The Honorable Charles R. Wolle, Chief Judge, United States

1

District Court for the Southern District of Iowa.

___________

No. 95-3927

___________

United States of America, *

 *

Appellee, *

 * Appeal from the United States

v. * District Court for the

 * Southern District of Iowa.

Tom Boston Johnson, Jr., * [UNPUBLISHED]

 *

Appellant. *

___________

 Submitted: July 26, 1996

 Filed: August 2, 1996

___________

Before FAGG, WOLLMAN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.

___________

PER CURIAM.

In this direct criminal appeal, Tom Boston Johnson appeals his

conviction and resulting 89-month sentence imposed by the district court,1

after a jury found him guilty of possessing crack cocaine with intent to

distribute within 1,000 feet of a school, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§

841(a)(1) and 860. We affirm.

Counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738

(1967), and was granted leave to withdraw. Counsel argues that Johnson was

selectively prosecuted, and that insufficient evidence supported Johnson's

convictions. In a supplemental brief, Johnson argues that his conviction

violates the Double Jeopardy Clause, that police lacked a reasonable,

articulable suspicion for the initial stop which led to his arrest, and

that he was stopped only because he is an African-American.
-2-

Viewed in a light most favorable to the government, the evidence was

sufficient to support Johnson's convictions. United States v. Quintanilla,

25 F.3d 694, 699 (8th Cir.) (standard of review), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct.

457 (1994). From the evidence presented, a reasonable jury could conclude

Johnson dropped a baggie of crack he knowingly possessed within 1,000 feet

of a school. Johnson's intent to distribute could reasonably be inferred

by the amount of crack, the fact it was broken up into individual rocks,

and testimony that this amount was much larger than that a typical user

would possess for personal use. See United States v. Lopez, 42 F.3d 463,

467 (8th Cir. 1994) (listing factors which lead to reasonable inference of

intent to distribute). 

As to Johnson's selective prosecution claim, Johnson has not shown

plain error, because he has not produced "clear and convincing evidence"

that the decision to prosecute him was motivated by a discriminatory

purpose. See United States v. Armstrong, 116 S. Ct. 1480, 1486-87 (1996);

Fritz v. United States, 995 F.2d 136, 137 (8th Cir. 1993) (plain error

review for issue not raised below), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 887 (1994).

Johnson also has not shown plain error as to his claims that officers

had no probable cause to stop him, and that he was stopped only because he

is an African-American. Given the location of the lot where police

officers observed Johnson drop the baggie of crack, the time of night, and

the officers' observations of the actions of Johnson and his companions,

the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to detain Johnson for

a Terry-stop. See United States v. Dawdy, 46 F.3d 1427, 1429-30 (8th Cir.)

(reasonable suspicion determined on totality of circumstances; listing

factors that may lead experienced officer to stop individual), cert.

denied, 116 S. Ct. 195 (1995); United States v. Hawthorne, 982 F.2d 1186,

1190 (8th Cir. 1992) (although court "concerned" by Hawthorne's allegation

he was targeted because he
-3-

was young black male, relevant facts supporting Terry-stop were non-race

based and sufficient to justify stop). Johnson has not raised an issue of

selective enforcement, as he has not shown that the officers did not stop

persons of a different race under similar circumstances, or that their

decision to stop him was at least partially based on his race. Cf. United

States v. Bell, 1996 WL 333447, at *2 (8th Cir. June 19, 1996) (person

claiming unequal enforcement of facially neutral statute must show that

enforcement had discriminatory effect, and motivated by discriminatory

purpose).

Johnson's double jeopardy argument is baseless, because his sentence

was determined solely on the basis of the crack seized when he was

arrested, not on the prior conduct he refers to in his brief. We have

reviewed the record to determine whether any other nonfrivolous issues

exist, in accordance with Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988), and have

found no such issues. Johnson's motion for transcript copies is denied.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.