In the

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit ____________

Nos. 01-1048, 01-1184

LISA S. FINE, Plaintiff-Appellee,

Cross-Appellant,

v.

RYAN INTERNATIONAL AIRLINES,

Defendant-Appellant,

Cross-Appellee.

____________

Appeals from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

No. 97 C 2005—Larry J. McKinney, Chief Judge.

____________

ARGUED JANUARY 11, 2002—DECIDED SEPTEMBER 19, 2002

____________

Before EASTERBROOK,KANNE, and DIANE P.WOOD, Circuit

Judges.

DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge. Lisa Fine, a pilot for

Ryan International Airlines (Ryan), was demoted in April

1996 after failing a required proficiency check. Fine believed that her test had been rigged because Ryan’s male

leadership did not want women flying its planes. In September of that same year, Fine and three female co-workers

wrote a letter to management complaining about Ryan’s

inequitable treatment of its female pilots. This resulted in
2 Nos. 01-1048, 01-1184

a meeting where management said they could do nothing

unless the women made formal written complaints. The

next month, when Fine became eligible for a promotion

back to her old job, she experienced difficulty in scheduling

the required training. This time, she submitted a written

complaint to Ryan alleging that this too was based on her

sex. Days later Ryan fired her. A jury found that Ryan

had illegally retaliated against Fine and awarded her

over $400,000 in compensatory and punitive damages and

backpay. Ryan appeals both liability and damages; Fine

has cross-appealed on several points. We find no error

in either the liability or damages verdict in Fine’s favor and

therefore affirm the court’s judgment in those respects;

on the cross-appeal, we agree that the figure for prejudgment interest was mistaken, and we remand for a recalculation of that award.

I

Ryan is a freight air carrier that flies Boeing 727s, each

of which requires three pilots: a captain, a first officer, and

a flight engineer. Fine, the fourth female pilot ever to work

at Ryan, was initially hired as a flight engineer in 1991.

Pilots at Ryan can be promoted from flight engineer to first

officer upon the completion of upgrade training. Ryan offers

the necessary training and promotes from within ranks

when it needs new officers. Promotions have been frequent,

as Ryan has grown tremendously in recent years. In April

1995, Fine successfully upgraded to first officer.

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) requires all

pilots to complete an annual proficiency check, which is

conducted by the airline in a flight simulator. Fine’s annual

check was scheduled for April 18, 1996. Normally, Ryan

provides all its pilots an opportunity for a warm-up session

the day before their check, but this process went awry in
Nos. 01-1048, 01-1184 3

Fine’s case. She was misinformed by a Ryan employee that

her check was to take place on April 19. She therefore

arrived at the training facility on the evening of April 17, in

time for an April 18 warm-up, but she was informed that

she had missed her warm-up and that the test itself would

be administered on the 18th. It was, and she failed it. 

Ryan permits all pilots who fail a proficiency check to

retest, and so a retest for Fine was scheduled for the next

week. Fine passed two warm-ups but failed the check because the check airman determined she had landed long.

Fine believed that the simulator had been manipulated to

cause her to fail and that the company was using training

to get rid of or demote females. She complained verbally to

Jim Miller, Ryan’s Director of Flight Standards, and Ron

Ryan, the company president, who found her explanations

“fairly credible.” She never reduced this complaint to

writing. Because Fine failed her proficiency check, she was

demoted to flight engineer. She then was granted a 90-day

leave of absence.

In late August 1996, the four most senior female pilots at

Ryan (Eugenia Smith, Vicki Ramos, Julie Chapleau, and

Fine) met in Indianapolis to discuss issues of workplace

harassment and problems with training. Ramos informed

Fine that she had been placed in unsurvivable situations in

the simulator when she was demoted to flight engineer.

Later that month, a fifth female pilot, Kathy Schindelar,

who had also been demoted, told Fine that Schindelar

believed her own proficiency check had been manipulated

and that when she complained to Danny Looney, Vice

President of Flight Operations, Looney told her that she

could not fly and that “no woman can fly an airplane.”

On September 6, the four female pilots wrote a letter to

Chief Pilot Dan Scott. The letter stated, “The senior female flight crewmembers of Ryan International Airlines re-
4 Nos. 01-1048, 01-1184

quest fair and equitable treatment by management and

staff in all employment matters. Biased and prejudicial

attitudes have been maintained and exercised in employment matters.” This letter prompted Scott, along with

Looney and Human Resources Director Mary McGoldrick,

to meet with the women on September 18. The meeting

primarily focused on sexual harassment, including complaints that male pilots were labeling the women by the

size and shape of their rear ends and spreading rumors

about their sex lives, and that female pilots were stereotyped as emotional, criers, and weak pilots. Looney confirmed that male pilots had told him that they would never

let Chapleau touch the controls on an instrument approach,

that Fine was a whiner, and that no one had anything good

to say about Smith. Fine also complained about her failed

proficiency check and other training inequities. At the end

of the meeting, according to notes taken by Scott, Looney

said that he could do nothing unless the women were

willing to put their complaints in writing to human resources. He also warned that if they did so “they could

expect that the pilots that were carrying any of [them] . . .

might not carry them and write them up.” The women did

not follow up with a written complaint.

At their earlier meeting, the four female pilots had also

discussed the rumor that Looney and Scott maintained

confidential personnel files on them. On September 27, Fine

and Joe McCloy, the head of Ryan’s pilot committee, asked

Scott if they could review Fine’s file. Scott initially refused,

saying the file was confidential. Scott then wrote to Fine

that she could view the files as long as she personally came

to Indianapolis and submitted supporting documentation

stating the reasons why she needed access. McCloy had

previously been permitted to review his file without any

such rigmarole. 
Nos. 01-1048, 01-1184 5

Under Ryan’s policy, a demoted first officer was eligible

for an upgrade six months “later,” which Fine interpreted

to mean six months from the date of her April 25 demotion.

Looney, however, decided that since Fine had taken a

90-day leave of absence she would not be eligible to upgrade

until six months after her actual return to work. Fine

appealed to Ron Ryan, who overruled Looney and determined that Fine could upgrade through training any time

after October 25. Training is normally scheduled one month

in advance, but as of October 1, Fine had heard nothing

from Ryan about her upgrade. That day she called Looney

and pressed him to set a training date and provide her with

written confirmation. At this request, Looney became irate,

telling Fine he would schedule her at his convenience. He

refused to provide a specific date, stating, “Lisa, I don’t

know. It may be tomorrow, it may be next week, it may be

a month, it may be six months. I don’t know.” Looney then

hung up on Fine.

On October 2, Fine wrote a letter to McGoldrick reciting

the details of her conversation with Looney. She referenced

the September 18 meeting at which she had been called a

weak pilot and a whiner. She also complained that Looney

had denied her access to her personnel files (although it

was actually Scott who had done this). She then stated:

To date, Danny Looney and Dan Scott have (1) denied

me training, (2) delayed scheduling my training, (3)

demoted me, (4) hindered my upgrading, (5) pressured

me to quit, (6) threatened license revocation, (7) defamed my professional flying reputation. This has

caused me humiliation, embarrassment and a loss of

income. 

I am a competent professional pilot and believe that the

above actions are motivated by the fact that I am

female. Other female Ryan pilots have been subjected

to similar treatment.
6 Nos. 01-1048, 01-1184

Shortly before sending the letter, Fine was informed orally

(but not in writing) that she had been scheduled for upgrade training on October 28.

McGoldrick received Fine’s letter on October 9. According

to Ryan’s sexual harassment policy, employees are to bring

all complaints about discrimination by supervisors to the

Human Resources Department for investigation. The day

she received the letter, McGoldrick turned it over to Looney,

who immediately directed her to fire Fine. Before proceeding with that directive, McGoldrick checked with Ron Ryan,

who concurred, stating, “If I were her boss, I would fire her

ass.” McGoldrick then prepared a letter stating that,

“Subsequent to receiving your letter . . . it was determined

to terminate your employment.” Looney noted in Fine’s

personnel file that he was terminating her because she

“routinely missed work and was always hard to get along

with.” Prior to her dismissal, there were no written complaints about either Fine’s attendance or her interpersonal

skills in her file.

Fine then filed this Title VII suit charging sexual harassment, sex discrimination, and retaliation. The district court

granted Ryan summary judgment on the first two claims. It

found that any instances of sexual harassment were timebarred. It also concluded that Ryan had a valid nonpretextual reason for demoting Fine, namely her two failed

proficiency checks, and that Fine had no evidence other

than speculation and hearsay that the check was manipulated. However, the district court allowed the retaliation

claim to proceed to trial. After hearing eight days of testimony, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Fine and

awarded $6,000 in compensatory damages and $3.5 million

in punitive damages, an award the district court reduced to

the statutory cap of $300,000. The court also awarded backpay and attorneys’ fees, although it denied Fine’s request

for reinstatement to her job with Ryan.
Nos. 01-1048, 01-1184 7

II

Ryan raises three issues with respect to the jury’s finding

on liability: (1) it should have been granted judgment as a

matter of law because Fine did not have a reasonable belief

that she was opposing discrimination; (2) the jury instructions were erroneous; and (3) the district court admitted

irrelevant testimony regarding other acts of discrimination

by Ryan. We consider each of these points in turn.

A.

Title VII makes it unlawful for any employer to discriminate against an employee for opposing a practice made

unlawful by the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). To prove a case

of retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) she engaged in

statutorily protected expression; (2) she suffered an adverse

action at the hands of her employer; and (3) there was a

causal link between the two. Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co.,

28 F.3d 1446, 1457 (7th Cir. 1994). Ryan concedes that

there was sufficient evidence to meet the second and third

parts of this test; we therefore take as a given that Ryan

fired Fine for writing the October 2 letter. Ryan nevertheless claims that it should have been granted judgment as a

matter of law because Fine did not present enough evidence

for a rational jury to conclude that she had a reasonable

and good faith belief that her letter was an act of statutorily

protected expression. We review the denial of judgment as

a matter of law de novo, asking whether the evidence, when

viewed in the light most favorable to Fine (as the

nonmoving party), sufficiently supports the jury’s verdict.

Tincher v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 118 F.3d 1125, 1129 (7th

Cir. 1997).

We have repeatedly held that a plaintiff need not prevail

on her Title VII discrimination claim or have opposed an

action that in fact violated Title VII to win a retaliation
8 Nos. 01-1048, 01-1184

claim. McDonnell v. Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256, 259 (7th Cir.

1996); Alexander v. Gerhardt Enters., Inc., 40 F.3d 187, 195-

96 (7th Cir. 1994); Dey, 28 F.3d at 1457-58. All that is

required is that “she reasonably believed in good faith that

the practice she opposed violated Title VII.” Alexander, 40

F.3d at 195. Yet the heart of Ryan’s attack lies in the fact

that Fine’s discrimination claim failed to survive summary

judgment. How, it argues, could Fine reasonably have

believed she was complaining about discrimination when

the district court found that she was not discriminated

against as a matter of law?

Asking the question in this fashion reveals the crux of

Ryan’s mistake. It is improper to retaliate against anyone

for claiming a violation of Title VII unless that claim is

“completely groundless.” McDonnell, 84 F.3d at 259. But a

groundless claim is one resting on facts that no reasonable

person possibly could have construed as a case of discrimination. Many claims might appear legitimate on the surface, but after discovery and a harder look at the full

picture they turn out ultimately to lack merit. Under Title

VII, a person may not be terminated for making such a

grounded, yet unsuccessful, complaint.

On this record, it is impossible to conclude as a matter of

law that Fine had no grounds for believing that Ryan’s

actions violated Title VII. Fine knew that Looney had

initially found her ineligible for training on October 25 and

had been overruled by Ron Ryan and that she was now

experiencing a delay in scheduling training that none of her

male counterparts experienced. She was aware that Ramos

and Schindelar had also failed proficiency checks, and that

they too believed that the checks had been manipulated to

demote female pilots. (In everyday life, it is quite reasonable for people to rely on what they learn from their coworkers; the Federal Rules of Evidence do not govern the

workplace.) She and other women had been thwarted in
Nos. 01-1048, 01-1184 9

their attempts to persuade management to respond to

complaints of sexual harassment at the September 18

meeting, where Looney had called Fine a “whiner” and

discouraged the women from pursuing written complaints.

Fine also knew that she had been treated differently from

male pilot McCloy when both attempted to see their

personnel files. In light of this evidence, a jury could easily

find that Fine’s belief that she was opposing discrimination

was reasonable.

Ryan, citing Little v. United Technologies, 103 F.3d 956

(11th Cir. 1997), insists that Fine must present legally

admissible objective evidence that she suffered unlawful

discrimination to prevail. That is not, however, what the

Eleventh Circuit held, nor is it a correct statement of the

law. The Little court said only that the employee’s belief

that he was opposing a violation of Title VII had to be a

good faith, objectively reasonable belief: “the allegations

and record must also indicate that the belief, though

perhaps mistaken, was objectively reasonable.” Id. at 960;

see also Lipphardt v. Durango Steakhouse of Brandon, Inc.,

267 F.3d 1183, 1187 (11th Cir. 2001). The standard Ryan

proposes would require every retaliation trial to include a

mini-trial on the underlying discrimination, a standard that

Ryan admits our circuit rejects.

Ryan also seems to believe that Fine cannot now argue

that any of the events she complained about in her October

2 letter were discriminatory because she stated in her

deposition that there were no incidents that she considered

sexually harassing from April 25, 1996, until the date of her

termination. But why not? A party is free to contradict her

deposition testimony at trial, although her opponent may

then introduce the prior statement as impeachment. Tidemann v. Nadler Golf Car Sales, Inc., 224 F.3d 719, 724 (7th

Cir. 2000). The jury could have reasonably believed that

Fine’s earlier statement was an error or that her statement
10 Nos. 01-1048, 01-1184

referred only to workplace harassment and not to disparate

treatment in regard to training and personnel files. There

was enough evidence for the jury to find that Fine had a

good-faith, objectively reasonable belief that Ryan was discriminating against her on the basis of her sex, and we will

not disturb its finding.

B.

Ryan next complains about the district court’s jury instruction on reasonable belief, which stated, “Ms. Fine must

also prove that she reasonably believed in good faith that

the conduct she complained about violated Title VII. However, her activity may be protected regardless of whether

the charges were correct or not.” We review jury instructions only for an abuse of discretion and will not reverse

unless the instruction inadequately states the law and was

likely to have misled the jurors. Susan Wakeen Doll Co. v.

Ashton Drake Galleries, 272 F.3d 441, 452 (7th Cir. 2001).

In this case, the instruction contained no errors of law. See

Alexander, 40 F.3d at 195-96; Dey, 28 F.3d at 1458. While

Ryan complains that the term “reasonably believed in good

faith” was likely to confuse the jurors, we disagree. Ryan’s

proposed clarification that Fine’s belief must have been

“objectively reasonable in light of the facts and record

presented” is certainly no better. The district court made no

error in approving the instruction.

C.

Ryan also objects to the district court’s decision to admit

the testimony of two of Fine’s co-workers, Eugenia Smith

and Vicki Ramos. At trial, Ryan filed a motion in limine

seeking to bar Smith and Ramos from testifying to any

incidents of sex discrimination that they had discussed with
Nos. 01-1048, 01-1184 11

Fine, including those at the September meetings, other

than those incidents specifically mentioned in the October

2 letter that involved Fine and either Scott or Looney. The

court denied this motion. Both women then testified about

a number of matters raised at the meetings, including a

rumor spread by male pilots that Fine was having an affair,

the labeling of female pilots by the shapes of their rear

ends, and the fact that all four women had experienced past

troubles with the training department.

Ryan argues that all of this testimony was irrelevant to

the question of whether Fine was terminated for filing her

complaint. This is undoubtedly correct, but that is not the

purpose for which the district court admitted the testimony.

Instead, the district court found it admissible on the theory

that the conversations preceding the writing of the September 6 letter and at the September 18 meeting were relevant

to determining whether Fine in fact had a reasonable goodfaith belief that she was opposing discrimination through

her October 2 letter. 

This court has previously found that evidence of underlying sexual harassment is relevant on a retaliation claim to

establish that a plaintiff “reasonably believed in good faith

that the practice she opposed violated Title VII.” Dunning

v. Simmons Airlines, Inc., 62 F.3d 863, 874 (7th Cir. 1995)

(quoting Alexander, 40 F.3d at 195). Because other women

but not other men had experienced the same problems with

training and proficiency checks that Fine had, it was more

likely that both she and any other reasonable person would

believe that Looney’s foot-dragging in scheduling her own

training was illegally based on her sex. The fact that

management shrugged its shoulders when informed on

September 18 of numerous problems female pilots had

experienced with their co-workers could also justify that

belief. The October 2 letter specifically refers to the September 18 meeting and, while it does not reallege each
12 Nos. 01-1048, 01-1184

accusation from that meeting, the basic topics of that meeting remain relevant under Rule 401.

Even if we were to agree with Ryan that some of the

allegations and rumors were not relevant for any purpose,

we would reverse only if there was a significant chance that

this error affected the trial’s outcome. Collins v. Kibort, 143

F.3d 331, 339 (7th Cir. 1998). Ryan speculates that the few

statements to which it objected during the eight-day trial

somehow caused the jury to conclude that Ryan had

engaged in wholesale discrimination against its female

employees and to punish it accordingly. But the jury received special verdict forms that permitted it to find for

Fine only if she proved that she reasonably believed in good

faith that Ryan was violating Title VII. The jury was also

instructed to base its verdict only on the law as set out by

the district court, and we presume that those instructions

were followed. We see no significant chance that the testimony of Smith and Ramos caused the jury to depart from

its instructions simply to punish Ryan.

III

Ryan also disputes the hefty punitive damages awarded

to Fine. Under Title VII, punitive damages are appropriate

if the plaintiff “demonstrates that the respondent engaged

in a discriminatory practice or discriminatory practices

with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally

protected rights of an aggrieved individual.” 42 U.S.C.

§ 1981a(b)(1). As the district court correctly noted, the

Supreme Court set out the guiding standard for an award

of punitive damages in Kolstad v. American Dental Ass’n,

527 U.S. 526 (1999). It rejected the requirement of some

courts that punitive damages be available only in “extraordinarily egregious” cases, and instead found an award

proper so long as the employer discriminates “in the face of
Nos. 01-1048, 01-1184 13

a perceived risk that its action will violate federal law.” Id.

at 533, 536. A plaintiff can meet this standard by showing

that the employer was aware of the law and chose to

discriminate anyway. EEOC v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 256

F.3d 516, 527 (7th Cir. 2001) (en banc). The plaintiff can

prove such knowledge by showing either that the individual

who discriminated was familiar with the antidiscrimination

laws or that the principals of the corporation authorized the

action. Kolstad, 527 U.S. at 536, 543.

There is more than sufficient evidence here to sustain the

adjusted award of punitive damages. Ryan had an antidiscrimination policy of which all its managers were aware.

That policy required employees to refer complaints of discrimination by supervisors to McGoldrick for investigation.

McGoldrick, however, did not play her assigned role. Instead of investigating Fine’s accusations, she immediately

turned Fine’s letter over to Looney. In addition, McGoldrick’s letter to Fine openly indicated that she was terminated for writing the October 2 letter, but Looney recorded

in her personnel file that she was terminated for poor

attendance and interpersonal skills. The jury obviously

found the latter explanation to be pretextual, which permitted it to infer that Looney was aware that terminating

Fine for her report of sex discrimination violated federal

law. And there is no argument here that Looney was acting

contrary to company policy or outside the bounds of his

authority, as President Ron Ryan himself concurred with

Looney’s decision to fire Fine.

Ryan also asserts that because it provided Fine with a

“fair treatment hearing” before Ron Ryan to appeal her

termination it could not have acted with malice. But this

was a question for the jury and certainly does not prove

Ryan’s lack of malice as a matter of law. Indeed, the fact

that Ron Ryan had already weighed in on Fine’s firing casts

grave doubt on the hearing’s fairness. At the hearing, Ron
14 Nos. 01-1048, 01-1184

Ryan declared that he could not reinstate Fine because if he

accepted her allegations of discrimination he would have to

fire all of his top managers. There is no indication that such

steps would have been necessary; Ron Ryan could (and

should) have simply recognized that, regardless of the truth

of Fine’s complaints, it was illegal to terminate her solely

for making them. And if all of Ryan’s top managers really

were discriminating against women, then Ron Ryan should

have taken whatever steps necessary to fix the problem and

ensure compliance with federal law.

Ryan next contends that awarding Fine punitive damages

at the statutory maximum of $300,000 was excessive. Since

Ryan is not alleging a constitutional violation, we review

this decision only for abuse of discretion. Cooper Indus., Inc.

v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 433 (2001).

For its argument, Ryan principally relies on Hennessy v.

Penril Datacomm Networks, Inc., 69 F.3d 1344, 1355-56

(7th Cir. 1995). In that case, a “smidgin” of sexual harassment by a single mid-level supervisor in a nearly 200-

person company was found to be not “so egregious” as to

justify the maximum award of punitive damages. Id. at

1352-53. But these cases are fact-specific, and we have

made it clear that we will not normally disturb an award of

damages in a Title VII case at or under the statutory cap,

as this decision is “largely within the province of the jury.”

EEOC v. Indiana Bell Tel. Co., 214 F.3d 813, 822 n.4 (7th

Cir. 2000), vacated on other grounds, 256 F.3d 516 (7th Cir.

2001) (en banc). When a company has a policy of intentionally disregarding the rights of its employees, the statutory

maximum for punitive damages can easily be upheld.

Emmel v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Chicago, 95 F.3d 627,

638 (7th Cir. 1996).

Ryan’s protestations notwithstanding, there was more

than enough evidence for the jury to find its conduct suf-
Nos. 01-1048, 01-1184 15

ficiently egregious to justify the maximum legally possible

punitive damages award. Indeed, that is what the jury’s

very high monetary assessment signaled. (It is therefore not

necessary for us to consider whether punitive damages

awards that must be adjusted because of the statutory cap

should simply be lopped off at the maximum, or if they

should be reduced to a number less than or equal to the

statutory cap based on a proportional assessment of culpability.) This was not a case where there was a “smidgin”

of retaliation, such as a temporary suspension or minor loss

of pay. Instead, Ryan, having recently informed its female

pilots to put complaints of sexual harassment and discrimination in writing, terminated Fine within 24 hours of its

receipt of her complaint on these subjects precisely because

she had written the letter. Nor can Ryan credibly argue

that its actions were the result of a rogue supervisor, since

its general counsel and the president of the company both

concurred in the decision. To accept Ryan’s position here we

would essentially have to hold that the statutory maximum

for punitive damages could never be awarded in a Title VII

complaint where the plaintiff prevailed only on her retaliation claim. We see no evidence that Congress sought to

enact such a rule, and we decline to endorse it. The damages award is affirmed.

IV

We turn now to Fine’s cross-appeal, which raises three

distinct issues. First, Fine asserts that the district court

erred by denying her reinstatement to her old position at

Ryan. Title VII’s remedial scheme is designed to make a

plaintiff whole, and reinstatement is often used as an

equitable remedy when money damages alone will not

suffice. McKnight v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 104,

116 (7th Cir. 1990). Fine argues that because she has been

unable to secure comparable employment, she has not been
16 Nos. 01-1048, 01-1184

made whole and Ryan is continuing to profit from its past

wrongs. We review the district court’s decision only for an

abuse of discretion. Bruso v. United Airlines, Inc., 239 F.3d

848, 861 (7th Cir. 2001).

The district court denied reinstatement because Fine

stipulated that her claim for damages ceased on January

28, 2000. This stipulation was made to prevent Ryan from

inquiring into the circumstances surrounding Fine’s resignation from employment with another airline around that

time. The district court reasoned that if Fine was seeking

no damages after that date, awarding her full backpay and

compensatory damages to that time sufficed to make her

whole, and reinstatement was not warranted. Fine argues

that her stipulation was intended to apply only to money

damages, not to equitable remedies such as reinstatement.

That is not, however, what the stipulation says. It refers to

“any damages” without drawing a distinction between legal

and equitable relief. Even more importantly, Fine herself

created the endpoint for Ryan’s responsibility when she

took the new job. It makes no sense to make Ryan her

employer of last resort for life, if it bears no responsibility

for the actions of later employers. Both because of the

stipulation and for the latter reason, we agree with the

district court’s decision to deny reinstatement.

Fine next disputes the district court’s decision to reduce

her attorneys’ fees by ten percent off the lodestar amount.

The court did this because some of the claimed hours

were spent on the unsuccessful discrimination claim, and

it did not wish to reward Fine for her unsuccessful claims.

This decision too is reviewed only for abuse of discretion.

Dunning, 62 F.3d at 872. Where several claims are presented and the plaintiff prevails on less than all, the court

must decide how related the claims were to one another.

Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 435 (1983). This is a

classic question of degree. Where the plaintiff achieves
Nos. 01-1048, 01-1184 17

only partial or limited success, the court may at its discretion make a percentage reduction. Bryant v. City of Chicago, 200 F.3d 1092, 1101-02 (7th Cir. 2000). Here, in an

important sense Fine was fully successful, not partially

successful: she received all the monetary relief she could

have gotten, even if she had won on every theory. Nevertheless, the district court only reduced the award by ten

percent, and this action may have reflected its view that

counsel wasted time pursuing less promising theories of

liability. Because our review is only for abuse of discretion,

and we find none in that decision, we will not disturb the

district court’s judgment on this point. Compare Merriweather v. Family Dollar Stores of Ind., Inc., 103 F.3d 576,

584 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming 90% of lodestar award where

plaintiff lost discrimination claim but prevailed on retaliation count).

Finally, Fine points out that the district court erred in

calculating prejudgment interest by computing interest

only through June 30, 2000, even though it did not enter

final judgment until November 22, 2000. It is the latter

date which is relevant for the calculation. First Nat’l Bank

of Chicago v. Standard Bank & Trust, 172 F.3d 472, 480

(7th Cir. 1999). Ryan concedes the error but argues that

prejudgment interest is not appropriate at all because

punitive damages make up almost half the award and this

court has held in other contexts that prejudgment interest

should not be awarded on punitive damages. But Fine seeks

interest only on her award of backpay, not on her punitive

damages, and so the error should be corrected. In any

event, Ryan did not raise this argument until its reply brief

and never mentioned it to the district court, and so it is

forfeited. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co.,

949 F.2d 226, 228 (7th Cir. 1991).
18 Nos. 01-1048, 01-1184

V

The judgment of the district court is MODIFIED to reflect

a prejudgment interest rate of 8.47% on the judgment of

backpay, running through the date of judgment, November

22, 2000. In all other respects, the judgment of the district

court is AFFIRMED.

A true Copy:

Teste: 

 ________________________________

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 

USCA-97-C-006—9-19-02