the risk 

of conflict in neighboring countries by sapping public 

resources, inciting ethnic tensions, or spreading fear 

and uncertainty. Anticipating the problems associated 

with taking on refugees on a large scale, potential host 

countries might deny entry to civilians from the target 

country. If this happens, refugees themselves might 
191

turn to violence, in a desperate attempt to gain sanctuary in a neighboring state. 

The third use of nuclear weapons could also have 

long-term consequences for international conflict. It is 

widely believed that conflict begets conflict.11 In other 

words, once two countries fight, they are more likely 

to experience future military disputes. War, therefore, 

can lead to a vicious cycle that is difficult to reverse. 

It is no accident, according to this perspective, that 

countries such as India and Pakistan fight repeatedly 

over similar issues. Why do many conflicts recur? Part 

of the answer is that armed conflict creates grievances 

and leads to resentment and distrust, which increases 

the likelihood of future conflict. For example, there is 

still bad blood between Japan and South Korea over 

atrocities committed by Imperial Japan during World 

War II. Today, due to persistent feelings of resentment, the leaders of these two countries are reportedly “barely on speaking terms.”12 The use of nuclear 

weapons would likely result in widespread bitterness 

toward the nuclear user among individuals in the 

target country. As a result, once two countries fight a 

nuclear war, they are likely to fight again in the future. 

The consequences of nuclear use for international conflict, therefore, could persist long after fighting in the 

nuclear war stops. Nuclear use could severely exacerbate an existing interstate rivalry, or lead to the onset 

of a new one.

Political Blowback for the Nuclear User.

The preceding discussion highlights some of the 

ways in which nuclear use could be damaging for 

international security. In this section, I focus on consequences that are unique to the nuclear user.13 I high-
192

lighted the most direct such cost previously: the user 

could suffer nuclear or conventional retaliation from 

the target or from third parties. Yet the possible costs 

for the attacker do not end there. A state that carried 

out the third use of nuclear weapons could experience 

other kinds of political blowback. 

A leader who carries out a nuclear attack could 

put his or her political future at risk. The third use of 

nuclear weapons would shatter a tradition of nuclear 

nonuse that has persisted for decades, a point that I 

will revisit in the subsequent section. Other countries 

are therefore likely to be threatened by the nuclear 

user’s actions. They may seek to remove him or her 

from power through a foreign imposed regime change 

(FIRC). In the past, the United States has used FIRCs 

to punish leaders who pursued policies that were inimical to American interests. Washington covertly removed Mohammad Mosaddegh from power in Iran 

during the 1950s, and attempted to eliminate former 

Cuban leader Fidel Castro on numerous occasions in 

the 1960s, to cite a couple of particularly infamous examples. The United States has also removed foreign 

leaders from power overtly, as in the case of Saddam 

Hussein during the 2003 Iraq War. It is not too hard 

to imagine that a leader who used nuclear weapons 

might suffer a similar fate. International actors may be 

unnecessary to remove the nuclear user from power. 

The use of nuclear weapons could incite domestic unrest, possibly triggering a domestic revolt that forces 

the nuclear user to step down.

Using nuclear weapons could complicate a state’s 

relations with friendly nations. Countries often strain 

their alliance relationships when they take aggressive 

actions. For example, the United States was displeased 

when British and French troops invaded the Suez 
193

Canal Zone in 1956. The Soviet Union was similarly 

alarmed when one of its protégés, North Korea, seized 

a U.S. military vessel known as the USS Pueblo in 1968. 

Alliances are particularly likely to become strained 

when there is the possibility of nuclear escalation. 

Many leaders in Western Europe were incensed by 

discussions of nuclear use in the United States during 

the Korean War (1953), the Indochina War (1954), and 

the Berlin crises (1958-1959 and 1961). Former Soviet 

leader Nikita Khrushchev likewise became deeply 

concerned when Fidel Castro privately advocated for 

preventive nuclear strikes against the United States 

during the Cuban Missile Crisis. As a result of this 

episode, Khrushchev believed that he could no longer trust Castro. When the crisis ended, the Soviets 

removed their tactical nuclear weapons from Cuba 

(the existence of which the United States did not know 

about at the time) that they had initially intended to 

keep on the island. Castro’s mercurial behavior thus 

cost him the weapons that could have been vital to 

his security. The actual use of nuclear weapons could 

have profound effects on alliance relationships. Allies 

may turn their backs on the nuclear user or, at the very 

least, lose confidence in that state. The nuclear user 

may be left with few, if any, friends.

In addition to causing a state to lose friends, using nuclear weapons may create enemies. Other states 

may align against the nuclear user, seeking to contain that state in the long term. Countries often form 

military alliances to counter common threats.14 As the 

old adage goes, an enemy of an enemy is a friend. 

Because other countries are likely to find a state that 

uses nuclear weapons highly threatening, they may 

unite against it by forging formal alliances. By ganging up on the nuclear user in an attempt to contain 
194

it, the international community would likely frustrate 

the user’s ability to pursue its interests in the realm of 

foreign policy. Imagine if China used nuclear weapons in a future crisis with one of its regional rivals. 

That would likely change the way that many states 

perceive Beijing’s intentions, causing them to be more 

wary of China’s rise than they otherwise would be. 

Countries in Asia might therefore actively contain 

China, to meet what they perceive as a growing threat. 

In the end, China, a country whose grand strategy is 

based partially on the notion of a “peaceful rise,” may 

end up worse off than it would have been in the absence of a nuclear attack. 

The nuclear user could also become internationally isolated in other ways. Countries might levy 

harsh economic sanctions against that state or terminate commercial ties altogether. It is also conceivable 

that states might sever diplomatic relations, leaving 

the nuclear user politically cut off from the rest of the 

world. Additionally, being labeled as a pariah could 

undermine a country’s international influence. 

Damage to the Nonproliferation Regime.

The third use of nuclear weapons could undermine the nuclear nonproliferation regime. As noted 

above, there is a 70-year tradition of nuclear nonuse. 

Countries had opportunities to use nuclear weapons 

on a number of occasions, including some of those 

referenced above, but they refrained from doing so 

each time. In a few instances—notably the Vietnam 

War and the Soviet-Afghan War—nuclear powers accepted defeat before using their nuclear arsenals. The 

persistent absence of nuclear use has led to the creation of a “nuclear taboo.”15 This taboo brings stability 
195

to world politics by giving states greater confidence 

that they will not be subjected to unprovoked nuclear 

attacks. The third use of nuclear weapons, however, 

could shatter the nuclear taboo. 

Using nuclear weapons a third time might set a 

dangerous precedent—namely, that it is acceptable 

to use atomic bombs to resolve interstate disputes.16

By changing the rules of the game, nuclear use could 

make future nuclear attacks more likely. To illustrate, 

consider how the use of nuclear weapons during the 

1982 Falklands War might have affected the nuclear 

taboo. Britain carried nuclear weapons—specifically 

nuclear depths bombs—to the South Atlantic after 

Argentina occupied the disputed Falkland Islands. 

What if Britain had used one of those bombs, either 

intentionally or accidentally? Some may find this possibility farfetched, but if it had happened, it may have 

changed the way that countries thought about nuclear 

weapons. Up until that point, the bomb had not been 

used in war for 37 years, contributing to the perception that “responsible” countries do not use such a 

destructive weapon. However, if Britain had broken 

the nuclear taboo, other nuclear powers might have 

believed that they too could use atomic weapons. 

Nuclear arsenals, then, may have come to play a bigger role in world politics. This brings me to a related 

point.

Nuclear use may foment nuclear proliferation. 

One effective nonproliferation strategy is to make 

the world think that nuclear weapons are utterly useless. If having a nuclear arsenal provides no benefits, 

why would anyone want to build one? The third 

use of nuclear weapons could cultivate the opposite 

perception—that possessing the bomb allows one to 

get their way in international relations. This was one 
196

unintended consequence of the nuclear attacks against 

Hiroshima and Nagasaki. At the time, most observers believed that using nuclear weapons helped the 

United States end the Pacific War on favorable terms.17

This perception fueled widespread interest in nuclear 

weapons, particularly in the Soviet Union. If nuclear 

weapons are again seen as useful for coercing other 

states, interest in atomic arsenals could spike globally.

The preceding logic assumes that states desire nuclear weapons for offensive diplomatic purposes; and 

yet, nuclear arsenals are useful primarily for defense.18

Even status quo oriented countries, then, might seek 

nuclear weapons following their third use. Those 

states might do so to protect themselves from nuclear 

blackmail or nuclear attacks. History shows that countries sometimes launch nuclear weapons programs 

after they are faced with perceived nuclear threats. 

During the 1950s, for instance, the United States brandished its nuclear arsenal in two crises with China in 

the Taiwan Strait. This caused officials in Beijing to believe that they were vulnerable to U.S. pressure in the 

absence of a nuclear deterrent. As the Chinese official 

statement issued after its first nuclear test in 1964 stated, China became a nuclear weapons state to “oppose 

the U.S. imperialist policy of nuclear blackmail and 

nuclear threats.”19 The third use of nuclear weapons 

could cultivate a sense of vulnerability in nonnuclear 

countries, similar to what China felt in the 1950s, causing them to seek a nuclear arsenal. It is not unreasonable to suppose that China’s use of nuclear weapons 

in a future crisis with Taiwan, for example, might motivate some of the other countries with whom Beijing 

has ongoing disputes—Brunei, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam—to go 

nuclear.
197

There are, of course, significant costs associated 

with building nuclear weapons. In some cases, launching a bomb program may harm a state’s security. As 

underscored by Israel’s attacks against Iraq (1981) and 

Syria (2007), countries suspected of pursuing the bomb 

may be vulnerable to preventive military strikes. Some 

states might therefore hesitate to proliferate even if 

the third use of nuclear weapons leaves them feeling 

threatened. They may instead opt for another strategy: 

building the technical capacity to proliferate without 

actually building nuclear bombs. This strategy, known 

as “nuclear hedging,” allows a state to build a crude 

bomb quickly in the event of a crisis. It is a potentially 

attractive path because it allows a country to have its 

cake (by being able to proliferate quickly if necessary) 

and eat it too (by skirting some of the costs associated 

with pursuing nuclear weapons). Some have argued 

that this is precisely the strategy that Iran is adopting 

today; Japan is another state believed to be engaging 

in nuclear hedging.20 If states opt for this approach, the 

third use of nuclear weapons could lead to the diffusion of advanced nuclear capabilities. Countries may 

not immediately weaponize those capabilities, but the 

presence of additional “latent nuclear powers” could 

undermine international security.21

Another use of nuclear weapons could weaken key 

international institutions, like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT allows five countries 

to possess nuclear weapons, and requires everyone 

else to give up the nuclear option. Many scholars and 

policymakers credit the treaty with restraining the 

further spread of nuclear weapons. In the early-1960s, 

then-President John F. Kennedy famously predicted 

that 15 or 20 countries could build nuclear weapons 

in the coming 2 decades. Yet, after the NPT entered 
198

into force in 1970, only four states proliferated: India, 

North Korea, Pakistan, and South Africa. According 

to NPT advocates, many more countries would have 

proliferated if the treaty had not been created. Today, 

the NPT has near-universal membership: all but four 

countries are members.22 However, the third use of 

nuclear weapons could cause states to withdraw from 

the treaty, which is within their right per Article X of 

the agreement, so long as they provide 90 days advanced notice. Countries who seek nuclear weapons, 

alternatively, could remain in the treaty and cheat on 

their NPT commitment. Either way, the glue that held 

the nonproliferation regime together for more than 40 

years may no longer hold, following the third use of 

nuclear weapons.

The discussion in this section so far assumes that 

the third use of nuclear weapons would negatively 

affect the nonproliferation regime. It is also possible, 

and somewhat paradoxical, that nuclear use would 

result in a stronger regime. The international community often reacts to disasters by instituting sweeping 

reforms. Most of the major improvements to the nonproliferation regime since 1970 resulted from crises of 

confidence in existing measures. India’s nuclear test 

in 1974 led to the creation of the Nuclear Suppliers 

Group (NSG), a cartel designed to regulate trade in 

nuclear technology and materials. Iraq’s violations of 

the NPT prior to the 1991 Persian Gulf War caused 

the international community to give the International 

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the main enforcer 

of the NPT, more teeth through the 1997 Additional 

Protocol. In addition, the international community 

sought to strengthen global export controls by passing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 

after the public exposure of the A. Q. Khan network, 
199

a Pakistani-based operation that supplied nuclear 

weapon-related technology to Iran, Libya, and North 

Korea. As these examples illustrate, sweeping reforms 

are sometimes possible in a time of crisis. The third 

use of nuclear weapons would no doubt be horrific. 

It might, therefore, create a broad international consensus to strengthen nonproliferation norms in an 

attempt to lower the odds that the bomb would be 

used a fourth time. This does not imply that the third 

use of nuclear weapons would be a good thing. The 

negative consequences would outweigh any marginal 

improvement in the nonproliferation regime resulting 

from nuclear use.

Erosion of Democracy.

Political theorists and international lawyers have 

long recognized that war can undermine democratic 

governance—especially civil liberties. In times of war, 

leaders sometimes face pressures to degrade individual freedoms in the name of protecting state security. 

As one British lawyer put it, “it’s always the case that 

the flame of civil liberties burns less brightly when surrounded by the smoke from bombed buses and tube 

trains.”23 Former U.S. President Abraham Lincoln, for 

example, famously suspended the writ of habeas corpus during the American Civil War, denying detainees 

the right to challenge unlawful imprisonment. Following the attack on Pearl Harbor, former U.S. President 

Franklin Delano Roosevelt gave the military authority 

to remove Japanese-Americans from the west coast of 

the United States. And, more recently, civil liberties 

declined in the United States following the American 

response to the 9/11 attacks. Measures taken by Washington to prevent future terrorist attacks—such as the 
200

passage of the Patriot Act—had the consequence of 

reducing individual freedoms. As these examples underscore, war can put democratic values at risk in the 

short-term.

War may also have enduring, long-term effects on 

civil liberties, although this point is more widely contested in academic literature. Measures that are put 

in place during times of emergency, according to one 

line of thinking, persist long after the fighting stops. 

Ronald Krebs aptly characterizes this view: 

temporary states of emergency become permanent, 

emergency measures are incorporated into ordinary 

law, authorities employ emergency powers in everyday situations, and populations’ civil liberties baselines adjust to new realities.24

Others challenge this argument. Measures that are imposed during times of war, they argue, are lifted when 

peace returns.25 Several historical cases support this 

view: The United States, for instance, reinstated habeas corpus once the civil war ended (although former 

President Ulysses S. Grant temporarily suspended it 

again in some places during Reconstruction).

It is also possible that the long-term effects of war 

on democracy are positive. An executive’s erosion of 

democracy during wartime could prompt a domestic 

backlash once fighting stops, leading to new measures 

that reign-in executive power. Some scholars point 

to the U.S. experience with the Vietnam War to substantiate this notion.26 When the war ended, Congress 

passed the War Powers Resolution (1973), making 

it more difficult for the President to send U.S. forces 

abroad without congressional consent.

How might the third use of nuclear weapons influence democracy? There is a general consensus that 
201

civil liberties are more likely to erode when states face 

intense threats.27 A nuclear attack would likely trigger a sense of extreme panic in the target country. It is 

therefore possible that the target would face pressure 

to prioritize security above all else. When the conflict 

ended, the target might continue to impose restrictions 

on civil liberties to forestall future nuclear attacks.

The bomb’s third use might also erode democracy 

in states other than the target— particularly in those 

countries that could be vulnerable to nuclear strikes. 

Once the tradition of nuclear nonuse is broken, all

states might change their views on the likelihood that 

they could suffer a nuclear attack. Given their obvious incentive to avoid atomic strikes, states may institute new measures to protect themselves. One possibility is that countries would give executives more 

sweeping-powers, potentially at the risk of individual 

liberties, institutional checks and balances, and other 

hallmarks of democratic governance. Imagine if Russia launched a nuclear attack against Ukraine (leaving aside judgments about whether this is conceivable or not). Following such an attack, Russia’s other 

rivals might come to believe that they are vulnerable 

to nuclear strikes. In addition, states that are enemies 

of nuclear powers other than Russia would probably 

face a heightened sense of insecurity. If Russia used 

nuclear weapons against Ukraine, for example, Japan 

and South Korea might fear that North Korea would 

be emboldened to follow suit against them. The potential victims of future nuclear attacks would naturally 

seek to enhance their security, and, in doing so, they 

may weaken their commitments to democracy.
202

FACTORS THAT MIGHT INFLUENCE 

THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR USE

We cannot know for certain, as noted previously, 

what would happen if there is another nuclear attack. Some of the consequences identified above may 

emerge following the third use of nuclear weapons, 

but others may not. Whether costs materialize—and 

the degree to which they do so—will depend on a 

wide variety of considerations. This section focuses on 

some of the relevant factors. I identify the five “W’s”—

who, what, when, where, and why—of nuclear third 

use that could shape the nature and magnitude of the 

above political costs.

Factor #1: Who Uses Nuclear Weapons? 

The characteristics of the nuclear user could play 

an important role. How powerful that state is, for 

example, may affect the price that it pays for using 

nuclear bombs. A superpower, like the United States 

today, may be relatively insulated from political blowback. Other states might be deterred from launching 

retaliatory strikes against the United States, for fear 

of provoking a broader conflict that they would likely 

lose. By contrast, potential punishers of the nuclear 

user may be less worried about military escalation if 

they are dealing with a non-superpower. The relative 

“rogueness” of the nuclear user would also be important. For a state that is largely cut off from the international community already—for example, North 

Korea—any additional isolation they might suffer as a 

result of using nuclear weapons could be trivial. Nuclear use, therefore, may be less costly for those states. 

Yet, for a country like China that is heavily integrated 
203

in the global economy, economic sanctions could have 

a devastating effect.

Some of the preceding discussion implies that the 

nuclear user would be a country. However, this need 

not be the case. It is theoretically possible that the third 

user of nuclear weapons could be a terrorist group. 

Whether the user is a country or not would likely matter when it comes to the political fallout of a nuclear 

attack, a point on which I will elaborate later. 

Factor #2: What Is Targeted? 

What the nuclear user destroys in an attack would 

also influence the political costs. Launching an attack 

against a city that kills 100,000 or more civilians is one 

thing. Using tactical bombs on the battlefield against 

an advancing army is another. Yet another is bombing 

a remote “hardened” target that results in relatively 

few casualties. The international community would 

likely deplore any use of nuclear weapons, but states 

would probably react the strongest to countervalue 

targeting. Thus, the political costs—especially the 

blowback for the nuclear user—would likely be greatest in cases where a state deliberately targets civilians.

Factor #3: When Are Nuclear Weapons Used? 

When a state launches a nuclear attack is another 

significant factor. It matters, in particular, whether 

nuclear use occurs during an ongoing war or in 

peacetime. Even conventional preventive attacks are 

controversial, as underscored by the 2003 Iraq War. 

A bolt from the blue nuclear attack would be a particularly strong violation of a longstanding international norm. Such an incident could draw extreme 
204

ire from other states, thus increasing the costs for the 

attacker. Things might be different if the third use of 

nuclear weapons occurred in the midst of a protracted 

conventional war. The political costs for the attacker, 

then, may be somewhat reduced in those cases, even 

if the blowback is still severe. Think, for the sake of 

illustration, about the U.S. attack on Hiroshima visà-vis a hypothetical preventive nuclear strike against 

Tokyo in 1940. 

Factor #4: Where Is the Bomb Used? 

Against whom an attacker uses nuclear weapons 

could influence the consequences of nuclear use for 

world politics. Whether the target possesses nuclear 

weapons is one critical consideration. If the target is 

nonnuclear, the potential for nuclear escalation declines. At the same time, some of the non-military 

costs for the attacker could increase. Using the bomb 

against a nonnuclear state could be seen as particularly reprehensible,28 and might trigger a stiffer response 

from the international community. If the target also 

possesses the bomb, there is a higher probability of 

nuclear retaliation. Those scenarios, then, are potentially more dangerous for international security. Yet 

the non-military costs might decline slightly, as others 

are less likely to perceive the attack as an attempt to 

bully a defenseless country. 

The target’s ability to cope with a nuclear attack 

might also be significant. Several of the political costs 

discussed previously may be worse when the target 

is unstable. In particular, countries that are already 

prone to political violence would probably be more 

prone to civil war following a nuclear attack. On top 

of this, unstable countries, which are also likely to be 
205

underdeveloped, may be relatively helpless when it 

comes to addressing the fallout from a nuclear attack. 

Life in a developed country would almost certainly 

be chaotic after a nuclear strike, too. However, a state 

with the capacity to at least partially deal with an 

emergency might be able to lessen refugee problems 

and other environmental issues, although these problems would still be acute. Therefore, conflict might 

more likely diffuse when the target is weak (for example, Pakistan) than when it is strong (for example, 

the United States). 

Factor #5: Why Are Nuclear Weapons Used?

The reason a state would use nuclear weapons 

represents a fifth key consideration. The third use of 

nuclear weapons could be deliberate or accidental. 

Indeed, many plausible nuclear attack scenarios during the Cold War and today involve non-authorized 

nuclear use. It was possible that during the Cuban 

Missile Crisis, for instance, a local Soviet commander 

in Cuba could have fired a nuclear weapon without 

explicit authorization from Moscow. If the third use of 

nuclear weapons occurs due to the actions of a rogue 

military officer, the nature of the political costs could 

change dramatically. For example, international attention might be focused on how to better secure existing nuclear arsenals, rather than on how to punish 

the nuclear user. This does not imply, of course, that a 

nuclear user would be absolved of any and all responsibility simply because an attack was accidental. 

When attacks are deliberate, the intentions of the attacker also matter. First, it makes a difference whether 

others perceive its aims as offensive or defensive. Most 

deliberate uses of nuclear weapons that one can imag-
206

ine serve a coercive purpose: The attacker hopes to 

change the behavior of the target by inflicting massive 

amounts of punishment, or impose its will militarily. 

However, not all coercive uses of nuclear weapons are 

the same. In some cases, the attacker seeks a return to 

the status quo ante. Using nuclear weapons to restore 

stability to a system that was challenged by a revisionist power may be viewed as more acceptable than 

launching a nuclear attack entirely for offensive purposes. Consider the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The United States tried to force Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, 

first with diplomacy and then with military force. Yet 

the international community did not view Washington as the aggressor. Most observers recognized that 

the United States was responding to Saddam’s unprovoked invasion and occupation of a largely defenseless neighbor. In this type of case, nuclear use may be 

less costly than when the attacker’s aims are perceived 

as offensive, as in the 2003 invasion of Iraq (note that 

there is some overlap here with factor #3).

Second, the attacker’s specific goals are also relevant. Other countries would probably respond differently to the third use of nuclear weapons based on 

the stakes for the attacker. If the attacker is fighting for 

its survival, and especially if it was attacked first, others might understand why it resorted to the nuclear 

option, potentially lessening their willingness to retaliate diplomatically, politically, or economically. By 

contrast, others may have a hard time empathizing 

with a state that used nuclear weapons in pursuit of 

an important but non-vital objective, like forcing the 

target to hand over disputed territory.
207

CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR 

WEAPONS IN WORLD POLITICS

Two points about the consequences of nuclear use 

are worth underscoring. First, many of the political effects discussed in this chapter—for example, the possibility of conflict escalation—are straightforward, but 

others are less obvious. The effects of nuclear use for 

democracy and civil war, in particular, have received 

relatively little attention in the literature. These things 

might seem trivial when compared to the loss of hundreds of thousands of civilians. At the same time, we 

risk underestimating the effects of nuclear use by neglecting the political costs of an atomic attack. This 

chapter represents a modest attempt to discuss some 

of the main political consequences; there are no doubt 

others that I have not identified. 

Second, there is important variation in the political costs of nuclear use. All uses of atomic bombs are 

not created equal, even if they produce similar human 

costs. Both a Pakistani tactical nuclear attack against 

advancing Indian conventional forces in a future war, 

and a North Korean nuclear attack on Seoul launched 

in response to a mistaken false warning of an incoming American missile attack, for example, would produce horrific consequences, but they would likely affect world politics in different ways. The “five W’s” of 

nuclear use discussed in this chapter offers a framework for understanding how the political costs might 

vary. 

More generally, the analysis in this chapter speaks 

to the tradition of nuclear nonuse.29 Everyone understands that a nuclear attack would be devastating for the target. However, my analysis reaffirms 

that the third use of nuclear weapons would also be 
208

quite costly for the attacker. A state that launched a 

nuclear attack would probably suffer enormous political blowback, and would do great damage to the 

nonproliferation regime (which is damaging to the extent that the attacker cares about limiting the spread 

of nuclear weapons). These costs help explain why 

countries have refrained from using nuclear weapons 

in war since 1945, although moral considerations also 

play an important role. 

In addition, this chapter has implications for the 

benefits that states derive (and do not gain) from 

possessing a nuclear arsenal. Some have argued that 

atomic arsenals are useful tools of coercion and intimidation.30 Nuclear weapons, according to this line of 

thinking, have benefits that extend well beyond deterrence. States can extract concessions more effectively 

or impose their will on others simply by raising the 

possibility of a nuclear attack. Others have challenged 

this view, arguing that nuclear weapons have little 

utility beyond deterring military conflict.31 The reason 

is simple: It is difficult to make nuclear threats credible when the potential attacker’s aims are compellent 

in nature (as opposed to deterrent). Recognizing that 

there is variation in the costs of nuclear use for the 

challenger helps us understand why nuclear weapons 

may be useful for some political purposes and not 

others. Consider a hypothetical scenario where China 

decides to attack Japan’s third largest city, Osaka, 

after escalating conventional engagements over the 

Senkaku Islands. The costs for the attacker are greatest in this case because nuclear use occurred for offensive purposes during a crisis in which the attacker’s 

national survival was not at stake. This is partially 

why this scenario is quite unlikely to occur. China is 

unlikely to carry out a strike that harms its strategic 
209

interests to such a degree. Japan and the United States 

would recognize this at the outset, and they are likely 

to dismiss Beijing’s coercive nuclear threat as incredible. China thus will have a hard time wresting away 

the Senkakus from Japan by practicing nuclear coercion. In cases like this, then, states are unlikely to derive much political utility from their nuclear arsenals. 

By contrast, in deterrence, the costs of nuclear use 

for the challenger are smaller, and the stakes may be 

higher. A state’s threat to launch a nuclear attack if it 

is invaded, therefore, may be deemed credible. Again, 

nuclear weapons may deter, but they generally do not 

compel.32

Given the possible political costs of nuclear use 

detailed above, states would do well to take further 

measures to avoid the possibility of third use.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6

1. This phrase is borrowed from Robert Pape, who characterizes the study of military coercion as “the dark side of international relations.” See Pape, Bombing to Win: Air Power and Coercion 

in War, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996, p. 3.

2. As Ronald Krebs writes, “the field’s overriding concern 

was how to prevent a catastrophe in which millions would perish. This understandable focus on the causes of war came at the 

expense of research into its consequences.” See Krebs, “In the 

Shadow of War: The Effects of Conflict on Liberal Democracy,” 

International Organization, Vol. 63, No. 1, Winter 2009, pp. 177-210.

3. See, for example, Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, 

“Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs 

in Extended Nuclear Deterrence,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 58, No. 4, October 2014, pp. 919-935.

4. Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and 

the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons Since 1945, New York: Cambridge 
210

University Press, 2008; and T. V. Paul, The Tradition of Non-Use of 

Nuclear Weapons, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009.

5. This is similar to a scenario discussed in Daryl Press, Scott 

Sagan, and Benjamin Valentino, “Atomic Aversion: Experimental Evidence on Taboos, Traditions, and the Non-Use of Nuclear 

Weapons,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 107, No. 1, February 2013, pp. 188-206.

6. A target contemplating retaliation with nuclear weapons 

would have to weigh the benefits of attacking against the costs. A 

state might choose not to strike back with atomic weapons, for instance, if it believed that doing so would cause it to suffer further 

nuclear punishment, especially if the issue at stake was non-vital. 

7. See, for example, Hazem Adam Ghobarah, Paul Huth, and 

Bruce Russett, “Civil Wars Kill and Maim People—Long After the 

Shooting Stops,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 97, No. 2, 

May 2003, pp. 189-202; and Zaryab Iqbal, War and the Health of Nations, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010.

8. Henrik Urdal, “People vs. Malthus: Population Pressure, 

Environmental Degradation, and Armed Conflict Revisited,” 

Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 42, No. 4, July 2005, pp. 417-434.

9. Idean Salehyan and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, “Refugees 

and the Spread of Civil War,” International Organization, Vol. 60, 

No. 2, Spring 2006, pp. 335-366.

10. Martin Fackler, “Japan’s Nuclear Refugees, Still Stuck in 

Limbo,” The New York Times, October 1, 2013, available from www.

nytimes.com/2013/10/02/world/asia/japans-nuclear-refugees-stillstuck-in-limbo.html?_r=0.

11. See, for example, Paul Diehl and Gary Goertz, War and 

Peace in International Rivalry, Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000.

12. Martin Fackler and Choe Sang-Hun, “A Growing Chill Between South Korea and Japan Creates Problems for the U.S.,” The 

New York Times, November 23, 2013, available from www.nytimes.

com/2013/11/24/world/asia/a-growing-chill-between-south-korea-andjapan-creates-problems-for-the-us.html.
211

13. The discussion in this section draws partially on Todd 

S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive Diplomacy, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 

forthcoming.

14. Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances, Ithaca, NY: Cornell 

University Press, 1987.

15. Tannenwald.

16. Scott D. Sagan, “Realist Perspectives on Ethical Norms and 

Weapons of Mass Destruction,” in Sohail Hashmi and Steven Lee, 

eds., Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular 

Perspectives, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004.

17. Scholars continue to debate the role that the U.S. atomic 

bombings played in ending the Pacific War. See Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, Racing the Enemy: Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan, 

New York: Belknap Press, 2006; and Richard Frank, Downfall: The 

End of the Imperial Japanese Empire, New York: Penguin Books, 

2001.

18. Sechser and Fuhrmann, Nuclear Weapons and Coercive 

Diplomacy.

19. John Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb, Palo Alto, 

CA: Stanford University Press, 1991, p. 1.

20. Ariel Levite, “Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal 

Revisited,” International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3, Winter 2002-03, 

pp. 59-88.

21. Matthew Fuhrmann and Benjamin Tkach, “Almost Nuclear: Introducing the Nuclear Latency Dataset,” Conflict Management and Peace Science, Vol. 32, No. 4, September 2015, pp. 443-461.

22. The non-members are Israel, India, Pakistan, and North 

Korea.

23. Krebs, p. 184.

24. Ibid., pp. 187-188.
212

25. Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Executive Unbound: 

After the Madisonian Republic, Oxford, UK: Oxford University 

Press, 2011.

26. Krebs, pp. 181-182.

27. Ibid., p. 186.

28. Paul Huth and Bruce Russett, “Deterrence Failure and 

Crisis Escalation,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 32, No. 1, 

February 1988, p. 35.

29. Tannenwald; and Paul, The Tradition of Non-Use of Nuclear 

Weapons.

30. See, for example, Pape, Bombing to Win; Kyle Beardsley 

and Victor Asal, “Winning with the Bomb,” Journal of Conflict 

Resolution, Vol. 53, No. 2, March 2009, pp. 278-301; and Matthew 

Kroenig, “Nuclear Superiority and the Balance of Resolve,” International Organization, Vol. 67, No. 1, January 2013, pp. 141-171.

31. Todd S. Sechser and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Crisis Bargaining and Nuclear Blackmail,” International Organization, Vol. 67, 

No. 1, 2013, pp. 173-195.

32. Ibid., p. 175.
213

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS

W. SETH CARUS is a Distinguished Research Fellow 

at the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) at the National Defense University 

(NDU). His research focuses primarily on issues related to biological warfare, including threat assessment, 

biodefense, and the history of biological warfare. He 

is a co-author of The Future of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Their Nature and Role in 2030 (2014), and author of

Defining “Weapons of Mass Destruction,” Revised and Updated (2012), both published by the National Defense 

University Press. Dr. Carus has been at NDU since 

1997. He has a Ph.D. in international relations from 

the Johns Hopkins University in Baltimore, Maryland.

MATTHEW FUHRMANN is an associate professor of 

political science at Texas A&M University. He is a former Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at the Council on 

Foreign Relations, and a research fellow at the Belfer 

Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard 

University. Dr. Fuhrmann is the author of Atomic Assistance: How “Atoms for Peace” Programs Cause Nuclear 

Insecurity, a co-author of Nuclear Weapons and Coercive 

Diplomacy, and a co-editor of The Nuclear Renaissance 

and International Security. His research has been published in a number of journals, including the American

Journal of Political Science, British Journal of Political Science, International Organization, International Security, 

Journal of Conflict Resolution, Journal of Peace Research, 

and Journal of Politics, among others. He has published 

opinion pieces in outlets such as the Christian Science 

Monitor, Slate, and USA Today.
214

REBECCA DAVIS GIBBONS is a Visiting Assistant 

Professor at Bowdoin College. Her current book project examines how the United States has employed various tools of hegemony to bring about participation in 

the nuclear nonproliferation regime. In 2013-2014, Dr. 

Gibbons held a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellowship 

at the RAND Corporation. She received a Ph.D. in 

government from Georgetown University, an M.A. in 

international security studies from Georgetown University, and a B.A. in psychological & brain sciences 

from Dartmouth College.

VICTOR GILINSKY is an independent consultant primarily on matters related to nuclear energy. He was 

a two-term commissioner of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission from 1975-1984; and before that he 

was Head of the Rand Corporation Physical Sciences 

Department. He holds a Bachelors of Engineering 

Physics degree from Cornell University and a Ph.D. 

in physics from the California Institute of Technology, 

which gave him its Distinguished Alumni Award. He 

is a member of the American Physical Society and the 

Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers.

MATTHEW KROENIG is an associate professor of 

government and foreign service, and a nonresident 

senior fellow at the Brent Scowcroft Center on International Security at the Atlantic Council. From July 2010 

to July 2011, he was a Special Advisor in the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense on a Council on Foreign Relations International Affairs Fellowship; and he worked 

as a strategist in the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

in 2005. Dr. Kroenig has held fellowships from the 

Council on Foreign Relations, the National Science 

Foundation, the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, the Center for 
215

International Security and Cooperation at Stanford 

University, and the Institute on Global Conflict and 

Cooperation at the University of California. He is a life 

member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

JOHN MUELLER is Woody Hayes Senior Research 

Scientist at the Mershon Center as well as an adjunct 

professor of political science at Ohio State University. He is also a Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute 

in Washington, DC. Among his books are Chasing 

Ghosts: The Policing of Terrorism and Terror, Security and 

Money, both co-authored with Mark Stewart; as well 

as War, Presidents and Public Opinion; Astaire Dancing; 

Retreat from Doomsday: The Obsolescence of Major War; 

Quiet Cataclysm; Overblown; Atomic Obsession: Nuclear 

Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al-Qaeda War and Ideas. He

is the editor of Terrorism Since 9/11: The American Cases; 

and co-editor of A Dangerous World? Mr. Mueller is a 

member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and has been a John Simon Guggenheim Fellow. He has received several teaching prizes, and in 

2009 he received the International Studies Association’s Susan Strange Award that “recognizes a person 

whose singular intellect, assertiveness, and insight 

most challenge conventional wisdom and intellectual 

and organizational complacency in the international 

studies community.”

HARVEY M. SAPOLSKY is a Professor of Public 

Policy and Organization, Emeritus, at Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology (MIT), and the former Director of the MIT Security Studies Program. He has written extensively on the United States and comparative 

science, defense, health and communication policies. 

In defense, he has specialized in weapon acquisition 

policy, the defense industry, defense politics, national 
216

strategy, and military innovation. Professor Sapolsky 

has been a visiting professor at the University of Michigan and the U.S. Military Academy, and a consultant 

to many government agencies, national commissions, 

and firms. His most recent books are U.S. Defense Politics: the Origins of Security Policy (with E. Gholz and C. 

Talmadge) and U.S. Military Innovation Since the End of 

the Cold War: Creation Without Destruction (edited with 

B. Friedman and B. Green).

HENRY D. SOKOLSKI is the Executive Director of the 

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center (NPEC). 

He previously served as Deputy for Nonproliferation 

Policy in the Department of Defense, and has worked 

in the Office of the Secretary of Defense’s Office of 

Net Assessment, as a consultant to the National Intelligence Council, and as a member of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Senior Advisory Group. In the U.S. 

Senate, Mr. Sokolski served as a special assistant on 

nuclear energy matters to Senator Gordon Humphrey 

(R-NH), and as a legislative military aide to Dan Quayle (R-IN). He was appointed by Congress to serve on 

both the Commission on the Prevention of Weapons 

of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation and Terrorism in 2008, and the Deutch WMD Proliferation Commission in 1999. Mr. Sokolski has authored and edited 

a number of works on proliferation, including Underestimated: Our Not So Peaceful Nuclear Future (Strategic 

Studies Institute, 2016), Best of Intentions: America’s 

Campaign Against Strategic Weapons Proliferation (Praeger, 2001), and Moving Beyond Pretense: Nuclear Power 

and Nonproliferation (Strategic Studies Institute, 2014).
U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. Rapp

Commandant

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

and

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

Director

Professor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of Research

Dr. Steven K. Metz

Editor

Mr. Henry D. Sokolski

Editor for Production

Dr. James G. Pierce

Publications Assistant

Ms. Denise J. Kersting

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Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil

Nonproliferation Policy Education Center NNPPEECC

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Nonproliferation Policy Education Center NNPPEECC