Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 82A01-1701-JT-57 | July 19, 2017 Page 1 of 19

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT A.S.

Erin L. Berger

Evansville, Indiana

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT J.M.

Julianne L. Fox

Evansville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Abigail R. Recker

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Involuntary 

Termination of the Parent-Child 

Relationship of C.S., Co.M., 

Ca.M. (Minor Children), 

and 

A.S. (Mother) and J.M. (Father),

Appellants-Respondents,

v.

The Indiana Department of 

Child Services,

Appellee-Petitioner

July 19, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

82A01-1701-JT-57

Appeal from the Vanderburgh 

Superior Court

The Honorable Brett J. Niemeier, 

Judge

Trial Court Cause Nos.

82D04-1605-JT-826, -27, -28
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Crone, Judge.

Case Summary

[1] J.M. (“Father”) challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support the trial 

court’s order terminating his parental relationship with his children, Co.M. and 

Ca.M. (collectively “his Children”). He also contends that the trial court 

abused its discretion in denying his motion for continuance. A.S. (“Mother”) 

also challenges the sufficiency of evidence to support the termination of her 

parental relationship with C.S., Co.M., and Ca.M. (collectively “her Children”

or “the Children”).1 Because Mother and Father share parentage to two of the 

children, they are both parties in this joint appeal. Finding no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court’s denial of Father’s motion for continuance and 

concluding that the evidence is sufficient to support the termination orders as to 

both Mother and Father, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[2] Mother has two sons with Father, Co.M. and Ca.M. Her oldest son, C.S., has 

a different father.2 In April 2015, the Department of Child Services (“DCS”) 

received a report concerning Mother’s illegal drug use and neglect of her 

Children. She and her Children had been living with friends at a home without 

running water, food, or beds for her Children. Mother tested positive for 

 

1

 C.S. was born February 12, 2002; Co.M. was born May 15, 2005; and Ca.M. was born November 7, 2006.

2

 C.S.’s father consented to the termination of his parental rights and is not involved in this appeal.
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benzodiazepines, marijuana, oxycodone, amphetamine, and methamphetamine

(“meth”), and her Children were removed and placed with their respective 

fathers. A week later, DCS filed petitions seeking to adjudicate the Children as 

children in need of services (“CHINS”). The trial court ordered Father to 

remain substance-free and submit to random screens. Both Mother and Father 

were present for the April 22, 2015 CHINS hearing, and all three of the 

Children were designated as CHINS.

[3] On May 12, 2015, DCS acted on a report that Father had neglected and 

abandoned his Children by leaving them with his mother, who was an 

unapproved caregiver due to her drug use. DCS removed his Children and 

placed them in foster care. 

[4] On May 19, 2015, the trial court held the CHINS dispositional hearing. The 

trial court ordered Mother to complete a substance abuse evaluation, follow 

treatment recommendations, submit to random drug screens, refrain from drug 

and alcohol use, and participate in supervised visitation. On a couple 

occasions, Mother began parent aide services but cancelled numerous 

appointments and eventually was discharged for lack of progress. She failed to 

attend the scheduled assessments and began drug court in June 2015. She was 

discharged from her treatment group for failure to attend. 

[5] Father failed to appear for the dispositional hearing, and DCS was unable to 

locate him. At that time, DCS learned that Father was the subject of an active 

arrest warrant for felony forgery and theft. A second warrant was issued in a 
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previous cause involving a meth conviction for which Father was serving 

probation. Father’s whereabouts were unknown until July, when he was 

apprehended by authorities and eventually brought to court from jail on a writ. 

At a July 15, 2015 hearing, the trial court issued a parental participation order 

requiring Father to obtain a substance abuse evaluation, follow treatment 

recommendations, remain drug and alcohol free, submit to random drug 

screens, and participate in supervised visitation. Father remained incarcerated 

for three more months and was eventually placed in a forensic diversion 

program. 

[6] In August 2015, DCS filed an information for contempt against Mother based 

on her failure to attend various assessments and appointments and 

noncompliance with drug court for failure to attend Alcoholics 

Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous (“AA/NA”) meetings. Mother was found 

to be in contempt and served ninety days of work release. She eventually 

completed the treatment group sessions in October 2015. She did not 

participate in individual therapy, and her case was closed in December 2015. 

Thereafter, she relapsed and used hydrocodone, alcohol, tramadol, and 

oxycodone, which prompted DCS to file another contempt petition. She was 

referred for more services but failed to attend the assessment. Her child C.S. 

was sent to a behavioral center in Columbus. Eventually, he was placed with 

his brothers Co.M. and Ca.M. in the same foster home. Mother’s supervised 

visits advanced to unsupervised visits. However, her positive drug screens 

caused her visitation to revert to supervised visits, which eventually were 
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discontinued in May 2016 due to lack of consistency. She had brief stints of 

employment and lived with a friend and then her mother during the pendency 

of the CHINS proceedings. 

[7] In October 2015, Father was convicted of forgery, theft, and fraud, all as level 6 

felonies. He was sentenced to two years but was assigned to a county treatment 

center. In November and December 2015, he tested positive for alcohol. He 

was admitted for inpatient treatment but was medically discharged after he 

fractured his elbow. He enrolled in an outpatient treatment program but within 

three months tested positive for meth. In the ensuing two months, he tested 

positive twice for meth and once for alcohol, in violation of his probation 

conditions. After each positive screen, he served a few days in jail. He declined 

to participate in individual therapy recommended by his substance abuse 

treatment provider. His visits were changed from supervised to unsupervised, 

but his Children reported that he was taking them to his own mother’s house 

and leaving them with her (unsupervised) so that he could sleep. By December 

2015, he was allowed only supervised visits, and his visitation was closed out in 

the spring of 2016. 

[8] On May 16, 2016, DCS filed a petition for termination of Mother’s and 

Father’s parental rights with a permanency plan of adoption by the foster 

parents. Mother’s factfinding hearing was conducted on September 12 and 13, 

2016. After one continuance on Father’s motion and a couple rescheduled 

dates by the trial court, the trial court held Father’s factfinding hearing on 
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September 9 and October 28, 2016. Father made another request for 

continuance, which the trial court denied. 

[9] On December 14, 2016, the trial court issued separate orders terminating the 

parental rights of Mother and Father. Both parents appeal. We will address 

their claims separately where appropriate. Additional facts will be provided as 

necessary.

Discussion and Decision

Section 1 – The trial court acted within its discretion in 

denying Father’s motion for continuance.

[10] Father challenges the trial court’s denial of his motion for continuance. The 

decision to grant or deny a motion for continuance is within the sound 

discretion of the trial court. J.P. v. G.M., 14 N.E.3d 786, 789 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2014). We will reverse only for an abuse of that discretion. Rowlett v. 

Vanderburgh Cty. Office of Family & Children, 841 N.E.2d 615, 619 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2005), trans. denied (2006). An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court 

reaches a conclusion that is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts or the 

reasonable and probable deductions that may be drawn therefrom. J.P., 14 

N.E.3d at 790. Where the trial court denies a motion for continuance, an abuse 

of discretion will be found if the moving party has demonstrated good cause for 

granting the motion. Rowlett, 841 N.E.2d at 619; see also Ind. Trial Rule 53.5 

(stating that trial court has discretion to grant continuance on motion and 

continuance “shall be allowed upon a showing of good cause established by 
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affidavit or other evidence.”). No abuse of discretion will be found where the 

moving party has not shown that he was prejudiced by the denial of his 

continuance motion. J.P., 14 N.E.3d at 790.

[11] Here, the record contains no written motion or affidavit establishing good cause 

for Father’s request for continuance. Our review of the chronological case 

summary shows that Father had already been granted at least one continuance 

and that the proceedings had been rescheduled by the trial court on at least one 

other occasion. Appellant’s App. at 48-50.3 Father’s disappearance during the 

first two months of the CHINS proceedings also contributed to the protracted 

proceedings in this case. The transcript of Father’s factfinding hearing contains 

but one brief reference by the trial court to its denial of Father’s latest request

for continuance. See Tr. Vol. 1 at 60 (“Alright, and I know you had moved to –

actually prior to this trial starting – for a continuance, which I denied.”). As 

best we can discern from his appellant’s brief, Father predicated this request for 

continuance on his desire for more time to demonstrate his strides toward 

parental fitness. Father’s Br. at 16. Although not entered in response to 

Father’s previously-denied request for continuance, the following excerpt from 

Finding 414 offers insight into the trial court’s reasons for denying Father’s 

request:

 

3

 The only appendix included in the record is Mother’s “Appellant’s Appendix.” It includes documents 

pertinent to Father and Mother, collectively and individually, and we cite it as captioned.

4

 Where the findings include personal designations other than those used throughout this decision, we use 

the latter for clarity and consistency.
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If circumstances had been different and these children were living 

with close relatives (so the delay wouldn’t have a material 

adverse effect) maybe delaying this case for another six months, 

so more of the future could be known, could have occurred. Or 

maybe, if this termination case had been filed only after six 

months, the Court could justify taking a wait and see approach. 

Unfortunately, the CHINS cases are already [a] year and [a] half 

old. The Court must rule according to the facts and the law as 

they exist now.

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 105. 

[12] Simply put, the record is devoid of evidence to indicate that Father made any 

showing of good cause for a continuance. As such, we find no abuse of 

discretion in the trial court’s denial of his request for continuance.

Section 2 – The trial court did not clearly err in terminating 

the parental relationships of Mother and Father with each of 

their children.

[13] Mother and Father challenge the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial 

court’s judgments terminating their parental relationships with their children. 

Where they raise separate allegations, we will address them individually. 

When reviewing a trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions thereon in a case 

involving the termination of parental rights, we first determine whether the 

evidence supports the findings and then whether the findings support the 

judgment. In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 642 (Ind. 2014). We will set aside the trial 

court’s judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Bester v. Lake Cty. Office of Family 

& Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005). We neither reweigh evidence nor 
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judge witness credibility. E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 642. Rather, we consider only the 

evidence and inferences most favorable to the judgment. Id. “[I]t is not enough 

that the evidence might support some other conclusion, but it must positively 

require the conclusion contended for by the appellant before there is a basis for 

reversal.” Best v. Best, 941 N.E.2d 499, 503 (Ind. 2011) (citations omitted).

[14] In Bester, our supreme court stated,

The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution 

protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and 

raise their children. A parent’s interest in the care, custody, and 

control of his or her children is perhaps the oldest of the 

fundamental liberty interests. Indeed the parent-child 

relationship is one of the most valued relationships in our culture. 

We recognize of course that parental interests are not absolute 

and must be subordinated to the child’s interests in determining 

the proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. 

Thus, parental rights may be terminated when the parents are 

unable or unwilling to meet their parental responsibilities. 

839 N.E.2d at 147 (citations, quotation marks, and alteration omitted). 

[15] To obtain a termination of a parent-child relationship, DCS is required to 

establish in pertinent part:

(A) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) The child has been removed from the parent for at least six (6) 

months under a dispositional decree.

....
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(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions 

that resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for 

placement outside the home of the parents will not be 

remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation 

of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the wellbeing of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child. 

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). 

[16] In recognition of the seriousness with which we address parental termination 

cases, Indiana has adopted a clear and convincing evidence standard. Ind. 

Code § 31-37-14-2; Castro v. State Office of Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 

377 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006), trans. denied. “Clear and convincing evidence need 

not reveal that the continued custody of the parents is wholly inadequate for the 

child’s survival. Rather, it is sufficient to show by clear and convincing 

evidence that the child’s emotional and physical development are threatened by 
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the respondent parent’s custody.” In re K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 

2013) (citation omitted).

Section 2.1 – Mother and Father have failed to demonstrate

clear error concerning the reasonable probability of 

unremedied conditions.

A. Mother

[17] Mother asserts that the evidence is insufficient to support the trial court’s 

conclusion that a reasonable probability exists that the conditions that led to the 

Children’s removal will not be remedied. Where, as here, Mother does not 

challenge any of the trial court’s findings, we simply determine whether the 

unchallenged findings are sufficient to support the judgment. T.B. v. Ind. Dep’t 

of Child Servs., 971 N.E.2d 104, 110 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. When 

assessing whether there is a reasonable probability that conditions that led to a 

child’s removal will not be remedied, we must consider not only the initial basis 

for the child’s removal but also the bases for continued placement outside the 

home. In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied. 

Moreover, “the trial court should judge a parent’s fitness to care for his [or her] 

children at the time of the termination hearing, taking into consideration 

evidence of changed conditions.” In re J.T., 742 N.E.2d 509, 512 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2001), trans. denied. “Due to the permanent effect of termination, the trial court 

also must evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct to determine the 

probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.” Id. In making its case, 

“DCS need not rule out all possibilities of change; rather, [it] need establish 
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only that there is a reasonable probability that the parent’s behavior will not 

change.” In re Kay.L., 867 N.E.2d 236, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). In 

determining reasonable probability of unremedied conditions, the court may 

properly consider evidence of a parent’s substance abuse, criminal history, lack 

of employment or adequate housing, history of neglect, and failure to provide 

support. McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family & Children, 798 N.E.2d 185, 199 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

[18] Here, the trial court entered extensive unchallenged findings concerning the 

reasonable probability of Mother remedying the conditions that led to her 

Children’s removal. With respect to treatment for substance abuse, the court 

found that she completed inpatient treatment but failed to follow the 

recommendations after her release. She also failed to meet with her parent aide 

and failed to attend AA/NA meetings, which led to her first contempt of court 

citation. When the court gave her a chance to purge herself of the contempt 

finding by complying with its orders, she failed to comply and was sentenced to 

ninety days incarcerated in a county work release facility. After her release, she 

abused prescription drugs (without prescriptions) and continued to fail drug 

screens, which resulted in a second contempt petition. Even then, she 

continued her drug use and was discharged from drug court for unsatisfactory 

progress. She enrolled in counseling but failed to attend appointments. “As of 

the date of the termination hearing, Mother had not successfully completed 

substance abuse treatment.” See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 65 (Finding 11). 

Even after the permanency plan had been changed to termination, she was 
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discharged from an inpatient program for “giving another patient a prescription 

sleep aid.” See id. (Finding 13). She continued to snort opiates and struggled to 

maintain stable housing and employment. “As of the date of the termination 

trials, Mother was not employed and admitted that she was unable to provide 

for the basic necessities of the children if they were returned to her 

immediately.” See id. at 66 (Finding 16). The trial court ultimately found: 

20. Mother has continued to struggle with sobriety during the 

pending CHINS matter. Mother admits that she has struggled 

with sobriety and addiction, but her actions have shown that very 

little has changed since the initial removal of the Children. 

Mother was actively using benzodiazepines in April, 2015; and 

she continued to use opiates and benzodiazepines through June, 

2016, despite receiving multiple services aimed at dealing with 

her addiction, getting stable housing and becoming employed. 

The Court ordered Mother to participate in the most intensive 

and supportive service available – the Parents’ Drug Court, but 

Mother simply refused to put in the work necessary to overcome 

her addiction. Mother has simply failed to overcome her 

addiction, mental health and stability issues.

Id.

[19] The Children were initially removed from Mother due to her substance abuse 

and neglect in the form of living with a friend in a home without any running 

water, food, or beds for the Children. Thereafter, her habitual patterns involved 

persistent use of illegal drugs, brief stints of employment, and living with friends 

or her mother. Although she initially made strides in her visitation with the 

Children, her pattern of drug abuse was one of relapse and failed drug screens. 

She had two contempt petitions filed against her based on these failed drugs 
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screens. As for services, her prevailing pattern was one of initial compliance

followed by a failure to complete them. This resulted in many of the services 

being closed out due to lack of progress. Other than her acquisition of a Section 

8 apartment, she simply has made no positive strides. The record supports the 

trial court’s conclusion that a reasonable probability exists that the conditions 

that led to her Children’s removal will not be remedied. See McBride, 798 

N.E.2d at 199 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003).

B. Father

[20] Father also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s 

conclusion that a reasonable probability exists that the conditions that led to his 

Children’s removal will not be remedied.5 He correctly observes that the 

Children’s initial removal was largely due to Mother’s acts and omissions. 

However, as the trial court observed in its findings, just a few weeks after his 

Children were placed with him, he left them with his mother, whom he knew to 

be an unapproved caregiver due to her own drug abuse. Immediately 

thereafter, he was the subject of felony arrest warrants for forgery and a 

probation violation, and he disappeared for two months. This contributed to 

the chaos surrounding his Children’s living situation and resulted in their 

 

5

 Father also challenges the trial court’s conclusion that there is a reasonable probability that the 

continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to his Children’s well-being. Indiana Code 

Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) requires DCS to prove only one of the three circumstances listed. Because we find 

no error concerning the reasonable probability of unremedied conditions, we need not address the threat to 

the children’s well-being.
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removal and placement in foster care. The trial court emphasized the negative 

effect of Father’s disappearance on his Children in Finding 22:

As previously stated, Father’s whereabouts during the first two 

(2) months in the underlying CHINS matters were unknown. 

Father testified at trial that he was attempting to get his financial 

affairs in order and had planned on turning himself in. The 

Court believes his excuse was a hallow [sic] excuse. Father was 

eventually arrested and brought to Court from jail on July 15, 

2015. Father’s abandonment of his Children weighs heavy with 

this Court. The Court doubts whether Father ever would have 

come to Court or provided any assistance to his Children, but for 

him being caught and arrested. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 101.

[21] The trial court also emphasized in its findings that over the course of the 

CHINS proceedings, Father failed numerous drug screens, testing positive for 

meth and alcohol. For each screen that he failed, he was jailed for a few days

for violating probation. Though he recently made some strides, especially when 

it comes to sobriety, he nevertheless tested positive for methamphetamine six 

days after having been advised of the termination proceedings. See id. at 103 

(Finding 33). Most of his “remarkable change” came shortly before the 

termination factfinding hearing. Id. The trial court was within its discretion to 

consider the timing of his improvements and weigh them accordingly. See 

D.B.M. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 20 N.E.3d 174, 181-82 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) 

(in balancing parent’s recent improvements against habitual patterns of 

conduct, trial court has discretion to “weigh a parent’s prior history more 
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heavily than efforts made only shortly before termination”), trans. denied (2015). 

Father’s historical patterns include drug relapses as well as general disrespect 

for the many court orders, resulting in his being incarcerated for four probation 

violations. His criminal history is not minor, and includes multiple felony 

convictions, including class B felony burglary, class D felony theft, level 6 

felony forgery with intent to deceive, and several level 6 felony drug-related 

convictions. With respect to the reasonable probability of unremedied 

conditions, the trial court ultimately found as follows: 

41. After weighing all of the facts and circumstances in this case, 

the Court finds that Father has failed to adequately remedy the 

situation that brought about the removal and continued removal 

of his Children. The Court finds that Father has at least 

temporarily kept his addiction in check, but Father has simply 

run out of time to cure the instability issues and show the 

consistency necessary that would convince this Court that these 

first steps will lead to real permanent change, which is essential 

so these children[’s] well-beings are no longer threatened by their 

relationship with Father. There certainly is a reasonable 

probability that Father’s instability and/or drug usage which has 

put us in this case has not been remedied at this moment. The 

relapse rate for an addict like Father is incredibly high, [and] the 

recidivism rate for a person with Father’s criminal record is also 

high. A relatively new job, a new home, an old girlfriend and 

sobriety for the first time in approximately a decade are a lot to 

handle and there is nothing to suggest Father can handle all of 

these things for any significant length of time. If circumstances 

had been different and these children were living with close 

relatives (so the delay wouldn’t have a material adverse effect) 

maybe delaying this case for another six months, so more of the 

future could be known, could have occurred. Or maybe, if this 

termination case had been filed only after six months, the Court 

could justify taking a wait and see approach. Unfortunately, the 
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CHINS cases are already a year and a half old. The Court must 

rule according to the facts and the law as they exist now. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 105.

[22] In short, Father has a pervasive pattern of criminal conduct, probation 

violations, and substance abuse. He also has a history of instability when it 

comes to employment and housing. All these circumstances were properly 

considered in determining the reasonable probability of unremedied conditions. 

See McBride, 798 N.E.2d at 199. Father’s arguments amount to invitations to 

reweigh evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we may not and will 

not do. We find no clear error here.

Section 2.2 – Mother and Father have failed to establish clear 

error concerning the Children’s best interests.

[23] Mother and Father both assert that the trial court clearly erred in concluding 

that termination is in the best interests of the Children. Although not 

dispositive, permanency and stability are key considerations in determining the 

best interests of a child. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 1257, 1265 (Ind. 2009). A 

determination of a child’s best interests should be based on the totality of the 

circumstances. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012). 

[24] Although Mother does not challenge any of the trial court’s findings on best 

interests, Father challenges the following:

43. The Children are strongly bonded with the foster parents; 
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44. The Children are doing well in the care of the current foster 

parents; 

....

46. It is in the best interests of the Children to be adopted due to 

the inability of Father to provide appropriate care and 

supervision for the Children; 

47. DCS and the Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) 

believe that adoption by foster parents is in the Children’s best 

interest. These children need to be kept together as their bond 

with each other is very strong. The Court finds that adoption by 

the foster parents is in the Children’s best interest.

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 105-06.6

[25] Here, the totality of the circumstances shows that the parents, though making 

some strides, simply could not maintain any improvement due to their deeply 

ingrained patterns of drug abuse, criminal conduct (particularly in Father’s 

case), and instability. Meanwhile, the Children, now reunited as a group with 

the addition of C.S., are thriving in their preadoptive foster home. The foster 

parents, initially willing to adopt Co.M. and Ca.M., brought C.S. into their 

home and indicated their willingness to adopt all three as a group. DCS Family 

Case Manager Hilary Bemis and CASA Shannon Schultz both testified that 

termination followed by adoption by the foster parents is in the Children’s best 

 

6

 Father also challenges Findings 56 and 58. Finding 56 is merely a (correct) statement of the law, and 

Finding 58 is simply the trial court’s conclusion that termination is in the Children’s best interests. 

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 107-08.
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interests. “[T]he testimony of service providers may support a finding that 

termination is in the child’s best interests.” In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 224 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed. 

[26] The trial court specifically found adoption by the foster parents to be in the 

Children’s best interests, reasoning that all the Children “need to be kept 

together” due to their “very strong” sibling bond. See Appellant’s App. Vol. 2

at 105-06 (Finding 47). Father posits that this amounts to a finding that sibling 

rights prevail over parental rights. We disagree, believing that the strong sibling 

bond is simply a component of the totality of the circumstances considered in 

determining best interests, as is the fact that Father’s criminal record prohibits 

him from adopting his Children’s half sibling, C.S., with whom Father has no 

parental relationship. Father’s arguments amount to invitations to reweigh 

evidence and reassess witness credibility, which we may not and will not do. 

Neither Father nor Mother has demonstrated clear error in the trial court’s 

conclusion that termination and adoption are in the Children’s best interests. 

Accordingly, we affirm.

[27] Affirmed.

Baker, J., and Barnes, J., concur.