21404 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 69 / Tuesday, April 10, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

(b) Unsafe Condition 

This AD defines the unsafe condition as 

mislocated aluminum wire mesh in the blade 

skin which leaves portions of the graphite 

torque tube (spar) region unprotected from a 

lightning strike. This condition could result 

in spar delamination, loss of the blade tip cap 

during a lightning strike, blade imbalance, 

loss of a blade, and subsequent loss of control 

of the helicopter. 

(c) Effective Date 

This AD becomes effective May 15, 2012. 

(d) Compliance 

You are responsible for performing each 

action required by this AD within the 

specified compliance time unless it has 

already been accomplished prior to that time. 

(e) Required Actions 

Within 60 days, inspect the upper and 

lower airfoils of each tail rotor blade to 

determine if the wire mesh is mislocated. 

(1) Inspect by using either an eddy current 

inspection in accordance with paragraphs 

B.(1)(a) through B.(1)(o) or using the handsanding method and visually inspecting in 

accordance with paragraphs B.(2)(a) through 

B.(2)(d) of Sikorsky Special Service 

Instructions SSI No. 92–021A, Revision A, 

dated October 21, 2009, except you are not 

required to contact or report nonconforming 

blades to the manufacturer. If you sand and 

visually inspect and confirm the correct 

location of the wire mesh, touch-up and 

repaint the sanded area. 

(2) If there is a blade with a mislocated 

wire mesh, before further flight, replace the 

blade with an airworthy blade. 

(f) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Boston Aircraft 

Certification Office, FAA, may approve 

AMOCs for this AD. Send your proposal to: 

Nicholas Faust, Aviation Safety Engineer, 

Boston Aircraft Certification Office, Engine & 

Propeller Directorate, 12 New England 

Executive Park, Burlington, MA 01803; 

telephone (781) 238–7763; email 

nicholas.faust@faa.gov. 

(2) For operations conducted under a Part 

119 operating certificate or under Part 91, 

Subpart K, we suggest that you notify your 

principal inspector, or lacking a principal 

inspector, the manager of the local flight 

standards district office or certificate holding 

district office before operating any aircraft 

complying with this AD through an AMOC. 

(g) Subject 

Joint Aircraft Service Component (JASC) 

Code: 6410, Tail Rotor Blades. 

(h) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) You must use the specified portions of 

Sikorsky Special Service Instructions SSI No. 

92–021A, Revision A, dated October 21, 

2009, to do the specified actions required by 

this AD. The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference of 

this service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Sikorsky Aircraft 

Corporation, Attn: Manager, Commercial 

Technical Support, mailstop s581a, 6900 

Main Street, Stratford, CT 06614; telephone 

(800) 562–4409; email 

tsslibrary@sikorsky.com; or at http:// 

www.sikorsky.com. 

(3) You may review a copy of the 

referenced service information at the FAA, 

Office of the Regional Counsel, Southwest 

Region, 2601 Meacham Blvd., Room 663, Fort 

Worth, Texas 76137 or at the National 

Archives and Records Administration 

(NARA). For information on the availability 

of this material at NARA, call (202) 741– 

6030, or go to: http://www.archives.gov/ 

federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ 

ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Fort Worth, Texas, on March 20, 

2012. 

Kim Smith, 

Manager, Rotorcraft Directorate, Aircraft 

Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2012–8052 Filed 4–9–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2007–0109; Directorate 

Identifier 2007–NM–235–AD; Amendment 

39–16990; AD 2012–06–09] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Lockheed 

Martin Corporation/Lockheed Martin 

Aeronautics Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for all 

Lockheed Martin Corporation/Lockheed 

Martin Aeronautics Company Model 

382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G 

airplanes. This AD was prompted by a 

report of incidents involving fatigue 

cracking and corrosion in transport 

category airplanes that are approaching 

or have exceeded their design service 

objective. This AD requires revising the 

maintenance inspection program to 

include inspections that will give no 

less than the required damage tolerance 

analysis for each principal structural 

element (PSE), doing repetitive 

inspections to detect cracks of all PSEs, 

and repairing cracked structure. We are 

issuing this AD to maintain the 

continued structural integrity of the 

fleet. 

DATES: This AD is effective May 15, 

2012. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of a certain publication listed in the AD 

as of May 15, 2012. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact Lockheed 

Martin Corporation/Lockheed Martin 

Aeronautics Company, Airworthiness 

Office, Dept. 6A0M, Zone 0252, Column 

P–58, 86 S. Cobb Drive, Marietta, 

Georgia 30063; telephone 770–494– 

5444; fax 770–494–5445; email 

ams.portal@lmco.com; Internet http:// 

www.lockheedmartin.com/ams/tools/ 

TechPubs.html. You may review copies 

of the referenced service information at 

the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., 

Renton, Washington. For information on 

the availability of this material at the 

FAA, call 425–227–1221. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 

9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Document Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Carl 

Gray, Aerospace Engineer, Airframe 

Branch, ACE–117A, FAA, Atlanta 

Aircraft Certification Office, 1701 

Columbia Avenue, College Park, Georgia 

30337; phone: 404–474–5554; fax: 404– 

474–5606; email: carl.w.gray@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an AD that would 

apply to the specified products. That 

NPRM was published in the Federal 

Register on November 14, 2007 (72 FR 

64005) (corrected December 3, 2007 (72 

FR 67998)). That NPRM proposed to 

require revising the maintenance 

inspection program to include 

inspections that will give no less than 

the required damage tolerance rating for 

each structural significant item (SSI), 

doing repetitive inspections to detect 

cracks of all SSIs, and repairing cracked 

structure. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. The 

following presents the comments 

received on the proposal (72 FR 64005, 

November 14, 2007; corrected December 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 69 / Tuesday, April 10, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 21405 

3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) and the FAA’s 

response to each comment. 

Support for the Proposed AD (72 FR 

64005, November 14, 2007; Corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) 

Safair and Lockheed Martin 

Aeronautics Company (LM Aero) 

concurred with the proposed 

requirement to implement the Lockheed 

Martin Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, 

and 382G Series Aircraft Service 

Manual Publication (SMP), 

Supplemental Structural Inspection 

Document (SSID), SMP 515–C–SSID, 

Change 1, dated September 10, 2010 

(‘‘the SSID’’). 

Lynden Air Cargo (Lynden) agreed 

that the SSID would provide an 

acceptable way to comply with the 

maintenance program requirements of 

the inspection procedures specified in 

section 121.370a of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 121.370a), which 

was superseded by section 121.1109 of 

the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 

CFR 121.1109). 

Request To Extend Comment Period 

The SSID identified eight individual 

ADs that affect the principal structural 

elements (PSEs) identified in Section 

4.0 (Principle Structural Elements) of 

the SSID. (The individual ADs are 

identified in the SSID in Section 2.0, 

Table 2.1, pages 2–3.) Lynden requested 

additional time to comment on the 

proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 

14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 

(72 FR 67998)) to compare the 

compliance intervals and standards 

with those in the proposed AD, the 

individual ADs, and the continuous 

airworthiness maintenance program 

(CAMP). Lynden was unable to 

determine how the SSID addresses the 

existing ADs, and added that the 

proposed AD did not indicate that it 

would supersede the existing rules. 

We reopened the comment period to 

allow additional time for operators to 

comment on the proposed AD (72 FR 

64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)). We 

also provide the following clarification 

of the relationship among the various 

programs. The SSID can be used to 

show compliance for the baseline 

inspections for section 121.1109(c)(1) of 

the Aging Airplane Safety Rule (section 

121.1109(c)(1) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109(c)(1)). 

This AD adds other more broad and 

specific inspections that supplement but 

do not conflict with other ADs. The 

SSID inspections should identify safety 

issues related to the PSEs. When a SSID 

inspection reveals a certain number of 

positive findings on a PSE, that part— 

and only that part—of the PSE will be 

removed from the SSID and addressed 

in an individual AD and associated 

service bulletin. The remainder of the 

PSE will remain in the SSID and will be 

subject to the SSID inspections only. If 

the problem area is not removed from 

the SSID, the SSID requirements still 

apply, but at a lower priority until the 

area is removed. We have not changed 

the final rule regarding this issue. 

Request To Consider Industry 

Participation in Lockheed Working 

Group Sessions 

The proposed AD (72 FR 64005, 

November 14, 2007; corrected December 

3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) stated that 

members of the airline industry 

participated with Lockheed in working 

group sessions and developed the 

Supplemental Structural Inspection 

Program (SSIP) for the affected 

airplanes, but Lynden reported that it 

was not consulted by the type certificate 

(TC) holder, and it was not aware of or 

invited to participate in any working 

group on this issue. Further, Lynden 

stated that it understood that the TC 

holder used military operational and 

design data for the basis of the SSID. 

Lynden, as the lead carrier for the 

Model L–382 Master Minimum 

Equipment List (MMEL) and the largest 

part 121 operator of the affected 

airplanes, would have provided 

valuable input on the civil operation 

and maintenance of the affected 

airplanes. Lynden requested that we 

consult the service difficulty report 

(SDR) database for the operator’s 

submitted data regarding the structural 

inspection findings of the operator’s 

CAMP. 

According to Lynden, the SDRs 

ensure that the airplane is in an 

airworthy condition because fatigue 

cracks are found and reported before 

any adverse effect on airworthiness. The 

existing inspections in the CAMP reveal 

cracks based on existing inspection 

intervals, which, in most cases, are 

identical to the inspection intervals in 

the CAMP now being used by the 

operators. The SDRs also prove the 

accuracy of the evaluation by the FAA 

and design approval holder (DAH) of 

commercial usage (military usage for 

baseline structure is very similar to 

commercial usage), based on objective 

criteria and information submitted by 

the operators to the SDR database. 

Operators may request approval of an 

alternative method of compliance 

(AMOC) based on the existing CAMP. 

The information in the SSID is based 

on military usage, which defined the 

baseline inspection requirements. 

Operators may be allowed to extend the 

inspection intervals by completing an 

operational usage evaluation (OUE) as 

specified in Lockheed Service Bulletin 

382–57–84, and requesting approval of 

an AMOC from the FAA. Recent 

analysis of the usage data has shown 

that typical commercial operations of 

the affected airplanes are at higher 

payloads than military operations with 

significantly less time in training. 

Analysis and in-service cracking data 

have also shown that the crack growth 

rate severity of typical commercial 

usage is very similar to the baseline 

military usage. Therefore, the FAA’s 

evaluation of commercial usage is based 

on objective criteria and information 

submitted by the operators. We have not 

changed the final rule regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Withdraw the Proposed AD 

(72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; 

Corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 

67998)): No Unsafe Condition 

Lynden noted that the proposed AD 

(72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; 

corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 

67998)) was prompted by incidents 

involving fatigue cracking and corrosion 

in transport airplanes that are 

approaching or have exceeded their 

design service objective. The proposed 

AD was intended to maintain the 

continued structural integrity of the 

entire fleet of Model 382, 382B, 382E, 

382F, and 382G airplanes. Lynden 

reported there have been no accidents 

involving fatigue cracking and corrosion 

relating to this type design on its 

airplanes. Lynden asserted that the 

program required by section 121.370a of 

the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 

CFR 121.370a) ensures that such 

accidents will not happen. Lynden 

therefore questioned the conclusion that 

an unsafe condition even exists. Lynden 

alleged that we have not provided 

objective evidence of the unsafe 

condition in the affected airplanes, but 

have general concerns regarding aging 

airplanes. Lynden added that continued 

airworthiness of an airplane is ensured 

by the development of extensive 

inspection and maintenance programs. 

In Lynden’s case, those maintenance 

requirements are detailed in an 

extensive CAMP, which has been 

proven to ensure the airworthiness of its 

fleet for over 97,000 flight hours. 

We infer that Lynden was requesting 

that we withdraw the proposed AD (72 

FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)), 

because no unsafe condition has been 

identified. We disagree. The DAH 

performed several full-scale fatigue tests 

on the Model L–382, and has developed 

a large data bank of service history 


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21406 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 69 / Tuesday, April 10, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

(including SDRs) to identify problem 

areas and PSEs that provide objective 

evidence that an unsafe condition 

exists. The damage tolerance analysis 

(DTA) assessments established 

inspection intervals after many of the 

PSEs were identified. Initially the 

fatigue test and service history data 

were used only to identify the problem 

areas (i.e., PSEs) that were to receive 

DTA evaluation, and to validate the 

DTA data. Every PSE received a DTA 

assessment. As part of the assessment of 

each PSE, the DAH found that in some 

instances the DTA did not correlate well 

with the fatigue test and service life 

data. In these instances, the fatigue test 

and service life data were used to 

establish the inspection intervals that 

are specified in the SSID. 

Lynden has developed an FAAapproved, operator-specific CAMP for 

its fleet in accordance with section 

121.1109 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109) based 

upon the latest guidance and documents 

from the DAH. The latest guidance and 

documents from the DAH were 

provided in the Lockheed Martin Model 

L382, SMP 515–C–MASTER Report, 

dated November 2010. This document 

should already be incorporated into the 

operator’s CAMP. Therefore, if the 

operator has been performing its CAMP 

as required, adequate information is 

available to perform the required 

inspections. The operator should 

already be in compliance with the SSID. 

If the operator has made changes to the 

CAMP to meet its maintenance 

schedules that were previously 

approved by the FAA, the subject 

operator may request approval of an 

AMOC to the SSID based on the existing 

CAMP, in accordance with the 

provisions of paragraph (q) in this final 

rule. If the AMOC is approved by the 

FAA, the operator will not need to 

change the CAMP except for minor 

changes provided in the SSID, and 

would already be in compliance with 

this AD except for the minor changes. 

As discussed previously, the SSID 

addresses an identified safety issue on 

the affected airplanes and therefore 

must be mandated by an AD. The 

inspection requirements in the SSID are 

required for the continued safe 

operation of the aircraft. We have not 

changed the final rule regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Withdraw the Proposed AD 

(72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; 

Corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 

67998)): Redundant With Existing 

Programs 

Lynden asserted that it is already 

required to comply with the intent and 

scope of the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, 

November 14, 2007; corrected December 

3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) through 

accomplishment of the CAMP, which 

ensures the continued airworthiness of 

its fleet through constant analysis and 

surveillance. The CAMP and the 

improvements required through the 

CAMP procedures ensure that fatigue 

cracks will be detected before becoming 

critical. The CAMP will be used as the 

basis for compliance with section 

121.370a of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 121.370a) (which 

was superseded by section 

121.1109(c)(1) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109(c)(1)). 

Lynden stated that the proposed 

requirements of the SSID are 

comparable to the requirements already 

imposed under section 121.370a of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

121.370a), and the proposed grace 

period will provide nearly the same 

timeline. Lynden noted that the 

proposed AD stated that fatigue cracking 

may increase as a result of transport 

airplanes reaching or exceeding their 

design service objective (DSO), and as a 

result of their increased utilization and 

longer operation. Lynden asserted that 

the proposed AD would be redundant 

with the requirements for the SSIP, 

which are contained in section 121.370a 

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 

CFR 121.370a). Section 121.370a of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

121.370a) already requires incorporation 

of FAA-approved damage-tolerancebased inspections into the maintenance 

program for aircraft structure 

susceptible to fatigue cracking for the 

airplane to continue operating after 

December 20, 2010. 

Lynden was concerned that the 

proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 

14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 

(72 FR 67998)) will not establish 

compliance with section 121.370a of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

121.370a) and will cause confusion and/ 

or duplicative recordkeeping 

requirements regarding whether a 

particular inspection is acceptable for 

compliance. If the AD does establish 

compliance with section 121.370a of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

121.380a), then it is unnecessary and 

redundant, since section 121.370a of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

121.370a) will ensure the aircraft’s 

structural integrity. On the other hand, 

if the AD does not establish complete 

compliance, section 121.370a of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

121.370a) needs to be reviewed to 

ensure that it establishes the level of 

safety originally anticipated by the FAA. 

In either case, both requirements should 

not be needed to establish continuous 

structural integrity of the affected 

airplanes. 

We infer that Lynden was requesting 

that we withdraw the proposed AD (72 

FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) as 

unnecessary because it is redundant 

with the CAMP or the requirements of 

section 121.1109(c)(1) of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

121.1109(c)(1)). Some inspections were 

not included in the SMP–515–C 

inspection program, and some operators 

do not have the latest revision to this 

program, including the changes made by 

the SSID and required by this AD. So an 

AD is necessary to mandate the 

implementation of the SSID. Further, an 

AD would be necessary to ensure 

continued operational safety if a related 

operational rule is changed in the 

future. Except for some minor changes 

made by the DAH and approved by the 

FAA, any operator with a CAMP already 

meets the requirements of the SSID and 

this AD; no additional work would be 

required, and no alternative method of 

compliance would be necessary to 

demonstrate compliance. However, the 

SSID can also be used as a means to 

show compliance for the baseline 

inspections for the section 

121.1109(c)(1) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109(c)(1)) 

(which superseded section 121.370a of 

the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 

CFR121.370a). That rule requires 

operators to incorporate FAA-approved 

damage-tolerance-based inspections and 

procedures into the maintenance 

program for airplane structure 

susceptible to fatigue cracking that 

could contribute to a catastrophic 

failure on airplanes meeting the 

following criteria: 

• Transport category airplanes 

• Airplanes type certificated after 

January 1, 1958 

• Turbine power airplanes 

• Airplanes having a maximum typecertificated passenger seating capacity 

of 30 or more, or a maximum payload 

capacity of 7,500 pounds or more 

Those airplanes must have FAAapproved damage-tolerance-based 

inspections and procedures 

incorporated into the maintenance 

program for airplane structure 

susceptible to fatigue cracking that 

could contribute to a catastrophic 

failure. The SSID meets this 

requirement for the affected airplanes. 

Therefore, no change to the final rule is 

necessary regarding this issue. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 69 / Tuesday, April 10, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 21407 

Requests To Revise Repair Approval 

Safair, Lynden, and LM Aero 

requested that we change paragraph (n) 

of the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, 

November 14, 2007; corrected December 

3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)), which would 

have required repair ‘‘using a method 

approved by the Manager, Atlanta 

Aircraft Certification Office (ACO), 

FAA.’’ 

Safair requested that we instead 

require repair ‘‘in accordance with an 

FAA-approved method’’ to alleviate 

unnecessary burdens on both the 

Atlanta ACO and the operators. 

Lynden noted that the preamble to the 

proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 

14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 

(72 FR 67998)) explained that the AD 

would allow the use of FAA-approved 

methods for the repair, but the proposed 

regulatory language would actually 

require each repair to be specifically 

approved by the ACO. Lynden 

requested that the preamble and 

regulatory language agree. Lynden 

believed that requiring approval for 

each repair is an unworkable and 

unacceptable regulatory burden for 

operators and the FAA. Lynden added 

that a typical Boeing SSID AD does not 

contain such an onerous paragraph, but 

allows cracked structure to be repaired 

in accordance with an FAA-approved 

method. Lynden added that the FAA’s 

Transport Airplane Directorate has 

specifically promised to use the 

following language: ‘‘Cracked structure 

must be repaired prior to further flight 

in accordance with an FAA-approved 

method.’’ If the suggested language is 

used, operators can perform repairs in 

accordance with previously acceptable 

methods, techniques, and practices that 

are based on approved data—whenever 

they find cracked structure, not just 

when performing inspections required 

by the AD. Lynden asserted that it is 

extremely important for the FAA to 

understand that an operator with an 

effective CAMP is constantly inspecting 

for structural integrity, not just when an 

AD requires an inspection. To ensure 

proper alignment with their 

responsibilities to ensure the 

continuous airworthiness of the affected 

airplanes, operators must not face 

conflicting, overlapping, or confusing 

compliance requirements. 

LM Aero interpreted paragraph (n) in 

the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, 

November 14, 2007; corrected December 

3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) as a requirement 

to obtain an approval letter from the 

Atlanta ACO for every repair carried out 

on PSEs with cracks detected by the 

SSID inspections. LM Aero added that, 

in many cases, cracking detected by the 

SMP–515–C inspection procedures in 

the SSID can be repaired with existing 

FAA-approved repair procedures. 

Including the additional requirement to 

obtain specific approval letters for each 

repair is likely to place significant 

burden on both operators and the FAA. 

LM Aero requested that we revise 

paragraph (n) of the proposed AD to add 

the following provision: 

Existing FAA approved repair procedures 

that are applicable to repair the damage 

detected, such as FAA approved Lockheed 

Model 382 Series Service Bulletins (when so 

stated in the Service Bulletin) and the 

Lockheed Service Manual Publication SMP 

583 Structural Repair Manual [SRM], do not 

require further approval. 

Lynden concurred with LM Aero’s 

comment. 

We agree with the commenters’ 

rationale. Accordingly, we have revised 

the final rule to add new Note 1 to 

paragraph (o) of this AD, which explains 

the source of guidance for repairing 

damage. We also added new Note 2 to 

paragraph (o) of this AD to explain that 

operators may contact the Manager, 

Atlanta ACO, for information regarding 

the use of published service data 

approved by the FAA for these repairs, 

as required by paragraph (n) of this AD. 

Request To Revise Terminology: ‘‘PSE’’ 

vs. ‘‘SSI’’ 

LM Aero and Lynden requested that 

we revise the proposed AD (72 FR 

64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) to be 

consistent with the SSID, which uses 

the term ‘‘principle structural element 

(PSE)’’ instead of ‘‘structural significant 

item (SSI).’’ 

We agree to standardize the 

terminology. The original term was 

‘‘Structural Significant Item (SSI).’’ 

Although the two terms are currently 

used interchangeably, we agree to use 

the latest terminology in this AD. We 

have revised the final rule to replace 

‘‘SSI’’ with ‘‘PSE.’’ 

Request To Revise Terminology: ‘‘DTA 

Values’’ vs. ‘‘Inspection Intervals’’ 

Lynden stated that neither the FAA 

nor the operators can ensure compliance 

with the AD without a clear 

understanding of how the DTA was 

conducted and without the required 

DTA values. If we were to accept LM 

Aero’s inspection intervals as ‘‘DTA 

values,’’ Lynden requested that we 

revise the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, 

November 14, 2007; corrected December 

3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) to correspond 

with the SSID. Lynden noted, for 

example, that paragraph (g) of the 

proposed AD states, in part, ‘‘The 

required DTA value for each PSE is 

listed in the SSID.’’ Lynden asserted 

that there are no DTA values or ratings 

listed in the subject SSID. 

We partially agree. We agree to accept 

the DAH’s inspection intervals 

(presented in the SSID as ‘‘DTA 

values’’), and we have revised the final 

rule to correspond to the SSID by 

changing ‘‘DTA values’’ to ‘‘inspection 

intervals’’ throughout this final rule. We 

disagree that compliance with the AD 

cannot be ensured without clear 

understanding of how the DTA was 

conducted and without DTA values. 

The operator is required to set up a 

tracking system for each inspection and 

maintain that system at all times. The 

operator and the FAA can track the 

status of the inspections using 

inspection numbers assigned to each 

inspection requirement by the operator 

or they can track the inspections by the 

procedure/card number defined by the 

SSID document or any other procedure 

approved by the FAA. The DAH has 

given an adequate description of its 

DTA methodology in Section 5.0 

(Damage Tolerance Analysis 

Methodology) of the SSID. This 

methodology should provide the 

operators an understanding of how the 

DTA was conducted. In addition, the 

FAA is familiar with the DAH’s DTA 

procedures and has a good 

understanding of how the DTA was 

conducted. The FAA has reviewed and 

approved the DTA analysis and 

inspection intervals as approved in the 

SSID. This information cannot be 

released to the operators because it is 

the DAH’s proprietary data. In addition, 

we have determined that operators do 

not need this information to do the SSID 

inspections. 

Request To Revise Applicability: 

Exclude Airplanes Subject to Section 

121.1109 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109) 

LM Aero and Lynden requested that 

we revise the applicability of the 

proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 

14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 

(72 FR 67998)) to include only those 

airplanes on which the SMP–515–C 

inspection program has not been 

incorporated and the applicable service 

bulletins identified in the SSID have not 

been accomplished. Lynden added that, 

according to Section 2.0 (Introduction) 

of the SSID, some operators have not 

updated the SMP–515–C inspection 

program in many years, and some 

commercially certified aircraft in other 

countries may not have an SMP–515–C 

inspection program. Lynden noted that 

the TC holder issued the SSID only for 

those operators without a CAMP or an 

updated one, and the AD should 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
21408 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 69 / Tuesday, April 10, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

therefore apply only to airplanes that 

are not subject to section 121.370a of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

121.370a). 

We disagree to change the 

applicability. The SSID addresses a 

safety issue on all Model 382, 382B, 

382E, 382F, and 382G airplanes as the 

specified unsafe condition is likely to 

exist on all of these products. The 

inspections in the SSID are necessary 

for the continued safe operation of all 

applicable aircraft, and must be 

mandated by an AD. If the operator has 

been performing the CAMP as required, 

the operator is in compliance with the 

SSID, except for the minor changes. We 

have not changed the final rule 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Revise Applicability: 

Remove Airplanes With CAMPs 

Lynden alleged that the SDR database 

is directly related to the specific 

inspections contemplated by the SSID 

and the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, 

November 14, 2007; corrected December 

3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)), and that the 

required reports are evidence that the 

FAA-approved part 121 CAMP is 

keeping the aircraft in an airworthy 

condition; i.e., defects are found and 

repaired before there is any adverse 

impact on airworthiness. 

We infer that Lynden was requesting 

that we revise the applicability to 

remove airplanes with CAMPs. We 

disagree. The purpose of the SDRs is to 

help the FAA identify and address 

problem areas in the fleet before a 

catastrophic failure occurs. The SDRs 

are used to justify the inspection 

intervals in the SSID. The SDRs help 

maintain affected airplanes in an 

airworthy condition because the reports 

advise of fatigue cracks found before 

any adverse effect on airworthiness is 

encountered. The existing inspections 

in the CAMP reveal cracks based on 

existing inspection intervals. The 

inspection intervals in the SSID are in 

most cases identical to the inspection 

intervals in the CAMPs now being used 

by operators. The SDRs also verify the 

accuracy of the FAA’s and DAH’s 

evaluations of commercial usage and are 

based on objective criteria and 

information submitted by the operators 

to the SDR database. Not all affected 

operators use a CAMP or have equal 

maintenance programs. Consequently, 

and based on the SDRs of Lynden and 

other operators, we have determined 

that the PSEs on the affected airplanes 

are a potential safety issue that needs to 

be addressed. 

We have chosen to address this issue 

with an AD that will mandate the 

inspections provided in the SSID, 

through an FAA-approved SSIP. We 

intend to reduce the workload for the 

DAH, operators, and the FAA, and still 

accomplish the intent of the AD. The 

SSID meets the requirements for all 

Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G 

airplanes. Except for some minor 

changes made by the DAH and 

approved by the FAA, any operator with 

a CAMP is already in compliance with 

the SSID. If the inspections per the 

CAMP have been accomplished, except 

for the minor changes that may be 

incorporated into the program and 

accomplished as required, no additional 

work is required by the operator. If the 

operator has changed the CAMP to meet 

maintenance schedules previously 

approved by the FAA, the operator may 

request approval of an AMOC to the AD 

based on the existing CAMP. If an 

AMOC request is approved by the 

Atlanta ACO, the operator would not 

have to change the CAMP, except for 

minor changes, and would already be in 

compliance with this AD. 

In summary, airplanes with CAMPs 

are in compliance because either (1) the 

initial inspection has been done in 

accordance with the CAMP or (2) the 

inspection is not yet due, in which case 

the inspection would be done in 

accordance with the SSID. But airplanes 

with CAMPs are still affected by the AD 

because the repetitive inspection 

intervals may not agree between the 

SSID and the CAMP. We have not 

changed the final rule regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Clarify Applicability: 

Airplanes Identified in SSID AD vs. 

SSID 

Lynden requested that Section 3.0 

(Affected Aircraft) be removed from the 

SSID. Lynden asserted that an AD 

identifies the affected airplanes, and 

conflicting information in the SSID does 

not aid clarity. 

We disagree with the request. 

Paragraph (c) in this AD identifies the 

affected airplanes, and the service 

documents identify the respective 

individual affected serial numbers. 

Where there are differences, the AD 

prevails. We have not changed the final 

rule regarding this issue. 

Request To Clarify Applicability: U.S.- 

vs. Non-U.S.-Registered Airplanes 

While the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, 

November 14, 2007; corrected December 

3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) reported there 

are ‘‘91 airplanes of the affected design 

in the worldwide fleet,’’ Lynden stated 

that the proposed AD would affect U.S.- 

registered airplanes only. 

We agree to provide clarification. 

Lynden is correct that the AD affects 

U.S.-registered airplanes only. The 

quoted statement is from the Cost of 

Compliance section of the proposed AD 

(72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; 

corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 

67998)). In that section, we report the 

number of affected airplanes operated 

worldwide, but provide the cost 

estimates for only U.S.-registered 

airplanes. All airplanes are identified in 

the AD; airplanes that are later added to 

the U.S. registry will also be affected by 

this AD. We have not changed the final 

rule regarding this issue. 

Requests To Revise Compliance Time: 

Revise the Initial Compliance Time 

LM Aero stated that the compliance 

times for the initial inspections 

specified in paragraph (h) of the 

proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 

14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 

(72 FR 67998)) provide operators with 

considerable time to implement 

inspection requirements that should 

already be in their inspection programs. 

LM Aero agreed that a grace period to 

initiate the inspections (36 months as 

specified in the proposed AD) might be 

necessary, but recommends against 

exceeding the ‘‘initial’’ interval plus one 

‘‘recurring’’ interval by more than 12 

months. LM Aero added that the 

compliance times, including a grace 

period exceeding twice the ‘‘initial’’ 

interval on wing PSEs, would exceed 

the crack growth ‘‘Safety Limit’’ defined 

in Section 5.0 (Damage Tolerance 

Analysis Methodology) of the SSID, and 

would contravene the intent of section 

25.571 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 25.571) and FAA 

Advisory Circular (AC) 91–56B, 

‘‘Continuing Structural Integrity 

Program for Airplanes,’’ dated March 7, 

2008 (http://rgl.faa.gov/ 

Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/ 

rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/ 

c41f92c5f55751a58625740800686473/ 

$FILE/AC%2091-56B.pdf). LM Aero 

recommended the initial compliance 

times in the following table. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 69 / Tuesday, April 10, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 21409 

RECOMMENDED COMPLIANCE TIME

Airplane status Commenter’s recommended compliance time 

Has not exceeded the initial 1 threshold ............................ Before the initial threshold plus 10 percent of the specified interval. 

Has exceeded the initial threshold ..................................... Before reaching the initial plus one recurring inspection interval, or within 36 months 

after the effective date of the AD, whichever occurs first. 

Has exceeded the initial threshold plus one recurring inspection interval.Within 12 months after the effective date of the AD, or before reaching twice the initial threshold, whichever comes first. 

Has exceeded twice the initial threshold ........................... Before the next flight. 

1The ‘‘initial’’ threshold is specified in Section 6.3 of the SSID. 

Lynden concurred with this comment. 

We disagree with the requests to 

revise the compliance time. Most SSIDs 

provide operators 12 months to 

incorporate the inspections into the 

maintenance program. Then the 

compliance time starts for those 

inspections that have exceeded the 

threshold; otherwise the first inspection 

is due at the threshold. We have not 

changed the final rule regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Revise Compliance Time: 

Extend Repetitive Interval for Sloping 

Longerons 

LM Aero questioned the repetitive 

inspection intervals specified in 

paragraph (k) of the proposed AD (72 FR 

64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) for the 

‘‘Special Condition’’ of the sloping 

longeron at the fuselage station (FS) 

1041 fitting (per Special Inspections 

card (SP) 113). LM Aero stated that the 

proposed 12-month interval would be 

too frequent and would add a significant 

burden on the operator to continually 

remove the FS 1041 fitting to perform 

the inspection. Furthermore, frequent 

repeated removal would likely result in 

excessive over-sizing of the holes, 

which would require replacement of the 

sloping longeron (FS 737 to 1041). The 

intent of this inspection is to provide an 

opportunity to inspect the longeron for 

stress corrosion cracking that is hidden 

under the FS 1041 fitting. Although 

stress corrosion cracks that have not 

propagated beyond the FS 1041 fitting 

do not affect the structural integrity of 

the longeron, they will eventually 

propagate out from under the fitting for 

which the SSID recommends 

replacement. The need to replace the FS 

1041 fitting depends on crack findings 

during the task associated with SP– 

109—which will also detect relatively 

long stress corrosion cracks in the 

sloping longeron by the x-ray primary 

procedure No. 2. Lynden concurred 

with this comment. 

For the reasons provided by LM Aero, 

we agree to revise the repetitive 

intervals, specified in paragraph (l) in 

this final rule, from 12 months to an 

interval that corresponds to the ‘‘Special 

Condition’’ inspection interval currently 

in the SSID, which requires the 

inspection when the FS 1041 fitting is 

replaced. Paragraph (l) in this final rule 

agrees with the SSID revision for the 

inspection requirements for PSE 53–50– 

13. 

Request To Remove Repetitive 

Inspection Requirement for ‘‘Special 

Conditions’’ 

LM Aero asserted that the intent of 

the SSID ‘‘Special Condition’’ 

inspections is to provide an opportunity 

to perform an enhanced inspection of 

the applicable PSE during another 

unscheduled maintenance action— 

typically, the removal of a component or 

structural part. LM Aero recommended 

against mandatory scheduled intervals 

for these inspections, because of the 

potential for associated damage from 

repetitive part removal and 

replacement. LM Aero agreed that the 

inspections should be done in 

accordance with paragraph (j) of the 

proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 

14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 

(72 FR 67998)), if none of the ‘‘Special 

Condition’’ inspections are part of an 

operator’s maintenance program. 

Lynden concurred with this comment. 

We agree that the subject inspections 

should be done only when the part is 

removed for scheduled maintenance— 

not at regular intervals. The inspection 

area is a PSE but not a problem area. 

The inspection requires removing parts, 

and continually removing the part for 

inspection will result in excessive 

damage to the airplane structure 

compromising the use and value of the 

inspection. The current schedule is 

adequate to maintain safety. Because 

more damage will be done by removing 

the parts to do the inspection, we have 

changed this final rule to refer to the 

exceptions noted in paragraph (j) of this 

AD to agree with the provisions of the 

SSID. 

Request To Revise Compliance Time: 

Extend Repetitive Interval for Aft 

Engine Mount 

LM Aero also questioned the 

repetitive inspection interval specified 

in paragraph (m) of the proposed AD (72 

FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) for the 

‘‘Special Condition’’ inspection of the 

aft engine mount beam (SP–190). LM 

Aero stated that the proposed 24-month 

interval would result in a significant 

burden on the operator to remove the aft 

engine mount to do the inspection. This 

inspection is intended to provide an 

enhanced procedure for detecting 

cracking of the aft mount beam normally 

hidden by the lord mount. The aft lord 

mount does not have a scheduled 

removal time, and replacement is based 

on the condition found (cracks in the 

rubber mounts). The inspections 

associated with SP–189 performed at 

24-month intervals will detect cracking 

in the aft mount beam that extends 

beyond the lord mount. Lynden 

concurred with this comment. 

We agree, for the reasons provided by 

the LM Aero. The proposed compliance 

time could also result in excessive hole 

over-sizing, requiring replacement of the 

steel beam. We have revised paragraph 

(n) of this final rule to require the 

repetitive inspection interval as 

specified in the SSID when the aft lord 

mount is replaced. Paragraph (n) in this 

final rule agrees with the revision in the 

SSID for the inspection requirements for 

PSE 71–10–03. 

Request To Revise Compliance Time: 

Allow Changes to Intervals Based on 

Findings and Design Changes 

Lynden stated that Section 5.0 

(Damage Tolerance Analysis 

Methodology) of the SSID presents two 

steps: (1) Incorporating the methodology 

for assessing/analyzing each PSE listed 

in Section 4.0 (Principle Structural 

Elements) that validates the assigned 

DTA value; and (2) implementing 

inspection intervals established for each 

PSE based on the DTA and the value 

assigned. During the actual 

accomplishment of the PSE inspections, 

findings are evaluated to determine 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
21410 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 69 / Tuesday, April 10, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

whether the results are within the 

anticipated safety limits, i.e., within 

assigned values. When implemented, 

this requirement would provide a 

methodology to allow adjustments to 

the inspection intervals based on 

findings, changes in design, and 

implemented repairs and alterations. 

We infer that Lynden was requesting 

that we revise the proposed AD (72 FR 

64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) to 

allow for adjustments to the inspection 

intervals based on the suggested criteria. 

We disagree. Section 5.0 (Damage 

Tolerance Analysis Methodology) of the 

SSID clearly describes the DTA and 

methodology, and Section 6.0 

(Structural Inspection Requirements) of 

the SSID clearly specifies the required 

inspection intervals for each PSE. As 

previously stated we have evaluated the 

document and supporting data, and 

have established that the methodology 

presented in the SSID will ensure that 

the identified unsafe condition will be 

corrected. All the information that the 

operator needs to incorporate into the 

maintenance inspection program is the 

inspection procedures and the 

inspection intervals, in Section 6.0 

(Structural Inspection Requirements) of 

the SSID. The discrepancy reporting 

requirements specified in Section 7.0 

(Discrepancy Reporting) of the SSID 

must also be included. The DTA 

Methodology in Section 5.0 (Damage 

Tolerance Analysis Methodology) of the 

SSID provides the basic information 

needed to develop the inspection 

intervals provided in Section 6.0 

(Structural Inspection Requirements) of 

the SSID. The inspection intervals are 

already provided, so operators do not 

need the detailed analysis. By 

incorporating inspection intervals 

provided in Section 6.0 (Structural 

Inspection Requirements) of the SSID, 

the operator is already in compliance 

with Section 5.0 (Damage Tolerance 

Analysis Methodology) because the 

intervals were based on Section 5.0 

(Damage Tolerance Analysis 

Methodology). This AD does not allow 

adjustments to the inspection intervals 

without FAA approval. Operators may 

request AMOCs for this purpose in 

accordance with procedures specified in 

paragraph (q) of this AD. 

Request To Revise Compliance Time: 

Require SSID Incorporation by Certain 

Date 

Lynden requested that we revise the 

proposed compliance time to a specific 

date, such as December 2010—for the 

pending DTA requirements in section 

121.370a of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 121.370a). 

We partially agree. December 20, 

2010, is the date by which operators 

must incorporate an inspection program 

into their maintenance program to 

address the baseline structure 

inspections required by the Aging 

Aircraft Safety Rule (14 CFR 121.1109, 

‘‘Supplemental Inspections’’). Operators 

may either use the SSID or incorporate 

their own FAA-approved inspection 

program for baseline structure. 

Lockheed has agreed, once the AD is 

issued, to provide operators that have 

incorporated certain inspections into 

their maintenance program with a 

revision of Lockheed Service Manual 

SMP–515–C that includes the SSID 

requirements. Therefore, most if not all 

operators have complied with this AD 

by that date, with no additional work 

required of operators. We have not 

changed the final rule regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Revise Compliance Time: 

Match CAMP’s Inspection Intervals 

Lynden questioned whether operators 

will be able to comply with the 

proposed requirements in the proper 

timeframe, adding that several proposed 

inspection intervals would be 

problematic. Lynden emphasized that 

the CAMP’s intervals have ensured the 

structural integrity of its fleet for 97,000 

flight hours of civil operation in the 

most difficult civil operating conditions 

envisioned by the type design. Lynden 

observed that the proposed inspection 

intervals are slightly shorter than those 

established by Lynden’s CAMP, and 

suggests that changing these intervals 

could introduce the potential for 

maintenance error, with possible 

harmful results. Lynden stated that the 

proposed AD must correspond with its 

CAMP to ensure compliance and 

structural integrity without unnecessary 

duplication and cost. 

We infer that Lynden was requesting 

that we revise the proposed inspection 

intervals to match those in its CAMP. 

We disagree. In developing an 

appropriate compliance time for this 

AD, we considered the practical aspect 

of accomplishing the inspections within 

intervals of time that correspond to 

typical scheduled maintenance for 

affected operators. But since the various 

operators have different maintenance 

schedules, we could not provide 

optimal schedules for each operator in 

the AD. As previously explained, 

operators who perform the CAMP as 

required should already be in 

compliance with the SSID, except for 

the differences noted. Operators with 

FAA-approved revisions to their CAMP 

to meet maintenance schedules may 

request an AMOC to the AD, in 

accordance with the provisions of 

paragraph (q) of this AD, based on the 

existing CAMP to adjust the 

maintenance schedule, provided no 

interval exceeds the DTA-established 

inspection intervals mandated by the 

AD and presented in the SSID. We have 

not changed the final rule regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Revise Compliance Time: 

Extend Time To Incorporate SSID 

Lynden was concerned that the 

compliance times in the SSID and the 

AD do not contain the exact same 

language. Determining exact compliance 

is essential to an operator’s efficient and 

effective management of ADs. Lynden 

requested additional time to ensure that 

its current CAMP establishes 

compliance with the AD, which will in 

turn comply with section 121.1109 of 

the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 

CFR 121.1109). Lynden has already 

worked with its Principal Aviation 

Safety Inspector (PASI) to ensure that its 

program can comply with the 

requirements of section 121.1109 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

121.1109) and the December 2010 

deadline. Lynden has followed FAA 

Advisory Circular (AC) 120–93, 

‘‘Damage Tolerance Inspections for 

Repairs and Alterations,’’ dated 

November 20, 2007 (http://rgl.faa.gov/ 

Regulatory_and_Guidance_Library/ 

rgAdvisoryCircular.nsf/0/ 

f73fd2a31b353a71862573b000521928/ 

$FILE/AC%20120-93.pdf), regarding the 

actual accomplishment and 

implementation of the section 121.370a 

of the Federal Aviation Regulations (14 

CFR 121.370a) program. The operator’s 

PASI has agreed to the carrier’s phased 

approach and will ensure the following: 

1. The maintenance program for the 

airplane includes FAA-approved 

damage-tolerance-based inspections and 

procedures for airplane structure 

susceptible to fatigue cracking that 

could contribute to a catastrophic 

failure. These inspections and 

procedures account for the effects of 

adverse repairs, alterations, and 

modifications on fatigue cracking of 

airplane structure. 

2. The Atlanta ACO has approved the 

damage-tolerance-based inspections and 

procedures, including any revisions. 

Lynden has already included the SSID’s 

damage-tolerance-based inspections and 

procedures in its CAMP. 

We agree with the request to revise 

the compliance time in this AD. As 

stated previously, we have changed the 

compliance time of paragraph (g) of this 

final rule to 12 months after the 

effective date of the AD for operators to 

incorporate the requirements of the 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 69 / Tuesday, April 10, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 21411 

SSID into their maintenance program. 

Lynden has a CAMP, and the latest 

guidance and documents from the DAH 

should already be incorporated into the 

operator’s CAMP. So operators 

performing their CAMP as required 

already have the necessary information 

to perform these inspections. The 

operator should already be in 

compliance with the SSID so it should 

not be necessary to revise the 

compliance time. If the operator has 

made changes to the CAMP to meet its 

maintenance schedules that were 

previously approved by the FAA, the 

subject operator may request an AMOC 

based on the existing CAMP; if the 

AMOC is approved by the FAA, the 

operator will not have to change the 

CAMP, and they would already be in 

compliance with this AD, except for the 

minor changes. 

Request To Clarify Compliance Times 

(DTA Initial Values) 

Lynden questioned how operators 

will know how to comply with 

paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (72 FR 

64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)), since 

the SSID provides a methodology for 

accomplishing the DTA but does not 

assign the initial values (compliance 

times). 

We disagree that the SSID does not 

assign the initial values. The initial and 

repetitive inspections are provided in 

Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection 

Requirements) of the SSID, along with a 

reference to the inspection procedure 

for each PSE. Paragraph (g) of this AD 

requires operators to incorporate the 

information in the SSID (inspection 

intervals and procedures) into their 

maintenance inspection programs 

within 12 months. Paragraph (i) of this 

AD specifies the compliance time for 

accomplishing the initial inspections. 

We have not changed the final rule 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Revise Cost Estimate: Cost 

for SSID Incorporation Is for the Fleet, 

Not per Airplane 

LM Aero noted that the estimated cost 

of implementing the AD applies to 

operators that do not currently follow 

the Model 382 SMP–515–C inspection 

program. To LM Aero’s knowledge, all 

U.S. operators currently use this 

program (although it is not yet 

mandated by the FAA), and the latest 

revision includes the intent of the SSID. 

Revising the maintenance program 

therefore should be considered a onetime effort of 600 hours for the entire 

fleet (not per airplane). Lynden 

concurred with this comment. 

We agree. The proposed AD (72 FR 

64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) 

inadvertently stated that revising the 

maintenance program would take 600 

work hours per airplane. We have 

revised the Costs of Compliance section 

of this final rule accordingly. 

Request To Revise Cost Estimate: 

Include Work Hours for Recordkeeping 

Lynden stated that the estimated costs 

specified in the proposed AD (72 FR 

64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) do not 

include the additional recordkeeping 

requirements necessary to comply with 

the AD. Lynden owns and operates six 

of the affected airplanes, all under part 

121 and all under a program developed 

to comply with section 121.370a of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

121.370a). Lynden noted that operators 

must report structural issues under the 

SDR rules as well as reporting findings 

to the TC holder in accordance with the 

AD. This duplicative action must take 

place at the time of the inspections and 

repairs so that the airplane can be 

approved to return to service and 

accomplishment with the AD 

requirements can be recorded. 

We infer that Lynden was requesting 

that we revise the cost estimate in the 

proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 

14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 

(72 FR 67998)) to include additional 

time for recordkeeping. We disagree. 

Based on the best data available, the 

manufacturer provided the number of 

work hours necessary to do the basic 

required actions. This number 

represents the time necessary to perform 

only the actions actually required by 

this AD. We recognize that, in doing the 

actions required by an AD, operators 

might incur incidental costs in addition 

to the direct costs. The cost analysis in 

AD rulemaking actions, however, 

typically does not include incidental 

costs such as the time required for 

recordkeeping or other administrative 

actions. Those incidental costs, which 

might vary significantly among 

operators, are almost impossible to 

calculate. 

Further, the SSID requirements are 

already part of the maintenance 

program, so if the inspections have been 

done as specified in the SSID, no 

additional work is required. Most of the 

information required by the SSID will 

be identical to the SDRs except for some 

minor changes. To simplify the 

reporting requirements, operators may 

use one report for both the SSID 

inspections and the SDRs. For these 

reasons we find that there will be very 

little additional cost for recordkeeping 

once the maintenance program is 

revised to incorporate the SSID 

requirements. We have not changed the 

final rule regarding this issue. 

Request To Revise Cost Estimate: 

Account for Duplicate Inspections 

The Cost of Compliance section in the 

proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 

14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 

(72 FR 67998)) explained the following: 

The number of inspection work hours 

* * * is presented as if the accomplishment 

of the actions in this proposed AD [(72 FR 

64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998))] are to be 

conducted as ‘‘stand alone’’ actions. 

However, in actual practice, these actions for 

the most part will be done coincidentally or 

in combination with normally scheduled 

airplane inspections and other maintenance 

program tasks. Therefore, the actual number 

of necessary additional inspection work 

hours will be minimal in many instances. 

* * * 

Lynden alleged that this is not true for 

its current program, and that if the AD 

is issued as proposed, Lynden would be 

required to duplicate inspections to 

comply with its program and the AD. 

We infer that Lynden was requesting 

that we revise the cost estimates in this 

AD. We disagree. Each operator’s 

inspection schedule will be different, 

and we cannot account for the 

individual costs incurred by each 

operator. We have not changed the final 

rule regarding this issue. 

Request To Revise Cost Estimate: 

Account for Discrepancies Between AD 

and SSID 

Lynden contended that the cost 

estimates specified in the proposed AD 

(72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; 

corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 

67998)) would be more accurate if we 

reconcile the differences between the 

AD and the SSID. Lynden asserted that 

the estimated costs are based on the 

assumption that the proposed 

inspection intervals were in line with 

the inspection intervals already used by 

air carriers. Lynden stated that these 

intervals do not align and would add 

scheduling complexities and associated 

costs for the operators. Lynden 

requested that we revise the proposed 

AD based on Lynden’s estimated costs, 

since Lynden operates the most affected 

airplanes. 

We disagree with the request to revise 

the cost estimate. Where safety 

considerations allow, we try to set 

compliance times that generally 

coincide with operators’ maintenance 

schedules. But since schedules vary 

substantially, we cannot accommodate 

each operator’s optimal scheduling in 


tkelley on DSK3SPTVN1PROD with RULES
21412 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 69 / Tuesday, April 10, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

each AD. Therefore, we do not consider 

it appropriate to attribute to the AD the 

costs associated with the type of special 

scheduling that might otherwise be 

required. Each AD does allow 

individual operators to request approval 

to adjust the compliance time via an 

alternative method of compliance, based 

on data showing that the adjustment 

will not adversely affect safety. In any 

event, any compliance time adjustments 

would have little effect on costs since 

most of the inspections already align 

with each operator’s maintenance 

program. We have not changed the AD 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Address Imprecision in 

SSID 

Lynden objected to the proposed AD 

(72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; 

corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 

67998)) incorporating the SSID ‘‘by 

reference’’ because the SSID is not 

precisely written. Lynden alleged that 

other supplemental structural 

inspection documents adopted through 

ADs clearly delineate the methodology 

used to develop the requirements for 

determining the structural elements and 

the inspection intervals. Lynden stated 

that those documents also clearly lay 

out the damage tolerance values for each 

element. Lynden added that Section 5 

(DTA Methodology) is not like the 

sections of other SSIDs referenced in 

other ADs. Those SSIDs clearly establish 

the DTA methodology and the DTA 

value assigned to each SSI. Lynden 

added that such clarity is necessary for 

appropriate changes to the maintenance 

program and for the assignment and 

continued evaluation of the inspection 

intervals implemented under that 

program. 

Lynden made no specific request to 

change the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, 

November 14, 2007; corrected December 

3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)), but we provide 

the following explanation to address 

Lynden’s concerns. 

We disagree with the assertion that 

the SSID is not precisely written. As 

explained previously, an operator’s 

CAMP is based on the latest guidance 

and documents from the DAH, as 

provided in the Lockheed Martin Model 

L382 SMP 515–C–MASTER Report, 

dated November 2010. 

We also disagree that the SSID does 

not clearly delineate the methodology 

used to develop the requirements for 

determining the PSEs and the 

inspection intervals. Section 4.0 

(Principle Structural Elements) of the 

SSID provides enough information for 

operators to determine how the PSEs 

were developed. Sections 4.0 (Principle 

Structural Elements) and 8.0 (Inspection 

Zone Description) also provide enough 

information to identify each PSE and its 

location on the aircraft by zones. 

Section 5.0 (Damage Tolerance Analysis 

Methodology) clearly explains the DTA 

methodology, and Section 6.0 

(Structural Inspection Requirements) 

clearly states the required inspection 

intervals (damage tolerance values) for 

each of the PSEs. Further, operators 

have already incorporated into the 

CAMP the inspection procedures 

required to perform the SSID 

inspections on SP cards (special 

inspection cards) and ST cards 

(structural inspections cards). The 

operators have not advised of any 

concerns about these inspections, and 

therefore must be following the 

procedures to perform the inspections 

without difficulty. The inspection 

procedure/card number to be used for 

each inspection is clearly identified in 

the first column of the table in Section 

6.0 (Structural Inspection Requirements) 

of the SSID. Also, the required 

inspection intervals (assumed to be the 

damage tolerance values referenced in 

the comments) are clearly defined in the 

fourth and fifth columns of the table in 

Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection 

Requirements) of the SSID. Operators 

are required to set up a tracking system 

for each inspection, and to maintain that 

system at all times. Operators and the 

FAA can track the status of the 

inspections using inspection numbers 

assigned by the operator to each 

inspection requirement, or operators can 

track the inspections by the procedure/ 

card number defined by the SSID 

document or any other procedure 

approved by the FAA. 

We have reviewed and approved the 

DTA and inspection intervals as 

approved in the SSID. This information 

is the DAH’s proprietary data, and we 

cannot release it to the operators. 

Further, operators do not need this 

information to accomplish the SSID 

requirements. 

Each manufacturer’s SSID is different, 

and each DAH has a different approach 

regarding methods for developing the 

data, information they need to provide 

to accomplish the required inspections, 

and reporting procedures. The different 

overseeing ACOs also have authority to 

approve whatever data they deem 

necessary to meet the requirements of 

the AD, provided the data meet the 

intent of the FAA regulations, policies, 

and guidance materials. We find that the 

SSID meets those requirements. 

We have not changed this final rule 

regarding these issues. 

Request To Address General 

Differences Between AD and SSID 

Lynden was concerned about 

differences noted between the proposed 

AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; 

corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 

67998)) and the SSID, and made several 

assertions based on these alleged 

differences. 

1. The SSID’s stated purpose is to 

capture a point in time to help civil 

operators establish compliance with 

section 121.1109(c)(1) of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

121.1109(c)(1)). 

We partially agree with Lynden’s 

position. The SSID inspections are 

necessary for the continued safe 

operation of the affected airplanes, and 

therefore must be mandated by an AD. 

However, the SSID can also be used to 

show compliance for the baseline 

inspections for the Aging Airplanes 

Safety Rule (14 CFR 121.1109(c)(1)). 

That rule requires operators to 

incorporate FAA-approved damagetolerance-based inspections and 

procedures into the maintenance 

program for airplane structure 

susceptible to fatigue cracking that 

could contribute to a catastrophic 

failure on airplanes meeting the 

following criteria: 

• Transport category airplanes. 

• Airplanes type certificated after 

January 1, 1958. 

• Turbine power airplanes. 

• Airplanes having a maximum typecertificated passenger seating capacity 

of 30 or more, or a maximum payload 

capacity of 7,500 pounds or more. 

The SSID meets the requirements for 

the affected airplanes. 

2. Section 121.1109 of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109) 

is tied to the operator’s CAMP, which 

can be continually adjusted, with FAA 

approval, to accommodate 

improvements in design, production, 

maintenance, and operations. Lynden 

added that an AD is ‘‘carved in stone’’ 

and may be changed only through an 

AMOC or a superseding AD, which 

require expenditures of time and money 

by the operator, the DAH, and the FAA. 

We partially agree with Lynden. 

Because the subject regulation is tied to 

each operator’s CAMP, which may be 

adjusted to accommodate such 

improvements, we required the DAH to 

develop a separate document—the 

SSID—and have mandated its 

incorporation by this AD, so that the 

inspection requirements in the SSID 

cannot be revised by the operator 

without approval by the Atlanta ACO. 

The inspection program may be 

incorporated into operators’ 


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maintenance programs in one of two 

ways: (1) By developing a separate 

maintenance inspection document that 

stands alone and requires that only 

those instructions in the SSID be 

accomplished in accordance with the 

AD, or (2) by incorporating the SSID 

inspections into the existing 

maintenance program. Either method is 

approved for the SSID AD, because they 

are both considered part of an operator’s 

maintenance program. As Lynden 

noted, those inspections can then be 

changed only by an AMOC approved by 

the FAA, or by a revision to the SSID 

followed by a new or superseding AD 

that mandates the new requirements. 

3. The SSID is adequate for its stated 

purpose, but it does not provide the 

certainty and objectivity required to be 

incorporated into a rule. 

We disagree that the SSID lacks 

certainty and objectivity. As previously 

explained, the inspection intervals and 

procedures are clearly identified in 

Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection 

Requirements) of the SSID, and the PSEs 

are identified in Section 4.0 (Principle 

Structural Elements). And, if the 

operator has been performing the CAMP 

as required, adequate information is 

available to perform the required 

inspections, and the operator should 

already be in compliance with the SSID 

except for the noted changes. 

No change is necessary in this final 

rule to address these assertions. 

Request To Address Additional 

Differences Between AD and SSID 

Lynden asserted that the SSID is 

inadequate, and will need considerable 

revision and additions to satisfy the 

intent and purpose of FAA Advisory 

Circular (AC) No. 91–56, ‘‘Supplemental 

Structural Inspection Program for Large 

Transport Category Airplanes,’’ dated 

May 6, 1981 (now 91–56B, dated March 

7, 2008). Lynden was concerned that it 

will need an AMOC immediately to 

establish compliance with the intent of 

the AD. Further, the AD changes the 

SSID in significant portions. Lynden 

stated that, to ensure proper 

compliance, the SSID must align 

properly with the proposed 

requirements of paragraphs (k) through 

(m) of the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, 

November 14, 2007; corrected December 

3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)). 

Lynden also requested that we ensure 

that Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection 

Requirements) of the SSID and 

paragraphs (h) through (m) of the 

proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 

14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 

(72 FR 67998)) match exactly. 

Reconciling these differences would (1) 

ensure that any changes to the SSID can 

be quickly reconciled with the final rule 

and any unique air carrier requirements; 

(2) ensure that an appropriate AMOC 

can be approved by the FAA without 

unnecessary explanation or confusion; 

(3) allow the original equipment 

manufacturer itself to apply for an 

AMOC to change the DTA and/or 

assigned values based on design 

changes; and (4) enhance compliance. 

We agree with the request and made 

the requested revisions (in paragraphs 

(j) through (n) in this final rule) to 

ensure that the requirements of the AD 

align with the SSID accordingly. We 

agree that the SSID must align with the 

AD, but the AD is the prevailing source 

and we have determined these intervals 

to be appropriate. 

Request To Clarify Section 6.0 

(Structural Inspection Requirements) of 

SSID 

Lynden requested that we account for 

conflicts and confusing information in 

Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection 

Requirements) of the SSID: 

The inspection intervals provided in this 

Section should be taken as the minimum 

required intervals for a typical cargo 

transport operational usage with average 

payloads not exceeding 20,000 lbs. For 

routine carriage of cargo in excess of 30,000 

lbs, the inspection intervals for wing lower 

surface PSEs should be reduced by a factor 

of 2. * * * In no circumstances should the 

operator extend these inspection intervals 

without having completed an LM Aero 

Operational Usage Evaluation and obtaining 

FAA approval for an updated SMP 515–C 

inspection program. 

Lynden asserted that there is no 

definition of the term ‘‘routine,’’ and no 

requirement for deviations if the 

operator has obtained an OUE. Lynden 

questioned whether an operator with an 

FAA-approved program developed to 

comply with section 121.370a of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

121.370a) would need an AMOC to 

comply with the proposed AD (72 FR 

64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)). 

Lynden further questioned whether an 

operator would have an automatic 

AMOC if it completed an OUE and 

obtained FAA-approval of the updated 

inspection program through its local 

Flight Standard District Office (FSDO). 

Lynden was concerned about potential 

conflicts and confusion between the 

SSID and the proposed AD, and notes a 

specific example of confusing 

information, where Section 6.3 of the 

SSID includes the caveat of ‘‘later than 

+10% of the specified interval.’’ Lynden 

questioned whether this indicates that 

the proposed AD would allow the 

addition of 10% to all intervals without 

additional approval. 

We agree to provide clarification. In 

this AD, ‘‘routine’’ refers to typical cargo 

transport operational usage with an 

average payload of 30,000 pounds, 

rather than the defined typical usage of 

20,000 pounds; in that case the 

inspection intervals should be reduced 

by a factor of 2. 

AMOCs are never automatically 

approved. The operator must 

substantiate, and we must approve, any 

AMOC for a different compliance 

method or compliance time not 

specifically identified in the AD. The 

OUE and the +10% extension have not 

been evaluated or approved by the FAA, 

so these may not be approved as 

AMOCs to this AD without further 

substantiation that these methods 

provide an equivalent level of safety. 

Further, the OUE will vary from 

operator to operator, so we must review 

each AMOC on a case-by-case basis in 

lieu of including this information in this 

AD. We have not changed the final rule 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Address Errors in SSID and 

Clarify Use of References in AD 

Lynden noted certain errors and 

omissions throughout the SSID, 

including references to certain 

documents. 

We infer that Lynden was requesting 

that we revise the proposed AD (72 FR 

64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) to 

explain and correct the noted errors in 

the SSID. We disagree with the request, 

and we disagree that the SSID contains 

errors that would affect compliance 

with the requirements of this AD. In the 

SSID, the PSEs are clearly identified in 

Section 4.0 (Principle Structural 

Elements), and the locations and 

inspection requirements are clearly 

identified in Sections 6.0 (Structural 

Inspection Requirements) and 8.0 

(Inspection Zone Description), and these 

cannot be changed without FAA 

approval. All the information necessary 

to accomplish the AD is in Sections 4.0 

(Principle Structural Elements), 6.0 

(Structural Inspection Requirements), 

7.0 (Discrepancy Reporting), and 8.0 

(Inspection Zone Description) of the 

SSID, a stand-alone document. Lynden 

notes that Section 4.0 (Principle 

Structural Elements) omits Chapter 52, 

the PSEs, which are required to comply 

with Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection 

Requirements), but there are no SSID 

PSEs for the doors in Chapter 52. The 

two PSEs identified in Section 6.0 

(Structural Inspection Requirements) in 

Chapter 52 are actually located on the 

fuselage and not on the doors, so those 


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21414 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 69 / Tuesday, April 10, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

PSEs are listed under Chapter 53 in 

Section 4.0 (Principle Structural 

Elements). Those PSEs are referenced in 

Chapter 52 in Section 6.0 (Structural 

Inspection Requirements), because they 

are part of the door surround structure. 

We have not changed the final rule 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Verify Compliance With 

Section 121.1109 of the Federal 

Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109) 

Lynden suggested that the SSID was 

based on a menagerie of methodologies 

to determine the inspection intervals, 

and that the proposed changes to these 

intervals are based on an unclear 

understanding of the original analysis. 

Neither the intervals proposed by the 

SSID nor the changes proposed in 

paragraphs (i) through (m) of the 

proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 

14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 

(72 FR 67998)) can be tracked to a clear, 

concise, objective DTA evaluation—as 

required by paragraph (g) of the 

proposed AD. The proposed AD stated 

that compliance with the AD including 

the SSID establishes compliance with 

section 121.1109 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109). Lynden 

requested that we restate this in the 

final rule. 

We partially agree with Lynden. We 

agree to restate that compliance with the 

AD establishes compliance with section 

121.1109(c)(1) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109(c)(1)). We 

have revised this final rule accordingly 

by adding this information in new Note 

3 to paragraphs (g) through (p) of this 

AD. But we disagree that changes to the 

inspection interval are based on an 

unclear understanding of the original 

analysis. We have previously described 

the different bases for the SSID, and 

have explained that all the inspection 

intervals were originally established 

using a DTA. We might consider 

different intervals through requests for 

AMOCs if the service history data, 

fatigue test results, or risk analysis does 

not correlate well with the DTA, or if 

service history shows no discrepancies 

in the PSE inspection area following 

inspections as directed by the SSID. 

And we might consider different 

intervals to a calendar schedule if 

discrepancies exist within a given time 

period regardless of the aircraft usage, or 

to fit the operator’s maintenance 

program schedule (although that 

interval cannot exceed the interval 

established by a DTA). Changes in 

inspection intervals must be 

substantiated by fatigue testing and 

extensive service history. We might 

consider a different DTA-based 

inspection, based on existing data. Or 

we might consider a different DTAbased inspection interval if a risk 

analysis shows an extremely low 

probability of fatigue damage occurring. 

Request To Address Differences 

Between This (SSID) AD and Individual 

ADs 

Lynden was concerned that Table 2.1 

on page 2–3 of the SSID might conflict 

with the various requirements of the 

individual ADs identified in the SSID 

and the proposed inspection intervals of 

the proposed AD (72 FR 64005, 

November 14, 2007; corrected December 

3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) or the 

requirements of section 121.1109 of the 

Federal Aviation Regulations (14 CFR 

121.1109). Lynden stated that the 

individual ADs must be reconciled 

appropriately, superseded as 

appropriate, to ensure continued 

compliance. 

We disagree that it is necessary to 

revise this final rule. This AD adds 

inspections that supplement but do not 

conflict with other ADs. The SSID 

inspections will identify safety issues 

related to the PSEs. When a SSID 

inspection has a certain number of 

positive findings on a PSE, then that 

part of the PSEs will be removed from 

the SSID and addressed in an individual 

service bulletin and associated AD. The 

rest of the PSEs will remain in the SSID 

and will be subject to the SSID 

inspections only. We have not changed 

the final rule regarding this issue. 

Request To Address Differences in PSEs 

Identified in SSID and CustomerSpecific Programs 

Lynden stated that the last sentence of 

the second paragraph of Section 4.0 

(Principle Structural Elements) of the 

SSID clearly indicates that the 

inspection intervals derived from the 

analysis for the United States Air Force 

have already been incorporated into 

operator-specific ‘‘SMP–515–C–X 

Hercules Series Inspection Programs.’’ 

Lynden requested that we revise the 

proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 

14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 

(72 FR 67998)) to reconcile the PSEs 

identified in Section V of the customerspecific SMP–515–C–X inspection 

programs that have been ‘‘superseded’’ 

by the PSEs identified in the SSID. In 

further support of its request, Lynden 

has provided the FAA with its analysis 

of the SSID against its FAA-approved 

program (SMP–515–C–113). The 

analysis revealed few, but significant, 

differences. 

We agree that the information in the 

SSID is based on military usage, which 

was used to define the baseline 

inspection requirements. As explained 

previously, analysis and in-service 

cracking data have shown that the crack 

growth rate severity of typical 

commercial usage is very similar to the 

baseline military usage. Our evaluation 

of commercial usage is therefore based 

on objective criteria and information 

submitted by the operators. As stated 

previously, we accept the DAH’s 

inspection intervals presented in the 

SSID as ‘‘DTA values,’’ and have revised 

this final rule to change ‘‘DTA values’’ 

to ‘‘inspection intervals’’ to correspond 

to the SSID. 

But we disagree that the differences 

are significant. The DAH carefully 

reviewed and evaluated the operator’s 

maintenance program, and considered 

the civilian usage of the affected 

airplanes. Our intent is to reduce the 

workload of the DAH, operators, and the 

FAA, and still accomplish the intent of 

the AD. The SSID meets the 

requirements for the affected airplanes. 

Except for some minor changes made by 

the DAH and approved by the FAA, any 

operator with a CAMP is already in 

compliance with the SSID, except for 

the minor changes. The SSID 

requirements are already a part of the 

operators’ maintenance programs. If the 

operator has made changes to the CAMP 

to meet its maintenance schedules that 

were previously approved by the FAA, 

the subject operator may request an 

AMOC to the SSID based on the existing 

CAMP. If this is approved by the FAA, 

the operator will not have to change the 

CAMP, and would already be in 

compliance with this AD except for the 

minor changes in the SSID. 

Request To Address Differences 

Between This AD and AD 92–10–14, 

Amendment 39–8249 (57 FR 21727, 

May 22, 1992), and AD 75–17–04, 

Amendment 39–3185 (43 FR 16151, 

April 17, 1978) 

Lynden suggested that we revise the 

proposed compliance times in the 

proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 

14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 

(72 FR 67998)), in light of two related 

existing ADs, to avoid duplicative or 

contradictory results. 

AD 92–10–14, Amendment 39–8249 

(57 FR 21727, April 22, 1992), affects 

certain Lockheed Model 382 airplanes 

and addresses fatigue cracking. That AD 

requires inspections at intervals not to 

exceed 3,600 flight hours, in accordance 

with SP–126 and SP–224. Lynden 

reported being in compliance with that 

AD at its scheduled C check interval of 

2,800 flight hours. The initial 

compliance times in the SSID are 1,800 

flight hours for SP–126 and 3,600 flight 

hours for SP–224. 


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AD 75–17–04, Amendment 39–2300 

(40 FR 32827, August 5, 1975), as 

revised by Amendment 39–3185 (43 FR 

16151, April 17, 1978), affects certain 

Lockheed Model 382 series airplanes 

and addresses cracking on main frames. 

That AD requires inspections at 

intervals not to exceed the ‘‘C check’’ 

(which corresponds to 2,800 flight hours 

for Lynden), in accordance with SP–95, 

which is required at intervals not to 

exceed 1,200 flight hours in accordance 

with the SSID. Lynden reported being in 

compliance with AD 75–17–04 at 1,400- 

flight-hour intervals, at B–2 and C 

checks. 

We disagree that it is necessary to 

change the compliance times in this AD. 

The inspection requirements of AD 92– 

10–14, Amendment 39–8249 (57 FR 

21727, May 22, 1992); and AD 75–17– 

04, Amendment 39–3185 (43 FR 16151, 

April 17, 1978); as well as the other ADs 

identified in the SSID, do not conflict 

with this AD. We have not changed the 

final rule regarding this issue. 

Request To Clarify Basis for SSID 

Inspections 

Lynden found no objective evidence 

that the inspections are based on clear 

objective damage tolerance evaluations. 

Lynden noted that the SSID was drawn 

from existing programs and the 

inspection areas were validated by ‘‘full 

scale fatigue test and service corrosion 

and cracking data.’’ Lynden added that 

the DAH understands that the 

maintenance program must be based on 

FAA-approved DT-based structural 

inspection procedures, but the fourth 

paragraph of Section 2.0 (Introduction) 

of the SSID reveals that the information 

is based only in part on damage 

tolerance assessments. 

We infer that Lynden was requesting 

clarification of the basis for the 

inspection procedures. The information 

in the SSID comes from several sources. 

On affected airplanes, the DAH 

performed several full-scale tests and 

has developed a large data bank of 

service history (including SDRs) to 

identify problem areas and PSEs. A DTA 

was performed to establish the 

inspection intervals after many of the 

PSEs had already been identified. 

Initially, the fatigue test and service 

history data were used only to identify 

the problem area PSEs to receive DTA 

evaluation, and to validate the DTA 

data. Every PSE received a DTA. As part 

of the assessment of each PSE, the DAH 

found that in some instances the DTA 

did not correlate well with the fatigue 

test and service life data. In those 

instances, the fatigue test and service 

life data were used to establish the 

inspection intervals that are presented 

in the SSID. We have not changed the 

final rule regarding this issue. 

Request To Clarify Use of Military Data 

as Basis for the SSID 

According to Sections 1.0 (Purpose) 

and 2.0 (Introduction) of the SSID, data 

used by the DAH were based on 

information from military usage. 

Lynden concluded that the FAA’s 

evaluation of commercial usage does not 

appear to be based on objective criteria 

or on information submitted to the SDR 

database sufficient to determine 

whether the ‘‘crack growth rate severity 

of typical commercial usage is similar to 

the baseline military usage, particularly 

in wing lower surface structure.’’ 

Lynden found nothing in the AD docket 

indicating whether the DAH or the FAA 

evaluated the findings of commercial 

operators. 

We agree that the SSID is based in 

part on military usage, which was used 

to define the baseline inspection 

requirements. Recent analysis of the 

usage data has shown that typical 

commercial operation of the affected 

airplanes is at higher payloads than that 

of military operations with significantly 

less time in training. Analysis and inservice cracking data have also shown 

that the crack growth rate severity of 

typical commercial usage is very similar 

to the baseline military usage. Our 

evaluation of commercial usage is 

therefore based on objective criteria and 

information submitted by operators. We 

have not changed this final rule 

regarding this issue. The DAH has 

advised that the recommended 

inspection intervals might be extended 

if operators complete an OUE and 

request AMOC approval. 

Request To Clarify SSID Basis 

Paragraph (g) of the proposed AD (72 

FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) would 

require incorporation of a revision into 

the maintenance inspection program 

that provides no less than the required 

damage-tolerance rating for each PSE 

listed in the SSID. Lynden noted 

however that the SSID does not provide 

damage-tolerance ratings (as published 

in Boeing SSIDs), and provides only 

inspection intervals for SPs that are 

already part of the CAMP. And the 

required reports have not been 

incorporated into the findings or 

reassessment by the TC holder or FAA. 

We agree to provide clarification. 

Each manufacturer’s SSID is different. 

And each DAH has a different approach 

regarding collecting the data, 

implementing the required inspection, 

and reporting the results. Boeing used a 

damage tolerance rating procedure for 

its SSID program; Lockheed chose a 

different method. We accept both 

methods. The different oversight ACOs 

also have authority to approve whatever 

data they deem necessary to meet the 

requirements of the AD, as long as the 

data meet the intent of the FAA 

regulations, policies, and guidance 

materials. We have determined that the 

SSID meets those requirements. We 

have not changed the final rule 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Clarify Purpose of Section 

4.0 (Principle Structural Elements) of 

the SSID 

Lynden stated that Section 4.0 

(Principal Structural Elements) of the 

SSID seems to be the list of PSEs 

required by the proposed AD (72 FR 

64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)), yet 

there is no specific reference to that 

section, and that section does not 

contain the required DTA values. 

We agree to provide clarification. 

Section 4.0 (Principle Structural 

Elements) of the SSID simply links the 

PSE number with a description of the 

PSE. Section 4.0 (Principle Structural 

Elements) identifies and defines the 

individual PSEs by zones of the 

airplane. The required DTA values or 

inspection intervals are presented in 

Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection 

Requirements) of the SSID. We have not 

changed the final rule regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Require Inspections in 

Service Bulletins Instead of SSID 

Lynden stated that the actions 

proposed in the proposed AD (72 FR 

64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) would 

increase recordkeeping complexity 

without equally enhancing safety. Since 

the SP cards listed in the SSID are 

already a mandatory part of the CAMP, 

Lynden requested that we issue an AD 

that requires accomplishment of the 

specific structural service bulletins 

already issued by the TC holder and 

incorporated into Lynden’s inspection 

program, instead of the SSID 

inspections. Lynden suggested this as a 

better, less complex method of ensuring 

continued structural integrity. 

We disagree with the request. Any 

operator with a CAMP is already in 

compliance with the SSID, except for 

the minor changes noted previously. 

Furthermore, mandating 

accomplishment of those service 

bulletins would necessitate issuing a 

supplemental NPRM to provide the 

opportunity for the public to comment 

on the merits of this change, and would 

further delay issuance of this AD, 


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21416 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 69 / Tuesday, April 10, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

without increasing safety. Operators 

doing the inspection program are 

required to set up a tracking system for 

each inspection and maintain that 

system at all times, so very little 

additional work for recordkeeping 

should be required. The operator and 

the FAA can track the status of the 

inspections by inspection numbers 

assigned to each inspection requirement 

by the operator, or by the procedure and 

card number defined by the SSID, or by 

any other procedure approved by the 

FAA. We have not changed the final 

rule regarding this issue. 

Request To Revise Reporting 

Requirement 

Lynden asserted that the proposed 

reporting requirement of the proposed 

AD (72 FR 64005, November 14, 2007; 

corrected December 3, 2007 (72 FR 

67998)) (as specified in Section 7.0 

(Discrepancy Reporting) of the SSID) is 

unnecessary and burdensome, because 

operators must also file SDRs for all 

structural defects. Lynden stated that 

submitting the SDRs to the TC holder 

would comply with the proposed 

reporting requirements of the proposed 

AD, since the TC holder could simply 

query the FAA’s SDR database and 

obtain the same information. To 

eliminate the need to develop two 

different reporting systems to comply 

with both reporting requirements, 

Lynden requested that we revise the 

proposed AD to either (1) specify that 

operators do not need to report to the 

TC holder if the report is made under 

the SDR requirements, or (2) match the 

proposed AD language to the 

specifications of the SDR. 

We partially agree. Most of the 

information required by the SSID will 

be identical to the SDRs except for some 

minor changes. The results reported for 

the SSID inspections may be used for 

the SDRs (if the reports include all the 

information required as specified in the 

SDR reporting procedures), and the 

SDRs may be used for the SSID 

inspections. But to simplify the 

reporting requirements, one report may 

be used for both the SDR and the AD. 

We have revised paragraph (g) in this 

final rule to include this provision. 

Request To Address Cracking Found 

During Non-SSID Inspections 

Lynden requested that we clarify 

whether cracks found in SSID-specific 

PSEs fall under the scope of the 

proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 

14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 

(72 FR 67998)), including repairing and 

reporting cracks found in SSID-specific 

PSEs during a non-SSID inspection. 

We agree that clarification is 

necessary. All cracks found during a 

SSID inspection are covered by the SSIP 

reporting procedures. Cracks in a PSE 

found outside a SSID inspection are not 

part of the SSID reporting but do fall 

under the Aging Airplane Safety Rule 

(70 FR 5518, February 2, 2005) (Docket 

FAA–1999–5401) reporting so they will 

still need to be reported. The reporting 

procedures should be the same. We 

have not changed the final rule 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Allow Future SSID Changes 

in AD 

Lynden stated that, according to 

Section 1.0 (Purpose) of the SSID, 

Lockheed Martin will provide operators 

with a method to comply with section 

121.1109 of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109), which 

allows for continual adjustments to (1) 

account for changes in the product 

materials, parts, and processes; and (2) 

issue new or improved repairs and 

revisions of the structural repair manual 

and service bulletins. Lynden noted that 

changing an AD requires additional time 

and resources of the operator, the DAH, 

and the FAA. 

We infer that Lynden was requesting 

that we revise the proposed AD (72 FR 

64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) to 

allow for unspecified adjustments to the 

requirements. We disagree. All changes 

to the SSID must be approved by the 

Atlanta ACO. We would consider 

superseding the AD only when 

significant changes to the SSID affect 

the airworthiness of the affected 

airplanes. The only requirements are 

those specified in the AD—in this case, 

the specific revision to the SSID. An 

operator wishing to use any changes in 

a future revision to the SSID (not 

mandated by the AD) must request 

AMOC approval in accordance with the 

provisions of paragraph (q) of this AD. 

We have not changed this final rule 

regarding this issue. 

Request for Access to ‘‘Reference #2’’ 

Lynden alleged that the ‘‘initial flaw 

criteria’’ specified in Section 5.2 of the 

SSID are based on assumptions 

unknown to Lynden. The SSID states 

that the initial flaw size and flaw shape 

assumptions as well as the structural 

flaw configuration used in the DTA of 

crack growth are based on the 

assumptions determined in ‘‘Reference 

2,’’ as specified in that paragraph. 

Because ‘‘Reference 2’’ is reserved and 

therefore unidentified, Lynden asserted 

that it could not review or confirm the 

methodology. Lynden requested access 

to all information used to establish 

compliance with the proposed AD (72 

FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) to 

make substantive comment to the 

docket. 

We disagree that access to ‘‘Reference 

2’’ is necessary. We have reviewed 

‘‘Reference 2’’ and approved the ‘‘initial 

flaw criteria.’’ The information in 

‘‘Reference 2’’ is the DAH’s proprietary 

data, and the FAA cannot release this 

information to operators. We have 

determined that operators do not need 

this information to accomplish the SSID 

requirements. We accept the DAH’s 

initial flaw size and flaw shape 

assumptions as well as the structural 

flow configuration used in the DTA of 

crack growth presented in ‘‘Reference 

2.’’ We have not changed the final rule 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Clarify DAH’s Involvement 

in SSID 

Lynden interpreted Section 1.0 

(Purpose) of the SSID as suggesting that 

the DAH anticipated an AD but did not 

expect it to be based on its everchanging SSID document. Lynden 

added that the DAH did not understand 

that, after the AD is issued, the SSID 

requirements cannot be changed unless 

the operator obtains an AMOC or the 

FAA supersedes the AD. Lynden also 

asserted that the first paragraph of 

Section 2.0 (Introduction) of the SSID 

clearly establishes that the DAH did not 

understand or appreciate how its SSID 

document would be used as the basis for 

an AD. 

We disagree with Lynden’s assertions. 

The DAH understands how its SSID will 

be used as the basis for the AD. The 

DAH also understands that the FAA 

must either supersede the AD to 

incorporate any significant changes to 

the SSID, or approve AMOCs to make 

any changes to SSID procedures or 

compliance times that are not 

specifically required by the AD. We 

have not changed the final rule 

regarding this issue. 

Request To Identify Section 6.0 

(Structural Inspection Requirements) of 

SSID 

The proposed AD (72 FR 64005, 

November 14, 2007; corrected December 

3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) proposed 

implementing the requirements of 

Section 5.0 (Damage Tolerance Analysis 

Methodology) and Section 7.0 

(Discrepancy Reporting) of the SSID, but 

LM Aero suggested that the most 

important requirements are in Section 

6.0 (Structural Inspection 

Requirements). Section 6.0 (Structural 

Inspection Requirements) contains the 

references for the required inspection 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 69 / Tuesday, April 10, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 21417 

procedures as well as the compliance 

times for the initial and repetitive 

inspections. LM Aero stated that 

implementing the Section 6.0 

(Structural Inspection Requirements) 

requirements will meet the DTA 

methodology requirements contained in 

Section 5.0 (Damage Tolerance Analysis 

Methodology). LM Aero agreed with the 

proposed requirement to comply with 

Section 7.0 (Discrepancy Reporting). 

Lynden concurred with this comment. 

We agree with LM Aero’s position. 

We have revised paragraph (g) in this 

final rule to include Sections 5.0 

(Damage Tolerance Analysis 

Methodology), 6.0 (Structural Inspection 

Requirements), and 7.0 (Discrepancy 

Reporting) of the SSID. 

Request To Provide Terminating Action 

Lynden noted that the SSID, on page 

6–12 in Section 6.0 (Structural 

Inspection Requirements), requires 

accomplishment of a certain inspection 

initially by 12,000 total flight hours, 

with recurring inspections due at 

intervals not to exceed 2,400 flight 

hours thereafter. Lynden requested that 

the SSID or the proposed AD (72 FR 

64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) be 

revised to state that accomplishment of 

Lockheed Service Bulletin 382–71–24, 

dated January 21, 2010, eliminates the 

need for this recurring inspection 

requirement. 

We disagree with the request to allow 

accomplishment of Lockheed Service 

Bulletin 382–71–24, dated January 21, 

2010, as terminating action for the 

specified inspection requirement. 

Lockheed Service Bulletin 382–71–24, 

dated January 21, 2010, was never 

approved by the Atlanta ACO as 

terminating action. But replacing the 

bushing and repairing existing damage 

per Lockheed Service Bulletin 382–71– 

24, dated January 21, 2010, will allow 

operators to zero out the time for the 

inspection. Operators may request an 

AMOC for relief from this requirement 

in accordance with the provisions of 

paragraph (q) of this AD, provided data 

are provided that show that 

accomplishment of Lockheed Service 

Bulletin 382–71–24, dated January 21, 

2010, would provide an acceptable level 

of safety allowing for this terminating 

action. Since not all operators have 

accomplished the actions specified in 

Lockheed Service Bulletin 382–71–24, 

dated January 21, 2010, the inspections 

must remain in the SSID. We have not 

changed the final rule regarding this 

issue. 

Request To Clarify Impact on Alaska 

Operations 

Lynden interpreted the Regulatory 

Evaluation for this action as stating that 

the AD would have no impact on 

intrastate aviation in the state of Alaska. 

Lynden reported that it moves over 82 

million pounds of cargo per year in 

Alaska, so the proposed AD (72 FR 

64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)) would 

definitely have an impact on those 

operations. 

We agree to provide clarification. The 

Regulatory Evaluation states that the AD 

‘‘could affect intrastate aviation in 

Alaska,’’ but adds that it is not 

‘‘appropriate to include specific 

requirements for aircraft operated in 

Alaska.’’ This AD applies only to 

airplanes when operated outside the 

territorial boundaries of Alaska. We 

have not changed the final rule 

regarding this issue. Because of the 

nature of the unsafe condition, we 

cannot justify a regulatory distinction 

between aviation only in Alaska and 

other aviation. 

Request To Account for Widespread 

Fatigue Damage (WFD) Rulemaking 

Lynden was concerned about the 

pending rulemaking related to WFD to 

propose certain changes to the 

requirements for evaluating structure, 

assigning inspections, and doing other 

maintenance or alteration tasks. 

Lynden made no specific request. The 

SSIP does not account for the effects of 

WFD. We have not changed the final 

rule regarding this issue. 

Additional Changes Made to This AD 

We have revised this final rule to 

identify the legal name of the 

manufacturer as published in the most 

recent type certificate data sheet for the 

affected airplane models. 

We have added new paragraph (e) in 

this final rule to provide ATA subject 

code 51: Standard practices/structures. 

This code is added to make this final 

rule parallel with other new AD actions. 

We have re-identified subsequent 

paragraphs accordingly. 

We have revised paragraph (g) of this 

AD to remove the phrase ‘‘FAAapproved’’ from ‘‘FAA-approved 

maintenance inspection program,’’ 

because we do not approve operators’ 

maintenance programs. 

We have removed the ‘‘Service 

Information’’ paragraph from this final 

rule. (That paragraph was identified as 

paragraph (f) in the proposed AD (72 FR 

64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)).) 

Instead, we have provided the full 

document citations throughout this final 

rule. 

Since we issued the proposed AD (72 

FR 64005, November 14, 2007; corrected 

December 3, 2007 (72 FR 67998)), we 

have increased the labor rate used in the 

Costs of Compliance from $80 per workhour to $85 per work-hour. The Costs of 

Compliance information, below, reflects 

this increase in the specified labor rate. 

We have re-identified Note 3 of the 

proposed AD (72 FR 64005, November 

14, 2007; corrected December 3, 2007 

(72 FR 67998)) as Note 1 of this final 

rule, and relocated that note to follow 

paragraph (g) of this AD. We have 

reidentified subsequent notes 

accordingly. 

Conclusion 

We reviewed the relevant data, 

considered the comments received, and 

determined that air safety and the 

public interest require adopting the AD 

with the changes described previously. 

We also determined that these changes 

will not increase the economic burden 

on any operator or increase the scope of 

the AD. 

Costs of Compliance 

There are about 91 airplanes of the 

affected design in the worldwide fleet. 

The following table provides the 

estimated costs for the 14 U.S. airplanes 

to comply with this AD. 

ESTIMATED COSTS

Action Work hours Average labor 

rate per hour Fleet cost 

Revision of maintenance inspection program.600 for the fleet ...................................... $85 $51,000. 

Inspections ............................................... 2,724 per airplane .................................. 85 $3,241,560, per inspection cycle. 


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21418 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 69 / Tuesday, April 10, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

The number of inspection work hours, 

as indicated above, is presented as if the 

accomplishment of the actions in this 

AD are to be conducted as ‘‘standalone’’ actions. However, in actual 

practice, these actions for the most part 

will be done coincidentally or in 

combination with normally scheduled 

airplane inspections and other 

maintenance program tasks. Therefore, 

the actual number of necessary 

additional inspection work hours will 

be minimal in many instances. 

Additionally, any costs associated with 

special airplane scheduling will be 

minimal. 

Further, compliance with this AD is a 

means of compliance with the aging 

airplane safety final rule (AASFR) for 

the baseline structure of Model 382, 

382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G series 

airplanes. The AASFR requires certain 

operators to incorporate damage 

tolerance inspections into their 

maintenance inspection programs. 

These requirements are described in 14 

CFR 121.370(a) and 129.16. 

Accomplishment of the actions required 

by this AD will meet the requirements 

of these CFR sections for the baseline 

structure. The costs for accomplishing 

the inspection portion of this AD were 

accounted for in the regulatory 

evaluation of the AASFR. 

Authority for This Rulemaking 

Title 49 of the United States Code 

specifies the FAA’s authority to issue 

rules on aviation safety. Subtitle I, 

section 106, describes the authority of 

the FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII: 

Aviation Programs, describes in more 

detail the scope of the Agency’s 

authority. 

We are issuing this rulemaking under 

the authority described in Subtitle VII, 

Part A, Subpart III, Section 44701: 

‘‘General requirements.’’ Under that 

section, Congress charges the FAA with 

promoting safe flight of civil aircraft in 

air commerce by prescribing regulations 

for practices, methods, and procedures 

the Administrator finds necessary for 

safety in air commerce. This regulation 

is within the scope of that authority 

because it addresses an unsafe condition 

that is likely to exist or develop on 

products identified in this rulemaking 

action. 

Regulatory Findings 

This AD will not have federalism 

implications under Executive Order 

13132. This AD will not have a 

substantial direct effect on the States, on 

the relationship between the national 

government and the States, or on the 

distribution of power and 

responsibilities among the various 

levels of government. 

For the reasons discussed above, I 

certify that this AD: 

(1) Is not a ‘‘significant regulatory 

action’’ under Executive Order 12866, 

(2) Is not a ‘‘significant rule’’ under 

DOT Regulatory Policies and Procedures 

(44 FR 11034, February 26, 1979), 

(3) Will not affect intrastate aviation 

in Alaska, and 

(4) Will not have a significant 

economic impact, positive or negative, 

on a substantial number of small entities 

under the criteria of the Regulatory 

Flexibility Act. 

List of Subjects in 14 CFR Part 39 

Air transportation, Aircraft, Aviation 

safety, Incorporation by reference, 

Safety. 

Adoption of the Amendment 

Accordingly, under the authority 

delegated to me by the Administrator, 

the FAA amends 14 CFR part 39 as 

follows: 

PART 39—AIRWORTHINESS 

DIRECTIVES 

■ 1. The authority citation for part 39 

continues to read as follows: 

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 40113, 44701. 

§ 39.13 [Amended] 

■ 2. The FAA amends § 39.13 by adding 

the following new airworthiness 

directive (AD): 

2012–06–09 Lockheed Martin Corporation/ 

Lockheed Martin Aeronautics Company: 

Amendment 39–16990. Docket No. 

FAA–2007–0109; Directorate Identifier 

2007–NM–235–AD. 

(a) Effective Date 

This AD is effective May 15, 2012. 

(b) Affected ADs 

None. 

(c) Applicability 

This AD applies to all Lockheed Martin 

Corporation/Lockheed Martin Aeronautics 

Company Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 

382G airplanes, certificated in any category. 

(d) Unsafe Condition 

This AD results from a report of incidents 

involving fatigue cracking and corrosion in 

transport category airplanes that are 

approaching or have exceeded their design 

service objective. We are issuing this AD to 

maintain the continued structural integrity of 

the fleet. 

(e) Subject 

Air Transport Association (ATA) of 

America Code 51: Standard Practices/ 

Structures. 

(f) Compliance 

You are responsible for having the actions 

required by this AD performed within the 

compliance times specified, unless the 

actions have already been done. 

(g) Revision of the Maintenance Inspection 

Program 

Within 12 months after the effective date 

of this AD, incorporate a revision into the 

maintenance inspection program that 

provides no less than the required damage 

tolerance assessment/analysis (DTA) for each 

structural significant item (SSI) listed in 

Lockheed Martin Model 382, 382B, 382E, 

382F, and 382G Series Aircraft Service 

Manual Publication (SMP), Supplemental 

Structural Inspection Document (SSID), SMP 

515–C–SSID, Change 1, dated September 10, 

2007. (The required inspection interval for 

each principal structural element (PSE) is 

listed in Lockheed Martin Model 382, 382B, 

382E, 382F, and 382G Series Aircraft Service 

Manual Publication (SMP), Supplemental 

Structural Inspection Document (SSID), SMP 

515–C–SSID, Change 1, dated September 10, 

2007.) The revision to the maintenance 

inspection program must include and must 

be implemented in accordance with the 

procedures in Section 5.0 (Damage Tolerance 

Analysis Methodology), Section 6.0 

(Structural Inspection Requirements), and 

Section 7.0 (Discrepancy Reporting) of 

Lockheed Martin Model 382, 382B, 382E, 

382F, and 382G Series Aircraft Service 

Manual Publication (SMP), Supplemental 

Structural Inspection Document (SSID), SMP 

515–C–SSID, Change 1, dated September 10, 

2007. One report may be used to report 

findings for both the service difficulty report 

and this AD, provided the report refers to this 

AD and the PSE number for the inspection 

being accomplished when the discrepancy 

was found. 

Note 1 to paragraphs (g) through (p) of this 

AD: Compliance with the requirements of 

this AD establishes compliance with section 

121.1109(c)(1) of the Federal Aviation 

Regulations (14 CFR 121.1109(c)(1)). 

(h) Paperwork Reduction Act Burden 

Statement 

A federal agency may not conduct or 

sponsor, and a person is not required to 

respond to, nor shall a person be subject to 

a penalty for failure to comply with a 

collection of information subject to the 

requirements of the Paperwork Reduction 

Act unless that collection of information 

displays a current valid OMB Control 

Number. The OMB Control Number for this 

information collection is 2120–0056. Public 

reporting for this collection of information is 

estimated to be approximately 5 minutes per 

response, including the time for reviewing 

instructions, completing and reviewing the 

collection of information. All responses to 

this collection of information are mandatory. 

Comments concerning the accuracy of this 

burden and suggestions for reducing the 

burden should be directed to the FAA at: 800 

Independence Ave. SW., Washington, DC 

20591, Attn: Information Collection 

Clearance Officer, AES–200. 


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Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 69 / Tuesday, April 10, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 21419 

(i) Initial and Repetitive Inspections 

At the later of the times specified in 

paragraphs (i)(1) and (i)(2) of this AD, except 

as provided by paragraphs (j) through (n) of 

this AD: Do the applicable initial inspections 

to detect cracks of all SSIs, in accordance 

with Lockheed Martin Model 382, 382B, 

382E, 382F, and 382G Series Aircraft Service 

Manual Publication (SMP), Supplemental 

Structural Inspection Document (SSID), SMP 

515–C–SSID, Change 1, dated September 10, 

2007. Repeat the applicable inspections 

thereafter at intervals not to exceed the 

‘‘Recurring’’ intervals specified in Section 6.0 

(Structural Inspection Requirements) of 

Lockheed Martin Model 382, 382B, 382E, 

382F, and 382G Series Aircraft Service 

Manual Publication (SMP), Supplemental 

Structural Inspection Document (SSID), SMP 

515–C–SSID, Change 1, dated September 10, 

2007, except as provided by paragraphs (l) 

through (n) of this AD. 

(1) Before the applicable ‘‘Initial’’ 

threshold specified in Section 6.0 (Structural 

Inspection Requirements) of Lockheed 

Martin Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 

382G Series Aircraft Service Manual 

Publication (SMP), Supplemental Structural 

Inspection Document (SSID), SMP 515–C– 

SSID, Change 1, dated September 10, 2007. 

(2) Within 36 months after the effective 

date of this AD, or within one ‘‘Recurring’’ 

interval measured from 12 months after the 

effective date of the AD, whichever comes 

first. 

(j) Exception to Service Information 

Compliance Time (Threshold Since New) 

Where Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection 

Requirements) of Lockheed Martin Model 

382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G Series 

Aircraft Service Manual Publication (SMP), 

Supplemental Structural Inspection 

Document (SSID), SMP 515–C–SSID, Change 

1, dated September 10, 2007, specifies the 

‘‘Initial’’ threshold in years (since new), this 

AD requires compliance within the specified 

year since the date of issuance of the original 

standard airworthiness certificate or the date 

of issuance of the original export certificate 

of airworthiness. 

(k) Exception to Service Information 

Compliance Time (Special Condition) 

Where Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection 

Requirements) of Lockheed Martin Model 

382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G Series 

Aircraft Service Manual Publication (SMP), 

Supplemental Structural Inspection 

Document (SSID), SMP 515–C–SSID, Change 

1, dated September 10, 2007, specifies the 

‘‘Initial’’ threshold as ‘‘Special Condition,’’ 

this AD requires compliance within 24 

months after the effective date of this AD. 

(l) Exception to Service Information 

Compliance Time (Fuselage Station (FS) 

1041 Fitting Replacement) 

Where Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection 

Requirements) of Lockheed Martin Model 

382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G Series 

Aircraft Service Manual Publication (SMP), 

Supplemental Structural Inspection 

Document (SSID), SMP 515–C–SSID, Change 

1, dated September 10, 2007, specifies the 

‘‘Initial’’ threshold and ‘‘Recurring’’ interval 

as ‘‘FS 1041 Fitting Replacement,’’ this AD 

requires compliance within 24 months after 

the effective date of this AD and thereafter at 

intervals not to exceed those specified in 

Lockheed Martin Model 382, 382B, 382E, 

382F, and 382G Series Aircraft Service 

Manual Publication (SMP), Supplemental 

Structural Inspection Document (SSID), SMP 

515–C–SSID, Change 1, dated September 10, 

2007, concurrently with any FS 1041 fitting 

replacement. 

(m) Exception to Service Information 

Compliance Time (Engine Change) 

Where Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection 

Requirements) of Lockheed Martin Model 

382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G Series 

Aircraft Service Manual Publication (SMP), 

Supplemental Structural Inspection 

Document (SSID), SMP 515–C–SSID, Change 

1, dated September 10, 2007, specifies the 

‘‘Initial’’ threshold and ‘‘Recurring’’ interval 

as ‘‘Engine Change,’’ this AD requires 

compliance before further flight after the next 

engine change, and thereafter before further 

flight whenever the engines are changed. 

(n) Exception to Service Information 

Compliance Time (Aft Lord Mount Change) 

Where Section 6.0 (Structural Inspection 

Requirements) of Lockheed Martin Model 

382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G Series 

Aircraft Service Manual Publication (SMP), 

Supplemental Structural Inspection 

Document (SSID), SMP 515–C–SSID, Change 

1, dated September 10, 2007, specifies the 

‘‘Initial’’ threshold and ‘‘Recurring’’ interval 

as ‘‘Aft Lord Mount Change,’’ this AD 

requires compliance before further flight after 

the next aft lord mount change (FS 1041 

fitting change), and thereafter at intervals not 

to exceed those specified in Lockheed Martin 

Model 382, 382B, 382E, 382F, and 382G 

Series Aircraft Service Manual Publication 

(SMP), Supplemental Structural Inspection 

Document (SSID), SMP 515–C–SSID, Change 

1, dated September 10, 2007, concurrently 

with any FS 1041 fitting replacement. 

(o) Repair 

If any cracked structure is found during the 

inspections required by paragraph (i) of this 

AD, before further flight, repair the cracked 

structure using a method approved by the 

Manager, Atlanta Aircraft Certification Office 

(ACO), FAA. For a repair method to be 

approved by the Manager, Atlanta ACO, as 

required by this paragraph, the Manager’s 

approval letter must specifically refer to this 

AD. 

Note 2 to paragraph (o) of this AD: 

Applicable existing FAA-approved repair 

procedures do not require further approval 

provided they have DTA-established 

inspection procedures and intervals 

previously approved by the FAA. 

Note 3 to paragraph (o) of this AD: 

Operators may contact the Manager, Atlanta 

ACO, for information regarding the use of 

published service data approved by the FAA 

associated with the repairs specified in 

paragraph (o) of this AD. 

(p) Inspection Program for Transferred 

Airplanes 

Before any airplane that is subject to this 

AD and that has exceeded the applicable 

compliance times specified in paragraph (i) 

of this AD can be added to an air carrier’s 

operations specifications, a program for the 

accomplishment of the inspections required 

by this AD must be established in accordance 

with paragraph (p)(1) or (p)(2) of this AD, as 

applicable. 

(1) For airplanes that have been inspected 

in accordance with this AD: The inspection 

of each PSE must be done by the new 

operator in accordance with the previous 

operator’s schedule and inspection method, 

or the new operator’s schedule and 

inspection method, at whichever time would 

result in the earlier accomplishment for that 

PSE inspection. The compliance time for 

accomplishment of this inspection must be 

measured from the last inspection 

accomplished by the previous operator. After 

each inspection has been done once, each 

subsequent inspection must be performed in 

accordance with the new operator’s schedule 

and inspection method. 

(2) For airplanes that have not been 

inspected in accordance with this AD: The 

inspection of each PSE required by this AD 

must be done either before adding the 

airplane to the air carrier’s operations 

specification, or in accordance with a 

schedule and an inspection method approved 

by the Manager, Atlanta ACO. After each 

inspection has been done once, each 

subsequent inspection must be done in 

accordance with the new operator’s schedule. 

(q) Alternative Methods of Compliance 

(AMOCs) 

(1) The Manager, Atlanta ACO, has the 

authority to approve AMOCs for this AD, if 

requested in accordance with the procedures 

found in 14 CFR 39.19. In accordance with 

14 CFR 39.19, send your request to your 

principal inspector or local Flight Standards 

District Office, as appropriate. If sending 

information directly to the manager of the 

ACO, send it to the attention of the person 

identified in the Related Information section 

of this AD. 

(2) Before using any approved AMOC, 

notify your appropriate principal inspector, 

or lacking a principal inspector, the manager 

of the local flight standards district office/ 

certificate holding district office. 

(r) Related Information 

For more information about this AD, 

contact Carl Gray, Aerospace Engineer, 

Airframe Branch, ACE–117A, FAA, Atlanta 

Aircraft Certification Office, 1701 Columbia 

Avenue, College Park, Atlanta, Georgia 

30337; phone: 404–474–5554; fax: 404–474– 

5606; email: carl.w.gray@faa.gov. 

(s) Material Incorporated by Reference 

(1) You must use the following service 

information to do the actions required by this 

AD, unless the AD specifies otherwise. The 

Director of the Federal Register approved the 

incorporation by reference (IBR) of the 

following service information under 5 U.S.C. 

552(a) and 1 CFR part 51: 

(i) Lockheed Martin Model 382, 382B, 

382E, 382F, and 382G Series Aircraft Service 

Manual Publication (SMP), Supplemental 

Structural Inspection Document (SSID), SMP 

515–C–SSID, Change 1, dated September 10, 

2007. 


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21420 Federal Register / Vol. 77, No. 69 / Tuesday, April 10, 2012 / Rules and Regulations 

(2) For service information identified in 

this AD, contact Lockheed Martin 

Corporation/Lockheed Martin Aeronautics 

Company, Airworthiness Office, Dept. 6A0M, 

Zone 0252, Column P–58, 86 S. Cobb Drive, 

Marietta, Georgia 30063; telephone 770–494– 

5444; fax 770–494–5445; email 

ams.portal@lmco.com; Internet http:// 

www.lockheedmartin.com/ams/tools/ 

TechPubs.html. 

(3) You may review copies of the service 

information at the FAA, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, 1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, call 

425–227–1221. 

(4) You may also review copies of the 

service information that is incorporated by 

reference at the National Archives and 

Records Administration (NARA). For 

information on the availability of this 

material at an NARA facility, call 202–741– 

6030, or go to http://www.archives.gov/ 

federal_register/code_of_federal_regulations/ 

ibr_locations.html. 

Issued in Renton, Washington, on March 

12, 2012. 

John P. Piccola, 

Acting Manager, Transport Airplane 

Directorate, Aircraft Certification Service. 

[FR Doc. 2012–8450 Filed 4–9–12; 8:45 am] 

BILLING CODE 4910–13–P 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

Federal Aviation Administration 

14 CFR Part 39 

[Docket No. FAA–2011–0913; Directorate 

Identifier 2011–NM–031–AD; Amendment 

39–17010; AD 2012–07–04] 

RIN 2120–AA64 

Airworthiness Directives; Cessna 

Aircraft Company Airplanes 

AGENCY: Federal Aviation 

Administration (FAA), DOT. 

ACTION: Final rule. 

SUMMARY: We are adopting a new 

airworthiness directive (AD) for certain 

Cessna Aircraft Company Model 680 

airplanes. This AD was prompted by a 

false cross-feed command to the righthand fuel control card, due to the crossfeed inputs on the left- and right-hand 

fuel control cards being connected 

together and causing an imbalance of 

fuel between the left and right wing 

tanks. This AD requires adding diodes 

to the fuel cross-feed wiring, and 

revising the airplane flight manual to 

include procedures to use when the left 

or right generator is selected OFF. We 

are issuing this AD to prevent lateral 

imbalance of the airplane, resulting 

from uncontrolled fuel cross-feed, 

which can be corrected by deflecting the 

aileron trim; deflecting the aileron trim 

increases the pilot’s workload and could 

exceed the airplane’s limitation in a 

short period of time, resulting in 

reduced controllability of the airplane. 

DATES: This AD is effective May 15, 

2012. 

The Director of the Federal Register 

approved the incorporation by reference 

of certain publications listed in the AD 

as of May 15, 2012. 

ADDRESSES: For service information 

identified in this AD, contact Cessna 

Aircraft Co., P.O. Box 7706, Wichita, 

Kansas 67277; telephone 316–517–6215; 

fax 316–517–5802; email 

citationpubs@cessna.textron.com; 

Internet https:// 

www.cessnasupport.com/newlogin.html. 

You may review copies of the 

referenced service information at the 

FAA, Transport Airplane Directorate, 

1601 Lind Avenue SW., Renton, 

Washington. For information on the 

availability of this material at the FAA, 

call 425–227–1221. 

Examining the AD Docket 

You may examine the AD docket on 

the Internet at http:// 

www.regulations.gov; or in person at the 

Docket Management Facility between 

9 a.m. and 5 p.m., Monday through 

Friday, except Federal holidays. The AD 

docket contains this AD, the regulatory 

evaluation, any comments received, and 

other information. The address for the 

Docket Office (phone: 800–647–5527) is 

Document Management Facility, U.S. 

Department of Transportation, Docket 

Operations, M–30, West Building 

Ground Floor, Room W12–140, 1200 

New Jersey Avenue SE., Washington, 

DC 20590. 

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: 

Nhien Hoang, Aerospace Engineer, 

Electrical Systems and Avionics Branch, 

ACE–119W, FAA, Wichita Aircraft 

Certification Office, 1801 Airport Road, 

Room 100, Mid-Continent Airport, 

Wichita, Kansas 67209; phone: (316) 

946–4190; fax: (316) 946–4107; email: 

nhien.hoang@faa.gov. 

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION: 

Discussion 

We issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking (NPRM) to amend 14 CFR 

part 39 to include an AD that would 

apply to the specified products. That 

NPRM was published in the Federal 

Register on August 31, 2011 (76 FR 

54141), and proposed to require adding 

diodes to the fuel cross-feed wiring, and 

revising the airplane flight manual to 

include procedures to use when the left 

or right generator is selected OFF. 

Comments 

We gave the public the opportunity to 

participate in developing this AD. The 

following presents the comments 

received from Cessna Aircraft Company 

(Cessna), the manufacturer, on the 

NPRM (76 FR 54141, August 31, 2011), 

and the FAA’s response to each 

comment. 

Requests To Correct References to 

Airplane Flight Manual (AFM) 

Revisions and Temporary Changes 

(TCs) in Paragraph (h) of This AD 

Cessna commented that the NPRM (76 

FR 54141, August 31, 2011) has 

incorrect references to certain AFM TCs, 

does not refer to certain applicable AFM 

TCs, and incorrectly addresses the 

procedure change in the recently FAAapproved Revision 10, dated June 30, 

2011, of the Cessna 680 Citation 

Sovereign AFM. We infer that Cessna 

requested that we correct references to 

the AFM revisions and TCs in paragraph 

(h) of the NPRM. 

Cessna also commented that the text 

for AFM revision 68FM–10, dated June 

30, 2011, of the Cessna 680 Citation 

Sovereign AFM, does not include the 

instruction to pull the fuel pump circuit 

breakers, which was part of the TC, and 

is not necessary once the modification 

specified in Cessna Service Bulletin 

680–24–11, dated December 16, 2010, is 

done. 

Cessna further commented that the 

wording of the NPRM (76 FR 54141, 

August 31, 2011) is incorrect in its 

reference to Cessna TC TC–R09–13, 

dated October 15, 2010, to the Cessna 

680 Citation Sovereign AFM, Revision 

9, dated May 24, 2010, and that the TC 

is applicable until Revision 10, dated 

June 30, 2011, of the Cessna 680 

Citation Sovereign AFM, is incorporated 

into the AFM. Further, the commenter 

stated that the remaining TCs for 

Revision 9, dated May 24, 2010, of the 

Cessna 680 Citation Sovereign AFM are 

to be removed when Revision 10 is 

incorporated, and there are 3 new TCs 

for Cessna 680 Citation Sovereign AFM, 

Revision 10, dated June 30, 2011, that 

are the same as the previous TCs for 

Cessna 680 Citation Sovereign AFM, 

Revision 9, dated May 24, 2010. 

We agree with Cessna’s requests for 

the reasons given. We have changed 

paragraph (h) of this AD to include the 

updated AFM revisions and current 

TCs. However, some operators still use 

Cessna 680 Citation Sovereign AFM, 

Revision 9, dated May 24, 2010, and 

therefore the TCs referenced in Cessna 

680 Citation Sovereign AFM, Revision 

9, dated May 24, 2010, still apply for 

some affected airplanes. Therefore, 


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