IN THE SUPREME COURT OF IOWA

No. 16–0005

Filed May 20, 2016

IN THE MATTER OF HONORABLE MARY E. HOWES,

District Court Judge of the Seventh Judicial District.

On application of the Iowa Commission on Judicial Qualifications.

The Iowa Commission on Judicial Qualifications filed an 

application for judicial discipline recommending this court discipline a 

district court judge for various violations of the Iowa Code of Judicial

Conduct. APPLICATION GRANTED AND JUDGE PUBLICLY 

ADMONISHED.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik and Grant K. 

Dugdale, Assistant Attorneys General, for complainant.

Gregory M. Lederer of Lederer Weston Craig PLC, Cedar Rapids, for 

respondent.
2

WIGGINS, Justice.

The Iowa Commission on Judicial Qualifications filed an 

application for discipline of a judicial officer recommending this court 

publicly reprimand a district court judge. See Iowa Code § 602.2106 

(2015). Because we conclude the judge violated the Iowa Code of 

Judicial Conduct, we grant the application for judicial discipline. Rather 

than publicly reprimand the judge, however, we publicly admonish the 

judge.

I. Scope of Review.

When the Iowa Commission on Judicial Qualifications files an 

application with our court to discipline a judicial officer, we conduct an

equitable proceeding to review the application. See In re Inquiry 

Concerning Stigler, 607 N.W.2d 699, 701 (Iowa 2000); see also Iowa Code 

§ 602.2106(1). We review findings and recommendations by the 

Commission concerning the discipline of a judicial officer de novo. In re 

Krull, 860 N.W.2d 38, 43 (Iowa 2015); see Iowa R. App. P. 6.907. 

Accordingly, we give respectful consideration to but are not bound by its 

recommendations and findings. Krull, 860 N.W.2d at 43. An ethical 

violation must be established by a convincing preponderance of the 

evidence. In re Block, 816 N.W.2d 362, 364 (Iowa 2012); Stigler, 607 

N.W.2d at 705 (Iowa 2000).

II. Factual Findings.

On our de novo review, we find the facts as follows. The Honorable 

Mary E. Howes is a district court judge in the Seventh Judicial District of 

Iowa. Judge Howes has not been disciplined in the past and has 

dedicated most of her professional career to public service. Prior to 

1993, she served for seven years as an assistant county attorney in Scott 

County. From 1993 to 2000, she served as a magistrate in Scott County. 
3

From 2000 to 2006, she served as a district associate judge in the 

seventh judicial district. She has served as a district court judge in the 

seventh judicial district since September 2006. 

Judge Howes petitioned for dissolution of her marriage to her 

husband, Jack Henderkott, in June 2011. Maria Pauly represented 

Judge Howes in the dissolution action, and Chad Kepros of Bray & 

Klockau, P.L.C. represented Mr. Henderkott. The district court approved 

the parties’ settlement agreement and entered a dissolution decree 

incorporating that agreement in May 2012. 

On April 16, 2013, Mr. Henderkott sent Judge Howes an email 

indicating the Internal Revenue Service had deducted $3192 from his 

2012 income tax return because she did not claim income she received 

from liquidating an individual retirement account on the couple’s 2010 

joint income tax return. Mr. Henderkott claimed he was entitled to 

reimbursement in the full amount of the deduction per the terms of the 

settlement agreement. 

On May 2, Judge Howes responded by letter to Mr. Henderkott and 

offered to reimburse half the amount deducted from his 2012 tax return 

because she and Mr. Henderkott had filed a joint income tax return in 

2010. Judge Howes’s letter stated she had discussed the issue with her 

attorney, whom she identified as Ms. Pauly. It also indicated she was 

mailing a copy of the letter to “Attorney Maria Pauly.” Judge Howes 

enclosed two postdated checks for $798 each along with the letter.

On May 17, Mr. Kepros sent a letter regarding the tax issue to 

Ms. Pauly. The letter advised Ms. Pauly that the settlement agreement 

incorporated into the dissolution decree obligated Judge Howes to 

reimburse the entire deduction. It also acknowledged the letter Judge 

Howes had sent to Mr. Henderkott.
4

Ms. Pauly delivered a copy of the letter she received from 

Mr. Kepros to Judge Howes, and the two spoke in person about it at the 

courthouse. Judge Howes advised Ms. Pauly she believed her payment 

of half the amount deducted from Mr. Henderkott’s tax return satisfied 

her obligations under the dissolution decree. 

Ms. Pauly responded to the letter from Mr. Kepros on behalf of 

Judge Howes on May 22. In the letter, Ms. Pauly indicated she had 

spoken to Judge Howes, whom she referred to as her client. She also 

reiterated Judge Howes’s position that her payment of half the amount 

deducted from Mr. Henderkott’s 2012 tax return satisfied her obligations 

under the decree because she and Mr. Henderkott had filed a joint 

income tax return in 2010. In closing, the letter stated, “If you need 

anything further, please contact me.”

Mr. Henderkott eventually cashed the two checks Judge Howes 

had enclosed along with her response to his letter. After Ms. Pauly sent 

the May 22 letter, Judge Howes never attempted to contact 

Mr. Henderkott to confirm the tax dispute had been resolved. Rather, 

during the two months that followed, neither Judge Howes nor Ms. Pauly 

heard from either Mr. Henderkott or Mr. Kepros. On July 31, however, 

Mr. Kepros sent another letter to Ms. Pauly indicating Mr. Henderkott 

was prepared to file a contempt action if Judge Howes did not reimburse 

the remaining amount deducted from his 2012 tax return. 

On September 26, Daniel Bray, another attorney at Bray & 

Klockau, sent Ms. Pauly a letter informing her that he had taken over 

representation of Mr. Henderkott. Thereafter, Ms. Pauly began 

corresponding with Mr. Bray about the tax dispute. However, Ms. Pauly

did not immediately inform Judge Howes she had received the letter from 

Mr. Bray.
5

On October 15, Mr. Henderkott filed an application for a finding of 

contempt alleging Judge Howes’s failure to reimburse the full amount 

deducted from his 2012 tax return constituted a willful violation of the 

dissolution decree incorporating the settlement agreement. On 

October 22, before the hearing to show cause had been set on the 

application, Ms. Pauly sent Mr. Bray a letter stating Judge Howes would 

reimburse Mr. Henderkott the remaining amount withheld from his 2012 

tax return. Consequently, Mr. Henderkott dismissed the contempt 

action. Ms. Pauly provided her legal services to Judge Howes free of 

charge.

During the lull in correspondence concerning the postdissolution 

tax dispute with her ex-husband, Judge Howes was involved in another 

dissolution dispute in her official capacity as a judge. In that case, 

Ms. Pauly represented petitioner Farrakh Khawaja in seeking dissolution 

of his marriage to his wife, Shafaq Jadoon. The petition for dissolution of 

marriage Ms. Pauly filed on behalf of Mr. Khawaja indicated the couple 

had one child and requested the district court to grant joint legal custody

to both parties and primary physical care to Ms. Jadoon with liberal 

visitation for Mr. Khawaja. With the consent of Mr. Khawaja, Ms. Jadoon 

resided in Pakistan, though the petition inaccurately stated that she 

resided in Oak Brook, Illinois. 

The child, who had been residing in Pakistan with Ms. Jadoon, 

stayed in the Quad Cities with Mr. Khawaja during the summer of 2013. 

During the visit, Mr. Khawaja came to believe that Ms. Jadoon was 

abusing the child and confronted her with his concerns. Eventually, 

Mr. Khawaja asked Ms. Pauly to file an amended petition requesting the 

district court to award him primary physical care of the child, which she 

did on July 24. 
6

On the same day Ms. Pauly filed the amended petition, Ms. Jadoon

informed Mr. Khawaja that she was in the area and intended to retrieve 

the child and return to Pakistan. Mr. Khawaja learned from the 

employees at the summer program the child was attending that they 

were obligated to release the child to Ms. Jadoon if she arrived there to 

pick him up. Consequently, Ms. Pauly prepared an application for a 

temporary injunction and a supporting affidavit on behalf of Mr. Khawaja 

seeking to restrain Ms. Jadoon from removing the child to Pakistan. The 

application alleged Ms. Jadoon had assaulted the child and threatened to 

remove the child to Pakistan without Mr. Khawaja’s consent. 

The following morning, the Honorable Mark Cleve, another district 

court judge in the seventh judicial district, was the designated

assignment judge. As the designated assignment judge, Judge Cleve was 

scheduled to hear unscheduled matters during two “order hours” from 

8:30 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. and 1:30 p.m. to 2:00 p.m. Between the order 

hours, Judge Cleve was scheduled to hear motions from 10:00 a.m. to 

noon in fifteen-minute intervals. 

By the time Ms. Pauly arrived at the courthouse on July 25 to 

present the application for a temporary injunction to a judge, the 

morning order hour was over and Judge Cleve was busy hearing 

scheduled motions. Because the judges at the Scott County Courthouse 

adhere to an open-door policy, Ms. Pauly proceeded to look for a different 

judge to grant the temporary injunction. She soon discovered that every 

judge in the courthouse that day had a full schedule, except for Judge 

Howes, who had unexpectedly become available when the case she was 

to hear that day had fallen off her schedule. 

Ms. Pauly told Judge Howes her client had an emergency and 

asked if she would be willing to consider the application for a temporary 
7

injunction. Judge Howes then reviewed the application and signed an 

order temporarily enjoining both Ms. Jadoon and Mr. Khawaja from 

removing their child from the area for thirty days and temporarily 

enjoining Ms. Jadoon from removing the child from Mr. Khawaja. 

After Judge Howes granted the temporary injunction, Ms. Jadoon 

retained Lori Klockau and Daniel Bray of Bray & Klockau to represent 

her. Shortly after Ms. Klockau learned that Judge Howes had signed the 

order granting the temporary injunction against Ms. Jadoon, she learned 

from her secretary that another attorney at Bray & Klockau had recently 

written a letter to Ms. Pauly regarding the tax dispute between Judge 

Howes and Mr. Henderkott. Because Ms. Klockau knew the tax dispute 

was ongoing, she became concerned and shared her concerns with 

Ms. Jadoon, who became distraught upon hearing that the same lawyer 

who was representing her husband was representing the very judge who 

had signed the order granting the temporary injunction. 

On October 7, Ms. Klockau and Mr. Bray filed a complaint 

regarding Judge Howes with the Iowa Commission on Judicial 

Qualifications. On December 13, the Commission sent Judge Howes a 

letter notifying her it had received the complaint and asking her to 

provide it with a written explanation of her conduct and the 

circumstances that led her to sign the order granting the temporary 

injunction on July 25. The letter noted the Commission was especially 

interested to learn whether Ms. Pauly was in fact representing Judge 

Howes in her postdissolution tax dispute on the date Judge Howes

signed the order. 

On January 6, 2014, Judge Howes responded by letter to the 

Commission. In the letter, Judge Howes acknowledged Ms. Pauly had 

represented her in her dissolution action and noted she had advised
8

court administrative staff that Ms. Pauly could not appear before her 

while her dissolution was ongoing. She also informed the Commission 

she had not decided any matter in which Ms. Pauly represented a party 

for approximately one year following entry of the dissolution decree.

With respect to the question of whether Ms. Pauly represented her 

on July 25, Judge Howes advised the Commission she had not contacted

or hired Ms. Pauly upon being asked to reimburse the funds withheld 

from Mr. Henderkott’s tax return in April 2013. Rather, she indicated 

Ms. Pauly had called her in May 2013 upon receiving the letter from 

Mr. Kepros and she had informed Ms. Pauly the matter was resolved 

because she had already reimbursed half the withheld funds. Judge 

Howes asserted that after Ms. Pauly had informed Mr. Kepros to this 

effect, both she and Ms. Pauly had considered the matter to be resolved, 

as neither heard anything more about it.

Judge Howes asserted she had reasonably believed Ms. Pauly was 

not representing her in any dispute when she signed the order granting 

the temporary injunction on July 25, as she had not believed she had an 

unresolved dispute with Mr. Henderkott on that date. Moreover, Judge 

Howes assured the Commission she would not have signed the order if 

she had believed Ms. Pauly represented her at that time. Though she

forthrightly acknowledged another attorney, Dennis Jasper, had 

appeared before her in the past despite having previously represented 

her in another matter, she indicated she now realized that out of an 

abundance of caution, Ms. Pauly should not appear before her in the 

future. In closing, Judge Howes acknowledged the importance of 

impartiality and stated she would never intentionally violate any ethical 

rule or create an appearance of impropriety.
9

On January 15, Judge Howes sent a second letter to the 

Commission to correct a typographical error appearing in her January 6 

letter.1 In that letter, Judge Howes did not address the substance of the 

complaint against her or the circumstances that led her to sign the order 

granting the temporary injunction.

On September 25, the Commission issued a notice informing 

Judge Howes it had charged her with violating rules 51:1.2 and 

51:2.11(A) of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct because she failed to 

disqualify herself from a judicial proceeding involving Ms. Pauly.

On March 30, 2015, the Commission issued a second notice 

informing Judge Howes it had charged her with additional violations of 

the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct. The notice stated the Commission 

had charged Judge Howes with violations of rules 51:1.1, 51:1.2, and 

51:2.16(A) because statements in her letter to the Commission 

contradicted statements in her correspondence with Mr. Henderkott. 

The notice further stated the Commission had charged Judge Howes with 

violations of rules 51:1.1, 51:1.2, and 51:3.13(A) because she accepted

free legal services from Ms. Pauly and Mr. Jasper.

During a hearing before the Commission, Judge Howes and 

Ms. Pauly acknowledged they had an attorney–client relationship when 

Ms. Pauly sent the May 22 letter. But Judge Howes and Ms. Pauly

testified they had not believed the tax dispute was ongoing on July 25 

when Judge Howes signed the order granting the temporary injunction. 

In addition, Judge Howes testified that both Ms. Pauly and Mr. Jasper 

refused her offers for payment for their legal services, but she 

1Judge Howes’s first letter to the Commission mistakenly indicated she had 

served as an associate district judge from 1994 to 2000. She actually served as an 

associate district judge from 1993 to 2000.

 
10

acknowledged she accepted their services without entering into fee 

agreements in advance. Ms. Pauly confirmed she refused to accept 

payment for her services from Judge Howes, but she noted that Judge 

Howes paid the filing fee associated with filing her dissolution petition.

Following the hearing, the Commission filed an application for 

discipline of Judge Howes with this court. See Iowa Code § 602.2106. In 

the application, the Commission concluded Judge Howes violated rules 

51:1.1, 51:1.2, and 51:2.11(A) as well as canons 1 and 2 of the Iowa 

Code of Judicial Conduct when she failed to disqualify herself from 

deciding whether to grant the temporary injunction. The Commission 

also concluded Judge Howes violated rules 51:1.1, 51:1.2, and 51:3.13(A) 

as well as canons 1 and 3 of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct when she 

accepted gifts of free legal services from Ms. Pauly and Mr. Jasper. 

However, the Commission concluded Judge Howes did not violate rules

51:1.1, 51:1.2, or 51:2.16(A) by failing to be candid and honest in her 

letter of explanation regarding the circumstances that led her to sign the 

order granting the temporary injunction. The Commission recommended 

this court publicly reprimand Judge Howes for her conduct. 

III. Discussion and Analysis.

The Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct contains four canons, each of 

which states “overarching principles of judicial ethics that all judges 

must observe.” Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, Scope [2]. Following 

each canon is a series of rules that more specifically defines the conduct 

the canon prohibits. Block, 816 N.W.2d at 364. Comments 

accompanying those rules serve two important purposes. Iowa Code of 

Judicial Conduct, Scope [3]. “First, they provide guidance regarding the 

purpose, meaning, and proper application of the rules,” including 

explanatory examples of permitted and prohibited conduct. Id. Second, 
11

they “identify aspirational goals for judges.” Id. at [4]. “Comments 

neither add to nor subtract from the binding obligations set forth in the 

rules.” Id. at [3].

The Commission charged Judge Howes with violating rules 

contained in canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, 

including rules 51:1.1, 51:1.2, 51:2.11(A), 51:2.16(A), and 51:3.13(A).

We will consider each charged violation separately.

A. Rule 51:2.11(A) and Canon 2. We first consider whether 

Judge Howes violated rule 51:2.11(A) and canon 2 of the Iowa Code of 

Judicial Conduct by failing to disqualify herself from deciding a matter in 

which Ms. Pauly represented a party. 

1. Governing legal principles. Canon 2 of the Iowa Code of Judicial 

Conduct provides that “a judge shall perform the duties of judicial office 

impartially, competently, and diligently.” Id., Canon 2. Rule 51:2.11 

governs circumstances under which canon 2 requires a judge to recuse 

himself or herself from a judicial proceeding. In relevant part, it 

provides,

(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any 

proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably 

be questioned, including but not limited to the following 

circumstances:

(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice 

concerning a party or a party’s lawyer . . . .

. . . . 

(C) A judge subject to disqualification under this rule, 

other than for bias or prejudice under paragraph (A)(1), may 

disclose on the record the basis of the judge’s 

disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to 

consider, outside the presence of the judge and court 

personnel, whether to waive disqualification. If, following the 

disclosure, the parties and lawyers agree, without 

participation by the judge or court personnel, that the judge 
12

should not be disqualified, the judge may participate in the 

proceeding . . . . 

Id. r. 51:2.11 (emphasis added). The Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct 

defines “impartiality” as the “absence of bias or prejudice in favor of, or 

against, particular parties . . . as well as maintenance of an open mind in 

considering issues.” Id., Terminology.

Under rule 51:2.11(A), judicial disqualification is ordinarily 

mandatory, rather than discretionary, when the impartiality of a judge 

might reasonably be questioned if he or she were to decide a particular 

matter. The rule’s mandatory nature is clear from its language, which 

provides a judge “shall disqualify himself or herself” from deciding a 

matter whenever his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

Id. r. 51:2.11(A); see, e.g., State v. Luckett, 387 N.W.2d 298, 301 (Iowa 

1986). The mandatory nature of the rule is also evident from its 

structure, as the rule includes an expressly nonexclusive list of 

circumstances in which a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned. See Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct R. 51:2.11(A). A 

comment clarifies that the “obligation not to hear or decide matters in 

which disqualification is required applies regardless of whether a motion 

to disqualify is filed.” Id. r. 51:2.11 cmt. 2. 

However, a comment to rule 51:2.11 encourages a judge 

contemplating whether the rule mandates recusal because his or her 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned to “disclose on the record 

information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might 

reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification, 

even if the judge believes there is no basis for disqualification.” Id. r. 

51:2.11 cmt. 5. When a judge makes such disclosures and the parties 

waive disqualification, the judge may proceed to hear the matter 
13

regardless of whether a basis for disqualification actually existed, unless 

the basis for disqualification was “personal bias or prejudice concerning 

a party or a party’s lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in 

dispute in the proceeding.” Id. r. 51:2.11(A)(1), (C). Accordingly, in 

practice rule 51:2.11 does not require a judge to determine whether 

disqualification is actually required because his or her impartiality might 

reasonably be questioned so long as the judge discloses any possible 

basis for disqualification to the parties before hearing a matter and 

obtains their consent to proceed.2 

Another comment to rule 51:2.11 provides that necessity may 

override the disqualification requirement under limited circumstances. 

Id. r. 51:2.11 cmt. 3. More specifically, it provides,

The rule of necessity may override the rule of 

disqualification. For example, a judge might be required to 

participate in judicial review of a judicial salary statute, or 

might be the only judge available in a matter requiring 

immediate judicial action, such as a hearing on probable 

cause or a temporary restraining order. In matters that 

require immediate action, the judge must disclose on the 

record the basis for possible disqualification and make 

reasonable efforts to transfer the matter to another judge as 

soon as practicable.

Id. As contemplated in this comment, the “rule of necessity” eliminates 

the disqualification requirement if no judge lacking the same basis for 

disqualification exists or if a matter requires immediate action and no 

judge lacking some basis for disqualification is available. 

Although disqualification is generally mandatory under rule 

51:2.11(A)(1) when a judge has a personal bias or prejudice in favor of, or 

against, a party or a party’s lawyer, rule 51:2.11 does not presume actual 

2When a party does not agree to waive disqualification and moves for 

disqualification, however, the judge must decide whether disqualification is required. 

 
14

personal bias or prejudice on the part of a judge merely because a party’s 

lawyer currently represents or previously represented the judge in an 

unrelated matter. Rather, disqualification is required based on an 

existing or former attorney–client relationship between the judge and a 

party’s lawyer only when “the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be 

questioned” due to that relationship. See id. r. 51:2.11(A).

The standard for determining whether judicial recusal is required 

under rule 51:2.11(A) because “the judge’s impartiality might reasonably 

be questioned” is objective, not subjective. State v. Mann, 512 N.W.2d 

528, 532 (Iowa 1994) (addressing nearly identical language in the prior 

version of rule 51:2.11). In other words, the test is not whether the judge 

actually questions his or her own impartiality, “but whether a reasonable 

person would question it.” Krull, 860 N.W.2d at 44 (quoting Mann, 512 

N.W.2d at 532). Proving scienter is not necessary to establish a violation 

of the rule. Mann, 512 N.W.2d at 532. Rather, the appropriate inquiry is 

whether a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts might have a 

reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality such that the 

judge deciding a matter would create an appearance of impropriety. See 

id. 

In considering whether a judge has violated rule 51:2.11(A), 

“drawing all inferences favorable to the honesty and care of the judge 

whose conduct has been questioned could collapse the appearance of 

impropriety standard . . . into a demand for proof of actual impropriety.” 

Rosado v. Bridgeport Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 970 A.2d 656, 669 

(Conn. 2009) (quoting United States v. Jordan, 49 F.3d 152, 157 (5th Cir. 

1995)) (describing the appropriate standard under a nearly identical 

rule). Recusal is required under rule 51:2.11(A) when a reasonable 

person might reasonably doubt the judge’s impartiality because the rule 
15

anticipates “that people who have not served on the bench are often all 

too willing to indulge suspicions and doubts concerning the integrity of 

judges.” Mann, 512 N.W.2d at 532 (quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. 

Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864–65, 108 S. Ct. 2194, 2205, 100 

L. Ed. 2d 855, 875 (1988)). Thus, rule 51:2.11(A) operates “to promote 

public confidence in the integrity of the judicial process.” Id. at 533. 

There can be no serious doubt a reasonable person who knows an 

attorney appearing before a judge currently represents the judge in a 

personal matter would have a reasonable basis for questioning the 

judge’s impartiality.3 See, e.g., Berry v. Berry, 765 So. 2d 855, 858 (Fla. 

Dist. Ct. App. 2000). “If the attorney in this instance represents the 

judge in a pending action, the other party may question the judge’s 

impartiality, even if the resolution of the case appears fair to the public 

in general.” Charles Gardener Geyh, et al., Judicial Conduct and Ethics

§ 4.14[3], at 4-60 (5th ed. 2013). 

Nonetheless, “if an attorney appearing before the judge represented 

the judge only in the past, the concerns about partiality are not so 

acute.” Id. at 4-61. Thus, the question of whether a reasonable person 

might perceive a reasonable basis for questioning a judge’s impartiality 

becomes a closer one when an attorney appearing before the judge 

represented the judge only in the past. 

Like the Model Code of Judicial Conduct, the Iowa Code of Judicial 

Conduct prescribes no specific time period during which a judge must 

disqualify himself or herself from deciding a matter based solely on his or 

3In this case, Judge Howes decided a matter in which a party was represented 

by an attorney who currently or previously represented her in a personal matter. We 

need not decide whether or under what circumstances disqualification is required 

under rule 51:2.11(A) based on an attorney’s representation of a judge in a matter 

concerning the judge’s official acts.

 
16

her former attorney–client relationship with an attorney who presently 

represents a party appearing before the judge in an unrelated matter. 

Compare Model Code of Judicial Conduct R. 2.11(A) (Am. Bar Ass’n 

2011), with Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct R. 51:2.11(A). Nor do existing 

authorities discussing the circumstances in which a judge must 

disqualify himself or herself based on the judge’s former representation 

by a party’s attorney reveal a clear consensus. See Powell v. Anderson, 

660 N.W.2d 107, 117 & n.8 (Minn. 2003). Courts generally agree that 

once significant time has passed since the conclusion of a former 

attorney–client relationship between a judge and a party’s attorney, any 

appearance of bias or impropriety arising therefrom is insufficient to 

warrant disqualification. See, e.g., Noland v. Noland, 932 S.W.2d 341, 

342–43 (Ark. 1996) (three years); In re Disqualification of Park, 28 N.E.3d 

56, 58 (Ohio 2014) (sixteen years); Young v. Young, 971 S.W.2d 386, 390 

(Tenn. Ct. App. 1997) (ten years). In contrast, most courts and judicial 

ethics commissions to consider the disqualification issue in the context 

of a judge’s recent representation by a party’s attorney appear to have 

adopted one of two approaches to determining whether a reasonable 

person would conclude the prior representation might constitute a 

reasonable basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality.

Under the first approach, the question of whether judicial 

disqualification is required based on a former attorney–client relationship 

between a judge and an attorney representing a party in an unrelated 

matter turns primarily on how much time has passed since the 

relationship ended. Among commissions adopting this approach, 

however, disagreement exists as to how much time must pass before a 

former attorney–client relationship no longer constitutes a reasonable 

basis for questioning the judge’s impartiality. See, e.g., N.Y. Advisory
17

Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Joint Op. 08-171/08-174 (2009), 

www.nycourts.gov/ip/judicialethics/opinions/08-171and%2008-

174.htm (two years); Utah Judicial Conduct Comm., Joint Op. 00-4 

(2000), www.utcourts.gov/resources/ethadv/ethics_opinions/2000/00-

4.htm (six months). Moreover, some commissions endorse a variant of 

this approach whereby a judge must consider whether the circumstances 

make continued disqualification appropriate after the requisite time 

during which disqualification is required has passed. See, e.g., Colo. 

Judicial Ethics Advisory Bd., Advisory Op. 2006-05 (2006), 

www.courts.state.co.us/userfiles/File/Court_Probation/Supreme_Court/

Committees/Judicial_Ethics_Advisory_Board/opinion2006-05_1.pdf (one 

year unless circumstances such as the length, nature, extent, cost, and 

recency of the representation make continued disqualification 

appropriate); N.C. Judicial Standards Comm’n, Formal Op. 2011-02 

(2011), www.aoc.state.nc.us/www/public/coa/jsc/formaladvisoryopini

ons/11-02.pdf (six months unless circumstances such as the length, 

nature, extent, cost, and recency of the representation make continued 

disqualification appropriate). 

Under a second approach recently adopted by the supreme courts 

of Minnesota and Mississippi, a reviewing court should generally weigh 

four factors to determine whether a former attorney–client relationship 

between a judge and an attorney requires the judge to disqualify himself 

or herself. Powell, 660 N.W.2d at 118; Washington Mut. Fin. Grp., LLC v. 

Blackmon, 925 So. 2d 780, 791 (Miss. 2004). Under this approach, a 

reviewing court should determine whether recusal was required by 

considering (1) the extent of the attorney–client relationship; (2) the 

nature of the representation; (3) the frequency, volume, and quality of 

the contacts between the judge and the attorney; and (4) special 
18

circumstances that might enhance or diminish the likelihood that the 

judge deciding a matter in which a party is represented by the attorney 

might reasonably create an appearance of impropriety from the 

perspective of the public. Powell, 660 N.W.2d at 118; Blackmon, 925 So. 

2d at 791. 

Similarly, the American Bar Association Standing Committee on 

Ethics and Professional Responsibility advises that several factors 

influence whether judicial disqualification is required based on an 

attorney’s former representation of a judge because “a reasonable person 

would believe, in light of the time that had elapsed, that the judge’s 

fairness and impartiality could still be questioned.” ABA Comm. on 

Ethics & Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-449 (2007). According to 

the committee, these factors include (1) whether the matter was 

consequential or relatively inconsequential; (2) the size of the fee the 

judge paid to the attorney; (3) whether the representation concerned an 

isolated matter or several matters over time; and (4) whether the 

representation concerned a matter that was highly confidential or highly 

publicized. Id.

In 1989, the Iowa Supreme Court Board of Professional Ethics and 

Conduct addressed this issue in an advisory opinion intended for the 

benefit of practicing attorneys within the state. See Iowa Supreme Ct. 

Bd. of Prof’l Ethics & Conduct, Op. 90-47 (1991). The opinion advised an 

attorney may not properly appear before a judge for a period of one year 

following the performance of “actual legal activities” on the judge’s behalf 

by the attorney or the attorney’s firm. Id. 

Nevertheless, this court has never determined the precise 

circumstances under which rule 51:2.11(A) requires a judge to disqualify 

himself or herself in a matter in which an attorney with whom the judge 
19

once had an attorney–client relationship represents a party. We 

conclude that we need not do so today. Under our existing precedents 

interpreting the language in rule 51:2.11(A), it is clear that a judge who 

fails to disqualify himself or herself from a proceeding in which an 

attorney who recently represented the judge in a personal matter 

represents a party violates rule 51:2.11(A) unless the judge complies with 

rule 51:2.11(C) by disclosing the relevant facts to and obtaining a 

disqualification waiver from both parties in advance.4 See Bride v. 

Heckart, 556 N.W.2d 449, 455 (Iowa 1996) (relying on a prior 

interpretation of the language in the prior version of rule 51:2.11(A));

Forsmark v. State, 349 N.W.2d 763, 767–69 (Iowa 1984) (interpreting 

language in the prior version of rule 51:2.11(A)). Indeed, we have long 

expected trial judges to follow the procedures contained in rule 

51:2.11(C) and comment 5 before deciding a matter when a possible 

basis for recusal exists in order to permit the parties to determine 

whether to request disqualification.

In Forsmark, we considered an appeal from a district court 

judgment denying a motion to vacate a judgment in a medical-negligence 

action.5 349 N.W.2d at 765. The plaintiffs had filed the motion to vacate 

the judgment upon discovering the estate of the trial judge’s brother had 

a pending wrongful-death action against the plaintiffs’ chief medical 

witness. Id. The trial judge found in the defendant’s favor without ever

4Of course, trial judges frequently recuse themselves from proceedings without 

notifying the parties of their basis for doing so upon being designated by court 

administration to hear a case.

5Although not relevant for purposes of our analysis, we note the trial judge who 

failed to disclose the possible basis for his disqualification during the trial recused 

himself from deciding the motion to vacate the judgment. Forsmark, 349 N.W.2d at 

765.

 
20

disclosing this fact to the plaintiffs. Id. The plaintiffs asserted the trial 

judge’s failure to recuse himself constituted an irregularity in the 

obtaining of the judgment that amounted to a basis for vacating it under 

our rules of civil procedure. Id. 

We determined it was neither practical nor necessary to determine 

whether the trial judge was required to recuse himself in order to decide 

the appeal. Id. at 768. In doing so, we reasoned,

No meaningful way existed after trial to reconstruct how the 

issue would have been resolved before trial. The judge failed 

before trial to disclose facts creating a substantial and 

serious issue concerning his duty to disqualify himself. As a 

result plaintiffs were denied an opportunity to raise the issue 

or be heard on it. 

Id. Accordingly, the precise question before us was not whether recusal 

was in fact required, though we acknowledged the judge “should have 

known that a party in plaintiffs’ position might question his impartiality.” 

Id.

Ultimately, we concluded the trial judge’s failure to disclose the 

possible basis for disqualification constituted an irregularity in obtaining 

the judgment within the meaning of our rules of civil procedure because

it denied plaintiffs the opportunity to raise or be heard on the potential 

basis for disqualification. Id. at 767–68. Accordingly, because we 

determined the plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence to generate an 

issue for the trier of fact, we vacated the district court order denying their 

motion to vacate the judgment. Id. at 768–69.

Years later, in Bride, we considered another appeal based on a trial 

judge’s failure to disclose a basis for disqualification to the parties 

appearing before him. 556 N.W.2d at 455. Specifically, the trial judge 

had failed to disclose that less than two years prior to the start of the 
21

trial he was represented by the same law firm that represented a party

appearing before him. Id. Relying on language in the prior version of 

rule 51:2.11(A) nearly identical to that appearing in the current version 

of the rule, we concluded the trial judge’s failure to disclose the basis for 

disqualification was error. Id. In doing so, we reasoned the trial judge’s 

mere nondisclosure constituted error because it deprived the party before 

him an opportunity to make a timely request for disqualification. Id. 

Thus, based in part on the trial judge’s failure to disclose his former 

attorney–client relationship with a party’s attorney, we reversed a district 

court decision denying a motion to vacate the judgment. Id. 

Neither of these cases required us to decide whether judicial 

discipline was appropriate. See Bride, 556 N.W.2d at 455 (appeal based 

on a trial judge’s failure to disclose a possible basis for disqualification);

Forsmark, 349 N.W.2d at 767–69 (appeal based on a trial judge’s failure 

to disqualify himself). Yet, in Bride, we implicitly acknowledged a 

reasonable person might question the impartiality of a judge who 

presides over a proceeding in which an attorney who recently represented 

the judge in a personal matter appears without disclosing that fact to the 

parties. See Bride, 556 N.W.2d at 455 (“The judge should have known 

that, based on his recent, prior representation by defense counsel’s law 

firm, a party in plaintiff's position might question his impartiality.”). 

When a basis for disqualification exists because a reasonable 

person knowing all the facts might reasonably question a trial judge’s 

impartiality, the judge must either disqualify himself or herself pursuant 

to rule 51:2.11(A) or disclose the relevant facts and obtain a waiver of the 
22

disqualification requirement from the parties under rule 51:2.11(C).6 If 

the judge wishes to hear a matter despite the existence of a possible 

basis for disqualification, the judge should “disclose on the record 

information that the judge believes the parties or their lawyers might 

reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion for disqualification” in 

order to assure the parties have an opportunity to raise and be heard on 

the potential basis for disqualification. Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct R. 

51:2.11(C) & cmt. 5; see Bride, 556 N.W.2d at 455; Forsmark, 349 

N.W.2d at 767–68. When it is debatable whether a basis for 

disqualification actually exists, the best practice is for the judge to 

disclose all the relevant facts to the parties “even if the judge believes 

there is no basis for disqualification.” Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct R. 

51:2.11 cmt. 5. If the parties thereafter waive disqualification, the judge 

may then decide the matter. Id. r. 51:2.11(C).

6We note the section of the Iowa Code addressing the circumstances under 

which a judicial officer is disqualified also emphasizes the importance of disclosure in 

this context. In relevant part, the Code provides,

1. A judicial officer is disqualified from acting in a proceeding, 

except upon the consent of all of the parties, if any of the following 

circumstances exists:

a. The judicial officer has a personal bias or prejudice concerning 

a party, or personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning 

the proceeding.

. . . .

2. A judicial officer shall disclose to all parties in a proceeding 

any existing circumstances in subsection 1, paragraphs “a” through “d”, 

before the parties consent to the judicial officer’s presiding in the 

proceeding.

Iowa Code § 602.1606(1)(a), (2). Unlike rule 51:2.11(A) of the Iowa Code of Judicial 

Conduct, Iowa Code section 602.1606(1) does not mandate judicial disqualification 

merely because a judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Rather, section 

602.1606(1) provides an exclusive list of circumstances under which disqualification or 

disclosure and waiver is required. See Iowa Code § 602.1606(1).

 
23

2. Application of legal principles. Notably, Judge Howes recognized 

she could not preside over any matter in which an attorney who was 

currently representing her represented a party. Judge Howes and 

Ms. Pauly testified that no attorney–client relationship existed between 

them on July 25 when Judge Howes signed the order granting the 

temporary injunction Ms. Pauly sought on behalf of Mr. Khawaja.

Despite this testimony, the Commission concluded Judge Howes 

was obligated to disqualify herself from any case in which Ms. Pauly was 

representing a party when she signed the order even if Ms. Pauly was not

currently representing her. More precisely, the Commission determined 

that under either approach described above, Judge Howes was obligated 

to disqualify herself from deciding whether to grant the temporary 

injunction because Judge Howes and Ms. Pauly admitted they had an 

attorney–client relationship in May 2013. 

“Generally, in a civil action, once the period for motions and 

appeals expires, the lawyer’s representation of his or her client ends.” 

Iowa Supreme Ct. Att’y Disciplinary Bd. v. Marks, 814 N.W.2d 532, 538 

(Iowa 2012); see 16 Gregory C. Sisk & Mark S. Cady, Iowa Practice 

Series: Lawyer and Judicial Ethics § 5:3(e), at 181 (2015) (“If the lawyer 

has been retained to represent the client with respect to a specific 

matter, the attorney–client relationship ends with the completion of legal 

services for that matter, and the lawyer has no ongoing responsibility to 

address other legal concerns of the client.”). Accordingly, we recognize 

Judge Howes and Ms. Pauly did not have an ongoing attorney–client 

relationship extending from the entry of the dissolution decree in May 

2012 to the date in May 2013 on which Ms. Pauly sent the letter to 

Mr. Kepros.
24

Nonetheless, Judge Howes does not dispute that Ms. Pauly 

represented her in two highly confidential personal matters within the 

two years preceding the date on which she signed the ex parte order 

granting the temporary injunction that Ms. Pauly sought on behalf of her 

client. Nor does Judge Howes dispute that she and Ms. Pauly shared an 

attorney–client relationship when Ms. Pauly sent the letter to Mr. Kepros 

on her behalf just two months before she signed that order. 

Furthermore, Judge Howes does not deny that she did not pay for the 

legal services Ms. Pauly provided.

Given these facts, we agree with the Commission that it is 

unnecessary to decide the precise standard that governs determinations 

as to whether disqualification is required under rule 51:2.11(A) based on 

a former attorney–client relationship between a judge and an attorney 

appearing before the judge in this case. Instead, we conclude a 

reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts on July 25 might have 

had a reasonable basis for questioning Judge Howes’s impartiality when 

she signed the ex parte order even if Judge Howes did not have an 

ongoing attorney–client relationship with Ms. Pauly on that date.7 See

Bride, 556 N.W.2d at 455; see also Mann, 512 N.W.2d at 532. When an 

attorney who contemporaneously represents or recently represented a 

judge in a personal matter appears before the judge in another case and 

the judge does not disclose that fact to the parties, the judge’s 

impartiality might reasonably be questioned. 

Accordingly, unless Judge Howes disclosed all the facts relevant to 

her representation by Ms. Pauly to the parties and obtained a waiver of 

7Under these facts and our caselaw, we find it unnecessary to determine 

whether the attorney–client relationship Judge Howes and Ms. Pauly shared in May 

2013 was ongoing when Judge Howes signed the ex parte order.

 
25

the disqualification requirement under rule 51:2.11(C), she was required 

to disqualify herself from deciding whether to grant the application for a 

temporary injunction under rule 51:2.11(A) so long as the rule of 

necessity did not apply. Under our caselaw interpreting the language of 

rule 51:2.11, Judge Howes was required to disclose to the parties every 

relevant fact concerning her representation by Ms. Pauly before signing 

the order, including the fact that she did not pay for the legal services 

Ms. Pauly provided, in order to assure the parties received an 

opportunity to file and be heard on a motion seeking her disqualification 

unless she actually disqualified herself. See Bride, 556 N.W.2d at 455; 

see also Forsmark, 349 N.W.2d at 768–69.

Thus, because Judge Howes signed the order granting the 

temporary injunction ex parte, we agree with the Commission that her 

inability to disclose the facts concerning her representation by Ms. Pauly

to Ms. Jadoon or Ms. Jadoon’s counsel obligated her to recuse herself 

unless the rule of necessity excused her from the sua sponte 

disqualification requirement.

3. Governing legal principles concerning the rule of necessity. The 

rule of necessity constitutes an exception to the general rule obligating a 

judge to disqualify himself or herself from any judicial proceeding in 

which his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Iowa Code 

of Judicial Conduct R. 51:2.11 cmt. 3. Because the disqualification rule 

rests on sound public policy, the rule of necessity is strictly construed. 

State ex rel. Brown v. Dietrick, 444 S.E.2d 47, 55 (W. Va. 1994). Thus, 

although necessity may afford a judge who would otherwise be 

disqualified the power to hear a case, necessity extends such power only 

when the occasion truly requires. 
26

Although the rule of necessity has its genesis in the common law, 

state and federal courts alike recognize its continued vitality in modern 

times. United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 213, 101 S. Ct. 471, 480, 66 

L. Ed. 2d 392, 405 (1980). The common law tradition has “long regarded 

the absence of an appropriate forum in which to resolve a legitimate case 

to be intolerable.” Bd. of Trs. of Pub. Emps’ Ret. Fund v. Hill, 472 N.E.2d 

204, 206 (Ind. 1985). The rule of necessity thus reflects the longstanding 

principle that to deny an individual access to courts for the vindication of

his or her rights constitutes a far more egregious wrong than to permit a 

judge to hear a matter in which he or she has some interest. See 

Weinstock v. Holden, 995 S.W.2d 408, 410 (Mo. 1999) (en banc) (per 

curiam). 

When the matter to be decided affects the interests of every judge 

qualified to hear it, the rule of necessity clearly applies “without resort to 

further factual development.” State ex rel. Hash v. McGraw, 376 S.E.2d 

634, 639 (W. Va. 1988) (McGraw, J., noting his disqualification). The 

theory on which the rule rests when such circumstances arise is that 

“where all are disqualified, none are disqualified.” Ignacio v. Judges of 

U.S. Ct. of Appeals for Ninth Circuit, 453 F.3d 1160, 1165 (9th Cir. 2006)

(quoting Pilla v. Am. Bar Ass’n., 542 F.2d 56, 59 (8th Cir. 1976)). Courts 

ordinarily invoke the rule of the necessity in such circumstances because 

disqualifying every judge with an interest in the matter to be decided 

would leave the parties with no court in which to resolve a dispute. See, 

e.g., id. (applying the rule because a litigant sued all the judges in a 

federal circuit); Hill, 472 N.E.2d at 206 (applying the rule to consider a 

challenge to a statutory amendment affecting judicial retirement 

benefits); Weinstock, 995 S.W.2d at 410 (applying the rule to consider a 

resolution affecting judicial pay). Similarly, the rule of necessity has 
27

been invoked to prevent an attorney who represented every judge within 

a jurisdiction from having no court in which to practice. See Reilly by 

Reilly v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 489 A.2d 1291, 1295 (Pa. 1985). 

The rule of necessity contemplated in comment 3 to rule 51:2.11(A) 

is broader than the common law rule in that it may also override the 

disqualification obligation of a judge who is “the only judge available in a 

matter requiring immediate judicial action” when certain conditions are 

met. Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct R. 51:2.11(A) cmt. 3. Nonetheless, 

the rule of necessity applies on this basis only when (1) the matter to be 

decided requires “immediate judicial action,” (2) the judge is “the only 

judge available” to decide it, (3) the judge “disclose[s] on the record the 

basis for possible disqualification,” and (4) the judge makes “reasonable 

efforts to transfer the matter to another judge as soon as practicable.” 

Id.

A judge has an affirmative obligation to assure deciding a matter is 

in fact necessary before relying on the rule of necessity to excuse a duty 

of disqualification based on the unavailability of another judge. To 

establish necessity excused a disqualification requirement, a judge must 

show he or she made reasonable efforts to transfer the particular matter 

to which it applied to another judge “as soon as practicable.” Id. It 

follows that when a judge learns it is practicable to transfer a matter 

from which he or she would ordinarily be disqualified to another judge 

before considering it, the rule of necessity does not permit the judge to 

consider it. Stated another way, a judge with a duty of disqualification 

can only show he or she was the only judge available to decide a matter 

requiring immediate attention when the evidence shows it was not

practicable for the judge to transfer the matter to another judge before 

deciding it. Thus, under such circumstances, a judge must assess 
28

whether any available options for transferring the matter to another

judge satisfies the degree of urgency called for before relying on the rule 

of necessity.

4. Application of the rule of necessity. Judge Howes contends the 

rule of necessity excused her from any duty she had to disqualify herself 

from deciding whether to grant the temporary injunction. We agree with 

Judge Howes that an application for a temporary injunction is the sort of 

matter that may require immediate judicial attention.8 But we conclude 

the circumstances existing when Judge Howes signed the ex parte order 

did not excuse her from disqualification based on necessity for two 

reasons.9

First, we are not persuaded that Judge Howes was the only judge 

available to consider the application for a temporary injunction. The 

record indicates at least six or seven of the eight district court judges 

with chambers in the Scott County Courthouse were present on the 

morning Ms. Pauly presented the ex parte application to Judge Howes. 

Judge Howes presented evidence revealing that every judge present in 

the courthouse when she signed the order granting the temporary 

injunction had a full morning according to the assignment schedule. 

However, we conclude this evidence, though relevant, was insufficient to 

conclude necessity excused her failure to disqualify herself from 

considering the ex parte application for the injunction. 

8Because we decide necessity did not excuse Judge Howes from disqualification 

on other grounds, we do not address whether the application Ms. Pauly presented to 

her warranted a conclusion that the requisite degree of urgency existed. 

9Similarly, because we conclude necessity did not excuse Judge Howes from 

disqualification on other grounds, we need not decide whether necessity may excuse a 

judge’s duty of disqualification without advance disclosure of the basis for 

disqualification to the party not present in an ex parte proceeding permitted by law if 

disclosure is made on the record during that proceeding.

 
29

Ample testimony indicated the assignment schedule often included 

matters that had fallen off the schedule because they settled at the last 

minute. That was precisely the reason Judge Howes was available the 

morning she considered the application for a temporary injunction 

despite the assignment schedule indicating she would not be. 

Additionally, the evidence demonstrated the assignment judge was 

scheduled to hear motions in fifteen-minute intervals for the remainder 

of the morning following the morning order hour. Thus, the evidence 

unequivocally established not only that at least one judge present in the 

courthouse was not in the midst of a jury trial, but also that it would be 

possible to interrupt that judge to request that he consider an emergency 

matter within fifteen minutes. We are confident any judge who had been 

informed by Judge Howes or a court administrator that he or she was the 

only judge without a conflict available to consider an emergency 

application for a temporary injunction would have agreed to take five 

minutes to consider it. 

Moreover, we note Judge Howes presented no evidence to suggest 

she attempted to verify she was the only judge available before 

considering the application for a temporary injunction. Because there 

were at least a half dozen judges in the courthouse that morning, it was 

not obvious that necessity permitted Judge Howes to consider the 

application despite her conflict, as might have been the case had she 

been the only judge in the courthouse. Yet the record reflects no 

evidence suggesting Ms. Pauly told Judge Howes she had attempted to 

present the application to the other judges in the courthouse. Nor does 

the record reveal any evidence suggesting Judge Howes asked Ms. Pauly 

if she had done so. In fact, the record reflects no evidence suggesting
30

Judge Howes consulted the assignment schedule or called the court 

administrator before considering the application. 

Second, we are not persuaded that Judge Howes made reasonable 

efforts to transfer the matter to another judge or considered whether 

transfer was practicable under the circumstances before considering it. 

The record reveals no evidence suggesting Judge Howes attempted to 

assess whether transfer was practicable under the circumstances. There 

was no evidence suggesting Judge Howes investigated the degree of 

urgency called for by questioning Ms. Pauly.10 Nor did the evidence 

suggest Judge Howes checked with the court administrator or the clerks 

in the chambers of any of the other judges before deciding to consider

the application herself. During her testimony before the Commission, 

Judge Howes acknowledged that, given the nature of the application, it 

was immediately apparent to her that considering it would take mere 

minutes. Thus, in light of the many other judges present in the 

courthouse, Judge Howes had no basis for concluding transfer to 

another judge was wholly impracticable without some investigation. 

Under these circumstances, we conclude her failure to investigate and 

her failure to attempt to find another judge to consider the ex parte 

application fatally undermine her claim of necessity. 

Our research has not uncovered a single case in which a judge 

successfully invoked the rule of necessity under similar circumstances. 

See Huffman v. Ark. Judicial Discipline & Disability Comm’n, 42 S.W.3d 

386, 393 (Ark. 2001) (concluding there was no showing of necessity when 

it was unclear a party seeking a temporary restraining order could not 

10For example, had Judge Howes questioned Ms. Pauly, she might have learned 

that Ms. Pauly prepared the application for a temporary injunction the night before yet 

arrived at the courthouse after the morning order hour had ended.

 
31

have waited “until another judge could be found” or been sent to the 

chambers of a judge on the bench in the same courthouse “to wait for 

him to take a recess or otherwise become available”). Unless necessity is 

evident from the circumstances, a judge may not invoke the rule of 

necessity to circumvent his or her duty of disqualification without first 

attempting to determine whether transfer was practicable under the 

circumstances. 

The record in this case does not support a finding that necessity 

was evident from the circumstances existing when Judge Howes 

considered the application for a temporary injunction. Nor does the 

record support a finding that Judge Howes determined transfer of the 

matter to another judge was impracticable. Therefore, we conclude the 

rule of necessity did not excuse Judge Howes from the duty of 

disqualification that arose due to her attorney–client relationship with 

Ms. Pauly. Accordingly, we agree with the Commission that Judge 

Howes violated rule 51:2.11(A) and canon 2 of the Iowa Code of Judicial 

Conduct when she decided whether to grant the application for a 

temporary injunction Ms. Pauly presented to her on July 25, 2013. 

B. Rule 51:3.13(A) and Canon 3. We next consider whether 

Judge Howes violated rule 51:3.13(A) and canon 3 of the Iowa Code of 

Judicial Conduct by failing to minimize the risk of conflict with her 

judicial obligations and accepting gifts of free legal services from 

Mr. Jasper and Ms. Pauly.

1. Governing legal principles. Canon 3 of the Iowa Code of Judicial 

Conduct provides that “a judge shall conduct the judge’s personal and 

extrajudicial activities to minimize the risk of conflict with the obligations 

of judicial office.” Because judges accepting gifts creates a risk of conflict 

with their judicial obligations, rule 51:3.13 limits the circumstances 
32

under which a judge may accept a gift or thing of value from another 

person.

First, rule 51:3.13(A) sets forth two considerations a judge must 

take into account before accepting any gift or thing of value. It provides, 

“A judge . . . shall not accept or solicit any gift, loan, bequest, benefit, or 

other thing of value, if acceptance is prohibited by law or would appear to 

a reasonable person to undermine the judge’s independence, integrity, or 

impartiality.” Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct R. 51:3.13(A). Under this 

rule, a judge may not accept a gift or thing of value in violation of the 

state gift laws set forth in chapter 68B of the Iowa Code. See Iowa Code 

§§ 68B.2, .22, .23, .34. In addition, a judge may not accept a gift or 

thing of value when its acceptance would reasonably appear to 

undermine his or her independence, integrity, or impartiality. Iowa Code 

of Judicial Conduct R. 51:3.13(A).

Second, rule 51:3.13(B) sets forth an exclusive list of gifts and

things of value a judge may accept from a “restricted donor.” Any party 

or other person involved in a case pending before a judge qualifies as a 

“restricted donor.” See id., Terminology. Therefore, the rule identifies 

the only gifts or things of value a judge may accept from an individual 

involved in a pending case before him or her. Id. r. 51:3.13 cmt. 1. 

Third, rule 51:3.13(C) describes circumstances under which a 

judge may accept a gift or thing of value from an individual who is not a 

restricted donor. It provides that a judge may accept gifts and things of 

value “from friends, relatives, or other persons, including lawyers, whose 

appearance or interest in a proceeding pending or impending before the 

judge would in any event require disqualification of the judge under rule 

51:2.11.” Id. r. 51:3.13(C)(1). Under this rule, a judge may generally 

accept gifts or things of value from lawyers or other individuals whose 
33

appearance before the judge would require disqualification or disclosure 

under rule 51:2.11 with the important caveat that acceptance may not 

otherwise be prohibited under rule 51:3.13(A). Id. r. 51:3.13(C). 

“Whenever a judge accepts a gift or other thing of value without 

paying fair market value, there is a risk that the benefit might be viewed 

as intended to influence the judge’s decision in a case.” Id. r. 51:3.13 

cmt. 1. Nevertheless, the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct recognizes that 

acceptance of a gift is unlikely to appear to a reasonable person to 

undermine judicial independence, integrity, or impartiality when the 

circumstances quite clearly indicate the person giving the gift did not 

give it based on the recipient’s status as a judge. Rule 51:3.13 generally 

does not prohibit judges accepting special pricing, discounts, and other 

benefits made available to the public or certain classes of persons by 

businesses or financial institutions: 

Businesses and financial institutions frequently make 

available special pricing, discounts, and other benefits, 

either in connection with a temporary promotion or for 

preferred customers, based upon longevity of the 

relationship, volume of business transacted, and other 

factors. A judge may freely accept such benefits if they are 

available to the general public, or if the judge qualifies for 

the special price or discount according to the same criteria 

as are applied to persons who are not judges. As an 

example, loans provided at generally prevailing interest rates 

are not gifts, but a judge could not accept a loan from a 

financial institution at below-market interest rates unless 

the same rate was being made available to the general public 

for a certain period of time or only to borrowers with 

specified qualifications that the judge also possesses. 

Id. r. 51:3.13 cmt. 3. Accordingly, rule 51:3.13(B) permits a judge to 

accept “commercial or financial opportunities and benefits, including 

special pricing and discounts” offered by restricted donors so long as “the 

same opportunities and benefits . . . are made available on the same 
34

terms to similarly situated persons who are not judges.” Id.

r. 51:3.13(B)(2).

Because legal services constitute a thing of value, rule 51:3.13(A) 

forbids a judge from accepting free legal services if doing so would appear 

to a reasonable person to undermine his or her independence, integrity, 

or impartiality. Attorneys with matters presently before a judge fall 

within the definition of “restricted donor” precisely because a judge 

accepting a thing of value from such an attorney would appear to a 

reasonable person to undermine the judge’s independence, integrity, or 

impartiality. 

However, an attorney or firm who is currently providing legal 

services to a judge is an attorney or firm whose appearance before the 

judge would trigger the disqualification or disclosure requirement of rule 

51:2.11. Therefore, under rule 51:3.13(C), a judge may accept free legal 

services from an attorney or firm currently representing him or her 

because it would trigger the disqualification or disclosure requirement of 

rule 51:2.11 if that attorney or firm were to appear before the judge. 

Ordinarily, a reasonable person would not perceive a judge’s acceptance 

of free legal services to undermine the judge’s independence, integrity, or 

impartiality if the judge is required to disclose the relevant facts and 

obtained a waiver of disqualification from the parties under rule

51:2.11(C) before deciding a matter.

In contrast, when a judge accepts free legal services from an 

attorney or firm and then permits the attorney or firm to appear before 

him or her in court without disclosing the relevant facts and obtaining a 

waiver as required by rule 51:2.11(C), the judge’s conduct might appear 

to a reasonable person to undermine his or her independence, integrity, 

or impartiality. The language of 51:3.13(C) explicitly acknowledges a 
35

judge deciding a matter in which a party is represented by a lawyer from 

whom the judge accepted free legal services is sufficient to trigger the 

disqualification or disclosure requirement of rule 51:2.11 so long as the 

matter was impending when the services were accepted.11 Its clear 

implication is that a reasonable person might believe a judge’s 

independence, integrity, or impartiality has been compromised if the

judge fails to disclose his or her recent acceptance of free legal services 

from an attorney or firm before deciding a matter in which the attorney 

or firm appears. 

Because rule 51:3.13(A) requires judges to avoid accepting gifts or 

things of value under circumstances that might erode or diminish

confidence in the judicial system, it would be ill-served to the task for 

which it was intended if we were to construe it in an overly mechanical 

fashion. Accordingly, we conclude any judge who accepts free legal 

services from an attorney or firm has a continuing obligation under 

51:3.13(A) and canon 3 to ensure his or her acceptance of those services 

would not appear to a reasonable person to undermine his or her 

independence, integrity, or impartiality by honoring the disclosure and

waiver requirements of rule 51:2.11(C) before deciding a matter in which 

the attorney or firm appears. 

Because rule 51:3.13 does not forbid judges accepting free legal 

services under all circumstances, occasionally an attorney from whom a 

judge accepted free legal services will be scheduled to appear before the 

judge in court. Once a judge has accepted free legal services from an 

attorney or firm, the judge must either disqualify himself or herself from 

11The Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct defines “impending matter” as “a matter 

that is imminent or expected to occur in the near future.” Iowa Code of Judicial 

Conduct, Terminology. 

 
36

any matter in which the attorney or firm who provided the services 

appears or disclose his or her acceptance of free legal services and obtain 

a waiver of the disqualification requirement from the parties. See id. 

r. 51:2.11(A), (C). A judge violates rule 51:3.13(A) and canon 3 of the 

Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct by failing to ensure his or her acceptance 

of free legal services does not reasonably appear to undermine his or her 

independence, integrity, or impartiality.

2. Application of legal principles. Though Judge Howes offered to 

pay Mr. Jasper and Ms. Pauly for their legal services, the record indicates 

she accepted free legal services from both attorneys when they refused 

her offers for payment. The Commission concluded Judge Howes 

violated rule 51:3.13(A) because it found her acceptance of free legal 

services from Mr. Jasper and Ms. Pauly would appear to a reasonable 

person to undermine her independence, integrity, or impartiality.12

Judge Howes had an attorney–client relationship with each of the 

attorneys from whom she accepted free legal services at the time she 

accepted the services. Furthermore, the record contains no evidence 

suggesting the attorneys from whom Judge Howes accepted free legal 

services were restricted donors. Accordingly, we conclude Judge Howes 

did not violate rule 51:3.13 merely by accepting free legal services. See 

id. r. 51:3.13(C)(1). 

However, the record also reveals Judge Howes failed to honor her 

continuing obligation to ensure her acceptance of free legal services from 

Ms. Pauly would not reasonably appear to undermine her independence, 

12Ms. Pauly filed the petition for dissolution of the marriage between 

Mr. Khawaja and Ms. Jadoon in the district court on November 9, 2012. However, the 

Commission did not charge Judge Howes with violating 51:3.13(B) or find that 

Ms. Pauly was a restricted donor.

 
37

integrity, or impartiality by failing to disqualify herself from a matter in 

which Ms. Pauly appeared or disclose her acceptance of free legal 

services from Ms. Pauly to the parties and obtain a waiver of the 

disqualification requirement.13 Because Judge Howes failed to disqualify 

herself or disclose her acceptance of free legal services from an attorney

who appeared before her, we agree with the Commission that she 

violated rule 51:3.13(A) and canon 3 of the Iowa Code of Judicial 

Conduct.14

C. Rules 51:1.1 and 51:1.2 and Canon 1. We now consider 

whether Judge Howes violated rules 51:1.1 and 51:1.2 as well as canon 1 

of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct by failing to comply with the rules 

set forth therein, failing to avoid the appearance of impropriety, and 

failing to promote public confidence in the independence, integrity, and 

impartiality of the judiciary.

1. Governing legal principles. Canon 1 of the Iowa Code of Judicial 

Conduct provides that “a judge shall uphold and promote the 

independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and shall avoid 

impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” Rule 51:1.1 provides 

that judges “shall comply with the law, including the Iowa Code of 

Judicial Conduct.” Id. r. 51:1.1. Rule 51:1.2 provides that a judge must 

“act at all times in a manner that promotes public confidence in the 

13We note the record does not indicate whether Judge Howes honored these 

requirements when Mr. Jasper appeared before her after she accepted free legal services 

from him.

14Because we conclude rule 51:3.13(A) imposes a continuing obligation on a 

judge who accepts free legal services from an attorney to ensure his or her acceptance 

of those services would not reasonably appear to undermine his or her independence, 

integrity, or impartiality by honoring the disqualification or disclosure requirement of 

rule 51:2.11 before deciding a matter in which the attorney appears, we need not decide 

whether the matter Judge Howes decided constituted an “impending matter.” See Iowa 

Code of Judicial Conduct, Terminology; id. r. 51:3.13(C)(1).

 
38

independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary and shall avoid 

impropriety and the appearance of impropriety.” Id. r. 51:1.2. For 

purposes of applying this rule, the term “impropriety” means “conduct 

that violates the law, court rules, or provisions of the Iowa Code of 

Judicial Conduct, and conduct that undermines a judge’s independence, 

integrity, or impartiality.” Id., Terminology. The term “integrity” means 

“probity, fairness, honesty, uprightness, and soundness of character.” 

Id.

As the preamble to the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct provides, 

judges “should aspire at all times to conduct that ensures the greatest 

possible public confidence in their independence, impartiality, integrity, 

and competence.” Id., Preamble [2]. Accordingly, rule 51:1.2 governs a 

judge’s conduct both on and off the bench. In re Meldrum, 834 N.W.2d 

650, 653 (Iowa 2013); Block, 816 N.W.2d at 364; see Iowa Code of 

Judicial Conduct R. 51:1.2 cmt. 1.

The comments to rule 51:1.2 describe various means by which a 

judge might fail to promote public confidence in the judiciary or fail to 

avoid the appearance of impropriety. In particular, conduct undermines, 

rather than promotes, public confidence in the judiciary when it appears 

to compromise the independence, integrity, and impartiality of a judge. 

Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct R. 51:1.2 cmt. 3. Conduct creates an 

appearance of impropriety when it violates the Iowa Code of Judicial 

Conduct or creates in reasonable minds the perception that a judge 

engaged in conduct reflecting adversely on his or her impartiality or 

fitness as a judge. Id. r. 51:1.2 cmt. 5.

2. Application of legal principles. Judge Howes decided a matter 

from which she failed to disqualify herself when the rule of necessity did 

not apply without disclosing all the relevant facts and obtaining a waiver 
39

of the disqualification requirement from the parties. She also failed to 

ensure her acceptance of free legal services did not reasonably appear to 

undermine her independence, integrity, or impartiality by deciding a 

matter in which an attorney from whom she accepted free legal services 

represented a party without disclosing her acceptance of free legal 

services from the attorney and obtaining a waiver of the disqualification 

requirement from the parties. By this conduct, Judge Howes failed to 

comply with the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, failed to avoid the 

appearance of impropriety, and failed to promote public confidence in the 

independence, integrity, and impartiality of the judiciary. Therefore, we 

agree with the Commission that Judge Howes violated rules 51:1.1 and 

51:2.1 as well as canon 1. 

D. Rules 51:1.1, 51:1.2, and 51:2.16(A) as well as Canons 1 

and 2. Finally, we consider whether Judge Howes violated rules 51:1.1, 

51:1.2, and 51:2.16(A) as well as canons 1 and 2 of the Iowa Code of 

Judicial Conduct by failing to be honest and candid with the 

Commission. Rule 51:2.16(A) provides that judges “shall cooperate and 

be candid and honest with judicial and lawyer disciplinary agencies.”

The Commission charged Judge Howes with failing to be honest 

and candid with it based on statements appearing in her letter explaining 

her conduct. Judge Howes sent the letter in response to the 

Commission’s request that she provide a written explanation of her 

conduct addressing the circumstances under which she signed the 

ex parte order and whether Ms. Pauly represented her at that time. In it, 

Judge Howes stated she had not contacted or hired Ms. Pauly upon 

receiving the letter from Mr. Henderkott in which he requested she 

reimburse him the money deducted from his tax return.
40

This statement conflicted with a statement appearing in the 

response Judge Howes sent to Mr. Henderkott upon receiving his letter. 

Specifically, in the response to Mr. Henderkott, Judge Howes indicated 

she had discussed the tax issue with her attorney, whom she identified 

as Ms. Pauly.

During the hearing before the Commission, Judge Howes testified 

she never intended to mislead the Commission about her 

communications with Ms. Pauly. Judge Howes also acknowledged the 

statement in her response to Mr. Henderkott indicating she had spoken 

to Ms. Pauly was untruthful. Judge Howes did not remember precisely 

why she wrote the untruthful statement to Mr. Henderkott, but she 

indicated it might have been because she intended to tell Ms. Pauly 

about Mr. Henderkott’s letter at the time or because she wished to 

assume a particular posture in her communications with him. 

Although the Commission expressed concern that Judge Howes 

did not thoroughly review her records before responding to its request for 

a written explanation of her conduct, it concluded Judge Howes did not 

intentionally deceive it. Therefore, the Commission concluded there was 

not a convincing preponderance of the evidence indicating Judge Howes 

failed to cooperate with its investigation or deceived it in violation of any 

particular rule or canon.

After careful review of the record, we also conclude the evidence 

was inadequate to prove Judge Howes was intentionally dishonest with 

the Commission. What Judge Howes wrote to the Commission was 

inconsistent with what she wrote to Mr. Henderkott. However, in both 

her written explanation of her conduct and her testimony before the 

Commission, Judge Howes acknowledged that Ms. Pauly wrote the 

May 22 letter on her behalf. In addition, Judge Howes consistently 
41

indicated to the Commission that she communicated about the tax 

dispute with Ms. Pauly only after Ms. Pauly received the letter from 

Mr. Kepros, and Ms. Pauly corroborated this account of the timeline in 

her testimony.

Although a convincing preponderance of the evidence indicates 

Judge Howes made an inaccurate statement, the record indicates it was 

probably the statement in her letter to Mr. Henderkott, not the statement 

in her written explanation of her conduct to the Commission. However 

carefully worded the letter Judge Howes wrote to the Commission might 

have been, the evidence was inadequate to prove she violated any rule or 

canon in the manner charged by a convincing preponderance of the 

evidence. Accordingly, we agree with the Commission the evidence does 

not prove Judge Howes violated rules 51:1.1, 51:1.2, and 51:2.16(A) as 

well as canons 1 and 2 of the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct in the 

manner charged.

IV. Sanction.

We impose sanctions in judicial discipline proceedings “not to 

punish the individual judge, but to restore and maintain the dignity, 

honor, and impartiality of the judicial office.” In re McCormick, 639 

N.W.2d 12, 16 (Iowa 2002). We also impose sanctions to protect the 

public by deterring judges from engaging in unethical conduct in the 

future. Block, 816 N.W.2d at 365.

There are no standard sanctions in judicial discipline cases based 

on the rule or rules violated. Meldrum, 834 N.W.2d at 654. Ultimately, 

we determine the suitable sanction by considering the goals served by 

judicial discipline and the entire record before us. In re Dean, 855 

N.W.2d 186, 192 (Iowa 2014). We tailor the sanction to the particular 

case by considering all the aggravating or mitigating factors that may 
42

bear upon the appropriate sanction for the offending conduct. Krull, 860 

N.W.2d at 46. 

We begin our analysis concerning the appropriate sanction in a 

judicial discipline case by considering the following factors:

1. whether the misconduct is isolated or a pattern of 

misconduct;

2. the nature, extent, and frequency of the acts of 

misconduct;

3. whether the misconduct occurred in or out of the 

courtroom;

4. whether the misconduct occurred in the judge’s official 

capacity or in his or her private life;

5. whether the judge has acknowledged or recognized the 

misconduct;

6. whether the judge has made an effort to change or modify 

his or her conduct;

7. the length of service on the bench;

8. whether there have been any prior complaints;

9. the effect of the misconduct upon the integrity of and 

respect for the judiciary; and

10. the extent to which the judge exploited the judicial office 

to satisfy personal interests.

Krull, 860 N.W.2d at 46 (quoting Block, 816 N.W.2d at 365–66). We may 

also consider any additional factors we find relevant to calibrating the 

sanction to the particular misconduct, including the sanctions imposed 

in cases involving similar misconduct and the subjective motivations of 

the judge who engaged in misconduct. See id. at 46–47; McCormick, 639 

N.W.2d at 16–18. 

The Commission recommended Judge Howes be publicly 

reprimanded, rather than temporarily suspended, in light of a 
43

consideration it found to mitigate the severity of her misconduct. In 

particular, the Commission concluded the legal culture in which Judge 

Howes works likely contributed to her apparent confusion regarding the 

applicable standards for identifying conflicts that warrant judicial recusal 

and the appropriateness of judges accepting free legal services from 

attorneys likely to appear before them. We give respectful consideration 

to the Commission’s recommendation regarding an appropriate sanction, 

but we are not bound by it. Krull, 860 N.W.2d at 43. 

On the one hand, several factors we ordinarily weigh in considering 

the appropriate sanction for judicial misconduct counsel in favor of a 

serious sanction here. Though Judge Howes’s misconduct took place 

during an isolated episode, it was particularly likely to erode the 

confidence of litigants appearing before her. Furthermore, though Judge 

Howes never engaged in misconduct in a public courtroom, she 

committed misconduct in her chambers while acting in her official 

capacity. Additionally, misconduct of the sort at issue in this case is 

understandably likely to undermine public respect for and public 

confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.

On the other hand, several additional factors we traditionally find 

relevant to determining an appropriate sanction in a judicial discipline 

case counsel in favor of a lighter sanction. The conduct by which Judge 

Howes violated her ethical duties involved an isolated decision. In view 

of the charges against her, Judge Howes appears to have at least 

resolved to be more cautious about ensuring her conduct complies with 

her ethical duties in the future. Judge Howes has served the state as a 

member of the judiciary for approximately twenty-three years, and she 

has never been disciplined before. Nor does the evidence suggest Judge 

Howes exploited her judicial role to her personal benefit. On the 
44

contrary, judges and attorneys who appeared before the Commission on 

her behalf indicated she has an excellent reputation as a judge.

We agree with the Commission that additional circumstances are 

relevant to selecting the appropriate sanction in this case. Based on the 

testimony of the other judges who appeared before the Commission on 

her behalf, it is evident Judge Howes was not alone in her mistaken 

beliefs concerning her ethical obligations. But we are mindful that 

judges are responsible for assuring that they understand the parameters 

of their ethical duties. Because avoiding even the appearance of 

impropriety is of paramount importance to maintaining the public trust 

and respect for the judiciary, judges should conduct themselves 

especially cautiously whenever those parameters appear to be unclear or 

debatable. Accordingly, we conclude the apparent lack of clarity 

concerning the rules violated counsels only slightly in favor of a lighter 

sanction.

In addition, Judge Howes has reassured us that she did not 

intentionally or knowingly disregard her ethical obligations. Rather, it is

clear that, were it not for her mistaken beliefs concerning the rules 

governing her conduct, she would have conducted herself differently to 

avoid violating them. Judge Howes acted in good faith and took care to 

assure she honored what she understood those requirements to be. 

Moreover, we are firmly convinced Judge Howes did not intend to give 

Ms. Pauly or her client any advantage by granting the application for a 

temporary injunction. Rather, the order she signed was merely a 

temporary order maintaining the status quo pending a further hearing, 

and she believed that an emergency warranting immediate action existed. 

We conclude these facts also counsel in favor of a lighter sanction. 
45

Under the circumstances of this case, we believe a formal 

reprimand is unnecessary to maintain the dignity, honor, and 

impartiality of judiciary. See McCormick, 639 N.W.2d at 16. Judge 

Howes clearly violated the Iowa Code of Judicial Conduct, but she would 

have conducted herself differently had she understood her ethical 

obligations. See In re Frerichs, 238 N.W.2d 764, 770 (Iowa 1976). 

Shared confusion concerning the parameters of those obligations directly 

and understandably contributed to her conduct. 

In appropriate cases, a public admonition may be adequate to 

repair an appearance of impropriety in service to the public interest. See

Comm. on Prof’l Ethics & Conduct v. Liles, 430 N.W.2d 111, 112–13 (Iowa 

1988) (“The public’s interest in guarding against even an appearance of 

impropriety can be adequately served here by an admonition.”). A public 

admonishment may also perform the important function of avoiding the 

appearance of impropriety in the future by instructing members of the 

bench as to how to avoid violating their ethical obligations when similar 

circumstances arise. See id. at 113. Accordingly, we conclude a public 

admonishment will serve the fundamental purposes of judicial discipline 

in this case. Block, 816 N.W.2d at 365; McCormick, 639 N.W.2d at 16.

We are mindful of statutory and constitutional limits on our power

to sanction a judicial officer. Section 602.2106(3)(b) of the Iowa Code

permits this court to discipline or remove a judicial officer when the 

Commission files an application for judicial discipline. Iowa Code 

§ 602.2106(3)(b). In the context of attorney disciplinary proceedings,

however, we have previously recognized that public admonitions

constitute something “considerably less severe than reprimands, and . . . 

something less than actual discipline.” Liles, 430 N.W.2d at 113. 
46

Notwithstanding this distinction, we conclude this court has the 

power to admonish, rather than reprimand, suspend, or remove, a judge 

when the Commission files an application for judicial discipline for the 

following reasons. First, section 602.2106(4) states that this court may

“render the decree that it deems appropriate” when it finds an 

application for judicial discipline “should be granted in whole or in part.” 

Iowa Code § 602.2106(4). Second, the Iowa Constitution grants this 

court “supervisory and administrative control over all inferior judicial 

tribunals throughout the state.” Iowa Const. art. V, § 4. Thus, we 

conclude that when the Commission makes an application for discipline 

of a judicial officer to this court, upon deciding to grant the application 

this court has the power to admonish rather than reprimand, suspend,

or remove a judicial officer.

V. Conclusion and Sanction.

We conclude Judge Howes violated rules 51:1.1, 51:1.2, 

51:2.11(A), and 51:3.13(A) as well as canons 1, 2, and 3 of the Iowa Code 

of Judicial Conduct. We therefore grant the Commission’s application for 

judicial discipline and publicly admonish Judge Howes for her conduct.

APPLICATION GRANTED AND JUDGE PUBLICLY ADMONISHED.