Robots

on the

Battlefield

Contemporary Issues and 

Implications for the Future

Ronan Doaré, Didier Danet,

Jean-Paul Hanon, & Gérard de Boisboissel

General Editors

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

 Ecoles de

Saint-Cyr Coétquidan
Cover Photos:

Photo #1. American Soldier, taken from “A Statement on the Posture of the United States Army, 

2010,” submitted by the Honorable John M. McHugh and General Gearoge W. Casey, Jr. to 

Committees and Subcommittees of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, 

February 2010, page 15; https://secureweb2.hqda.pentagon.mil/VDAS_ArmyPostureStatement/2010/2010_army_posture_statement.pdf. Copyright Reprint permissions (CGSC Copyright 

Registration #10-1045 C/E), United States.

Photo #2. French Soldier. Source: Saint-Cyr French Military Academy - 56381 GUER Cedex, 

France, 9 November 2011.

Photo #3. French Robot, ECA. Source: Saint-Cyr French Military Academy - 56381 GUER 

Cedex, France, 9 November 2011.
Robots 

on the

Battlefield

Contemporary Perspectives and Implications for 

the Future

by

Ronan Doaré, Didier Danet, Jean-Paul Hanon, and Gérard de Boisboissel 

General Editors

Combat Studies Institute Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

 Ecoles de

Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan
ii

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

 

 Library of Congress Control Number: 2013957146

First Printing January 2014

Layout and Design by 

Elizabeth J. Brown

Combat Studies Institute Press

Combat Studies Institute Press publications cover a wide variety of military history topics. The views 

expressed in this CSI Press publication are those of 

the author(s) and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense. A 

full list of digital CSI Press publications is available 

at http:/ usacac.army.mil/CAC2/CSI/index.asp.

The seal of the Coambat Studies Institute authenticates this document as an official publication of 

the CSI. It is prohibited to use CSI’s official seal on 

any republication without the express written permission of the Director of CSI.
iii

Acknowledgements

This project was made possible thanks to the financial support of the Délégation aux Affaires Stratégiques (Directorate for Strategic Affairs, French MoD) 

which funded translations of several of the chapters in this collection.

Selected chapters in this anthology were previously published in Ronan Doaré 

and Henri Hude (eds.) Les robots au coeur du champ de bataille (Paris, 2011). Permission to publish English translations of these chapters in this collection has been 

granted by the original publisher, Les Editions Economica.

Selected chapters in this anthology were previously published in Didier Danet, 

Jean-Paul Hanon, and Gérard de Boisboissel (eds.) La guerre robotisée (Paris, 

2012). Permission to publish English translations of these chapters in this collection has been granted by the original publisher, Les Editions Economica.

“The Use of Robots on the Battlefield: Benefits, Constraints, and Limitations for Soldiers” by Gérard de Boisboissel was previously published in Vaclav 

Krivanek and Alexandr Stefek (eds.) International Conference in Military Technology Proceedings (ICMT), (Brno, 2013). Permission to publish an English translation of this chapter in this collection has been granted by the original publisher.
iv

Foreword

Technological implications are often less obvious than technological innovations. 

Learning the uses and the limitations of any new technology can take a long time...

subsequent generations are apt to regard those who go through this process as 

having held antiquated, even weird, notions.

—John Lewis Gaddis

Technological innovation brings with it the promise of greater efficiency. This 

is particularly true for innovations applied to the implements of war. Moreover, at 

punctuated intervals throughout human history technical and scientific developments have resulted in a nonlinear change of both battlefield tactics and national 

strategies. The airplane, the tank, and the magazine-fed rifle are modern examples, 

but the bow and the stirrup had equally revolutionary impacts on the armies of their 

times and later. Still, the process of innovation and the many avenues of exploration required before success is achieved can desensitize those who witness it. Since 

2001, the United States and its allies have employed a host of unmanned or remoteoperated “robotized” devices to support military operations both on the ground and 

in the air. The proliferation of this technology tends to lessen our recognition of its 

potential to dramatically change the character of warfare. Although much of the 

world’s current experience with ground robots is directly related to the clearing of 

mines and IEDs, it is not unreasonable to expect that within the lifetimes of current 

flesh-and-blood soldiers the world will witness the first use of mechanical “soldiers.” Because of that, and because robotics offer both state and non-state actors 

a truly bloodless and potentially revolutionary alternative to traditional combat, the 

arguments presented in the following chapters are both timely and appropriate. The 

first cooperative publishing effort between the Combat Studies Institute and Les 

Ecoles de St. Cyr Coëtquidan, this volume should spark further discussion between 

policy-makers and military practitioners, as well as among ethicists, scientists, and 

acquisition specialists. The Combat Studies Institute is indebted to Brigadier-General Antoine Windek and the contributing authors for choosing our press to bring to 

this volume to the English-speaking world.

Colonel Thomas E. Hanson

Director

Combat Studies Institute
v

Preface

Robots on the Battlefield is the first work published in the United States by 

the Ecoles de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan, the French military officer training facility. It 

is the fruit of cooperation with the Combat Studies Institute of the US Army Combined Arms Center, whom I wish to thank for their active part in this initiative. I 

look forward to seeing other joint publications from this original cooperation in the 

future.

The issues of this work are those to which everyone interested in or concerned with the world of defense at the highest level—members of the armed 

forces, as well as political leaders, industrialists, NGOs and university faculty in 

every field—should pay attention. As the school which trains the future officers of 

the French Army, Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan is no stranger to these issues. Saint-Cyr 

Coëtquidan has contributed to the discussion on robotization through a research 

program and a series of special events, a high point of which was an international 

colloquium in November 2011, attended by delegates from West Point, Annapolis, 

and Quantico, among others. Robots on the Battlefield also includes major contributions from talks at workshops and colloquia held as part of the Ecoles de SaintCyr Coëtquidan research program.

The theme of robotization of the battlefield is approached here from the 

angle of social and political sciences. The work does not cover scientific and technical aspects of the question but concentrates on legal, ethical, psychological, sociological, tactical, and strategic issues, in order to provide an overview of how the 

amazing development of military robots is going to change the conditions under 

which our armed forces act: preventing conflicts, coming between hostile parties, 

military intervention per se, and stabilizing and reconstructing the countries concerned. Without necessarily evoking “robolution” (the idea that robotization has 

led to revolutionary change and a turning point in military history), the multiplication of remotely controlled machines, some of which are capable of autonomous 

decisions and actions, transforms the conditions of using force and raises a number 

of questions about opportunities and threats: the balance of costs, advantages and 

risks; operational and budgetary priorities; compatibility with the laws of armed 

combat and military ethics; the organization of forces; the use of robots in conjunction with other arms; tactical changes; the impact on enemies and the population; 

and, more broadly, a change in the very sense of the military profession.

To answer these diverse and complex questions, the Pôle Action Globale 

et Forces Terrestres (the Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan Global Action & Land Forces Research Center) has been conducting a research program with a wide range of experts representing various stakeholders in the field of battlefield robotics. The majority of these experts have a European perspective, which North American readers 
vi

may find less familiar, but which, I hope, they will enjoy discovering. The work 

includes analyses by leaders of the French armed forces, by industrialists in the 

field, and by university professors specializing in defense issues. American readers 

will of course be on familiar ground with major contributions from our colleagues 

from the US Military Academy, the US Naval Academy and the Marine Corps 

University, whom we thank wholeheartedly for their involvement in this research 

program.

The Ecole Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr, founded in 1802 by first consul 

Napoleon Bonaparte just before the Battle of Austerlitz, has trained future officers of the French Army for over two centuries. The school’s graduates include a 

long line of military figures who distinguished themselves in battlefields around the 

globe, including Hubert Lyautey, Joseph Galliéni, Charles De Gaulle, and Jean de 

Lattre de Tassigny. The school’s mission is to provide French and foreign students 

with an education on one campus that combines academic excellence, thorough a 

grounding in military science and demanding physical training. The school’s research work, of which Robots on the Battlefield is one result, aims to understand 

better the nature and scope of changes in international conflicts in order to enrich 

the palette of knowledge useful for training cadets so that they are prepared as well 

as possible to face difficult situations and understand the changing technologies 

they will have to implement. The development of this knowledge is closely tied in 

with the training of our cadets, who took active part in the workshop days, as can 

be seen on the Ecoles de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan website: http://www.st-cyr.terre.

defense.gouv.fr/. 

We offer this work to our English-speaking colleagues in the hope that it 

will make a modest contribution, by the exchanges it could spark, to better reciprocate knowledge and to reinforce comprehension and cohesion among the allied 

forces working together in the main theaters of operation.

Brigadier General Antoine Windeck

Commander

Ecoles de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan
vii

List of Contributors

Gérard de Boisboissel

Research Engineer at the Research Center of the French Military Academy 

of Saint-Cyr (CREC Saint-Cyr).

Didier Danet

Associate Professor of Management, head of the Global Action and Land 

Forces Department at the Research Center of the French Military Academy of 

Saint-Cyr (CREC Saint-Cyr).

Thierry Daups

Associate Professor of Public Law, University of Rennes 1; associated 

researcher at the Research Center of the French Military Academy of Saint-Cyr 

(CREC Saint-Cyr)

Ronan Doaré

Associate Professor of Public Law, Director of the Research Center of the 

French Military Academy of Saint-Cyr (CREC Saint-Cyr).

Éric Germain

Ph.D., Policy Advisor in charge of “Ethical, Religious & Societal issues” 

at the Directorate for Strategic Affairs (DAS).

Captain (USN Ret.) Mark R. Hagerott

Deputy Director, US Naval Academy Center for Cyber Security Studies 

and Distinguished Professor of Cyber Operations and Policy.

Jean-Paul Hanon

Senior Lecturer at the Research Center of the French Army Academy of 

Saint-Cyr (CREC Saint-Cyr); lecturer at Sciences-Po Paris.

Dominique Lambert

Ph.D. in Theoretical Physics and Ph.D in Philosophy. Professor at the 

University of Namur and member of the Belgian Royal Academy.

Georges Lucas

Class of 1984 Chair of Ethics, US Naval Academy and Professor of Ethics 

and Public Policy, Naval Postgraduate School

Christian Malis

Adjunct Professor of Strategic Studies at the Saint-Cyr Military Academy.

Colonel Eric Ozanne

Plan and future capabilities office, officer in charge of dismounted combat 

(2009-2012), French Army Staff. Commanding officer of the Second Infantry 

Regiment of the French Foreign Legion (since 2012).
viii

Eric Pomes

Associate researcher at the Research Center of the French Military 

Academy of Saint-Cyr (CREC Saint-Cyr).

Colonel (USMC Ret.) E.W. Powers

Ph.D. Research Fellow, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies Center for 

Emerging Threats and Opportunities, Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, Quantico, 

Virginia.

Colonel Eugene K. Ressler

Head, Department of Electrical Engineering & Computer Science, U.S. 

Military Academy, West Point, New York.

Brigadier General Benoit Royal

Sub-directorate general in charge of the recruitment in the Army 

(Army Human Resources Directorate, 2010-2013). Army Information and 

Communication Branch Head (Army IC BH) and Public Affairs Advisor (PAA) of 

the Chief of Army Staff (2007-2010).

Noël Sharkey

Professor of Artificial Intelligence and Robotics and Professor of Public 

Engagement, University of Sheffield.

Colonel Barry L. Shoop

Deputy Department Head, Department of Electrical Engineering and 

Computer Science, U.S. Military Academy, West Point, New York.

Colonel Alexandr Štefek

Head of AD Systems Department, Faculty of Military Technology, 

University of Defence, Czech Republic.

Antonin Tisseron

Ph.D. in History, Independent Consultant and Research Fellow at the 

Research Center of the French Military Academy of Saint-Cyr (CREC Saint-Cyr).

Serge Tisseron

Psychiatrist, psychoanalyst, HDR Doctor of Psychology at the University 

Paris Ouest.

Dominique Vermersch

Professor of Ethics & Economics and Public policy at Agrocampus Ouest, 

Angers, France.

General Jean-Philippe Wirth

Member of the Conseil Scientifique de la Défense, French expert comittee 

advising the ministry of Defense on armament and Defense issues, former Deputy 

Chief of Staff, Studies-Plans-Finances on the Army Staff.

Major General Michel Yakovleff

Deputy Chief of Staff Plans at Joint Force Command, Brunssum.
ix

Contents page

Acknowledgements................................................................................................iii

Foreword................................................................................................................iv

Preface..................................................................................................................... v

List of Contributors...............................................................................................vii

Chapter 1 Introduction Digitization and Robotization of the Battlefield: Evolution 

or Robolution?

by Didier Danet and Jean-Paul Hanon.....................................................xiii

Part One The Military Robot: A New Stage in the History of Arms ...................... 1

Chapter 2 Robotic and Future Wars: When Land Forces FaceTechnological 

Developments

by Antonin Tisseron .................................................................................... 3

Chapter 3 Robots, Cyber, History, and War by Mark Hagerott...................................................................................... 19

Chapter 4 New Extrapolations: Robotics and Revolution in Military Affairs

by Christian Malis..................................................................................... 33

Chapter 5 Robotization of the Forces and Organization of Army Units

by Jean-Philippe Wirth.............................................................................. 49

Part Two Robots and Soldiers on the Battlefield: a Challenge in Law and Military 

Ethics......................................................................................................... 65

Chapter 6 Stakeholders and Issues: Outlook for Change in the International Legal Framework for the Use of Military Robotics

by Éric Germain........................................................................................ 67

Chapter 7 The Legal Aspects of Military Ground Robots

by Ronan Doaré ........................................................................................ 73

Chapter 8 A Comparison of Drones and Military Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) in International Law

by Eric Pomes........................................................................................... 89

Chapter 9 Robots and Civil Liberties

by Thierry Daups ..................................................................................... 99

 Chapter 10 Military Robots and Ethics: Ethical Problems for European Industrial, Political, and Military Leaders

by Benoit Royal ...................................................................................... 119

Chapter 11 Autonomous Robots: The Irreducible and Complementary Place of Officer’s Ethics

by Dominique Lambert........................................................................... 129
x

Contents page

Chapter12 The Ethical Challenges of Unmanned Systems by George R. Lucas, Jr............................................................................ 135

Chapter 13 Ethics and Techniques of the Invisible: Ethical Aspects of the Use of Undetectable Robots in the Private Sphere and Their Extension to Military 

Robots

by Dominique Vermersch........................................................................ 143

Chapter 14 Preparing Military Leader Education for the Age of Robotics by Eugene K. Ressler & Barry L. Shoop................................................ 151

Chapter 15 An Assessment of Combatant Empathy for Robots with a View to 

Avoiding Inappropriate Conduct in Combat

by Serge Tisseron.................................................................................... 165

Part Three The Future of Robots in the Military ................................................ 181

Chapter 16 The Future of Drone Warfare

by Noël Sharkey...................................................................................... 183

Chapter 17 Developing and Integrating Unmanned Systems for Military Operations

by E. W. Powers...................................................................................... 193

Chapter 18 The Use of Robots on the Battlefield: Benefits, Constraints, and 

Limitations for Soldiers

by Gérard de Boisboissel ........................................................................ 203

Chapter 19 Is the Insect the Future of Robots?

by Alexandr Štefek ................................................................................. 217

Chapter 20 Robotization of the Combined Arms Task Force: Perspectives by Eric Ozanne........................................................................................ 233

Chapter 21 Battlefield Robotization: Toward a New Combat Ecosystem by Michel Yakovleff................................................................................ 243
xi

Figures page

Figure 1. Three Realms of Conflict: Machine, Integrated, Social-Human. ......... 22

Figure 2. Technology Employment Curve............................................................ 26

Figure 3. Complete Spectrum of Operations Across Realms. .............................. 27

Figure 4. Implications for Robot Development/Investment. ............................... 28

Figure 5. Robotization: Incentives and Obstacles................................................. 35

Figure 6. Robot Acquisition Costs........................................................................ 61

Figure 7. OODA Loop. ....................................................................................... 154

Figure 8. US Army Lab Concept: “Autonomy Scale” for Robots...................... 158

Figure 9. Revolution: Developments Drive Processes. ...................................... 160

Figure 10. The Three Levels of Empathy............................................................ 168

Figure 11. Empathy for Human and Non-Human Entities. ................................ 177

Figure 12. Robots Extend the Unit Control Area................................................ 204

Figure 13. Robots Reduce a Unit’s Attrition Through Time............................... 205

Figure 14. Deployment of Robots....................................................................... 206

Figure 15. Lieutenant O’Kill’s Scenario............................................................. 207

Figure 16. Lieutenant Safetown’s Scenario in an Urban Area............................ 208

Figure 17. Final Assault Using Robots. .............................................................. 209

Figure 18. Natural Obstacles............................................................................... 211

Figure 19. Cooperating Ants............................................................................... 218

Figure 20. Cooperating Wolves (Canus Lupus).................................................. 218

Figure 21. Army Unit on Patrol. ......................................................................... 219

Figure 22. Relations in Applications. ................................................................. 220

Figure 23. Shared Computing Environment. ...................................................... 221

Figure 24. Code 1: Runtime Compilation........................................................... 222

Figure 25. Decision at Node. .............................................................................. 223

Figure 26. Equation 1.......................................................................................... 224

Figure 27. Equation 2.......................................................................................... 225

Figure 28. Equation 3.......................................................................................... 225
xii

Figures page

Figure 29. Equation 4.......................................................................................... 226

Figure 30. Equation 5.......................................................................................... 226

Figure 31. Cooperative Sensing—Sharing the Sensor Information.................... 227

Figure 32. Equation 6.......................................................................................... 228

Figure 33. Equation 7.......................................................................................... 228

Figure 34. Cooperative Navigation - Using the VideoSensor for Distance 

Recognition............................................................................................. 229
xiii

Chapter 1 Introduction

Digitization and Robotization of the Battlefield: Evolution or Robolution?

by Didier Danet and Jean-Paul Hanon

When historians turn their gaze on the questions of defense in this first half of 

the 21st Century, they will observe that military robots brought in something brand 

new to the world of warfare, constituting an even more radical game-changer than 

the invention of nuclear weapons, since this not only affects the constantly changing modalities of warfare (HOW to wage war) but also its basic essence (WHO 

wages war). Such is, in substance, the message conveyed in the book Wired for War

written by Brookings Institution researcher, Peter Singer.1

In support of the “robotics revolution” hypothesis, it is true that unmanned 

systems have undergone spectacular development in the Iraqi and Afghan theaters 

of operation.2 Taking this observation as a basis, and drawing on several laws of 

industrial evolution (Moore’s Law for the per-formance of machines, and the law 

of economies of scale with regard to their costs), Peter Singer and those sharing his 

views forecast the rapid generalization not only of robots but also of robotic systems operating in “packs,” and capable of standing in for soldiers when conducting 

military operations involving the use of force.3 They deduce from this the inevitability of battlefield robotization and the need for military and civilian commanders to show that they are up to the challenge by committing wholeheartedly to the 

process, which presupposes, in particular, addressing here and now the questions 

inherent in the opening of such a Pandora’s Box.4

To sum up this theory in brief, it culminates in two fundamental conclusions: 

1. Robotization is an inevitable and irreversible process; it is already underway and is as yet only in its infancy;

2. Robotization poses radical new questions that need to be addressed today in 

order to construct the intellectual framework required for mastering all this 

technological innovation.5

Yet when considered more closely, the theory of the robotics revolution, however 

seductive it may seem, does raise a certain number of questions.

First of all, does the deployment of these “Predators,” “Packbots” and the like 

really constitute such a radical technological game-changer, so exceptional in the 

history of warfare to the point that we may talk categorically in terms of a technical, 

scientific and military revolution? It seems to us that the theory of a radical gamechanger, with robots at its center, needs to be put into perspective, for two reasons. 

On the one hand, robotics is less a scientific revolution than a cross between disci-
xiv

plines that are already quite familiar: mechanics, electronics and telecommunications, IT and artificial intelligence, in particular.6

 To the extent that it is possible to 

quantify the import of discoveries, inventions and innovations, robotization seems 

less revolutionary than, for example, the discovery of nuclear power and the effective use of the atom bomb in World War II. According to Kuhn, military robotics is 

clearly about “normal science” and not “revolutionary science.” In no way does it 

call into question paradigms commonly assumed by the scientific community, this 

being a precondition of a genuine scientific revolution, but rather it comes across 

as a combination or synthesis of the respective advances of these paradigms. Secondly, even if robots do constitute a revolution in terms of their media visibility, the 

robotization of the battlefield is already a long-established military reality.7

 The capability of deploying remote-controlled or programmed devices to carry out a given 

mission dates back, at the very least, to the Second World War (remote-controlled 

German (Goliath) or Soviet (TT26) tanks, for example), and ground forces have 

long been using robots for mine-clearance operations. When taking a step back in 

order to contemplate whether or not robotization is genuinely revolutionary, it is 

no doubt possible to conclude, as does Robert Ranquet, that the history of weaponry has known phases of innovation more radical than those at the end of the 20th 

Century.8

It is then possible to ask oneself if the robotization argument, as put forward 

by Peter Singer, is not simply yet another embodiment of the “technologist temptation” which, without being exclusive to the United States, often takes form more 

vigorously there than elsewhere? Rightly denounced by General Vincent Desportes, the “technologist temptation” serves to “express the rationality specific to 

the US military-industrial complex, inciting it to pursue the profitable channels of 

high-tech weaponry and lobbying in favor of incessantly growing budgets so as to 

finance ever more expensive equipment.”9

 It would no doubt be specious to boil 

down the development of robotized systems to a simple matter of acquiring public 

money by means of a coalition of agents searching for public subsidies likely to 

boost the dividends of their shareholders. Conversely, it would also be wrong to 

ignore the fact that the robotization of the battlefield represents a major economic 

and financial issue that serves as a focus for specific visions and interests which 

are not entirely compatible and which presuppose a series of arbitrations, the challenges and consequences of which are decisive for the activity and for the profits 

of manufacturers in the sector. The massive use of drones therefore appears to be 

broadly inseparable from the movement towards defense privatization initiated in 

the United States. Private stake-holders control part of this, in a way that is without 

precedent in the history of armament. Whether it is a matter, in the traditional way, 

of the design, production and maintenance of weapons systems or, in more original fashion, of their deployment and all services arising from (or associated with) 
xv

weapons use, private companies are everywhere. What is on offer is so comprehensive that, if the political leaders were so to decide, the US Army might no longer 

own the equipment deployed by the military but could be a consumer of services 

entirely produced and controlled by external service providers: time spent on observation and surveillance, analysis of data and production of information, even 

the capacity to intervene and destroy. Presenting the general robotization of the 

Armed Forces as their only possible means of development in order to ensure their 

efficiency tends to echo rather too much the discourse regarding outsourcing not 

to appear as a troubling sign of a conception of defense activities largely anchored 

to military industry. Blindly adhering to this view means first, exposing oneself 

to the observation so often made in history that technological superiority is by no 

means synonymous with assured victory, and that all progress engenders its own 

contradictions and is bound up within its own limits (Augustine Law, limits of total 

technology,10 reaction of inventive adversaries,11 etc.). It means also going down the 

political, strategic, economic and budgetary dead ends of contractual commitment, 

so clearly illustrated today by the lessons learned from Iraq and Afghanistan.12

Last of all, are we not seeing, in the literature dedicated to drones (UAVs) or 

ground robots (UGVs), the projection of the science-fiction imagination onto the 

realities of contemporary conflict situations? The use of robots in Iraq and Afghanistan is grist for the mill of a discourse that is powerfully conditioned by SF literature, science fiction films and video games, thereby opening the path to questioning 

the very essence of warfare and the dehumanization of the use of force.13 As things 

stand, the reality on the ground is more banal. The robot, particularly the ground 

robot, constitutes far more an appendix to the soldier’s eye and arm than it does an 

autonomous decision-making and attack system. Operations recently conducted in 

Afghanistan clearly demonstrate that, despite the growing number of robots deployed by military forces, the fundamental characteristics of warfare continue to 

prevail despite the growing use of remote-control devices.14 As well as this first 

type of risk, it seems to us that there is another: that of a dearth of insight with regard to robotization. It is commonplace in military history or, indeed, in industrial 

history more generally, for the inventor of a technology not to be necessarily the 

best placed to explore it or exploit all its possibilities with a view to making best 

use of it. To take just the commonly cited example of the battle tank, the Germans 

showed themselves to be far superior to the French and the British in the use that 

could be made of a military tool which they had not themselves invented. By focusing on approaches formatted by models that are very largely imitative (imitating 

man, imitating nature) or else strongly inspired by the literature of science-fiction, 

military thought revolves around the terms of the problem and ignores the strategic or tactical data which could drive the design and deployment of robots on the 

battlefield.
xvi

By dint of these lines of enquiry, the question arising is that of the agenda of 

thoughts on military robots. Robotization incontestably deserves to be included 

in this agenda, as has already been the case for a long time now with regard to 

the engineering sciences. As far as the human, social and political sciences are 

concerned, the frequent tendency of scientists to focus their attention on a very 

advanced type of robot, equipped with artificial intelligence that endows it with 

extensive autonomy of action, makes the most spectacular and most futuristic form 

of robotization the center of gravity for reflections in this regard. This gives rise to 

widespread ignorance of the factors likely to call into question, limit or hold back 

the development of robots in military forces, along with basic questions relating to 

their end purpose, their use or their expected characteristics. 

The purpose of the argument that follows is to propose a framework for the 

problems that robotization will throw up tomorrow, along with the questions that it 

raises today, particularly in terms of the change management that would be required 

in the event of any generalized use of this particular technical asset: the military 

robot. Naturally, there is no contradiction inherent in this twin line of questioning, 

nor does it call into greater question the relevance of validity of the studies carried 

out previously. With regard to the debates regarding the theories presented, the 

problems highlighted may seem here to be transient or secondary. The scant interest 

that they have generated among specialists may then be explained by the traditional 

adage: “De minimis non curat praetor.” (Authority does not concern itself with 

trifles) Nevertheless, outside of the United States, where the volume of the budgets 

dedicated to defense is such that the risk of investment errors is not prohibitive, the 

size of the challenges and the weight of budgetary constraints impose extra levels 

of prudence and increased attention with regard to the management of the envisaged change.

Questions for Today

The questions being asked today about military robots relate globally to the 

problem of management in an organization faced with substantial technological 

innovation. Technological developments make it possible to envisage the production of remotely controlled machines, or machines endowed with a certain degree 

of autonomy for carrying out tasks involved in the realization of the missions of 

military forces. These machines are extremely diverse with regard to their usages, 

their capabilities, their technical characteristics, their degree of autonomy and their 

cost.15 The first question to be asked is therefore just what precisely is the definition of the military robot? Beyond that, if we consider that there is no technological 

inevitability and that the various military forces are not unavoidably driven to the 

generalized robotization of their equipment, then the deployment of military robots 

must be considered to be an investment choice which presupposes a favorable cost-
xvii

benefit analysis and a strategic change process, the conducting of which needs to 

take into account the inherent constraints of any process of this type.

The Uncertain Definition of the Military Robot

The term “robot” is likely to designate a set of individual machines or machine 

systems that are highly diverse from the point of view of their constituent elements, 

their capacities, their func-tions, their degree of autonomy or the nature of the missions in which they may be deployed. The field of enquiry is therefore very broad, 

and research suffers from the fact that there is no conventional definition for robots. 

Certain barriers seem at the very least debatable, even arbitrary. The fact, for example, of excluding missiles as a category from the discussion on robots is based 

far more on an argument of authority with a view to simplifying the handling of the 

issue than the fruit of indisputable objective classification. Each study is therefore 

likely to produce its own conceptual framework. Generally speaking, a military 

robot is most frequently defined as a system: 

1. Possessing capacities of perception, communication, decision-making and 

action;

2. Supervised by human combatants or acting autonomously according to preset behavioral rules; 

3. Capable of improving its own performance through automatic learning.

From a more pragmatic perspective, Lin et al. focus on decision-making autonomy and the capacity of the machine to find things out, make decisions and 

take action: “A powered machine that (1) senses, (2) thinks (in a deliberative, nonmechanical sense), and (3) acts.”16 From a highly operational perspective, the robot 

is sometimes perceived as a remote-controlled machine or one equipped with a 

certain decision-making autonomy, and capable of returning to its starting point 

once the mission is complete. All of these definitions, the most complex of which 

are no doubt the least usable, have one point in common, which is the truly distinctive criterion of the robot compared to other machines, i.ethe degree of autonomy 

vis-à-vis human beings.

The categorization of robots is hardly any more precise. There exists no universally accepted typology, and an analysis of the bibliography brings to light multiple classifications of different types: technical classifications (in particular, based 

on the size of the robotic platforms), functional classifications or operational classifications (according to the missions or tasks of robots). All characterizations insist 

on two of the fundamental dimensions of battlefield robotization: the degree of 

autonomy of the robot and the more or less imminent prospect of seeing robots act 

in groups, whether these groups are based on redundancy (in order to take account 

of the possible risk of some of them being destroyed) or on complementarity (with 
xviii

a view to operations presupposing a combination or recombination of machine capabilities). The robot should therefore be envisaged as an autonomous machine or 

as a system of machines.

The Cost-Benefit Analysis

The deployment of robots in the Armed Forces can be analyzed as a change in 

the current balance of the productive combination of the institution, i.e. in the composition of the resources made available for the action of military forces. The relative proportion of technological capital increases as the proportion of labor capital 

is reduced; in other words, man is freed from certain tasks which are assigned to 

the machine. In this regard, the possible deployment of robots involves considering 

the general logic of any equipment program aiming to substitute one factor with 

another. The analysis must enable an assessment to be made from the perspective 

of the ratio of costs to benefits. Yet the very diversity of the possible applications 

prevents any global judgement from being made of the robotization phenomenon.

Of course, it is possible to identify a general logic at work behind the largescale deployment of many robots that industry proposes for military forces: enabling human resources (rare, highly-trained, expensive, etc.) to focus on tasks 

where they provide specific added value (the famous “core business”) and relieving 

them of peripheral activities that may be delegated to a machine (the robot) just as 

they may be, in similar fashion, to a third party (employees of private military companies). With technological progress enabling the increased substitution of capital 

for labor, those in charge of the institution are led to query the pertinence of this 

kind of substitution. For it to be justified, the robot must demonstrate, at the very 

least, its capability to preserve and make best use of the human resources so that 

the latter’s potential can be fully leveraged in missions where it is irreplaceable. 

This may, for example, involve the robot exploring an inaccessible environment 

or one presenting a significant risk (contaminated zones, urban or mountainous 

zones, for example) or keeping specialists away from danger when the intervention 

can be done from a distance (neutralizing an explosive device, driving an exposed 

vehicle). The use of a robot is also justified when this prevents the attrition of potential through daily tasks that the machine can carry out better than people could 

do, since it is not susceptible to fatigue, boredom or distraction (surveillance of 

infrastructure or geographical area, for example). Lastly, the deployment of robots 

is justified once again when it helps to boost human capacities, such as in terms of 

mobility, load capacity, perception of the environment, etc. In this way the robot 

offers savings to the Armed Forces and partially relieves them of the constraints 

that the limits arising from human nature or the scarcity of human resources impose 

on their freedom of action. Beyond this immediate approach, we should envisage 

the consequences of robotization on the efficiency of action of the military force, a 
xix

question to which we shall return when considering the conditions of acceptability 

of the robot in military units.

Faced with these benefits, the principle of which is clearly perceptible even 

if the modes of assessment are somewhat complex to establish, there are many 

requirements to be taken into account, in particular those relating to the cost and 

deployment of the robot in this particular environment—the battlefield.17

It must first and foremost be as simple as possible to use. Deployed by military 

personnel in highly stressful situations, it must be possible to use the ground robot 

without the need for engineers or specialists (maintenance, IT, analysts, etc.), who 

will be absent from the battlefield. Likewise, since the robot is meant to be an aid 

to the soldier, it should not slow down maneuvers on account, for example, of its 

dimensions, its complex deployment or insufficient mobility.18 By the same token, 

the use of the robot should not require any additional physical effort or particular 

attention on the part of the soldier. Of a weight such that it can be easily added to 

the existing equipment and transported by the units on the ground, it must be possible to “start it up and forget about it.”

The robot must also be robust and sturdy, since it is meant to be used in hostile environments where the precise idea is to save the human resources from being overexposed. The robot must therefore work in extreme conditions (heat, dust, 

humidity, contamination, etc.), and the high rate of attrition that it is logically expected to undergo must not cause any problems in terms of cost.19

This quick sketch of the end purpose and environment of the ground robot 

generates an image that is considerably at variance with the notion of the Terminator, a sophisticated and autonomous machine that is capable of replacing the soldier 

in the use of force. The robot that we are talking about today is more of a simple and 

workmanlike tool, relatively inexpensive, easily transportable and which helps to 

safeguard combatants by intervening in inaccessible or dangerous areas and relieving them of physical or psychological burdens which diminish the potential of the 

human resource.

Undeniable progress has been made by the designers and manufacturers of 

military ground robots. The fact however remains that the devices presented to date 

do not correspond entirely to the notion of the ideal robot as has been sketched out 

here. It is therefore not surprising that, with budgets being squeezed, the armed 

forces of countries other than the United States seem somewhat reluctant to embark 

on massive battlefield robotization programs if these are to follow the usual logic 

of weapons programs: long design-manufacturing processes, complex technical 

specifications, systematic tightening up of procedures, high costs, limited numbers, 

etc.20
xx

The Change Management Process

By postulating the inevitable character of battlefield robotization and prioritizing questions predicated on a quasi-science-fiction context, we are led to understand that the robot is the future of the Armed Forces and that any delay in the 

robotization process may be detrimental to the efficiency of these forces. 

Yet even if we suppose that technological progress and the innovation capabilities of the designers and manufacturers of robots make it possible to align the 

properties of these robots with the expectations of military forces, the fact nonetheless remains that the robotization of the battlefield is a process of transformation which presupposes being taken into account and conducted according to the 

principles, constraints and methods applicable to any strategic change within an 

organization.21

In the particular case of robotization, the strategic change is no minor matter. 

Its promoters flag it as both radical and urgent. On the one hand, the generalization of the robot is presented as an inevitable process, the rapid speed of which is 

dictated by the incessant advances in robotics technology. On the other, it involves 

a profound transformation of the structures of the organization, its modes of operation, its values and its institutional culture. This concerns in particular the place of 

the soldier on the battlefield, his relation to the enemy, to the other members of his 

unit and to his commanders, and to the population within which the military operations take place. 

Faced with a transformation of such dimensions, many questions remain to 

be answered. Does the military institution have the budgetary, human and material 

resources required for the implementation of such a change? Is it ready to take on 

board the cultural, doctrinal and organizational upheaval that a robotics revolution 

would be sure to generate? Are the budgetary implications a prohibitive constraint 

or a means of excluding a priori questioning? Are the stakeholders all convinced of 

the pertinence of the change and of the efficiency of robotized solutions for the actions of the terrestrial armed forces? Are they structured so as to be able to manage 

the robotization process in such a way as to maintain a global perspective?22 Having 

already embarked on numerous processes of technical or organizational innovation 

that may be qualified as “operational,” can the military institution easily envisage 

the implementation of the ambidextrous structures required for managing an innovation that is presented as being radical (“exploratory innovation”)?23

All told, as current technological advances stand and for the countries whose 

defense resources are subject to major economy drives, robotization is by no means 

a given. Even if certain characteristics of robots are clearly attractive, in particular 

for preserving the human capital of military forces, the cost-benefit analysis would 

itself benefit from more profound investigation and, in the event of it making yet 
xxi

more apparent the advantages of robotization, a proactive change management process should be implemented. 

Questions For Tomorrow

The questions for tomorrow are those which result from the possible presence 

on the battlefield of autonomous robots endowed with artificial intelligence allowing them to make decisions on the basis of preset rules and for which recourse to 

force is part of their assignment. It is in this framework that the debates concerning 

the human essence of warfare and its legal-ethical corollary are conducted.

Robotization and the Essence of Warfare

The hypothesis often put forward is that the generalization of robots modifies 

the nature of warfare by substantially altering the decision-making chain which 

culminates in the use of force against an enemy. According to this theory, the introduction of robots onto the battlefield not only alters the modalities of military 

action (HOW war is waged) but, more profoundly, the nature of the combatants, 

and therefore of the combat (WHO wages war). According to the “Singer” theory, 

technological progress with weaponry (from the crossbow to the atom bomb) has 

until now only increased the action capability of the combatant, but has not called 

into question the combatant’s place in the decision-making system. He could move 

more quickly, strike harder and further, protect himself better from the blows of the 

adversary, process increasing quantities of data, etc. Yet he remained at all times 

master and commander of his decisions and his actions. The effect of robotization, 

if not its object, would be to hand over all or part of this capacity to choose to a machine endowed with a corpus of preset action rules, and which it would implement 

autono-mously. This would give rise to a profound transformation of the decision 

and leadership process, of the legal notion of the combatant and of the liability regime applicable in the event of damages caused by the improper actions of one of 

these robots.24 Likewise, the ethical principles that applied in the framework of a 

conflict opposing human combatants would be lost if machines were to take their 

place. It would therefore be necessary to reconstruct a new set of ethics designed to 

govern the rules of action covering the behavior of military robots.25

It would be presumptuous to attempt to answer such a complex question in just 

a few lines.26 It is nevertheless possible to point out that, here again, the transformation is not perhaps as radical as it might seem at first sightIt should first of all be 

underlined that robotization does not necessarily lead to the loss of human control 

over operations. Contrary to what the “Singer theory” may postulate, the history 

of military robots is not that of an increasing exclusion of man from the decisionmaking loop. Weapons development does not follow a linear progression leading 

from the tool manipulated by man through the remotely controlled machine to the 

independent robot driven by artificial intelligence. Paradoxically, total machine au-
xxii

tonomy seems to be more tolerated than aspired to, and to manifest not technological progress but the incapacity to procure the precise mechanisms that you need. 

The missions assigned to the first drones were therefore totally automated due to 

the lack of sufficiently powerful telecommunication tools to allow those controlling them the possibility of modifying the flight plan as the mission pro-gressed. 

In the case of a totally automated UAV, the machine cannot overfly a sector whose 

interest has not been anticipated or, conversely, cut short a mission which proves 

to be of less interest than was foreseen. Here, progress has consisted precisely in 

reintroducing the human being into the decision-making loop as soon as the available technology so allowed, thereby reducing the contribution of the artificial intelligence to the running of the mission. The same applies for ground robots, with 

the robot becoming autonomous when transmission between operator and machine 

becomes impossible, on account of physical obstacles for example.27

The autonomy of the machine should not therefore be simply envisaged as the 

culmination of technological reasoning that would lead to its inevitable extension.28

The result of this is that, in ethical and legal terms, certain balances or certain traditional distinctions may be modified through the intervention of robots, as indeed 

they may be in the wake of the involvement of employees from private military 

companies in the theaters of operation.29 Yet, de facto (and, probably, de jure), the 

State could not disclaim responsibility for equipment that it directly implements 

through the medium of its armed forces30 or, indirectly, through that of companies 

from which it purchases equipment, or to which it contractually delegates certain 

missions.31 This responsibility should govern the questions of accountability for the 

damages caused by robotization, if not their actual effectiveness.

Robotization and Conflict Management

Even if the extent of the impact of robotization on the essence of warfare 

is subject to discussion and debate, it is nonetheless incontestable that it changes 

some of the key ways in which military conflict is conducted. Without going into 

detail about these modifications, each of which could be subject to a program of 

research and study, it is possible to observe that robotization exercises an influence 

both in macroscopic terms with regard to power relations and the types of conflict 

and in the more microscopic terms of the conditions of terrestrial military action.32

The Risk of the Depolitization of Conflicts

What we call here the depolitization of conflicts refers to the deliberate intention of States, which are capable of so doing, to euphemize, politically and legally, 

the political, moral and media consequences of the conflict. If we consider that 

a robot is defined by its degree of autonomy vis-à-vis humans, and that it works 

moreover within a system which itself takes its place within automated scenarios, 

it is possible to claim that robotization necessarily involves placing the traditional 
xxiii

chain of management, up to the highest level, at arm’s length. The collateral damage caused by automated UAV fire in Afghanistan is one of the illustrations of this 

euphemism. The fact is, moreover, that the moral and political responsibility for 

them has never been shouldered by national governments. Technical error has been 

the sole argument to explain and justify the destruction of civilian populations.

Beyond this technical aspect, there is a real interest and therefore a real desire 

for States to deploy robots on the battlefield inasmuch as this deployment signifies fewer human losses, in particular in countries such as the USA or Israel where 

these human losses are an essential criterion in the political success of military 

operations and the vital support likely to be provided in the form of public opinion. Robotization is envisaged by some as bringing with it a relaxation of the legal 

constraints born of the contemporary laws governing armed conflicts. According to 

them, States conducting military operations would no longer bear the same degree 

of legal responsibility, since all the international principles and rules, both written 

and unwritten, governing the laws of armed conflicts are said to be intrinsically 

linked to the essentially human nature of these conflicts and would be inapplicable 

once operations were being conducted by robots. We have seen that this extreme 

position is probably ill-founded. However, be that as it may, questions arising from 

robotization remain. What, in the future, will be the impact of the use of robots on 

the fundamental concepts and principles of the laws of armed conflicts? Could robots be accredited with a legal personality, and brought under the umbrella of a legal system that recognised the personality of autonomous decision-making objects? 

Will the robot remain a complex machine involving a chain of responsibility that 

includes its designers as well as its users? This field of study remains very much 

open to exploration.

Neutralization of Conflicts

The robotization of the battlefield will offer a new range of strategic options 

for the deployment of military power. These options may be decisive with regard 

to preventing and neutralising conflicts. The large-scale deployment of robots in 

potential high risk zones (ethnic tensions, deployment of troops in border zones, 

loss of control of the territory by a State, etc.) would make available a vigilance 

and alert system which could lead to the rapid neutralisation of potential conflicts, 

something that the international community has found it difficult to do until now. 

This organised vigilance system would also make it possible to keep far more efficient track of peace agreements. Would this result in more significant involvement 

of the international organizations in low-intensity conflict situations? Would it be 

possible to deploy more rapidly and at least cost mechanisms designed to control 

tensions in a given zone? Would the world be safer if the prevention and treatment 
xxiv

of conflicts were based on robot systems rather than the international forces that we 

are familiar with today?

Lastly, the deployment of these robots would also carry a far more serious 

threat for those disrupting the international system insofar as rogue states and the 

like would logically be subject to forms of robotic prohibition. Their frontiers, their 

air space and their territorial waters, even certain zones within their territory, would 

be occupied by “robotized phalanxes” giving physical form to a permanent threat 

which completes the “spatial inquisition” already at work.33

Modifying Power Relations

By affecting military forces and the conditions for exercising offensive and 

defensive power, technical progress can cause considerable changes to the balance 

of power, as well as a reorganization of the strategic landscape.In this regard, there 

can hardly be any doubt that the robotization process will call into question the current classification and typology of the military powers. Taking account of the diversity of the foreseeable applications and the relatively widespread distribution of 

the necessary skills, it is possible to anticipate a relative dispersal of the production 

and use of military robots, with certain countries continuing to manage complex 

technologies and the most sophisticated robots while others may adopt “low-cost” 

robots, the workmanlike nature of which would not be to the detriment of their efficiency, especially if they were used in an innovative fashion in the framework of 

irregular conflicts.

This new arms age will herald a reshuffling of the pecking order in the technical-industrial world. On the one hand, it will modify the relations between the 

various branches contributing to the production of weapons systems. On the other, 

it will lead to a redistribution of the economic power between the traditionally 

dominant countries (USA, Europe, Russia, etc.) and the emerging nations which 

master the technologies of automation, miniaturization and IT.34 Certain countries 

or certain regions may profit from this reshuffle by offering fertile ground to the 

implementation of a new type of “armament clusters,” constructed in particular 

around dual technologies, the combination of which forms the basis of military 

robot manufacturing (telecommunications, IT, electronics, artificial intelligence, 

materials, mechanics, etc.). Internally, the possible redistribution of power between 

the industrial branches that contribute to the production of weapons systems raises 

the following questions in particular:

1. Can we apply to ground robots the notion of “generation,” such as it is recognized in the high-tech industries; with what effects in terms of capacities 

and costs; and with what degree of anticipation?
xxv

2. What is the reality of the supposed duality between civil robotics technologies and those required for military robotics? Will the production of military 

robots tend to comply with the economic laws applicable to the corresponding civil sectors (IT, telecommunications), characterized by major economies of scale and a rapid fall in production costs, or will it comply with the 

usual laws of the arms industry?

3. Will the cost of creating and operating robotized units be necessarily less 

than for the current units on account of the reduced human losses arising 

from the assignment to military robots of inherently dangerous tasks? Can 

the necessary investments in “the training of robots” (drafting operating 

scenarios, writing behavioral software, developing communication systems 

within the robotic systems and between robot and man, etc.) generate gains 

on account of the possible low-cost replication of the technical and software 

mechanisms? 

4. What governance would it be suitable to implement in order to encourage articulation of the operational needs, political choices and industrial 

ambitions? Is a structure such as the DGA (French General Directorate for 

Armament) likely to be able to resolve the problems posed by the complex 

relations that commonly characterize the production of weapons systems? 

5. How can the development of new defense robotics companies be encouraged in countries like France? What role can competitive clusters play in 

the development of the basic robot technologies and in the constitution of 

the technical-industrial networks required for the development of military 

robotics? 

Internationally, is the robotization of the battlefield likely to substantially 

modify the hierarchy of the weapons systems producers? We know, for example, 

that the United States have an unquestionable lead in terms of navigation in open 

environments, robotics architecture and military robotics applications. On the other 

hand, Japan and Korea dominate with regard to issues of mobility and humanoid 

robots, while Europe for its part has a strong case to state in terms of mobility in 

structured environments (urban networks, for example). Countries such as Israel 

and Australia also have specific strengths in the field. Many stakeholders, be they 

State or non-State players, are capable of drawing on the panoply of existing technologies in order to design and deploy “low-cost” robots that are likely to enhance 

their action capability in the framework of asymmetric strategies. These countries 

are, in certain cases, already involved in traditional arms production; others are 

likely to take their seat at the table, thereby calling into question the status quo. 

What is the current map of development of the robotics industry around the world? 
xxvi

Who are the stakeholders and what are the major strategies? What are the needs and 

the budgets? What are the geopolitical issues? What new alliances are to be set up?

Here again, the field of studies to be implemented is vast.

The Place of Robots in the General Coercion System

Since the 1980s, the international scene has come up with a reshuffling of 

the main players involved in coercion. Under the effect of the globalization of exchanges, the lack of differentiation between internal security and external security 

and the emergence of doctrines centered on the control or protection of populations, 

the main countries of the West have operated a constant diminution of their military 

forces and, in parallel, increased police and private security forces. In this regard, 

the constant reduction of military numbers, alongside the fact that the success of 

the operations in which they are engaged is increasingly relative, demonstrates that 

States are looking to find an equation other than the generalized mobilization of 

military forces. This new equation, which is characterized by the increasing preponderance of police and intelligence system—in Germany, for example: the advent of 

agencies specialized in organized crime or illegal trafficking control—in the USA 

in particular, the increasing recourse to private military and security companies, the 

intervention of legal systems to prop up the root-and-branch changes to the law, has 

a new player: robots. The question is now to understand the place of robots within 

this recomposed field of the stakeholders involved in coercion.

A first assumption is that robotic systems are at the interface of two major 

trends:

1. The trend that puts the emphasis, strategically and politically, on the mass 

capacity for the protection and surveillance of individuals in a society that 

is increasingly fluid and where population control involves the control of 

movements of all types: goods, capital, individuals, information, etc.; 

2. The trend which, in the name of general prevention, makes anticipation, 

speed of reaction and the least cost of intervention in all its dimensions the 

factors which tend to favor automated information collection and processing systems and the constitution of automated scenarios and profiles. 

Robotized systems, since they combine all these criteria: collecting and processing information of all types, in particular police and military information, along 

with autonomy, efficiency and disengagement from the hierarchical structures, 

should ultimately constitute a preferred player in this search for continuity in the 

field of coercion. The question however remains open concerning the distribution 

of roles, practices and usages, and their impact on the societies concerned and on 

the system of international relations as a whole. It is this dimension which makes 
xxvii

robotization and robotized systems an object of study which extends far beyond the 

framework of operational usage in the battlefield, and gives it its true scope.

Robotization and Conditions of Intervention of Military Forces

Lastly, robotization profoundly modifies the conditions of intervention of military forces. Even if the manufacturers of robots make special efforts with regard to 

the man-machine interface so that the robot is the “companion” of the soldier, the 

fact no less remains that the generalized use of robots on the battlefield will necessarily have effects of all kinds on the structures of military forces, the relations 

within units (robotization as a factor in developing the esprit de corps and leadership), the relations between the forces and the enemy (robotization as a manifestation of the ethnocentricity of developed countries) and the relations between military forces and local populations (robotization as a mechanism for the surveillance 

of areas and populations or as an impersonal weapon of destruction).35

Technological progress makes it possible to envisage multiple applications 

for military robots: reconnaissance, mine clearance, observation and surveillance, 

medical evacuation, acquisition and destruction of targets, etc. The only apparent limits to robotization would seem to pertain to the breadth of imagination of 

robot designers and the priorities set by those responsible for making the military 

or industrial choices. Nevertheless, envisaging battlefield robotization according 

to the sole criterion of technical feasibility and production capacities would mean 

neglecting, even ignoring, the man-machine interface and all that is most subtle and 

problematic in that regard. 

Three factors therefore appear essential: the degree of autonomy of robots in 

the phases of combat, the impact of robotization on the population, and the relationship with the enemy. 

The Degree of Autonomy of Robots in the Phases of Combat

As has already been previously pointed out, any definition of a robot or of a 

system of robots poses the general question of its degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the 

combatant and its integration within a human system. How to define the degree of 

autonomy assigned to robots? The robotization of the battlefield involves establishing detailed scenarios of combat situations and defining standardised behavior 

suited to the action to be carried out and respectful of the laws concerning armed 

conflicts and military ethics.36 The result of this is that the behavior of the robot 

must be determined by a set of behavioral rules that need to be formulated. 

This then gives rise to the question of knowing who is responsible for the doctrine of robot use in the field, for the formulation of the behavioral rules, for the architecture of the decision-making processes, and for the margin of autonomy granted to the robot, ranging from para-human artificial intelligence to hyper-human 
xxviii

artificial intelligence.37 Will the latter go so far as to enable the robot to eliminate 

an enemy or destroy a target without the intervention of a human decision-making 

echelon? Does a robot need to be programmed for it to evaluate the received orders 

and refuse to execute an order when it is illegal? To whom is a robot accountable 

for its actions? Who can decide to interrupt the action of a robot? Does the chain of 

command not risk being undermined by the possibility offered to political or military decision-makers to control the robot themselves, in other words to intervene 

directly in the conduct of operations on the ground? Is it not necessary to guard 

against this risk by installing, for example, mechanisms for the acknowledgement 

and systematic recording of the interventions requested of robots? 

Even if the actual robot has decision-making autonomy to a greater or lesser 

degree, the fact nonetheless remains that it operates alongside the men making up 

the military force. Its presence significantly modifies the practice of leadership, the 

formation of an esprit de corps, even the very notion of the combatant. It almost 

inevitably involves a modification of the manner in which ground operations are 

conceived and conducted. 

With regard to the practice of leadership, if robotization is analyzed as the 

total or partial replacement of the individual by the machine, the commanded units 

will evolve towards a lesser human density, in terms both quantitative (ratio of men 

to the forces as a whole) and qualitative (the handling of increasingly complex 

missions by increasingly qualified robots). Leadership will be exercised on human/

machine systems or even, in the medium term, on machine systems alone. The nature of leadership, the aptitudes required to exercise it, indeed, the very notion of 

“leadership” seem likely to evolve considerably.

In this way, the question of the relations between combatants and non-combatants is raised anew by the robotization of the battlefield. In an armed conflict 

situation, international laws stipulate the application of written and unwritten rules, 

valid with regard to both international and non-international conflicts, and the purpose of which is to protect persons who are not or who are no longer participating 

in combat, on the one hand, and to limit the methods and means of combat, on 

the other. In this context, international humanitarian law is based on a founding 

categorization of the stakeholders (combatants, non-combatants, war victims, civilian population) and the principles (of proportionality and discrimination). As such, 

these principles, which are already challenged in the event of contemporary irregular conflicts, will be all the more so with the arrival of robots on the battlefield. 

What becomes of the combatant/noncombatant distinction when the data gathered 

by the robot are analyzed by an employee of a civil company, and the robot is remotely controlled by an employee of a private military company who may or may 

not be present on the battlefield? Do robots form part of the dichotomy between 
xxix

military objectives and civil property? What sense can the notion of “direct participation in hostilities” take in the respective hypotheses of the robot being under the 

control of a soldier or else an engineer?

By the same token, robotization would have to incorporate as a direct consequence the distancing, disassociation even, of combatants from the same unit; 

a physical remoteness characterized by the distance between the person operating 

the remote controls (or who is responsible for this) and a psychological remoteness 

which raises the more general question of the levels of cohesion to be obtained 

between men and machines. Taking the assumption of highly robotized units, is the 

presence of machines, endowed with a certain decision-making autonomy, free of 

consequences with regard to the social relations within the group, or does it bring 

with it the risk of generating changes to the collective behavior? What becomes of 

the esprit de corps which constitutes the cornerstone of military units if the robot 

becomes an increasingly present “brother in arms”?

Robotization also brings with it consequences with regard to military tactics. 

Technical progress makes it possible to equip military units with machines capable 

of informing them, tackling explosive devices, supplying them, providing them 

with medical care, etc. The possibilities opened up by this are not just likely to 

amplify existing capabilities, with their conditions of implementation remaining 

unchanged. They are sure to give rise to the generation of new frameworks of use, 

new forms of tactical action, new procedures. There is a great risk in this area of 

“making new out of old,” in other words, conceiving robotization based on preexisting categories and routines, and not opening up the field of possibilities offered 

by the advent of robots in order to conceive new tactical approaches. History shows 

that in every age the inventors of new technologies are not necessarily those who 

have been able to make best use of them on the battlefield. 

Lastly, robotization and the automation of combat sequences presuppose the 

conceiving and drafting of complex scenarios corresponding to typical combat sequences which may, quite possibly, be integrated in their turn as part of widerranging procedures. Conceiving the interplay between men and machines is all 

about fitting this interplay into larger-scale automated systems. What might these 

typical combat sequences therefore be? With respect to what adversary? Do they 

need to be categorized hierarchically or sequentially? Do they rehash the questions of simulation and wargaming? Who bears general responsibility for software 

architectures of this type? What is likely to be the place of the inevitable software 

emanating from the civilian sector in the robotized system? Do military robots need 

to be kept entirely free of such software (at the risk of having to address problems 

of cost, transparency and maintenance), or should they integrate certain civil software packages (involving creation of significant dependence on a given specialized 
xxx

company)? Does the integration of these sequences into preset scenarios lead to the 

definition of profiles for adversaries and hostile actions? In this case, the use of this 

type of construction is inseparable from the notion of prevention.

Robotization and Relations with the Population

Robotization runs counter to the central idea of current doctrines of warfare 

within populations, since it is hard to see how the massive use of robots would 

make it possible to create the indispensable social link for “winning over hearts 

and minds.” The robotization of the battlefield and, beyond that, the entire theater 

of operations (intelligence, surveillance, support, destruction, etc.) is likely to engender reactions of distrust, even hostility, on the part of a population whom robots 

have been assigned to observe, monitor, record, control, and so on. The absence of 

human sentiment may be considered an advantage on the battlefield insofar as it 

eliminates the risk of deviant behavior driven by hatred, vengeance or fear. On the 

other hand, it constitutes a major handicap when it comes to reconciling military 

forces with the population.

Robotization and the Relationship with the Enemy

Western military forces will not have the monopoly of robots on the battlefield. It is reasonable to assume, indeed, that the use of technologies characterised 

by economies of scale and gains in productivity will make it possible to bring down 

rapidly the cost of producing these robots. The result of this is that many parties, 

whether regular forces or not, may acquire them and control how they are used. Furthermore, it is not inconceivable that robots might be captured and reprogrammed 

by specialists, whose skills seem to be fairly widespread worldwide.38 Lastly, and 

above all, even if robotization is envisaged in the developed countries as a form 

of advanced technology, it is quite possible to conceive of a robotization based on 

simple techniques (remote control, for example), but which is thoroughly efficient. 

An evident parallel may therefore be drawn with the manufacturing and use of improvised explosive devices on all contemporary battlefields. Western forces must 

therefore prepare themselves for “hybrid” forms of combat where the enemy will 

also be capable of implementing robotic systems which may be less sophisticated 

but the use of which may correspond to unusual tactical scenarios.

The use of robots for carrying out high-risk missions, increasing the destructive capability or monitoring populations addresses, for their Western users, a certain rationality and logic of minimizing human losses, something that is now axiomatic. This rationality should not obscure the fact, however, that for most nations 

at war—Israel and the United States in particular—the priority is to save the lives 

of their own people, whatever may be the price to pay for the adversary and, possibly, the civilian populations in combat zones. In other words, the enemy who has 

to fight a robotized army most certainly does not have the same perception of the 
xxxi

situation. There is therefore a high chance that the enemy gets an even stronger 

feeling that he is fighting against adversaries who once again possess technological supremacy, faced with which he is sure to be defeated. If this theory proved to 

be true, the robotization of the battlefield would therefore act as an accelerator of 

asymmetric combat in its most extreme and unexpected forms; it could then serve 

to reinforce the “normal,” justified and efficient character of certain modes of action that we today judge to be irregular:guerrilla tactics, terrorism, suicide attacks, 

IT attacks, etc.

Conclusion

More than a complete revolution in military technology and strategic thinking, 

the robotization of the battlefield seems to us rather to constitute a major evolution, 

all the more fascinating a topic of study inasmuch as, if we discount the idea of “inevitable technological fate,” i.e. an inevitable development to which military forces 

would be obliged to submit without the power of any control over it, those who turn 

their minds to the questions of defense or else who assume responsibility for it find 

themselves faced with essential questions.

 Questions about the desired degree of robotization of a military force, the rate 

of development of this robotization, the missions for which robots may be used appropriately, the degree of autonomy assigned to them, the type of use that can be 

made of them, the politico-strategic consequences for conflict management, and so 

on. Some of these questions fall within the scope of the relatively classic concerns 

of the human, social and political sciences, while others mark a new departure.

The way that we see it, and contrary to the analyses that are often proposed, 

robotization does not seem to radically transform the essence of warfare, which 

remains above all a human phenomenon, motivated by a clash of wills. However, it 

is likely to affect profoundly the ways in which conflicts are prosecuted, whether in 

terms of the balance of power that it risks disrupting, the renewed importance that 

it may confer on conflict prevention policies or the relations that prevail within and 

between groups of humans present on the battlefield.

In this regard, for us it seems vital that research is carried out in order to 

address the questions arising today, and in particular the cost-benefit analysis for 

guiding investment choices without falling victim to the “technologist illusion” or 

postulating that the budgetary constraints are insurmountable. This attachment to 

considerations which are relatively traditional, and which trivialize somewhat the 

robotization process, should not imply any renouncement of the study of the questions for tomorrow: those linked to the hypothesis of military robots endowed with 

a large degree of autonomy and technically capable of using force on the basis of 

preset rules. Whatever the case, it would be wise not to underestimate the capacity 
xxxii

for the former to hold back developments if they are ignored, and not to overestimate the game-changing potential of the latter if they are exclusively focused on. 

Lastly, the battlefield robotization process raises two types of essential questioning. The first concerns the nature of the intelligence architectures of the future, 

inasmuch as the emergence and generalization of robots add an unfamiliar loop to 

the classic intelligence systems. The second, in a wider political context, concerns 

a question that has already been alluded to via the process of outsourcing and the 

contractualization of withdrawal, and therefore the legitimacy of the State in coercion operations.
xxxiii

Notes

1. P. W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the Twenty-First 

Century (New York: Penguin Press, 2009). For a French perspective on robotization, see for example: Jean- Jacques Cécile, La guerre des robots. Les révolutions militaires de demain. (The war 

of the robots. The military revolutions of tomorrow.) (Ellipses Marketing, 2006); Pierre Pascallon, 

Demain, les drones de combat? (Tomorrow: combat drones?) (Editions L’Harmattan, 2004). Marc 

Grozel and Géneviève Moulard, Drones, mystérieux robots volants (Drones: mysterious flying robots) (Lavauzelle, 2008). 

2. Laurent Checola and Edouard Pflimlin, “War without pilots; Drones command the skies,” 

Le Monde Diplo-matique, December 1, 2009; John Keller, “The Time Has Come for Military 

Ground Robots.” Military & Aerospace Electronics, 20, no. 6 (2009): 24–30; Ellen M. Purdy, “The 

Increasing Role of Robots in National Security. Defense AT&L, 37, no. 3 (2008): 26–29; Alan S. 

Brown, “The Drone Warriors.” Mechanical Engineering, 132, no. 1 (2010): 22–27: William Wong, 

“Unmanned Military Vehicles: Robots on the Rise.” Electronic Design 56, no. 19 (2008): 30–34; 

Peter H. Lewis, “Iraq’s Robot Invasion” Fortune 151, no. 1 (2005): 58. 

3. Ferat Sahin, “Robotic Swarms as System of Systems” in Mohammad Jamshidi (ed.) System 

of Systems Engineering, (John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2008), 482-519. 

4. David Axe, War Bots: How U.S. Military Robots Are Transforming War in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Future (Nimble Books, 2008); Leighton Hanon, “Robots on the Battlefield–Are We 

Ready For Them?” AIAA 3rd Unmanned Unlimited Technical Conference, Workshop, and Exhibit 

(2004): 20–23 September, Chicago; Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann, “The Drone War” New 

Republic, 240 no. 9 (2009): 22–25. 

5. Christian Malis highlights the recurrent time lag between the advent of progress in the sciences of weaponry and strategic thinking. See Christian Malis and Pierre Marie Gallois: Géopolitique, histoire, stratégie (Geopolitics, history, strategy) (L’Age d’Homme, 2009). 

6. Consider for example the broad picture painted by Ajey Lele in “Strategic Technologies for 

the Military: Breaking New Frontiers” (Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, 2009). 

7. Elizabeth Bumiller and Christopher Drew, “Military Budget Reflects a Shift In U.S. Strategy,” The New York Times, 6 April 2009. Christopher Drew, “Drones are Weapons of Choice in 

Fighting Al Qaeda,” The New York Times, 17 March 2009. 

8. Robert Ranquet, “Défense de la technologie” (“In defense of technology”) Politique 

étrangère (Foreign policy) 4, (2009): 65-70. 

9. V. Desportes, “Armées : ‘technologisme’ ou ‘juste technologie’?” (“Armies: ‘technologism’ 

or ‘just technology’?”) Politique étrangère (Foreign Policy) 50, no. 2 (2009): 403- 418. Along the 

same lines: Thierry Allemand, “L’action militaire et l’impérialisme technologique” (“Military action and technological imperialism”), Le débat stratégique (The strategic debate) October, No. 176 

(2009). 

10. See the first difficulties in managing the information flows produced by drones in Christopher Drew, “Drone Flights Leave Military Awash in Data,” The New York Times, 11 January 2010. 

11. See the reactions of Afghan rebels to the use of drones in Yassin Musharbash, “In the 

Crosshairs–How al-Qaida & Co. Are Responding to Drone Warfare,” Spiegel Online International, 

12 March 2010. 

12. See for example Didier Danet, “Quelle régulation pour les sociétés militaires privées?” 

(“What kind of regulation for private military companies?”) in Christian Malis and Didier Danet 

(eds.) Frères d’armes? (Brothers in Arms?) (Economica, 2011), 77-90. 
xxxiv

13. To illustrate these largely stereotyped discourses, see for example Marc Pitzke, “Remote 

Warriors–How Drone Pilots Wage War,” Spiegel Online International, 12 March 2010. David Zucchino, “Drone pilots sitting in Nevada are just a click away from war in Afghanistan; Remote-controlled, unmanned planes are the vanguards of a revolution in warfare,” Vancouver Sun, 25 February 

2010. For a more subtle analysis, see Spiegel Online, “Interview with a Drone Pilot–‘It Is Not a 

Video Game,’” Spiegel Online International, 12 March 2010. 

14. Rajiv Chandrasekaran, “War, the old-fashioned way; Marines in Marja offensive find that 

the basics of battle haven’t changed,” The Washington Post, 20 February 2010. For a more nuanced 

overall reflection on this vision, see Christopher Coker, The Future Of War: The Re-Enchantment of 

War in the Twenty-First Century (Blackwell Publishing Ltd, 2004). 

15. Lieutenant Colonel Lucciti, “Quels systèmes robotisés pour l’armée de Terre à l’horizon 

2015?” (“What robotized systems for the Army looking ahead to 2015?”), Objectif Doctrine, No. 29 

(2005): 46-54; Michel Asencio, Digitazation and robotisation of the battlefield. Notes of the FRS 

(Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique) 2010. 

16. Patrick Lin, George Bekey, and Keith Abney, Autonomous Military Robotics No. 1 US 

Department of Navy, Office of Naval Research, 2008. 

17. Colonel Jean-Christophe Le Roux, “L’armée de Terre et la robotisation terrestre” (“The 

Army and robots on the ground”), presented at the symposium: “Robotisation du champ de bataille” (“Robotization of the battlefield”), Paris Ecole Militaire: Ecoles de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan, 

CESAT, CDEF, 2010). http://www.st-cyr.terre.defense.gouv.fr/index.php?ID=1033179, (accessed 

12 November 2013). 

18. David Hambling, “Quick and Nimble. Researchers seek Ways to Increase Robot Mobility,” Defense Technology International 3, no. 7 (2009). 

19. According to the New York Times, the United States is said to have lost a third of the Predator UAVs engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. Christopher Drew, “Drones are Weapons of Choice in 

Fighting Al Qaeda,” The New York Times, 17 March 2009. 

20. Bernard Bombeau, “Drones: gérer l’urgence, engager l’avenir” (“Drones: managing emergencies, committing to the future”), Air & Cosmos, 5 February 2010. 

21. See, for example, Johnson et al., Stratégique 8ème édition (Strategic 8th edition), 8th ed. 

(Pearson Education, 2008). Chapter 14: Managing strategic change. 

22. Adam N. Stulberg, “Managing the Unmanned Revolution in the US Air Force,” Orbis 51, 

no. 2 (2007): 251-265. 

23. Jacques Liouville, “Management de l’innovation et performances : bilan et leçons des 

recherches consacrées à l’ambidextérité” (“Management of innovation and performance: conclusions and lessons learned from research into ambidexterity”), Rev. Fr. Gestion Industrielle 28, No. 

4 (2009): 83–108. 

24. Gary E. Marchant, Braden Allenby, Ronald Arkin, et al. “International Governance of Autonomous Military Robots.” Columbia University Review of Science & Technology Law, 13, 2011; 

Ronan Doaré and Henri Dude, Les robots au coeur du champ de bataille (Robots in the heart of 

the battlefield) (Economica, 2011); Armin Krishnan, “Automating War: The Need for Regulation” 

Contemporary Security Policy, 30(1), 2009, 172–193. 

25. On this topic, see Ronald C. Arkin, Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots 

(Boca Raton, Fla: Chapman & Hall/CRC Press, 2009). For a more critical perspective, see Noel 

Sharkey, “Robotics Today: The Good, Bad, and Ugly,” 15th Annual IEEE International Conference 

and Workshop on the Engineering of Computer Based Systems (ECBS, 2008), 3-4; Robert Sparrow, 

“Predators or Plowshares? Arms Control of Robotic Weapons,” IEEE Technology & Society Magazine 28, no. 1 (2009): 25- 29; Nathan, S. (2011). “Robot wars” Engineer. (00137758), 296(7818) 

(2011): 20–22. 
xxxv

26. See Christian Malis, “La robotisation de l’espace de bataille nous promet-elle une nouvelle révolution dans les affaires militaires ?” (“Does the robotization of the battlefield presage a 

new revolution in military affairs?”), DSI Special issue, No. 10, (2010). 

27. See in this regard: Simon Lacroix, “L’état de l’art de la robotique militaire” (“The stateof-the-art in military robotics”) presented at Colloque “Robotisation du champ de bataille” (“Robotization of the battlefield”), Paris Ecole militaire: Ecoles de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan, CESAT, CDEF, 

2010.

28. Michael A. Goodrich and Alan C. Schultz, “Human-robot interaction: A survey,” Foundations and Trends in Human-Computer Interaction 1, no. 3 (2007): 203-275. 

29. Suzy Killmister, “Remote Weaponry: The Ethical Implications,” Journal of Applied Philosophy 25, no. 2 (2008): 121-133; Philippe Frin and Ronan Doaré, “La robotisaton du champ de 

bataille : défis et enjeux juridiques?” (“The robotization of the battlefield: challenges and legal issues”), DSI Special issue, no. 10, March (2010). 

30. Concerning this question, refer to the debate concerning the legitimacy and legality of 

attacks by UAVs against suspected enemies in the border zone between Pakistan and Afghanistan. 

Graham R. Shaw, & Majed Akhter, “The Unbearable Humanness of Drone Warfare in FATA, Pakistan.” Antipode, 44, no. 4 (2011): 1490-1509. 

31. Aaron Schwabach, “Kosovo: Virtual War and International Law,” Law and Literature 15, 

no. 1 (2003): 1–21. 

32. Jean-Paul Hanon, “Guerre, système international et robotisation” (“War, international system and robotiza-tion”), DSI Special issue, No. 10, (2010). 

33. We may consider that the creation by the United States following the 9/11 attacks of a 

double “smart border” (electronic as well as physical) prefigures this automation of surveillance, the 

real efficiency of which may be called into question since it has never really succeeded in slowing 

down the flow of Mexican immigration into the southern USA. 

34. See the example of the TerraMax robotized vehicle: Yi-Liang et al., “TerraMax TM: Team 

Oshkosh Urban Robot,” Journal of Robotic Systems 25, no. 10 (2008): 841–860. 

35. See for example the recommendations designed to encourage the integration of human 

factors in complex systems: Anne Bruseberg and Georgina Fletcher, The Human View Handbook 

for MODAF (Systems Engineering & Assessement Ltd, 2008). 

36. Robert Sparrow, (2007). Killer Robots. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 24, no. 1 (2007): 

62–77. 

37. J. Storrs Hall, Beyond AI: Creating the Conscience of the Machine. (Prometheus Books, 

2007). 

38. It is not irrelevant to point out in this respect that the mastery of IT technology is fairly 

widespread in the emerging countries, and that many non-State players are capable of designing and 

deploying robots which are fairly basic but perfectly suited to essential functions such as observation or the destruction of objectives.

Part One

The Military Robot: A New Stage

in the History of Arms

3

Chapter 2

Robotic and Future Wars:

When Land Forces FaceTechnological Developments

by Antonin Tisseron

Despite the fact that over the past 10 years, robotics fans among the general public have 

endured one disappointment after the next, having to content themselves with little more 

than a vacuum cleaner, while Sony closed down its robotics division, robots have invaded 

the battlefield.2

 Since 2002 and the death in Yemen of the terrorist Abu Ali al-Harithi, killed 

by a missile from a CIA Predator UAV, the offensive use of UAVs has become increasingly 

frequent for targeted assassinations. The US relied on UAVs to such an extent, that for the 

former director of the CIA, Leon Panetta (2009-2011), armed UAVs seemed to be the only 

efficient weapon to combat Al Qaeda worldwide.3

The growing use of robots is not limited to the “war on terrorism” and special operations. 

Between 2003 and 2007, 10,000 improvised explosive devices (IEDs) are said to have been 

destroyed by 5000 robots of the US Army, some of which have been given nicknames and 

dummy ranks by their operators. Likewise, these small devices, popularized in the film The 

Hurt Locker, only constitute a fraction of the robots deployed by the armies on the ground. 

Without harking all the way back to the German remote-controlled Goliath beetle tank of 

the Second World War, armies have possessed remote-controlled tanks since the 1970s and, 

in recent years, several devices have been developed which are capable of transporting a 

ton of payload and are able to be weaponized. Armies also use, in conjunction with the 

Air Force, their own UAVs, for supporting maneuvers, acquiring intelligence, providing 

covering fire, protecting the forces by means of their dissuasive effect, and enhancing the 

quality of wireless communications by serving as relay stations. In the operations that 

it carries out in Afghanistan, the French Army therefore distinguishes between UAVs 

functioning at operational level, those involved in the tactical operations zone, and miniUAVs (local level).

Do robots mark the advent of a new age of warfare? The impact of air/ground robots 

on the grammar of the battlefield is not clear, and there are two opposing—though not 

necessarily mutually exclusive—approaches to this. The first approach, a visionary one, 

considers robots to be the embodiment of a game-changer, comparable to the introduction 

of gunpowder in military forces. The second, more pragmatic, emphasizes the immutability 

of the rules of war and the uncertainties linked with these new tools.

Within land forces, for mainly organizational and budgetary reasons, the second 

approach tends to dominate, with many questions being asked about the integration of 

robots. Yet behind these uncertainties, robotics is only in its fledgling stages and robots 

will most probably become increasingly commonplace in the wars of tomorrow, which 

means that questions have to be asked about the way in which they affect and will affect 

battlefields, along with how we are to understand them. This, in any case, is the objective 

of this essay, designed above all to provide grist for the mill of future debates.

Introduction1
4

The Robotization of Battlefields

When the US Army V Corps entered Iraq in 2003, it had only one UAV and no ground 

robots. Five years later, 12,000 unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) were engaged in the 

theater of operations, principally for the purpose of reconnaissance, the destruction of 

explosive devices, or the interception of shells and rockets.

When Armies Turn to Robots

The Iraqi and Afghan theaters of operation have constituted vast centers of open-air 

experimentation for the robots of tomorrow. The Big Dog, a quadruped robot capable of 

accompanying infantrymen in rugged and mountainous terrains, for carrying kit and other 

heavy loads (up to 150 kg) at a speed of 4 km/h, is one such robot that has been sent to and 

tested in Afghanistan.4

 Another example is the SWORDS (Special Weapons Observation 

Reconnaissance Detection Systems) mobile robot armed with machine guns which was 

deployed in 2007 in Iraq, and which was also deployed in Afghanistan, where it is said 

that the Taliban succeeded in flipping over the devices and recovering their weapons and 

ammunition. Its successor, the MAARS (Modular Advanced Armed Robotic System), is 

indeed a heavier unit. It can be fitted with a range of different weapons: machine gun, 

grenade launcher, rocket launcher, along with loudspeakers to encourage the enemy to 

surrender or ask the population to leave the area. It can also be programmed to define 

“firing zones” and “exclusion zones.”

The United States is not alone in testing tomorrow’s tools of war in current operations. 

Israel is also at the cutting edge in the field of battlefield robotization, with work directly 

drawing on recent combats. Upon returning from the 34 days of violent confrontations in 

Lebanon during the summer of 2006, the engaged Israeli units reported their difficulties in 

flushing out Hezbollah fighters entrenched in a network of fortified subterranean shelters 

built under the direction of Iranian and North Korean engineers. Researchers from BenGurion University, in collaboration with those of Technion-Haifa, subsequently came up 

with and developed a 2m-long snake-robot, capable of crawling along narrow tunnels. This 

robot’s head is made up of sensors and cameras that send information back to the soldiers 

remaining in the rear. It can also be used for placing an explosive charge. As far as the 

border with Lebanon and the Gaza Strip is concerned, in order to limit attacks on patrolling 

troops, surveillance is provided by a remote-controlled device called the Guardium. The 

robots are a technological resource taking their place alongside the fences or walls of 

closed borders.

Robot development is a wealth creation factor. The State of Israel has well understood 

this, not contenting itself simply to exhibit its technological arsenal as a means of dissuading 

States and groups considered as hostile. Many Western armies engaged in Afghanistan use 

Israeli-origin unmanned aircraft for reconnaissance or destruction missions and, in 2008, 

Israel replaced Russia as the number one supplier of weaponry to the Indian Army. In 

South America, Brazil, and Colombia have purchased Israeli UAVs, and security at the 

2010 FIFA World Cup was largely provided by Israeli companies. Although there may be 

many economic outlets for companies designing and manufacturing robots for security 

usages, the technologies developed can also be used on robots designed for civil protection, 

industry, individual leisure, domestic tasks, or simply for keeping people company. These 
5

are all fields in which the needs are exponential on account of the aging of the populations 

in the wealthier nations, the growing recourse to technology for work in factories or the 

management of risks and disasters as well as, more generally, the importance of technology 

in our environment and for managing problems.

The Sources of the Robot’s Appeal

The prime military interest in robots comes from the fact that they help to save lives. 

This, in any case, is the credo of the manufacturers and one of the driving factors in the 

use of robots in the Armed Forces. Interviews conducted in the United States by Second 

Lieutenant Piraud, for his final year dissertation at the Écoles de Saint-Cyr Military 

Academy, demonstrate that the reduction in combat losses is indeed considered to be one 

of the main advantages of the use of robots.5

 Thanks to robots, human beings can be less 

exposed to risks, and it is better to lose a robot than a soldier to the blast from an explosive 

device, an ambush, or a skirmish. US Army Lieutenant General Rick Lynch said very much 

the same thing when he stated at a conference in 2009 that out of the 155 men in his unit 

killed in Iraq, the lives of 122 of them could have been saved by using robots. 

If the importance accorded to the preservation of life in Western societies and the 

perception of death in combat in limited-scale warfare in complex environments—Iraqi 

towns, Afghan caves, and Lebanese tunnels—have driven the acquisition of robots in the 

US and Israeli armies, the utility of robots takes can be seen in three other dimensions.

Robots are first of all perceived as tools that increase the operational efficiency of 

military forces. Although the reduction in military personnel numbers is a growing 

phenomenon, the fewer personnel must not only be capable of controlling zones covering 

larger areas than in the past (without necessarily occupying them), but also of doing this 

more rapidly. As the doctrinal philosophy of the Americans and Israelis would have it, “you 

need to see, understand and act more quickly than the enemy, in order to keep them in a 

permanent state of shock.”6

 A robot is both a response to the growing scarcity of human 

resources in the military, against the backdrop of the prospect of urban operations placing 

heavy demands on the infantry, and a tool enabling operations to be accelerated.

Secondly, a robot is not subject to lapses in concentration and is not subject to the 

same physiological limitations as the human body. It does not get hungry, does not get 

frightened, nor does it forget orders, provided that they have been correctly fed in or that 

the link with the operator has not been broken. It can carry out mine clearance all day long, 

operate in radioactive environments and fire with greater precision than a soldier. One of 

the arguments for vaunting the merits of the SWORDS system is, indeed, that the robot can 

hit a coin at a distance of 300 meters, whereas the precision of a trained infantryman at such 

a distance is limited to a target the size of a basketball. Better still, even if the manufacturer 

prefers not to say so, unlike the soldier the robot will not hesitate to shoot to kill. The idea 

underlying this discourse is that of outstripping the limits of man in the name of military 

efficiency, of realizing the age-old dream of institutions built upon reducing the frictions 

that are linked to the human factor thanks to the use of soldiers that act like machines.7

Lastly, from an economic point of view, the cost of a robot is less than that of a soldier 

in operation. An American soldier sent to Afghanistan equates to a cost of $1 million per 
6

year, training included. In comparison, a Packbot costs around $150,000 and a MARCbot 

$5000.8

 This, moreover, is without taking into account retirement costs. The Pentagon owed 

its soldiers, in 2010, $653 billion for their future retirement pay, resources the Pentagon 

simply does not have. To these direct costs may be added the costs of evacuating and 

tending for the wounded, and their post-conflict reintegration. The duty of coming to the 

aid of a brother in arms also does not apply to a robot, which can be destroyed by a bomb 

or other explosive to prevent it falling into enemy hands, at least in theory. In Iraq and 

Afghanistan, US combatants in fact risked their lives to recover robots described by their 

commanders as tools of great value that needed to be taken care of, running counter to 

the economic argument and the desire to limit human losses. Another driving factor in 

endangering men’s lives in order to “save” a robot is the emotional link projected by the 

combatant on the machine that he or she fights alongside, and which may lead him to seek 

to rescue the robot in a danger zone at the risk of his own life.

American Ambivalence

According to certain forecasts, in several years a third of everything that is flown, 

navigated or driven in the Israeli army will be under remote control.9

 In the United States, 

a comparable proportion of manned and unmanned vehicles were posited in the National 

Defense Authorization Act of 2000. By way of two mandates from the US Congress, the 

objective was set for 2010 that one third of aerial strikes deep within hostile territory will 

be carried out by unmanned aircraft and, for 2015, that one third of ground combat vehicles 

would be unmanned. This objective was also recapitulated in Robotics Strategy White 

Paper, written for the US Army in 2009, the purpose of which was to guide reflections on 

robotics in that force.10

In recent years, the “robotics strategy” of the US Army has been driven by the 

development and use of systems available in the framework of the Rapid Fielding Initiative, 

and the Joint IED Defeat Organization, designed to address the immediate needs of soldiers 

engaged in theaters of war.11 Concerning the preparation in the near future of land forces, 

robotization was included in the framework of the Future Combat System (FCS) program, 

under the aegis of DARPA and cancelled on 23 June 2009 in favour of the Brigade Combat 

Teams Modernization (BCTM) program.12

As it happens, then, far from an “all-technological” vision, it is rather a certain 

ambivalence with regard to what robotics has to offer on the battlefield which predominates 

within the BCTM program. The elimination of the FCS program was indeed accompanied 

by the abandonment of several initially planned robotic capabilities. Beginning in June 

2009, three systems were therefore cancelled since they were judged not to offer added 

value with respect to the envisaged needs and the most probable threats.13 This involved 

the class IV UAV (brigade level) and the logistics and mine clearance versions of the 

MULE (Multi-Function Utility/Logistics and Equipment) vehicle. All that were retained 

in the framework of the incremental 1 program for implementation in 2011-2012 were 

distributed autonomous sensors including one model for urban zones, a class I rotary wing 

mini-UAV project (section level, employed in particular by the US special forces and in 

certain specialties), a first type of unmanned ground vehicle, a kit enabling integration of 

all these elements with the C3 (command, control and coordination) network, a new model 
7

of inter-service radio and an indirect precision firing system called NLOS (Non Line Of 

Sight Launch System)designed to fire 15 missiles that are capable of tracking their target 

and are reprogrammable in-flight.14

The NLOS was abandoned in May 2010. On 12 January 2011, the BCTM program 

was pared down further with the ratification by the Pentagon of the request of the US Army 

to no longer include in it the class I UAV and the sensors. This decision was followed, on 

29 July, by the cancellation of the latest still-maintained version of the armed and combatready version of the MULE. All that remains of the defunct FCS program are the systems 

of communication and the small, unarmed ground robots, used for the reconnaissance 

of buildings, caves and tunnels. Against a backdrop of scepticism with regard to the 

technology along with ever more stringent budgetary constraints, the US Army has chosen 

to concentrate solely on the clearly identified needs of soldiers, while continuing to pursue 

research and development.

The Start of a New Story

Despite the setbacks to US-style robotization for the proponents of an “all-technological” 

approach, the robots appropriation phase is gradually giving way to a phase of development 

and expansion of the field of action of robotized systems. New usages are being envisaged, 

indeed discussed, but not without feeding into fears about the future of warfare.

Development and Diversification

With robots being so visible, used on the ground and deployed in various operations, 

every military professional is at liberty to conceive uses to satisfy his or her needs. “In 

the case of robots,” Colonel Michel Goya writes, “we need to bear in mind this lock-in 

effect created by the first mine clearing devices, in order to go beyond it and imagine other 

ramifications in line with a cumulative and exponential process.”15

According to this perspective of progressive introduction—inseparable from the 

growing use of robots in civil domains and from the technological progress being made—the 

US Department of Defense identified four priorities for robotized systems looking forward 

to 2030: reconnaissance and surveillance, the identification and designation of targets, 

neutralizing explosive devices, and reconnaissance in contaminated, polluted or boobytrapped zones.16 However, these orientations do not exclude the possibility of pursuing 

work in other directions, as is suggested by the authors of the Robotics Strategy White 

Paper, who distinguish five possible fields for the deployment of robots: logistics, security 

(understood as the protection of sites and locations or the control of traffic flow), clearing 

up the battlefield, health and maintenance. Rather than coming up with programs along set 

budgetary lines, it is above all a matter of determining broad orientations designed to create 

synergy in terms of research and costs between the different branches of the armed forces, 

and encouraging the sharing of information.

We are still a long way away from replacing the human combatant with the machine. 

The second element to be considered with regard to current processes is that the integration 

of ground robots will not follow a linear progression, and a lot of persuasion will be 

necessary. In the United States, even if the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have spurred 

on the search for robotized solutions to counter IEDs, the main financial contributor in this 
8

area has been the US Navy. Likewise, the abandonment of several projects in the BCTM 

program testifies to the extent of the questions being asked within the US Army, heightened 

by budgetary restrictions. However, it should not be forgotten that robotics is not solely the 

fruit of military research alone. The US Federal budget in 2012, for example, earmarked 

$30 million for the National Robotics Initiative, an inter-agency program incorporating 

among others NASA and the Department of Agriculture, and designed to accelerate the 

development and use of robots alongside human beings. Within this context, asking 

questions in the armed forces about the integration of robots amounts in effect to preparing 

for the wars of tomorrow.

On the Utility of Robots in Ground Combat

While military reflections on what robotics has to offer in the fields of logistics and 

medical evacuation reflect the desire to economize on human resources and save the lives 

of soldiers, the tactical utility of robots relates to the capacity of military forces to get the 

upper hand over the enemy on the battlefield, this being the primary and priority mission 

for all military tools.

Would the Uzbeen ambush on 18 August 2008, in the course of which 10 French 

soldiers were killed, have gone any differently if the section of the 8th RPIMa (Marine 

Infantry Parachute Regiment) had possessed robotized systems? Initially, a UGV or a UAV 

could have been used for reconnoitering and approaching the mountain pass, in order to 

observe the opposite flank. Once the section had been engaged by the Taliban, robots could 

have reinforced the defensive measures of the Paras, supplied ammunition or deployed 

weapons in order to get the better of the enemy combatants.17 These armed robots could 

also have been kept with the rearguard in order to provide long-range cover, both precise 

and insensitive to enemy suppressive fire.

Questioning what ground robots could have contributed to Uzbeen amounts to 

examining their utility on the battlefield. In this regard, it is already possible to observe 

that reconnaissance has proven to be one of the two essential missions of robots today, 

alongside the neutralization of explosive devices. Yet to return to the case of Uzbeen, the 

added value that a ground robot might offer for observation compared to a drone is not 

evident. On account of its position, the drone would offer a better view of the mountain 

pass and its surrounding area. As long as it is controlled by an operator outside of the unit, it 

is not part of the “payload” of the unit. Lastly, it may be armed. All of this notwithstanding, 

a ground robot has two advantages over its aerial counterpart with regard to reconnaissance 

missions. On the one hand, it can use the resources in the field to progress under cover 

to places that a soldier cannot reach, and provide information about the suspect element 

following processing. In this way it would act as a discreet sensor and mobile manipulator, 

and is moreover used in this function by police units and special forces in several countries. 

Also, UAVs have difficulty observing closed environments, such as the interior of a room 

or a cave (except for the smaller drones).

Concerning uses other than reconnaissance, there are multiple possibilities: protecting 

sites and bases, destruction-neutralization of enemy elements or equipment, diversions 

when triggering an offensive, or covering the flanks of armies operating in vacuum areas, 

etc. It is for example possible to envisage, when capturing a village, deploying robots to 
9

control the open spaces or a road link, with the robot offering the benefits of its precise 

sensors and its weaponry without exposing a forward group. Israeli laboratories and 

manufacturers, whose country is in conflict with identified and known enemies, go further 

still. Robots need to make it possible for enemy leaders to be hit wherever they may be. 

So it was that during Operation Cast Lead, at the turn of 2008-2009 in the Gaza Strip, the 

Hamas leaders were said to be hidden beneath the pediatric wing of Shifa hospital, making 

it impossible to eliminate them through bombing or the dispatching of commandos. Yet a 

very small “killer” robot would have been quite capable of accomplishing the task. Against 

another army, and along the same lines, another Israeli project being studied consists in 

sending swarms of kamikaze drones against enemy batteries, according to an approach 

based on saturation, comparable to the doctrinal reflections carried out in Iran and China 

in the field of naval warfare.

Autonomy: an Essential Question

Any reflections on the use of robots invariably relate back to their autonomy. The 

soldiers who came under ambush in Uzbeen had other concerns than preparing a robot 

designed to be sent into the enemy positions and piloted by one of the members of the 

section. They had neither the time nor the human resources to control one or more robots.

To bring real tactical added value to armies affected by reduced numbers, the autonomy 

of robots is essential in this regard. It is first of all a means of getting away from the notion of 

one operator (or several operators) for one robot, and having several devices controlled by 

one operator. This implies an autonomy of movement and a capability to identify potential 

targets, a sound or vision system to warn of intruders, even automatic firing capability 

in certain armies. In the field of anti-aircraft combat, the US Navy thus considers the 

involvement of man in the decision-making loop to authorize opening fire with the Phalanx 

system as a factor that limits optimal defense capability. On the border between the two 

Koreas, the SGR-A1 system, deployed by South Korea, also has autonomous targeting and 

capability to initiate fire. As far as the US Army is concerned, it is said to have developed 

“robotized snipers,” and the Norwegian manufacturer, Kongsberg, is said to propose a 

turreted system capable of firing autonomously. There are high-tech devices designed to 

take the place of the soldier in the modern arena of battle, with automation appearing 

desirable on account of the performance and efficiency it offers.

With this in mind, the capability of discriminating between targets is one of the main 

issues linked to robotics: distinguishing friend from enemy, combatant from civilian. Yet 

as pointed out by the authors of a report from the Office of Naval Research of the US 

Navy, even if discrimination is above all a matter of making progress in programming 

and artificial intelligence, other approaches are being explored: deploying armed robots 

exclusively in “kill boxes;” programming the robot to fire exclusively on vehicles or 

weapons; or equipping it only with reduced lethality weapons.18

There remain however many ethical and legal problems and, for the countries that 

signed the Ottawa Treaty its observance requires that human control is exercised over 

the weapons of a robotized system.19 Behind this approach to man and warfare, the fact 

nonetheless remains that autonomy is what makes robots so useful. The combatant must 

be able to assign a mission to a robot and then concentrate on other tasks, while being able 
10

to receive any warning messages and taking control of the program, for example in order 

to identify a potential target and, if necessary, authorize opening fire (by the robot or not). 

The robot—or the group of robots—resembles in this regard a simple pawn in the hands 

of the section leader, comparable to a combatant or a fire team carrying out a mission and 

reporting back if required. 

Fears, Questions, and Reproduction

Even if technology is the stuff of dreams, it can also breed fears, and not just because a 

robot can get “bugs.” Indeed, as the popular saying goes, to err is human. Nor is it simply 

the fact that by entrusting your future to a robot you are entrusting it to something whose 

operation is only understood by a handful of engineers.

Mistrust about machines relates first and foremost to the representations of warfare and 

the profession of the soldier. For soldiers who place honour and passion at the heart of their 

profession, constructing robots to wage war without men amounts to creating inhumanity.20

This mistrust, however, extends beyond just the framework of the military institutions 

and the war machine. “Today, more than ever,” says the robotics engineer, Frédéric Kaplan, 

“our Western conception of man is entirely founded in our appreciation of the performance 

as well as of the limits of machines. We see ourselves reflected in the mirror of the machines 

that we are able to build, and in this reflection we evaluate our difference.”21 In other 

words, with each new machine, there is a potential redefinition of our humanity, of that 

“something” which makes human beings different from these animated objects which are 

sometimes endowed with speech. The second implication, in order to prevent a machine 

calling into question this very foundation of human nature, is that it needs to be set against 

man. Hence the appeal of the argument: “Machines only do what they’re programmed 

to do, they don’t ‘understand’ what they do; we have emotions, machines only simulate 

them.”22

As well as this identity dimension, the integration of robots within military forces 

begs the delicate question of “what to do with them.” Aside from the applications of 

reconnaissance in confined spaces and the neutralization of explosive devices—missions, 

ultimately, which equate to excessive exposure to danger, the paradox of a profession in 

which danger is by definition accepted—the use of robots remains an extremely grey area. 

One of the interviews conducted in the United States by Second Lieutenant Piraud with a 

professor at the US Naval Academy, offers revealing insight into this:

Second Lt Piraud: “How do you go about taking into account the needs of the army?”

Professor B: “Well, I sit at my desk, as I’m doing here, with a naval officer, say. I 

explain to him what I’m technically capable of doing. I explain to him that, in order 

for me to design something, he needs to give me a mission to fulfill for my robots, a 

precise mission. The problem is that he himself does not know what he expects from 

me, he does not know what mission these robots may be used for.”

Many people outside the military also note this lack of an overcharging plan. iRobot 

executives complain that the military forces “still think of robots as RC [remote-control] 

cars.”23
11

The various armed forces do not all have the same relationship with technology. The 

Air Force tends to be more technophile than the Army. However, this absence of vision is 

a classic feature of the innovation process in institutions.24 The users, used to working with 

their usual tools, do not necessarily perceive the potential applications of new equipment 

which do not fit the box of institutional thinking. Bureaucracies are loath to innovate, 

and tend to favor progressive changes based on legacy. Reluctant to change, they are 

themselves designed not to change, with a whole set of mechanisms whose purpose is 

to produce stability. Therefore, when the impact of new technologies in terms of costs 

and utility is not clear, and when these come into conflict with the ethos of a section of 

the profession, the tendency to pursue what you know how to do predominates. Even so, 

warfare is undergoing change.

On War in the Age of Robots

Will robots change the course of warfare? For Peter W. Singer, far more than the 

Internet and a network-centric approach that has proven incapable of dispelling the fog 

of war, robots constitute a “revolution” affecting how to fight and who does the fighting.25

Robotic Game Changers....

The technological breakthrough that robots represent is exercised first of all in the 

relationship between people and war. During the 20th Century, war was waged by people 

subject to conscription. With professionalization, this link was weakened, and with robots, 

the dissociation between society and the use of armed force has increased in amplitude. 

Consequent to the reduced risk of friendly human losses, war appears to be a far easier tool 

to use with far less risk for the decision-makers.

If this notion takes in the work involved in coercive diplomacy along with the 

experience of the war in Kosovo and the operations conducted by the UAVs of the CIA in 

Yemen and Pakistan, the passivity of public opinion is not limited to wartime, and is part 

of a more general groundswell. Sociologists indeed concur in observing a lesser role for 

the people within democracies, and not only in Europe or North America. More precisely, 

as Pascal Vennesson points out, “The forces of democracy remain unchanged, but a system 

of governance has been put in place in which the people play a diminished role, while the 

reality of power is increasingly controlled by the elites.”26 Even after the 9/11 attacks in 

2001, American society was barely affected by the active participation of the people: no 

mobilization, few mechanisms to give local communities a voice with respect to national 

projects, the choice of the authorities to take recourse to an intervention in Afghanistan led 

by special forces against a background of professional management of media messages by 

the political authorities and not-for-profit associations.27

A second development is that the sensors of drones and robots enable what Peter W. 

Singer calls the rise of the “tactical general,” echoing the notion of the “strategic corporal” 

developed in the 1990s.28 The profusion and availability of images, added to the small 

number of active personnel in the theaters of operations, indeed encourage the telescoping 

of the levels of decision-making, with the interference of the highest echelons in the 

scope of responsibility of the lower echelons, which are thereby divested of the exclusive 

assessment of the tactical situation. Yet, here again, this trend goes back to before the 
12

introduction of robots in the Armed Forces. Robots are only mobile sensors, whose cost of 

acquisition and operation facilitates their multiplication.

For the combatant, or at least for some of them, the break is still cleaner. With the 

distancing from the battlefield, the controllers of drones in the United States experience the 

war at long-distance, in front of a screen, back in their own country. It may be considered 

in a way as the ultimate stage of development initiated with the invention of the slingshot, 

then continued with the bow and arrow and then the firearm, and consisting in getting as 

far away as possible from your enemy in order to kill them, and so reducing the risks of 

getting killed yourself. For the military, it is therefore the experience of combat that is 

changing. There is no longer any need to depart for an operation. It is possible to work 

inside a room, sheltered from any threat, commanding machines to fire missiles between 

two coffee breaks, and then going home in the evening for dinner with the wife and kids.

.... and the Invariables of Warfare

These breakthroughs, according to Peter W. Singer, are simply the premises for a 

revolution. The robots of tomorrow will be far more sophisticated than those of today and, 

following on from robots which depend on men, there will be more and more men who 

depend on robots. 

At the same time, however, the introduction of robots does not change the essence of 

warfare. Certainly, the drone missions operated by the CIA testify to the greater liberty 

of action open to the US security services thanks to robotics. Yet clandestine operations 

existed well before the development of these devices. War remains a confrontation of 

wills between two entities or groups which use their resources—human and economic—in 

order to produce a state that they consider to be better. “At the end of the day, whatever 

technological ‘revolutions’ there may be, war does not change its very nature. [...] 

Robots, however sophisticated they may be, will not be able to replace the essential: 

our determination to assume the cost of combat.”29 However, what may well be changed 

is the accepted and assumed cost: less blood spilled, yet just as much or indeed more 

money expended. Far more than the issue of the population, it will be the economic and 

technological capacities that will be crucial in the wars of the 21st Century, along with the 

capacity to integrate robots, their quantity, and how they fit in with the other units.

According to this perspective of war as a social phenomenon, several pundits, such 

as the Australian David Kilcullen, and the American Ralph Peters, have denounced the 

counter-productive use of robots on the strategic level. According to this argument, robots 

undermine Western societies and their credibility, and the use by foreign armies of robots 

also testifies, in the minds of the Afghans, to the incapacity of the Americans and their 

allies to protect them.30 This argument, which relates to the meaning of war and how it is 

understood by the other parties present, needs however to be placed in a broader context. 

The image of foreign armies is not conveyed simply through their recourse to robotics. 

In fact, this chimes with the feeling that Western armies would be unwilling to lose too 

many of their soldiers in Afghanistan. This criticism is not new, and it is fanned by the 

propaganda of the Taliban and their allies. Also, even for Lyautey, the icon of a certain idea 

of counter-insurgency, the use of force to suppress any notions of revolt would appear to be 
13

a necessity. In this sense, robots may conversely create a situation of superiority, propitious 

to the implementation of stabilization operations.

There can be no technical solution, moreover, without an operational doctrine. The 

example of French tanks during the campaign of May-June 1940 is quite familiar: despite 

possessing fewer tanks, and of inferior quality, than the French army, the German army 

was able to make better use of them by grouping them into armored divisions.31 Even if 

today robots are employed in support of units, Singer insists quite rightly on the need to 

ask questions about the development of a doctrine. Should we employ robotized platforms 

like humanized platforms? Should we, conversely, develop new doctrines in order to take 

account of the innovation constituted by the advent of robotized systems?32

Still, according to Singer, the doctrinal debate is structured around two approaches 

strongly influenced by reflections in the aviation and naval fields: the “mother robot” 

and “robot swarms.” The principle of the “mother robot”—sometimes called “marsupial 

robot”—corresponds to the concept of having a main robot (or else a manned vehicle) 

which carries with it other, smaller robots. The main robot may be either autonomous 

or remotely controlled, but the robots depending on it are themselves quasi-autonomous. 

The second concept of use, “robot swarms,” is also inspired by the animal world. Swarm 

systems seek to reproduce the behavior of predators which hunt in packs or of birds and 

bees which work together. Each animal chooses how to move individually but altogether 

they form an organized and efficient group. These two approaches offer rich potential, with 

the choice between the two being based on the robots developed, their missions and the 

considered timeframe. For surveillance or attack robots, the swarm makes it possible to 

create functional redundancy, to saturate the enemy defenses, and to limit the cost of the 

robots destroyed. Conversely, in the case of robotized support weapons or larger robots, 

centralization may seem more appropriate, with a human team controlling several robots.

Whatever the case, the doctrinal aspect of the integration of robots, a new tool in the 

hands of the military organizations, is all the more important insofar as they are not the 

sole province of the Western armies. During the war in the Lebanon in 2006, the Hezbollah 

combatants used several types of robots against Israeli forces and, today, over 40 countries 

are working on robotization.

Robots and the Action-Reaction Cycle

Unlike in the Second World War, in the field of robotics it will no longer be the size 

of the gun or the skill of the gunners, the fact of possessing radios or else the size of the 

fuel tanks which will make the difference between two armies, but the program of the 

robot and its capacity to tackle the threats and pitfalls of the battlefield. For every action 

there follows a reaction, according to a cycle whose only notable variable is the duration.33 

In Afghanistan, to prevent mine clearance robots from accessing explosive devices, the 

latter were installed in garbage cans, or in camouflaged holes. Another example, in 2009, 

involved Iraqi insurgents who, probably with the aid of Iran, intercepted images transmitted 

to American units on the ground by a Predator drone, using software enabling the pirating 

of TV broadcasts via satellite, such as the Sky Grabber program, which could at the time 

be downloaded from the Internet for $26.
14

The advent of robots has therefore created fault lines, of which piracy is but one 

expression. More generally, the choice of using remotely operated robots brings into focus 

the fragility of the link between the robot and its operator: limited available bandwidth, 

vulnerability of the data flows, absence of security for the civilian satellite resources used 

by the European armies, against the background of a growing threat of cybernetic warfare 

(or of a cybernetic dimension in a conflict). Even autonomous robots are reliant on these 

links, whether for communicating with one another or for receiving modified commands. 

By way of example, the guidance of French Harfang drones in Afghanistan is carried out 

through the rental of a civilian satellite shared with certain international mass media.

Another possibility resides in fooling the sensors, as the Taliban are already doing in 

Afghanistan, or in artificial intelligence. Once the behavior of the robots has been analyzed, 

the enemy combatants will put in place traps designed to fool, or even destroy them. Each 

conflict serves as a reminder that combatants learn according to a learning curve, and 

following the introduction of new equipment, the observation phase is succeeded by the 

implementation of countermeasures. At all levels of warfare, superiority generates a logic 

of working around and exploiting vulnerabilities, starting with the power requirements of 

the robot and the link connecting it with its army.

Conclusion

The robotization of the battlefield has barely been sketched out. Until now, the use of 

robots on the battlefield has been informed by lessons learned from the experience of the 

conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and, for Israel, in the Near East. For military organizations, 

understanding the impact of the technological innovations on future wars is not, however, 

self-evident. As pointed out by the historian, Martin van Creveld, in his book Technology 

and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present, “during the 20th Century, [...] none of the main 

equipment that transformed warfare—from the aircraft to the battle tank...—was born out 

of the doctrinal needs formulated by people in uniform.”34

The main difficulty of armies when faced with this technological innovation resides 

in the uncertainties concerning the enemy, along with the costs and utility of the technical 

responses. The scientists, for their part, have no more clearer vision than the military of 

the advantages of the technological innovations for the military. In such a context, the US 

academic, Stephen P. Rosen, considers that military forces need to adopt a technological 

approach favouring versatility, adaptability and flexibility, in other words, to work towards 

producing equipment that could be used in the majority of situations, corresponding to 

current economic and human constraints and to what we learn about the enemies of today 

and of tomorrow. Likewise, for models or technologies that carry with them too great an 

uncertainty, a complementary approach consists in pursuing research and development and 

asking questions regarding usage, while postponing decisions for large-scale production 

and favoring an exploratory approach within a military force in order to define uses and 

doctrines.35

Even if strategies do exist for controlling uncertainty—as applied by the US Air Force 

and Navy with regard to missiles between 1945 and 1955—their success nonetheless implies 

manufacturers continuing to pursue their work, decision-makers allocating resources, but 
15

also reflection within the Army on the impact of robotization on the battlefield and the 

possible uses for robots. In this regard, the publication by the French Army chief of staff of 

an exploratory concept constitutes incontestable and, above all, necessary progress for any 

future developments in the field of robotization. The fact remains that the regiments and 

military schools are also major players with regard to the experiments and brainstorming 

conducted in association with the chiefs of staff and the intelligence services in order to 

identify needs, move beyond the traditional reluctance to change, and favor the circulation 

of knowledge and ideas.

Robotization, in correlation with nanotechnologies, expands in any case the range of 

possibilities for producing new equipment that could meet precise needs in conjunction 

with the existing tools. Yet we need to keep in mind that many of the future uses of robots 

still remain imponderable. “Before a new weapon reaches full maturity,” wrote Camille 

Rougeron in 1939, “its use goes through several stages: the first is as a modest auxiliary for 

the weapons currently in place....In the second stage of its development, the new weapon is 

admitted into direct combat use....In the third and last stage, it has its own specific missions 

created for it, which now are only indirectly related with how the conduct of operations 

was envisaged prior to its conception.”36 As such, tomorrow’s wars have only just begun.
16

Notes

1. This text is a slightly abridged version of a document produced for IRSEM in 2011.

2. For the US essayist, Peter W. Singer, a robot is defined by four criteria: it is a machine 

constructed by man; it possesses sensors in order to apprehend its environment; it is programmed in 

order to be able to define a response; and it is able to implement this response (P. W. Singer, Wired 

for War, New York, 2009). This definition enables the inclusion of fixed systems, whereas other 

definitions exclude them, considering mobility to be a criterion that defines a robot.

3. Éric Germain, “2010: année zéro des guerres robotisées” (“2010: year zero for robotised 

wars”) Revue Défense Nationale, No. 740, May 2011, 119-121. According to Éric Germain, armed 

US drone strikes are said to have killed 1000 people in 2010 in the Afghan-Pakistani theater of 

operations.

4. The benefits expected by the promoters of UGVs include reducing the loads carried by 

combatants and thereby improving their capability to take cover and increasing their firepower.

5. Final year dissertation of Second Lieutenant Piraud, defended at the Écoles de Saint-Cyr 

Coëtquidan, 2010.

6. Joseph Henrotin, “La robotique, acteur de la contre-insurrection?” (“Robotics: protagonist 

in counter-insurgency?”), Défense et Sécurité Internationale (International Defence and Security), 

No. 10, Special issue, 2010, 72-74.

7. On the training of bodies, see the works of Michel Foucault. See also the work of S.L.A. 

Marshall on the Second World War ( S.L.A. Marshall, Men Against Fire. The Problem of Battle 

Command, (Norman, 2000).

8. P. W. Singer, Wired for War, 22, 32.

9. Jean-Marie Hossate, “Quand Tsahal roule des mécaniques...high-tech. La guerre 

télécommandée” (“When Tsahal flexes its high-tech muscles. Remote-controlled warfare”), Le 

Monde Magazine, 4 September 2010, 26-29.

10. Robotics Strategy White Paper, March 2009. This document was the result of collaboration 

between the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and the Tank Automotive 

Research, Development and Engineering Center (TARDEC).

11. The Rapid Fielding Initiative was first conceived in 2002, in response to the equipment 

needs of the soldiers deployed in Afghanistan. This came about because the military institution 

had come to realise that these soldiers, or their units, were buying their own equipment in order to 

mitigate the lack or inadequacy of the equipment provided in the theater of operations. In France, 

“operational emergency” purchases follow the same principle; the Joint IED Defeat Organization 

was urgently launched by the Pentagon to counter the threat represented by improvised explosive 

devices. Between 2004 and 2006, over $6 billion were spent on this program. These efforts 

culminated in particular in the development of MRAP (Mine Resistant Ambush Protected) vehicles, 

designed to be particularly resistant to mines and other improvised explosive devices.

12. When launching the FCS program, General Shinseki turned towards DARPA on account of 

the agency’s experience in the management of conceptual and difficult projects, but also because he 

could anticipate opposition on the part of the upper echelons of the American army, which would 

have preferred more tanks and armored vehicles (Andrew Feickert and Nathan Jacob Lucas, Army 

Future Combat System (FCS) “Spin-Outs” and Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV): Background and 

Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, 30 November 2009, 2.

13. General George W. Casey, Jr., “BCT Modernization: Versatile Capabilities for an Uncertain 

Future”, globalsecurity.org, 19 February 2010.

14. Classes II and III correspond, according to the classification of the FCS program, to the 

company and to the battalion respectively.
17

15. Michel Goya, “Quand la machine s’éveillera” (“When the machine will wake up”), Défense 

et Sécurité Internationale (International Defence and Security), No. 10, Special issue, 2010, 31.

16. Office of the Secretary of Defense Unmanned Systems Roadmap (2007-2032), December 

2007. This is the first edition of the document.

17. Michel Goya, “Des robots à Uzbeen” (“Robots in Uzbeen”), La lettre d’analyse du Centre 

de Recherche des Écoles de Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan (Letter of analysis of the Écoles de Saint-Cyr 

Coëtquidan Research Centre), No. 1, 10-11.

18. Patrick Lin, George Bekey, and Keith Abney, Autonomous Military Robotics: Risk Ethics, 

and Design, report produced by the California Polytechnic State University for the Office of Naval 

Research of the US Navy, December 2008, 91.

19. The Ottawa Treaty prohibits the use of antipersonnel mines and, more generally, any weapon 

system that is unable to distinguish between combatants and non-combatants.

20. Clauden Barrois, Psychanalyse du guerrier (Psychoanalysis of the Warrior), Paris: Hachette, 

1993, “Pluriel” collection, chapter VIII.

21. Georges Chapoutier and Frédéric Kaplan, L’Homme, l’Animal et la Machine (Man, Animal 

and Machine), (Paris, 2011), 122.

22. Chapoutier and Kaplan, L’Homme, l’Animal et la Machine, 123.

23. Quoted in Singer, Wired For War, 211.

24. For the dynamics of the innovation process in the Armed Forces, see Stephen P. Rosen, 

Winning the Next War, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1991, Part 1. See also Barry R. 

Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine. France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars, 

Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1984. 

25. Peter W. Singer, Wired for War, 192-194.

26. Pascal Vennesson, “La guerre sans le peuple?” (“War without the people?”), in Frédéric 

Ramel and Jean-Vincent Holeindre (dir.), La fin des guerres majeures (The end of major wars),

(Paris, 2010) 213.

27. Pascal Vennesson, “La guerre sans le peuple?” 215.

28. P. W. Singer, Wired for War, 343. Developed by Gen Charles Krulak of the US Marine 

Corps, the notion of “strategic corporal” relates to the idea that the action of a simple soldier may 

have repercussions on the entire strategy.

29. Commandant Damien Rouillé, “Les robots au combat, une révolution?” (“Robots in combat: 

a revolution?”), LeMonde.Fr, 21 December 2010.

30. Commandant Frédéric Fayeux, “Terminator versus Talibans”, Défense et Sécurité 

Internationale (International Defence and Security), April 2010, No. 58, 76-79.

31. On this question, see Karl-Heinz Frieser, “Le mythe de la guerre-éclair. La campagne de 

l’Ouest de 1940” (“The myth of the Blitzkrieg: the Western front campaign of 1940”), (Paris, 2003).

32. P. W. Singer, Wired for War. 343. See also by the same author: “Wired for War? Robots and 

Military Doctrine”, Joint Force Quarterly, No. 52, first quarter 2009, 104-110.

33. Edward Luttwak, “Le grand livre de la stratégie” (“The big book of strategy”), (Paris, 

2002,) 67-68.

34. Martin van Creveld, Technology and War: From 2000 B.C. to the Present, (New York, 1989), 

220.

35. Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War, 243-250.

36. Camille Rougeron, Les enseignements aériens de la guerre d’Espagne (Aerial lessons from the 

Spanish Civil War) Paris : Berger-Levrault, 1939. Quoted by Lt. Marie Bubenicek, in “Les 100 ans de 

l’hélicoptère. Perspectives” (“100 years of the helicopter: perspectives”), Air actualités (Air news), No. 

604, September 2007. 40-41.

19

Chapter 3

Robots, Cyber, History, and War 

by Mark Hagerott

Introduction

The world is on the cusp of a profound event in history: the creation of the lethal, 

autonomous robot. 

Such time as this requires clear thinking, for the emergence of the technical possibility 

of Lethal Autonomous Robots (LAR) creates a paradox that NATO nations cannot escape. 

On the one hand, our potential enemies will most likely develop certain types of the lethal 

autonomous robot, that if NATO has not done likewise, the resulting capability gap put 

us at a military disadvantage and our security at risk. On the other hand, if NATO nations 

develop and then allow the export of certain types of lethal autonomous robots to repressive 

regimes, some of these recipient countries can use LAR against their civilian population, 

the result being human rights violations on an historic scale, an abuse made possible by 

advanced NATO nations. Policy makers and military officers must confront this paradox 

and seek a way forward. 

As policy makers and military officers approach the paradox of LAR, historical context 

and a new framework for thinking are essential. It will be argued that the emergence of LAR 

is part the larger historical evolution of technology. Over the past several thousand years 

the development of technology has created three realms of warfare: the Social-Human, the 

Integrated Realm of man-machine, and the Machine Realm.1

As military officials come to understand that historical processes have created three 

realms of conflict, and that all military development and employment decisions can be 

situated in one or more of the three realms, than greater resolution of the paradox of LAR 

becomes possible. Placed in the framework of the three Realms, it is possible to navigate 

the paradox, to see how it can be urgent that NATO develop LAR designed for machine to 

machine combat in the Machine Realm, but at the same time, proceed with great caution 

the development of LAR designed to operate against human populations in the SocialHuman Realm of conflict. Moreover, the possibility that cyber operations and cyber 

hacking can corrupt the algorithms of these unmanned electronic control systems argues 

for early, careful thinking on the subject. We turn now to better understanding what are the 

three realms, and how did they come about over the course of history. 

Historic Evolution of Warfare: Three Realms Emerge

Over the past 1000 years, technological advancement has created three Realms of 

conflict and war. War began exclusively as a human activity (the Social-Human Realm) 

perhaps as long ago as the rise of agriculture, several millennia ago. To be sure, humans 

used and will continue to use technology in the Social-Human Realm. Possessing and 

creating technology is partly what sets humans apart. In the early years of warfare in the 

Social-Human realm, tools were rudimentary and human wit, will, and strength determined 

the outcome of battles. The Social-Human Realm still exists, and will exist as long as human 

societies remain, but it is no longer the only realm of conflict. Over several centuries the 
20

tools of war became progressively more machine-like and important to the battlefield, and 

in the process created an integration of man and machine, what can be called the Integrated 

Realm of conflict. 

While the rise of truly integrated man-machine warfare (Integrated Realm) did not 

happen instantaneously, at some point the density of man-machine integration became 

strategically significant. When military operations entered this new realm cannot be 

pinpointed precisely, but the new realm had certainly emerged by the 16th century in 

warfare at sea. A candidate date the emergence of the new realm is 1588 in war at sea 

between Spain and England, when the integration of man and his complex machine created 

decisive advantage on the battlefield. As a study of history shows, a mere half generation 

earlier, integrated man-machine systems were not as decisive: men fought men, hand to 

hand, even at sea. In 1571 the ‘Christian’ fleet turned back the Ottoman fleet in the Battle 

of Lepanto, fought for the most part on galleys jammed with soldiers who surged back 

and forth across the tangled decks, killing their opponent man to man. It was to be the last 

massed, human-infantry, muscle-powered galley battle at sea, a form of Social-Human 

massed warfare that had lasted almost 2,000 years. A mere seventeen years later in 1588 a 

new realm of warfare emerged, the Integrated Realm of man-machine at sea, the realm of 

close integration of human technical experts and their gunpowder-powered machines, but 

only one of the two opponents adequately prepared for the change in 1588. 

When the Spanish set sail against England, they planned to fight man to man: their 

Armada was jammed with approximately tens of thousands of Spanish soldiers who waited 

to grapple, board, and then kill or capture the Englishmen. In contrast, the English perceived 

the change in warfare and adapted their ships and warfighting doctrine to artillery duels at 

sea, and then trained for what became a running gun battle. And, the English adaptation 

was a decisive break with the past: they embarked few if any soldiers to counter the Spanish 

infantry hordes.2

 Sea combat had entered the Integrated Realm of warfare at sea, where 

close integration of man and their machines would prove decisive. English ship handling 

and longer range cannon enabled the increasingly specialized artillerymen to kill masses 

of Spanish infantry as they stood on their own Spanish decks, men who never did grapple 

“man to man” with the English.

The closer integration of human and machine continued to accelerate in successive 

centuries after the Armada of 1588. Ships were no longer measured by how many soldiers 

they could carry but by how many guns. The multi-gun decked “Ships of the Line,” 

became the forerunners of battleships that would duel at Jutland. On land, soldiers began 

to integrate more closely with their gun, muscular archers giving way to artillery specialists 

who, by the later 1800s, dueled almost out of visual range. The gun became synonymous 

with the machine (think “machine gun”), operated by a specialist, the “machine gunner.” In 

the First World War, in an effort to reduce the wastage of human life as soldiers advanced 

into the withering fire of machine weapons, the armored tank was created, an even closer 

integration of human and machine.3

The integration of human and machine in the early 20th century gave rise to whole 

new domains of warfare, those of undersea and in the air, where submarine sailors and 

pilots were valued primarily for their ability to integrate with and operate a machine.4
21

By the end of the Second World War and early Cold War, with the development of solid 

state electronics and computers, there began the creation of an almost entirely artificial 

realm of action, nearly devoid of human beings, the Machine Realm. However, until the 

development of advanced intelligence algorithms, humans had to necessarily pilot, and 

through data links control, the machines that fought and roamed the battle space. Possibly 

this year, in 2013, we will witness the first truly autonomous lethal machines that can patrol 

and maneuver without direct or extended range human control. 

How to Think About Robots in Three Realms 

Why will thinking in three Realms help solve the paradox of the Lethal Autonomous 

Robot (LAR)? When approaching questions of military employment, most military writers 

have typically framed their thinking of the battlefield by dimensional space or physical 

domains: air, ground, sea, subsurface. Such a system of classifications indeed has its 

place, but is no longer sufficient to address new issues brought about by the potentiality of 

autonomous, lethal robotics. Recent literature on robotics has struggled with questions that 

cross dimensional (domain) boundaries.5

 Moreover, an analytical structure that is merely 

physical is incapable of framing the moral implications that are emerging in proximity 

to lethal autonomous machines.6

 Organizing our approach to war in three Realms not 

only frames an historical reality, but will help to clarify such thinking and help guide 

the resolution of the paradox: which robotic machines to develop urgently to ensure our 

security, and which robot programs risk human rights implications, and thus to delay 

production of these systems, pending further study. 

The three realms can be depicted graphically, see Figure 1. At the top of the shaded 

areas is the Machine Realm, an environment that is more hospitable to machines than men 

(e.g., upper atmosphere, the open ocean, the sea bottom, cyberspace); at the bottom of the 

shaded areas is the realm of most social-human activity. The Social-Human Realm is that 

area of action where social considerations are central, and moral-ethical-political factors 

take on supreme importance (e.g., trusting an ally, creating alliances, behavior of crowds, 

perceptions of moral violation as at Abu Ghraib prison). In the Social-Human Realm, 

human communications and relationships are the most decisive factors (at least until such 

time as robots can become lifelike and perhaps impersonate humans, which seems a long 

way off and will not be discussed in this essay). 

In the middle of the spectrum is the realm of mixed activity, the Integrated Realm where 

machine-human activity resides, where integrated machine-human systems are decisive 

factors in military operations. In the Integrated Realm, human activity is less social, and 

is more mechanistic and closely related or connected to manned machine operations. 

For example, the human specialist who fires his Stinger missile system against manned 

combat aircraft is operating in the Integrated Realm of warfare. While the operators of 

these machines are still human, by nature of their mechanical-military activity their death 

typically is associated with the neutralization of the machine platform, and thus carries less 

political-moral significance as compared to the Social-Human realm where, for example, 

the abuse of prisoners or the killing of street protestors can undermine governments or 

entire alliances. 
22

The three realm framework helps put structure to what we know intuitively: the further 

away from Social-Human realm of action, the more appropriate, even desirable, would 

seem the employment of autonomous, lethal robots. But how so? An additional tool can 

help identify where lethal autonomous robotic development might be most productively 

directed. 

Beginning with the first “Ships of the Line,” combat capability began to be 

mathematically quantified in terms of machine characteristics, in ways still relevant to 

contemporary calculations of military power, and relevant to consideration of robots. The 

transformational warships of the 17th century were rated by the lethality of the iron shot 

they hurled at the enemy, a combination of the number of guns they carried and the weight 

of their broadside. They were also valued for their rate of fire (their speed of delivering 

repeated broadsides). Another measure of combat value was the delinking of operations 

from human input, the shift from manpower intensive galleys to more autonomous 

(labor saving and logistic saving) of wind powered sails. I would argue that these three 

characteristics, so important in the measure of the first complex systems, can be applied as 

a guide today when investing in robots. Where are the advantages of lethality, automation/

autonomy, and speed most valued? I would suggest that once again, the highest value is in 

the Machine Realm, not in a crowded, complicated Social Human realm. Let’s explore this 

suggestion in more detail. 

Robots in the Machine Realm

As noted previously, the Machine Realm is related to dimensional space that is typically 

unnatural or minimally hospitable to human habitation, e.g., the air, space, subsurface 

sea, open ocean, or especially lethal land battlefields such as would follow chemicalFigure 1. Three Realms of Conflict: Machine, Integrated, Social-Human. 

 Source: Created by Author.

Primacy of social factors and values 

(Social-Human Realm)

Integrated human and machine 

action (Integrated Realm)

Least inhabited (mostly 

accessible by machine, 

Machine Realm)

Primacy of social factors and values 

(Social-Human Realm)

Integrated human and machine 

action (Integrated Realm)

Least inhabited (mostly 

accessible by machine, 

Machine Realm)
23

radiological-nuclear weapons use.7 To operate in these spaces, increased automation or 

autonomy of machines takes on greater importance. Speed of operations is also a prime 

consideration in Machine Realm: given the increasing speed of advanced weapons, and 

complexity of machine combat systems, human reaction times may be too slow, and 

hence machines may dominate a region that might otherwise be habitable for humans. 

The higher speeds of microprocessors may be crucial to remain inside an enemy’s OODA 

loop.8

 Finally, lethality is a key feature of the machine realm: machines are not taken 

prisoner by other machines, nor are they persuaded to ‘give up’; machines typically strive 

for a ‘mission kill’ when employed against other machines. Examples of current military 

systems employed at the far edge of the Machine Realm include military satellites, antisatellite weapons, submarine launched weapons, ground to air systems (such as the US 

Navy’s AEGIS weapons systems and PHALANX in auto-modes), and military computer 

programs operating in cyberspace.

As shown in Figure 1, there is not a sharp line of demarcation between those regions 

that are solely the realm of machines and those that become Integrated. But our experience 

tells us such a theoretical demarcation is approximated in reality: there is minimal human 

habitation in space; little to no habitation under the sea; minimal human habitation of some 

deserts or mountain tops.9

 Interestingly, the surface of the sea is not an exclusive machine 

realm, and may not be as safe a field for autonomous machine operations as is subsurface 

or air systems. (The desirability for unmanned surface ships will be discussed later in the 

section on Integrated Realm). In general, then, operations in the Machine Realm enjoy 

a relatively large separation from the moral-ethical complexities of the Social-Human 

Realm. Being distant from the complex calculus that makes up human society, Machine 

Realm operations would be more mathematical and measureable. Thus, the employment of 

autonomous-lethal robots makes sound policy for operations in the Machine Realm, and as 

will be discussed below, is an urgent priority. 

Machine Realm: Why is it Urgent to Develop LAR Now? 

As recent American defense publications have noted, the United States and NATO are 

increasingly dependent on access to the global commons (the sea, space, and cyberspace).10

Not coincidently, these global commons, which are strongly associated with the Machine 

Realm, should it become necessary to fight for them, will be fought to a large degree 

between machines. Thus, our capacity to win decisively in the Machine Realm is crucial 

to our security, and advances in robotics may well determine who can win this battle of 

machines. 

In the “global commons,” Machine Realm combat power will be determined to large 

degree by the ability to field systems with a premium on lethality, speed, and autonomy. 

Traditional measures of national power—often associated with nuclear warheads, 

population and Gross Domestic Product (GDP)—may be misleading, for these do not 

necessarily produce technologies with either speed or the ability to conduct lethal combat 

against other machines. The fact that the United States retains several thousand nuclear 

bombs provides brute lethal capacity to kill populations on a mass scale, but since 1945 

have not been used precisely because their use resides predominantly in the Social-Human 

Realm, a realm fraught with enormous moral-ethical considerations. The figurative and 
24

literal “fall out” of these moral-ethical considerations have exerted a restraining effect on 

the use of nuclear weapons, and may do so in the future. 

The ability to control commons may also have little to do with the size of a country’s 

population or relative size of GDP. For example, in a contest to build advanced machines, 

NATO’s large populations and huge consumption-based economies may mean less than a 

smaller economy with a robust robotics industry. Japan, a nation with a relatively small and 

aging population, and no nuclear weapons, gives the impression of a declining power. Yet, 

some speculate that since Japan possesses one of the world’s leading robotic industries, 

she may in fact be an emerging military-technical robotic powerhouse. If a non-nuclear 

Japan can become a significant power in the Machine Realm, other nations may do the 

same. It may already be the case that the US and NATO are falling behind in Machine 

Realm robotics and be entering a period of strategic vulnerability.11 Why would a robotic 

development create strategic risk? 

A “go slow” approach in the Machine Realm could generate strategic vulnerability 

fairly quickly. History has shown that while Social-Human operations, such as insurgency 

and counter-insurgency, can take years to reach a decision, operations closer to the Machine 

Realm—involving large machines and advanced technology—often “break”quickly, even 

should one side gain only slight performance advantage. The battle of the Armada of 1588 

was resolved in a matter of days, while the insurgency of the Spanish Netherlands lasted 

for decades in the 16th century. As Churchill famously observed, Admiral Jellicoe and his 

handling of his machines could have lost the war in a matter of hours, while the humans 

tangled in the trenches for four years on the Western Front without decisive result. Heroic 

naval aviators in the Battle of Midway in 1942 turned the tide of the war in a matter of 

minutes, during a single dive-bomber attack, while the Japanese ground campaign against 

Chinese conventional and guerilla forces lasted for a decade and ended in defeat. More 

recently, a more technically advanced Israeli air forced devastated the Syrian Air Force in 

a matter of days in the Bekaa Valley in 1982, while the social-human conflict in southern 

Lebanon continues to this day. The lesson: recent, long running land wars in the SocialHuman and Integrated Realm are not a guide for war in the Machine Realm. Rather, slight 

differences between opposing systems in the Machine Realm can result in rapid breaks 

toward strategic failure or success. Thus the policy for LAR in the Machine Realm is 

compelling and consistent with history: build fast, deploy, innovate, and stay ahead of 

potential enemies. 

Might Moral Ambiguities Slow Development of LAR in the Machine Realm?

A rushed development and fielding of advanced technology has sometimes been a 

source of strategic-politic miscalculation. In WWI, the decision to apply the newest of 

machines to war—U-boats—in the undersea attack on commerce was largely responsible 

for a moral backlash that led to US entry into the war, and contributed decisively to German 

defeat. The deployment of poison gas, machine guns, and long-range artillery against the 

manhood of Europe on the Western Front contributed to an erosion of human morale that 

led to mutinies in both the French and German armies and political collapse in the later. 

But the technical miscalculations of our grandfathers were rooted in a failure to understand 

the intersection of machine systems and social-human factors, which resulted in a counter-
25

productive level and type of human casualties (e.g., non-combatant victims of unrestricted 

submarine warfare, the mass casualties of infantry in the trenches). 

The employment of advanced robotics in an exclusively machine realm does not appear 

to risk the type of moral-ethical problems of WWI which undermined the attainment of 

strategic-political objectives. While voters and, by extension, politicians attach ethicalmoral value to the treatment of the environment, animals, and humans, the same is not the 

case with machine systems (just think of the junk yards scattered across America, where 

automobiles once held dear by their owners are allowed to rust and decay with hardly a 

second thought!). Hence, the employment of robotics in the machine realm seem relative 

free of moral-ethical “down sides,” and such machine systems should be developed with 

the greatest of speed and urgency without moral inhibition. 

Robots in the Integrated Realm: Proceed with Caution

For operations in the Integrated Realm, situated closer to the Social-Human Realm of 

activity, the deployment of lethal, more automatic/autonomous machine systems quickly 

can become problematic. An example can illustrate the hazards of deploying highly 

automated and lethal systems in close proximity to social-human activity. The US Navy 

deployed a high tech ship (a ship designed to fight with high speed, autonomy, and lethality, 

in the Machine Realm by shooting missiles which would intercept Soviet Backfire bomber 

launched anti-ship missiles flying at supersonic speeds) into the crowded littoral region 

of the Persian Gulf in the last years of the Iran-Iraq War in 1987. The region was indeed 

a mixed environment of commercial ships, fishermen, commercial air traffic, and enemy 

gunboats. What turned out to be a moral-political defeat followed when the ship’s AEGIS 

system was employed in the Integrated Realm of civilian air space without the benefit of 

a manned aircraft to confirm visual identification (ID) of human piloted aircraft flying at 

subsonic speeds. The use of this most advanced machine systems yielded mixed strategic 

results not because of the ability of enemies to defeat machine systems in a physical sense, 

but because of the ethical and ultimately political consequences of human casualties when 

the USS VINCENNES shot down an Iranian airliner.12 This illustrated what, I argue, is 

intuitively obvious and can be seen as a truism: as the area of operations moves from an 

exclusively Machine Realm into a more Integrated and potentially Social-Human realm, 

the premium placed on lethality, autonomy, and speed will decline in relative value. In 

some cases, what were advantages in speed and lethality can become significant liabilities 

(e.g, the AEGIS automatic and lethal modes of operation, so important for defense against 

high speed anti-ship missiles become of limited utility in an Integrated Realm of mixed 

aircraft, civilian and military). As operations move yet closer to the Social-Human Realm, 

the relative value of lethality, autonomy, and speed are reduced even more. 

A display of the declining value attached to lethality, autonomy, and speed is shown 

in Figure 2. The declining relative value is illustrated by reference to how the line slopes 

down from a high where the PHALANX weapon systems which relies on a combination 

of lethality, autonomy, and speed to defeat high speed anti-ship missile (ASM), to a lower 

position on the line where manned aircraft with “human in the loop” mode (a slower mode) 

which is typically sufficient to ID, divert, or, if necessary, engage enemy air vehicles. The 

key factors—a Composite of Lethality, Autonomy, and Speed—are assigned the acronym 

“CLAS.” 
26

The US Navy’s early experience with the employment of autonomous, lethal machines 

has been paralleled or exceeded by the US Marine and Army units in the wars in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. While it seemed initially that the land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 

would be concluded quickly, without the use of robots or drones, such has not proved to 

be the case. As these wars have dragged on much longer than initially expected, they have 

become the test-bed for increasingly automated systems. From the streets of Fallujah to 

the mountains of Afghanistan, military organizations have been compelled to employ a 

range of increasingly automated (if not quite autonomous) weapon systems. But to move 

beyond drones controlled by ground operators to the deployment of LAR is a huge step of 

significance for the future of war and the law of armed conflict. And to take such a step, or 

to hesitate, will not be easy, but will be fraught with moral significance. Why? 

The decision to deploy or not deploy robotic systems on land can produce adverse 

moral-ethical consequences in two ways: the failure to deploy can result in higher casualties 

absorbed by our military; but the deployment of increasingly automated systems can result 

in civilian casualties which then erode indigenous support. Two cases help illustrate the 

tension.

Figure 2. Technology Employment Curve.

 Source: Created by Author.

Social-Human 

Realm

Integrated 

Realm

Machine 

Realm

Manned Aircraft 

for ID, intercept, 

and air combat

PHALANX robots 

Anti-Ship Missile 

(ASM)

Low CLAS Composite of 

Lethality, 

Autonomy, and 

Speed (CLAS)

High CLAS

Social-Human 

Realm

Integrated 

Realm

Machine 

Realm

Manned Aircraft 

for ID, intercept, 

and air combat

PHALANX robots 

Anti-Ship Missile 

(ASM)

Low CLAS Composite of 

Lethality, 

Autonomy, and 

Speed (CLAS)

High CLAS
27

In the first case, a decision not to deploy advanced, automated American systems would 

have led to higher casualties. American forces have since 2003 been subject to sporadic 

mortar fire in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The US Army developed a lethal, nearly automatic, 

and high speed response system that could shoot down incoming projectiles. The system, 

called CRAM (Counter Rocket Artillery Mortar) is similar to the Navy’s PHALANX, and 

poses few if any moral-ethical problems, precisely because it operates very far from the 

Social-Human realm, and does not even seek to kill the enemy operators of the mortar, just 

the incoming projectiles themselves. The problem gets yet more difficult when an enemy 

wants us to kill humans for their own political purpose, and more automated machines can 

fall into a public relations quagmire. 

In our second cases, Taliban forces in Afghanistan benefit from increased human 

suffering, and purposely plan for and provoke the employment of American machine 

systems with the hopes of collateral, civilian casualties. Senior US leaders appear to be 

aware of the problem, and are adjusting military doctrine to account for the adverse reaction 

to machine operations, and have restricted the use of standoff munitions even at the risk 

of higher American casualties.13 The intuition of our generals and admirals, though their 

decision may have raised eyebrows since it increased the threat to our own soldiers, makes 

compelling sense when it is recognized that such machine operations had increasingly 

overlapped with the Social-Human Realm of action with counterproductive results. 

Social-Human 

Realm

Integrated 

Realm

Machine 

Realm

Anti-piracy and 

Counterinsurgency 

operations, humans must be 

“on scene”

PHALANX robot 

vs (ASM)

Low CLAS Composite of 

Lethality, 

Autonomy, and 

Speed (CLAS)

High CLAS

Manned Aircraft for 

ID, intercept, and air 

combat

Social-Human 

Realm

Integrated 

Realm

Machine 

Realm

Anti-piracy and 

Counterinsurgency 

operations, humans must be 

“on scene”

PHALANX robot 

vs (ASM)

Low CLAS Composite of 

Lethality, 

Autonomy, and 

Speed (CLAS)

High CLAS

Manned Aircraft for 

ID, intercept, and air 

combat

Figure 3. Complete Spectrum of Operations Across Realms.

 Source: Created by Author.
28

Social-Human Realm Operations:

Minimize the Employment of High CLAS Robotics.

As discussed earlier, the Social-Human Realm is that arena of action where a premium 

is placed on human interaction, human perception, human persuasion, and consequently 

human sensibilities of moral-ethical nature are most critical. In this realm, politicalmilitary operations are focused on perceptions of justice, on the problem of winning the 

“hearts and minds,” which is done best via human contact. In this realm the human is 

the tool of choice and high CLAS advanced machines are of limited use. The limits of 

technology can be illustrated when one considers an almost daily operation in Afghanistan 

or even at sea: the intercept and interrogation of persons who could be innocent civilians 

or suspected terrorists or insurgents. The limits of large, lethal, fast technology quickly 

become apparently. For example, while a supersonic aircraft or tank may be a powerful 

determinants in a battle against other machine systems, of what utility are these lethal 

systems when dealing with suspected terrorists on land or at sea? For example, terrorists 

hiding aboard a seagoing vessel or land vehicle well know the supersonic aircraft cannot 

hover and cannot lower a man to investigate them, thus this higher CLAS machine system 

poses little risk. In contrast, think how terrorists would react to the approach of a lower 

CLAS helicopter or a small gunboat embarking a boarding party capable of interrogating 

them face to face, human to human? It becomes a general rule that for Social-Human 

Realm operations, systems should be lower CLAS, low lethality, closely controlled by 

human operator who can exercise wisdom and discernment, albeit at Human speed!! But 

the significance of this general rule, because it is so basic, may have escaped the attention 

of policy makers in the war today.

Social-Human 

Realm

Integrated 

Realm

Machine 

Realm

Low CLAS Composite of 

Lethality, 

Autonomy, and 

Speed (CLAS)

High CLAS

Mid CLAS: Premium on 

systems with “human in the 

loop,” which will mean slower 

ops. Some scope for LAR. 

High CLAS: Aggressively 

develop/deploy LAR to fight 

enemy LAR 

Low CLAS: Surveillance and nonlethal defensive robotic systems, 

LAR only for SPECOPs

Social-Human 

Realm

Integrated 

Realm

Machine 

Realm

Low CLAS Composite of 

Lethality, 

Autonomy, and 

Speed (CLAS)

High CLAS

Mid CLAS: Premium on 

systems with “human in the 

loop,” which will mean slower 

ops. Some scope for LAR. 

High CLAS: Aggressively 

develop/deploy LAR to fight 

enemy LAR 

Low CLAS: Surveillance and nonlethal defensive robotic systems, 

LAR only for SPECOPs

Figure 4. Implications for Robot Development/Investment. 

 Source: Created by Author.
29

In Pakistan and Afghanistan the use of unmanned systems and stand-off weapons may 

be complicating our efforts to win “hearts and minds.” Some military thinkers in recent 

articles in military publications have questioned the compatibility of current drone doctrine 

and practice with the principles of population centric COIN.14 On the other hand, those 

who support the current policy seem to imply that the Pakistani—Afghan discomfort with 

autonomous machines is culturally specific, and as the Afghans and Pakistanis become 

more advanced technological societies, their negative reaction to the deployment of our 

automated systems will fade. Perhaps. But the Pakistani-Afghan resistance to the use of 

lethal, semi-autonomous machines may be less culturally unique when we consider the 

rising chorus of questions in the Western press. 

Human discomfort with autonomous systems originated in the West, in the high-tech 

cultures of Europe and United States. Beginning with Isaac Asimov and his path breaking 

work, I, Robot (1940), and for younger audiences, any number of dystopian “robot run 

amok” films, Western elites have been uncomfortable with the employment of machines 

against humans. More recently, the world’s first robotics arms control society has not 

emerged in Pakistan, but in Great Britain. But the rising anxiety associated with drone 

strikes and robots now palpable in the West does not pertain to those cases where military 

organizations deploy machine against machine, or even machine against the operators of 

machines, but when the machines come too close to what we have described here as the 

Social-Human Realm: the killing of humans by a disembodied machine.15

Recent and ongoing operations seem to confirm that humanoid combatants or 

humanoid police will remain the tool of choice for governments when managing conflict 

in the Social-Human Realm. The most obvious real-world example is the ongoing counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, where NATO and Afghan National Army ground 

personnel must connect with and attempt to gain the loyalty of local populations. Advanced 

technologies, including the drones, cannot replace soldiers in this capacity: engendering 

loyalty is a social-human activity, shared between humans and not between humans and 

machines. 

In general then, for operations in the Social-Human realm, there is no substitute for 

skilled human operators who, yes, may put themselves of risk. If there is a compelling need 

to deploy autonomous robots, then a premium must be placed on non-lethal technology. 

In the civil setting, the US Department of Justice is already moving in this direction, with 

research focusing on non-lethal, disabling technologies.16

Pondering the Cyber Implications of Unmanned Systems

This paper would be incomplete if it did not reflect, however briefly, on recent 

developments in the emerging field of cyber operations and hacking. The larger public has 

now become informed of details concerning the first ever cyber attack that resulted in large 

scale physical damage to a significant system: the STUXNET attack on the highly protected 

Iranian nuclear processing machinery, an event which was followed by the assassination of 

one of the targeted system’s computer scientists who was attempting to contain the virus. In 

addition, a high value American surveillance drone was allegedly hacked over Afghanistan 

and forced down, analogous to traitorous action in a manned aircraft. In the wake of these 
30

two developments, along with advancements in cyber techniques and technology, it has 

become increasingly likely that despite the best efforts to install “anti-tampering” counter 

measures in future LARs, single units or swarms of unmanned machines may become 

vulnerable to cyber attack and corruption of control systems. Such a possibility is cause 

for great concern for two reasons. First, whereas for the past sixty years US/NATO have 

suffered few if any traitorous actions by small unit commanders on the battlefield, the 

possibility now exists that unmanned platforms may be cyber attacked, with the result that 

such machines may in large numbers turn on friendly forces, a radical new milestone in US/

NATO military history. Secondly, the possibility of cyber attack on unmanned systems may 

establish grounds to challenge the current ethical arguments that justify targeted killing 

by unmanned systems. Recently, arguments have been made that the use of unmanned 

systems in surgical strikes may be morally superior because they are more discriminating 

than human combatants and/or human manned systems.17 But in the cyber contested 

battlefields of the future, where unmanned systems may be corrupted and thus become less 

discriminating than the unhackable human pilot, the weight of the moral argument may 

shift against the development of greater fleets of unmanned or autonomous machines. 

Conclusion

We are in the midst of a technical revolution, perhaps the most profound in history: the 

emergence of the lethal, autonomous robot (LAR). With this revolution comes a paradox: 

NATO must develop LAR as quickly as possible to provide security for the alliance, but 

must at the same time strictly limit the application of these machines which might threaten 

human rights on an historic scale. Current thinking about warfare in physical domains is 

insufficient. Rather, thinking about warfare and conflict in three realms—the Machine, the 

Integrated, and the Social-Human—helps clarify the problem and solve the paradox. In the 

artificial Machine Realm NATO nations should aggressively develop, test, and deploy high 

CLAS robots, see Figure 4. But in the Integrated and Social-Human realm—realms that 

include insurgency in Afghanistan, piracy on the surface of the sea, or riots in the streets 

of unstable societies—creation of LAR should be carefully restricted. Is there a precedent 

for grappling with this paradox? In the 19th and 20th century, as the weapons of war grew 

more lethal, our grandfathers came together to attempt to set rules to limit human suffering, 

and eventually controlled the spread and number of weapons that threatened mass human 

suffering: poison gas, lead bullets, and nuclear weapons. Perhaps a new version of Geneva 

Protocol and Hague Convention, one that carefully considers the implications of lethal 

robots in the Social-Human Realm is now needed?
31

Notes

1. The initial concept of three realms of war was first articulated in a brief to VADM Art 

Cebrowski in 2004. These concepts were later published with my co-author, Mark Gorenflo, in 

2006, in the US Naval Institute, Proceedings. See Mark Hagerott and Mark Gorenflo, “The Shifting 

Domain of War,” US Naval Institute Proceedings, October 2006, 38-43.

2. See E.B. Potter, SEAPOWER, A Naval History Annapolis: US Naval Institute Press, 1981, 

chapter one for a discussion of naval transformation from the classical to the pre-modern period. 

For a detailed discussion of Lepanto, see Roger Crowley, Empires of the Sea (New York, 2009). For 

discussion of 1588, see Garrett Mattingly, The Armada (New York, 2005). 

3. For a discussion of the dehumanization of combat in the First World War, see Paul Fussel, 

The Great War and Modern Memory (New York, 2013) and Tim Travers, The Killing Ground: the 

British Army and the Western Front and the Emergence of Modern Warfare, 1900-1918 (Barnsley, 

2009). 

4. For a particular insightful discussion of how pilots integrated and identified with their 

machines, and were valued by their particular machine association, see Mike Wordon, Rise of 

the Fighter Generals: the Problem of Air Force Leadership, 1945-1982. (Stockton, 2002) For a 

navy discussion, see this author’s dissertation, Mark Hagerott, “Commanding Men and Machines: 

Admiralship, Technology, and Ideology in the US Navy, 1899-1990.” University of Maryland–

College Park.

5. For a recent attempt at moving beyond the limits of “domains” of air, ground, sea, and space, 

see Vincent Manzo, “Deterrence and Escalation in Cross-domain Operations: Where Do Space and 

Cyberspace Fit” Strategic Forum, December 2011, pg 2. www.ndu.edu/inss. Accessed 12 February 

2012. See also “Embracing Autonomy,” by Caitlin H. Lee, in Air Space Power Journal, Winter 

2012, 76-88.

6. Trimble, Jane’s Defense Weekly, 2006 as cited in P. W. Singer, Wired for War, (New York, 

2009) 128, footnote. Related, see Thomas K. Adams’ idea of moving outside ‘human space’ in 

“Future Warfare and the Decline of Human Decision Making,” Parameters Winter 2001-2002, 58. 

The problem is that Adams implies decisiveness in war has shifted to beyond the human space (what 

is identified in this article the Social-Human Realm). I would argue that Adam’s a conclusion is too 

simplistic. Rather, technology must be developed in reference to the realm in which it will operate. 

Care must be taken that we don’t attempt a “one size fits all,” that machines crucial to success in the 

Machine Realm perhaps should not be employed in the Social-Human Realm. 

7. Cyber-space is a realm of machines, a realm where machines sustain the space through which 

travels important information for use by both machines and humans. However, since the subject of 

this essay is robotic policy, discussion of cyberspace will be limited. 

8. “OODA” loop refers to the US Air Force concept of Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act 

(OODA), developed by COL John Boyd, USAF, as he analyzed the performance of fighter aircraft 

and pilots in combat. 

9. Depending on presence, lethality, and numbers of machines, physical terrain that would be 

thought as in the Social-Human Realm can instead become the near exclusive the realm of machines. 

This has happened in multiple cases, but some examples to illustrate include the emergence of “No 

Mans Land” between competing machine armies of the First World War, a region bombarded by the 

world’s largest concentrations of artillery, raked with machine guns, and poisoned with industrial 

gases. 

10. See Michele Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, “The Contested Commons” in US Naval 

Institute Proceedings, July 2009.

11. P.W. Singer, Wired for War, 241
32

12. A mismatch of technology in what is can be considered the lower “Integrated” or upper 

“Social-Human” Realm can generate a strong political-moral reaction. This tragic example of using 

the most complex and lethal of machines systems in the transition area of Integrated to SocialHuman Realm haunt US perceptions abroad, 20 years after the event. See Reese Erlich, The Iran 

Agenda (Boulder, 2007), 67.

13. Dexter Filkins, “Stanley McChrystal’s Long War” New York Times Magazine, 14 October 

2009.

14. Peter Matulich, “Why COIN Principles Don’t Fly with Drones,” Small Wars Journal, 24 

February 2012. 

15. In late 2011 and early 2012 numerous articles and even editorials of leading publications 

have questioned unmanned system development and employment, especially the US government’s 

use of drone strikes against what are arguably legitimate military targets. Part of the reaction appears 

not based on the legality of the drone attacks, but the negative perception of morality of disembodied 

machines used to do the killing. As an example of growing agitation and confusion about drone use 

in the public sphere, see W.J. Hennigan, “Anti-drone protester disrupts conference on drones in 

combat” Los Angeles Times, 9 February 2012, reporting on protestors at a defense industry robotic 

conference. 

16. See Office of Justice Programs, US Department of Justice, for discussion of less than 

lethal technologies under development, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/topics/technology/less-lethal/

welcome.htm, accessed 30 June 2009. See also “US Police Could Get ‘Pain Beam’ Weapon,” New 

Scientist, Dec 2008. http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16339-us-police-could-get-pain-beamweapons.html, accessed 30 June 2009.

17. Shane, Scott, “The Moral Case for Drones,” New York Times Sunday Review, 14 June 

2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/sunday-review/the-moral-case-for-drones.html?_r=0, 

accessed on 1 February 2013. See also, Schmitt, Michael N. , “Autonomous Weapon Systems and 

International Humanitarian Law: A Reply to the Critics”, Harvard National Security Journal, 5 

February 2013, http://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/d6f79610-c65c-4df1-919a-e60cc96f7bfe/

Autonomous-Weapon-Systems-Repl-to-Critics-HNSJ.aspx, accessed 9 October 2013
33

Chapter 4

New Extrapolations: Robotics and Revolution in Military Affairs

by Christian Malis

Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and the Middle East, with the spasmodic war between Tsahal 

and Hezbollah and Hamas, serve as military laboratories where certain traits of future 

wars can be observed. If robotization is taken to mean the generalization of the use of 

robots in the battlefield, this is one of the major traits in this respect. Iraq was pretty much 

the birthplace of operational ground robotics. For the US Army—which for decades now 

has been at the vanguard of military modernization worldwide—winged, caterpillar, and 

wheeled robots have already become commonplace companions. Robots have become 

well-established in tactical processes and are now to be found at every technological level, 

from basic, robust, and consumable models to technological jewels that are the worthy 

successors of U2s, SR-71s, and so on. 

The scale of the change can be seen in the figures. According to a recent Congress 

report quoted by Wired magazine, the US Air Force now owns 7500 drones. 40 percent of 

American armed forces aircraft are drones, their number having increased 40-fold between 

2002 and 2010. The goal, set by Congress in 2005, of robotizing one third of the nation’s 

air resources by 2015, appears to have been achieved ahead of time. In 2010, the USAF 

announced that it was training more drone operators than F-16 pilots. As far as investments 

are concerned, the Pentagon accounts for 70 percent of R&D and 61 percent of procurement 

within the United States, rising from $3 billion a year in 2008 to $6 billion in 2018. With 

regard to ground robotics, robots eventually represented the “third force” in Iraq (13,000 

Packbots, 11,000 Ravens and 1000 Talons sold), behind regular forces and those of private 

military companies (for which estimates vary between 25,000 and 50,000 men).1

 

As early as 1920, in a paper entitled “Extrapolations,” 16 months after the end of 

the First World War, the French Captain Mérat drew attention to “scientific progress in 

warfare and resulting military reorganization,” heralding a tactical and strategic revolution 

with the advent of new “superior weapons”—aviation and tanks. Twenty-five years later, 

nuclear weapons also had their visionary in the person of Admiral Castex—the author of 

the prophetic “Aperçus sur la bombe atomique” (Perspectives on the Atomic Bomb) in the 

October 1945 issue of Revue des Questions de Défense Nationale, a harbinger of weak-tostrong deterrence. 

Is it time for visionaries once again? The American academic Peter Singer seems to 

believe this is the case, and indeed stakes a claim to such a title with his most recent work, 

Wired for War.

2

 In this short article, I shall attempt to put forward ways of thinking about 

the issue in terms of forward planning, framed in terms of the following question: Does 

robotization of the battlefield signal a new revolution in military affairs?

The notion of “revolution in military affairs” returned to the fore in the United States 

in the early 1990s, and is the conceptual forerunner of “Transformation.” The mechanism 

of the American approach has been rightly criticized in that it tends to view military 

phenomena, which are in fact social phenomena, as mere appendices to technical changes. 

Jacques Sapir, for instance, argues that: 
34

Innovation takes on a revolutionary aspect due to its massive circulation and its 

capacity for destabilising long-standing relationships between individuals, the 

material world and society, and for forming new ones.[...] A revolution in military 

affairs is characterized, from a military point of view, by the need for radical 

changes to the structure and position of forces, the nature of the economic and 

social system underlying these armed forces and lastly the relationship between 

offense and defense and the nature of the general correlation of forces. The 

revolution in military affairs is therefore fundamentally situated at the intersection 

between technical, social and organizational innovation. It is not indicative of 

any mechanistic application of technical innovation to the other fields, because 

technical innovation is naturally a result of both economic and scientific progress 

and of transformations affecting societies and organizations.3

During the Second World War, Raymond Aron had already examined the sociological 

circumstances (with a correlation between the “military revolution” of 1940 and the 

“totalitarian revolution”) to explain how the Germans, unlike their enemies, were able to 

make the most of technical progress to completely transform warfare.4

If robotization is indeed going to bring about a revolution in the war fighting business, 

it will be because it will lead to significant changes in the following three areas:

1. The relationship between offensive and defensive power and the nature of 

strategic balances. 

2. The relationship between men engaged in combat, tactical doctrines and 

operational art. 

3. The relationship between the population and defense systems. 

It will come as little surprise to encounter the three elements of Clausewitz’s “strange 

trinity” in this context. We shall examine each of them in turn.

Obstacles and Catalysts

However, before dealing with this issue, a preliminary question needs to be addressed: 

are robots not merely putting in a short-lived (though spectacular) appearance on the stage 

of war? Is the recent boom in robots not related to the particular context of two atypical 

counter-insurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan? Is it not likely that we will soon see the 

collapse of the “robot bubble?” Firstly, it is worth noting that the same question could 

be asked with regard to another military phenomenon whose growth is linked to Iraq and 

Afghanistan—that of private military companies. A thorough examination of the major 

trends in robotization, in the form of obstacles and catalysts, can provide some answers to 

these questions. The following table offers an analytical presentation of these trends.

This paper will comment on just some of these elements. From a technical point of 

view, while artificial intelligence has for now fallen far short of its promised capabilities, 

it has made sufficient progress to enable relative operational autonomy during vehicle 

navigation, for drones and land-based robots alike. Command and control functions rely 

on data links. For both LOS (Line of Sight) and BLOS (Beyond Line Of Sight) mode, 

the constant increase in available bandwidth, for instance through the use of new satellite 
35

transmission frequencies (the Ka band) is allowing increasingly large amounts of image 

and video data to be transmitted. These are just a few examples. At the same time, a certain 

number of obstacles that may prove quite difficult to overcome need to be taken into 

consideration. For the field of robotics, one of these is the high degree of mobility required 

if the robot is actually to become a commonplace companion for soldiers, especially for 

expeditionary missions. Scene analysis is another: this may be critical in the case of armed 

robots and have considerable influence on the rules of engagement, as will reliability. In the 

field of naval drones, the obstacles relate more to submarine communications and energy. 

The register of political factors is seldom mentioned, but is also fundamental. In 

Western nations, the known sensitivity of public opinion to losses clearly weighs in favour 

of robotization. In Iraq, the small iRobot and Foster-Miller devices have led to a marked 

decrease in human losses, which could have otherwise reached Vietnam-like proportions. 

With respect to intelligence, in particular strategic intelligence, if a drone flying over a 

Figure 5. Robotization: Incentives and Obstacles

 Source: Created by Author.

Technological Incentives

Human Incentives

Political Incentives

Economic Incentives

Operational Incentives

• Advances in IT

• Advances in navigation systems

• Advances in data links

• Advances in AI

• Expanding 3D potential: “Dumb, Dirty, 

Dangerous”

• Going beyond the physiological limits of 

humans

• Fewer losses

• Decreasing the “Gary Powers” risk

• Drone capabilities = technological prowess,

sign of modernity and prestige

• Strike accuracy → less collateral damage

• Drones can replace more expensive

sovereignty systems (satellites)

• The West: recovering mass effects

• Helping to offset budget cuts

• “Ubiquity by proxy”

• Continuity of ISTAR → tightening the OODA 

loop → Real Time

Regulatory Obstacles

Ethical and Legal Obstacles

Cultural Obstacles

Technical Obstacles

The End of Afghanistan/Iraq Type Wars

Vulnerabilities

• How drones fit in airspace

• Certification

• Frequency allocations (civilian competition)

• Target discrimination: a key problem

• The issue of responsibility

• Fear of loss of control, situational 

intelligence, etc.

• Congestion of the frequency spectrum

• Scrambling

• Tactical land mobility

• Stimulating investment

• Of robots themselves

• New vulnerabilities created by robotization

Incentives Obstacles

Technological Incentives

Human Incentives

Political Incentives

Economic Incentives

Operational Incentives

• Advances in IT

• Advances in navigation systems

• Advances in data links

• Advances in AI

• Expanding 3D potential: “Dumb, Dirty, 

Dangerous”

• Going beyond the physiological limits of 

humans

• Fewer losses

• Decreasing the “Gary Powers” risk

• Drone capabilities = technological prowess,

sign of modernity and prestige

• Strike accuracy → less collateral damage

• Drones can replace more expensive

sovereignty systems (satellites)

• The West: recovering mass effects

• Helping to offset budget cuts

• “Ubiquity by proxy”

• Continuity of ISTAR → tightening the OODA 

loop → Real Time

Regulatory Obstacles

Ethical and Legal Obstacles

Cultural Obstacles

Technical Obstacles

The End of Afghanistan/Iraq Type Wars

Vulnerabilities

• How drones fit in airspace

• Certification

• Frequency allocations (civilian competition)

• Target discrimination: a key problem

• The issue of responsibility

• Fear of loss of control, situational 

intelligence, etc.

• Congestion of the frequency spectrum

• Scrambling

• Tactical land mobility

• Stimulating investment

• Of robots themselves

• New vulnerabilities created by robotization

Technological Incentives

Human Incentives

Political Incentives

Economic Incentives

Operational Incentives

• Advances in IT

• Advances in navigation systems

• Advances in data links

• Advances in AI

• Expanding 3D potential: “Dumb, Dirty, 

Dangerous”

• Going beyond the physiological limits of 

humans

• Fewer losses

• Decreasing the “Gary Powers” risk

• Drone capabilities = technological prowess,

sign of modernity and prestige

• Strike accuracy → less collateral damage

• Drones can replace more expensive

sovereignty systems (satellites)

• The West: recovering mass effects

• Helping to offset budget cuts

• “Ubiquity by proxy”

• Continuity of ISTAR → tightening the OODA 

loop → Real Time

Regulatory Obstacles

Ethical and Legal Obstacles

Cultural Obstacles

Technical Obstacles

The End of Afghanistan/Iraq Type Wars

Vulnerabilities

• How drones fit in airspace

• Certification

• Frequency allocations (civilian competition)

• Target discrimination: a key problem

• The issue of responsibility

• Fear of loss of control, situational 

intelligence, etc.

• Congestion of the frequency spectrum

• Scrambling

• Tactical land mobility

• Stimulating investment

• Of robots themselves

• New vulnerabilities created by robotization

Incentives Obstacles
36

given territory crashes or is intercepted, this leads to far fewer diplomatic complications 

due to the fact that the local authorities cannot hold hostage, or indeed exhibit, pilots 

wearing the uniform of the power responsible for espionage. We refer to this as limiting 

the “Gary Powers” risk, after the American U2 pilot shot down by Soviet forces in 1960. 

This episode allowed Khrushchev to publicly accuse the United States and sabotage the 

Paris summit, much to the annoyance of Eisenhower. By contrast, the recent RQ-170 affair, 

in which an ultra-secret CIA stealth drone was intercepted and recovered by the Iranian 

army, did not give Tehran as much scope to make political capital out of the incident. 

Lastly, the possession of Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) UAVs, which provide 

a sovereign strategic intelligence capability which may be seen as a low-cost alternative to 

the possession of spy satellites, has become an issue of prestige—a mark of technological 

and military modernity. 

As regards to other obstacles, the key problem of target discrimination should also be 

reiterated: “there is too great a risk involved in entrusting the task of distinguishing targets or 

non-combatant military objectives from civilian property to UAVs,” is the typical objection 

from lawyers.5

 This issue seems to affect the question of armed land-based robots more 

specifically (for UAVs it can be seen that is being resolved on a daily basis in operational 

practice by the Americans and Israelis, who use them to neutralize “terrorist” leaders); it 

is linked to the technical hurdle of scene analysis. Here too, any confusion resulting from 

an error of appraisal could, in the present-day context of “war amongst the people,” easily 

be used by the enemy and create serious complications in terms of local and international 

public opinion. 

We will leave the “horizontal” analytical approach there, since it is not a good means of 

identifying which trends which will end up taking over, and take a more summary approach. 

At the end of the day, in the medium to long term, it would appear that the blend of these 

various obstacles and catalysts clearly favors a continued increase in the robotization of 

armed forces. In this respect, we believe that the winning equation offered by robotization 

is as follows: 

A number of comments are in order. The automation of military systems is now an 

undisputedly general and long-standing trend, as has been noted by a number of military 

historians.6

 For example, it is now quite advanced with respect to a certain number of 

functions on board ships and in surface-to-air defense. Strictly speaking, robotization 

can be defined as the point, in terms of both time and function, at which automation has 

been developed through to completion. We have borrowed this definition from Admiral 

Sifantus.7

 This more technical definition supplements and refines our original definition 

of robotization as being the generalization of robots on the battlefield. Automation should 

be linked to digitization; with the help of communications science, digitization allows for 

the transmission of the large amounts of data gathered. We have already commented on 

the increasing importance of protection, a realistic incarnation of the former “zero death” 

doctrine. This argues in favour of anything that enables combat operations to be conducted 

AUTOMATION=DIGITIZATION x PROTECTION x DOWNSIZING OF ARMED FORCES
37

remotely—a trend that is also longstanding. Proof enough of this is that since 2008, most 

UOR procurement for France (worth some €150 million per year ) and the United Kingdom 

(€1 billion per year) in Afghanistan has been to meet ground force protection needs.8,9

Lastly, the downsizing of the armed forces in large military nations is a major trend that 

is not confined to the West. In China, as indicated by the authors of La Guerre hors-limite 

(Unrestricted Warfare), the prohibitive cost of computerization and digitization may not 

have resulted in the abandonment of a “popular” mass army, but it has at least led to 

significant downsizing.10 Similarly, the Russian Army is currently modernizing its forces 

(Russian President Vladimir Putin has just announced a scheme worth €450 billion) and 

constantly downsizing, having divided the number of troops by five since 1980 and halving 

them since 1994. Colin Gray also emphasises the trend towards “demassification of military 

force,” so much so that 21st century armed forces will be distinctly different from those 

of the 20th century.11 The accompanying reduction in the number of platforms involves 

preserving rare resources as much as possible—that of the manned system (the FELIN 

soldier being, in a sense, one such “manned system”), and recovering mass effects in order 

to be able to operate in the extremely large theaters that characterize a large number of 

present-day operations.12 This results in the need to be “everywhere by proxy” and to have 

systems which are able to “replace us in these vast areas,” i.e. robots.13

Strategic Transformations and Robotization

That point made, we can now turn to the question of how robotization is likely to affect 

power-based relations. Indeed, this is the first dimension of a “military revolution” that we 

wish to investigate.

By affecting military forces and the conditions for exercising offensive and defensive 

power, technical progress can cause considerable changes to the balance of power, as 

well as a reorganization of the strategic landscape. Thus in the 1930s, the “marriage of 

cannon and engine” (Raymond Aron) was, at least at first, an added bonus for land-based 

invaders, provided that they were able to implement industrial mobilization in advance. 

More recently, the spread of precision and information technologies, coupled with new 

operational concepts developed for the NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict in Central Europe, 

gave the United States a military superiority that was displayed to the world during the 

First Gulf War (1991), and described thus by General Gallois immediately following the 

conflict: 

Technically, the Gulf War innovated “war in the ether.” The United States was 

in control from the very beginning of hostilities. It may be something of an 

approximation, but it can be said that General Schwarzkopf, in addition to his other 

titles, was also king of the airwaves. Within a huge pear-shaped area, the bottom 

of which encompassed Iraq, Saudi Arabia, the Red Sea, the eastern Mediterranean, 

southern Turkey, western Iran and the Gulf, and whose top reached up to 36,000 km 

above the earth and geostationary orbit, the coalition’s electrons deafened, blinded, 

silenced and thus paralyzed the entire Iraqi military system. All that remained to 

be done was to flatten the entire country by means of air raids: these released as 

much energy as six “Hiroshimas”—and with better distribution of the destructive 

power—and were achieved with complete impunity. The silent, inoffensive, dense 
38

and multifarious dance of American electrons was a huge innovation. It put the 

United States well ahead of all the other powers and set a lower bound for European 

nations, whether singly or indeed together, when it came to any military ambitions 

they might have.14

Within the next 20 years, a number of questions also deserve to be thoroughly 

investigated: 

1. The first is the extent to which robotization could rejuvenate the American 

military leadership, in a similar fashion to what happened between 1990 and 

2005. From “king of the airwaves” to “king of the robots?” In Kuwait City back 

in 1991, Iraqi soldiers waved the white flag when they noticed a US Marine Corps 

reconnaissance drone flying over their position. The USAF appears to want to 

move in this direction and is once again using revolutionary rhetoric in its plan for 

UAVs through to 2047.15 In the light of the planned withdrawal from Afghanistan, 

the Pentagon wants to move on from counterinsurgency. The US President recently 

announced a new strategic doctrine in which the “Pacific pivot” becomes the new 

center of US attention and strategic effort. This paradigm shift puts drones in the 

pole position when it comes to investment priorities. 

2. The second is to identify the new range of strategic options for the exercise 

of military force that will be opened up by robotization. The 1990s provided the 

image of the Tomahawk missile strikes demonstrating an ability to inflict unrivalled 

military punishment capabilities. The present-day equivalent is the image of armed 

Predator patrols above Pakistani tribal areas, punctuated by unexpected attacks 

decided by a reach back capability. In the future, certain “disruptive” countries 

could be subject to forms of robot-imposed bans, with their airspace, waters, or 

even certain land areas filled with fleets of robots embodying a permanent threat—

in addition to the space borne inquisition that is already in action. The BAMS 

(Broad Area Maritime Surveillance) program can be given as an example: five 

drone bases will perform ocean surveillance to a range of up to 3000 nautical miles. 

Since “Augustine’s law” also applies to naval units (Virginia-class submarines, Sea 

Wolf missiles, Littoral Combat Ships), it would indeed appear that faced with the 

expanding Chinese and Indian navies, the US Navy is seeking to return to a mass 

effect and 24-hour surveillance capabilities for sensitive areas (such as straits), for 

which it is calling on the use of robots.16

3. Due to the rise of potentially “revisionist” regional powers such as China and 

Russia that are eager to enforce, in their regional environment, the equivalent of 

the American “Monroe doctrine” laid down in 1823, America is likely to have to 

face a new state of play in terms of strategic power from the middle of the next 

decade onwards. This is particularly the case for China, against which America’s 

future strategic system will clearly be directed. In this context, what use of more 

widespread, if basic, robotics could be made by major powers, or even regional 

powers such as Iran? 
39

Robotics and Warfare

The current development of the use of robots and the emerging doctrines and concepts 

of use appear to present striking analogies with the original history of weapons—which 

ended up revolutionizing tactics. This has made a particular impression on Peter Singer, 

and he has expressed amazement at the gap he sees between the generalization of robots 

and the change in doctrines.17 Most present-day military documents available set out to 

describe robots as support systems using existing tactics and operational methods. One 

such document offers the following insight into doctrine: “Robotics can be used to support 

land-based manoevers. As part of tactical action, robotics can greatly increase the latter’s 

effects, either by adding to the range of capabilities already held, or by increasing the 

efficacy of combatants. Such integration could possibly involve altering methods of action 

and procedures.” 

Analyzing the military consequences of the Second World War in 1945, Pierre Gallois 

noted that the technological reasoning that had been at work during the course of the 

conflict obeyed two virtual laws of military history: the law of “revolutionary weapons” 

and the “law of formations.” The first applied to the missiles and guided bombs used by 

Germany in 1944-1945 (V1 and V2). Although they were too recent and not yet mature 

enough to upset the conflict or reverse its outcome, he held that they had the potential for 

transforming future conflicts: 

Typically, no weapon that is revolutionary in any given war is decisive in that war. 

However, it becomes decisive in the next war.18 

The second law—the “law of formations.” Revolutionary weapons finally produce 

their effects only when grouped together into tactical formations. This can be seen with 

the Germans with their use of tanks and planes, but there are a multitude of examples in 

history, many of which were identified by the German military historian, Hans Delbrück. 

The Battle of Marathon and the Burgundian Wars in the 15th century illustrate the triumph 

of tactical infantry heavily armed with pikes (Greek phalanx, Swiss infantry). Generally 

speaking, we read that the main advantage of robots is to relieve soldiers of the most 

repetitive tasks (logistics, surveillance) and the most dangerous tasks (mine clearance, 

operating in an NRBC environment, etc.), to allow humans to concentrate on “what they 

alone can do.” However, what could be more dangerous than combat itself?

Another characteristic of the history of military thought in the 20th century is that 

whenever revolutionary weapons came into being, a few visionary thinkers saw them 

as a harbinger of “transformation,” describing this in prophetic works, often magazines 

or books aimed at the general public. Thus one of the most lucid, prophetic works on 

the transformation of fighting through the use of armed aircraft is that mentioned in 

the introduction, by Captain L. Mérat, in the March 1920 issue of the Revue Militaire 

Générale. In this forward-looking study entitled “Extrapolations,” he sought to identify the 

transformations of warfare from a technical point of view, before moving onto the strategic 

consequences of these changes. He identified “superior weapons”: those whose progress 

has considerable repercussions on the tactics for all other weapons. These weapons are the 

most “scientific” and usually the most recent. According to him, these were aviation and 

tanks, such that if weapons were classified from weapons of the future to weapons of the 
40

past, the following order was apparent: “aviation, assault artillery, artillery, fortification, 

infantry, cavalry.” The mass use of tanks, applied to the tactics of the strategic principle of 

mass, required attack formations to be envisaged, especially with a view to fighting against 

enemy tanks. Thus the armed forces had to reorganize themselves around the superior 

weapons, since these were the weapons that “set the tactical pace.” From this point of view, 

it is interesting to note that a military analyst as lucid as Ferdinand Miksche had predicted 

the transformation of combat modes as early as the late 1970s, in “PGMs are changing the 

combat picture” in 1978. Along the same lines, other visionaries could be quoted, such as 

Clément Ader and Giulio Douhet, who discussed the airplane and its strategic importance, 

or Bernard Brodie and Raoul Castex on the subject of nuclear weapons.19 

As noted by Liddell Hart with regard to warplane formations, and by Pierre Gallois 

with regard to armed forces equipped with tactical nuclear weapons, these “new weapons” 

became the shock weapons, while conventionally organized forces (Second World War 

infantry divisions, Warsaw Pact conventional forces) took on the responsibility of occupying 

and organizing conquered territory. In the late Forties and early Fifties, the entire Western 

military community’s reflex was still to think of future wars along the same lines as the 

Second World War—a drawn-out war, expending millions of conscripted soldiers, calling 

on the entire industrial potential of the nations at war to produce huge quantities of weapons 

and resources. But from 1953-1954 onwards, Pierre Gallois predicted very short conflicts, 

in which due to the use of nuclear explosives the apogee of violence would be reached in 

just a few days; a small number of resources embodying immense destructive power; and a 

few hundred thousand career soldiers using the new weapons, without it being possible to 

call on the population and resources at large, due to a lack of time. A new, very different, 

explicit model replaced the “tacit knowledge” characteristic of a certain military culture. 

In doing so, he resembled those scientists who, in Kuhn’s words, can no longer ignore the 

anomalies overturning the established state of affairs in scientific practice and embark on 

extraordinary investigations; this finally leads them to a new set of convictions established 

on a new basis for practicing science. 

Iraq, and to a lesser extent perhaps Afghanistan, acted as a laboratory for military 

robotics, just as the war in Spain did for “mechanical” warfare in the 1930s. As in Spain, 

and during the First World War, these new techniques did not yet lead to a thorough 

overhaul of tactical plans, even less so the overall strategy of the war. Like Guderian 

in the early 1920s, we have to imagine and “foresee” the robotized wars of the future. 

Industrially speaking, the usual pattern of pioneering start-ups can be observed—iRobot 

with its Packbot, Foster Miller with SWORDS and TALON—while the large groups 

are observing what is happening before moving into action (the British firm Qinetiq has 

bought out Foster Miller). It would also appear that the same phenomenon of a doctrine 

coming in on the back of technology can be observed. If the robot is indeed one of Captain 

Mérat’s “superior weapons,” at some point the other weapons will gather round these, with 

a renewed organization of the forces and tactical patterns. This phenomenon would appear 

to be at a more advanced stage in the air force, where the use of UAVs is beginning to 

replace that of manned aircraft for a certain number of missions. However, as will be seen 

later, this appearance could prove to be deceptive. 
41

The forecast hypothesis could therefore be as follows: the use of unmanned devices 

in autonomous formations will thoroughly change combat methods, with combat contact 

tending to be increasingly entrusted to robots, and “conventional” forces (in their current 

form) being assigned to the occupation and organization of the conquered territory. In 

addition to the study of this new paradigm of warfare, there should also be an analysis of 

the future tactical patterns for the use of unmanned devices according to the criterion of 

tactical dilution, considering compact formations, swarming tactics and/or a mix of these 

two approaches. Experiments are due to take place.20 All of this also supposes that progress 

is made not only technically, but also doctrinally and legally, towards drawing up a doctrine 

of autonomy. What is really at stake is to preserve three things: operational control, in the 

very interest of the mission (not betraying an avenue of progress, etc.); safety (avoiding 

possible “mistakes” with an out-of-control robot killing its own side); and responsibility.21 

Imagine a scenario in 2025 in which Western land-based units have to enter an insurgent 

city to take control of it. They will use a “robotic screen” for the initial, most dangerous, 

contact. Patrols of reconnaissance/observation robots and teams of robots capable of remote 

fire—all of which are all semi-autonomous devices—will arrive ahead of the troops. All of 

these robots are semi-autonomous and capable of cooperative action. Their task is to “thin 

out” the situation before “conventional” forces intervene. 

We are not yet at this point either technically or doctrinally. However, military research 

seems to be undertaking the construction of building-blocks to move in this direction. One 

example in France is the “ACTION” advanced research program (PEA) (heterogeneous 

multi-robot cooperation for ground/air control and maritime channel clearing missions).22 

In actual fact, the current development of the use of robots and the emerging doctrines 

and concepts of use appear to present striking analogies with the original history of 

those weapons that have ended up revolutionizing tactics. This has made a particular 

impression on Peter Singer, and he has expressed amazement at the gap he sees between 

the generalization of robots and the change in doctrines.23

Indeed, it would appear that robots represent a major step towards remote combat 

operations, potentially entrusted to formations of robots. Using robots, it might be possible 

to provide better protection of soldiers from the murderous combat of contemporary 

contact (IEDs, anti-tank rockets and missiles, artillery, individual weapons, etc.) behind 

a “cybernetic invisibility cloak.” This is already the case with Foster-Miller’s SWORDS 

which are operated by soldiers 500 meters to the rear. In this respect, robotics would be 

more revolutionary than digitization, altering “the traditional relationship of soldiers with 

their weapons and thus of men with warfare.”24

The Timetable for Robotization

Is this hypothesis of operational forecasting consistent with the current discourse of the 

armed forces concerning robotics, and more specifically with planning, programming and 

R&D funding? To push the question further: what is the estimated date by which the French 

armed forces will have begun their “robotics transformation,” meaning the development of 

missions using formations of robots for combat-related tasks? 

In the event, in France the surprise could come from the navy.25 Robotics can be seen 

to be making an appearance in new naval systems in two distinct ways in this presentation. 
42

First, there is the generalization of naval robots. The multiplication of tactical drones for 

surveillance and minesweeping, as well as strategic drones for surveillance requiring a 

great degree of autonomy, constitute a future reality noted recently by Admiral Forissier 

in a speech in 2010, at which time he was Navy Chief of Staff: this will create a structure 

for the concepts of use; centers of operations to deploy drones will become targets.26 

Furthermore, we can note the extension of robotics as being a moment and function of 

a process of automation which is nearing completion. Today, automation is already very 

advanced on board ship: detection and tracking is automated and the unit is operated, 

along with the firing function by the celebrated CMS (Combat Management System). 

Automation is impacting other functions, too, such as supplies at sea. Although in the 

past the rule was for a high degree of versatility on a vessel, now and in the future it will 

be possible to perform a certain number of functions remotely using robots. This does 

not however involve complete robotization of naval missions. For those who are devising 

the Navy of the future and planning procurement, the challenge is to reflect the balance 

between human and technological resources within a system right from the design stage 

onwards. Bruno Sifantus suggests doing this by means of segmentation into four groups 

to enable an analysis of the confrontation between individuals and systems—decisionmakers, operators, administrators and maintenance technicians, experts. Which groups of 

individuals would be needed in the system? Are individuals needed in intervention zones? 

Administration and maintenance can no doubt be extensively automated. Today the operator 

tends to be absorbed by the system. The system will not replace a DECISION-MAKER but 

depending on the case, the decision-maker may be placed elsewhere, leaving contact itself 

to robots. Unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) and unmanned “X” vehicles (UXVs) 

and their implementation are at the heart of this approach.

Counterintuitively, naval forces may play a pioneering role in the renewal of operational 

art based on robotics, followed by the air force and land-based forces. This is a summary 

view, but it has the merit of situating the different forces within a timetable, without any 

value judgement. However, it inevitably has the drawback of not mentioning special forces 

as such; these are often at the forefront and already use small, simple robots, as do special 

police units in France (RAID). For the sake of completeness, the picture should also include 

two environments with fully robotized structures—outer space and cyberspace. 

Regarding air forces, based on the ONERA “UCAV systems” PEA project, combat 

drone formations could be used to support manned fighter planes (Rafale). This schedule is 

consistent with the Franco-British projects engaged, following the Lancaster House Treaty, 

for future MALE and UCAV drones. Initial operational capacity may be envisaged for 

UCAV drones by 2030. 

The hypothesis of using formations of robots for tasks including combat is of course 

subject to the toughest possible testing on land, due to the previously mentioned technical 

obstacles. The present primitive nature of land-based robots in most known cases is striking. 

The French Army does not envisage taking a first step towards robotization (generalization 

or at least broader distribution of robots for a certain number of functions) before 2020, as 

part of stage 2 of the Scorpion project. Technically, although remote control has a bright 

future and the ‘autonomy versus remote control’ debate is probably fallacious, progress 

does need to be made on promising notions such as “adjustable autonomy.” This concept 
43

currently represents a fair summary of the need to adjust automation and human decisionmaking depending on the situation. As far as bringing devices together is concerned, 

expected progress relates to the field of multi-robot cooperative work. A reasonable forecast 

for the completion of simple tasks would seem to be 2020. This, in any case, is the ambition 

of the PEA ACTION project for land-based de-pollution and maritime zone control.27

As can be seen, the prospects are further off time wise than for the other two 

environments. It seems that the future will involve soldiers “taming” robots, to make them 

their usual companions (the “accustomization” which apparently occurred in Iraq, between 

soldiers and mine clearance robots). The following step would be renewal of operational 

concepts—robot formations for advancing on the enemy, etc. Of course unexpected 

crises may cause this to develop more quickly. Clearly, the ways in which the land and 

its particular characteristics are very different from the other environments should not be 

forgotten: land is uneven, compartmentalized, heterogeneous and habited. However we can 

imagine that for certain functions, missions or weapons, robotics will be taken further. This 

brings to mind ALAT (French Army Light Aviation, with a command helicopter in charge 

of “robocopters,” for example), and artillery. Two different scenarios can be imagined:

1. The human operator (e.g. a FELIN foot soldier) remains at the cutting edge 

of the tactical system but is surrounded by robotized auxiliaries and services 

(logistics, reconnaissance, mine clearance, unmanned or semi-robotized 

driving of manned vehicles, etc.), with adjustable autonomy. 

2. Robots in formation are the contact system, with the human forces working 

behind them. This is the same pattern as the armored division in 1940 being 

followed by the 1918-style infantry. Technical forecasting and military 

sociology does not seem to allow for such a scenario before 2040. 

Robotics, Arming of the People, and Society

A revolution in military affairs involves a change in relations between society and 

the national defense system. This is clear with respect to the revolutionary and imperial 

armies that emerged from the French Revolution, as well as the German Army of the Third 

Reich, made up of an increasingly large politicized army (the SS), and a conventional army 

whose combativeness and inventiveness had been boosted by the “totalitarian revolution” 

(Raymond Aron). Three aspects can be taken into consideration here: Western societies, 

enemy societies and the place of conflict in popular psychology.

To touch briefly on the first point, the advent of robots is to some extent in keeping 

with the traits of popular culture in the information society, such as the use of the Internet 

and mass circulation of video games. The Predator operator’s cabin looks like a replica of 

an arcade game, while the control units for PackBots are deliberately based on commercial 

game consoles to make them easier for GIs to use. Let us however take a closer look at the 

potential relationship between robotics and society when it comes to the adversary.

When the resistance of the regular army is quashed, the only solution is, in Clausewitzian 

terms, the “people in arms.” In some respects, for Western armies, Iraq and Afghanistan are 

analogous to Spain for the French Imperial Army from 1808 onwards: you are not defeated 

as long as you refuse defeat. As a last resort, armed resistance on the part of the population 
44

(or part of it) allows you to benefit from the intrinsic advantages of defense (knowledge 

of the terrain, solidarity of the population, trading space for time). A certain number of 

new features have already made use of modes of action based on individual action or 

small groups, as in terrorism and guerrilla warfare: rocket blitzes and advanced tactical 

missiles (anti-tank missiles used by Hezbollah), civilian communications and intelligence 

technology (satellite imaging, mobile telephony, GPS, etc.), and cybermobilization.28

Will the spread of robots further enhance the resistance capabilities of irregular forces 

and provide new assets which can be used for the “arming of the people” in “national 

defense” situations? As can be recalled, three years ago Hezbollah used basic Iranianmade drones against the Israel Defense Forces (Ababil, Misradl and Mohajer 4 drones). 

Questions may legitimately be asked about the scope for asymmetric use of a basic drone, 

along similar lines to semi-artisanal IEDs and rockets. Mini-UAVs resulting from “high 

end” modelling, small land-based robots used en masse and carrying explosive charges, 

or remote controlled submarines (already used by certain mafias to replace go-fast boats), 

swarms of small drones, etc. Asia, particularly China and Korea, has filed a great deal of 

patents for civilian robotics over the past few years. One may wonder if this area is not 

destined to become a hub for the proliferation of robotics techniques. All of this runs the 

risk of rapidly giving rise to the issue of export controls.29 Japan has already suspended 

foreign sales of the Airmax mini robotic helicopter, originally designed for agricultural 

spreading.

A third non-negligible dimension is that the use of robots can have adverse strategic 

effects that neutralize tactical gains, if they serve to render the action illegitimate in the 

eyes of the local population—precisely where widespread “strategic wisdom” currently 

tends to see the true “center of gravity” of stabilization/counterinsurgency operations.30 

The emblematic case is that of the armed Predator strikes in Afghan tribal areas, fiercely 

criticized in this respect by one of the gurus of counterinsurgency theory in the United 

States, David Kilcullen.31 The reactions of local populations may be likened to those of the 

“rearguard.” Each “mistake” in Afghanistan leads to animated discussion in the Western 

blogosphere and social networks; the phenomena of cyber-arguments may need to be 

apprehended. 

Conclusions 

As recently noted by Jacques Sapir, as well as by Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui in 

La Guerre hors limites (Unrestricted Warfare), the downsizing of the military and the 

establishment of small high-tech professional armies over the past 20 years in the West, 

Russia and China, is also linked to the cost of modern “computerized” equipment, making 

it impossible to equip large numbers of conscripts.32 Robotics cannot be disassociated 

from computerization and digitization. Communications science and networks are the vital 

interface for disseminating and using the data issued by all types of drones. In the long 

term, robotization completes and extends the transformation of automation and digitization, 

giving it a truly revolutionary turn. The extent of this transformation can quickly be seen by 

comparing the US Army in 2012 with that of 1970.

However, modern armed forces in which robotization is in progress are aristocratic 

armies. They can be compared to the heavily armed French cavalry under King Philip the 
45

Fair. They may, as was the case in Courtrai in 1302, be taken by surprise by “villains” with 

no respect for the “normal practices of war,” armed with basic weapons that are however 

effective against any enemy drawn into a land war. Robotization could allow Western-style 

armies to recover mass effects and truly fulfill the revolutionary promises of digitization. 

However, this phenomenon could benefit the enemy. In his study on innovation in the face 

of irregularity, P. J. Lassalle speaks of the “equalizing power of networks.”33 Should we be 

talking in terms of the “equalizing power of robots”?
46

Notes

1. Scott Gourley and Tony Skinner, “Robot Wars: unmanned ground vehicles” Jane’s Defence 

Weekly, 3 June 2008.

2. P.W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflicts in the 21st Century. 

Penguin, 2009. 

3. Jacques Sapir, in Thierry de Montbrial (dir.) Dictionnaire de stratégie (Dictionary of 

Strategy), 2000, 456 ; and La Mandchourie oubliée (Forgotten Manchuria), Le Rocher, 1996, 39.

4. Christian Malis, Raymond Aron et le débat stratégique français (Raymond Aron and the 

French strategic debate), Economica, 2005, 150-152.

5. Philippe Frin and Ronan Doaré, “La robotization du champ de bataille : enjeux et défis 

juridiques” (Robotization of the battlefield: legal issues and challenges), in Défense et Sécurité 

Internationale, special issue no. 10, February-March 2010, 34-36.

6. For example, Martin Van Creveld identifies four technological military ages and calls the 

most recent one, which began in 1945, the “age of automation.”Martin Van Creveld, Technology 

and War. Macmillan, 1991, 235-320.

7. Paper given during the PP30 symposium organized by the French General Armaments 

Directorate, on 10 May 2011, and conversation with the author in November 2011.

8. UOR = Urgent Operational Requirement. 

9. Source: General Armaments Directorate.

10. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, La Guerre hors limites (War without limits), Payot, 2003.

11. La Guerre au 21e siècle (War in the twenty-first century), Economica, 2007, 186.

12. Fantassin à Equipements et Liaisons Intégrés = French Future Infantry Soldier System

13. General Desclaux, paper given at the “20 ans d’opérations aériennes” (Twenty years of 

airborne operations) symposium organized by the Centre d’Etudes Stratégiques Aérospatiales 

(Strategic Aerospace Study Center), École Militaire (Military Academy), 16 June 2011.

14. Pierre Gallois, “A la charnière des siècles, de bouleversements en turbulences” (“Upheavals 

and disruption at the turn of the century”), Défense Nationale, June 1992, 23-36.

15. Headquarters, United States Air Force, United States Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

Flight Plan, 2009-2047. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/usaf/usaf-uas-flightplan_2009-2047.htm, 18 May 2009, (accessed 1 October 2011).

16. Flyintelligence AEGE, September 2008, 3-4.

17. Peter W. Singer, “Wired for War? Robots and Military Doctrine,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 

52, 1st quarter 2009, 104-110, and his recent book, Wired for War.

18. Pierre Gallois, “Vers une stratégie décisive” (“Towards a decisive strategy”), La France 

libre, 1945.

19. Military Review, July 1978, 10-18.

20. C. Lundberg, Long-Term Study of a Portable Field Robot in Urban Terrain, Journal of Field 

Robotics 24(8/9) 2007, 625–650.

21. It is true that the USAF reckons that by 2047 it will be possible to give drones autonomy 

allowing them to act “within legal and policy constraints without necessarily requiring human 

input.”

22. For more information on this project, see http://action.onera.fr/. 

23. Peter Singer, “Wired for War? Robots and Military Doctrine,” 104-110.

24. CES Velut, “La robotisation terrestre, défi technologique et défi humain” (Land robotisation: 

a technological and human challenge), Check Point, 8 August 2004.

25. We have made extensive use of the thinking set out in the presentation of Admiral Sifantus, 

military advisor to the DCNS group, previously quoted. 
47

26. Forces Navales 2020 (Naval Forces 2020), a symposium organized by “Stratégie et 

Défense”, December 2010.

27. For more information, see http://action.onera.fr/node/71, accessed on 15 April 2012. 

28. Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Cybermobilization: the New “Levée en masse” Parameters,

Summer 2006, 77-87.

29. Robert Sparrow, “Predators or Plowshares? Arms Control of Robotic Weapons.” IEEE 

Technology & Society Magazine 28, no. 1 (Spring 2009): 25-29.

30. To tell the truth, this opinion is dubious.

31. Mark Mazzetti, “The Downside of Letting Robots Do the Bombing” New York Times, 21 

March 2009.

32. Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, La Guerre hors limites (War without limits), 81.

33. “L’innovation technologique dans les conflits irréguliers” (Technological innovation in 

irregular conflicts), in Christian Malis, Hew Strachan, Didier Danet, (eds.) La Guerre irrégulière 

(Irregular warfare), Economica, 2011. 

49

Chapter 5

Robotization of the Forces and Organization of Army Units

by Jean-Philippe Wirth

Introduction

Objectively, the usefulness of robots for modern forces is no longer really questionable. 

They are progressively invading western military forces, especially those in the Iraqi and 

Afghan theaters where they are or have aleady been used owing to the many adantages they 

offer, in particular for the missions that the Americans call 3D: Dull, Dirty, and Dangerous.

For the last ten years, the nature of recent conflicts and the imperative to preserve human 

lives have indeed led the various military forces to wonder about the place of robots and 

mini-UAVs within their forces. As of 2007, the American authorities have decided on this 

question by acknowledging its importance. They initiated ambitious programs planning 

to integrate robots within land forces as of 2015 to conduct new missions. At the same 

time, significant financial assets were commited to improve the robots dedicated to the socalled traditional missions such as Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), a mission which 

currently concerns the majority of the robots deployed in the theaters of operations. 

Though their integration is just beginning, an evolution has been perceptible since 

2010 and it turns out that within the French armed forces, military robots will be much 

more numerous and complex tomorrow. Among them, the place of ground robots (UAVs 

included) is inevitably going to increase in the coming years, given the strong capability 

development potential of the domain. Indeed the proliferation of operational requirements 

is about to coincide with the maturity of available technologies. This situation therefore 

makes us think that the progressive generalization of the fielding of robots in units will take 

place soon enough to imply that we must think about it now. 

Indeed, behind this near certainty, the integration of robots is an actual issue. The 

stopping of the Future Combat System (FCS) program and the evolutions of the Brigade 

Combat Team (BCT) induced the United States to cancel several envisaged programs. 

It can thus be useful to initiate some reflection on trends and on the consequences the 

robotization of land forces could have on the organization of the units. 

Besides, in order not to repeat in the ground robotics domain the same mistakes made 

in the field of UAVs, an assessment regarding the interest and credibility of robotization 

options is imperative, since the SCORPION program itself is shaping the future of the 

French Army. 

The Introduction of Robots Within Land Forces

In foreign countries, with the first lessons learned and the consequences of budget 

constraints, the current decade is a period when reflections on concepts of employment 

and on the integration of robots in military forces are deepening; this phase breaks with the 

wide-ranging developments conducted over the previous decade. Between 2000 and 2009, 

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the French MoD.
50

many new robotized system concepts appeared, mainly in the United States. It is now clear 

that the motivations of the American government were based not only on the preoccupation 

of preserving human lives, but also on the will to find technologically-oriented answers to 

the new threats represented by terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda. 

Designed in order to produce quick lessons learned, some “pilot robots” have thus been 

deployed in Afghanistan and Iraq with a partly undefined employment. Therefore, they 

were usually not interoperable with the other systems used in the field. More than a dozen 

types of Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) have thus been tested, ranging from ultralight robots (a few kilos) to robots designed to prepare the terrain (a few tons) and even 

robots that are armed. Other countries such as Israel have started developing robotized 

systems able to fulfil complex missions. These missions naturally resulted directly from 

the conflict with the Palestinans, like the surveillance of the urban terrain and searches of 

buildings. 

However, the results are mixed regarding the new concepts of deployed robots. They 

have confirmed the importance for the soldiers to have a robot able to deal with new 

threats such as the IEDs. In that case, the remote operation of the robot is made most 

often within sight and at less than 200 meters from the combatant. But they also have 

highlighted the difficulty to implement systems able to fulfil less specialized missions such 

as reconnaissance or surveillance in a hostile environment. The main reason was probably 

the lack of maturity in the concepts of employment and in the sharing of roles between men 

and robots. 

For France today, the robots deployed into theaters of operations outside national 

territory are exclusively dedicated to EOD-type missions, the framework of employment 

of which is clearly defined. But France is considering the wider introduction of military 

robots within its forces as well as their high potential for capability development. The 

place of robotics in SCORPION and the study of battlefield robotization initiated by the 

Academies and Schools of Saint-Cyr Coëtquidan reveal this recent evolution. 

In that context, many stakeholders speak in favor of a comprehensive approach. They 

indeed think that it is the only approach likely to obtain the best compromise between 

parameters as varied as performances, weight, ownership cost, procurement times, readiness 

rate, flexibility of employment, ease of maintenance, lifetime of equipment, respect of the 

environment or the possibilities to recycle equipment at the end of their life. They also 

consider it as necessary to conduct reflections on the place of man in the decision-making 

loop and the sharing of tasks between man and the robot, in order to prevent the emergence 

of doctrinal or ethical reservations. Lastly, this approach seems to be the most appropriate 

one for the development of employment considerations, for the integration within the 

forces, and for the definition of an indispensable set of references which would be coherent 

with the SCORPION program. The organization of strength and equipment of the units 

in a structure matching their doctrine of employment, their operational training and their 

logistic support will have to be redefined in order to integrate the parameters linked to these 

new machines, namely the robots. 

Let us nonetheless insist on the fact that a ground military robot has currently nothing 

to do with some uncontrollable android monster with iron eyes. It is today a discreet, smart, 
51

and docile small mobile device. And in the future, its shape with legs, wheels or flexible 

tracks could make it look like a pet or an unmanned utility vehicle rather than an extraterrestrial humanoid. 

Beyond the four identified priority missions, namely reconnaissance and surveillance, 

target identification and designation, counter-mining and counter-IED and CBRN 

reconnaissance, other missions have been identified for robots, both in the medium and 

longer terms. Current studies indeed lead us to think that robot systems will be involved 

in increasingly complex missions, thus requiring capabilities to adapt to the situation and 

to share information with other systems (whether manned or unmanned). This evolution 

will be made possible owing to the progressive breaking down of several barriers, not only 

technological ones but also legal and ethical ones, and will take place simultaneously in 

several directions: 

1. Improvement of existing performances and systems for some given missions. 

2. Improvement of the intrinsic capabilities of robots. 

3. Extension of the missions and reconfiguration capability.

4. Invention of new concepts of robots. 

It seems that, in the future, resorting to a robotized machine will be possible for 

nearly all missions. The concepts of employment of ground robots have therefore to be 

systematically integrated in considerations developed by many countries on the possible 

future formats of their military forces in order to face new threats. 

All in all, relying on the lessons learned from recent conflicts, all the stakeholders of 

the domain agree to say that the introduction of robots in the forces is unavoidable. This 

introduction still has to be designed in terms of organization and its success will most 

probably depend on the progressive character of the fielding of the robots. However, this 

will necessarily result from a precise definition of their employment, from their acceptability 

by the forces, and from the evolution of technologies. By sharing the expected tactical 

advantages of their implementation, it is worth wondering about the evolution which can 

be induced by their fielding in the units in terms of strength, equipment fleet, collective and 

individual training and logistic support, in order to guarantee that they are fully integrated 

in the functioning of a unit. 

Preserving the Human Potential

The first acknowledged technical advantage of the robot is that it improves the soldier’s 

protection by making him/her less exposed to the danger. Though the robot cannot totally 

replace the combatant, it indeed carries the risk off-course for some actions limited in time 

and space. This thus induces an indisputable preservation of the human fighting potential. 

For high-risk tasks like mine-clearing or CBRN reconnaissance, the current trend is 

to increase the performances of existing robots in order to limit, and even suppress human 

interventions. That is for instance the case for the AEODRS program in the US, aimed 

at developing tools with an unprecedented dexterity of the effect-producers in order to 

replace the human operator in the very dangerous phases of explosive ordnance disposal. 
52

These hyper-skilfull arms, associated to “toolboxes,” would be able to screw, cut, tear or 

unstick any piece of an IED in order to defuse it. 

For all that, can we deduce from these expected performances of robotization that it 

is possible to downsize the unit engaged in a combat action? Beyond an automatic answer 

often given by some technocrat, the study of this question first and foremost requires a 

minimum of common sense. Even if it is eminently beneficial, the preservation of the 

human potential above all avoids having to renew it, given the necessity to systematically 

replace losses. It is obvious that preserving a life is an immeasurable and necessary deed. 

It also allows the State to avoid paying survivor or disability benefits. But this does not 

erase the need for the posting of the concerned soldier in the structure of the engaged unit. 

The only direct impact of the actual preservation of human potential on the organization 

of the engaged force lies in fact in the possibility of adjusting the strength of the medical 

support necessary for the operation. This indirectly results in a decrease of the recruitment 

and training flow of the military personnel required in order to reconstitute the strength 

necessary for the good functioning of units. In other words, the following confusion has 

to be avoided: sparing lives means preserving the strength immediately available to fulfil 

the mission. But it does not mean questioning the need for the strength deemed necessary 

to fulfil the mission with a given item of equipment. Besides, the random nature of human 

casualties—limited as they are—will continue to imply that the training given to the 

combatant prepare him/her for the possibility of replacing his/her comrade or superior who 

would have been injured or killed, even if this case occurs fortunately less often. 

In terms of organization of units, it is not the economy of human lives but the automation 

of the tasks to be fulfilled which can be the basis of a new assessment of the strength of 

the units equipped with robots. But this is not new. Artillerymen remember that in 1970 

one commander and 8 men were required to fire the 155 mm gun whereas in 1990 one 

commander and 3 men were enough to use the modern and much more efficient automaticloading version of the same weapon. 

Moreover, efforts for optimization and automatization of tasks are continuously going 

on as, for example, the weight reduction which aims to facilitate their implementation 

and deployment in operation: the 25 kg Packbot robot, for example, has been reduced to 

a 12 kg model; and the 50 kg CAMELON EOD robot with a neutralization function has 

been transitioned to the 10 kg COBRA equipped with the same gun. Since their weight 

is reduced, the tactical and logistic transport requires fewer personnel. In principle, there 

would be an appreciable amount of economy of strength by systematically automating 

tasks fulfilled by combatants, in particular the heavy, precise or repetitive ones, since they 

consume a lot of time and effort. To deny this evolution induced by scientific progress and 

the human mastering of progressively elaborate technologies would be in vain. 

The Possible Increase of Military Capabilities

However, robotization could destroy the framework of a too financial approach which 

would be strictly based on the number of capabilities to be held. The new technicaloperational possibilities that robotization is going to progressively introduce can quickly 

lead to give up an “iso-mission” approach since they will sometimes make it possible to 
53

radically change the capability scale. It is the case for UAVs that flight altitude can be much 

lower than that of manned aircraft. The introduction of robots within land forces is thus 

going to unavoidably lead to doctrinal evolution and pave the way for the production of 

new concepts following an iterative course. 

For instance, deploying a significant number of forces is currently the only way to 

correctly control the terrain of the area of action allocated to an infantry unit. In dismounted 

combat, a high number of combatants is necessary to engage on a long-lasting basis. In 

this type of mission, the strength often limits the extent of the area they are indeed able to 

control although it would often be needed to cover a much wider area. 

In the future, it will become possible to employ many sensor robots without mortgaging 

in situ significant strength nor risking to dangerously spread it, and to therefore cover much 

wider areas by using automated relays in order to ensure indispensable communications. 

It will then be possible, not only to ensure the maintenance of our current capabilities, 

but also to reach a profitable increase of the latter in the various “robotizable” areas of 

activities. The improvement of these intrinsic capabilities and others should result from 

advances in the field of ground robots’ mobility, power supply, security of communication 

assets, level of decision-making autonomy, and ability to cooperate with others. 

The emergence of these increased possibilities will thus induce the following question: 

is the sought after goal just the optimization of strength, equipment, and organization of 

units so that they can fulfil the current missions only (“iso-mission” approach)? Or, is it 

worth extending a unit’s scope of missions by exploiting the new possibilities offered by 

robotization? 

Eventually, this issue of organization can be summarized in the following way: in the 

projected evolution of each system of forces, will the increase of the capability productivity 

induced by robotization only help return the investment back, or will it make it possible to 

reinvest the latter to procure additional military capabilities? 

Regarding the engagement capabilities of units in the area of contacts, the study of 

“robotizable” actions over the entire spectrum of missions of the combined arms task force 

shows for instance that it is possible to increase the task force’s capabilities in the field of 

intelligence by providing it with a much better vision of the enemy situation in contact and 

in short depth. The detailed knowledge of the tactical situation down to the lowest echelons 

would be a considerable improvement. In practice, it would enable the combatants to 

optimize the local conditions (moment, axis of effort, layout) of their maneuver and to 

notably accelerate the tempo of their engagement. 

The capability to detect, identify, neutralize and, if need be, destroy a threat consisting of 

mines and explosive devices, by punctually using robotized machines has been developing 

for several years. But it is now possible to systematically strengthen the neutralization and 

destruction capabilities of existing systems while limiting human physical intervention. 

Seeking to complement the destruction capabilities of the combined arms task force with 

robots that mount direct fire weapon systems will undoubtedly require deep study. Their 

implementation against a human adversary indeed raises some ethical and legal questions 

and it would be counter-productive to leave them unanswered for too long. However, these 
54

robots—or effect-producers—could initially at least help apply some effects in the field, 

like opening a breach in a wall or destroying abatis obstacles. 

Lastly, we unfortunately have to acknowledge the actual tactical handicap resulting 

from the individual combatant’s combat load. This load is currently calculated at 50 kg—

approximately 110 lbs; the historical average used to be 35-40 kg [77-88 lbs] or even more 

depending on the soldier’s function, such as light-machine gunner or mortar crewman. In 

order to remedy this unavoidable problem, equipping forces with carrier robot systems 

seems to be an appropriate solution to this problem, be it MULE robots or exo-squeletontype systems. 

It is clear that the second proven tactical advantage attributed to robots is to make it 

possible to save forces by increasing their operational efficiency with the same number 

of personnel, relying on the material possibilities robots offer to carry actions away and 

to apply some remote effects. This enables the combatant to keep a stand-off distance, 

both in friendly and hostile areas. But this functional move can involve a shifting of 

the competencies requirements from less “know how to do” toward more “know how 

to control.” It looks a little like what the outsourcing trend for some support activities 

has shown, a trend launched by the armed forces in order to refocus on the core of the 

combatant profession. 

In the new context, the know-how will become less necessary than the “knowledge of 

how to have the job done.” The training system will therefore have to adapt to this evolution 

of the need for new competencies by developing the ability of the combatant to control all 

the configurations of employment of the robot. This will be true for restoration of the 

robot’s normal functioning mode or for switching it to degraded mode, the various steps of 

which will have to be designed ab initio. This process will also have to take into account 

the increase of automated intervention capabilities put at the disposal of the individual 

combatant while avoiding giving way to an over-specialization. The uncertainties and risks 

inherent to a combat engagement prevent clear compartmentalization of the competencies 

held by the various combatants deployed in the field. 

The Probable Development of Combined Arms Cooperation

The robotization of land forces is undoubtedly likely to increase the operational 

efficiency of units, especially reaction time or the accuracy of their weapons. Initially at 

least, this improvement is going to concern mainly combat capability and the capacity 

of sustaining contact with the enemy. These changes will thus likely make the rules of 

deployment evolve, as well as the tempo with which units engaged in the first echelon are 

relieved. Fighting with the increasing help of militarized robots may even be likely to result 

in a progressive modification of the necessary balance between combat, command, combat 

support, and combat service support units. 

As proof of that, let us just remember the effect that motorization and mechanization of 

French Army units had on the balance of the functions within its regiments and formations 

(brigades, divisions, Army corps) during the second part of the 20th century. Be it the 

adoption of the RC 80 structures (Leclerc MBTs) or the fielding of armored personnel 

carriers in the 11th Airborne Division, such evolutions—once called “cultural evolutions”—

did have an impact on the organization, daily life, needs for specialists, collective training, 
55

ways to move, training conditions, maintenance of equipment, and the logistic support of 

the units concerned by these changes. 

It is thus neither impossible nor unlikely that the ease of integration of robots in the 

digitized systems of the battlefield as well as their strongly sought interoperability will 

gradually reduce the current functional differences between branches. In which category 

of effect-producer will an armed robot be placed? More precisely, which criteria will 

we have to take into account in order to make such a classification, knowing that it is 

indispensable for the drafting of major organization documents (like an Order of Battle) 

which use precise references in order to define the composition of permanent formations 

as rigorously as possible? 

Moreover, the guideline of land force robotization is the SCORPION program, the 

perimeter of which is defined by the equipment of the combined arms task force and its 

combat support. During two phases in the 15 coming years, a definite combined arms 

approach is going to lead the achievement of this “super-program,” the staff objective 

of which is organized around 3 capability axes: a unit’s equipment of course, but also its 

operational training and support system. The reference value of this approach will ensure 

the necessary coherence of the numerous items of equipment developed and fielded in the 

units. It will so naturally strengthen the de-compartmentalization expected between the 

various branches of an Army with a now very limited size. 

Nonetheless, this innovative approach potentially tends to restore some kind of 

coincidence between the operational side and the organic one which used to prevail at 

the end of the 1970s but from which the organization of the land forces command had 

to progressively move away. It is thus a de facto proposal for the creation of units which 

would be “combined arms” in their conception, whereas until now the capacity to combine 

the effect produced by the units of different branches has been obtained by mixing units 

for a limited time depending on the expected length of employment. What we currently do, 

namely defining the composition of the force to be engaged on a case-by-case basis, could 

evolve in order to better preserve the natural cohesion of the standing units. The quality 

of their engagement in an operation outside the national territory would thus be better 

guaranteed or the operational preparation period reduced. 

For approximately twenty years, the principle of unit force packaging has prevailed in 

the military management of the successive crises, in order to reconcile the requirements for 

performance of individual and collective training for each specialty, with the compulsory 

necessity to optimize the composition of the force to be deployed, and with the preservation 

of an overall strength always highly restricted owing to pressing political and financial 

reasons. The building of the Force to be deployed to the concerned theater of operation 

must be so sharply fine-tuned that it always induces a too subtle functional division in order 

to keep homogeneous standing units in each branch. 

Since the non-conclusive experience tried during the 70s, there has virtually been no 

combined arms regiment on the national territory, but just some small units in the overseas 

departments and territories. The brigade is thus currently the first level of combined arms 

training for the various regiments or units of each branch. But tomorrow, the robotization 

of the forces might question this historical organization and lead to the progressive 
56

implementation of regiments organized around standing combined arms task forces. In 

other words, with bottom up doctrinal developments that the use of robots is going to 

naturally induce, starting from the lowest unit of employment and the announced spread of 

simulation practice inside the units, the development of the equipment modularity might 

also reduce the need for units modularity and even progressively replace it when force 

building is to be performed. 

Modularity in the field of ground military robots has by the way been developed in 

France as early as 2003 with the “MiniRoc” upstream studies program which was aimed at 

designing robots able to both conduct multiple missions in urban terrain and be transported 

there by dismounted combatants. The solution adopted to achieve that was to develop the 

modular payload concept called “mission module” which makes it possible to configure 

the robot before each mission. Since then, this modular concept has been adopted by the 

Americans with an extension which has resulted in the notion of a generic commandcontrol station. This approach finally led to the development of the Joint Architecture 

for Unmanned Systems (JAUS) standard which must guarantee the “intraoperability” of 

the 3 main components of the robot: its platform, its payload, and its command-control 

station. Incidentally, the arrival of middleware like the Robot Operating System (ROS) 

now reinforces this trend toward modular robotics. 

In order to properly appreciate the advantages and drawbacks of such an evolution, 

knowing that various modularity levels can be envisaged, it will probably be necessary to 

assess various solutions for the robotization of the forces by integrating in particular the 

major following criteria: assessment of operational aspects, procurement and ownership 

costs, interest in terms of technological capitalization, increasing complexity of structures, 

possible loss of rusticity, and normalization process. Another way of organizing units, 

training them and consequently supporting them is thus emerging. Incidentally, the planned 

creation of a SCORPION Combat Center of Expertise clearly shows that such evolutions 

have to be studied in the upstream, by gathering the indispensable competencies in order to 

ensure that the adopted solutions are coherent. 

The Acceptability of Robotization in Units

The third major advantage which can be expected from the irruption of robotics in the 

armed forces is the possibility to carry out many precise, repetitive and boring tasks. The 

permanence and regularity of performance, which are its corollary, will undoubtedly have 

significant consequences on the tactical employment and logisitic support of units. This 

simply shows that the implementation of such machines can have notable consequences on 

the living and working conditions of military personnel who, as professionals, are highly 

demanding regarding the quality of their tools. 

The analysis of the acceptability of robots by various French Army units includes two 

major axes. The first one is naturally that of operational acceptability, but the second one 

is unavoidably the acceptance by the humans. The first approach consists in studying and 

validating the operating reality of the proposed systems in operational conditions, both in 

terms of technical coherence between the various implemented assets (transportation of 

platforms, readiness of sources of energy, variable nature of the terrain, ability to outclass 
57

the adversary) and in terms of abiding by the capacities and the operators’ potential (effect 

on stress, size efficiency ratio, level of mobilization of attention abilities).

The second approach concerns the taking into account of human factors. Robotic 

systems are indeed new items of equipment and actually innovative ones, and their relations 

with humans must therefore be carefully analyzed. Besides the fact that the man/machine 

interface occupies an unprecedented dimension in the yet to be established relation, the use 

and doctrine of robot employment must take into consideration the specific place and role 

of this new collaborator which is as intelligent as it is unfeeling. The choice for a relevant 

strategy of unit robotization will depend on a detailed assessment. 

For instance, the classification of military robots according to their weight has long 

been a key consideration. But, for a few years now, though the weight of a robot remains a 

fundamental element, the machine has rather been considered in terms of “deployability,” 

since the mobility constraints are of course different if the robot can easily be carried by a 

man or not. A combatant can thus easily deploy it if the platform does not exceed 5 kgs (11 

lbs), or it can be deployed from a vehicle and carried by one or several combatants if the 

weight of the platform does not exceed 30 kgs (66 lbs). 

Innovations in the field of mobility over the last years are mainly due to the extraordinary 

development of Japanese humanoid robots. They bring with them new generations 

of micro-motoreducers and make it possible to elaborate polyarticulated robots. In the 

military domain, the most famous robot of this type is the “big dog” manufactured by 

Boston Dynamics, the major function of which is the transportation of supply in order to 

lighten the burden of the combatant. Today, the many limitations of this robot (robustness, 

weight, noise) do not permit its use in operations. Nonetheless, the current trend is to 

elaborate these “bio-mimetic” robots in the civilian field, which will unavoidably have 

consequences in the military one. 

In the field of communications, robots usually require a very efficient radio link, in 

particular in high-speed teleoperating modes, in which the latency of the video sent by the 

robot should generally not exceed 100 milliseconds. In the coming years, we can expect 

an increase in performance. But it will naturally go hand in hand with the implementation 

of modes of decision-making autonomy making it possible to “cut,” at least provisionally, 

the link between the teleoperator and the robot (this is indeed the most demanding type of 

link in terms of pass band and latency) and also to meet the requirement for more discreet 

systems. 

The man/robot interaction is therefore of paramount importance because it is going 

to define the communication details between the man and the robot and “process” the 

aspects linked to the cognitive power of robot operators. There are indeed many underlying 

technologies since they include the robot command modes (like for instance speaking to a 

robot in a natural language), aid-to-decision systems, systems reconstructing the perceived 

environment or the modes of decision-making autonomy which make it possible to change 

the role and/or qualification of the operator (like for instance switching from a simple robot 

teleoperator to a robot fleet supervisor). 

The general trend is definitely to try and reduce the cognitive burden of the operators 

linked to tasks that do not bring any added value to the mission. This includes the 
58

implementation of autonomous navigation modes, new multimodal interfaces such as the 

voice-activated control of a robot (as if it were a team member), environment reconstruction 

modes with relevant information for the mission, or a decrease in the number of teleoperators 

in favour of specialized analysts, etc. 

The domain of decision-making autonomy linked to the mission is materialized by the 

ability of the robot to learn job-oriented behaviors, or to make an automatic decision (like 

taking cover if fired at or responding in case of attack). Though little research has been 

done until now in this field, it will certainly develop in the coming years. It will probably 

not be oriented toward a total replacement of human beings by robots which would require 

the application of new doctrine but rather toward the conduct by the robot of sequences of 

autonomous activity in space and time, like the simple missions that the commander of a 

small element deployed in the field gives orally or by sign to one of the executing personnel 

subordinated to him/her. 

The Advent of Cooperative Engagement

Cooperative robotics is going to present a major interest since its areas of application 

are very broad, be it that of military operations or that of civil security. Its implementation 

will make it possible to significantly increase the efficiency of robots (including UAVs) 

which are still currently employed independently and which cannot hence benefit from 

an actual sharing of information. If we do not go further than the mere military field, 

this increased efficiency could undoubtedly provide several advantages likely to have an 

impact on the structural compositions of units. 

Logically, it should be possible to further reduce the need for personnel necessary to 

serve the equipment. Today, two people are needed to control a robot: one who conducts 

it and the other one who handles its payload. In the same way, two or three personnel 

are necessary to ensure the mission of a flying UAV: the station chief, the pilot of the 

UAV, and the payload operator. The challenge of cooperative robotics is to envisage selfpiloted systems, which would clearly be more autonomous. However, the complexity of 

the processes to be implemented in order to have actually autonomous platforms implies 

that this ambition will probably not be a technological reality within the next decade. 

More prosaically, we are looking for solutions to help pilot the robots. Cooperation 

is going to permit the transfer, in the short run, of some controls from the operator to the 

robot. This is the case for robot convoys behind a manned armored vehicle, designed in 

the framework of the Robotic Followers Advanced Technology Demonstration (RF-ATD) 

program, or for the transport of a heavy load by several robots, achieved in the MARS 

program. In the area of combat, the lightening of the infantryman will certainly make it 

possible to increase his mobility in compensation for the increasing numbers of machines 

he will have the possibility to operate in the field. Able to remain longer far from his 

adversary, the combatant could have a range of machines on a following “shelf” in order to 

engage that adversary by combining their various effects. He will therefore have to manage 

these machines wisely, without letting himself be hindered by their number, since, in the 

end, it will not be the human capacities which will improve but those of these smart tools. 

Cooperative robotics will also make it possible to increase the security and protection of 

forces. Today, a robot operator must remain some hundreds of meters from his/her platform 
59

because of the technological limitations of communication range. But the challenge is 

to noticeably extend the projection capacities of robotized systems. This result could be 

obtained by deploying a cooperative system, each element of which would participate 

in the communication network, which would allow the operators to get farther from the 

danger. It could also be obtained by watching the largest possible area with several agents, 

by equipping the ground robots and UAVs with power supply capacities, or by achieving 

tasks impossible without cooperation, owing to coordinated actions between the machines 

(like synchronized fires, validated and initiated by a human). 

By organizing a platform specialization, cooperation will finally permit to improve 

the awareness of the tactical situation since the gains we could expect are an optimization 

of payloads and a reduction of the robots’ complexity. The exploitation of the sensors’ 

complementarities in the various bands (visible, infrared, acoustic, radar, etc.) would 

consequently make it possible to make the information more reliable and to produce a 

sufficiently elaborated synthesis so that man can fully exploit it. 

That is why cooperation between men and robots on the one hand, and among robots 

on the other hand, must be as of now a major research axis within the robotics institutes and 

be included in staff studies. It will undoubtedly be an essential element to be integrated in 

the design of future robotized systems because it must also take into account the notions of 

cooperation between manned and unmanned vehicles, be they ground or aerial ones. 

The distribution of roles will necessarily give priority to the ability of manned systems 

to produce effects on the adversary (like letting the robots localize targets and having man 

control the rounds fired by artillery launchers). The need for duality, which stems from the 

need for the conception or the organization of equipment to be fielded in units, will result 

in a technical constraint that will have to be integrated by considering it like an unavoidable 

compensation for the improvement of flexibility of tactical employment. 

It is nonetheless worth noting that the implementation of a normative set of references 

dedicated to robotics remains pending since there is no standard at all in this field. Even 

the JAUS standard, which has long been unavoidable in the US, in particular in order 

to have generic control/command stations, seems to have been put on stand-by for 

several years. Oddly enough, even in the world of civilian robotics, the standardization 

approach does not seem to be topical. In the military domain, standardization agreements 

(STANAGs) are applicable for UAVs only. However, it seems likely that in the near future, 

the implementation of standards will become compulsory for military robots to guarantee 

their appropriate integration into force systems. 

Quetioning the Equipment Policy

The emergence of new concepts for robots seems to be not only unavoidable but 

also desired. Beyond the missions currently carried out by human beings, which could 

already be performed by robots, a huge panel opens on new missions which could not be 

accomplished by humans until now, in particular when they were considered too dangerous 

or even suicidal. After the Chernobyl disaster, the Fukushima incident has just highlighted 

again the need to have (possibly consumable) robots available in order to intervene in 

hostile environments. The American Warrior and Packbot robots thus intervened there in 
60

order to measure the level of radioactivity. The new conditions of use and maintenance of 

equipment could thus introduce a sort of rupture in their design. 

One can indeed wonder about the usefulness of armor and active or passive protection 

of the vehicles when they become unmanned. This should logically result in the adoption 

of less “militarized,” and therefore less expensive systems. The arrival of new civilian 

vehicles or “drive by wire” kits onto the market, for less than 20,000 euros ($25,000), 

must be taken into account when staffs reflect on the future of land forces. We can thus 

imagine the emergence of the following problem in the field of robotized equipment, be 

they remotely operated tomorrow or autonomous the day after tomorrow. Since there will 

no longer be any human operators to be protected inside of these vehicles, what will be the 

residual need for protection of these machines? 

The answer which will have to be given will certainly imply taking into account the 

two following parameters: 

1. The level of efficiency to be guaranteed in the fulfilling of the mission. 

2. The financial cost of a possible loss or destruction of the robotized device. 

Such are, by the way, the implicit foundations of UAV equipment policy. 

Should we then privilege a traditional investment approach, consisting in equipping 

units with very sophisticated robots that are obviously well-protected but the cost of which 

will consequently limit the size of the fleet? Or could we envisage a new acquisition 

approach, choosing to procure a large number of robotized machines, which will indeed 

be less sophisticated, poorly protected, but for a significantly lower cost, possibly 10 or 50 

times less expensive? 

The acquisition costs indicated in Figure 6 are just given as examples. It is obvious 

that they are average figures and that they can vary depending on numerous factors such 

as integrated equipment, series effects, hardening for a given environment, synergies with 

productions for the “general public,” the emergence of new components or technologies, 

political orientations and decisions, among others. 

That being acknowledged, knowing that the value 1 represents the top of the range of 

the deployable sensor, that is 5k€ ($6000), the third column gives an idea of the cost ratio 

which can exist between various potentially usable machines. It permits visualization of 

the impact of the choice of equipment type on the final costs and can thus orient the choice 

that has to be made between the various possible solutions. This comparison shows that the 

mass employment of mini or micro-robots may be more economical than the fielding of an 

inevitably limited number of heavy and complex ones. 

In other deliberately more provocative words, one can wonder if the future of the 

robotized contact armored vehicle would not be the creation of a significant (several 

thousand) all-terrain vehicle fleet from the commercial range, which would be completely 

remotely operated, without any armor kit, equipped with a “low-cost” direct fire weapon 

and with some very efficient missiles? It would be somewhat comparable with a ground 

drone that we could easily take the risk to lose since there would be nobody on board, it 

would not be expensive, and since we would have many of them. 
61

Of course, in the conception of future equipment, such questioning is not really 

new, though it has many consequences in terms of doctrine of employment, operational 

logistics, and maintenance. But robotization itself can substantially modify the “core” of 

the issue by breaking down the barrier of the indisputable necessity to protect the life of 

the personnel dedicated to the implementation of the vehicle. Consequently the need for 

protection which characterizes this vehicle would only be linked to the value of the items 

of equipment it would be equipped with in order to fulfil its role in the action. We could 

thus expect some form of rupture in the field of equipment and organization of units, even 

if this evolution takes place step by step given the progressive aspect of the fielding of new 

robotized generations of equipment. 

The Need to Define a Robotization Strategy

In order to take into account the complexity of the challenge represented by the 

progressive robotization of land forces, and to ensure the permanent coherence of the 

progress that will occur in the many domains affected by this evolution, we will have to 

define the best strategies to be implemented in order to develop, procure, field, support, and 

renew the proposed robot systems. The chosen strategies will necessarily have to integrate 

the need to tightly link the achieved operational advances and the organic adaptations to 

be implemented. 

In this framework, the strategies to be envisaged could be based on three major common 

principles: 

1. The general and simultaneous development of all the functions, with levels 

of achievement (performance, maturity of technologies) increasing over time. 

2. The development of each component or function following separate plans, 

with the drawing of some parallel axes and the definition of periodical updates. 

3. The constant seeking of optimization of the various costs induced by 

robotization of the concerned function or domain. 

The expression of operational requirements will have to include the definition of 

equipment priorities between the various functions for which possibilities of robotization 

have already been identified, such as intelligence, reconnaissance, static protection, 

Figure 6. Robot Acquisition Costs.

 Source: Created by Author.

Robots Price range

Relative Costs

Range Average

Deployable sensor from 0.5k€ to 5k€ 0.1 to 1 1

Micro robot from 15K€ to 25K€ 3 to 5 4

Light mini robot from 100K€ to 250K€ 20 to 50 35

Mini robot from 200K€ to 750K€ 40 to 150 95

Heavy mini robot from 600K€ to 1,250K€ 120 to 250 175

Robots Price range

Relative Costs

Range Average

Deployable sensor from 0.5k€ to 5k€ 0.1 to 1 1

Micro robot from 15K€ to 25K€ 3 to 5 4

Light mini robot from 100K€ to 250K€ 20 to 50 35

Mini robot from 200K€ to 750K€ 40 to 150 95

Heavy mini robot from 600K€ to 1,250K€ 120 to 250 175
62

communication relays, and target marking. But it will also have to astutely anticipate the 

long-term achievable actions. 

One has therefore to expect specific difficulty from the probable impossibility of 

stabilizing the expression of these requirements on a long-lasting basis, as rapid and 

potentially divergent changes are going to appear. Distinguishing between short-lived 

infatuations and key improvements will be a particularly hazardous exercise as long as the 

prospective fog has not broken up, at least in any given area of such a transverse capacity 

domain. 

The insertion of robots in existing or to-be-conceived systems and organizations 

will also have to integrate the impact of their fielding in the operating modes they will 

come with (simple teleoperation, assisted teleoperation, incremental development of 

autonomy capacities, progressive modification of responsibility-sharing, etc.). Indeed, the 

indispensable changes of unit structures will have to be studied and decided on in due time, 

both for what will pertain to the implementation and to the maintenance of these machines. 

By the way, the utterly cultural dimension of these transformations will require a real 

process of acceptance aimed at users. In order to be employed at the highest level and to 

be efficiently used, any new system—a fortiori if it is brand new as will be the case for the 

robots—must be fully accepted at all the levels concerned by its implementation. Knowing 

that the slightest gap in this field is likely to result in a psychological rejection, the holders 

of the robot will have to fully appropriate each of them and they will have to be totally 

convinced of the added-value brought by its implementation. 

To illustrate the cultural transformation that has to be conducted, we can mention the 

possible loss of relevance of the traditional expression “to serve a weapon or a piece of 

equipment.” Indeed, though this expression is still aimed at highlighting the care with 

which this piece of equipment has to be maintained, keeping in mind that there could be no 

ambiguity regarding its use by the soldier, it could be different with a robot since the first 

requirement of the human operator will be to never lose his control and rather to assert his 

mastery. 

Guaranteeing the developmental qualities of a robotized system will undoubtedly be 

another challenge. Because even in the case in which a rapid and massive introduction of 

one or several robotized systems could be envisaged, this fielding should neither result in 

closing one axis of development nor in going against the seeking of other future solutions 

which could be more interesting. The acquisition of experience and the capacity to exploit 

its feedback will have to be used not only to directly improve the fielded equipment but 

also to orient the studies or research applied to the development of new capabilities. 

Lastly, the taking into account or the definition of legal constraints, and even the 

acceptance of the existence and employment of such new systems by public opinion, will 

have to be integrated early enough in the equipping process in order to avoid any potential 

inhibition. The objective will be to avoid civil-military duality between robotized systems 

which might induce some confusion regarding the legitimacy of their employment by land 

forces in their operations. 
63

Having superiority over the adversary remains a fundamental requirement of combat. 

Just as it would be unnatural not to admit the notion of “endangering other people’s life” in 

war, it would be deeply inappropriate to object to the robotized nature of these machines in 

order to limit their use—a fortiori to give them up—as long as the combatant keeps control 

over them and therefore remains fully responsible for their employment. It would certainly 

be astute to have this principle accepted and to decide on this issue as early as possible in 

the robotization process of the armed forces. 

The strategy aimed at achieving it may usefully include the following main steps: 

1. Have the direct users appropriate the equipment and gain confidence in the use of 

these new items 

2. Gain experience by deploying and employing robotized systems in theaters of 

operations as early as possible 

3. Progressively validate new concepts of employment and simultaneously rearrange 

current organizations in order to best manage the new proposed capabilities 

4. Take into account as early as possible the interoperability constraints induced by 

the implementation of the various robotized systems 

5. Integrate them into the planned developments in the SCORPION framework in 

order to benefit optimally from potential synergies 

6. Exploit civil-military convergences which could be highlighted in terms of 

common requirements and components (like pre- or post-military intervention 

surveillance capacities) 

For reasons due to the cycle of engagement of land units, to the tempos of technological 

advances observed in the concerned domains, to the average duration of organic command 

or responsibility periods and the multi-annual character of investments to be made, it seems 

astute to envisage a robotization tempo based on two to three-year cycles. Each cycle could 

then be built around three main axes: 

1. A short-term axis which would include the implementation of available or 

very easily adaptable machines (intially remotely operated) as well as the 

organization of the corresponding lessons learned process 

2. A medium-term axis focused on meeting the requirements expressed in the 

framework of SCORPION, along with a concrete objective regarding the 

operational fielding of a coherent set of equipment 

3. A long-term axis aimed at preparing the following cycle, ensuring that the 

available technologies are mature (models or demonstrators) in order to match 

the expressed requirements (equipment specifications, training of personnel) 

Conclusion

The significant tactical advantages offered by the robotization of the land forces in 

the next ten or fifteen years will certainly have consequences on the standing organization 

of Army units. Be it the increased selection for men in the production of the sought after 

effects on the adversary to gain superiority, or the still stronger contribution of equipment 
64

to obtain these effects, units are going to experience a natural and spontaneous evolution 

of their operating modes. 

Their structure, their doctrine of employment, their training and their support will have 

to be adapted to this new configuration, and the “software” of their functioning will have 

to be reviewed. This transformation, which is already predictable, directly concerns the 

young military cadres who have just started their career. Before their third promotion, 

they will certainly have experienced stimulating robotization in the units in which they are 

going to serve. It is thus better to master it here and now so that they anticipate it, like they 

have been invited to do so during the seminar organized by the Center for Research at St. 

Cyr Coetquidan (CREC) on 9/10 November 2011. 
Part Two

Robots and Soldiers on the Battlefield: 

a Challenge in

 Law and Military Ethics

67

Chapter 6

Stakeholders and Issues: Outlook for Change in the International Legal 

Framework for the Use of Military Robotics

by Éric Germain

The law may be considered to be a reflection of society: it is a transposition of changes, 

the fears arising from these changes, and the social need for protection that they entail. For 

instance, the upheaval of North American society in the 1960s is reflected very directly in 

the Quebec Criminal Code, with more new offenses created between 1965 and 1975 than 

during the whole of the previous one hundred years.1

In the years to come, it can be imagined that developments in civilian and military 

robotics will produce major changes in society which, in turn, will spark concerns and 

perhaps even fears, and therefore a demand from society for greater supervision through 

national and international law.

Investigation of these social implications cannot be carried out in isolation from an 

examination of the balances of power that, ultimately, will nurture fresh definitions in 

new legal frameworks. In order to anticipate the national, and above all international legal 

changes that will regulate the future developments and uses of military robotics, the forces 

that will influence the production of such laws need to be properly identified.

The concerns of institutional and industrial stakeholders appear to focus essentially 

on issues relating to capabilities and underestimate the importance of the social and legal 

implications—in both national and international law—which may be expected in the wake 

of this technological revolution.

Which Stakeholders Will Determine the Changes to the International Legal 

Framework?

Researchers who talk in terms of a “robotics revolution” insist on the scope of the 

upheaval to be expected, while recognizing the difficulty of measuring the implications for 

our societies with any degree of accuracy. For instance, Peter Singer draws a comparison 

with the birth of the automotive revolution. As far as robotics is concerned, he states that 

we are now at the stage of the Model T in the 1920s.2

 He argues that not only did the 

development of mass-produced cars lead to a new body of legislation (the Highway Code), 

it also completely transformed urban geography (with development of the suburbs) and 

led to whole array of social behaviors in North American society, which has even been 

described as the “car culture.”

We can thus expect the development of robotics to influence not only social relationships, 

but also the philosophical, moral, and religious dimensions of our view of mankind itself. 

This ontology should be borne in mind as we turn our attention to the stakeholders in the 

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the Directorate of Strategic 

Affairs, the MoD or the French government.
68

debate surrounding the issues of military robotics; it also explains the influence of religious 

nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the international ethical and legal debate.

Through their foundations and NGOs, Christian churches are already very much 

involved in the debate on military robotics. In 2009, the Roman Catholic Church relied 

on the Institut für Religion und Frieden, an Austrian military chaplaincy foundation, to 

investigate the issue of unmanned weapons.3

 Other faith-based stakeholders are committed 

to a considerably more pacifist orientation; these include the Fellowship of Reconciliation 

(FoR-England)4

 and the Quaker movement, whose Rowntree Charitable Trust sponsored 

the meeting of international experts held in Berlin in September 2010. This symposium 

in Berlin, to which we will return subsequently, marked a first attempt to coordinate the 

international campaign against remotely operated and unmanned weapons systems.

The fact that the collateral victims of essentially American and Israeli technology were 

located in predominantly Muslim nations meant that an increasingly significant politicalcum-religious dimension to the debate on unmanned weapons was expected. In 2009, an 

initial example of this was Amnesty International’s campaign condemning Britain’s work 

on the engines of Hermes drones used by the Israeli army during Operation Cast Lead in 

the Gaza Strip.5

 The conclusions of the UN Goldstone Commission stated that along with 

governments and military actors, arms manufacturers should also be held liable in cases 

where unmanned equipment is involved in a disproportionate use of force.6 

While the ability of non-governmental stakeholders (such as faith-based organizations) 

to mobilize public opinion should not be underestimated, the involvement of certain States 

to communicate on some ethical uses of military robotics should also be considered. As 

early as 2002, Iran highlighted the initiative by the Polytechnic University of Tehran 

to organize the very first international competition for unmanned anti-personnel mine 

detection devices.

The actors mobilizing public opinion exert lobbying pressure on governments to 

change national and international legislation, either through new laws or through changes 

in the way existing legislation is interpreted. However, there is a second level of action 

which relates rather to soft law. It is more particularly in the field of international law, 

which is not binding and not very normative in nature, that the direct expression of the 

sensibilities of public opinion is likely to find an ideal home.

This field of soft law should be increasingly taken into account when it comes to 

anticipating the new international legal framework for the use of military robotics. It 

is a complex field in which ethical, legal and political considerations are inextricably 

interwoven.

What Avenues for Changes in this Framework can be Envisaged in the Coming 

Years?

The change in the future legal framework regulating the development and use of 

unmanned weapons systems will largely depend on the ways in which opinion is mobilized 

around ethical issues. This means that it is vital to follow developments closely in the 

various forums addressing these issues, such as the International Committee for Robot 

Arms Control (ICRAC).
69

The ICRAC is an association of roboticists and academics engaged in the ethical debate 

on robotics (founded by Briton Noel Sharkey, Australian Rob Sparrow, German Jürgen 

Altmann and American Peter Asaro). From 20 to 22 September 2010, ICRAC organized 

a meeting of international experts in Berlin that brought together the main stakeholders 

in the international debate on the ethical and legal aspects of military robotics. Their 

primary goal was to promote the international regulation of remotely operated unmanned 

weapons systems such as armed drones. More radically, ICRAC sought to examine how 

a moratorium, or even a ban, could be obtained on weapons systems that could make 

the decision to open fire autonomously. These goals were ratified by a majority of the 

participants, although certain academics (Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen)7

 expressed a 

more nuanced position, and some even defended the legitimacy of reasoned development 

of robotic weapons (Ronald Arkin).8 

Currently, the only agreement to mention drones explicitly is the Missile Technology 

Control Regime (MTCR)9

 which includes them in its definition of Unmanned Aerial 

Vehicles (UAVs or alternatively UAS, standing for Unmanned Aircraft Systems).10 In this 

context there is also the 2002 Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation 

(HCOC). When the treaty was under negotiation, some lobbying led to UAVs being 

excluded from its field of application. However, the criteria of the Hague Code relating 

to technical sophistication and control of the scope of action could well be extended to 

airborne drones. 

Although it has been suspended since 2007, use could also be made of the Treaty 

on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), in which it is interesting to note that 

the definition of the terms “combat aircraft,” “combat helicopter,” and “attack helicopter” 

(whether specialized or multi-purpose) was deliberately drafted in such a way as to describe 

a manned or unmanned craft.11 

The field of international humanitarian law (IHL) could also be brought into play, with 

particular attention drawn to the possible implications for robotic weapons in Article 36 

“New Weapons” of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions. In Berlin, the major 

concern related to the increasing degree of autonomy of robotic weapons systems leading 

to a transition from “man in the loop” to “man on the loop” and finally to humans being 

“out of the loop,” i.e. not involved in the decision-making process.12 Although the issue of 

armed airborne drones was much discussed at the Berlin meeting, the issue of humans being 

“out of the loop” was then more acute for ground rather than airborne military “robots.”

The two most often mentioned examples were first, the South African accident in 2007 

when an automated anti-air defense system’s guns started firing horizontally, killing 9 

soldiers, and second, the latest generation South Korean SGR-A1 robot. In June 2010, two 

SGR-A1s were tested on the border with North Korea.13 This robot, developed by Samsung 

Techwin, has autonomous decision-making capabilities to open fire, making a breach of 

Asimov’s first law of robotics a disturbing reality.14

Research into military robotics is conducted in the context of the law of armed conflict, 

which is still a singular law, outside the scope of ordinary law (“exorbitant du droit 

commun”). The first exceptional aspect is the military function, which allows the use of 

deadly force, within the State’s monopoly on legitimate violence. This is an “exorbitant” 
70

power as defined by law and ethics. Although it is largely accepted in our societies that 

danger of death establishes a right to kill, the robotization of the battlefield is now likely to 

call into question this fundamental principle of the military function.

The example of the robotization of a military convoy may offer an approach to the 

issue in the context of armed conflict, as well as extending it to peace-keeping operations. 

The risk to civilians—children in particular—arising from the catch-up speed of a convoy 

vehicle is justified at present by the need to ensure the physical safety of the driver. How 

could this thinking be applied in the case of an unmanned vehicle?

The question can also be extended to ambulances or even robotic stretcher bearers. 

In the latter case, would such a robot be protected under the First Geneva Convention of 

1949 (art.24), just like its human counterpart? The question is all the more legitimate in 

that attackers could make a case for action on the basis that the sensors required to run a 

robotic stretcher bearer could also be used to gather military intelligence. The example of 

a system whose non-combatant use and nature should not immediately pose any ethical 

problem demonstrates the complexity of the legal issues surrounding military robotics—

issues which have not as yet been properly identified.

Robotization of the battlefield has the capacity to fundamentally change our appraisal of 

the law of war and international humanitarian law. The combination of technical, economic 

and operational factors is increasingly likely to lead to human beings being removed from 

the battlefield, and even from the decision process that determines whether to fire and the 

choice of target.

The number of accidental deaths caused by robots used in industry is now known, and 

it can be imagined that this number will not be any lower in the event of faults in military 

machines whose purpose is to use deadly force. In the future, the liability of the military or 

political stakeholders could be brought into play, as could that of the industrial designers 

of such robotic weapons.

The ethical and legal aspects are inextricably linked, but as yet they have not been 

sufficiently dealt with when considering our defense policy. A combined approach to 

ethical, social, and legal issues is undoubtedly a major strategic challenge for our nation, 

because to a large extent, it is they that will determine our future norms.
71

Notes

1. “Law and Society” Canadian Encyclopedia. http://www.thecanadianencyclopedia.com.

2. P. W. Singer, Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century. 

(Penguin Press, 2009).

3. The hearings of the IRF’s research program “Ethical and Legal Aspects of Unmanned 

Systems” led by Gerard Dabringer (who was present at the ICRAC meeting in Berlin) are available 

at http://www.irf.ac.at.

4. The FoR’s anti-drone campaign was led by Chris Cole (now heading up Drone Wars UK).

5. David Pallister, “British link with drone aiding the Israeli war effort” The Guardian, 9 

January 2009. www.guardian. co.uk/world/2009/jan/09/armstrade-gaza. The United Kingdom is not 

the only nation that could have been incriminated according to the work by Patrice Bouveret at al., 

Qui arme Israël et le Hamas? (Who is arming Israel and Hamas?), GRIP, 2009.

6. The UN Human Rights Council report dated 15 September 2009 talks in terms of “war 

crimes” that could even be qualified as “crimes against humanity” with respect to the Gaza conflict.

7. Colin Allen & Wendell Wallach, Moral Machines: Teaching Robots Right from Wrong, 

(Oxford University Press, 2009).

8. Ronald Arkin, Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots, (CRC Press, 2009).

9. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) signed in 1987 now has 34 signatory 

nations. 

10. According to the terminology of the “equipment and technology” annex of the MTCR 

(11/06/1996), the definition of UASs concerned by the agreement “includes cruise missile systems, 

target and reconnaissance drones with capabilities exceeding a 300km/500kg range/payload 

threshold.”

11. See Article II, Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe, 1990.

12. This debate was launched by the publication of the US Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems 

Flight Plan 2009-2047 which mentions on page 41 the switch from direct human action in the 

decision-making loop to simple supervision “on the loop.” See HQ, United States Air Force, United 

States Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems Flight Plan, 2009-204, 41. http://www.globalsecurity.

org/military/library/policy/usaf/usaf-uas-flight-plan_2009-2047.htm.dated 18 May 2009. Accessed 

on 10 October 2013.

13. “South Korea deploys robot capable of killing intruders along border with North”, The 

Telegraph, 13 July 2010. http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/southkorea/7887217/

South-Korea-deploys-robot-capable-of-killing-intruders-along-border-with-North.html, (accessed 

10 October 2013).

14. Isaac Asimov’s First Law of Robotics: “A robot may not injure a human being or, through 

inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.”

73

Chapter 7

The Legal Aspects of Military Ground Robots

by Ronan Doaré

For many years, those studying military and political strategy have been taking an 

interest in changes in conflict and in particular what is known as irregular combat, and the 

involvement of private military companies (PMCs) in theaters of operations.1

 French legal 

commentators (la doctrine) are also examining, albeit more discreetly, the introduction of 

new military hardware, such as robotic devices, onto the battlefield.2

 The White Paper on 

Defense and National Security meanwhile stresses the development of high technology, 

especially on “surveillance and intelligence, both exo- and endo-atmospheric” (drones 

or UAVs), but also on “long-range precision strikes, including by armed drones.”3

 By 

extension, and to meet the various remits of the armed forces, military ground robots are 

also the target of “major investment spending in research, development and acquisition.” As 

a general rule, there are several reasons for using robots, mainly “Carrying out hazardous 

work (while limiting human exposure), increasing force effectiveness, and performing 

arduous or repetitive tasks.”4

 The preservation of human lives appears to be a key driver, 

and it alone fully justifies the technological innovations that could lead to a “complete 

overhaul of the strategy landscape.”5 A 2006 report to the French upper house (Senate) on 

the functions of drones in armed forces stressed, in this way, that the role of aerial drones is 

“to overcome the constraints inherent in manned aircraft stemming, in the main, from the 

dangers posed to the lives of the crew and their physical limitations, while still benefiting 

from the specific advantages of aerial intelligence gathering.”6

There are many questions raised by the development of military ground robots whether 

relating ethically to the relationship between man and machine or legally to the status of 

robots and the implications in terms of liability. Indeed, the deployment of robotic devices 

requires the legal framework to be determined as regards the use and control of hardware, 

the development of which opens up prospects as interesting as they are worrying. It is 

true that “against a backdrop of military strategy that is increasingly oriented towards 

the protection of human life, the systematic use of robots in the armed forces is arousing 

great interest.”7

 The issue is complex because of the large number of parties involved 

(manufacturers, users who are by definition governed by a hierarchy and included within 

a chain of command, combatants, and civilian populations). Armed forces intervene under 

bilateral agreements or, more usually, multilateral agreements, under a mandate (from the 

UN, NATO or EU) although oversight by national and international courts is developing.8

Should new legal models be sought, such as liability for loss or harm caused by objects 

in one’s care (fait des choses), properly suited to encompassing the specific missions and 

risks inherent to the deployment of robots?9

 Or, conversely, should we content ourselves 

with applying existing legal provisions by taking the view that the use of robots does not 

alter the question of the division of liability in relation to the use of force and does not call 

for any major changes to the fundamentals of the various parties’ liabilities if robots are 

deemed to be equipment? 

For now, it must be admitted that “unlike air forces which are equipped with attack 

drones, ground forces remain reluctant to deploy robots with attack capabilities. Control over 
74

fire on the ground remains the sole preserve of humans with no technological interface.”10 

However, developments are expected which might radically alter the application of certain 

provisions, and the provisions of international humanitarian law (IHL) in particular. Taking 

an interest in the legal aspects to military robotics makes it possible to both understand the 

legal framework of robot deployment and anticipate potential developments. 

Human-Controlled Robots

“Will ground robots and drones one day replace the infantry?”11 The question deserves 

to be asked. The issues are, admittedly, first and foremost human and technological, but 

also legal. 

A great deal of speculation surrounds the issue of using robots. “But one of two things 

results: either humanoid robots acquire autonomy and it is then up to them—not us—to 

devise their normative systems, or robot autonomy is mere illusion and if there is law 

to be established then it is very human law concerning use of robots.”12 Logic of course 

dictates the second option to be assumed. Robots are today assigned various functions: 

mine clearance, bomb disposal, reconnaissance and surveillance missions, and in certain 

circumstances, use of weapons. They are ultimately intended to take part in two types of 

missions, namely a) support missions and b) combat missions, what is today known as 

“remote warfare.” However, one thing all robots have in common is that they are remotecontrolled.13 Consequently, the presence of a “person in the loop” makes it possible to 

apply the usual liability systems with appropriate adaptation for a particular case in point. 

Operators are responsible for the consequences of robotic devices’ activities in the same 

way that any member of the military must answer for his or her actions or inactions. They 

receive orders, take decisions for which they must account, and receive, depending on 

the context, the legal protection and various degrees of exemption from criminal liability 

that are stipulated for the military.14 However, “the day when a robot alone, depending 

on how it has been programmed, will take the decision to kill a man is really not far 

away.”165Meanwhile, and depending on the political and military decisions that will guide 

the choice of technology and standards, the effects of using conventional robot technologies 

need to be evaluated with reference to existing legal frameworks. 

An Appropriate Legal Framework, yet Many Question Marks

It is difficult yet necessary to define what is meant by the term “robot.” The difficulty is 

a genuine one in the absence of any statutory or commonly-agreed definition and the term 

may refer to either remotely-operated or autonomous machines. The need for a definition 

is evident because the applicable legal provisions depend on it. The term robot is first, in 

those cases attracting our attention, an item of military equipment, an expression which 

conventionally covers “arms, munitions and implements of war.”16 Legally, a robot is a 

movable in the sense of Article 528 of the French Civil Code which stipulates that [official 

Legifrance translation] “animals and things which can move from one place to another, 

whether they move by themselves or whether they can only move as the result of an 

extraneous power, are movables by their nature.” 
75

Loss or Harm Caused by a Robot, but a Human Liability

Whatever the scenario, the deployment of robot systems is based today on human 

decision-making power. As a result, issues arise related to the attribution of harm which 

may involve national or international legal provisions while at the same time account 

must be taken of the operational context, the rules of engagement, both global and local, 

together with the chain of command and, in some case, the device designer’s liability. The 

deployment of robot technologies consequently demands that the liabilities of the various 

parties are clearly defined—the state, the parties in the chain of command (including political 

authorities) as well as the manufacturer. The notion of liability refers here to the obligation 

on natural and legal persons to make good any loss or damage caused by their activities. 

It is not exclusive, as in parallel to incurring civil or administrative liability; criminal and 

disciplinary proceedings may be instituted. Use is made of the assets of the various parties 

on the basis of their involvement in causing the loss or harm. Accordingly, the state must 

answer for both the consequences of errors committed by members of the military while 

performing their duties and the excessive use of force, just as it must account for the use of 

certain equipment. Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions17 provides, first, that 

“in any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose methods or means 

of warfare is not unlimited”18 and, secondly, that in “the study, development, acquisition or 

adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under 

an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be 

prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High 

Contracting Party.”19 Military personnel, meaning remote operators and their hierarchy, 

must answer for their misconduct and, depending on the charge, may see their criminal 

liability incurred. Lastly, the delicate question arises of the attribution of liability between 

the user and other parties involved (the designer, manufacturer, and owner). As the design, 

programming (in part) and operator training in the use of robot systems are part of the 

manufacturer’s role, how can its share of liability be determined when harm occurs?20

Ultimately, the application of conventional legal frameworks, as regards liability, 

leads to a distinction between the consequences of the deployment of robots with regard to 

domestic law and international law, and particularly international humanitarian law (IHL), 

some of the principles of which might be infringed by the deployment of equipment having 

a certain degree of autonomy. Studying robots’ legal status makes it possible to envisage 

the changes to law or international conventions necessary to take into consideration, where 

needed, legal models that are appropriate to the missions, consequences and operating 

conditions of current and future robotic devices.

Deployment of Military Ground Robots—Who is Liable for What? 

Military personnel, in carrying out their duties, will be applying domestic legal 

provisions as well as provisions laid down by international conventions. The applicable 

legal frameworks are stable, whether entailing the involvement of domestic courts, or the 

international courts which have experienced a resurgence of interest with the adoption of 

the Rome Statute and the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC).21
76

Domestic Liability

With regard to domestic jurisdictions, the overriding principle is the state’s immunity 

from liability during military operations. Indeed, the French Council of State said, more than 

forty-five years ago now, during proceedings for damages against the French state, that “the 

measures taken must be viewed as connected, as a whole, to military operations for which, 

by their very nature, the state cannot be held liable.”22 The judge in the administrative court 

consequently rejected the claim for compensation submitted. 

More recently, examining a claim for compensation for damages as a result of 

navigation on the Danube becoming blocked after bombing campaigns conducted in the 

former Yugoslavia in 1999, the Council of State (France’s highest administrative court) 

reiterated that “the state cannot be held liable for military operations, by their very nature, 

including on the grounds of unequal treatment (specifically ‘unequal discharge of public 

burdens’).”23

This position of principle is justified either, classically, by reference to the notion of 

“act of government” which prohibits a judge from examining a claim24 or, more frequently, 

by reference to some liability of the state which from the outset, is viewed as being 

“neither general nor absolute,”25 which permits, for reasons of sovereignty in particular, the 

establishment of the “state’s immunity from liability arising from military operations.”26

The claim for compensation was considered by the judge in the administrative court but 

was dismissed. The deployment of robots during military operations has no bearing on 

incurring the legal liability of the State, which will be dismissed. 

However, the state or its agents may be rendered liable in other circumstances, and in 

particular in cases of peace-time intervention in a foreign state, or indeed in France. For 

over twenty years now, external operations have been multiplied with varied missions, such 

as peacekeeping activities or the enforcement of international law, stabilization missions, 

or training of national forces. Intervention by armed forces abroad is a decision for the 

government, but “where the said intervention shall exceed four months, the Government 

shall submit the extension to Parliament for authorization.”27 In the event of injury or damage 

in connection with such interventions, claims before national courts are possible. However, 

agreements exist on the status of forces, which frequently stipulate dispute resolution 

methods and, in particular, out-of-court settlements.28 The conventional provisions of public 

authority fault liability (with intention or negligence), or no-fault liability (strict liability), 

will apply. In the event of personal fault (committed outside official duties), the personal 

assets of the agent will be used to form compensation.29 However, the administrative court 

adopts a broad interpretation of the notion of fault by public servants while performing 

their duties (for which they are not personally liable) and it operates independently of the 

definition in the criminal court.30 If the claim for compensation from the state fails, the 

victims, following in so doing the natural inclination of society, may be tempted to shift 

their proceedings and claims to the criminal courts, thus contributing to what is called “the 

litigation society.”31 Either the French public prosecutor (public prosecution) or the victim 

(party claiming damages) alike may instigate criminal proceedings. On principle, there is 

no collective criminal liability. Accordingly, under Article 121-1 of the French Penal Code, 
77

“No one is criminally liable except for his own conduct.” This also means that, with certain 

exceptions, there is no vicarious criminal liability.

While criminal liability requires prior intent, there are also, by way of exceptions, some 

unintentional offenses.32 Accordingly, Article 121-3 of the French Penal Code stipulates that 

“the deliberate endangering of others is a misdemeanour where the law so provides” and it 

adds that “a misdemeanour also exists, where the law so provides, in cases of recklessness, 

negligence, or failure to observe an obligation of due care or precaution imposed by any 

statute or regulation, where it is established that the offender has failed to show normal 

diligence, taking into consideration where appropriate the nature of his role or functions, 

of his capacities and powers and of the means then available to him” [official Legifrance 

translations].33 Many applications are possible when deploying military equipment, and 

especially robotic devices. As we can see, military staffs are not immune from criminal 

prosecution, even in the absence of any intent. However, is the conclusion to be drawn that 

exposure to criminal risk undermines military operations?

The answer has to be negative, for several reasons. First of all, there is a whole series 

of justifications or defenses that prevent criminal charges.34 In a case in point, “it is the 

illegal nature of the act that is removed.”35 Next, alongside these causes of immunity 

from liability listed in the French Penal Code, the legislature has stipulated a number of 

guarantees working in the military’s favor. First, Article 16 of France’s general military 

statute (encapsulating its “military covenant”) brings limitations to the incurring of liability 

for unintentional acts,36 and secondly, Article L. 4123-12 of the French Defense Code37

stipulates that “criminal liability is not incurred by a member of the military who, while 

complying with the provisions of international law and as part of a military operation 

taking place outside of French territory, exercises coercion or uses armed force, or gives 

the order to do so, when this is necessary for the accomplishment of the mission.” Lastly, 

the military is now covered under existing general law, for offenses committed both within 

French territory38 and outside it,39 but its members continue to benefit from certain special 

arrangements as regards procedure.40

International Liability

Military personnel action must fall within the domestic legal and regulatory framework 

but is also governed by many provisions of public international law (PIL), which include 

the requirements of IHL. 

This, in the first instance, means the United Nations Charter, which governs the 

terms of the use of force by stating at the outset, in Article 2, its prohibition as a matter 

of principle.41 Any intervention must therefore be limited to peacekeeping operations 

(Chapter 6). However, the Charter provides for two exceptions: first, states’ individual 

or collective self-defense and second, the possibility of collective action decided upon to 

deal with a “threat to the peace [sic], breach of the peace or an act of aggression” (Chapter 

7). Secondly, IHL will evidently be more directly relevant to the deployment of robotic 

devices in theaters of operation. IHL, essentially based on the Geneva Conventions and 

their Additional Protocols, is designed to limit the effects of armed conflict by protecting 

those who are not participating (civilians) or who are no longer participating (the 
78

wounded and prisoners of war) in the fighting. IHL is also designed to limit the resources 

and methods of warfare. To achieve these various objectives, IHL is based on different 

principles including the principle of proportionality and the principle of discrimination. 

These are the different principles that might, in future, be infringed by the use of robots. In 

fact, when the international legal framework for the use of force is respected and the rules 

of engagement determined for a given operation, “then the principle of military necessity 

justifies the deployment of the hardware used including robot systems.”42 What causes 

concern is both the ability to enforce the principles of IHL when new hardware is deployed 

(drones, ground robots) and to ensure that ethical and legal considerations prevail and, 

in particular, the first of Asimov’s three laws of robotics, i.e. “A robot may not injure a 

human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm.”43 The hypothesis 

of a violation of IHL principles is not a mere case study. Since 2009, Professor Sharkey 

has postulated many times over that it is not possible to replace a human’s judgment and 

ability to discern and measure whether the principle of proportionality is satisfied or not.44 

However, technologically, such changes are already reality with the implementation of 

algorithms enabling the requirements of the principles of discrimination (legal objectives) 

and of proportionality demanded by IHL to be incorporated in the robot.45 At this time, both 

ethical and legal principles are hindering robots’ attainment of autonomy and explain the 

reluctance of ground forces to pursue autonomous robots.46 What makes great vigilance 

necessary is, obviously, the use of such hardware in conventional conflicts (although all 

military personnel receive training in the law of armed conflict)47 but even more so during 

asymmetrical conflicts.48

Internationally, various jurisdictions operate, notably the International Criminal Court 

(ICC). France recently ratified the Rome Statute and has adapted its own penal legislation 

by introducing the “offence of war crimes.”49 The ICC is competent to try individuals for 

war crimes, but its competence is complementary to domestic criminal jurisdictions, which 

are intended to rule on establishing the facts of possible offenses committed by military 

personnel including those on foreign soil.50 Alongside this permanent international criminal 

jurisdiction, special-purpose courts may be instituted. Thus the International Criminal 

Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY)51 and the International Criminal Tribunal for 

Rwanda (ICTR)52 were set up. Charges against the French state, during a military operation, 

brought before an international court, cannot be ruled out; however, as external operations 

essentially take place under an international mandate (UN, NATO, and EU) with rules of 

engagement (ROE), the determination of those liable for injury or damage will be more 

difficult.

An Unclear Legal Framework

Deployment of robot systems does not shift the conventional boundaries of liability law 

but does raise different issues regarding the position of the remote operator, compliance 

with the provisions of IHL law and the attribution of liabilities. These are just some of the 

questions that argue in favor of the need for clarifications as regards both the relevance 

of the status of robots and the development of a legal framework for intervention by 

international conventions and domestic law. 
79

The Legal Status of Robots

The legal status of robots is a known factor. It is not a sui generis classification, but 

is derived from a classic categorization in civil law which distinguishes persons, being 

subjects of law (i.e. holders of rights and obligations), and property, being the subject 

matter of the law. Robots must be deemed movables by their nature in the sense of Articles 

527 and 528 of the French Civil Code.53 This categorization does not raise any major 

difficulties and is of a kind to satisfy, at this point, the requirements of the deployment 

of remotely operated robots. It furthermore brings legal consequences that enable the 

compensation claims of the victims of robot systems to be met. Thus, the robot, a movable, 

is placed under the responsibility of its custodian. Consequently, a robot is not a subject 

of law. A robot has neither civil nor criminal liability. The rules of civil liability apply, and 

in particular Article 1384 of the French Civil Code whereby “A person is liable not only 

for the damages he causes by his own act, but also for that which is caused by the acts of 

persons for whom he is responsible, or by things which are in his custody.” The provisions 

relating to property are therefore applicable to robots: the person liable for the actions of 

the robot and its harmful consequences, if any, is its custodian, i.e. the user. As military 

equipment belongs, except in special cases, to the state, military ground robots can cause 

harm which will be made good, in principle, by applying the provisions of the law of public 

authority liability.54

Nevertheless, some legal commentators have wondered about the opportunity to 

change the legal status of robots, suggesting that robots acquire legal personality.55 The 

suggestion is not new but ignores the common categorizations in civil law and, importantly, 

the reasons for them.56 In fact, the French Civil Code has only two legal categories: persons 

and property. As a result, “the distinction between persons and property gives structure to 

the whole area [i.e. civil law]: the former are subjects of law, i.e. the independent will by 

which they act makes them ideally suited to bear rights and obligations, while the latter are 

nothing other than the subject matter of the former’s wishes.”57 The distinction between 

persons and property stems from the need to allocate rights and obligations. While legal 

personality confers some traditional rights on holders (especially individual rights), it also 

imposes constraints on them, and in particular the obligation to make good the harmful 

consequences of their action or inaction from their own assets. Although, at first sight, 

the question of granting legal personality to robots may cause surprise, it should not be 

overlooked that the recognition of legal personality for impersonal groups did not come 

about without some criticism, because legal personality first and foremost results, for a 

number of commentators, from a legal fiction, including as regards natural persons. In this 

way, believes Kelsen, “a natural person is not a human being, but a personified unit of legal 

norms imposing obligations and legal norms conferring rights on a single individual. It is 

not a natural reality but a legal construct created by the science of law, an auxiliary concept 

in the description and formulation of law data.”58 In contrast, some legal commentators, 

including Hauriou, said that legal personality reflected a social and institutional reality.59

The two ideas can each complement the other. Thus, “the legal person is a fiction, since 

it is more or less anthropomorphism; yet it is [also] a reality since conferring personality 

presupposes that a meaningful collective interest equipped with a means of expression has 
80

in fact been observed.”60 Finally, in the light of such debates, the effectiveness of legal 

institutions and instruments that work towards the taking into account of social reality has 

to be acknowledged. In a thorough study on “Legal persons in French Law,”61 Professor 

Gridel raised the question of the usefulness of conferring personality and responded by 

assigning it two main purposes, in that first, it delivers efficiency in legal proceedings 

and secondly it provides a mechanism for arranging financial liability. Indeed, “once legal 

personality becomes a legal device, it is easy to make a legal person a defendant in civilian, 

administrative or criminal proceedings.” The benefit of legal personality, institutionalizing 

an activity enabling the consequences of actions for damages to be attributed not to natural 

persons but to private or public organizations, can be deduced. 

Should this institution be transposed onto robots, however? The answer is apparently 

negative. In fact, the point is not so much to create a subject of law to make a robot system 

exist legally where natural persons fail to do so (the classic purpose of legal personality) 

than to confer a status on devices which are already the responsibility of a legal person, 

the state in this instance, deemed more solvent than any other natural or legal person. 

The state’s assets would be spared from the potential attribution of liability, and the new 

legal entity thus created would be open to criminal proceedings which the state, by way 

of an exception, cannot be. The use of remotely controlled devices and, eventually, semiautonomous devices, must first lead to consideration of the attribution of the harmful 

consequences of their actions. The aim is definitely not to remove any form of liability 

from their owner. Furthermore, the choice of such a legal construct brings to mind the 

theory of ‘fictitious legal person’ used by the administrative courts to designate and punish 

public bodies using the French “association” legal form in order to avoid the application of 

public law. The court decided that the purpose is no more and no less than a rejection of the 

“administrative instrumentalization of legal personality,” which aims in part to exempt the 

public body from the application of extra-contractual liability.62

In recent years, deliberations on a new mechanism have been appearing, namely virtual 

personality that could be attributed to various entities including, by extension, robots.63 

The Council of State itself, in a 1998 report, considering the question of the protection 

of personal data and privacy, suggested that thought be given “to the issue of the rights 

of virtual persons, different perhaps from the rights of real persons.”64 To the number of 

proposals shown at the end of the report, the Council of State suggested “initiating a study 

into the notion of the virtual person.” 

Despite these various avenues, there is no overriding imperative, at this time, to make 

changes to the legal status of robots. In fact, proponents of the extension of legal personality 

to automated systems are yielding to an appealing idea, namely the transfer of liability 

from the owner or user to some other subject of law. In so doing, the question is to establish 

which system of liability might apply in connection with the activities of military ground 

robots? Traditional legal mechanisms make it possible to meet the most complex demands 

of the attribution of liability. It can be seen that what matters is less the legal status of robots 

than organizing the system of liability applicable, if need be by statute, that is to govern the 

division of liability for compensation, in the event of proceedings, between various parties 
81

that will usually include a public body (the state) and users (soldiers) operating within a 

chain of command (with a military and political hierarchy). 

What Changes are Necessary?

The robot, as military equipment, is both a vehicle and, where appropriate, a weapon. 

Legally, it is a property with the traditional consequences resulting from this categorization. 

Analogies with the status of animals, which fall into the same legal category, are strong. 

Property by nature, animals are covered by both general legislation for categorization 

purposes, and specific provisions to govern certain aspects of the legal framework applicable 

to them. Accordingly, Article 1385 of the French Civil Code stipulates that “the owner of 

an animal, or the person using it, during the period of usage, is liable for the damage the 

animal has caused, whether the animal was under his custody or had strayed or escaped” 

[official translation]. In the same way, it now seems desirable that international law and 

domestic law alike take into consideration all aspects of the emergence of air, ground and 

sea robots in order to set down appropriate legal provisions. Three sets of factors support 

this argument.

Firstly, the inclusion of robots in various legislative texts, as regards both civil and 

military matters, should occur without delay, because robot deployment is a paradigm shift 

which is only going to accelerate. Indeed, the use of robots is approved not only for many 

defense applications (combating piracy, reconnaissance missions, intervention in theaters of 

operations such as the drones deployed in Iraq, Kosovo or Afghanistan) but also in security 

for border surveillance, emergency aid, public security or even environmental protection.65

Secondly, robotic devices share the characteristic of being unmanned vehicles. However, 

various sets of regulations currently block most movement of such devices. Hence, “the 

addition of either civilian or military drones to air traffic requires that such systems be 

certified or approved to fly, and that special air traffic rules be set down owing to the 

difficulties that they raise as regards the risk of collision with other aircraft.”66 The aim 

is to procure compliance, in particular, with the Chicago convention, Article 8 of which 

stipulates that “each State undertakes to ensure that the flight of such aircraft without a pilot 

shall [...] obviate danger to civil aircraft.”67 An information report to the Senate (the French 

upper house) recommends the adoption of appropriate Europe-wide regulations, stipulating 

in particular “payment of compensation in the event of incidents.”68 Similar difficulties 

are encountered for ground robots, as the French Highway Code makes no provision for 

unmanned vehicle traffic and thus forms an obstacle to the development of robotic devices 

in France especially during internal security operations. Various proposals have been drawn 

up, first “using traffic authorization and certification processes of a kind similar to what 

is done for manned military ground vehicles”69 and, secondly, looking further ahead, “it 

is conceivable that one day, implementation of all the subtleties of automatic compliance 

with the highway code within a robot will be achieved.”70 Second, in the United States, 

some states have started work on bringing about consistency in their various regulations as 

regards both flight clearance for UAVs71 or unmanned vehicle traffic on the roads.72

Third and last, while robots can be categorized as vehicles with all the legal barriers 

that entails, they can also in some circumstances be considered weapons. As such they are 

subject to different domestic and international provisions addressing that aspect. Armed 
82

robots are already a reality with drones able to conduct bombing missions (there are many 

examples, from Kosovo in 1999 to Libya in 2011). Irrespective of the theater of operations, 

the harm caused, particularly to the civilian population, can be of great magnitude. 

Beyond the principle of the state’s immunity from liability during military operations, 

the key question arises of the liability framework to apply to the use of robotic devices, 

especially on domestic territory in peacetime, given the deployment of such equipment 

on foreign soil has to be governed, in part, by international conventions along with 

the international organization under the aegis of which the operations in question are 

conducted.73 The issue is naturally of interest not only to the Ministry of Defense but also to 

other public and private operators. And it is a complex issue. In fact, military ground robots 

have dual legal categorization. They are firstly land motor vehicles to which are applied the 

provisions and procedures resulting from this categorization. But they are secondly military 

equipment able to fulfil various functions beyond a transport purpose, which then becomes 

incidental. For the first categorization, there is legislation which confers jurisdiction on 

judicial courts “to rule on any action for damages seeking compensation for loss or harm 

of any kind caused by any vehicle.”74 However, the objective of the law is more to unify 

litigation surrounding vehicle accidents, in favor of the judicial courts, than it is to organize 

a liability system. 

For the second categorization, several factors argue in favor of a liability framework 

suited to the special case of military ground robots with, if need be, some aspects shared 

with other types of device. First of all, it should be pointed out that “compensation for loss 

or harm caused by the armed forces is an outdated principle in comparison to the general 

theory of the state’s immunity from liability which has prevailed for a long time.”75 The 

actions of military personnel have thus contributed, through various administrative court 

rulings, to the building of frameworks governing fault liability (for intention or negligence) 

and no-fault liability (strict liability). As a consequence, taking an interest in the armed 

forces’ changing methods of intervention and their effects relates to a continuing wish to 

see victims compensated; it follows that it is important, in the face of a certain reluctance 

in response to the introduction of new technologies, to bring some legal certainty to their 

use by organizing a legislative system of reparation for loss. It means, lastly, as regards 

operators acting within a hierarchy, the accompanying decline in individual liability in favor 

of socialization of risk. This development is evidenced by the establishment of mechanisms 

replacing civil liability, such as insurance, or, as regards administrative law, the extension 

to the scope covered by the notion of fault by public servants while performing their duties 

and also the development of legislative and case-law no-fault liability frameworks based, 

in particular, on risk. 

Under the influence of first legal commentators76 and then the judicial courts,77 the 

restrictive reading of liability for loss or harm caused by objects in one’s care introduced 

by paragraph 1 of Article 1384 of the French Civil Code came to be replaced by a general 

principle of no-fault liability for such loss or harm, this being understood to be a strict 

liability based on the risk attached to “liability for care or custody of the object and not for 

the object itself.”78 Various specific legislative provisions were introduced, either from the 

outset such as Article 1385 for loss or harm caused by a kept animal, or subsequently. This 
83

is the case, for example, with the French law of 5 July 1985,79 which establishes special 

provisions for compensating victims of road traffic accidents, or the law of 19 May 1998 

which transposes into national law the EEC Directive of 25 July 1985 on liability for 

defective products.80

However, it should be noted, following Professor Truchet that “no-fault (administrative) 

liability is viewed as an invention of administrative case law,81 which the legislators and 

judicial courts appropriated subsequently.”82 No-fault liability founded on risk has been 

extended a great deal, especially in cases of the “occurrence of risk events involving staff 

or third parties.”83

The demand from some quarters for the development of liability for loss or harm 

caused by objects in one’s care testifies to the desire to deliver a solution to an unusual and 

sometimes complex situation.84 In fact, “the fact that loss or harm has been caused not by 

military personnel directly, but by a robot has a dual impact: first as regards the causal link 

between the offense, its consequences and its perpetrator, this link being undermined by the 

introduction of the robot intermediary which complicates the judge’s task; and second as 

regards the intention of military personnel, which is found to be difficult to prove as far as 

semi-autonomous devices are concerned.”85 The search for a suitable liability framework 

must not ignore the responsibility of the operator, nor disregard security imperatives. For 

both of these reasons, and to meet a fair division of the burden, fault liability (with intention 

or negligence) should remain the benchmark reparation system even though it is useful to 

consider the establishment of a no-fault liability framework for a hazardous activity, i.e. the 

deployment of robotic devices.86

One avenue remains to be explored, which is the state taking out insurance as a result 

of the deployment of robots, in the military sphere naturally, but also in various security 

functions. Contrary to a widespread idea, the principle by virtue of which “the state is its 

own insurer” is merely standard practice, motivated by financial considerations since a 

decision taken by the French Finance Minister on 23 September 1889.87 It means that, with a 

few exceptions, the French state does not take out civil liability insurance and, furthermore, 

many statutes draw their own conclusions as a result.88 However, public bodies are free 

to take out insurance and should, in making the decision, undertake a conventional costbenefit analysis of doing so, to compare the risk of loss or harm arising and the concomitant 

compensation with the cost of insurance. 

Lastly, “if lives and money are saved, with a genuine improvement in the effectiveness 

of missions undertaken, then driverless vehicles will become an essential tool in conducting 

warfare.”89
84

Notes

1. Christian Malis, Didier Danet, and Hew Strachan, La guerre irrégulière (Irregular Warfare), 

Economica, 2011; Didier Danet and Christian Malis, Frères d’armes? Soldats d’Etat et soldats 

privés (Brothers in Arms? State Soldiers and Private Soldiers), Economica, 2011.

2. Ronan Doaré and Henri Hude (eds.), Les robots au cœur du champ de bataille (Robots at the 

Heart of the Battlefield), (Economica, 2011).

3. Défense et Sécurité nationale, Le Livre Blanc (Defense and National Security White Paper), 

La Documentation française (pub. by the French Stationery Office, 2008), 208.

4. Dominique Luzeaux and Delphine Dufourd-Moretti, “L’autonomie ajustable en robotique 

militaire terrestre” (“Adjustable Autonomy in Military Ground Robots”), La Jaune et la Rouge,

May 2010 (No. 655), 30.

5. Christian Malis, “La robotisation de l’espace de bataille nous promet-elle une nouvelle 

révolution dans les affaires militaires ?” (“Does Robotization of the Battlefield Promise a New 

Revolution in Military Matters?”), Défense et Sécurité Internationale, (No. 10) January 2010, 21 

et seq.

6. Maryse Bergé-Lavigne and Philippe Nogrix, Information report to the Senate (French Upper 

House) on behalf of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defense and the Armed Forces, following an 

assignment on the role on drones in the armed forces, Senate reports, 2006, No. 215.

7. V. Altran, “Réflexions juridiques sur les conflits opposant les robots et les soldats” 

(“Discussions on the Legal Options Regarding Conflicts Between Robots and Soldiers”), Les 

cahiers du CHEAr, September 2004.

8. Louis Gautier, La politique de défense de la France après la guerre froide (France’s Defense 

Policy after the Cold War), PUF, 2009, 275 et seq.

9. For some, “The introduction of robots within the armed forces must be combined with some 

monitoring of the legal aspects which would alter the rules of respect and dignity for civilians.” V. 

Altran, “Réflexions juridiques sur les conflits opposant les robots et les soldats.” 

10. Francois Cornut-Gentille, Opinion submitted on behalf of the French Committee on 

National Defense and the Armed Forces, regarding the draft budget for 2012, filed with the office of 

the President of the National Assembly (France’s Lower House) on 25 October 2011, No. 3775, 169.

11. Cornut-Gentille, Opinion submitted on behalf of the French Committee on National Defense 

and the Armed Forces, 169.

12. Dominique Lecourt, “Le droit des robots” (Robots and the law), La Croix, 18 September 

2007.

13. However, certain functions, such as movement, may be partly autonomous or semiautonomous, even if an operator is able to take control.

14. Articles L.4123-10 to L.4123-12 of the French Defense Code.

15. Joseph Henrotin, “Quelques élémentaires de la robotique militaire terrestre” (“The 

Rudiments of Military Ground Robots”), Défense et Sécurité International (No. 10) January 2010, 

8.

16. Articles L. 2331-1 and L. 2333-1 of the French Defense Code. French government order of 

17 June 2009 setting the list of military and similar equipment subject to a special export procedure, 

JO [France’s Official Gazette] 20 June 2009, p. 10087.

17. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 relating to the Protection 

of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1).

18. Article 35 of Protocol I.

19. Article 36 of Protocol I.
85

20. “Training course contents are currently determined by the manufacturers that build the 

drones.” See R. Jaulmes, “Aspects réglementaires pour la robotique aéroterrestre” (“Regulatory 

Aspects of Air-Ground Robots”), in Ronan Doaré and Henri Hude (eds.), Les robots au cœur du 

champ de bataille, 134.

21. Law No. 2010-930 of 9 August 2010 Adapting French Criminal Law to the Establishment of 

the International Criminal Court, JO [France’s Official Gazette] 10 August 2010, 14678.

22. CE (Council of State) 30 March 1966 Société Ignazio Messina et Cie, Application. No. 59 

664.

23. CE (Council of State) 23 July 2010, Sociétés Touax and Touax Rom, Application. 328757. 

See H. Belrhali-Bernard, “L’îlot de l’irresponsabilité de l’Etat du fait des opérations militaires” 

(“The State’s Immunity from Liability Arising from Military Operations”), case note filed under 

CE (Council of State) 23 July 2010 Sociétés Touax et Touax , AJDA 2010, P. 2269; H. Flavier, 

“L’absence de responsabilité de l’Etat du fait des opérations militaires” (“The Absence of State 

liability Arising from Military Operations”), Dr. Adm. 2010, No. 10, comm. No. 136.

24. See Louis Gautier, “La politique de défense de la France après la guerre froide,” 276. 

25. TC (Tribunal des Conflits – jurisdictions court) 8 February 1873, Blanco, Rec. 1st 

supplement, p. 61, concl. David.

26. See H. Belrhali-Bernard, “L’îlot de l’irresponsabilité de l’Etat du fait des opérations 

militaries.” 

27. Article 35 of the Constitution of 4 October 1958 (from the Constitutional Law No. 2008-724 

of 23 July 2008 on the modernization of the institutions of the Fifth Republic, JO [France’s official 

gazette], 24 July 2008, p. 11890).

28. As defined in a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), for example; out-of-court settlement is 

described and encouraged by the internal texts: see French Government Order of 23 December 2009 

setting out the competencies of the armed forces’ administrative offices as regards compensation for 

loss or harm caused or sustained by the French Ministry of Defense, defending the Ministry in the 

administrative courts and legal protection for military and civilian staff, French official gazette, JO 

[France’s official gazette], 30 December 2009, text no. 41.

29. TC (Tribunal des Conflits—jurisdictions court) 30 July 1873 Pelletier, Rec. 1st supplement, 

17.

30. TC (Tribunal des Conflits—jurisdictions court) 14 January 1935, Thépaz; see Jean Rivero 

and Jean Waline, Droit administratif (Administrative Law), Dalloz, 2000, No. 288.

31. See “La judiciarisation des conflits” (“Increasing Litigiousness in Conflict Resolution”), 

Inflexions No. 15, La Documentation française (pub. by the French Stationery Office), 2010.

32. Article 121-3 [of the French Penal Code] “There is No Felony or Misdemeanour in the 

Absence of an Intent to Commit It” (para. 1).

33. See Article L.4423-11 of the French Defense Code.

34. Jean Pradel, Droit pénal general (General Criminal Law), 18th edition, Cujas, No. 306 et 

seq.

35. Jean Pradel, Droit pénal general (General Criminal Law), 18th edition, Cujas, No. 307.

36. “Subject to the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article 121-3 of the [French] Penal Code, 

military personnel can only be found guilty on the grounds of paragraph 3 of the same Article for 

unintentional acts committed in fulfilling their duties if it is established that they have failed to 

show normal diligence taking into consideration their capabilities, powers and means available to 

them together with the specific difficulties of the mission entrusted to them” (Law no. 2005-270 of 

24 March 2005 Concerning the General Military Statute, JO [France’s official gazette], 26 March 

2005, 5098).

37. Wording from Article 17 of French Law no. 2005-270 of 24 March 2005. 
86

38. Article 1 of French Law no. 82-621 of 21 July 1982 on investigation and judgement of 

offences as regards the military and state security amending the French Codes of Criminal Procedure 

and Military Justice, JO [France’s Official Gazette] 23 July 1982, 2318.

39. Article 32 of French Law no. 2011-1862 of 13 December 2011 on the distribution of 

litigation cases (between competent courts) and the streamlining of certain court procedures, JO 

[France’s Official Gazette], 14 December 2011, 21105.

40. See Articles L.698-1 and L.698-2 of the French Penal Code. 

41. Article 2 states “The use of force is prohibited.”

42. DGA (Directorate General for Armaments), Opérations extérieures et robotique, Un 

éclairage juridique sur l’emploi des robots en OPEX (External Operations and Robotics, Legal 

Clarification on the Operational use of Robots), ONERA (French Ccenter for Aerospace Research), 

16 October 2007.

43. See Isaac Asimov, I, Robot, Gnome Press, 1950.

44. Noel Sharkey, Professor of Artificial Intelligence at the University of Sheffield. Noel 

Sharkey, “Death Strikes from the Sky: The Calculus of Proportionality,” IEEE Science and Society, 

Spring 2009, 16.

45. Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman, “Law and Ethics for Robots Soldiers” Policy 

Review, No. 176 1 December 2012.

46. Francois Cornut-Gentille, Opinion submitted on behalf of the French Committee on National 

Defense and the Armed Forces, op. cit. p. 169.

47. “All military personnel must be trained in the knowledge of and compliance with the rules 

of international law applicable in armed conflicts” (Article D.4122-11 of the French Defense Code). 

48. Kenneth Anderson and Matthew Waxman, “Law and Ethics for Robots Soldiers.”

49. Article 1 of the Rome Statute. See Doreid Becheraoui, “L’exercice des compétences de 

la Cour pénale internationale” (“The Exercising of the Competency of the International Criminal 

Court”), Revue internationale de droit pénal (International Review of Criminal Law), 2005, 3, vol. 

76, 341.

50. Defense agreements, cooperation agreements, and SOFAs frequently stipulate a division of 

jurisdiction between France and the host country. 

51. UN Security Council Resolutions 808 of 22 February1993 and 827 of 25 May 1993.

52. UN Security Council Resolution 955 of 8 November 1994.

53. Articles 527 and 528 both state “Property is movable by its nature or by prescription of law.”

54. See Didier Truchet, Droit administratif (Administrative Law), PUF, 2011, 383 et seq.

55. P. W. Singer, “Ethical Implications of Military Robotics,” The 2009 William C. Stutt Ethics 

Lecture, US Naval Academy, 2009. http://www.usna.edu/Ethics/_files/documents/PWSinger.pdf. 

Accessed 11 October 2013; Peter M. Asaro, “Robots and Responsibility from a Legal Perspective” 

in Proceedings of the IEEE 2007 International Conference on Robotics and Automation (ICRA’07).

Rome, April 2007.

56. For a summary of the key points in the debate, see Didier Danet “Enjeux généraux et 

problématiques juridiques” (“General Issues and Legal Problems”) in Ronan Doaré and Henri Hude 

(eds.), Les robots au cœur du champ de bataille, 11 et seq.

57. R. Libchaber, “Perspectives sur la situation juridique de l’animal” (“Viewpoints on the 

Legal Position of Animals”), Revue trimestrielle de droit civil (Quarterly Review of Civil Law), 

2001, 1, 293 et seq.

58. Hans Kelsen, Pure Theory of Law, trans. C. Eisenmann, (Dalloz, 1962), 225.

59. Maurice Hauriou, Principes de droit public (Principles of Public Law), 2d edition, Dalloz, 

2010, 98.
87

60. Jean-Pierre Gridel, “La personne morale en droit français” (“Legal persons in French Law”) 

Revue internationale de droit comparé (International review of comparative law), Vol. 42 (No. 2) 

1990, 496.

61. Jean-Pierre Gridel, “La personne morale en droit français,” 495 et seq.; Leon Michoud, 

La théorie de la personnalité morale et son application au droit français (The Theory of Legal 

Personality and its Application in French Law), 1909, (reprint LGDJ, 1998).

62. Francois Paguet and Clemence Paillet, La théorie des associations transparentes, réflexions 

sur la personnalité morale fictive (The Theory of Transparent Association:; Thoughts on Fictitious 

Legal Personality), Conference for the René Cassin Class, Legal personality, 30 May 2007.

63. Daniele Bourcier, “De l’intelligence artificielle à la personne virtuelle : émergence 

d’une entité juridique ?” (“From Artificial Intelligence to the Virtual Person—Is a Legal Entity 

Emerging?”), Droit et Société (Law and Society), No. 49, 2001, 847; Didier Danet, “Enjeux 

généraux et problématiques juridiques.” 

64. Council of State, “Internet et les réseaux numériques” (“The Internet and Digital Networks”), 

Paris, La Documentation française (pub. by the French stationery office), 1998.

65. For an overview of civilian and military applications, see: Michel Asencio, Philippe Gros, 

Jean-Jacques Patry, “Les drones tactiques à voilure tournante dans engagements contemporains” 

(“Tactical rotary wing drones in contemporary military action”), Fondation pour la recherche 

stratégique (Foundation for Strategic Research), October 2010.

66. Maryse Bergé-Lavigne, Philippe Nogrix, Information report to the Senate (French upper 

house), 2006.

67. Convention on International Civil Aviation, 7 December 1944.

68. M. Bergé-Lavigne, P. Nogrix, Information report to the Senate (French upper house), 

2006; see Eric Pomès, “Comparatif drones et robots militaires terrestres en droit international” 

(“Comparison of drones and military ground robots in international law”), in Ronan Doaré and 

Henri Hude (eds.), Les robots au cœur du champ de bataille, 187.

69. R. Jaulmes, “Aspects réglementaires pour la robotique aéroterrestre,” 135.

70. R. Jaulmes, “Aspects réglementaires pour la robotique aéroterrestre,” 135.

71. See Stew Magnuson, “Regulatory, Technological Hurdles Stand In Way of Domestic Drone 

Mandate” National Defense May 2012, http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2012/

May/Pages/Regulatory,TechnologicalHurdlesStandInWayofDomesticDroneMandate.aspx( 

accessed 11 October 2013).

72. Daniel R. Rosen, “Driverless Cars & The End of Distracted Driving” 14 February 2012 

http://www.danielrrosen.com/2012/02/driverless-cars/. Accessed 11 October 2013.

73. CE (Council of State) 30 March 1966 Société Ignazio Messina et Cie.

74. French Law no. 57-1424 conferring jurisdiction on the judicial courts to rule on any action 

for damages taken against a public body and seeking compensation for loss or harm of any kind 

caused by any vehicle, JO [France’s official gazette], 5 January 1958, 196.

75. J. Moreau, Jcl Adm , fascicule 894, Responsabilité de l’armée (The armed forces’ liability), 

No. 1.

76. Raymond Saleilles, Les accidents du travail et la responsabilité civile (Workplace accidents 

and civil liability), 1897; Louis Josserand, De la responsabilité du fait des choses inanimées (On 

liability for harm caused by inanimate objects), thesis, Paris, 1897; L. Josserand, “Le travail de 

refoulement de la responsabilité du fait des choses inanimées” (“Work on curbing liability for harm 

caused by inanimate objects”), D. 1930, chron. 5.

77. Cass. , civ. (Court of Cassation [French Supreme Court of Review], Civil chamber), 16 

June 1896 Teffaine, DP 1897, 1, p. 433, Saleilles case notes; Cass. Ch. Réunies, (Court of Cassation 

[French Supreme Court of Review], Plenary session) 13 February 1930 Jand’heur, D. 1930, 1, 57.
88

78. Cass. Ch. Réunies, (Court of Cassation [French Supreme Court of Review], Plenary session) 

13 February 1930 Jand’heur.

79. French Law No. 85-677 of 5 July 1985 to improve the situation of victims of road traffic 

accidents and accelerate compensation procedures, JO [France’s official gazette] 6 July 1985, 7584.

80. Articles L.1386-1 to L.1386-18 of the French Civil Code. 

81. See CE (Council of State) 21 June 1985, Cames, GAJA (Major rulings of administrative 

case law) No. 6.

82. Didier Truchet, Droit administrative, 415.

83. Didier Truchet, Droit administrative 421.

84. V. Altran, “Réflexions juridiques sur les conflits opposant les robots et les soldats.”

85. V. Altran, “Réflexions juridiques sur les conflits opposant les robots et les soldats.”

86. See Jean-Sebastien. Borghetti, “La responsabilité du fait des choses/ou du fait des activités 

dangereuses” (“Liability for loss or harm caused by objects or hazardous activities”). grerca.univrennes1.fr/digitalAssets/268/268671_jsborghetti.pdf. Accessed 11 October 2013

87. This decision “is purely a financial opportunity and is viewed as an internal guideline which 

the state may ignore when it deems it necessary” (F.-P. Franc Valluet, De la règle “l’Etat est son 

propre assureur” (On the rule that “the state is its own insurer”), RCAT 1978, 596).

88. See Article L. 211-1 of the French Insurance Code. 

89. Michel Asencio, Philippe Gros, Jean-Jacques Patry, “Les drones tactiques à voilure tournante 

dans engagements contemporains,” 35.
89

Chapter 8

A Comparison of Drones and Military Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) 

in International Law

by Eric Pomes

“Surgical warfare” is the term used by the Obama administration to justify the use 

of drones in the war against terrorism.1

 This decision inevitably raises concerns for 

internationalists, given that such a doctrine recommends the use of force—which all 

international law attempts to rule out of international relations. It is not sufficient to note 

this behavior; it must be properly apprehended in order to establish the conditions under 

which it is permissible and the consequences arising from any breach of these conditions.

Such an undertaking is all the more important given the ever-increasing number of 

UAVs and UGVs on the battlefield—in 2008, there were over 12,000 in Iraq—and the 

ever-increasing number of States with this kind of technology, indeed there are around 

forty, plus a certain number of Non-State armed groups. 

As in the case of new players in armed conflicts, lawyers are confronted with new 

issues with regard to UGVs and UAVs. Lieutenant Colonel Philippe Frin has dealt with 

the consequences of their use in the light of international humanitarian law; I will take a 

broader approach and attempt to determine under which body of law these new combat 

resources can be apprehended, in the light of international law.

This question is not merely a theoretical one; it is of particular interest because the law 

may be taken either as a weapon or as a limiting factor. The law can be deemed to be used 

as a “weapon” if it is used to achieve military objectives. Americans use the term “lawfare” 

to designate this strategy, which may be defined as a strategy of use or misuse of the law as 

a substitute for conventional military resources in order to achieve an operational objective 

or prevent the enemy from achieving its objective. This weapon may be used to support 

or criticize an operation; its objective is to gain the moral high ground over an enemy in 

public opinion.2

 In this perspective, better understanding of the applicable rules will enable 

optimum use of these new combat resources.

A Variable Body of Law 

Determining which law applies to UAVs and UGVs involves defining them in legal terms 

and studying their mission.

A Different Legal Definition 

Before moving on to a more in-depth analysis, UAVs and UGVS need to be legally 

defined in order to allocate them to existing legal regimes; these will then govern their use.

The fact that they are unmanned—a term which is closer to the actual state of affairs 

than the descriptor ‘pilotless’—is not of major significance when it comes to establishing 

this definition. This characteristic does not have any real consequence on their legal 

qualification. What is important, however, is the environment in which they are used—

land, sea, or air.

Viewed thus, defining what drones are appears to be a complex issue. Some argue that 

the absence of a pilot means they are missiles. However, this definition is not satisfactory 
90

because a missile is an unmanned, pilotless, autonomous vehicle which cannot be recalled, 

whether it is guided or non-guided, and which carries a weapon or any other useful 

payload. Even though drones share a number of these characteristics, they cannot legally 

be considered as missiles in that they are designed to be used more than once and thus to 

return to their point of departure.3

 Pursuant to Annex 7 to the 1944 Chicago Convention4 

and article L. 6100-1 of the French Transport Code,5 if drones are capable of taking off and 

travelling in the air, they should be qualified as aircraft; more specifically so in application 

of article 3 (b) of the Chicago Convention, as State aircraft.6

The rules of aerial warfare and some aspects of the law of the air therefore apply to 

drones. But only some aspects, since by virtue of article 3 (a), the Chicago Convention 

does not apply to State aircraft. The Chicago Convention, however, requires States to take 

the safety of civil aircraft into consideration when using unmanned aircraft.7

With respect to UGVs, based on their primary feature which is the ability to move 

on the ground by means of a motor enabling them to travel, and following analogous 

reasoning to that for UAVs, UGVs may therefore be compared to and defined as land-based 

motor vehicles. It follows that the rules of ground warfare and the rules relating to land 

vehicles apply to them.

Another difference between these two types of robots is that contrary to UGVs, UAVs 

are subject to a particular control regime—the missile technology control regime (MTCR). 

This control is the result of a 1987 agreement whose purpose was to put an end to the 

proliferation of ballistic and cruise missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (drones). To 

achieve this, for exports, States have engaged in the control of certain technologies to ensure 

that equipment and technology is not diverted to develop carriers capable of carrying a firstgeneration nuclear payload. This difference in qualification must therefore be taken into 

account when writing their doctrine of use and operational Rules of Engagement (ROE). 

In order to have a more accurate idea of the legal regime applicable to robots, a second 

distinction must be drawn. This does not relate to the type of robot but to the use of such 

unmanned combat vehicles.

Distinction in Terms of Missions

The distinction is not drawn between drones and robots but rather on the basis of the 

missions assigned to them.8

 The first type of mission that comes to mind is that of offensive 

missions whose aim is to eliminate the enemy’s human and material resources. Without 

doubt, the best example of this is the use of drones to apply the policy of targeted killings. 

In this instance, drones are used to eliminate an individual who is deemed to be dangerous 

and outside national territory. In addition to these missions, which garner extensive media 

coverage, robots can be used for missions that can be qualified as passive, in that they do 

not involve making a strike against the enemy. The variety of these missions demonstrates 

the versatility and therefore the soldiers’ interest in robots. Robots enable them to carry out 

intelligence and mine clearance missions. For example, Predator drones are used by the 

United States for surveillance of the border with Mexico. 

This distinction as to their use also affects how legal liability is defined. Indeed, the 

applicable legal regime can be determined according to their missions. The rules applicable 
91

to each of these combat vehicles can be envisaged within each of these regimes, according 

to the nature of the vehicle in question.

Since they do not feature in any treaty, their use is not prohibited by international 

law.9

 In the light of laws armed conflict law, the lawfulness of the use of robots as a means 

of combat could however be called into question if their use were to cause superfluous 

damage or fail to distinguish between combatants and civilians.10 It should be noted that 

the use of drones by the United States in its war on terror results in a great number of 

civilian losses. These losses may be explained in a number of ways. The first is the obvious 

proximity of civilians to “combatants.” The second is related directly to their conditions of 

use and the appraisal of their legality in the light of armed conflict law. The use of drones 

leads to a distance being established between the battlefield—and thus the enemy—and the 

personnel operating them. Additionally, it is not always possible to have a clear appraisal of 

the situation on the ground. Whereas article 50 of Additional Protocol I to the 1977 Geneva 

Convention requires States to refrain from the use of force against a person if there is a 

doubt as to their civilian or non-civilian status, this distancing could lead to a certain degree 

of moral permissiveness, i.e. an uncontrolled increase in force, in that it reduces the risks 

to the personnel operating them.11 However, since States do not take this position, their use 

must be apprehended in terms of responsibility; the issue becomes one of deciding whether 

the use of robots is in breach of the rules of international law.12

Use of Unmanned Combat Vehicles and Prohibition of the Use of Force

The use of these combat vehicles raises the question of compatibility with article 2 (4) 

of the UN Charter prohibiting the use of armed force in international relations. It also raises 

the question of whether the use of robots and drones automatically constitutes prohibited 

use of armed force on a State’s territory.

In the event of breach of international law, two types of responsibility may be envisaged. 

The first is the individual responsibility of the robot or drone operator—the possibility of 

the robot or drone making autonomous decisions is not envisaged here—or that of the 

person giving the orders. This qualifies as criminal liability, the grounds for which will vary 

from war crimes to unintentional misdemeanors.

The second type of responsibility is the international liability of the State for illegal 

acts. International liability can be analyzed in terms of sanctioning illegal acts, meaning 

breach of international law, for which a State can be held responsible. Article 1 of the draft 

article relating to the responsibility of States says that “any illegal international act engages 

the responsibility of the State responsible for it.”13 The responsibility of the State is thus 

engaged if the State breaches any of its agreed or usual obligations; for instance, respecting 

another State’s sovereign airspace. Similarly, article 5 (2) of resolution 3314 specifies that 

crimes of aggression engage the State’s international responsibility. 

Standard Policing Measures

Article 2 (4) prohibits all uses of armed force including targeted military operations. 

However, in actual fact, not all operations in which armed force is used are prohibited by 

this article.14 In this respect, there is a threshold condition, below which these operations 

are qualified as policing measures—limited-scale coercion—and these are not covered 
92

by article 2 (4). Only operations which cross this threshold constitute prohibited use of 

armed force. This question of thresholds will be analyzed in practice. An operation is a 

policing measure if it is targeted, limited, does not lead to conflict between State forces, 

and targets individuals rather than the State. For example, Pakistan did not claim that the 

American missiles—which can be taken as analogous to drones in this instance—fired 

over its territory in 1998 constituted a breach of article 2 (4). Similarly, reconnaissance 

operations carried out by drones or robots could be qualified as policing measures.

Any military operation on a State’s territory without its consent does however 

undermine its sovereignty and is therefore liable to engage the international liability of the 

State responsible for it. Seen thus, a drone overflight of a State constitutes a breach of the 

State’s sovereignty by virtue of article 1 of the Chicago Convention, which specifies that 

there should be no airborne activity without the knowledge of the State being over flown. 

Article 3 (c) of the Chicago Convention specifies that “No State aircraft of a contracting 

State shall fly over the territory of another State or land thereon without authorization by 

special agreement or otherwise, and in accordance with the terms thereof.” This prohibition 

is expressly reiterated in article 8 with respect to unmanned aircraft.15 Reconnaissance 

flights have also been recognized as violations of the airspace of the State being over 

flown by the International Court of Justice, in its judgment of 27 June 1986 “Military and 

paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua.”16

Today, however, the practice of the United States reveals that drones and robots are 

used in situations other than those which are covered in legal terms by the regime for armed 

conflict; this is the case for the war against terror. Their use is covered by law enforcement 

rather than armed conflict law.

The use of force against one or more individuals by means of robots must therefore 

abide by common law applicable to delinquents. There is no rule in international law 

allowing a State to pursue, still less kill, an individual it deems to be a criminal by violating 

the sovereignty of another State. This kind of action engages the liability of the State 

responsible. The use of robots in such circumstances is only legal under international 

law if there are grounds for this use due to circumstances that would render such an act 

legal. These circumstances constitute a temporary cause of exoneration, whose effect is 

to provisionally suspend the execution or requirement of conformity of behavior with an 

international obligation of the State. Consequently, the existence of such circumstances 

makes behavior which in other circumstances would be in breach of an international legal 

obligation. A distinction must be drawn between situations in which there is no illegal act, 

due to objective circumstances, independent of the State’s behavior, such as force majeure 

circumstances, distress or necessity, and on the other hand, scenarios in which a deliberate, 

proven act would no longer be illegal, in response to another illegal act committed by the 

State responsible for the original act; such acts might include self-defense, countermeasures 

and the consent of the adversely affected State.17

Given the extraordinary nature of such circumstances, the Americans have sought 

other legal grounds to justify the use of drones. For instance, US Forces that start to 

monitor the movements of Taliban deem that they can continue to do so into Pakistan. 
93

As grounds for crossing the Pakistani border, they invoke the right of pursuit. The ROE 

applicable in Afghanistan in 2007 therefore included the right of pursuit in the case of 

continuous, uninterrupted pursuit of the Taliban.18 These grounds are drawn from the law 

of the sea. Indeed, coastal States have the right to continue the pursuit of a foreign vessel 

into international waters if the pursuit began in the State’s territorial waters.19 Article 111 

of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, signed on 10 December 1982 in 

Montego Bay, authorizes hot pursuit when “the competent authorities of the coastal State 

have good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws and regulations of that 

State.” This immediately gives rise to a first comment: the use of such a legal basis is not 

admissible when a drone or robot is pursuing a target beyond a land border rather than at 

sea. If the pursuit is taking place at the sea, paragraph 5 of article 111 allows for pursuit 

to be exercised only by “warships or military aircraft, or other ships or aircraft clearly 

marked and identifiable as being on government service and authorized to that effect.” 

Pursuit on the seas by a drone therefore appears to be possible. Paragraph 6 of article 111 

does however lay down conditions: the aircraft must give the order to stop. Pursuit is thus 

authorized only if the drone can communicate with the ship being pursued. This condition 

is all the more important in that “it does not suffice to justify an arrest outside the territorial 

sea that the ship was merely sighted by the aircraft as an offender or suspected offender, if 

it was not both ordered to stop and pursued by the aircraft itself or other aircraft or ships 

which continue the pursuit without interruption.”

In any case, the use of robots must abide by human rights. This means that the 

use of force will be possible only in the case of absolute necessity and that it must be 

proportionate.20 This obligation relates both to relationships between States and individuals 

and relationships between individuals and State officers conducting operations. 

This is why the “targeted killing” policy, i.e. the use of lethal force by a State against 

a particular individual representing a threat and who is not under the control of that State, 

with the intention of killing them by means of a drone, is problematic. The use of drones 

is however an integral part of American strategy for neutralizing Al-Qaeda terrorists, 

regardless of which country they reside in. The execution by means of this process of a 

number of Al-Qaeda members by the Central Intelligence Agency in Yemen in 2002 is a 

good example of this.21 The legality of such action is dubious under human rights law.

Consequently, such a practice may be qualified as an extra-judicial execution, consisting 

of arbitrarily depriving an individual of their life in the absence of any independent 

competent court ruling with no appeal possible.22 Such a practice is characterized by the 

arbitrary nature of the designation of the individual and the possibility of mistaken identity. 

This designation takes place without any legal process, which is the only competent route 

for a State of law to decide on the guilt of an individual. It is therefore clear that it is at 

odds with the right to life and fair trial. The existence of other means of putting an end 

to the illegal activities of the individual designated is an additional issue weighing in the 

balance against the legality of the action.23 Except in exceptional circumstances, imminent 

threat or an absence of other means, this kind of practice appears to be illegal in positive 

international law.24 The State’s responsibility and that of its officers may be engaged.
94

A Violation of Article 2 (4)

The State’s international responsibility may also be engaged for violating the prohibition 

on the use of armed force if the act is serious and directed against the State, i.e. with the 

aim of compelling the State to adopt a specific behavior. The use made of robots is more 

important than the nature of the robots themselves. When it has serious consequences or 

is intended to compel the State to comply, it may be qualified as an aggression as defined 

by articles 1 and 3 of General Assembly Resolution 3314 of 14 December 1974. Article 1 

states that “aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, territorial 

integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent 

with the Charter of the United Nations.”25 Similarly, if an act is not directed against the 

State, violation of Article 2 (4) can be established if the State knows that its operation will 

cause substantial damage. Article 3 (b) specifies for example that “bombardment by the 

armed forces of a State against the territory of another State or the use of any weapons by a 

State against the territory of another State” may be qualified as an act of aggression.

Even if the use of robots were to correspond to these circumstances, it would be lawful 

if it were carried out in application of permission by the Security Council or in self-defense. 

For this to be the case, a State would have to have been the victim of armed aggression 

by another State. Consequently, even if this may be debatable, the use of these means to 

respond to an attack by Non-State actors is not lawful in positive international law as stated 

by the ICJ in its order “Armed Activities in the Territory of Congo” dated 19 December 

2005, unless the intervention is requested or authorized by the territorial State and provided 

it remains within the limits set by this authorization.26 It follows that while, for instance, 

the use of a drone to eliminate a Taliban member in Afghanistan does not pose a problem if 

IHL is adhered to, this use is more problematic in Pakistan if it takes place with no regard 

to the arguments providing grounds for the use of force.

The existence of these prohibitions does not mean that the use of force has disappeared 

in international relations. It should be specified that international humanitarian law applies 

whether the use of force is lawful or unlawful. In both international armed conflict and 

non-international armed conflict, the use of force must adhere to the relevant rules of 

armed conflict law, in particular the principles of discrimination and proportionality.27 The 

principle of discrimination obliges protagonists to distinguish between combatants and 

civilians. The principle of proportionality obliges them to refrain from launching an attack 

which can be expected to cause collateral loss of human life in the civilian population, 

injury to civilians, damage to civilian property, or a combination of such loss and damage 

which would be excessive compared to the direct, tangible military advantage expected.28 

The application of this principle involves the issue of the suitability of the resources used 

with regard to the desired military effect. This is because it attempts to reconcile “opposing 

values, such as the interest of the protagonist in conducting the military operation and 

the interest of civilians who are not taking part in hostilities but could be victims of this 

action.”29

A cursory mention should be made of one of the most extensively discussed issues 

today in international humanitarian law—direct participation in hostilities. This relates not 

to the status of the drone or robot’s victim but to that of their user, if the latter is a civilian 
95

contractor or a civilian member of the intelligence services. In the context of armed conflict, 

both have been qualified by the ICRC as civilians participating directly in hostilities.30

Consequently, unlike combatants who benefit from criminal immunity for their actions 

provided these abide by armed conflict law, these civilians may be held criminally liable 

for their acts.

Uncertainty as to the International Responsibility of States

In both scenarios envisaged, the difficulties reside in demonstrating that the conditions 

for the State’s responsibility to be engaged are met in the actual circumstances. The 

requesting State must demonstrate the existence of a causal link between the damage and 

the illicit act. Demonstrating this is not very difficult. For example, in the case of an extrajudicial execution, the link between moral damage (an attack on honor) and the illegal act 

(a violation of sovereignty) is not difficult to demonstrate. However, demonstrating that 

this illegal act is the responsibility of a State is more problematic. In the previous example, 

while there is no difficulty in proving the existence of the damage (the bombardment) it 

would still be necessary to demonstrate the involvement of a drone or robot in committing 

the act at fault. Above all, it will be necessary to establish its nationality. Similarly, a 

demonstration of the violation of a State’s sovereignty by a robot or drone on the occasion 

of a reconnaissance mission raises obvious difficulties as far as proof is concerned, unless 

the device is photographed, intercepted or in the hands of the authorities of the State in 

which the operations took place.

If these conditions are met, Article 30 of the draft resolution on the State’s international 

responsibility requires the State to cease its unlawful behavior and provide assurance and 

guarantees that the behavior will not be repeated. Article 31 obliges the State to make full 

restitution for all harm, which includes both material and moral damage caused by the 

unlawful act.

Furthermore, in such a scenario, the victims, understood as “persons who, individually 

or collectively, have suffered harm [...] through acts or omissions constituting serious 

violations of international human rights law or gross violations of international humanitarian 

law have the right to remedy and reparation.”31 Such rights are envisaged in a General 

Assembly Resolution dated 16 December 2005 entitled “Basic principles and guidelines 

on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of gross violations of international 

human rights law and serious violations of international humanitarian law.”32 However 

the legal scope of this resolution, like any provision of declarative law, is uncertain. 

According to para. 4 of this resolution, States have the duty to investigate and, if there is 

sufficient evidence, the duty to bring to prosecution the person allegedly responsible for 

the violations and, if found guilty, the duty to punish them. Moreover, the victims have the 

right to “adequate, effective and prompt reparation for harm suffered.”33 Failing this, at 

least for French soldiers, legal action brought before the ICC—which acts in the event of a 

legal vacuum—would still be a possibility.

Conclusion. 

While it may be felt that for armed forces these new combat resources are indispensable 

in new conflicts, they should be used with caution with regard to international law, especially 
96

if this use goes against the tide, i.e. the major shift in contemporary international law in 

favor of jus contra bellum.

The International Committee for Robot Arms Control, which met in September 2010, 

is of the opinion that these combat resources constitute a threat to international peace 

and security and a threat for civilians during armed conflict, and that they run the risk of 

potentially undermining international law, in particular human rights. These risks should 

lead to them being apprehended by an arms control regime.34
97

Notes

1. Renaud Girard, “Les guerres “au scalpel” d’Obama contre al-Qaida” (“Obama’s ‘surgical 

warfare’ against al-Qaeda”), Le Figaro, 16 August 2010. 

2. C. J. Dunlap, “Lawfare Today: A Perspective”, Yale Journal of International Affairs, 

Winter 2008, 146-154. Also Eric Pomes, “Les implications juridiques de la contre-insurrection. 

Vers une convergence de la nécessité militaire et de la protection des non-combattants?” (“Legal 

implications of counter-insurgency. Towards convergence of military necessity and protection of 

non-combatants?”), Stratégique, 2012, No. 100-101, 305-337.

3. A/57/229, La question des missiles sous tous ses aspects (Examining every aspect of the issue 

of missiles), July 23, 2002. 

4. Any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air other 

than the reactions of the air against the earth’s surface.

5. Any vehicle capable of taking off and moving in the air shall be defined as an aircraft in 

application of this code.

6. Aircraft used in the military, customs, and police departments are deemed to be State aircraft.

7. Article 3 (d) “The contracting States undertake, when issuing regulations for their state 

aircraft, that they will have due regard for the safety of navigation of civil aircraft.”

8. Lieutenant Colonel Marcus Fielding, “Robotics in Future Land Warfare”, Australian Army 

Journal, 2006, Vol. III, No. 2. 99-108.

9. Armin Krishnan, Killer Robots: Legality and Ethicality of Autonomous Weapons, (Burlington, 

2009), 89.

10. Noel Sharkey, “Grounds for Discrimination: Autonomous Robot Weapons”, RUSI Defence 

Systems, October 2008, 86-89.

11. P.W. Singer, “Military Robots and the Laws of War,” The New Atlantis, Winter 2009, pp. 

27-47.

12. Mary Ellen O’Connell, “The International Law of Drones” ASIL Insights, 12 November 

2010, vol. 14, No. 36. 

13. Appended to A/RES/56/83, 28 January 2002.

14. Olivier Corten, “Le droit contre la guerre. L’interdiction du recours à la force en droit 

international contemporain” (“Law versus warfare: Prohibition of the use of force in contemporary 

international law”), (Paris, 2008), 65 et seq.

15. Article 8—Unmanned aircraft No aircraft capable of being flown without a pilot shall be 

flown without a pilot over the territory of a contracting State without special authorization by that 

State and in accordance with the terms of such authorization. Each contracting State undertakes 

to ensure that the flight of such aircraft without a pilot in regions open to civil aircraft shall be so 

controlled as to obviate danger to civil aircraft.

16. “Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. ÉtatsUnis)” (“Case concerning the military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 

v. United States of America)”, fond arrêt du 27 juin 1986 (Judgment of 27 June 1986), 14 para. 91.

17. Veronique Huet, “Les circonstances excluant l’illicéité et le recours à la force” 

(“Circumstances ruling out unlawfulness and the use of force”), Journal du droit international, 

2008, no. 1, 75-99.

18. “Hot pursuit of Al Qaeda and Taliban terrorist command and control targets from Afghanistan 

into Pakistan so long as pursuit is continuous and uninterrupted” or if “the head of US Central 

Command or the secretary of defense allow such incursion” or to “recover personnel that may have 

been taken across the border.”

19. Philippe Vincent, Droit de la mer (The law of the sea), (Brussels, 2008),136-137.
98

20. ECHR, Ergi vs. Turkey, judgment, Reports 1998-IV, Petition no. 23818/94, 28 July 1998, 

para. 79.

21. On 3 November 2002, six men were killed in their vehicle, which was struck by a missile 

launched from a Predator drone controlled by the United States. This strike was deemed to be an 

extra-judicial execution. See E/CN.4/2003/3, 13 January 2003, para. 39.

22. Francoise Bouchet-Saulnier, Dictionnaire pratique du droit humanitaire (A practical 

dictionary of humanitarian law), 2nd Edition, (Paris, La découverte, 2000).

23. Such a policy therefore appears to be in violation of the right to a fair trial and the right to 

life. The right to life may be waived in certain circumstances. See ECHR, Grand Chamber, McCann 

and others v. the United Kingdom, judgement of 27 September 1995, Petition no. 18984/91, series A 

no. 324, pp. 45-46. The judgement states that “Against this background, in determining whether the 

force used was compatible with Article 2 (art. 2), the Court must carefully scrutinise, as noted above, 

not only whether the force used by the soldiers was strictly proportionate to the aim of protecting 

persons against unlawful violence but also whether the anti-terrorist operation was planned and 

controlled by the authorities so as to minimise, to the greatest extent possible, recourse to lethal 

force.” (para. 194) and that “The question arises, however, whether the anti-terrorist operation as 

a whole was controlled and organized in a manner which respected the requirements of Article 2 

(art. 2) and whether the information and instructions given to the soldiers who, in effect, rendered 

inevitable the use of lethal force, took adequately into consideration the right to life of the three 

suspects.” (para. 201).

24. Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 

executions: Study on targeted killings, A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, May 28, 2010, p. 5, para. 10.

25. Aggression implies the specific desire of a State to attack another State. See Oil rigs, 

judgement, ICJ 2003 Reports, para. 64.

26. Armed activities in the territory of Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo v. Uganda), 

judgement, ICJ 2005 Reports, 168.

27. John J. Klein, “The Problematic Nexus: Where Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles and the 

Law of Armed Conflict Meet,” Air & Space Power Journal, July 2003; Chris Jenks, “Law from 

above: unmanned aerial systems, use of force, and the law of armed conflict” North Dakota Law 

Review, 2009, 649-671.

28. Article 57 2) a) iii) of Protocol I; K. Watkin, “Targeting: Pragmatism and the Real World”, 

Canada Army Journal, Summer 2005, vol. 8.2, 75-84.

29. Enzo Cannizzaro, “Contextualizing proportionality: jus ad bellum and jus in bello in the 

Lebanese war,” International Review of the Red Cross, 2006, vol. 88 (no. 864), 275-290.

30. Nils Melzer, Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities under 

International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, June 2009. http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/

htmlall/direct-participation-report_res/$File/direct-participation-guidance-2009-icrc.pdf. (accessed 

15 October 2013).

31. A/RES/60/147 para. 8.

32. A/RES/60/147; Pierre d’Argent, “Le droit de la responsabilité internationale complété? 

Examen des Principes fondamentaux et directives concernant le droit à un recours et à réparation 

des victimes de violations flagrantes du droit international des droits de l’homme et de violations 

graves du droit international humanitaire” (“Additions to law on international responsibility? 

An examination of the fundamental Principles and directives concerning the right to recourse 

and reparation by the victims of flagrant violations of human rights law and serious violations of 

international humanitarian law”), Annuaire français de droit international 2005, vol. 51, 27-55.

33. A/RES/60/147 para. 11.

34. The purpose of such a regime is to limit arms in various respects (for example their quantity, 

scope and lethal capacity).
99

Chapter 9

Robots and Civil Liberties

by Thierry Daups 

Introduction

Civil Liberties and Robots in a Rationally Ordered Society 

Isaac Asimov, the famous American author of the Three Laws of Robotics, might have 

appreciated dealing with a topic like this. The issue is one of assessing the effects of the 

use of robots on civil liberties. The difficulty here lies in the ability to understand the 

issue, given the recent emergence of military and civil robots. We must therefore make our 

assessment in advance, starting from existing law and procedures in adjacent fields, such as 

IT.1

 As a consequence, measuring the impact of robots on civil liberties requires us first to 

define the latter, especially in their relationship with technology; then we shall observe that 

this assessment is part of a triangular relationship. Finally, we shall determine the issues 

involved in this topic.

Social Order Between Civil Liberties and Technology-Based Security

To do this, we shall start from the hypothesis that this assessment relates to the 

establishment of a society based on the search for optimal individual and collective security, 

by adapting the system of individual and collective civil liberties to the level of security 

that the powers that be wish to introduce.2

 The military or civil robot, combined with 

other resources, participates in this objective and in an increasingly rational management 

of human society that respects civil liberties.3

 The latter arise from a subtle political 

arbitration, relayed by law, between the general interest of society and the citizens’ demand 

for individual freedom. This gives rise to various administrative arrangements, which 

determine public order.4

However, today, the political desire to increase the security of citizens is leading to 

a legal modification of the conditions for applying liberties, in order to increase security, 

especially via increased surveillance of the population.5

 This development translates a 

philosophical inversion6

 where, instead of the presumed goodness and innocence of the 

human being,7

 it is suggested that the principle of precaution be applied to him or her, due 

to the potential danger that this human being represents. This approach authorizes a priori 

intervention, in advance of the commission of an offence, against individuals who have yet 

to commit any punishable act.8

 This requires every individual human being to be:

1. Identifiable,

2. Traceable, 

3. Dissuadable, and

4. Punishable.

The use of technology by the State and its specialist services is gradually achieving 

this result.9

 Reduced to a set of personal information, the individual is made virtual 

and transparent. This machinization of society and security could lead to a mechanical 
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application of the law by reducing the occasions when a human judge intervenes in favor of 

a “mathematical” application of the ideal legal order invented by the legislator. Thus, more 

than the technology itself, it is the use of technology by a public authority that presents a 

threat to civil liberties.10

Now, the assessment of the robot’s impact on civil liberties will be based on the conception 

of the connection between the robot, the soldier or policeman, and the person or the target.

What are the Consequences of the Triangular Relationship: Robot, Soldier, and 

Person?

The introduction of the robot upsets the classic duo: soldier—target (object, armed or 

unarmed civilian, young/old, friend/foe or unknown), to create a triangular relationship 

that causes us to ask the following questions, before looking at its components.

First of all, should the weapon adapt to man or vice versa; what level of artificial 

intelligence will be the most appropriate to ensure a good relationship between man and 

robot for the execution of a mission?11 We will also take into consideration the difference 

in operating logic and, therefore, in the nature of the soldier and the robot. The first is 

the result of experience, professional training, individual philosophy, and personality. The 

second obeys its own determined logic. What will be the influence of this difference in 

nature on the decisions to be taken? Add in the design of the robot and therefore its degree 

of autonomy; the nature of the mission to complete and its legal and political framework, 

and finally the reaction of people in front of the robot, or in front of the robot—soldier 

partnership. These elements allow us to appreciate the roles of each member of the triangle.

The soldier first, acting on the authority of his superior officers, is carrying out a mission 

in a particular legal framework. Responsible for the use of the robot, he takes the decision 

whether or not to use it. What relationship protocol should be established between them?

Next, the robot is carrying out a mission and takes a certain number of decisions in its 

course. Without responsibility, it reacts in accordance with its mission in response to the 

action of a third person and in relation to the soldier. Its level of autonomy determines its 

capacity to make a decision.

Finally, the people, who might have varying statuses—child, adult, armed or not armed, 

acting peacefully or aggressively, friend or foe—how should the robot consider them? As a 

precaution, should the instruction be that every person is a potential enemy to be destroyed 

or is it necessary to wait until the person’s behavior betrays a malevolent intention to 

trigger a decision and an action by the robot or the soldier?

It follows from this relationship that decision and responsibility are key to the use of robots.

Let us turn first to the issue of the decision. The robot’s mission and nature will allow 

us to assess its ability to make its own decision, without human intervention or with the 

soldier. Will such a decision have a legal value and an opposability equivalent to one taken 

by a human being? The answer would depend on the assessment of the legal framework of 

the action and on the share of the decision taken, or not, by the soldier, alone or with his 

superior officers, and would seem to be yes in the light of existing procedures.12 Equally, we 

shall insist on the difference in nature between the decisions: the policeman, via a human 
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appreciation of the seriousness of the offense will decide to report it to trigger the sanction, 

while the robot will have no other choice than to make this report, in accordance with the 

mathematical conditions that it gathers and with its programming (embedded software, 

parameters). This difference in nature would call into question civil liberties; hence the 

importance of the procedures in this area that ensure that the liberties are respected. Thus 

the overly confident recourse, without a spirit of doubt, to the expertise of the computer or 

of a robot, which will encourage a person to make a decision that he would not have made 

had he verified this expertise, would present a danger.13

The issue of responsibility ensues from that of the decision. Its assessment will rely 

on a scale of autonomy and responsibility. The more the robot is autonomous, the less 

will man be responsible. However, as the robot cannot be responsible, a human being 

or an institution must be. More precisely, how can the level of human responsibility be 

determined in relation to a robot’s level of autonomous decision-making? Finally, in the 

case of the fully autonomous robot, will the master still be liable for the fact when an 

unsuitable decision causes harm to a third party14 or a malfunction causes harm?15 Here too, 

procedures will play a key role. 

The relationship between robotics and civil liberties determines a more general set of issues.

The Robot and the Conditions of its Use in Compliance with Civil Liberties

In brief, the robot remains above all an instrument in the service of a specific mission 

conducted in a multiform framework.16 Consequently, current law is already adapted to 

the technical constraints and provides a certain number of answers to the questions posed 

by the use of robots; but not all answers are available, due to the specific nature of these 

machines.17 There ensues a neutrality of the robot in respect of civil liberties, due to the 

materiality of its action, avoiding direct confrontation with these liberties. Alone, its use 

for essentially security ends, in the framework of a democratic state or otherwise, by the 

competent authorities or actual people, would be in doubt.18 Up to what point will it be 

necessary to adapt the human being to the robot? As a consequence, the assessment of the 

robot’s impact on civil liberties would be measured against the changes that it causes in its 

legal environment. 

We will thus see how robots encounter civil liberties, plus the procedural and technical 

guarantees that would be required in their use to provide maximum guarantees for civil 

liberties while ensuring the security of the person and of society.

The Influence of the Definition of Robots in Their Encounter With Civil 

Liberties

An assessment of the encounter between robots and civil liberties requires us to define 

them and determine the legal frameworks of their encounter.

Material and Legal Definition of the Robot

The Material Definition

The thing should be simple though. In fact, imaginings of the robot in animal or 

humanoid form would influence a realistic definition. Thus the robot may be described 

by its level of mobility, of autonomy and therefore of artificial intelligence, but also 
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by its shape and its material or immaterial nature, when we are talking about computer 

software that IT people refer to as “bots” and which operate continuously, without human 

intervention, making their own decisions. Thus the robot is able to analyze a real situation, 

associate a solution with it and, as a consequence, take a decision or leave a decision up to 

a human authority. It is a degree of intermediation between man and his action, according 

to the philosophers.

However, are mobility and materiality two essential characteristics of the robot?19

PP30, indeed, defines the robot as a mobile, pilot-less, reusable machine.20 Is mobility an 

indispensable characteristic though, given the computer software mentioned above? Would 

its artificial intelligence capabilities be the main characteristic of the robot? Would the 

material or immaterial form, its mobility or immobility, not come into play as the extension 

of its said capacities to carry out its mission?21 And one must not forget to discuss the 

robot’s multi-purpose or specialist nature.22

South Korea’s law on the development and promotion of the distribution of robots 

would confirm this impression.23 It defines the robot in article 2-1: “The intelligent robot 

is an autonomous machine that understands its external environment independently, that 

operates and reacts alone.” Article 2-2 of the same law states that the design and operation 

of the robot are subject to a robot ethical charter. Finally, the objective of a robot, according 

to the South Korean legislature is to contribute to the quality of life of the citizen and to the 

development of the economy.24

Let us note here merely that the robot is essentially defined by its artificial intelligence, 

used to analyze its environment, adapt to it and, finally, to take a decision, independently. 

The most extensive possible autonomy seems to be the characteristic of the robot. The 

ability to decide and, therefore, its nature and the legal significance of its nature therefore 

occupies a central place. 

Thus, the robot, carries out an essentially physical task following an order. And this 

could be done under remote control, semi-autonomously or autonomously. In the latter 

case, its artificial intelligence for carrying out its physical task adapts to its natural and 

artificial environment and, to this end, takes a certain number of decisions required to 

complete its mission, without human intervention. 

It remains to measure the robot’s impact on civil liberties to determine its legal nature.

The Legal Definition: a Movable, a Vehicle, and a Weapon

Today, the robot does not constitute a legal entity identified as such in law. We shall 

note its absence from the Manuel de droit des conflits armés (Legal Handbook for Armed 

Conflicts) and even from international arms conventions.25 For the moment, we can only 

proceed to its legal description, first of all in civil law.

If the robot belongs to an actual person or to a civil or military corporate entity,26 it is 

indeed a movable according to the definition in the civil code,27 as it can be transported or 

it can move itself. However it could acquire the character of an immovable by destination, 

according to Article 524 of the civil code. Thus a robot belonging to the army could be an 

immovable by destination if it were allocated to a mission carried out within the confines of 

a military site or barracks and never beyond these boundaries.28 However, a robot intended 
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to carry out missions outside the barracks or military site would indeed be a movable. This 

being so, is this movable a vehicle?

The highway code defines categories of vehicles and equipment for travelling on the 

public highway.29 Ever since law 54-1424 of 31 December 1957 brought liability cases 

related to vehicles under the jurisdiction of judicial tribunals, whether or not they are the 

property of a public entity, any machine capable of moving by its own means, be it an 

engine or any other means (animal, wind, oars, pedal arrangement), is deemed to be a 

vehicle. It follows that the technical characteristics of its movement determine if it is a 

vehicle or not. Thus, a drone, a fully robotic military craft ought to be considered as a 

vehicle. Finally, a robot which only carries out missions to locate, monitor, and neutralize 

an enemy, on a public or private highway or on the land, would constitute a vehicle because 

of the automotive capability that allows it to carry out a mission.30

Finally, as for the qualification of the robot as a weapon, according to the current national 

legislation, two complementary approaches authorize this.

The legislation on weapons subject to export permits, on the basis of the technical 

characteristics and the description of their main characteristics, a legal definition of a drone 

and a robot.31 The drone is legally an unmanned aerial vehicle32 and, according to the 

decree of 17 June 2009, the robot33 is a “Handling mechanism which can be of two types, 

continuous trajectory or point by point, which may use sensors and which displays all of 

the following characteristics:

1. Has multiple functions;

2. Capable of positioning or arranging materials, parts, tools or special devices by 

variable movements in a three dimensional space;

3. Comprising three or more closed or open loop controls, which may include 

stepping motors, and

4. Fitted with a programming capability accessible to the user by the learning method 

or by a computer which may be a logical programming unit, in other words without 

mechanical intervention.34 

Finally, the robot used as a robotic platform on which a weapon is installed would fall 

into the second category of controlled war materiel, weapons and munitions:35 the materiel 

destined to bear or to use firearms in combat.36

In conclusion, the military robot appears most often legally as a movable, belonging to 

a public entity. It may be covered by the law related to category two weapons of war and 

subject to export licences, or may constitute the weapon itself. However, does it constitute 

a new weapon?

The Robot, an Intelligent Weapon Subject to International Law

That said, the robot is, by its nature, a new weapon. Its special features distinguish it 

from the traditional weapon, manually separated from the human being, requiring a human 

action to operate it (a dagger, a rifle, a battle tank, a ship, an aircraft, a mine, etc.). Here, 

on the contrary, the amalgamation of decision-maker and object makes the robot more 

dangerous as its level of autonomy increases, due to the operation of its purely rational 
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logic. If, however, in the future, there is a rapprochement of the soldier’s and the robot’s 

ability to take autonomous decisions in the framework of a predetermined mission, we 

hope that the human being will distinguish himself by his ability to introduce something 

which cannot be set as a parameter: an appreciation, an evaluation that allows him to 

take a decision other than the one he would usually have taken and the one that the robot 

would have taken. In so doing, the robot, as an auxiliary to the soldier and undertaking an 

operation that involves another target individual (an enemy to be put out of action, to be 

monitored, or a person to be searched), finds itself interacting with the latter. This is not 

without influence on the assessment of the robot in relation to civil liberties, in addition to 

the fact of it being a weapon. 

It remains to identify its legality in respect of international disarmament law. Actually, 

is the robot an authorized or a banned weapon? The robot does not appear in the glossary 

of traditional weapons, and the treaty on conventional forces in Europe appears not to 

offer any clarification.37 Nor do the conventions on inhumane weapons or the ban 

or restriction on the use of some traditional weapons that could be deemed to produce 

excessive traumatic effects or as striking indiscriminately mention robots.38 However, 

as a consequence, the robot would have to comply with these international requirements 

to constitute an internationally legal weapon. Finally, the robot, would have to be able 

to distinguish between a combatant and a civilian, between a military target and civilian 

property, and even be able to identify a cultural asset protected by international law.39 All 

are abilities to discriminate, which require intelligence and specific programming capable 

of interfering with the decision to unleash a destructive round. 

We would classify robots in accordance with their design and their mission, by 

distinguishing robots that constitute the weapon itself from those destined to carry a 

weapon. Thus, the robot that was merely the vector for a prohibited weapon would be 

authorized, unlike the robot that constitutes that weapon. This distinction, however, does not 

necessarily correspond to the reality, insofar as the robot might combine the two functions: 

both gathering information and containing an explosive. It would not however constitute 

an insidious weapon. Finally, we will add that the robot should not be used to commit war 

crimes, genocide or crimes against humanity or to attack fundamental freedoms.

To close, we shall note the existence of a legal study indicating three legal circumstances 

where the State would be implicated by a robot.40 In the first place, it would be a case of 

the engagement of the State’s civil liability under international law (the country where 

the operation occurs) and under internal law (French law). In the second place, criminal 

liability under international law and under internal law would also be involved. In the last 

place the liability of the soldiers would come into play as operators or as commanding 

officers. Now, in what circumstances would the military robot encounter civil liberties?

Procedural Frameworks Where Robots and Civil Liberties Meet

From Temporary States of Security to Permanent Security

While the battlefield is the usual field of action for military robots, their intervention 

outside of this area as a force for public order is still possible. It is in this context that Army 
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robots would encounter civil liberties in three legal situations, where the application of the 

liberties changes gradually from exercise without restriction to restriction.

The first usual situation is where these liberties are exercised in the framework of their 

application procedures. The citizen will be able to exercise their rights and the administrative 

judge will exercise control over the acts of the administration applying them.41 At this 

stage, the use of military robots by soldiers has, a priori, no basis. However, civil robots 

may still be used by civil or military police forces in a civil setting.42 It is merely a case of 

ensuring respect for public order in a normal situation.

The second, relating to legally specified exceptional circumstances, arising from 

major disruption to public order, organizes a legislative and regulatory reduction in the 

application of these liberties. The judge, with less control, assesses the legality of the 

measures taken by the powers that be. It is in these circumstances that the military robot 

would encounter civil liberties and where the law of armed conflicts43 distinguishes between 

international conflicts and non-international armed conflicts, such as civil wars (which will 

not be discussed here). The latter category is itself separated from “situations of internal 

tension, internal disturbances, rebellions and other similar cases of violence which are 

not considered to be conflicts as such.”44 Thus, situations where public order is disturbed 

form a circumstance where the military would use robots in a civil context. The Code de 

la défense nationale (National Defense Code)45 governs those situations where the military 

forces contribute to the maintenance of public order; these are: a state of siege,46 in the 

service of defense,47 standby,48 mobilization,49 maneuvers and exercises,50 jurisprudence 

rules for exceptional circumstances and, finally, a state of emergency.51

The third situation finally, corresponds to a normal situation with exceptional 

procedures. For if the preceding legal frameworks are not applicable, the permanence of 

the threat, in essence a terrorist threat on the national territory or to French interests abroad, 

requires the continuity of special measures, such as the so-called VIGIPIRATE plan.52 This 

institutes a permanent state of surveillance and control of the population; and this is outside 

the exceptional situations described above. 

The Influence on Civil Liberties

Do these various legal arrangements reduce civil liberties? The use of military robots 

on these occasions would encounter civil liberties, such as, for example, the following:

1. The right to property: overflight, intrusion, voluntary/involuntary, legal/illegal.

2. The right to move freely: monitoring of movements, speed checks, parking, etc.

3. The right of assembly; to protest: unexpected gathering, entry to a meeting place, 

number of protestors, identity of the protestors; this raises the question of the 

existence or otherwise of a right to anonymity.

4. Image rights.

5. Privacy (knowledge of the identity of persons met, of private or public places 

visited, etc.).
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6. The right to work: the robot replaces a person, but most often it is to perform an 

activity hazardous to humans.

7. The ban on discrimination: racist stereotyping when carrying out identity checks.

8. The demarcation of virtual areas and borders.

In this, it is not the robot as such that will forbid movement, close a theater, or arrest 

a person. However, these technical actions offer the forces of order additional capacities 

in the execution of their mission. It operates as the instrument of the application of the 

military or civil forces’ police jurisdiction. However, the encounter between robots and 

civil liberties will have particular characteristics.

We shall consider first the usefulness of using military robots in operations to maintain 

public order. Are they adapted to such missions whose aims are not identical to those 

of a purely military conflict? While we might suppose that military robots designed for 

reconnaissance, observation, materials handling or transport or even for defensive actions 

would pose no special difficulties, would it not be otherwise for robots fulfilling an 

offensive function?53 Would they be able to kill or not to kill? Is a demonstrator an enemy? 

The use of military robots outside the battlefield would imply flexibility in their autonomy, 

their artificial intelligence and their technical capacities for carrying out a mission of a civil 

nature in a precise legal framework.54

This circumstance would require a distinction to be made between the battlefield and the 

public order environment. The latter would tend to amalgamate a public place55 (highway, a 

facility open to the public, a public service) and a private place where illegal acts requiring 

investigation are occurring.56 We can easily imagine robots used for this purpose.

In addition, we shall consider the effect of the robot’s form and size on civil liberties. 

Must it, in fact, be identifiable as a robot, or can it be disguised, as far as the citizen is 

concerned, to carry out its mission? We will suppose that the robot must be identified as 

such57 to dissuade the commission of offenses and that in other circumstances, such as 

information gathering, its identification would be made impossible.58 Finally, we will not 

forget that the robot’s form has an influence on its acceptance by the individuals affected 

by its action.59

Finally, the last character consists of the robot’s ability to intrude due to its capabilities: 

size, storage of sounds and images, decision to act, authorizing identification, location, 

discretion, or even connection to one or more computer networks. Normal in a military 

conflict, the use of these intrusive capabilities in the civil setting would remain questionable 

because they confront civil liberties, even when these are limited as the result of a state 

of emergency or siege.60 To what extent do these physical and virtual technical resources 

constitute disproportionate behavior? 

At the end of the day, the robot in its relationship with civil liberties participates as 

a complement to other tools in the establishment of an impalpable, increasingly virtual, 

chain surrounding the individual in the pursuit of his personal activities, even those which 

cause no disturbance to public order.

We can understand then the central importance of legal procedures to apply civil liberties 

and to determine the legal conditions for the intervention of robots.
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The Implication of and Legal Guarantees on the Use of Robots

For a specialist like Colonel Thomas Adams, part of the difficulty with military robots 

arises from the fact that they would make the use of force easier as well as make going to 

war easier and difficult to control due to the creation of a complex environment that man 

will not always be able to master.61 Thus it is important to set standards for the triangular 

relationship mentioned in the introduction and envisage procedures and guarantees on their 

design to protect civil liberties.

The Legal Implications of the Use of Robots for Civil Liberties

At What Procedural Stage and For What Physical Task Would the Robot be 

Introduced?

To reconcile the robot’s effectiveness and respect for civil liberties to prevent the 

latter being adapted, to their detriment, to the technical constraint, we need to determine 

the best stage for the intervention of the robot in a legal procedure. A few examples will 

demonstrate this.

First, let us consider vehicle speed checking by automatic radar units. It fulfils62 the 

desire to automate63 the procedure as completely as possible, starting with the detection 

of the offense and ending with the payment of the fine and also provides a system which 

discourages64 recourse to a judge to contest the offense. Thus, the policy design of speed 

checks conditioned the design of the legal procedure and the technology used, which 

also feeds back into the procedure. It follows that the digital photo is admissible unless 

evidence to the contrary is provided,65 and that CACIR66 is the theoretical scene at which 

the infraction is committed for the whole of France. Finally, the dispute relating to the 

offense goes to the representative of the public ministry, who examines its admissibility 

while defending the public interest.67 From this process, it transpires that the automatic 

recording of the infraction occurs at a precise moment in the procedure, which is amended 

to guarantee its full effectiveness.

Equally, the design of identity cards and biometric passports is responding to technical 

and security constraints. The desire to make them impossible to reproduce is leading 

to worldwide and European harmonization thanks to technology: the use of a standard 

photo taken by a competent agent on an approved device and the introduction of personal 

biometric data. Do the latter not infringe the human being’s intrinsic privacy? Here too we 

shall determine the stage at which it would be useful to use a technology-based process that 

the security concerns would justify.

Finally, governments, including Japan’s, are considering the introduction on the public 

highway of robot policemen whose presence raises the following questions. Will it be 

necessary to make any individual immediately identifiable by comparing his face with 

various databases? Or will this presence make it compulsory to carry a digital identity 

card that could be checked remotely via an RFID chip? Or allow the robot to analyze 

facial expressions to reveal a person’s intentions; authorize it to force a person to reveal 

its identity? Will it also be necessary to publicize the fact that a street, neighborhood or 

town is under robot surveillance and finally, will the robot have to be identifiable by the 

citizen or will it be unmarked? These questions also raise the issue of the stage in the 
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procedure at which the robot intervenes, its ability to take decisions and therefore its 

competence. Consequently, if the robot itself does not infringe on civil liberties, it does 

however participate in a procedural system established for this purpose which could do so.

Thus the use of the robot would occur at a particular and predetermined stage in the 

procedure to guarantee that its use was compliant, not only with its capabilities but also 

with a particular mission. In this way, its use will be part of a process where the international 

rules on the use of weapons or on respect for property and persons who are not military 

targets would be observed. It would be necessary to establish the particular conditions for 

its use: what is the best stage in the procedure for using it to respect the liberties? Who 

decides on the action to be taken: the soldier, the superior officer, the robot, all three? 

What technical and legal training will the soldier who uses the robot require? What type of 

mission may the robot carry out and does its use comply with the prescriptions?

At the end of the day, how valuable will the use of a military robot be in operations to 

maintain public order? The legal impact of the decision taken then by the robot therefore 

occupies a central place.

The Legal Status of the Robot’s Decision

Like digital photos from roadside radar, the legal effect of decisions taken by robots 

would be assessed against two categories of decisions considered in respect of their 

objective and of their legal consequences. We should make a distinction between the purely 

technical decisions, i.e. those related to the mere workings of the robot, and those related 

to its legally approved action which result either in allowing or denying an action to the 

soldier or finally in limiting the rights of a third person. 

Thus the first of the robot’s decisions would have no legal effect as they are linked 

to its internal workings. The situation would change as soon as they caused damage to a 

person or to property. For decisions relating to the robot’s action in the framework of a 

specific procedure: the assessment of their legal nature would result either from the law 

that recognized their legal value (the radar photo, for example) or from their legal effect on 

the exercise of a civil liberty, a fundamental right or an international legal ruling. Would 

the best guarantee not be provided by procedures, especially ones to ensure the robot’s 

neutrality?

Technical and Procedural Guarantees to Ensure the Robot Respects Civil 

Liberties

In the face of the robot’s intrusive capabilities, the guarantee of civil liberties would 

require the recognition of the citizens’ right of access to the technical standards and data 

stored by the robot. Equally, will it be necessary to load the essential standards that must be 

observed into the robot’s artificial intelligence?

Guaranteeing Civil Liberties by Access to the Technical Standards and to 

Information Stored by the Robot

Public law already provides the citizen with the right of access to documents and 

other types of information. We will consider the creation of the Commission d’accès aux 

documents administratifs (Committee for Access to Government Documents), or even 
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the Commission nationale informatique et liberté (France’s data protection authority) 

which, in particular, guarantees citizens access to any of their personal data collected by 

a computerized process. The essential issue resides, however, in the status of these bodies 

as independent governing bodies. In this capacity, they have the jurisdiction and powers 

needed for their task. Thus, a similar right and a similar body would need to be created in 

the area of robotics due to the special nature of this new field (a robotics regulatory body, 

for example). 

At this stage, we shall identify a citizen’s right of access in case of a robot malfunction, 

whether or not the person suffers direct harm. The technical standards used to ensure its 

mechanical, electronic and software operation, and without forgetting all of the sensors and 

other devices not directly supplied by the manufacturer, would be accessible in conditions 

yet to be specified to preserve their confidentiality. Such a right would play an essential 

role in determining the respective liabilities. This right would be distinct from the right to 

access yet to be defined to all of the data relating to a person or a group of people gathered 

by a robot on operations. Finally, access to the protocols on the use of the robot would be 

necessary. These concern the conditions for its introduction in the field as defined by the 

manufacturer and those defined by the Army for the execution of the mission.

However, due to its nature, the classification of the information gathered by the robot 

would form an obstacle. We shall suppose that the citizen will have access to all data 

concerning the robot’s design if he is the victim of damage caused by a malfunction of 

the robot to allow evidence of the wrong done to be established. However the information 

obtained in the course of a military mission or a mission to maintain public order would be 

harder to access. A purely military mission would justify a special procedure for accessing 

the information, as is already the case with the Commission consultative nationale du 

secret de la défense nationale.68

 A mission to maintain public order carried out by a robot 

would authorize easier access as the information thus collected would be administrative or 

computer documents.

How is this information gathered? The first method would be the installation of a “black 

box” recording all of the robot’s actions, both to ensure its operation and to complete its 

mission, without forgetting the instructions received. These data would be stored for an 

appropriate period in the “black box” and on an external medium for a different length of 

time.

Finally, the creation of a governing authority independent of political, economic, 

administrative, and military influence is needed. On this point, we will observe that, in 

France, EU law had to separate telecommunication manufacturers from the service 

providers, especially to distribute telephone apparatus. This was to avoid a conflict of 

interest and protect competition. Such a principle could be applied here. If we could 

imagine the existence of a useful link between the military administration and the robot 

manufacturer responsible for meeting military requirements, it would be essential for the 

institution responsible for guaranteeing compliance with the relevant standards to be wholly 

independent. This independence would not put at risk civil liberties, national security, or 

industrial secrets. On this point the study of the workings of the Agence nationale de la 
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sécurité des systèmes d’information (National Information System Security Agency) created 

by decree 2009-834 of 7 July 2009 should provide useful data.

Finally, South Korea has taken this route, via its legislation on the development, 

promotion and distribution of intelligent robots. The order applying this law establishes a 

certification body which ensures the competence of those building civil robots and ensures 

the quality of these robots. However, would an additional guarantee of “correct action” not 

result from adding imperative standards to its artificial intelligence?

Implanting Fundamental Standards and Procedures in the Robot

Let us consider first the most fundamental standards. Here too we shall distinguish 

between those directly related to the robot’s operation and those intended to prevent it 

from committing an act that would engage the liability of its manufacturer, owner or user. 

For a military robot there would be a requirement to respect the standards in international 

laws relating to the law on armed conflicts, to humanitarian law, to human rights and, 

(why not?), to moral or ethical standards, such as respect for the enemy’s religious 

ceremonies. On this point, the Manuel de droit des conflits armés (Legal Handbook for 

Armed Conflicts) published by the French Ministry of Defense insists on the existence of 

common rules in the various conventions on this law. Thus, the principles of humanity,69

discrimination,70 and proportionality71 must always be respected by the robot. There then 

remains the technical issue of installing such standards in the robot’s artificial intelligence 

and especially their interaction with the mission that it has to carry out. Actually, the 

wise use of the robot would imply that an action contrary to law would lead to its being 

blocked. These rules would operate to prevent illegal programming and to prevent firing on 

a civilian or to avoid disproportionate damage. Evidently, such a possibility would require 

the identification of priority rules and an especially fine artificial intelligence capability so 

that the robot would be able to distinguish the nuances of the various situations. Thus, as 

the robot becomes increasingly autonomous and capable of less predetermined behavior 

and decision-making, the existence of a hard core of hierarchically arranged standards that 

govern it will prove increasingly necessary. Equally, the establishment of a protocol for 

the relationship between the robot and the soldier on operations would be indispensable, 

at least to determine the robot’s level of autonomy in decision-making. It might be useful 

for the soldier to have a means of action that did not depend merely on his own will and 

sole responsibility, when the robot’s assessment of a situation would place the soldier in 

danger. Here too, the case of settling a conflict of appreciation between the robot and the 

soldier will have to be taken into account, and this in a highly tense situation, in combat or 

in a public order operation.

Next comes the procedures. Essential for guaranteeing respect for civil liberties, they 

will be embedded in the robot’s operating system as a security mechanism to prevent 

malfunction. Surgical robotics make their contribution here by showing that the highest 

level of autonomy is not always necessary, yet the establishment of standards proves 

indispensable.72 Equally, the remote medicine covered by decree No. 2010-1299 of 19 

October 2010 published in the Journal officiel de la République française (JORF) of 21 

October 2010, defines the acts and the conditions of implementation and its organization. 

Above all, the Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertes (CNIL) insisted on 
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the measures related to the security of exchanges, the authentication of professionals, data 

confidentiality, traceability of connections, and the introduction of secure archives.73 Given 

these examples, the search for standards both for military and public order-related missions 

would be necessary for military robots. For these reasons a charter of robotics would seem 

necessary.

Conclusion: Towards a Charter of Robotics and New Technologies?

The Symbiosis Between the Human Being, Society and the Machine Relies on 

Standards

The robot has a history and arrives in human society at a time when science allows 

it to be designed and built, in a society where minds can welcome it. In the process, the 

current symbiosis, between the human being, society and the machine, would indicate that 

civilization is evolving into a hyper-rational society. Up to what point can we rationalize 

society in the name of public order and security, without reducing the natural rights of 

the human being, for (rational?) purely practical, technical or administrative reasons. The 

establishment of enforceable international and national procedural standards would provide 

an answer. This trend is already at work. 

Thus, the South Korean government has been attempting to establish an ethical 

code or a code of practice for this area since 2007.74 Japan is studying, via its Ministry 

of the Economy and Industry, a definition of the rules that robot manufacturers should 

observe to ensure the security of the citizen.75 In Europe, the European Robotics Research 

Network (EURON) has identified five principles of robot design that would ensure that 

the human being retains control. These principles are “safety, security, privacy, traceability 

and identifiability.”76 Scientist Noel Sharkey demands the establishment of international 

rules for an ethical use of robots.77 Finally, the International Conference of Data Protection 

and Privacy Commissioners voted for the adoption of an international convention on the 

protection of personal data.78 A resolution taken to this end indicates which principles a 

charter for robotics and the new technologies might include.79 These examples, without 

forgetting Isaac Asimov’s three well-known laws, translate the desire to determine the 

standards for both the operation and use of robots and their relationship with the human 

being.80 Therefore, the creation of national charter on robotics linked to European and 

international standards does not seem out of place.

Towards a Constitutional Charter for Robotics and the New Technologies?

The creation of a charter inscribed in the foreword to the French Constitution would set 

out the technical and legal conditions for the use of the robot and would retain the principle 

that man or an institution are always responsible for the robot. We shall thus propose: 

1. A person may always opt to have recourse to a human being rather than to a robot. 

The use of technology in government must not adversely affect the rights of users. 

2. The robot, irrespective of its level of autonomy and artificial intelligence, remains, 

in essence, a machine that can be switched off using any means, at any time and 

anywhere by a human being when it malfunctions. Only an actual person or a 

corporate entity may assume responsibility for the acts he or it commits.
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3. The robot must always be identifiable as a robot and not confused with an existing 

animal or a human being.

4. The principle of the right to technical compliance to certify that the robot is not a 

hazard. This implies the right to know: the manufacturer, the owner, the technical 

characteristics, and the software to verify its operation.

5. Right of access to the personal data stored by the robot.

6. The right to use any means to provide evidence contrary to that established by the 

robot and therefore the obligation to retain all of the data of any nature related to 

a robot.

7. Consideration of the protection of the robot.

8. Finally, the creation of an independent administrative authority.81

This charter would open up a public discussion of the science and its use, and of the 

reasonable limits that can be imposed thereon without affecting its essence: continuing 

knowledge of Nature. Such a text would set out the conditions necessary for preserving 

human nature and its natural rights and would re-establish the link between science and 

philosophy.82 Is the scientifically and legally possible always humanly acceptable and 

achievable?
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Notes

1. This exercise requires us to juggle the existing situation and the future potential of robots. 

To do so, we will assume that these robots will have the full decision-making autonomy that their 

designers are seeking to give them.

2. We are referring here both to public security and to the security of the person requiring 

assistance or medical attention.

3. Purely utilitarian civil robots are not involved in this discussion (toys, robot companions, 

etc.).

4. In other words, the legal regime of each of the liberties introduced by the powers that be and 

citizens. For example: official arrangements governing religions, fishing, canals, etc.

5. This desire corresponds to a reality. We merely need to note that political leaders take a 

close interest in crime statistics, clear-up rates, the sense of insecurity and the number of verdicts 

delivered in various types of litigation. The politician’s obsession with results and cost-effectiveness 

comes into play here. 

6. This is only an hypothesis.

7. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789.

8. This is done even without needing to revise the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of 

the Citizen of 1789, one of whose principles is the presumption of innocence. It is not a case of 

condemning a person, rather of taking precautionary measures, at the risk of standardizing human 

behavior in the public sphere, by determining what is or is not normal behavior. Thus, the legislator 

organizes or attempts to organize the identification and traceability of individuals, irrespective 

of age, whose psychological profile, activities, civil or criminal past pose a risk to society. Video 

surveillance also makes its contribution here.

9. Both military and civil history show that the State has always sought to use the latest scientific 

advances. This is therefore normal in itself, but questionable when the use of technological progress 

turns against the innocent citizen.

10. Question: up to what point can a democratic state make use of a sophisticated technological 

resource without calling into question civil liberties themselves?

11. We can read on this point the fascinating Comité 5 study “Doit-on adapter les hommes aux 

armements ou les armements aux hommes” (Should We Adapt Man to Weapons or Weapons to 

Man), published by the Centre des hautes études de l’armement (Centre for Advanced Armaments 

Studies), 2009, 45th national session. The question is worth extending to the level of society: Is it 

up to society to adapt to the robots?

12. For example, photos from roadside radar devices are admissible unless there is proof to 

the contrary. Let’s not forget the many decisions to buy and sell securities (shares or bonds) taken 

directly by computer software, without human intervention.

13. I am thinking here of the civil Iranian aircraft brought down over the Persian Gulf in 1988 

by the US Navy, due to the parameters transmitted by the aircraft’s computers characterizing it as 

an enemy craft, while information from other sources indicated the contrary. See the report of this 

incident in the Ouest France newspaper, 17 August 2009.

14. Would the inactive owner of a fully robotic vehicle be responsible for a machine that 

operates without his intervention? We shall distinguish between the responsibility of the master of 

the thing who has programmed it badly or used it for an unsuitable mission and the responsibility of 

the robot’s manufacturer and of all those participating in the robot’s design.

15. One can imagine, due to the degree of autonomy, the existence of an area of uncertainty that 

gives rise to a malfunction that could not be attributed either to the robot’s owner, nor to the user, 

nor to the manufacturer; this area of uncertainty would require its own insurance mechanism so that 

the victim of the damage could be compensated.
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16. This framework is technological and scientific; economic, political and social; religious 

(reaction of religions to the new technologies, deontology, ethics, morality) and, above all, legal.

17. We think here of the legal framework for access to government documents, the classification 

of documents, of the control exercised by the Commission nationale de l’informatique et des libertes 

(CNIL), the French data protection agency, or of the national committee responsible for monitoring 

compliance with professional practices, especially by the forces of public order and the military.

18. Must the new technologies be the occasion for reducing the guarantees accorded to citizens 

in the exercise of their liberties?

19. This approach to the robot depends in part on its reality, yet also on the way in which it is 

imagined, especially in science fiction. We do not conceive of an immobile robot. 

20. PP30 is France’s 30-year forecast (plan prospective à 30 ans).

21. Is the robot not merely a computer fitted with arms and legs or other form of locomotion?

22. The choice between the two, the form and the method of locomotion, depends on its use.

23. The 16 October 2010 law on the development and promotion of the distribution of intelligent 

robots. 

24. The 16 October 2010 law on the development and promotion of the distribution of intelligent 

robots, article 1.

25. Ministère de la défense nationale, SGDSN, Manuel de droit des conflits armés, direction des 

affaires juridiques, sous-direction du droit international et du droit européen, bureau du droit des 

conflits armés (French Ministry of Defense, SGDSN, Legal Handbook for Armed Conflicts, Legal 

Affairs Department, International and European Law Sub-Section, Office for the Law of Armed 

Conflicts).

26. It would be yet to determine whether it belonged to the public or private part of the army or 

of any other public authority.

27. Article 528 of the civil code states that: “Animals and things which can move from one 

place to another, whether they move by themselves, or whether they can move only as the result of 

an extraneous power, are movables by their nature.” 

28. The robotic arms used in the car industry, by being fixed to the ground on the company site, 

present this character of immovable by destination.

29. Livre 3 Titre 1 Dispositions techniques (Book 3, Title 1 Technical Provisions) (Article L311-

1 -1 to L318-4) (Articles R311-1 to R318-8), Chapter I, Decree R311-1.

30. Thus a concrete vibrator was deemed to be a vehicle (Appeal Court, 12 February 2001, 

no. 3243, Préfet du Val d’Oise), as was the raft used by an officer to reach the riverbank, a road 

roller, and even the emergency sled pulled by a member of a ski patrol (TA Grenoble 17 April 1996, 

Kienle).

31. Decree of 17 June 2009 specifying the list of war materiel and similar materials subject to 

a special export procedure, NOR: DEFD0908305A. The appendix contains the definition of drones 

and robots.

32. Appendix to the aforementioned decree, in category ML 10.

33. Appendix to the aforementioned decree, in category ML 17. However, it is only in the list 

of definitions that this word is defined.

34. This definition, although included in a 2009 decree, would be difficult to apply to the 

military robot.

35. Decree no. 95-589 of 6 May 1995 on the application of the decree of 18 April 1939 specifying 

the control of war materiel, arms and munitions NOR: DEFC9501482D

36. For example: battle tanks, unarmored vehicles used to set up or carry a weapon, warships of 

all types, aircraft, balloons, helicopters, cryptology resources, night vision equipment, etc.
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37. Located at: www.un.org/fr/disarmement/conventionalarms.glosssary.shtml.

38. For the latest conventions, see: www.un.org/fr/disarmement/conventionalarms.glosssary.

shtml

39. On this issue, refer to the Manuel de droit des conflits armés (Law handbook for armed 

conflicts) issued by the French Ministry of Defense.

40. Marc Galdéano and Emmanuel Gardinettti, “L’acceptabilité des robots dans le combat 

futur: aspects psychologiques, et juridiques” (The Acceptability of Robots in Future Combat: 

Psychological and Legal Aspects) in La robotique en matière de défense et de sécurité: Bilan et 

perspectives, Laboratoire de stratégie de l’armement, Centre des hautes études de l’armement et 

Direction générale de l’armement, Ministère de la défense (Robots, Defense and Security. Review 

and Perspectives, Armament Strategy Laboratory, Center for Advanced Armament Studies and 

General Directory of Armaments, French Ministry of Defense), 3c et seq.

41. For example, the organization of a religious procession remains possible in a secular State; 

the judge exercises control over the decision of the mayor to refuse it.

42. We might consider traffic radar, if this device can be accorded the status of robot, or even 

the use of mini drones by the police at demonstrations. The Japanese and South Koreans are already 

thinking about using robot policemen.

43. Refer on this point to the Manuel de droit des conflits armés (Law handbook for armed 

conflicts), published by the French Ministry of Defense.

44. Manuel de droit des conflits armés, 3.

45. Article R1321-1 et seq. of the Code de la défense (Defense Code).

46. Article 36 of the Constitution of 4 October 1958, and articles 2121-1 et seq. of the Code de 

la défense nationale (National Defense Code).

47. See articles L2151-1 et seq. of the Code de la défense (Defense Code).

48. See articles L2141-1 et seq. of the Code de la défense (Defense Code).

49. See articles L2141-1 et seq. of the Code de la défense (Defense Code).

50. Refer to the Code de la défense (Defense Code).

51. Article L2131-1 of the Code de la défense nationale (National Defense Code), which refers 

to law no. 55-385 of 3 April 1955.

52. This plan, combined with other plans specific for certain threats (nuclear, toxic, etc.), 

authorizes an increase in the surveillance and operational resources available to respond to a terrorist 

threat, in accordance with the level of alert in place.

53. Gerard de Boisboissel, a research engineer at CREC at the St Cyr Coetquidan college, 

distinguishes between control robots which do not interact with their environment (reconnaissance, 

patrol, and observation), support robots for materials handling and transport, operational robots 

performing a defensive action and operational attack robots which may constitute the weapon itself 

or carry a weapon and, therefore, kill an enemy.

54. Or should we envisage the military using robots specific to public order. Equally, it would 

be necessary to determine the cross-service protocols between the military and the civil police forces 

in respect of the use of robots.

55. Since the introduction of the law banning the wearing of any clothing hiding the whole of 

the face, the concept of public place is now defined in a general, rather than a specific way, in the 

name of public order. Previously, this notion was subject to circumstantial definitions and linked to 

a specific area. For example, the ban on smoking in public places or demonstrations. We will thus 

see the decision of the Conseil constitutionnel (Constitutional Council).

56. Penal code article 706-95, Interception of Telecommunications and article 706-96, The 

Taking of Audio Recordings and Visual Images in Specified Vehicles and Places. Thus judicial police 

officers or agents may, without the consent of the people concerned, “install any technical device 
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designed to hear, preserve, transmit or record words spoken by any person or persons in a private or 

confidential context, in private or public places or vehicles, or the images of any person or persons 

in a private place.”

57. For example, the fixed radar units that check vehicle speeds on the public highway or 

compliance with red lights.

58. For example, an insect robot, whose appearance would make it unidentifiable at first sight.

59. This explains the importance currently being paid to the design of robots to allow the 

identification of the robot and its operation in relation to its environment. The humanoid form is not 

necessarily the most suitable.

60. For example, see the article in Le Figaro, 12 November 2010, 8. As regards video surveillance, 

the effectiveness of this tool results from its combination with software capable of identifying, 

storing and notifying behaviors deemed likely to disturb the public order, such as suddenly raising 

an arm in the air, assemblies of persons, or running, which do not, however, of themselves constitute 

offenses. How capable will a robot be of distinguishing between a blameworthy act and a joke that 

looked like a blameworthy act?

61. An article in Ouest France, 17 August 2009, quoting US colonel Thomas Adams, who states 

that the speed, miniaturization, and the number of robots create a complex environment. Finally, 

the article quotes Marc Garlasco, an advisor to Human Rights Watch, who would like to know who 

would be responsible if a robot committed a war crime.

62. See the comparative study of Europe in Sécurité routière (Road Safety), press kit, June 

2003.

63. This was the decision made after observing other European systems that are only partially 

automated and retain human intervention, especially in the detection of the offense and the 

identification of the number plate, in Sécurité routière, press kit, June 2003, 19 pages.

64. Refer on this issue to Sécurité routière, press kit. 

65. Article L 130-9, Highway Code.

66. This refers to automatic road traffic offense detection center (CACIR), created by decree 

no. 2004-504 of 10 June 2004, in JORF, 13 June 2004. Thus, “The automatic road traffic offense 

detection center (CACIR) is a joint service where officials and agents of the judicial police of the 

national police and gendarmerie carry out their usual tasks. Its jurisdiction extends across the whole 

of the national territory for the offenses detected.” 

67. It operates under the authority of the Procureur de la République (France’s Attorney 

General).

68. Article L 2312-1, Code de la défense (Defense Code)

69. Avoid superfluous wrongs in the use of force. The use of robots would have to, therefore, 

observe this principle.

70. It consists of distinguishing between the military objectives, civil property, and the civilian 

populations.

71. Aim to avoid launching an attack that would harm civilians, their property, actions that 

would be excessive in relation to the advantage that the military action would gain.

72. It should be noted that the current development of surgical robotics already requires the 

surgeon and the medical team to undergo special training; the presence of an emergency team 

is required in case of malfunction, that the robot has to have embedded autonomous security 

mechanisms and a maintenance company has to be used to ensure that the robot is kept in a perfect 

operational state.

73. See the article on remote medicine on the “News” tab on the CNIL website.

74. Information quoted by Courrier International, 15 March 2007.
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75. For example, sensors to avoid collisions, flexible materials and even emergency switches 

would ensure that a robot did not harm a human being.

76. Quoted in Evan Blass “Guide to Robot Ethics Set for Publication” http://www.engadget.

com/2006/06/18/guide-to-robot-ethics-set-for-publication/. Accessed 16 October 2013.

The robot should be: safe, non-hazardous, identifiable, traceable and discreet. 

77. Refer on this point to: “A call for international controls on the spread of armed military 

robots” at www.icrac.co.cc/index.html.

78. The reference is to the 32d International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy 

Commissioners held in Jerusalem at the end of October 2010.

79. See the CNIL website for the resolution on international privacy standards adopted at the 

31st conference in Madrid. This conference proposed the adoption of binding international and 

national standards.

80. The inspiration for this 20th Century science fiction writer to draw up his three laws came 

from the editor in chief of the magazine which published his short stories: “1. A robot may not injure 

a human being or, through inaction, allow a human being to come to harm; 2. A robot must obey 

orders given it by human beings except where such orders would conflict with the First Law; 3. A 

robot must protect its own existence as long as such protection does not conflict with the First or 

Second Law.” The author would go on to suggest another law as the “Zeroth” law: “A robot may not 

injure humanity or through inaction allow humanity to come to harm.” How much credence should 

we give to these laws?

81. We might suppose that the chair of this authority would be drawn from the judiciary 

and appointed by a committee of representatives from the Conseil supérieur de la magistrature 

(Supreme Magistrates Committee) and from the Conseil d’Etat (Council of State). It would consist 

of members drawn from parliament, civil society, citizens selected at random from the electoral rolls 

and particularly competent individuals from the mechanical engineering, IT, and electronics fields, 

as well as from the law. This authority’s mission would be to inspect the certifications awarded to 

companies responsible for inspecting the software, to ensure the citizen’s right of access, to inspect 

the companies manufacturing robots and the civil or military user institutions and to guarantee 

compliance with the procedures in this area. It could take any offense to court and would have 

regulatory powers and be able to impose administrative sanctions. It would deliver opinions on 

any topic related to robotics, in voluntary or compulsory consultation with government, members 

of parliament and other elected representatives, judges and even companies linked with the design 

and commercial distribution of robots. These opinions would be made public in their entirety, or 

partially where the national interest was at stake. This authority would have an investigative role. 

All citizens would have recourse to it.

82. See Paul Virilo, “Nous sommes dans le culte de la vitesse-lumière” (We Are in the Cult of 

the Speed of Light), Science et avenir, January 2011, 44 et seq.

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 Chapter 10

Military Robots and Ethics:

Ethical Problems for European Industrial, Political, and Military Leaders

by Benoit Royal

How might public opinion and the media comprehend robots and the associated 

issues?

What might be the vision of the military, political and industrial decision-makers 

regarding the development of robots in current and future crises, taking into account 

the various technological evolution prospects?

How does the nature of these robots—Remote-controlled, semi-autonomous, totally 

autonomous—affect these visions?

I will try to simultaneously answer these questions through three major ideas:

1. Our current modern society is genuinely fascinated by robots. This 

fascination stimulates research and speeds up robotic development 

since, every day, one finds new possibilities to use them, especially 

when it comes to preserving human lives.

2. The development of the use of robots alongside men, and especially of 

military robots aimed at inflicting wounds or at killing, already raises 

ethical issues pertaining to international laws and to the fundamental 

liberties which will increasingly be imposed on designers and on 

political authorities.

3. The “legalization” of Western societies, induced by the refusal of 

the inevitable and the search for the guilty in an environment highly 

saturated with media, will sooner or later force political leaders to 

consider the need to write laws concerning robots.

“Robolution”-the Fascination for Civilian and Military Robots, Increasingly 

Aimed at Preserving Human Lives 

In the civilian domain, people are fascinated by all that is linked to new technologies: 

it is fashionable, new, and talks them into buying. This interest is centered on things which 

make personal, family and professional lives easier, especially by reducing constraints. 

When asked “what would be the ideal robot for you?” a majority of people have answered: 

the baby-sitter robot, the carrier robot, the secretary robot, the cleaning and shopping robot, 

etc.

Bruno Bonnell (Director of Robopolis, a company specialized in personal robots, 

and Chairman of SYROBO, the European individual robots association), who wrote a 

book entitled Viva la Robolution, recently declared, “In Korea, I visited schools where the 

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the 

author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the French MoD or 

Euro-ISME.
120

teacher was helped by a robot. It would take the register or be in charge of the gym class 

while she would concentrate on pupils with learning problems. Robots are going to change 

your lives in the next 20 years, as have computers. The tool has been the continuation of the 

hand and, following the same logic, men are devolving intelligence to robots.”

Beyond their interest at home, they are also – or mainly – increasingly interesting in the 

security domain. Many ideas have emerged to use convenient and rather cheap unmanned 

aircraft to observe fires, large open spaces, bridges, high voltage lines, maritime areas, 

etc. Their employment is indeed still very limited since the laws concerning flying objects 

dramatically limit their use (to avoid the risk of collision with aircraft or people on the 

ground), but the evolution of safety technologies should progressively help reduce these 

limitations.

In the Military Domain 

The combat robot fascinates as much or even more than the “domestic” one, but the 

issue of its freedom of action is always present. The current interest is mainly focused on 

the “flying robot,” as unmanned aerial vehicle, the most widely used during conflicts and 

the one for which most development are planned. The media speak about it a great deal:

1. Sara Daniel, “The UAV War” Le Nouvel Observateur, 27 May 2010. 

2. “Do Ground Robots Represent the Future of the Armies?” La Tribune, 

25 May 2010. 

3. Pierre Grumberg, “Armies Put a Big Bet on Robots” Le Télégramme, 

30 May 2010.

4. “Letting UAVs Make War for Us.” Slate.fr, 13 June 2010. 

In the United States, many books about robots with highly significant titles were 

published in 2009: 

1. P. W. Singer, Wired for war: The Robotic Revolution and Conflict in 

the 21st Century, (Penguin Press).

2. Ronald Arkin, Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots,

(CRC Press).

3. Wendell Wallach and Colin Allen, Moral Machines: Teaching Robots 

Right from Wrong (Oxford University Press). 

The main use of these robots in the military domain is to reduce combat constraints. 

For the French Army, the stake is to intervene in complex theaters of operations while 

reducing the risk of human losses. In that respect, a member of the French DGA (the French 

Procurement Agency) explained: “We have to be able to rapidly deliver these technologies 

to our soldiers, and to speed up dual research with the large robotic laboratories.” The 

main reason for this passion is that robots spare the tears, blood and sweat of the soldiers 

by carrying out many missions, those that the Americans call the “3D:” Dangerous, Dull 

and Dirty.

That being said, let us not fantasize about the word “robot,” that the Americans prefer 

to call UGVs (Unmanned Ground Vehicles), USVs (Unmanned Surface Vehicles) or UUVs 
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(Unmanned Underwater Vehicles): those which are currently in service are still remotely 

controlled by an operator. It is worth noting that, in France, airmen refuse to speak about 

“planes without pilots.” They demand that we speak about “planes without pilots aboard,” 

since UAVs indeed have someone who pilots them.

Examples of Missions Carried out by UAVs and/or Robots: 

1. The spotting and defusing of mines: there has been a major breakthrough 

in the field of ground robots dedicated to the spotting and defusing of 

improvised explosive devices, the home-made mines which currently 

cause 70% of the losses in Afghanistan. Where you used to need a 

mirror and a lot of courage to observe what was happening inside a 

house, you now have small robots (such as the Inbot, weighing less 

than 2 kilos [4.5 lbs], with three cameras and four wheels, developed 

in France by ECA) which see in the dark, listen and send their data to 

an operator located some 100 meters away. Another robot can then be 

sent to destroy the device.

2. Painful and tiresome tasks: The first robots able to carry the backpacks 

(such as Big Dog) should enter into service in the coming years. We 

are also beginning to consider the development of robots that carry 

stretchers.

3. The so-called “dirty” missions. There is no lack of ideas to find jobs to 

robotize for these very dangerous missions. The Army is for instance 

working on systems able to automatically draw a map of biologically 

or radioactively contaminated areas.

4. War missions: the specific case of attack UAVs. Ever since 9-11 and the 

war in Iraq, flying machines initially designed to collect intelligence 

have become killing machines used to “suppress” terrorists and those 

designated as “illegal combatants” by the United States. 

Unmanned aircraft have become, as former CIA Director Leon Panetta pointed out, 

“the only game in town,” the only efficient weapon we are supposed to have against Al 

Qaeda. There are more than 300 types of UAVs today. They range from the micro-UAV, 

the Nano Flyer which only weighs a few grams up to the Global Hawk which is as big 

as an Airbus. Imagination in military technology knows no limit. The point there is to 

suppress enemies without jeopardizing the lives of the soldiers. In addition to that, UAV 

missions are less expensive than those of the “conventional” Air Force. Unmanned aircraft 

have become the main investment area for the US Air Force. The United States has about 

7,000 UAVs. According to General Norton A. Schwartz, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, 

the US Air Force has trained more UAV operators than pilots for the first time ever in 

2010. Andrew, a young UAV operator working on Creech Base in Nevada explained, “This 

is a crucial step in military history, comparable to the discovery of [gun] powder or the 

nuclear bomb. War will never be the same again.” A journalist recently commented about 

this phenomenon: “Battles are increasingly conducted by staff personnel, trained on video 

games, who almost only drop bombs during working hours, using only their screens, on an 
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enemy located dozens of thousands of kilometers away, before going back home in time to 

prepare the dinner for their kids.”

UAV war also raised the enthusiasm of all parties represented in the US Congress. The 

press mentions the passion of the current Vice President Joe Biden, who even thinks that 

instead of waging a counterinsurgency war against the Taliban in Afghanistan, which costs 

a lot of human lives, the US Army should only focus on those computer-assisted strikes to 

destroy Al Qaeda’s HQ.

To summarize the first part of this article, one can say that the potential represented by 

UAVs and robots for the civilian world as well as for political and military leaders, causes 

real fascination and not mere interest. However, in the military domain, this fascination 

and this interest are increasingly confronted with rejection, fear and disgust when one 

looks from the side of those who suffer from their consequence or perverse effects. 

Only the mention of extreme cases of armed UAVs used in the Afghan conflict, is 

enough to get some people to start speaking out—increasingly loudly—to denounce the 

perverse effects of the UAVs.

In Pakistan, the main target of armed UAVs, these systems have been nicknamed “the 

wasps,” and the populations of the tribal areas scatter as soon as they hear this distant 

lawnmower noise which characterizes the flight of UAVs. Resentment against them is 

growing because of serious mistakes and of the massive collateral damage they cause. 

The Pakistani Prime Minister and Chief of Staff have declared that these bombings were 

“counter-productive.” Pakistani newspapers condemn these “underhanded” attacks led by 

invisible machines that are only sometimes announced by a slight rumbling noise. “Drone” 

has become a pejorative word in urdu and Pakistani rock bands write songs about an 

America which has lost its honor. The “accurate” and “efficient” strikes are perceived as 

“cruel” and “cowardly” by the Middle-Eastern press.

In Pakistan, like in Afghanistan, stories of tragic blunders inevitably create new 

insurgents, and military and political leaders do not discard the media effect induced by 

the massive employment of “killer” UAVs or by the consequences of targeting mistakes.

As with the employment of other weapons, the use of such lethal equipment as the 

armed UAV cannot be envisaged without an ethical approach comparable to that applied to 

conventional engagements.

Ethical Questions Pertaining to International Laws but also to Fundamental 

Freedoms 

In Civilian Societies Outside Combat Areas 

The arrival of robots in civilian society (for instance for surveillance purposes) is 

beginning to raise legal issues, since these robots record and store all types of data. Some 

judges consider that it will rapidly induce problems regarding the protection of private 
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lives and the legal value of evidence collected in that way. Just remember the first debates 

when the first surveillance cameras were put in place.

In the US, some people have started wondering whether the Second Amendment of 

the Constitution will allow the ownership and use of robotic weapons. This question might 

seem far-fetched, but there has been an example in Atlanta where a bartender has built an 

“anti-tramp robot” with an infrared camera, a spotlight, a loud-speaker and a water-gun. He 

uses it to push away tramps and drug-dealers who try to settle in the parking lot of his bar.

In Combat Areas

The massive arrival of mechanical systems will raise issues, since the emergence of 

these robots on the ground also questions some of the most fundamental notions of the laws 

of war.

1. Let us remember that no mechanical system can distinguish the 

difference between friendly and hostile behavior or between a civilian 

and a soldier. The Geneva Convention appeals to “common sense.” 

Try to download THAT into a computer! In South Africa in 2007, 

due to a “software problem”, an automatic air-defense gun killed nine 

soldiers during a training session. Conducting the investigation and 

pronouncing a judgement on such accidents raises new questions. 

2. Answers to questions—which are crucial to military and politicians—

about the proportional nature of retaliatory actions or the responsibility 

for those actions: in case of blunder or technical malfunction, who is 

responsible? The designer? The manufacturer? The user? 

For the time being, the US military confirms that they permanently keep “the human 

in the loop” for the final decision to open fire. But the border is slippery and, with the 

development of technologies and autonomy, humans can rapidly find themselves “on the 

loop” or even “far above the loop.” The user will then have to choose between trusting the 

machine and running the risk of a blunder, or check the data and downgrade the efficiency. 

These crucial questions, which pertain more to the ethical than to the technical domain, 

have not been answered yet.

Considering This, Where are We From an Ethical Point of View Regarding the 

Employment of UAVs 

In France, the ethical reflection is first of all philosophical. The point is to defend 

values in which a country recognizes itself and, since the enforcement of ethical rules in 

combat has a positive influence when fights take place amongst the populations, one can 

consider that we have to be ambitious in that domain. It is significant to see that one of the 

very first official documents regarding the use of armed UAVs and robots published by the 

French Ministry of Defense already associated the induced strategic stakes to the ethical 

reflections it causes.

In the United States, the legal advisor of the State Department borrowed Hillary 

Clinton’s “smart power” catchphrase. This concept covers the smart use of all existing 

assets, including technology, human rights, and international laws to justify the use of 
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UAVs and their positive effects. It is the search for this added value in the communication 

action which is desired, beyond communication on the actual results. Some academics 

who specialize in these subjects do not hesitate to ask the US film industry to give a more 

pleasant image of UAVs (by fighting for instance against the negative image conveyed by 

the Terminator). As one can see, the more important point is to develop communication 

strategies rather than ethical rules.

The Refusal of the Inevitable and the Search for Responsibility in a MediaSaturated Environment 

The Refusal of Chance in Western Societies and its Immediate Corollary: the 

Search for Individual or Collective Responsibility 

Currently, Western citizens increasingly discard the notion of “fortuitous event,” chance 

or bad luck for several reasons (fortuitous meaning “happening by chance” and, in French 

legal terms, “which frees the apparent perpetrator of the damage from any responsibility”). 

On the one hand, technological advances and the progress of our knowledge over the past 

century have led us to dream of finding a cure to all human problems, have made accidents 

unacceptable and have induced us to refuse the fact that life can end at an early age as we 

now live long. The Western way of life automatically leads to rejecting risks, and especially 

that of losing lives. 

 On the other hand, one can observe a social phenomenon called the private domain 

ideology by Professor Hude, which tends to overwhelm everything else. It consists in a 

marked rejection of institutional power, inducing excessive media attention on all facts 

which could place this power in a difficult situation. It triggers a systematic search for 

somebody else’s responsibility in all daily events, even when said events are unpredictable 

or when they have natural causes (why has the hurricane or earthquake not been foreseen 

by the weather services?). This determinist development in our societies needs to be taken 

into account.

Consequently, when an incident or accident causes the injury or death of a beloved 

one, the very idea of fate cannot be accepted any longer, and the loss becomes unbearable. 

This questioning is often perceived as a necessary catharsis aimed at trying to mitigate the 

pain. The “legal” process is hence launched in order to ward off emotion and to respond 

to the pain. The loss of religious feeling, which helped accept “fate,” further amplifies this 

phenomenon. It is the role of the judge to decide. This fuels the legalization phenomenon 

in our society.

Two emblematic examples: 

1. The loss of 10 soldiers on 18 August 2008 during an ambush in 

Afghanistan in Uzbeen valley was followed by a legal action against 

person or persons unknown presented to the Paris Armed Forces 

Court for “having deliberately endangered the lives of other people.” 

Mrs. Alexandra Onfray, public prosecutor at the Paris Armed Forces 

Courts, wrote: “justice intervenes in areas which are at the heart of 
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the military profession and could exercise a pressure which had never 

been experienced or even considered in the past.” 

2. More recently, firemen, whose work is to provide assistance to the 

populations, have also been subject to search for liabilities and 

complaints for their relief actions, while they risk their own lives 

to save that of the populations. Claims such as “they did not arrive 

quickly enough” or “they made a wrong choice” are now heard. 

In that framework where the inevitable is no longer accepted and where people demand 

compensation, one can see that legal prosecutions for mere carelessness now applies to all 

domains of human activities, and the military domain is not excluded. How could we think 

that the arrival of robots (both civilian and military) could be excluded from this? 

The Media-Saturated Environment Leads to the Need for Increased 

Transparency in all Military Actions 

Media saturation comes along with another fact of our Western societies: the citizenry 

is very emotional. This emotionalism is mainly perceptible when it comes to limiting 

freedoms, to issues of dignity, and to the interpretation of justice or of the law.

These realities mean that any violent action conducted during an operation which 

could be perceived as violating the law is likely to immediately intrude into the daily life of 

populations at peace, comfortably sitting in their living-rooms and watching evening news 

programs, thus simultaneously evoking the same emotion in thousands or even millions of 

fellow citizens. As early as 1999, General Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the United 

States Marine Corps, had highlighted the risk generated by this phenomenon in an article 

entitled “The Three-block War.” He described the phenomenon as “the Strategic Corporal.” 

In a nutshell, he explained that any misbehavior committed by the most junior corporal on 

the ground could be almost instantly denounced in the international press and could trigger 

reactions likely to go as far as the questioning of the strategy of the operation itself.

Through media of this type, populations are hence able to have a weight and an influence 

on political decisions, which could in fine modify the employed strategies and also induce 

politicians to try to identify and punish those they feel are responsible. Besides, wherever it 

happens, when broadcasted by the international media, any breach of the law or of dignity 

touches public opinions and makes the public react. People use their legitimacy to express 

their disapproval in the streets and in the press and, when they can, at the ballot boxes.

As an example of this phenomenon, in September 2009, asummary of a blunder 

committed by a German Colonel in Afghanistan was published in the German newspaper 

Bild.

On 4 September, NATO bombed, upon request from German Colonel Georg Klein, 

two tanker lorries stolen by the Taliban near Kunduz. The German officer feared that both 

vehicles might be used as rolling bombs.
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Bild, relying on an Army report and on a video, states that Colonel Klein ordered 

the attack despite the fact that he could not be absolutely certain that there were no 

civilians nearby, which complies neither with the NATO Rules of Engagement nor with 

the directives given by General Stanley McChrystal, the Commander of the international 

forces in Afghanistan.

At the end of October, General Schneiderhan had declared that Klein’s name had 

been cleared by a NATO report, and that he had “no reason to doubt that the German 

soldiers had acted in an adequate military fashion, given the mandate of the United Nations 

and the difficult solution.” However, a NATO military source stated that US fighters had 

twice offered to make a “show of force” to intimidate, while the German commanders had 

demanded the use of force. Bild also affirms that former Defense Minister Franz Josef Jung 

had known about possible civilian victims long before the time he publicly acknowledged.

The direct consequence of this serious blunder was the forced resignation of the Chief 

of the German Joint Staff and of a Defense Minister in November 2009, and the officer who 

made the decision still has several legal proceedings pending.

The emotion caused by the vision of the human consequences of military deployments—

for our own troops, for the opponent, or for the innocent population—was made even 

more vivid with the refusal of the inevitable and the demand for compensation which 

mechanically increases the risk of exposure for our soldiers. This requires transparency in 

our actions. That being said, in the report of New America Foundation, a think tank which 

specializes in counter-terrorism, two researchers (Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann) 

considered that one third of the casualties UAVs produced were innocents. For instance, 

the successful attack against Baitullah Mehsud (one of the most powerful Pakistani Taliban 

leaders) in August 2009 had been preceded by some 15 other bombings which killed many 

civilians by mistake. The consequences of a false denunciation or of an intelligence mistake 

can be dreadful, whatever the means of delivery of the bombs (UAV or aircraft manned by 

a “flesh and bone” pilot).

Beside the induced human consequences, the improper use of military robots 

increasingly excites reactions against their users. It makes them look bad by showing them 

as users of a lethal weapon who do not even dare take the risk of using it themselves. 

Sooner or later, they will face criminal prosecutions. 

Peter W. Singer, a military expert at the Brookings Institution who wrote a book about 

the robotic revolution in the art of war, goes even further by considering that the use of 

killer robots should absolutely lead the international community to ask some legal, moral 

and political questions such as whether it is constitutional to destroy one’s enemies by 

clicking on one’s computer mouse?

Conclusion

Technological progress in the design of robots seems to gain exponential momentum, 

but our institutions cannot keep pace with it. The laws of war, as defined in the Geneva 
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Convention, have been written at a time when people listened to 78 rpm records. How 

could these laws for instance be used for those who use 21st century weapons such as 

the U.S. MQ-9 Reaper UAV, deployed at very long distance against an insurgent who is 

himself violating international conventions by fighting from a hospital?

It thus seems increasingly necessary to try to define a legal framework that will 

determine the ethical framework of the use of these new technologies since the passion 

caused by the arrival of robots will not survive long after the first blunders (for military 

robots) or first malfunctions (for civilian ones). Regarding the latter, let us remember the 

debates in France after the malfunction of a speed regulator which had caused a serious car 

accident.

To the question “will the law be able to follow the pace?” it is not preposterous to think 

that the citizens will be the first to ask or even demand that they do follow this pace. 

On the other hand, it also seems necessary to rapidly consider limiting the dissemination 

of these technologies because we should not forget that, sooner or later, a rogue opponent—

or state—might also have access to them and find a way to attack us with our best weapons. 

This is the reason why we need to develop military and domestic security strategies which 

will rule the use of these sophisticated technologies and which will also take into account 

the way our opponents might try to use them against us.

There is therefore a real strategic stake linked to the design of the future generation of 

robotized weapons, which could induce the drafting of a new Additional Protocol to the 

Geneva Conventions. It would then define their framework of employment while limiting 

their use to a small number of countries.

To conclude on ethical considerations, it is worth reminding ourselves over and over 

again that international laws have been developed around the idea that even war cannot 

be prosecuted with any type of method. In this extreme situation where everyone is trying 

to kill the enemy before being killed, laws and customs apply in order to govern combat 

and to make sure that it is honest, fair, and proportionate. These rules have been compiled 

in texts which recall that, even in the toughest fights, in the design of the most complex 

techniques, in the development of the most sophisticated robots, a little nucleus of that so 

precious and so dearly obtained civilization must remain. It must be preserved at all costs. 

If we fail, we will lose our humanity and our most essential values. It is our duty to work 

on that and we, the military, being the first stakeholders in war and the first users of these 

weapons, must also be the first to participate in this reflection.

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Chapter 11

Autonomous Robots:

The Irreducible and Complementary Place of Officer’s Ethics

by Dominique Lambert

Let’s start, first of all, by putting the ethical problems raised by military robots back 

into a wider context. This will show in fact that our thinking could be fruitful for a wide 

spectrum of fields of human activity well beyond the sphere of military ethics. 

Ethical problems, underscored by the robotization of weapons systems in military 

operations, come up in every situation where man has delegated the power to make 

decisions and take action to a machine, or more broadly to a system that executes, on a 

physical or computer substratum a set of procedures controlled more or less rigidly by 

rules. And these situations are becoming more universal in our society. 

This delegation of power and action, which implies granting total or partial autonomy 

to these machines or complex formal systems, appears as a corollary of human limits 

in emergency situations calling for fast action, or when the amount of information that 

must be handled largely exceeds the usual capacity of the human brain. Such situations 

are actually quite common, for example, in the practice of intensive care or emergency 

medicine. In fact, the need to quickly integrate a lot of data on the patient in distress and 

take a virtually instant decision on what action to take, has led to the development of a 

series of decisional and action support programs, which, in a sense, robotize the practices 

of the Emergency Room (ER) physician. This robotization of ER decision-making support 

demands inclusion of legal and ethical parameters in software which helps physicians to 

choose a course of action and to assess the legitimacy and the pertinence of the risks to be 

taken. 

Computer-aided decision-making is also used in financial portfolio management and in 

determining economic strategy in complex contexts where reaction speed is essential and 

imposed by stochastic market fluctuations and key players who are not always rational. In 

a somewhat different but still fairly close way, we find this kind of tendency to resort to 

robotized systems to support legal or academic rulings. For example, in the case of a very big 

competitive examination, the need to rank a large number of candidates (sometimes several 

thousand) very quickly (in just a few days) leads juries to leave their deliberative power 

in the hands of IT systems which automatically decide the students’ fate by processing a 

great many complicated criteria, which an ordinary jury would have difficulty weighing in 

a perfectly equivalent manner for all candidates in a reasonable amount of time.

As we have seen, all these situations demand very fast acquisition of information, a 

huge amount of data processing, and surprisingly rapid actions and reactions. But these 

situations are also bound by practically zero tolerance for errors (e.g. medical errors are not 

tolerated and military missions without casualties are demanded). This naturally leads to 

computerization and robotization (and by this term I wish to emphasize that some systems 

automation is inevitable) to compensate for human limits and to meet socio-political 

demands, or even the constraints of the academic calendar. 
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All of these situations raise practically the same issues, due essentially to giving up 

human prerogatives to a machine in the name of safety and efficiency. This ultimately means 

implementing a formal system, i.e. establishing up a step-by-step, finite procedure controlled 

by rigid rules set in advance. Let us also note that quite similar issues are raised when the 

prerogatives of states are delegated, for the same reasons as those we have mentioned, to 

human groups that behave like quasi-autonomous systems free of true political regulation, 

that are driven solely by the profit motive, as is the case (1) of certain financial companies, 

or (2) of private security companies, described in the so-called “Montreux Document” of 

2008. Very characteristically, these two situations constitute present-day phenomena that 

threaten our political and economic systems. In her book entitled Libertés et sûreté dans 

un monde dangereux (“Freedom and security in a dangerous world”), Ms. Delmas-Marty, 

a renowned legal expert, professor at the Collège de France, and member of the Académie 

des Sciences Morales et Politiques, perceptively analyzes the erosion of the power of states 

who, to deal with consequences of globalization, subcontract law enforcement and security 

to private groups.1

 Professor Philippe de Woot, renowned economist and member of the 

Académie royale de Belgique (Technologies & Societies class) has brought out the hazards 

of economic or financial practices that are totally free of political control, stemming from 

shareholders groups whose behavior can be described as a profit mechanism that lies pretty 

much outside of society, politics, or the law. 

Now that I have widened the scope of the autonomous robot problem by examining the 

basis of similar issues that have become universal in a society as complex as ours, I suggest 

some areas for thought specifically dedicated to military robotics. 

In a democratic regime, any time a human group starts to gain significant independence 

from society at large, or any time a sophisticated technological system becomes more 

independent of man himself, it must be regulated by a precise legal and ethical system in 

order to avoid breaking the bonds that are vital to the cohesion of society. In the context of 

our conference, the exact problem is to know what controls can be exercised in the case of 

armed robots with effective decision-making autonomy.

I would now like to analyze the position on this subject taken by Ronald Arkin, which 

consists in seeking to implement ethical constraints in the very computer architecture of 

the robot.2

 At first, this sounds like a very good idea and, in the situations that I have 

mentioned above like decision-making support and emergency medicine, this type of 

ethical software has, in fact, already been proposed. Building in an “ethics fuse” that 

blows if the protocol automatically proposed by the software would break moral rules 

is obviously better than nothing. However, the problem that comes up here is to know 

whether we can ultimately formalize the process of ethical judgment, i.e. completely and 

adequately translate it into a sufficiently sophisticated formal language. The crux of the 

matter is the central philosophical question raised by artificial intelligence: is it possible to 

completely or sufficiently imitate human thought using powerful digital computers? (The 

question could in fact be extended to other types of computers such as quantum machines 

or hybrid biological-digital systems.) 

To develop a robot based on ethics software, one starts typically by boiling down ethics 

to law, then adopting a purely procedural representation of the law, and finally seeking to 
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implement the procedure in the form of an algorithm. But this is relevant only if the moral 

dimension can be reduced to a legal dimension. And yet we know this is not the case. It 

is rather the other way round: there are a series of moral principles which often prevail 

over the legal institution and in fact underpin its architecture. Consequently, the proposed 

“ethical” robot is ultimately thinkable only if ethics can be completely formalized and 

computerized. 

However, we cannot take this track, for we do not think it possible to completely 

formalize ethics. In logician’s terms, we could state this by saying that the ethical decisionmaking process is not completely algorithmic. Or we could argue that the intuition which 

governs our judgement is much too rich to be expressed by a step-by-step procedure in 

finite time. In other words, ethical decision-making is incalculable. Historically, the famous 

mathematician, jurist, and philosopher Leibniz dreamed of such a procedure written in 

a universal language, the characteristica universalis. But we do not think this line of 

reasoning goes in the right direction. Why? 

One part of the answer is the following. In medical ethics, in military ethics, or more 

generally in decisional ethics, the limits of formalization are in part linked to “conflicting 

goods.” Two goods of the same importance, or two laws codifying these goods, may pertain 

to the same situation. Choosing one conduct means denying the other and ipso facto taking 

an unethical position in contradiction with the other “good,” thereby blocking the decisionmaking process. This is a well-known situation with no easy way out, even if one tries to 

choose “the lesser of two evils.” Choosing one good over another calls for deliberation, 

which must take factors into account which go beyond strictly formal information. Canadian 

philosopher Michel Métayer sums it up well in his work La philosophie éthique. Enjeux et 

débats actuels (Ethical philosophy. Current challenges and debates):

In cases where there is a conflict of values, the essential problem lies 

in weighing up the opposing values, in judging which value is more 

important. [However it should be noted that] each concrete situation is 

always particular and complex. Moral judgement must consider the 

particularities of the context where it applies.3

And yet it is this very complexity and the infinite subtlety of the details of the context 

which mean that a computer program (even if it uses legal criteria or advanced logic) 

cannot replace a human decision-maker, whether judge, or doctor, or military officer. 

This contextual complexity stands out the most in current military operations, where the 

boundary between combatants and non-combatants is blurred and where urban combat 

constantly mixes civilians and military personnel, preventing real discrimination among 

subjects of law. Hence Marc Garlasco of Human Rights Watch is right in saying, “You can’t 

just download international law into a computer. The situations are complicated; it goes 

beyond black-and-white decisions.”4

If ethical decision-making is not completely translatable into purely algorithmic or 

formal terms, then an irreducible place must be kept for the human decider; he or she cannot 

be left out of the loop. The officer’s role thus remains irreducible, for it is he or she who 

must in good conscience end indecision and accept or refuse the use of the weapons borne 

by the robot. And it is also the role of one’s conscience that cannot be entirely formalized. 
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Even if we took a purely naturalistic or reductionist standpoint that the conscience could be 

explained by the activation of neurons, our problem would not be solved, because even this 

purely naturalized consciousness could not necessarily be imitated by a digital machine, or 

its workings by an algorithm! 

One must then consider both an ethics for or in the robot, and at the same time, the 

fundamental ethics of the officer who remains the decision-maker on use of this technology. 

One might then imagine building formal limits based on law into the robot’s software (as 

Ronald Arkin proposes), such as jus ad bellum (criteria to be consulted before engaging 

in war), and jus in bello (acceptable wartime conduct). But since ethics and law are not 

the same thing, it is important to set aside a place for mediation, for the officer’s ethics 

go widely beyond the principles implemented in the software. These ethics are ultimately 

based on respect of human dignity (friend or foe) as General de Lapresle reminded us a 

few years ago during a colloquium chaired by General Cuche, and translated into codes and 

deontology that must absolutely not be confused with law.5

This rediscovery of the irreducible place of the human decider is echoed by the judge 

who cannot be simply the mechanical executor of a procedure but who must remain a real 

judge, judging according to justice. The same goes for the professor, who must retain the 

privilege, the academic freedom, to take a decision in good conscience when he sits on a 

jury, based on his assessment of the student’s situation and of the fundamental values that 

underlie her or his ethics.

Our position might spark one major objection. Might not keeping the officer’s ethical 

and decisional role in the procedure for engaging an armed robot result in less efficiency 

and longer reaction time, which could be fatal? Let us note that this role is not necessarily 

required in all operational situations. The officer may decide (but reserves the right to go 

back on this decision) to opt for an automatic reaction mode, for example, in the case of a 

robotized anti-missile defense system (detecting incoming hostile vectors and destroying 

them). But we must remain aware that an ultra-fast, virtually instant response is not always 

(and is even rarely) the best decision in a complex ethical situation. It is often better to 

have decision-making time and acquire additional information that can sometimes clarify 

the situation. In military ethics or international diplomacy, a lightning-quick reaction is not 

always a sound one. 

Our position comes down to this: when armed robots may be engaged in combat 

operations, an officer must be standing by as a responsible decision maker. This of course 

implies intensified ethical training of future officers specialized in this robotic environment. 

But more is needed. Upstream of the engagement, it is important that the officers know 

exactly what the ethical software in the armed robots contains, so that they understand the 

scope but also (and especially) the limitations of these instructions, for overconfidence 

in the computer’s capacities could have disastrous consequences. My refusal of making 

armed robots radically autonomous is not solely based on the epistemological argument 

that ethics cannot be fully converted into an algorithm.6

 It is also based on the fact that an 

autonomous weapon dehumanizes conflict. However, the current engagement of troops 

in peace-keeping and anti-terrorist missions can succeed only if the troops contribute to 

building trust with the local population, and contribute to humanizing situations which in 
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fact are marked by distrust and dehumanization. In my view, a fully autonomous armed 

robot goes against this pacification doctrine. Any decision-maker who hands over powers 

to a completely autonomous robot whose powers surpass him or her, should remember 

the words of the philosopher Dominique Janicaud, former professor at the University of 

Nice, who argued that “The utopia of surpassing the human being is full of inhumanity” 

and that we cannot do without “preventive humanism.”7

 My refusal of making armed 

robots radically autonomous also stems from the risk of individuals divesting themselves 

of responsibility. Some people may be tempted to engage autonomous armed robots and 

then act as if they had no more responsibility for them. It is easier to voluntarily forget your 

responsibilities if you are distanced from them by the robot’s autonomy. 

In conclusion, my position is, to be clear, based on an anthropological perspective 

which, notwithstanding manifestly algorithmic aspects of the thought process and 

its decisional mechanisms, does not see how all the richness of human thought can be 

described by a digital machine, or how calculations could be used to exhaust and dominate 

the infinite subtlety of the contexts in which ethical decisions are taken. My position is 

also based on the conviction that the officer’s ethical role, with his or her moral force, 

his or her judgment and his or her own values, is essential for democratically conducting 

peace-keeping, security operations, and law enforcement.8

 If this role was totally delegated 

to autonomous structures, whether machines, robots, or private military and security 

companies, something would be lost from democracy and our essential humanity would be 

eroded. Keeping a place for the military decision-maker in an armed robotic system would, 

in my view, help foil this tendency to dehumanize security, the economy, law and more 

generally globalized society, as I suggested at the start of my talk. Dehumanization would 

prove dangerous for the balance and coexistence of societies at the planetary level.
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Notes

1. Mireille Delmas-Marty, Libertés et sûreté dans un monde dangereux, (Paris, 2010). 

2. Ronald C. Arkin, Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots, (New York, 2009).

3. Michel Métayer, La philosophie ethique. Enjeux et debats actuel. (Quebec, 1997), 8. 

(translated from the French by the Editor). 

4. Cited by P.W. Singer, Wired for War. The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st 

Century, (New York, 2009), 389.
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Chapter12

The Ethical Challenges of Unmanned Systems

by George R. Lucas, Jr.

In this brief essay, I wish only to make a few clarifying remarks, because I believe 

there is a great deal of confusion and even misinformation in the public domain about what 

systems we are talking about, about what we are trying to use them for, and especially 

about the resulting ethical, legal, and social issues that are properly raised regarding each 

of the several different kinds of unmanned systems we are considering. 

For their part, many scientists, engineers, and military personnel working to develop 

unmanned systems for military uses also find the ethical, legal, and social issues interesting, 

but are suspicious of people like me, because they have largely experienced that the people 

working in fields like law and ethics tend all too often to be ignorant obstructionists, who 

simply find fault with what they do or with what they are attempting to build without 

even the least bit of genuine understanding of them, their organizations, their activities, 

let alone about the systems they design, build, and operate. I myself happen to come 

from a family of engineers and military officers, and for several years I worked as an 

intermediate-energy particle physicist at the NASA Space Radiation Effects Laboratory in 

Newport News, Virginia, before (as I like to say) I decided to chase the really profitable 

salaries in philosophy. My own experience, coming from that background, is that scientists, 

engineers, warfighters, and defense industrialists regard ethicists as scientifically illiterate, 

nay-saying, fear-mongering Luddites who just get in the way of others who are simply 

trying to defend the nation and sustain the rule of law in international relations. 

So, in response to these legitimate concerns, I would like to begin by laying out a very 

clear and simple moral principle, one which I believe when anyone hears it and understands 

it, will find no reason not to give their unqualified intuitive consent. This is something that 

a young colleague of mine has labeled “the Principle of Unnecessary Risk.”1

Here, in a brief summary, is what this principle holds: We, the public (including 

scientists, policy makers, defense contractors, and philosophy professors...whomever) 

have a moral duty to provide the members of our security forces with every protection, and 

every avoidance of unnecessary risk of harm we can offer them in carrying out their duly 

assigned and authorized activities in defense of civil society and the state.

It is possible that some readers may have trouble understanding this principle, and 

wonder, in any case, what this principle has to do with unmanned systems. The answer 

is, “everything.” This is the fundamental principle that explains, and justifies, our desire 

to develop, build and deploy these systems, as well as undertake a number of other efforts 

to help make our duly authorized and legitimate security personnel— – be they domestic 

police, federal law officials, military personnel, intelligence and clandestine personnel, 

border and immigration forces, and Coast Guard— – safer and more effective in carrying 

out their duty of defending our nation, our society, and cooperating with the military 

forces of other law-abiding nations in upholding the rule of law. Let me illustrate how this 

principle applies first to unmanned, remotely piloted or controlled systems, and then turn to 

the ethical questions raised by increasing the degrees of autonomy in such systems.
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Most of the public’s ethical anxiety and hand-wringing has been with respect to “drones,” 

and to what they see as “killing by remote control.” We sometimes hear some incredible 

things put forward as reasonable views: for example, that these unmanned systems are 

“evil” and “unfair,” because they do not give the enemy or adversary a chance to fight 

back against them. Others complain that these systems are like the “Death Star” from 

the Hollywood movie “Star Wars,” raining down death and destruction indiscriminately 

from the sky on innocent by-standers. Finally, more sophisticated critics worry about using 

unmanned, remotely-piloted systems to carry out assassinations and targeted killings of 

a democratic nation’s enemies and adversaries without “due process,” and often also that 

such killings are carried out by non-military personnel, frequently within the sovereign 

borders of nations with whom our own nation is not formally at war. That last item raises 

some legitimate and important concerns. Otherwise, most of these objections are utter 

nonsense, and not supported by the evidence.

Unmanned systems have been unfortunately involved in causing the death of 

noncombatants. So have manned systems, and combat ground personnel. In all the instances 

that are not due to criminal negligence or recklessness, these deaths of noncombatants 

are always regarded as tragic and regrettable mistakes, or unavoidable (but necessary and 

proportionate) collateral damage when hitting high-value targets. But from all the data we 

have, the number of such incidents, the numbers of innocent lives lost, and the degree of socalled collateral damage inflicted by remotely piloted systems has been far less than what 

normally arises from manned systems and ground troops that would otherwise be employed 

in such missions. RPVs (“remotely-piloted vehicles” or “drones”) are remarkably accurate, 

discriminate, and proportionate in their deployment of force, far more so, on average, than 

the manned systems or combat operations they have come to replace. There are all kinds 

of reasons for this, including their ability to “loiter” around targets, and wait for the ideal 

moment to strike, while taking time and care to be as certain as possible of the identity of 

the targets.

This is in large part a result of taking the human pilot out of the cockpit, and placing 

him or her at a remote distance from the weapons delivery platform (for that is what a 

Predator or Reaper, just like an F-22, actually is: by itself, it is merely a machine, a lethalweapons delivery system). And here is where we encounter the “principle of unnecessary 

risk:” if that pilot or operator is engaged in an authorized, legal, and otherwise morally 

legitimate mission against our nation’s adversaries and enemies, then the mission does not 

suddenly become “illegal” or “immoral” just because the human is no longer inside of, or 

physically carried by, the weapons system. The only morally significant thing that changes, 

is that the degree of risk of harm to the operator is reduced nearly to zero. And, all things 

being equal, we, the public, whom they are defending, have a moral duty to provide that 

reduction of risk to our war-fighters and combat personnel, as well as to our intelligence and 

domestic security personnel. We especially owe it to them, if by reducing the risk of harm 

coming to them, we make them and their weapons systems in turn more effective, accurate, 

discriminate, and proportionate in their deployment of deadly force against enemy targets.

None of this would be true if the missions themselves were unauthorized, illegal, or 

immoral. If a nation’s security forces (its military and police, for example) were engaged in 
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persecuting its own citizens by killing, torturing them, or robbing them, or forcing them to 

work as slaves, then such actions would be immoral as well as a violation of international 

law, whether or not the force used to accomplish these terrible ends was inflicted directly 

by manned systems and ground combat troops, or remotely by unmanned systems. But 

then, again, it is not the system used, but the moral appropriateness and legality of the 

activity or mission, which is always the proper focus.

That might lead us to conclude that remotely operated, unmanned systems themselves 

raise absolutely no new moral or legal questions at all, other than the morality and legality 

of the missions or objectives for which they are deployed. That is almost correct, and surely 

shows the depth of the confusion and “technophobia” that have infused the moral and legal 

debates about unmanned systems. The one point to be noticed is that the development and 

use of such systems considerably enhances any nation’s ability to carry out such missions. 

 In the spring of 2012, the U.S. and European public first learned the news about a Saudi 

“double agent,” who coordinated with the American CIA in heading off a planned terrorist 

bombing of a civilian airliner, and then provided intelligence that led to the targeted killing 

through a “drone strike” a few weeks later of Fahd al-Quso, Al-Qaeda’s leading operative 

in Yemen, who had masterminded this operation, and who is suspected of planning the 

attack on the USS Cole in 2000. The action, and any moral or legal doubt that some citizens 

have over such covert actions, are not new, nor are such acts of covert retaliation by the 

clandestine services generally. Intelligence and police agencies have always conducted 

this “cat & mouse” game with criminals and adversaries, in order to avoid or deter bad 

behavior. 

In the past, however, a nation would have had to spend months planning how to seed 

an agent, or insert a special forces strike team, into what would be an extremely dangerous, 

risky, and unstable environment in order to “get back at” someone like al-Quso, or else 

postpone or forego any retaliation at all (and the hoped-for deterrent effect that prompt 

retaliation might have on enemies of this sort). With “drones,” a nation’s capacity to reach 

out and kill someone in retaliation for their criminal activity is considerably enhanced, and 

thus the frequency and timeliness of the deterrent responses has increased (and so, I gather, 

have the accuracy and effectiveness of such missions, while simultaneously minimizing 

the risk either of unintended collateral damage or loss of lives). 

Here is the only new moral or legal wrinkle we need to consider: that with the ease 

of relatively risk-free performance, comes the tendency to engage more readily in actions 

at the edge of the law—vigilante actions—which require careful procedural oversight. 

Also in the spring of 2012, the U.S. National Security Adviser, John Brennan, discussed 

the killing of an American citizen and Al-Qaeda operative, Anwar al-Awlaki, in a drone 

strike in the fall of 2011. He was at pains to point out that there is a detailed procedural 

process and oversight for carrying out such drone strikes, although, because the missions 

are classified, he was not at liberty to satisfy all questions from the media about the details 

of this procedure. 

Of course we want careful procedural review and oversight of such missions and of 

the agents who carry them out, in lieu of the criminal trial such suspects would receive 
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if apprehended in our own countries. We do not want the President or Prime Minister, 

his or her advisors, or senior intelligence or military personnel deciding arbitrarily which 

rogue citizens to execute without benefit of trial or due process in foreign settings, solely 

on their own recognizance. And, of course, they do not. Yes, there is a finite risk that 

troubling future precedent might be set; or that inappropriate or unauthorized actions might 

be undertaken, with serious legal and moral consequences. But this has always been the 

case, and the availability of remotely-piloted systems to aid in hunting down and targeting 

the suspects simply enhances our capacity to engage more effectively in these missions, 

while greatly reducing the risk of suffering harm while doing so to our own operatives. 

The last point, in particular—that dramatic reduction in risk of harm to our human 

agents - whether special forces, covert operatives, or military combat personnel—is a good 

thing, not a bad thing. That is again the application of this “principle of unnecessary risk.” 

The two gentlemen about whom I have spoken above, together with Osama bin Laden 

himself, were extremely dangerous and destructive persons, who had clearly warranted 

capital punishment for their crimes. But, of course, this condemnation and death sentence 

is a judgment which we should always reach with due care, thorough deliberation, sound 

judgment, and appropriate oversight. For myself, I am not sorry to say that I rest assured 

at present that our world is a better place, even if only incrementally, because Anwar alAwlaki and Fahd al-Quso, and their friend Osama bin Laden, are no longer in it.

Autonomy and Lethality

Finally, let us consider whether introducing ever greater degrees of autonomy into such 

systems raises any new troubling ethical or legal questions. As a result of more careful 

consideration of remotely-controlled systems at present, we might now readily see that 

some new questions and challenges are raised in this context, but not as many as critics 

might think.

The most dramatic presentation of the moral and legal obstacles comes from the 

computer scientist and roboticist Noel Sharkey, who teaches robotics at the University of 

Sheffield in the U.K., and is a co-founder of ICRAC—the “International Committee for 

Robot Arms Control.” ICRAC wants international laws that would outlaw the development, 

manufacture, and use of autonomous systems armed with lethal force. Sharkey is also a 

fierce critic of America’s use of remotely-piloted drone strikes. I hope from what I have 

said up to this point, especially about due process, oversight, and troubling precedents, that 

one can surely see that his criticisms are not unreasonable. But I myself obviously think 

Sharkey and his colleagues are simply mistaken or confused regarding specific points of 

fact and procedure, as well as of morality and international law. 

When it comes to autonomous lethal systems, these vociferous critics appear to 

envision something like, once again, the famous robot characters, R2D2 and C3PO from 

the movie Star Wars—– but now fully weaponized and roaming the mountains of southern 

Afghanistan entirely on their own recognizance, yet unable to distinguish between an 

enemy insurgent, a local shepherd, or a child playing with a toy rifle. The critics are 

probably correct to object to some of the features of that wildly-imaginative scenario, but 

we are nowhere even close to being able to operationalize such systems, nor do I think that 

is where we really want, in any case, to try to go.
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Their opposition, however, places them squarely in the path of the apparent trajectory 

of engineering and weapons development in the U.S., in which the benefits of economies 

of scale (in a time of scarce personnel and financial resources), and of otherwise desirable 

force multiplication are being sought primarily by enhancing the degree of autonomy in 

our unmanned platforms. We should not lose sight of the fact, however, that enhanced 

autonomy is not the only way to achieve those goals. Improving the human-machine 

interface—replacing cluttered and clumsy, cobbled-together Predator control stations 

with a joystick or iPhone-like controller—would yield immediate dividends in economy, 

reliability, and force multiplication.2

 We need to keep open minds about the relative 

desirability of alternate engineering paths to the same policy objective, and not become 

captive of the intriguing, but also relentless and sometimes unreflective, single-minded 

drive toward full autonomy.

Another colleague, however, computer scientist and roboticist Ronald C. Arkin, 

advocates the path of enhanced autonomy for a surprising reason: he thinks that introducing 

ever-greater degrees of autonomy into lethally-armed unmanned systems will not only 

reduce risk to our war-fighters, but eliminate the possibility of errors, mistakes, and even 

intentional war crimes that human combatants sometimes make or commit, because robots 

do not get scared, get angry, or try to get even. They do what they are told. Providing we 

take due care to ensure their safety and reliability (a tall order for defense industries, in 

particular), then robots, which literally have “no skin in the game” and no interests and 

concerns of their own, will be more reliable and effective in conforming to the moral rules 

and international laws of armed conflict than their human counterparts.3

 And if so, that is 

a good thing, and we are not merely permitted, but obligated, to develop such systems just 

as soon as we safely and reliably can.

That, at least, is Professor Arkin’s argument. Readers may have seen his work in the 

Proceedings of the IEEE. For my part, I’ve expressed caution primarily about marrying 

“strong AI” with full lethality. I do not want robots, at least at present, capable of altering 

their mission or making lethal targeting decisions entirely on their own, without some 

supervision. For example, I would be uncomfortable having my lethally-armed iRobot 

“Roomba” (a simple vacuum-cleaning robot) deciding to shoot an intruder late at night that 

it judged to be breaking a window to get into my house, when in fact it was me, quite drunk, 

and having forgot my house keys. Again, we are far from that point, but I do not think a 

great deal is to be gained by trying to get there.

Instead, especially as with our marine underwater unmanned systems at present, I’m 

comfortable with some degree of force being coupled with evasive tactics under carefully 

scripted conditions. Sentry robots in a demilitarized zone, or on a heavily-guarded security 

border over which transition is absolutely prohibited, might be permissible. The same 

would be true for a swarm of lethally-armed “Fire Scouts” (small robotic helicopters) 

guarding the “no-go security zone” around a naval fleet or carrier group. Those are what 

I mean by “highly scripted” environments, in which mission and targeting objectives are 

carefully circumscribed within fully programmable boundary conditions. 

The marine underwater environment, in particular, is an ideal environment for scripted 

lethal autonomous missions. We do not normally get a lot of commercial or civilian traffic 
140

down there, for one thing, apart maybe from James Cameron diving into the Mariana 

trench, or Jacques Cousteau’s research group. And of course, the whales! Provided we took 

due care, again, to avoid such circumstances, the most likely encounters below the surface 

are with criminals (drug runners or terrorists operating partially submersible vehicles and 

engaged in what our British allies would call “mischief”), as well as with enemies, and 

adversaries. So the opportunity for unintended collateral damage is reduced nearly to zero 

by the initial conditions. My own engineering colleagues at the Naval Postgraduate School 

are working on such systems, which include enough executive oversight by humans in the 

loop to ensure that their performance, including targeting and destruction, when called 

for, would be morally reliable and wholly in conformance with applicable international 

law. Again, and finally, I find this to be both a legal and morally acceptable application of 

engineering expertise in the field of unmanned systems.
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Notes

1. Bradley J. Strawser, “Moral Predators,” in G.R. Lucas, ed, New Warriors/New Weapons: 

Ethics and Emerging Military Technologies, Journal of Military Ethics 9, No. 4 (December 2010).

2. Professor Mary “Missy” Cummings, USN (retired), a systems engineer in the HAL Laboratory 

at MIT and project supervisor at ONR, has championed this alternative.

3. G.R. Lucas, Jr, “Engineering, Ethics, and Industry: the Moral Challenges of Lethally-Armed 

Autonomous Systems,” in Killing by Remote Control, edited by Bradley J. Strawser (Oxford, 2012), 

chapter 11.

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Chapter 13

Ethics and Techniques of the Invisible: 

Ethical Aspects of the Use of Undetectable Robots in the Private Sphere and 

Their Extension to Military Robots

by Dominique Vermersch

“Le propre de la volonté, c’est précisément d’être un pouvoir totalement inobjectivable” (“The peculiar end of the will is to be a wholly inobjectifiable power”)

—Jean Ladrière1

Introduction

As a researcher and teacher at a national school of agronomy, I feel somewhat of a 

stranger to and probably unworthy of speaking in this noble hall. Somewhat of a stranger 

then but not a moral stranger or a moral alien as defined, for example, by T. Engelhardt; 

because we all have, I believe, the conviction of sharing, to however small a degree, 

the same conception of the good.2

 This is precisely what is demonstrated by the task of 

dialogue, cooperation, and objectivation that has brought us together today.

The topic suggested to me is as follows. Amongst other attributes or properties that 

one would wish to bestow on robots, invisibility and even “undetectability” are probably 

amongst the most prized. This is true both in the military sphere and in the civil and 

private sphere with, especially, the possibility of putting individuals and societies under 

increasing levels of insidious surveillance. In both cases, these attributes are deployed in 

our relationships with others: be it with the aim of protecting them, watching over them, 

incapacitating them or killing them. In this way, they depend, in part, on strictly human 

characteristics and performances, limited by nature, and that it would therefore be proper 

to exceed to achieve the results that we have just mentioned.

We are proposing here to contribute to laying down the boundaries for the ethical 

impact associated with achieving such properties and putting them to effective use. In this 

connection, let us note that robotics is not alone in trying to achieve these properties. The 

invisible and the undetectable logically take us to the need for scale; at the observation and 

action level, that falls precisely within the objectives of nanotechnology. The affiliation 

between robotics and nanotechnology should also help us to clarify the ethical questioning 

that is the purpose of this presentation.

This will only be an outline today, intended to be descriptive rather than prescriptive, 

covering only the issues of the invisible and the undetectable.

Between Robotics and Nanotechnologies, Common Characteristics

To improve our understanding both of the ins and outs of robot development and the 

ethical impact inherent to their use, it would seem expedient to discuss, as a background 

issue, the advent of nanotechnologies. Let us first of all identify several characteristics 

common to robotics and nanotechnologies that are capable of providing them with the 

desired attributes of invisibility and undetectability.
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A Relevant Scale

By the henceforth possible exploration and manipulation of matter at the atomic scale, 

the nanotechnologies are aiming no more and no less at “building the world atom by atom” 

or rather at rebuilding it, including the human race. The exciting aspect of the adventure 

combines in fact straight away with the imaginary and fantasy, as no area of activity is meant 

to escape these supposedly generic technologies: sciences and technologies including the 

human and social sciences, health, agriculture, food, industry, army. Thus, and as with 

robotics, there is no assigned territory; the prospect is one of “functionalizing” matter or of 

programming artefacts or synthetic organisms.4 The nanometric scale is also probably the 

most relevant if we are seeking to build invisible, undetectable robots. This is confirmed by 

the five successive waves announced for the nanotechnologies: 

1. Pursuit of miniaturization of electronics down to molecular 

components.

2. Invention of materials with “thrilling” properties.

3. Invention of responsive products capable of changing state in 

accordance with their use and environment: programmable matter.

4. Assemblages of nanosystems or nanorobots (mechanical, hydraulic, 

optical, etc.).

5. Nanosystems with the ability to self-build and replicate.5

Improving Human Performance

Nanotechnologies should contribute to the process of convergence then fusion with 

biotechnologies, information technologies, and the cognitive sciences (NBIC), in preparation 

of a “unified cause-and-effect understanding of the physical world from the nanoscale to 

the planetary scale.”6

 This forecast convergence will set itself an objective which accords 

with that assigned to robots: namely, the augmentation of human performance. The goal 

is therefore one of effectiveness which, like any such goal, is never axiologically (i.e. 

morally) neutral.

Science, Fiction, Science Fiction?

A double language often prevails in the presentation of the advances in robotics 

and nanotechnologies. By closely mixing science and fiction in the presentation of their 

advances, robotics and the nanosciences maintain a sort of common rapport with the 

public, ultimately promoting disquiet about the former. At the same time though, there is an 

insistence on the argument of continuity: the advent of robots and of the nanotechnologies 

forms part of a technological, biosynthetic or even biological continuum.

This arises upstream from a blurring of the frontiers between sciences and technologies, 

between nature and artefact, between inert and living, between man and robot, between 

subject and object, between matter and spirit. This lack of differentiation looks for support 

to the digitization of the world and the bringing together of bits, atoms, neurons and genes. 

In fine, a lack of differentiation that is precisely the breeding ground of the invisible and 

the undetectable.
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Between Robotics and Nanotechnologies, Convergences...

Robo- or Nano-Surveillance?

Surveillance is one of the first functions assigned to robots when they enter the scene 

in military conflicts; and it is perhaps in this area that the convergence between robotics 

and nanotechnologies could be the most conclusive.7

 In fact, when we say surveillance, 

we mean the capture, cross-referencing, processing and storage of information based on 

nomadic, invisible, or even undetectable devices. It is also in the civil and private sphere that 

nanoelectronics leads to spectacular, not to say terrifying effectiveness; and this could have 

military effects that render the first generations of robots obsolete. Already in widespread 

use in large supermarkets, in biometric passports, which have been compulsory for farm 

animals since January 2008 for health reasons, “RFID” chips can also be implanted in 

the human body.8

 This “electronic tattoo,” to adopt Dorothée Benoit Browaeys’ phrase, 

was authorized by the American government in 2004 for medical and security monitoring 

in particular.9

 Like livestock, the complete traceability of humankind would therefore 

be possible. As exchanges between people increasingly rely on electronic media, these 

exchanges always and in all places leave traces that can be sequenced, recorded, crossreferenced, and profiled using “ubiquitous computing.” The latter terms was coined by Mark 

Weiser, the director of the Xerox Research Centre at Palo Alto, to refer to the thousands 

upon thousands of networked, integrated, and distributed processing devices. We could 

now talk of a true economic war to take over databases and the corresponding network 

architectures. An assumption of control to which the Google company is no stranger.

By extending the trends, one can imagine the potential military impact of this vast 

enterprise of digitization and storage of every human act and gesture. We shall offer only 

three outlines. Whoever holds information or all of the information prior to any hostile 

act obviously has a decisive advantage, and this probably unbeknownst to the opposing 

party. Will we not also be capable of producing “killer” signals received by RFID chips 

implanted in the human body? Let us note that, on various websites, this type of phantasmal 

threat was suggested at the time of the H1N1 flu epidemic: namely that the vaccine used 

also deliberately contained dormant but potentially fatal viruses. And finally rather than 

build robots that are a pale reflection of humans, is it not more valuable to adapt humans to 

robots, by inserting transponder implants that incite them to do as Big Brother says?

Beyond Anthropomorphism

Anthropomorphic projection would therefore become a “robomorphic” reduction. This 

can be observed, by analogy, in the argument of the animal rights cause in favor of an 

ontological non-difference between man and animal, where the anthropomorphic projection 

is coupled with a zoomorphic reduction: “voir un animal quand nous nous regardons et voir 

un humain quand nous regardons l’animal” (seeing an animal when we look at ourselves 

and seeing a human when we look at the animal).10

Whether discussing robotics or nanotechnologies, more than ever it is the living that 

is imitated, in its structures and in its organization: it is a question of designing “bioinspired” materials, objects and automata whose evolution we could now control and 
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even re-direct. All this will make the powerful anthropomorphism that still characterizes 

robotics obsolete. We will be entering the era of synthetic biology: rather than copying and 

improving man and his faculties, it would be more interesting to modify and replicate other 

organisms (bacteria, viruses) that are “much more” invisible and/or undetectable, including 

for military ends. In summary, assuming that the promises offered by the nanotechnologies 

might sooner or later enter the realms of possibility, will the current development of 

robotics, especially military, not be encumbered by a congenital anthropomorphism that is 

of little use? Is man the correct model to reproduce?

For a Broadening of the Ethical Question

The ethical questioning pertaining to the techno-sciences is broadly impregnated with 

utilitarianism and too often reduced to comparative analysis of the risks/benefits of the 

innovations that they provide. On the risk side, the focus is placed on the allocation of the 

liabilities incurred. It is necessary therefore to broaden this ethical questioning, especially 

as innovations are informed by anthropological conceptions and feed back into the latter.

The Incompleteness of Embedded Ethics

For some writers, such as Ron Arkin the military use of robots would offer a certain 

number of ethical benefits, but these in fact only occur in the technical area.11 By way of 

illustration, the software loaded into the robot could actually include an ethical module 

that has a complete set of the conventions, rights and duties relevant to a just war. Also, 

the robot has neither emotion nor feelings (anxiety, fear, etc.). All temporary states that can 

cause interference with the moral conduct of the human soldier. The robot could therefore 

be used as a prosthesis, even in existential and moral behaviour.

However, this last argument is reversible, in the sense that according to the time step 

allocated, emotions and feelings can contribute to marking out or even optimizing the 

moral conduct to follow. Also, like in a game of chess, it is impossible to define an optimum 

strategy for the “war game.” In other words, ethics cannot dissolve into legal formalism 

or, in consequence, into technical functionality. Military casuistry cannot be captured and 

established using a logical tree-structure or a computer program, especially when there 

is a need for proportionality or even moral probabilism. It seems to me, moreover, that 

this counter-argument is also raised in Professor Lucas’ contribution. This does not mean, 

however that there is no appeal against the sentence: while it may not be able to be a 

substitute, the technology of robotics may facilitate proper moral conduct.

Autonomization of Technology Versus Moral Autonomy

“Technology has become a biological process which, as such, is removed from 

man’s control”

—Werner Heisenberg12

The advent of robots is an emblematic illustration of the autonomization of technology 

that seems to challenge head-on the modern demand of the subject for moral autonomy: 

which of these two autonomies will have the final word? Today, is man’s ability to self-limit 

his technological power not called upon to become the best testimony to the affirmation 

and durability of his moral autonomy?
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Nature— an Obsolete Moral Bastion?

All physics, as a representation of nature, is hiding metaphysics in its baggage.13 Every 

science and its technical applications carry and suggest an ethics of substitution. This 

is what we observe, for example, in the animal kingdom where the scientific theory of 

evolution lends itself to a philosophy, indeed, to an ethos of adaptive selection.

As a scientific and technical innovation, the question now is to know what metaphysics 

the possibility of invisible, undetectable robots conveys. And it is in this self-same 

perspective that Jean-Michel Besnier notes that the imaginings produced by scientific and 

technical innovations today feed substitute ideologies for traditional humanism: a posthumanism or even a trans-humanism convinced of the obsolescence of the boundary 

between man, animal and machine, on which humanism rested.14 In other words, in such a 

world, the very word “ethics” and its humanizing intent, simply no longer make any sense.

Human Irreducibility and Excessive Violence

These various suggestions for broadening the ethical question call into question, in 

one way or another, human irreducibility. The working hypothesis that we should like 

to propose is that this calling into question generates excessive violence in response. Is 

this not what we are seeing in the extreme difficulty of introducing a public debate on 

nanotechnologies?

Ethical Antics

It is important therefore for ethical questioning not to allow itself to be wholly 

subordinated to the technical register. If there must be ethics, they cannot just be subordinate 

to the technology, as a sort of appendix to the instruction manual. Such an inverted tropism 

of the relationship between technology and ethics is in fact as old as the world and has been 

recorded in the major works of wisdom and even in cosmogonic stories.

What, for example, does the Bible tell us in Genesis? That in contemplating Creation, 

it is given to us to contemplate the Creator and his loving design on the world. Thus, and 

without sharing the believer’s religious convictions, the first act of contemplating nature 

allows us to deduce and reason a prior ethical meaning, capable of suggesting a form of 

action for the transformation of the world. In fine, ethics precedes technology. As Fabrice 

Hadjadj has so shrewdly remarked, as Genesis evokes the creation of the Garden, it invites 

us to a contemplation preceding action: “And out of the ground made the LORD God to 

grow every tree that is pleasant to the sight, and good for food” (Gen 2, 9).15 The respectful 

entry to knowledge of nature, a given nature, is precisely the pleasing moment, the moment 

of beauty. And what is beautiful takes us back to what is good; what is good to do in, by and 

with nature. Beauty tells us something about what is good. That is to say, metaphysically 

speaking, that the transcendentals are communicating with each other.

Still, the first flowering of modernity will be marked by the eviction of this prior 

contemplation, which will contribute to a gradual confusing of knowledge with power, 

making them indivisible.16 This “production of power” will be put into effect with 

increasing returns to scale. In other words, an increase in knowledge will lead to a more 

than proportional increase in power. It is a case here of the power of the technology that 

will bring progress; a technological progress that feeds a conviction that is still deeply 
148

rooted: that this technological progress results in an advance in humanity. This conviction 

is such that nothing appears capable of limiting technological progress: “what can be done 

will be done.” Due to our technical power over nature new possibilities open up, man 

anxiously senses the need to self-limit this power, but without managing to do so freely. 

More generally, it is this autonomization of technology that challenges head-on the modern 

demand of the subject on moral autonomy: of these two autonomies, which will have the 

last word?

Technology is also the object of an act of faith: it has replaced the traditional religions. 

What we asked of God in the past—health, healing, happiness—today we ask of technology. 

Our search for perfection no longer focuses on ourselves but on the results of technology. 

If there must be ethics, perhaps it is only subordinated to technology. This inversion 

resembles a sort of moral aping, where evil takes on all of the appearances of the good. 

And it is precisely this very inversion that Fabrice Hadjadj recalls at the moment when Eve 

prepares to eat the forbidden fruit: “And when the woman saw, that the tree was good for 

food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise” (Gen 

3, 6). Good for food and pleasant to the eyes: it is as if man’s original fall is inaugurated 

by this inversion of action and contemplation, an inversion which shapes desire and gives 

access to discernment, in other words precisely to ethics. The latter would be a derivative, 

a by-product of the technology and therefore of the multitude of human desires; such is the 

case with moral pragmatism which can be resumed in the following phrase: “it works, so 

it’s fine.” One might believe, therefore, that contemporary ethics would ultimately be an 

even more formidable device than technology itself.

Ethics as a Peculiarity of Human Action

As human action, ethics supposes and consolidates an authentic freedom; it presupposes 

therefore a certain imprecision of nature and of the world.17 In this sense too, human 

action cannot be reduced to a pure and simple determinism, to a simple causal relationship 

governed by necessity alone. By causal relationship we understand here the linking of a 

“cause” phenomenon which precedes in time an “effect” phenomenon; we find many such 

in nature. In human action, there also exists a logical relationship, in other words a rational 

link between the motives, intentions, and objectives of the action, a link which allows the 

passage from an initial state of nature to another state of nature different to that produced 

merely by the causal relationships based on the initial state. Human action thus begins with 

the possibility of a bifurcation, in other words a state of nature leaves it wide open to new 

imprecisions. Now, what do the new technological opportunities produce, if not new and 

increasingly numerous bifurcations in the face of which the ethical choice, and therefore 

human freedom, are called upon to make a pronouncement?

Now it is precisely faced with a bifurcation, an imprecision, that the feeling of 

responsibility, the requirement to answer for something to someone emerges, with nature 

acting here as a mediator. The human being has this feeling because he is a being who 

is divided within between what he is and what he is called upon to be; he maintains an 

interface between the being of the present and the being to come. Human action is located 

precisely between these two components of being, with the aim of gradually, freely, and 

rationally overcoming the distance that separates them. Ethical questioning, the ethical 
149

orientations given to our acts, the standards that we accept contribute thus to qualify and 

to bring forth “the humanity of man;” to bring forth, differentiate and comply with all that 

there is “human in man.” Now the human is first of all existence, human existence which 

is characterized especially by this movement between “the being” and the “must be,” or 

rather by the need borne by “the being,” of the need that inhabits existence. Such is the 

auto-constitutive task of existence.

It is precisely by abstaining from the moral use of reason that philosophical modernity 

has reduced this “call to be” to a “must be,” in other words to a set of moral injunctions 

stripped of their teleological underpinning and which, according to Alasdair MacIntyre, 

sooner or later become inaudible and incomprehensible.18 To this end, the American 

philosopher recalls that Aristotle, followed in this by the monotheistic beliefs, had developed 

a system characterized by a fundamental distinction between man as he is and man as he 

could be if he realized his essential nature. Ethics was then the science that should have 

allowed the passage from what I am to what I could be; it assumed therefore a conception 

of man as a rational animal capable of grasping its end (happiness) and of achieving it. It 

is the thirst for happiness inscribed in human nature that invites reason to bring order to 

human desires by prescribing moral habits (virtues) and by proscribing vices. This moral 

use of reason is supported by nature, insofar as it is there that resides good in the form of 

ends whose deployment will require the free collaboration of man.

To rehabilitate the moral use of reason is therefore to find a synthetic encounter between 

freedom and nature, far from any creationist vision of the latter. This moral use therefore 

spurs on the scientific effort to update the evolutionary trends inherent in nature; and, 

to take up Ladrière’s phrase to “leur donner un sens en les réinscrivant en [nos] propres 

initiatives” (“to give them meaning by making them a part of our own initiatives”). The 

challenge today is more than critical!
150

Notes

1. Jean Ladrière L’éthique dans l’univers de la rationalité (Ethics in a World of Rationality).

(Artel-Fides, 1997), chapter 12.

2. “Le problème éthique, tel que le définit par exemple T. Engelhardt, est de parvenir à un 

accord entre ‘étrangers moraux’, i.e. entre personnes qui ne partagent pas une même conception du 

Bien (de ce qui est intrinsèquement bon, ou avantageux, ou utile, ou préférable)” (“The ethical issue, 

as defined by T.Engelhardt, for example, is to arrive at an agreement between moral aliens, i.e., 

between people who do not share the same conception of the Good—of what is intrinsically good or 

useful) in Paul Clavier, Qu’est-ce que le bien? (What is Good?) (Vrin, 2010), 15

3. Title of the brochure published by the National NanoInitiative launched in 2000 by President 

Clinton: Shaping the World Atom by Atom.

4. Dorothée Benoit Browaeys, Promesses et craintes des nanotechnologies (Promises and Fears 

of Nanotechnologies) Etudes Tome 412 No. 3, 2010, 319-330.

5. Dorothée Benoit Browaeys, Promesses et craintes des nanotechnologies.

6. Mihaïl Roco and William Bainbridge (Eds.), Converging Technologies for Improving Human 

Performance: Nanotechnology, Biotechnology, Information Technology, and Cognitive Sciences 

(Dordrecht, 2003) Executive summary, x. http://www.wtec.org/ConvergingTechnologies/Report/

NBIC_report.pdf, (accessed 18 October 2013). 

7. The information in this paragraph is taken from Dorothée Benoit Browaeys, Promesses et 

craintes des nanotechnologies.

8. RFID = Radio Frequency Identification labels.

9. Dorothée Benoit Browaeys, Promesses et craintes des nanotechnologies, 325.

10. Jean Marie Meyer and Patrice de Plunkett, Nous sommes des animaux mais on n’est pas des 

bêtes. (Paris, 2007).S

11. Ronald C. Arkin, “Ethical Robots in Warfare” IEEE Technology and Society Magazine vol. 

28, no. 1, 2009. 30-33. http://www.cc.gatech.edu/ai/robot-lab/online-publications/arkin-rev.pdf, 

(accessed 18 October 2013).

12. Werner Heisenberg, Role of Technology in Man’s Relationship with Nature, The Physicist’s 

Conceeption of Nature (1958). http://www.wisdomportal.com/Technology/Heisenberg-Nature.

html, (accessed 22 October 2013).

13. From the Greek term physis, which the Romans translated precisely as natura.

14. Jean-Michel Besnier, “Post-humanisme et Trans-humanisme” (Post-Humanism and TransHumanism) in COMEPRA, Activity report, November 2004-December 2006, (2007), 41-44.

15. Fabrice Hadjadj, La foi des démons ou l’athéisme dépassé (Paris, 2009), 118.

16. “Knowledge is power,” according to Francis Bacon’s phrase.

17. This last section relies largely on chapter 12 of Jean Ladrière, L’éthique dans l’univers de 

la rationalité (Namur, 1997).

18. Alasdair MacIntyre, Après la vertu, (Paris, 1997).
151

Chapter 14

Preparing Military Leader Education for the Age of Robotics

by Eugene K. Ressler & Barry L. Shoop

Introduction

The contribution of this paper is a framework for reasoning about the impact of military 

robots over the next several decades with the purpose of shaping the education of military 

leaders right now. What that shape should be is discussed only a little. Our main goal is 

developing a view of the entire problem. This is surprisingly difficult, not least because it 

requires predicting an uncertain future—a risky but necessary enterprise. 

The stakes are high. Going to war has been mankind’s costliest endeavor. The calculation 

of when and how to go to war has been the ultimate testing ground for theories of politics, 

diplomacy, grand strategy, military doctrine, and economics—the thought disciplines 

that nations apply to understand and govern relationships with each other, their societies, 

and even between mankind and the natural world. Robots have very strong potential to 

fundamentally alter this crucial calculation. Military leaders being educated today will 

deal with the results during their lifetimes, successfully or not. The traditional thought 

disciplines will be challenged. Leaders must be prepared to use them as far as possible 

and then discard them, reverting to first principles as necessary to make right decisions. If 

there is error in their preparation, it had better be on the side of caution. There is surely a 

risk of “crying wolf”—predicting a revolution that never occurs. So be it. The reverse—no 

preparation or uneven preparation among nations, while a tidal wave of robot-induced 

change mounts unseen—is much worse.

We will find strong evidence that fundamental changes in the nature and conduct of 

war are already resulting from the proliferation of robots in military forces, with much 

more to come. Education must respond. For professional educators, this pattern is no 

surprise. Toffler (Toffler 1970) and others warned four decades ago that that the role of 

education was shifting from one of imparting knowledge about the world to imparting the 

ability to gain knowledge and adapt to a rapidly changing world throughout a lifetime. This 

has come to pass, particularly in the area of technology. In the authors early life, vacuum 

tubes and 5-minute recordings on vinyl disks were state-of-the-art. Now they are quaint. 

Change has accelerated vastly since then. The irrelevance of vacuum tube knowledge in a 

microcircuit world must pale when comparing the technology of today with that of 2050.

What does this mean for educators? Nothing essentially new. The constraints of human 

learning remain the same. Order-of-magnitude change in complexity and priority will, 

however, rule our days. The work of educators has always been first to envision the future 

world and then, with vision in hand, provide experiences to students with a lofty goal in 

mind: enable their positive effectiveness in that envisioned future. This burden was lighter 

when change was moderate. Through most of history, careful observation of the current 

world and commonsense extrapolation by individuals and small groups were sufficient. 

We have a word for the result: wisdom. Imparting personal wisdom has been the purpose 

of educators from Plato until the middle of the twentieth century. This is no longer true. At 

least, it is no longer the whole story. Envisioning the future and planning for it has graduated 
152

to an organizational function at the highest level in most schools, required for many forms 

of accreditation. For providing the right experiences to students, the wisdom of individuals 

has been supplemented with formal analysis and design processes. Educators of military 

leaders are in exactly the same boat. They envision future warfare and their students’ roles: 

leading soldiers and units to prepare and fight. They create educational experiences to 

match these challenges.

 Robotics Revolution?

The Introduction was the foundation for a question to guide the rest of this work. Let 

us ask it:

Should educators of future military leaders be preparing current students for rapid 

future change due to robots? If so, how? 

The rest of the paper provides an answer. “Revolution” is the best term for significant, 

rapid change. Therefore, we begin with the simpler question: Will there be a military 

robotics revolution? Revolutions make news. Therefore the first step is to examine recent 

events for signs that big changes are afoot.

We need not look farther than current conflicts. Operational needs in Iraq and 

Afghanistan created requirements for large numbers of robots and unmanned vehicles. 

New technologies created in response mitigated some of the riskiest battlefield situations 

on the ground. Robots served as “point men,” moving into closed spaces possibly occupied 

by armed enemies. They remotely sensed explosive devices and performed the delicate 

tasks needed to neutralize them while their human operators stood safely out of harm’s 

way. Robot Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) entirely changed cost/benefit ratios for 

obtaining military intelligence. They proved cheaper than space-based platforms and much 

more flexible. By removing human operators entirely from the battlefield, they eliminated 

risk of pilot prisoners of war and the associated political and operational costs. Their ability 

to loiter, observing any chosen objective for long periods, with sensors more potent than 

human eyes, provided commanders a new level of awareness. Armed UAVs provided new 

stand-off precision strike capability, also with less operational and political risk than ever 

before.

Just as the first Gulf War saw US forces overwhelm Saddam Hussein’s Army, sparking 

a rethinking of military strategy in the mid 90s, today’s decision makers worldwide have 

watched unmanned system advances and realized that a major military capability is being 

born. Programs to build more and more sophisticated robots have proliferated. In 2000, the 

US military possessed less than 50 UAVs and 162 ground robots. By 2010 these numbers 

had grown to 7,000 and 3,600 respectively. Some 311 different US systems are in use or in 

development. UAVs have flown 500,000 hours and ground robots have completed 30,000 

missions, detecting or neutralizing 15,000 explosive devices. At least 60 countries either 

possess or are acquiring significant robotics technology. (Weiss 2011) A $8 billion (€5.7 

billion) annual US market is projected by 2016. (ABI Research 2011) The US Congress in 

its Defense Authorization Act of 2001, mandated goals that by 2010, one-third of all strike 

aircraft and by 2014, the same fraction of military ground vehicles should be unmanned. 

The Department of Defense subsequently published its Unmanned Systems Integrated 
153

Roadmap for Fiscal Years 2009 through 2034 (Clapper, et al. 2009). Every major US 

Defense research and development (R&D) organization has a major program to develop 

robotics of some form.

From this list of contemporary developments, we conclude that national, military, and 

business leaders are convinced military robots are worthy of attention and investment. 

These two factors are mutually reinforcing. Investment begs more attention from the science 

and engineering community. Developments accelerate. New developments motivate new 

requirements from Defense and concomitant new investment. This cycle is important. In 

fact, we will exploit the process that governs it for our purposes—gaining insights on 

leader education. 

Three Models That Fit

Though the cycle itself is a necessary condition for technological revolution, it alone 

is not sufficient. New technologies are adopted routinely by militaries worldwide. We 

must turn elsewhere for ideas on when a normal level of change crosses the threshold of 

revolution.

Three disciplines of thought and their associated communities offer relevant 

viewpoints. Most obvious is military science. This community is already concerned 

with the theory and practice of robot employment: logistics, tactics, operational art, and 

strategy to bring about maximum positive effect on battlefields. A second is scientific and 

technological development. The science and engineering communities organize mankind’s 

intellectual effort to understand nature and use this understanding to create and refine 

technologies. Robots are perhaps the ultimate expression of science and engineering art. 

Last is the viewpoint of the marketplace. Defense industries respond to supply and demand 

forces, albeit distorted by non-market influences of government. Increasingly, technology 

demands of average citizens lead markets to allocate enormous resources to technology 

development and manufacturing. These can far exceed what even a rich nation can devote 

to military technology development. The result has been steadily increasing “Off-TheShelf” acquisition of commercial technology either for direct use or adaptation to military 

purposes. Indeed, civilian commercial market forces could have an equal or greater effect 

on military robot development than those generated by governments. Industry—defense 

and commercial—will have much to say about the robotic future.

Revolution in Military Affairs

Each of the three disciplines has at least one strong model of revolution applicable to 

the case of robotics. In military science, a theory of Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) 

due to technology has been in development since the early 1990s. (Metz and Kievit 1995) It 

hypothesizes that advances in sensing, particularly from space platforms, communications, 

information processing, and stand-off precision strike (a reference primarily to cruise 

missiles) have provided fundamentally new mechanisms to see, understand, and affect 

adversaries and to command battlefield events. 

The RMA meshes with a theory of strategic and operational command known as the 

OODA Loop: Observe, Orient, Decide, Act, due to Colonel John Boyd (Osinga 2007). 

The OODA loop describes military victory and defeat in terms of decision cycles. The 
154

winning commander is the one who accurately observes unfolding events on the battlefield, 

orients herself so that evaluation and analysis of events are aligned with reality, rapidly 

decides and promulgates decision on the best course of action, and follows through with 

necessary direction and support for action. Moreover, she does all this faster and better than 

her adversary, while exploiting insight and intelligence on the adversary’s OODA loop to 

confuse and disrupt all four stages of his cycle.

When the technology available in 2000 is placed logically on the OODA loop, strong 

support for the Orient and Decide phases of the cycle is evident as shown in the figure. 

Additionally, space-based sensing enhances the Observe phase. These drove RMA in its 

beginnings.

The argument for a robotics revolution is that this early suite of technologies was 

incomplete. It failed to support the decisive Act phase of the OODA loop, and it offered more 

than it delivered in the Observe phase. Notorious misreadings of satellite reconnaissance 

have occurred (United Nations 2003) with some regularity.

Military robots already fill the gaps, extending support that RMA technologies provide 

to all OODA loop phases. How complete will the gap-filling be? Unmanned systems for 

logistics, rescue, fire support, “close in” reconnaissance of many forms, and other selected 

applications (Clapper, et al. 2009) will soon provide commanders with important new 

capabilities at little or no risk to soldiers. In this manner, the shift in cost/benefit already 

Figure 7. OODA Loop.

 Source: Created by Author.

Observe

Orient

Decide

Act

Remote Sensing

Ground Recon

Force Protection

Supply

EOD

Deception

Evacuation

Fire Support

Air Recon

Precision Strike Decision Support

Net-centricity

High Bandwidth Global 

Communications

Global Positioning

Expert Systems

Information 

Processing

Visualization

Observe

Orient

Decide

Act

Remote Sensing

Ground Recon

Force Protection

Supply

EOD

Deception

Evacuation

Fire Support

Air Recon

Precision Strike Decision Support

Net-centricity

High Bandwidth Global 

Communications

Global Positioning

Expert Systems

Information 

Processing

Visualization
155

seen with reconnaissance and stand-off strike by UAVs has potential to extend to every 

major battlefield activity. US national policy has already been enabled in the form of armed 

UAV interventions in Pakistan. Such a level of change easily qualifies as revolution under 

the RMA umbrella.

Scientific Paradigm Shift

Turn now to science and technology. Stephen Kuhn in his classic work (Kuhn 

1962) developed a comprehensive model to describe the historical progress of science. 

He distinguishes normal science from periods of revolutionary paradigm shift. Normal 

science is evolutionary. A collection of scientific theories and practices grows up within 

a community of devoted people—a paradigm. A successful paradigm provides a support 

system for generating more success: new scientific discoveries. It provides methods and a 

structure—a subculture—that inspires scientists to invest their life efforts because it eases 

access to established knowledge, productive collaboration, financial resources, and other 

advantages. 

Kuhn argues that paradigms gradually wear out. New findings conflict with standing 

theories, or the accepted methods of the paradigm are exhausted: refined to the limit of 

their ability to elicit new knowledge. In time, an entirely new paradigm must emerge to 

compete with the failing one and replace it. This is often the work of younger community 

members. The competition can be acrimonious. A revolutionary shift to the new paradigm 

follows.

Kuhn’s model is restricted to basic science: learning truths of nature by applying 

the scientific method. Military science, however, is not a basic science. Herbert Simon 

(Simon 1996) provides the necessary link in his concept of sciences of the artificial. He 

argues that the behaviors of complex systems need not be understood from the inside, 

out—from detailed to macroscopic views. Rather, he advocates gaining useful knowledge 

by empirical study of external behavior and designing models of the behaviors rather 

than the systems themselves. Simon’s goal is an approach to artificial intelligence, but his 

notion of applying the scientific method—experiment and measurement—to direct design 

of complex systems has been used as a methodological philosophy in other disciplines 

including political science, psychology, and system-of-systems engineering. Our present 

purpose is an invitation to extend this to military affairs.

Are military robots a Kuhn-style paradigm shift in military science? Many events 

and decisions discussed in the previous section are convincing indicators. A community 

of scientists and engineers—with substantial resources available—is quickly creating a 

methodology of military robot development with standard design considerations, tools, and 

techniques. Military policy and doctrine developers are also gelling as a community with 

a literature (Headquarters, Department of the Army 2010). Not least, there are examples of 

“old paradigm” resistance to the new. In 2008, Secretary of Defense William Gates publicly 

chastised his Air Force for moving slowly to increase UAV capability in active theaters of 

war (Weinberger 2008). Later forced resignations of the Air Force Secretary and Chief of 

Staff, linked partially to this issue, were historically unique (Air Force Times staff 2008).
156

Market Disruption

Clayton Christensen (C. M. Christensen 1997) performed a large empirical study of 

business failures to develop a model of disruptive technology—an excellent “science of 

the artificial” application. He depicts a free market as a collection of relatively independent 

value networks. A value network is a system of R&D, suppliers, producers, and customers 

all organized to provide a product. Christensen describes value networks for disk 

drives, excavators, land transportation, etc. Each value network is an ecosystem for its 

product. Prices, margins, production quantities, marketing efforts, R&D investments, and 

organizational structures are set with respect to other parts of the network.

A disruption occurs when R&D within the value network of a relatively cheap, low 

margin, low-performing product gradually makes it good enough to do the job of a more 

expensive, high margin product. The personal computer (PC) was initially dismissed by 

minicomputer manufacturers. Within ten years, PC technology had become good enough to 

replace the much more expensive minicomputers in nearly all applications. Minicomputer 

manufacturers either shut down or entered entirely different businesses. This pattern 

is characteristic of disruption. Customers for an expensive product switch quickly to a 

cheaper one that has, through normal R&D, grown to be “good enough.” The expensive 

product’s value network is unable to adapt to the new, low cost margins. It simply dies. 

Will robots be disruptive? Clayton Christensen himself cited UAVs as a disruptor with 

respect to much more expensive, traditional manned aircraft (C. Christensen 2011). Early 

UAV technology emerged from the model airplane market. It is not hard to envision other 

commercial technology value networks shifting sideways to disrupt traditional military 

R&D: industrial assembly line robots, sensors, intelligent controls, power, and drive 

systems. 

Another likelihood is disruption within military R&D rather than from without. The 

Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency exists to find high potential disruptive 

technologies with military applications. The DARPA grand challenge pitted top robotics 

researchers against demanding cross-country and urban autonomous navigation problems 

(Thrun, et al. 2006). The Google Car (Markoff 2010) is a transplanted DARPA-sponsored 

technology development with high potential for future disruption.

Summary, Counter-Argument, Next Step

To summarize, our quick examination shows enormous attention and investments in 

military robotics already occurring, with plans for continued growth over the next two 

decades and more. Deeper analysis of predictable progress in robot technology with respect 

to models of military affairs, science, and market disruption is likely to further strengthen 

the argument for revolution in each case.

What are the arguments against? What could prevent a robotics revolution? There 

are no strong answers. Physics and the limits of engineering knowledge present the main 

hurdles: 

1. Efficiency of power sources: Batteries, generators, fuels cells, solar, 

and other available energy storage and conversion technologies are 

currently inadequate for many robotics purposes—a severe limitation. 
157

Progress has been steady if not dramatic. In 1980, electric aircraft were 

engineering novelties. Now they are a primary form factor of UAVs. 

Still, the ten-fold improvement in power-to-weight is dwarfed by the 

1,000,000-fold increase in transistors per micro-chip that occurred in 

the same period. Power sources are a laggard among robotics-enabling 

sub-technologies.

2. Bandwidth: Nature places unbreakable limits on information flow, 

particularly the high fidelity wireless communication that robots 

frequently require. We are far from reaching these limits. Engineers 

are making the most of nature’s offerings. Home satellite TV receivers, 

cell phones, Global Positioning, wireless baby monitors, and a hundred 

other bandwidth-intensive devices in our daily lives are all products of 

the last 30 years. Nonetheless, the unbreachable bandwidth wall must 

be considered.

3. Autonomy: Somewhere between the current state, where robots 

rely on detailed instructions from people, and futurist predictions 

of a “singularity,” where mankind uploads itself to a global supernetwork, and human evolution continues by other means (Zorpette 

2008), lies what machine autonomy will actually be during the lives 

of leaders being educated today. Many robot applications benefit 

from autonomy—machines emulating human thought. Though 

imagination has outstripped real progress in this area, the oft-lamented 

failure of artificial intelligence (AI) is a red herring, masking solid 

accomplishments. The “failure” rubric stemmed from a period where 

researchers focused too exclusively on symbolic abstraction (Brooks 

1990) and in the definition of AI itself. The practical definition of 

AI is “human behaviors too complicated for current systems to 

emulate.” Consequently, it is a truism that successful AI is no longer 

AI; it quickly becomes “normal technology.” Modern expert systems 

deduce purchasing habits, assign relative priority of Internet search 

results, and predict traffic snarls. Computers play grandmaster chess, 

synthesize and recognize speech, discern faces in crowds and identify 

them, translate language, and drive cars. In 1960, these would all have 

been considered AI. Today they are something less.

The US Army Research Laboratory (ARL) depicts robot intelligence on a continuous 

scale, as in Figure 8. The remotely controlled “dumb” robots of today are at the left. At 

the opposite end are fully self-aware, autonomous entities. ARL strategy is to build robots 

with combined human and autonomous control, capitalizing on strengths of each and 

providing the flexibility to “plug in” new autonomous capabilities easily. This is shown 

graphically in the figure. Flexibility is key, since surprises are possible, even if unlikely. If 

an autonomous decision program eventually proves itself consistently superior to human 

beings at battlefield rules-of-engagement decisions, then autonomy shifts from desired to 

ethically required functionally. This topic has been explored (Arkin 2009) and vociferously 

debated (Gibson 2010) in the true fashion of a paradigm shift.
158

Autonomy, then, is not “yes or no,” but a complex continuum. This way of thinking 

adapts easily to all three limiting factors—energy and bandwidth included—in the present 

analysis. In each case there is the current state, a most limiting future state, and a smooth 

transition between. It is not difficult to quantify, within an order of magnitude in each 

case, where technology must advance for revolutionary change to continue: weight per 

kilowatt-hour for energy systems, point-to-point bandwidth of data exchange for mobile ad 

hoc networks, and key forms of intelligence, for robots to be feasible performers of given 

military tasks. Even a cursory attempt indicates that progress at the present rate, continued 

over the next three decades, is sure to produce revolutionary capabilities, driving markets 

and future science as well as military affairs.

Having established the general structure of robotics revolution—RMA, paradigm 

shift, and/or industrial market disruption—we can turn to the resultant educational needs 

of military leaders. 

Military Technology Adoption

Our specific goal is to provide leaders with an intellectual foundation to guide future 

decision processes of military organizations regarding battlefield robotics technology 

adoption. Envisioning the nature of those future processes is a necessary part of the 

framework we are creating. The clearer our vision, the better will be the final result. On the 

other hand there is the trap of excessive imagination. With apologies to Albert Einstein, our 

Figure 8. US Army Lab Concept: “Autonomy Scale” for Robots.

 Source: Created by Author.

Today:

Aerial navigation

Sensor orientation

Primitive data culling

Robot Decides

5–10 years:

Ground navigation

Information synthesis

Limited planning ability

based on situational

awareness

Science Fiction:

Unknown: Not part of this talk

What today’s 

leaders-in-training

will experience . . .

Human Decides

Today:

Aerial navigation

Sensor orientation

Primitive data culling

Robot Decides

5–10 years:

Ground navigation

Information synthesis

Limited planning ability

based on situational

awareness

Science Fiction:

Unknown: Not part of this talk

What today’s 

leaders-in-training

will experience . . .

Human Decides
159

prediction should be “as detailed as possible, but no more so.” Unsupported conjecture will 

lead to an indefinite amount of missed opportunity. Obsession with unnecessary nuance 

will do the same.

The way forward is to follow Kuhn and Christensen with a “sciences of the artificial” 

approach by treating military technology adoption as a complex system with a model that 

can be validated through scientific investigation. Unfortunately, there appear to be no welldeveloped standard models of organizational technology adoption decisions (Brandyberry 

2011). 

What does exist? There do exist attempts to explain how people respond to new 

technologies at the personal level. Information technology acceptance (Davis, Bagozzi 

and Warshaw 1989) (Chau 1996) (Legris, Ingham and Collerette 2003) (Venkatesh, et al. 

2003) and technology adoption (Bohlen and Beal 1957) models explain and statistically 

predict human choices regarding new technology. Technology acceptance is a sociological 

theory based on perceptions of the technology’s ease of use and usefulness. Characteristics 

of both the technology and the potential user population affect these perceptions, hence 

user acceptance. Predictive power of this model has been demonstrated for computer 

software acceptance. Technology adoption was originally formulated to explain how use 

of an improved breed of seed corn diffused through sub-populations of Iowa farmers. The 

empirical study considered the lifecycle from zero to 100 percent adoption and grouped 

farmers in categories based on how early or late each one chose to adopt the new seed. 

Statistically significant demographic and psychological characteristics were observed in 

each group. Since this groundbreaking effort, adoption modeling has become a standard 

technique in marketing (Mahajan, Muller and Bass 1990).

Though these classical models may be helpful at the margins for predicting how 

individuals will behave as robots proliferate, the larger concern of how large organizations 

will respond remains. Fortunately, we can look within military organizations themselves. 

Many have formalized their technology adoption decisions in acquisition processes. These 

can serve as Rosetta Stones for our purpose. Consequently, we will adopt an abstraction 

of military capability acquisition as a relevant model of technology adoption. Though 

our discussion is in the US context, the abstract model resembles processes of most other 

nations. 

We hasten to add that we are not advocating that all leaders be educated as acquisition 

officers! Rather, for want of other alternatives, we are pressing a high-level view of 

acquisition into service as a roadmap for analyzing the needs of future leaders of robotenabled forces, who will be coping with whatever the acquisition process produces and 

shaping it as stakeholders.

An Acquisition-Based Adoption Model

An abstract model of acquisition is needed to determine with high probability what 

future robot-induced change will mean for leaders at that time. Regardless of details, certain 

classes of decisions will determine the outcomes and thus are useful for our purpose:

1. Types and levels of R&D investment, 

2. Which robotics technologies will be adopted, 
160

3. How they will be employed, and finally 

4. How progress will be evaluated and results fed back to affect future 

effort in a cyclic fashion.

Figure 9 depicts how these questions are answered systematically. R&D provides 

capabilities. The military, as “customer,” analyzes these for costs and benefits. Evaluations 

result in adoption decisions, which trigger planning at all levels. Production and 

implementation or “fielding” ultimately puts the new capabilities in soldiers’ hands. 

Feedback and feed-forward communications also occur at all levels while, simultaneously—

formally and informally—theories, models and assessments are developed by individuals, 

small and large organizations, militaries, and nations. Each box of this diagram represents 

a complex activity, each a human endeavor spanning many organizations.

Acquisition systems are designed to drive and manage technological developments 

on a routine basis. Revolutions thwart this design by inverting it. Rather than systems 

driving developments, the opposite occurs. Developments drive processes beyond their 

capabilities. There is no routine. Reaction supplants planning. Consequently, special 

burdens fall upon leaders. They take up the slack of failing systems and make complex 

out-of-the-ordinary decisions about technologies and their employment. Simultaneously, 

Figure 9. Revolution: Developments Drive Processes.

 Source: Created by Author.

Theories

Models

Assessments

Evaluation &

Planning

Production &

Implementation

Analysis:

Costs & Benefits

Research &

Development

Capabilities

Revolution: 

Developments Drive Processes

Theories

Models

Assessments

Evaluation &

Planning

Production &

Implementation

Analysis:

Costs & Benefits

Research &

Development

Capabilities

Revolution: 

Developments Drive Processes
161

they adapt the systems themselves to the new environment, even as they continue their 

functions.

There are recent examples of failure-driven reaction in acquisition, one even involving 

robots. In 2002, the US Army Rapid Equipping Force was created to quickly deploy small 

robots for cave clearance missions in Afghanistan because R&D and equipment fielding 

mechanisms were deemed too slow. The Joint Improvised Explosive Device (IED) Defeat 

Organization (JIEDDO) was established in 2006 to “defeat IEDs as weapons of strategic 

influence,” (US Department of Defense 2006) primarily because traditional acquisition 

processes were unable to address this quickly emerging extant threat.

Model to Curriculum

The proposal of this paper, the answer to the “how” in the question posed in section 2, 

is to center officer education design on a careful consideration of this model along these 

lines:

1. The range of revolutionary capabilities likely to issue from R&D.

2. The nature of cost/benefit analyses that will be needed for deciding 

which capabilities to acquire.

3. The skills and value systems—scientific, engineering, political, 

economic, ethical, and other—that will play parts in evaluation and 

planning. 

4. The knowledge of technology and the inspiration needed to implement 

successfully, even in the context of ongoing military missions.

5. Character and abilities needed to fill gaps when processes fail due 

to revolutionary change and to adapt the processes to the changed 

environment.

All broadly accepted methods of curriculum design (Romiszowski 1987) (Allan 2006) 

comprise a kind of “reverse engineering,” beginning with objectives—what graduates 

of the desired educational experience should have the potential to do by some set future 

time. These objectives enable a firm description of needed knowledge and attributes. From 

these, individual programs infer outcomes—what students should be able to do at the time 

of their graduation. Specific fact and technical knowledge and skills, habits of thought, 

problem solving, critical and logical thinking, and communications abilities are all typical 

of outcomes. From outcomes flow course objectives: subsets of the outcomes served by 

each offered course. Finally, lesson content and methodology follow. The skilled execution 

of such reverse engineering is the role of Toffler’s educator, discussed in the Introduction.

Early Insights

In this context, the purpose of examining the acquisition system is to establish 

educational objectives, a foundation for all that follows. The rest of the work is beyond 

the scope of this paper, but the analysis already in hand provides some early insights on 

what the final results might be. Knowledge components must include Basic Sciences: 

Mathematics, Computing, Physics, Chemistry, Biology. Engineering: Mechanical, 
162

Aeronautical, Electrical, Software Systems. Humanities and Social Sciences: History, 

Economics, Political Science, Psychology, Philosophy. Personal Abilities: think critically, 

adapt quickly, solve problems skillfully, respect scientific methodology, and seek out the 

right technology, understand people and society, decide and act ethically. In each area, it 

is apparent that fundamentals rooted in enduring principles are far more important than 

perishable facts and technological details that are likely to be superseded. 

Not surprisingly, these comprise standard directions for most liberal educational 

programs worldwide, particularly the ones that characterize leader education. However, 

curriculum design is equally about what not to attempt. It is in making systematic tradeoffs 

within time and financial constraints that the objectives-outcomes-course design procedure 

pays off. It also provides the foundation for faculty-staff-student communication—a 

common language for articulating what is to be accomplished. It becomes “part of the air” 

as one faculty member has expressed it.

Another early insight has less to do with systematic design than faculty creativity and 

energy. Fast-paced response to a revolution demands proactive people who imagine a better 

future and energetically pursue it. Capturing imagination on technology’s possibilities, 

encouraging initiative, and instilling a propensity for action with regard to new technology 

will be among the most important accomplishments of officer preparation for a robotics 

revolution.

Conclusion

We have examined current developments in military robotics, both at face value and 

with respect to three classical models of revolution and disruption. We found that the 

likelihood of change rising to the level of “revolution” by any reasonable definition is very 

likely. Details of this revolution are unknowable, but its shape will necessarily conform to 

norms of military technology adoption. These are embedded in the structure of systems 

for military acquisition, which is well-documented and understood, even if its efficacy is 

debated. If modern trends persist, robotics capabilities will be developed by science and 

engineering methods at ever-increasing rates and levels of sophistication. Despite strict 

constraints of physics and known limits of understanding, resulting capabilities are certain 

to alter basic assumptions of warfare.

Organizations at several levels will engage in a complex cycle of theorizing, hypothesis 

formulation, trials, implementation, assessment, and redirection of effort. In this manner, 

the military enterprise will decide which capabilities to acquire and how to apply them to 

best effect. This will encompass a large set a highly complex, multidimensional decisions 

incorporating many human and societal value systems. There will be successes and failures. 

Military leaders will inevitably bear responsibility for the results.

By analyzing acquisition processes, we can catalog the knowledge and professional 

attributes that leaders will need in order to understand and harness the potential of military 

robots. From this we can reverse engineer education to enable their success. This paper is 

a first step along that line of action.
163

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Chapter 15

An Assessment of Combatant Empathy for Robots with a View to Avoiding 

Inappropriate Conduct in Combat

by Serge Tisseron

Robots are already among us even though they usually go unnoticed. They answer 

the phone or operate certain means of transport, but they have not “materialized” into 

recognizable forms. Sometimes they even remain hidden so as not to cause users any 

anxiety. On the battlefield however, they are ever more present, and the trend is not about 

to be reversed. Indeed, robots are comparatively much cheaper than Western combatants, 

who are scarce and costly: deploying an American soldier for a year in Afghanistan is about 

the same cost as six PACKBOT robots, or US $150,000 (Singer P.W., 2009). Moreover, 

while Western public opinion has grown very sensitive to the notion of human loss, it is 

perfectly indifferent to the destruction of robots, seen as no more than machines.

But how does a combatant perceive robots? Everything changes for him the minute 

a robot is deployed on the battlefield. First of all, he can interact through the machine 

and see the world through its contact sensors. The battlefield almost turns into a virtual 

space insofar as he is now totally safe and able to destroy enemies which have become 

mere images on a screen. Likewise, the private on the ground will inevitably experience 

feelings of solidarity and bonding with autonomous machines capable of saving his life, 

even though such feelings are normally reserved for other human beings. 

As we will see, these two changes have all sorts of consequences which all revolve 

around the notion of empathy. But let us first focus on what this word refers to.

A Mutual and Reciprocal Construct that Begins with Birth

The concept of empathy was introduced in the 19th century by Théodore Lipps as the 

foundation for a new type of psychology taking sensory and motor systems into account. 

It then fell into disuse in the 20th century as the focus was placed exclusively on language. 

Renewed interest in the concept is now being fuelled by findings in three different fields: 

cognitive science, ethology (empathy is essential in the animal world, especially among 

mammals), and research highlighting how communication is conditional on motor and 

emotional imitation. This research demonstrates that empathy is neither sympathy, nor 

sympathy in the literal sense, nor identification.

Sympathy implies sharing not only the same emotions, but also the same values and 

objectives. That is what the word “sympathizer” means.

Sympathy in the literal sense, or “compassion,” as the French say, emphasizes suffering. 

It is inseparable from the notion of victims with whom you are siding against a hostile 

force, or even human aggression.

As for identification, it is but the first level of empathy. Indeed, empathy can be 

represented as a pyramid with three superimposed levels corresponding to relations both 

increasingly rich and shared with an increasingly limited number of people.
166

Direct (or Unilateral) Empathy

Direct empathy refers to what is usually called identification and can be defined as the 

ability to change viewpoints without losing one’s bearings. Based on neurophysiology, 

it is always possible (except for people with autism spectrum disorders). It subdivides 

into two components as it consists in both understanding another’s viewpoint (cognitive 

empathy) and feelings (affective empathy). Identifying with another does not imply totally 

putting ourselves in another person’s shoes, but suggests that some resonance is established 

between what another feels and thinks, and what we feel and think ourselves. In the end, 

it involves being capable of imagining how we might feel if we really were in that other 

person’s shoes. Identification does not require recognizing others as human beings. We can 

identify ourselves with cartoon or novel characters that we simply imagine. Identification 

with someone can occur without looking at them, and even without them noticing. For 

instance, I can put myself in the place of the waiter who is serving me lunch at the restaurant, 

and decide to tip him because I think that, if I were him, it would seem like the right thing 

to do, and yet not even look at him or harbor any feeling toward him.

Empathy thus defined can serve reciprocity just as well as psychological influence. 

In the former case, it leads to mutual support and solidarity; in the latter, it generates 

sometimes very subtle forms of mental and conscious manipulation. 

Reciprocal Empathy

There is another definition of empathy which makes it a prerequisite ethical choice for 

any type of peaceful social organization. Beyond the possibility to access another person’s 

inner world representation, this particular kind of empathy builds on a longing for mutual 

acceptance and on acknowledging that interaction with others is the best—perhaps the 

only—way to self-knowledge. Not only do I identify with the other person, but I also allow 

them to identify with me, or in other words, to put them in my shoes and thereby to have 

access to my psychic reality, to understand what I understand and feel what I feel. We 

perceive other men and women as endowed with sensitivity just as we are, and not as if they 

were mere inanimate things. Any relationship involving that aspect of acceptance “does not 

fictitiously construct its object, but indeed apprehends it in all its practical peculiarities” 

(Honneth A, 2005). As Emmanuel Levinas demonstrated in 2004, this sort of acceptance 

makes it possible to reconcile asymmetry and reciprocity. It can be associated with the 

mirror test. It involves direct contact as well as the whole gamut of expressive gestures 

such as smiles, exchanged glances and facial expressions, which are evidence that I accept 

to make the other person a partner of sensory-motor interaction. Conversely, the absence 

of such expressive mediation amounts to denying the other’s existence.

There are three aspects to mutual acceptance: recognizing that others are just as 

capable of self-esteem as I am (narcissism component); recognizing that they are capable 

of loving and being loved (object relations component); recognizing others as subjects of 

rights (which is the component of relations to the group).

Such acceptance can also extend to the non-human world, in which case it typically 

implies a particular perception of animals, plants and objects that takes into account “the 

variety of existential meanings they have to those around us and to ourselves” (Honneth, 
167

2005). In other words, this reciprocally empathetic outlook is based on respect for the 

diversity of meaning other human beings may have assigned to this world.

Intersubjectivity

Intersubjectivity consists in acknowledging that other people can help me shed light 

on certain sides to myself that I am not aware of. This is obviously what people seeing 

a psychiatrist do, but fortunately, it can also be true of people involved in a friendly 

or romantic relationship. That is when all barriers are brought down.1

 This longing for 

recognition in someone else’s eyes has its origin in the very beginning of life when babies 

look for self-approval in their mothers’ eyes. We then live the rest of our lives with the 

same desire, now expressed and played out through the privileged medium of the new 

communication technologies (Tisseron S. 2008). In every case, intersubjectivity implies 

admitting that other people can provide me with useful information on yet undiscovered 

aspects of myself. It is no longer about simply identifying with the other person, nor even 

about opening my inner self to them, and thereby acknowledging them as capable of 

identifying with me, it also entails discovering through their eyes that I am different from 

what I had been thinking, and allowing myself to be transformed by that discovery.

With intersubjectivity, the eye of the other is not necessary any more, although it has 

always been indispensable during the previous stages given that empathy as recognition 

was a prerequisite. 

Soldiers, Empathy, and Robots

Let us now examine what insight those definitions give us on changes brought about 

by the development of military robots. There are actually four facets to this question: 

the special effort that Western armies are currently making to win the support of local 

populations; the tightened monitoring ground combatants are submitted to from the higher 

ranks; the rise of a new type of relationship between combatants of similar status; finally, 

the ties that might emerge between combatants and robots deployed in a given theater of 

operations.

Striving to Secure Local Support

Any Western intervention in a foreign country is now concerned with winning the 

trust of local populations (Tisseron A, 2007). In this respect, robots have a major drawback 

insofar as they are perceived as the technological offshoot of a society that has lost its 

soul. Human combatants should be present in the field, and this is not only to report on the 

reality of combat to those who do not go to war, in particular non-combatant populations 

and political decision-makers. Boots on the ground also serve as indispensable evidence 

that the country which has decided to deploy its soldiers has reasons good enough to have 

considered going to war and risking the loss of human lives. Moreover, a physical presence 

1. This is what I have called “extimity-inducing empathy,” after the concept of “extimity” I started 

developing as early as 2001 (Tisseron S. 2001). Extimity consists in allowing a few people—indeed, 

sometimes many people—access to some fragments of oneself that had so far been preserved from 

outside scrutiny (and therefore kept intimate) in an attempt to make those fragments acknowledged 

as worthwhile.
168

is essential in countries where force is deployed to show local populations that they are 

considered as human beings.

Likewise, giving robots the capability to open fire seems very risky as long as they are 

unable to tell a civilian from an enemy combatant. Autonomous armed robots are likely 

to ruin the credibility of an intervention supposedly grounded on protecting human rights. 

While a soldier who kills a civilian can be presented as a particular, isolated case, it will 

be difficult to rely on the same explanations if the culprit is a robot. The very notion of 

giving a robot the ability to kill will immediately be denounced by local populations—

and possibly by part of the international community—as a case of intervening armies 

holding the natives in contempt. That is why it would be much wiser, apart from any 

other considerations, to entrust the decision to open fire with human operatives, so that 

local populations will not feel like their lives are in the hands of machines, which they 

would undoubtedly see as dehumanizing. The only actors that can possibly win hearts and 

minds are human combatants in sufficient number, capable of building interaction and 

mutual acceptance with local populations, which is the definition of second-level empathy 

as described in Figure 10. 

Figure 10. The Three Levels of Empathy.

 Source: Created by Author.

I agree that others 

have the same 

right to self-esteem 

as I have.

(narcissism)

I agree that others 

and I have the very 

same rights.

(group 

membership)

I agree that others 

might love and be 

loved just like me.

(object relations)

Reciprocal and Mutual Empathy

I will accept from others information

on who I am, and guidance

to self-revelation

Reciprocal Empathy

I will let others

put themselves in

my shoes

Direct Empathy

I put myself in 

someone else’s 

shoes.

Identification (Neurological and Experimental Bases)

Cognitive Empathy—four and a half-year-old children and over.

Consists in imagining what others imagine.

Emotional Empathy—as soon as a child is able to tell himself from others

Consists in feeling what someone else feels without confusing oneself

with them.

Inter-Subjectivity

I agree that others 

have the same 

right to self-esteem 

as I have.

(narcissism)

I agree that others 

and I have the very 

same rights.

(group 

membership)

I agree that others 

might love and be 

loved just like me.

(object relations)

Reciprocal and Mutual Empathy

I will accept from others information

on who I am, and guidance

to self-revelation

Reciprocal Empathy

I will let others

put themselves in

my shoes

Direct Empathy

I put myself in 

someone else’s 

shoes.

Identification (Neurological and Experimental Bases)

Cognitive Empathy—four and a half-year-old children and over.

Consists in imagining what others imagine.

Emotional Empathy—as soon as a child is able to tell himself from others

Consists in feeling what someone else feels without confusing oneself

with them.

Inter-Subjectivity
169

The Temptation to Turn Ground Combatants into Robots

With current systems allowing data transfer by satellite, a subordinate tasked to operate 

a drone or a ground military vehicle can be under the direct supervision of an officer 

working in the same office. All a senior officer has to do, as he watches the control monitor 

over his junior officer’s shoulder, is provide him with appropriate direction. However, this 

kind of supervision can also be exercised over ground combatants. Senior officers serving 

thousands of miles away from the theater have real-time access to the same information 

as ground combatants, and some might then be tempted to take maximum control of the 

operations from their distant, air-conditioned offices. They can see the battlefield as if they 

were there. For instance, some general officers might suddenly decide to take command 

and real-time supervision of all the details of the operations from their bunkers, or even 

from the US, while the fighting is actually taking place halfway around the globe. The risk 

then would obviously be for the officer on the ground to receive contradictory guidelines 

from several high-ranking officers supposed to provide him with the “right orders.” Such 

a situation can only generate strong bitterness among ground combatants who might well 

start feeling as if they were treated like...robots, with no authority to open fire until some 

far-away officer decides otherwise! Mutual empathy between the various operatives might 

take a serious hit, just like cohesion in the long run, as brothers in arms on the ground 

and their counterparts in an office are likely to grow into two distinct, antagonistic corps. 

That is why the best rule might be to let the personnel fighting on the ground make the 

decisions and be accountable, participation in the action and presence on the theater taking 

precedence over rank. In short, the brass would identify the objective, and field officers, 

along with the other parties on the ground, would decide what means are necessary to 

achieve it.

This situation can be likened to the one organizing relations between virtual tutors 

and players in virtual environment gaming. When a player enters a networked game, like 

World of Warcraft for example, his “avatar” (or in other words, the pixel-made creature 

representing him on screen and making interaction possible) is always poorly dressed and 

armed at the beginning. To make his way to the top ranks, the player will have to rely on 

characters that are generated by the game software—these are called NPCs (Non-Player 

Characters)—and who will prescribe what objective he has to achieve, but never how to 

achieve it. Players are first expected to find the means they need all by themselves, and later 

through cooperation with other players, all the avatars teaming up to achieve the desired 

goal. In other words, the NPCs, who, just like guild masters to journeymen in bygone days, 

are both authority figures and initiators, only indicate the goal to reach and never the means 

to do so.

This paradigm would hardly be worth mentioning here if it had not already radically 

transformed the expectations that today’s young generations confess having with regard to 

their elders. In a report published by the University of California—Berkeley, most teenagers 

polled declared that they wanted a pattern of relating to authority in which managers 
170

identify the objective to achieve, but leave them free to select the means to do so.2 This is 

no doubt a good case in point for anyone trying to come up with a code of conduct destined 

to regulate relations between ground combatants and personnel in an office simultaneously 

processing information from the sensors of robots.

Exchanging Without Seeing One Another

Computers have made chatting and communication on forums a most commonplace 

thing. So for drone operators guiding their machines from a distant office to rely on 

computers to communicate should hardly come as a surprise. The problem is that civilianlife habits are likely to make those operators forget that the tasks they have to carry out 

are usually much more urgent! That is why the US military has banned using block letters 

and smileys in its communications (Singer P.W., 2009). Another issue that can hardly be 

brushed aside is that of trust. While chatting, we cannot see the person with whom we 

are communicating, and we never know who we are dealing with. Here again, it can be 

interesting to examine the standard practice in networked gaming, whose “fighters” find they 

have to depend on chatting to organize and regulate their relations on the ground, usually 

without knowing each other or ever having met. The stakes in the “fighting” involved are 

obviously quite different since death is virtual and never for real, but the question of the 

extent to which you can trust another combatant you know nothing about is essentially the 

same. This is of particular concern to players who have to submit resumes to belong to 

high-level guilds, and who sometimes live very far away from each other. The ability to 

coordinate everybody’s moves, which is conditional on mutual trust, is indeed critical. This 

is one reason why some World of Warcraft guilds, including France’s Millenium which for 

a long time was ranked first in France and among the best in the world, make it compulsory 

for all their members to attend In Real Life (IRL) gatherings once a year, and even several 

times a year for those members living in the same region.

Staff headquarters might be well-advised to think about the merits of such practices, 

and to consider organizing regular IRL meetings for combatants who have to fight side by 

side from their offices via computer screens and chat sessions. Similarly, it seems essential 

for such personnel to have experienced field maneuvers at one time or another. Indeed, the 

ability all soldiers have to imagine themselves in their comrades’ shoes is central to the 

quality and efficiency or their collaboration.

Man-Robot Empathy

Of all the issues raised by the advent of robots, military or otherwise, the nature of 

the relation between man and a machine endowed with human features is beyond contest 

the most interesting one. Human beings can indeed empathize with both objects and other 

human beings (Tisseron S., 1999).

 As a matter of fact, there is a human tendency to transfer all sorts of thoughts, emotions, 

and feelings onto animals, plants, and even inanimate objects around us. But these various 

2. Mizuko Ito et al. Living and Learning with New Media: Summary of Findings from the Digital 

Youth Project. The John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation Reports on Digital Media and 

Learning, November 2008 http://digitalyouth.ischool.berkeley.edu/report, (accessed 22 October 

2013).
171

kinds of projection are not subjected to the same appreciation. While transfer onto animals 

is valued, projection tendencies involving green plants are politely ignored, and those 

involving objects are generally singled out for derogatory comments. And yet this tendency 

testifies to an essential component of the human psyche: our sense of belonging “to the 

world” is proportional to our ability to endow this world with certain features of our mental 

life. In other words, we familiarize ourselves with objects by projecting our physical and 

psychological functioning onto them. This is our way to try to “understand” them, to be at 

peace with them despite all the things that make them so different, and also to attempt to 

ward off any possible object malfunction. For example, the more an object reminds us of a 

particular body part, the more we will tend to imagine its resilience and capacities with this 

same body part as a model. At the same time, the more we project ourselves onto them, the 

more comfortable we feel with them. Let us remember the jet pilots of the Second World 

War who would paint figures or names on their planes. In the Buck Danny comics I used to 

read as a child, pilots would give their autopilot systems human names.

This tendency is all the stronger as we are dealing with a machine of which we do 

not know anything. Knowing the way it functions makes it more familiar. Yet, as far as 

military robots are concerned, another element should not be underestimated: the transfer 

tendency is accentuated by the fact that combatants are going through highly stressful and 

emotionally wrought situations. The robot that comes along to participate in operations 

with them will be also easily perceived as joining the surrounding emotions too, especially 

if technology eventually allows it to display facial expressions similar to those of a human 

being. 

The Issue of Appearance: Robots as Our Children 

The more human features robots have, the stronger the empathy for them. Professor 

Hiroshi Ishiguro has designed the Geminoid series, whose eye contact, variety of 

expressions, synthetic epidermis, and hair implants are eerily realistic.3 According to him, 

there are five levels of proximity between a robot and a human being:

1. Its appearance is close to a human being’s (android robots)

2. Its movements mimic those of a human being (it can seize objects, 

walk, etc.)

3. Its sensory systems are almost similar to a human being’s (it can see, 

hear, smell and feel)

4. It is capable of complex interaction with a human being (it can talk 

and answer, or even handle a conversation with a human being)

5. It can integrate into a social environment, learning from experience 

and furthering its ability to interact with the world just like a human 

being (Kaplan F., 2001)

3. See Advanced Telecommunications Research Institute International, “Geminoid” website at 

http://www.geminoid.jp/projects/kibans/resources.html, (accessed 22 October 2013).
172

When isolated, each of these characteristics makes relations between a human being 

and a robot smoother. Grouped together, however, they can become threatening. Indeed, 

there is documented evidence that the more a robot looks like a human being, the higher 

our level of trust in it—but only up to a point. When the similarities are too striking, 

our trust suddenly vanishes. A human-like robot becomes scary because it reminds us of 

zombies and ghosts, as robotics researcher Masahiro Mori pointed out in a famous article 

entitled “Uncanny Valley” (1970).

That is why tomorrow’s robots are unlikely to look like the Terminator Schwarzenegger 

embodies in the eponymous film. Indeed, such a robot would be positively frightening. 

Conversely, if the human appearance of a robot is seen as uncanny, human-like attitudes 

and movements are reassuring, especially when evocative of childish behaviour: a good 

case in point here is Star Wars and its unforgettable R2-D2 which looks more like a barrel 

with legs than a human being. Still, we grow fond of the little thing the minute it starts 

stamping its small stumps in excitement.

Drawing from these observations, Hiroshi Ishiguro has designed a project aimed at 

giving a child-like appearance to those humanoid robots tasked to help human beings. 

The robots he designs are actually destined to take care of elderly people, an age category 

whose numbers will soon be so high in Japan that there will no longer be enough caregivers 

to attend to their needs. Who will do that job, then? Robots. But how to make worried 

and frail elderly people accept the care of a metal creature? To clear this obstacle, Hiroshi 

Ishiguro’s vision is for people receiving a care giving robot in their homes to welcome it 

not as a machine, but...as their own child! The end goal is to make sure the robot will never 

appear as a threatening entity. For this goal to be reached, the robot must look like a young 

child rather than a grown-up. Its strength is of course much superior to a human being’s, 

but its appearance must suggest innocence, fragility, and above all imperfection. Just like a 

child, the robot is helped up by its owner who makes it learn how to stand on its feet. What 

we have here is obviously a metaphor for giving birth, and we recall Steven Spielberg’s 

Artificial Intelligence when the robot opens its eyes and memorizes its master’s face, thus 

becoming able to distinguish it from hundreds, or even thousands of other faces.

Hiroshi Ishiguro has gone one step further, though: he came up with the clever idea 

that robot owners should educate their machines with...smiles. This is an idea that was 

obviously suggested to him by some psychiatrists. Early childhood educators know how 

pivotal mothers’ emotions can be for babies in the process of constructing their perception 

of the world and of themselves. Take the example of babies having a hard time trying to 

walk: what do they do after their first fall? Try to get on their feet? Not at all: the first thing 

they do is look at their mothers’ faces. If the mothers smile, the babies smile back, get to 

their feet, and start toddling again. If the mothers look worried or angry, they just sit still 

and start crying. Babies with smiling mothers gradually build confidence in themselves 

and their environments, and score high in both learning and self-esteem; conversely, babies 

faced with the second reaction are likely to grow insecure and stifled in their exploration 

capacities.

What Hiroshi Ishiguro has imagined for the education of tomorrow’s robots is based 

on the same pattern. Those elderly people who will take a robot at home will not have to 
173

type on a keyboard to ask it to do the dishes or take them to their beds. They will simply 

program the machine with a smile! All they will have to do is smile while showing the 

robot how to perform a particular task, and it will try to reproduce what it will have been 

taught. If it succeeds, its owner’s smile will encourage it to go further; should it fail to 

prove itself up to expectations, a disapproving frown will only inhibit its learning process. 

In a baby’s life, this part is played by a privileged person called the child’s “mother,” even 

if the latter is an adoptive mother, or even a man in the case of same-sex couples. Using this 

term, Ishiguro has decided to call the owner in charge of educating the robot a “mother.”

The consequences are huge: not only will this way of interacting strengthen the 

robot’s ability to learn its “mother’s” exact expectations, it will also make the “mother” 

particularly fond of “her” robot inasmuch as she had to rely on empathetic interaction 

with it throughout the learning program. So the project actually creates no less than the 

conditions for empathetic communication between men and machines, a form of empathy 

whose consequences are still unimaginable: indeed, human beings had never managed to 

create a child that would never leave them and serve them until death. Ishiguro has not 

simply invented a robot that will serve such practical functions, but indeed one that will 

probably also provide this kind of emotional assistance.

Will we be more or less human when we grow able to empathize with a robot? Neither 

more nor less, by all means, but the temptation will probably be great to communicate less 

with other human beings seen as different from ourselves, and to live surrounded by robots 

perfectly matching our particular expectations. In the long run, this sort of involvement 

might even grow more intense than the relations human beings normally entertain. Every 

robot owner will indeed be able to teach the machine what he or she likes, regardless of 

whether it is lawful or not. Now, some may wonder if this is not already what happens with 

our own children? Sure, except that children are not raised exclusively by their parents, let 

alone only by their mothers! The other parent is free to correct the noxious or antisocial 

effects of his or her privileged partner’s education, and moreover, school later exerts yet 

another balancing influence. If the system currently developed by Ishiguro should come 

to be implemented on a large scale, I guess corrective action would be required, such as 

programming robots so that they automatically connect to the internet in order to rectify a 

potentially deviant or pathological “motherly” education. In short, a kind of evening class 

for robots, complementing their home education!

At any rate, if the scheme to turn a robot into the child of the person it serves is not 

without justification in the case of elderly people, the situation is much more complex 

when it comes to military robots. The danger would be for the soldier to develop an urge to 

protect the robot just like his child, at the risk of his own life.

A Matter of Confidence

Trusting one’s teammates is a fundamental aspect of being a soldier, as it makes 

for better unit performance in combat. Let a robot save one or several lives, and it will 

immediately enjoy the confidence of human personnel. The problem is that such confidence 

could also generate reciprocal ties: the soldier trusts the machine that is protecting him, 

but also increasingly feels like he has to reciprocate by protecting the machine in return. 

The key role played by reciprocity in empathetic processes, and beyond that, in closely 
174

interdependent relations, should not be overlooked. A soldier might then very well hesitate 

to send the machine on a highly dangerous mission, going instead for an option in which 

his own life will be more at risk.

The risk for a relationship between a soldier and a robot to grow into a highly emotional 

involvement has been documented by research on pet robots, especially the Paro robot 

which is reminiscent of a baby seal. This artificial creature elicits from the elderly people 

to whom it is entrusted even more intense exchanges than might be observed with a real 

pet. Actually, it never eludes interaction and always displays continued attention to its 

conversation partners who get used to addressing it as they would a human being. Most 

people add that they really feel like it can understand them, although some are careful to 

point out that they know full well that it is simply not so.

In order to forestall such a risk, I believe it is better to avoid an overly personal 

relationship between the soldier and a robot that would be like his special machine, the one 

with which he might feel as if they were sharing the same combat experience. The point 

is not to determine whether the mobile, intelligent, autonomous robot will be accepted 

as a full-fledged partner by the human combatant; rather, it is to set limits to this type of 

reciprocity-based relations. To each personnel his robot sounds like a hazardous notion 

to me, as it might trigger uncontrollable transfer processes. Two identical robots for three 

personnel or three for five is a solution that could prevent any individual soldier from 

establishing an excessively personal relation with a robot to the point that he might put his 

own life on the line to save the machine. The rule according to which “no one should be left 

behind” can only apply to a robot if it is of vital interest to the group. But if a soldier came 

to feel so close to a robot as to risk his own life to save it, there would be no further point 

in using robots to save personnel’s lives.

Mark Tilden, a physicist and a robotics expert, gives an example of this kind of 

excessively empathetic relation between a man and a robot (Singer P.W., 2009). He 

designed and built a mine-clearing robot in the shape of a stick insect. In the experience, 

the robot goes out into the minefield, stopping on purpose on every mine it comes across. It 

thus loses a leg every time it stops and goes on repeating the same routine until it no longer 

has any. Tilden explains that the US Army colonel in charge of the program could not bear 

watching the robot have its legs blown away one after the other until it turned into a burnt 

and damaged wreck slowly crawling to its last mine and complete destruction. This senior 

officer reportedly referred to the test as “inhuman,” even though the mine-clearing robot, 

whose shape suggested a stick insect, actually looked like a plain eight-legged stick. One 

wonders how he would have reacted if the machine had been a humanoid robot and had 

lost a leg-like or an arm-like limb on every mine! The attitude of this colonel when faced 

with the “suffering” he imagines the stick insect robot to be in is clearly a component of his 

psychic life, so that even a course on the disposable dimension of robots is unlikely to make 

him see things differently. It would be more practical to have this aspect of his psychology 

mapped out early so he is never deployed with units that might be fielded with robots in 

high-intensity environments.

Actually, the tendency to see robots as equal partners varies from person to person. 

If all human beings are likely to feel close to the non-human world (Tisseron S., 1999), 
175

not everyone will form attachment bonds to the same extent, nor with the same intensity. 

For instance differences in behavior among soldiers using mine-disposal robots have been 

documented. Some personnel will quickly give them names, explaining that it makes 

identification faster than having to check their service numbers every time. Yet, such a 

practice is fraught with significance: naming the machine leads to assuming that it has 

its own personality, if only because it is identified exactly as an individual would be in 

everyday life. Such personalization makes the machine stand out as an individual, and 

reinforces its embodiment as a person. Unsurprisingly, those soldiers whose relation to 

the machine is mediated by a name will often try to use their own robots instead of their 

comrades.’ Conversely, there are personnel who do not want to give their robots any 

individual markers other than service numbers, and who do not mind swapping machines: 

they are not “attached” to theirs.

Moreover, the example Tilden raises shows that even a robot in the shape of a stick 

insect is likely to elicit from a colonel such strong empathy as to make him forget that he 

was dealing with a pile of metal and silicon. For that reason, Peter Khan’s suggestion that 

robots be given “slightly aversive personalities” (quoted by Singer P.W., 2009) can be a 

necessary step, though by no means sufficient. Even if robots are designed with a “slightly 

aversive personality,” some soldiers will always have trouble getting over the destruction 

of a robot, and even worse, might grow so close to a machine as to endanger their own 

lives, or their comrades.’

And of course there is always the additional risk that an officer might end up feeling 

closer to the robots he uses than to the men and women he has under his command, 

especially in the case of a particularly sophisticated machine (let alone one that he might 

have programmed, independently of its military skills, to play chess with him for lack of 

any serious challengers in his unit).

In other words, taking care not to give the robot a human-like figure can only be part 

of the solution.

In order to guard against unfortunate surprises resulting from personnel growing too 

close to the robots under their orders, it would be wise to screen out all those personnel that 

are likely to form an excessively empathetic relation with the machines. Now, for such a 

screening process to be implemented, we need to develop a test measuring this attachment 

hazard and its consequences, and we could call it “test of personnel empathy for robots” 

(TPER). This test would make it possible to diagnose those soldiers that are likely to form 

such personal bonds with robots that they might stop considering them as mere tools, and 

possibly risk their own lives for them. Although we are now perfectly capable of measuring 

the forms of attachment to other human beings, we should urgently go further and start 

developing a test to assess the patterns of attachment to autonomous machines. Such a 

test would allow us to select soldiers able to be in charge of robots, with minimal risks of 

attachment and associated threats.

Only a test assessing the level of attachment to the non-human environment will 

enable us to relieve some soldiers from the responsibility of dealing with robots they might 

come to consider as full-fledged brothers in arms, and to exclusively entrust this kind of 

responsibility with those personnel that are the least likely to form an empathetic relation 

with the machines. 
176

Which Robots for Which Soldiers?

The use of robots on the battlefield actually raises a number of issues which are not 

limited to whether or not they should be allowed to open fire autonomously, or what 

kind of local reputation they make for the armies that deploy them. Those issues have an 

impact on all levels of relations between men and machines, but also between superiors 

and subalterns and same-rank comrades. Robots in fact question all the military modes of 

operation insofar as they have the power to hyper stimulate ways of feeling, thinking and 

reacting that are functional in a robot-free environment, but no longer necessarily so in a 

world where they are actively involved. The empathetic relation human beings can build 

with their non-human environment is often the key to a sound use of machines; yet, it can 

prove devastating when applied to military robots.

That is why establishing a few useful guidelines in designing the robots, and preparing/

selecting the combatants they will be deployed with, seems of vital interest to us. 

Concerning Robot Design

From the outset, we should avoid giving robots an undue human-like appearance. It 

is much better to make them look like animals rather than human beings, and better yet 

if they more closely resemble insects than pets. The goal here is indeed the exact reverse 

of what pet robot designers try to achieve, especially when they have the elderly in mind. 

For senior citizens, features fostering attachment are essential, which is why pet robots 

typically look like children (a choice made by Hiroshi Ishiguro), or more often like pets 

(a dog, for example, or to avoid difficulties raised by robot movements, a big, immobile 

seal such as the Paro robot). Conversely when dealing with military robots, the objective 

is to prevent the emergence of excessively strong attachment bonds, although a relation 

involving a moderate level of commitment is necessary for soldiers to trust the robots. 

Machines looking like human beings, let alone children, should therefore be banned. 

Indeed, soldiers separated from their families for long periods of time might form such an 

unduly strong relation with this type of robots as to risk their lives for them. For the same 

reason, the appearance of a pet robot can be a problem. In the end, it might be better to 

give the robot the form of an insect, i.e. an animal that does not elicit any empathy in our 

Western cultures. However, this insect should not have threatening looks; so robots should 

be sophisticated enough for us to be able to talk to them and feel as if they understood us. 

By the same token, size matters. If robots work with combatants, they should be smaller 

than them so as not to appear threatening, yet not so small as to prevent soldiers from 

assuming they have the same perception of the environment.

Another vital aspect is to make sure that missions destined for robots can always be 

carried out by human personnel, so that the notion of a superhuman robot deserving top 

priority in terms of protection never surfaces. 

Finally, robots must always be used in ways reminding combatants that a machine 

remains a machine. For this reason a robot must not be allowed to operate too autonomously, 

at least considering the present state of our relations to machines. When it comes to activating 

or deactivating a robot, the ultimate decision must be in the hands of the soldier. This 

reminder of the “machine” character of robots entails, among other things, the possibility 
177

to turn them into inanimate and interchangeable objects by removing a few circuits from 

them if they fail to meet our expectations.

A relatively flexible robot, for which soldiers would decide which program is best 

adapted to each mission, can therefore be imagined. It would permanently enhance the 

soldier’s identity as the one in charge, and give credit to his capacity to define the robot on 

an ad hoc basis. It would also make the robot less frightening as it would become no more 

than a modular machine to be adapted by the combatant himself according to his individual 

requirements. The more modular the robot, the lower the risk of excessive attachment 

because the relation will never be reciprocal: the robot certainly does not recommend 

transformations that the combatant would be expected to implement. The robot will then 

turn into a sort of Swiss Army knife whose pre-programmed behavior functions will be 

adapted by the combatant according to his needs.

If those conditions are met, robots will be acknowledged as constitutive of a third 

order of the animate world. We will be able to assume that they have their own way of 

experiencing the world—exactly as we do with animals. We will also be able to ask them 

to let us share what they experience, especially through the increasingly powerful sensor 

systems they will be fitted with. Yet, even if we do ascribe to robots the ability to think 

like us, our empathy for them will always be unilateral because we will not go so far as to 

consider that we might come to experience things the way they do. This is precisely what 

will always set the relation we will have with robots apart from the kind of relation we 

have with our fellow human beings...or at least with those human beings we have stopped 

considering as robots, see Figure 11.

Figure 11. Empathy for Human and Non-Human Entities.

 Source: Created by Author.

Different Types of 

Relational Empathy

Other Human 

Beings Animals Real or Virtual Objects, Robots

Selfless Empathy: 

Thinking that other 

people have their 

own way of 

experiencing the 

world, and being able 

to put oneself in their 

place

X X X

Reciprocal Empathy: 

Accepting that other 

people can imagine 

putting themselves in 

my place

X X

Extimity Inducing 

Empathy: Accepting 

that other people, by 

putting themselves in 

my place, can help 

me access yet 

undiscovered 

aspects of my own 

self

X

Different Types of 

Relational Empathy

Other Human 

Beings Animals Real or Virtual Objects, Robots

Selfless Empathy: 

Thinking that other 

people have their 

own way of 

experiencing the 

world, and being able 

to put oneself in their 

place

X X X

Reciprocal Empathy: 

Accepting that other 

people can imagine 

putting themselves in 

my place

X X

Extimity Inducing 

Empathy: Accepting 

that other people, by 

putting themselves in 

my place, can help 

me access yet 

undiscovered 

aspects of my own 

self

X
178

From a Combatant’s Perspective 

In order to prevent soldiers from forming an overly empathetic relation with their 

robots, all personnel should have basic knowledge of artificial intelligence and its ability 

to mimic human behaviour. However, in the thick of battle, it would be naïve to expect all 

future soldiers to believe, just because they were once told so, that a robot is nothing more 

than a piece of technology without any emotions whatsoever. Simply telling them is not 

enough, as evidenced by the example Tilden gives. The more sophisticated robots become 

in their ability to perform complex and varying tasks, the more indispensable it will be to 

distinguish those soldiers always capable of making the reasonable choice from those who 

are likely to make emotion-driven decisions resulting from various types of attachment 

they might have formed while operating with robots. It will then be possible to deploy the 

former along the robots in high-intensity environments, while the latter will preferably 

be employed for missions that do not require deploying robots, or for robot maintenance 

tasks. Differentiating between the various types of personnel will require developing a “test 

of personnel empathy for robots” (TPER) on the basis of the test of empathy for virtual 

creatures that we are currently working on. Robot appearance and soldier basic training are 

the keys to preventing certain drifts, but not all. The stress experienced in combat generates 

very strong needs in terms of attachment, and it would be very dangerous to underestimate 

them. It would actually be like confusing a human combatant for a robot, which is of course 

a total impossibility.

Conclusion

The deployment of armed robots on the battlefield obviously has a profound impact 

on many reference marks which all have to do with the ability to shift from understanding 

situations in terms of “either A or B” to understanding them in terms of “ both A and B.” 

A soldier operating an unmanned vehicle is both on the battlefield and away from it, while 

those personnel going to combat next to a robot must both consider it as a teammate when 

it protects them and as a pile of iron and silicon when they see it in danger and feel like 

protecting it.

Today, such a paradox may seem difficult to handle because most of us are the products 

of a book culture in which opposites are not meant to attract. Younger generations, however, 

have long been familiar with and intensely involved in digital technologies, and are trained 

ever earlier to constantly change viewpoints and reference markers. Will they be able, then, 

to “naturally” solve the paradox created by robots, and change perspectives on them as fast 

as the situation requires? Some will know how to do that, taking advantage of powerful 

skills in psychic plasticity generated by an extensive practice in changing viewpoints; but 

others will not.

Soldier training and preparation will therefore have to take into account two 

complementary aspects. First of all, it will have to be designed for the next generation 

of combatants to handle teamwork with robots in the best possible way. This part of the 

problem relates to the appearance of robots, their interfaces, and new cooperation and 

command practices yet to be invented. At the same time, the ability of each soldier to 

form with robots a relationship flexible enough to shield him from the danger of excessive 
179

empathy will have to be tested. It was the main purpose of this article to highlight this 

second problematic aspect, which, to the best of our knowledge, has never been explored 

so far, and to suggest implementing a TPER (test of personnel empathy for robots) as a 

possible solution.
180

Bibliography

Berthoz, Alain and Gerard Jorland. 2004. L’Empathie. Paris : Odile Jacob.

Bowlby, John. 1978, 1984, 1998. (Three volumes) Attachement et perte. Paris : PUF. 

Honneth, Axel. 2007. La réification. Petit traité de théorie critique. Paris : Gallimard.

Levinas, Emmanuel. 2004. Autrement qu’être ou Au-delà de l’essence. Paris : Gallimard.

Lipps, Theodor. 1903. Asthetik: Psychologie des Schônen und der Kunst, Leipzig: Voss.

Kaplan, Frederic. 2001. La naissance d’une langue chez les robots. Hermès Science Publications. 

Mori, Masahiro. 1970. Uncanny Valley. Energy, 7 (4): 33-35.

Pare, Zaven. 2010. O robô e a maçã. Rio de Janeiro : 7 Letras.

Rizzolatti, Giacomo (with Corrado Sinigaglia). 2007. Les neurones miroirs Paris : Odile Jacob.

Singer, P.W. 2009. Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century. New 

York: Penguin.

Tisseron, Antonin. 2007. Guerres urbaines: nouveaux métiers, nouveaux soldats. Paris: Ed. 

Economica.

Tisseron, Serge. 1999. Comment l’esprit vient aux objets. Paris : Aubier.

Tisseron, Serge. 2008. Virtuel, mon amour. Paris : Albin Michel.

Tisseron, Serge. 2010. L’empathie au cœur du jeu social. Paris : Albin Michel.

Tisseron, Serge. 2012. Rêver, fantasmer, virtualiser: du virtuel psychique au virtuel numérique. 

Paris : Dunod.

Trevathen, Colwyn and Kenneth Aitken. 2003. Intersubjectivité chez le nourrisson: recherche, 

théorie et application Clinique. Devenir, Vol. 15, No. 4: 309-428.

Turing, Alan. 1950. Computing machinery and intelligence. Mind LIX: 433-460.
Part Three

The Future of Robots

in the Military

Part Three

The Future of Robots in the Military

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Chapter 16

The Future of Drone Warfare

by Noël Sharkey

The recent Iraq, Afghanistan, and Gaza conflicts have created a dramatic increase in the 

use of remotely piloted armed drones. With over 50 countries now buying and developing 

the technology, autonomous armed drones could become dominant in future war. Although 

there is currently a “man-in-the-loop” for all lethal targeting operations, that role is set 

to shrink rapidly as more autonomous operation becomes available. Current autonomous 

robots cannot discriminate between combatant and non-combatant targets, do not have 

battlefield awareness, cannot reason appropriately or make proportionality decisions. We 

point to the dangers of relying on future technological fixes and examine the impact on 

International Humanitarian Law. Military necessity is considered as a possible way to 

allow the new indiscriminate weapons to be deployed. 

Proliferation

In the post-9/11 era, aerial drones have come to dominate military operations. Troop 

movements are almost always accompanied by intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance 

drones. The military success of UAVs in the theater of war in Iraq and Afghanistan create 

massive worldwide demand for the technology. It is massive business. The Teal Group 

has estimated that the market will increase to $11.3 billion per year over the next decade, 

not including the billions of dollars in development costs. Teal does not have access to the 

figures for military robotics spending from major countries such as Russia, China, or Iran.2 

There are now at least 50 countries using UAVs.3 Many of these are being developed 

in-house and many are being bought in (and probably copied). The US sells many of its 

drones to its closest allies in Europe and recently the US company General Atomics has 

been given permission to sell its earlier generation predators in the Middle East and Latin 

America. Israel has an even wider range of markets, having recently expanded into Latin 

American countries. Countries that do not have the advantage of being a close ally of the 

US cannot yet buy armed drones, and so they are having to find other means of acquiring 

or developing them. India and Pakistan are working hard to develop attack drones, having 

failed to purchase any from the US or Israel. Russia has shown models of the MiG Skat 

unmanned combat aircraft, which is intended to carry out strike missions on air defenses. It 

is, according to reports from Russia, able to carry cruise missiles and can strike both ground 

and naval targets. Iran demonstrated a rocket launched UAV, the Karrar or ambassador of 

death, to the press in 2010. It carries two cruise missiles. It is not possible to ascertain how 

operational the Iranian and Russian craft are, but it is clear that, at the very least, they are 

moving in the right direction to make the technology. 

China is showing the greatest commercial potential for selling armed UAVs over the 

coming decade. It has made a showing of many different types of UAV at its air shows over 

the last five years, some almost replicas of the US drones. The US-China Economic and 

Security Review Commission said that China “has deployed several types of unmanned 

aerial vehicles for both reconnaissance and combat.”4

 According to the Washington Post, at 

the Zhuhai air show in China in November 2010, there were more than two dozen Chinese 

1
184

UAV models on display.5 Worryingly, the Washington Post article quotes Zhang Qiaoliang 

of the Chengdu Aircraft Design and Research Institute as saying, “The United States 

doesn’t export many attack drones, so we’re taking advantage of that hole in the market.”

This is worrying because it indicates the opening up of a large and expanding market 

of which all the major players will want a share. If it looks like China’s combat UAVs 

threaten to dominate the market, then others will start selling them and every developed 

nation will have them. This could have a significant impact on how disputes are handled 

and what constitutes a war.

Autonomy and the Pace of Battle 

Since 2004, all roadmaps of the US forces have made clear the desire and intention to 

develop and use autonomous battlefield robots. Execution of these plans to take the human 

out of the loop is well underway. The end goal is that robots will operate autonomously to 

locate their own targets and destroy them without human intervention.6

Autonomous lethal targeting is not illegal so long as it accords with the principles of 

distinction and proportionality. In a military rich environment with few civilians in, say, a 

desert or at sea, there may be few problems with using armed robots to kill targets. Legally 

this may be little different from firing rockets from a distance, dropping bombs, or sending 

cruise missiles. However, armed robots are set to change the pace of battle dramatically 

in the coming decade. It may not be militarily advantageous to keep a human in control of 

targeting.

The speed of an unmanned craft is limited only by the integrity of its structure and 

components and not by human G-force limitations. Unmanned planes can not only travel 

faster than piloted planes but can also maneuver much faster, taking sharp turns that would 

kill a human pilot. 

The US has been testing the supersonic Phantom Ray and the X-47b. The US Navy 

would like to replace the F-35s on their carriers with the X-47b.7

 The Chinese (Shenyang 

Aircraft Company) are working on the Anjian (Dark Sword) supersonic unmanned fighter 

aircraft, the first unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV) designed for aerial dogfights. The 

US Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Pentagon want armed 

unmanned vehicles that can reach anywhere on the planet within 60 minutes. The DARPA 

HTV-2 programme is a good example of the direction of technological developments. The 

Falcon HTV-2 is a hypersonic unmanned plane that in recent tests flew at a velocity of 

between 17 and 22 Mach, i.e. 17 to 22 times the speed of sound at its altitude. That is a 

maximum speed of 13,000 mph (20,921.5 kph), which is around 8.5 times faster than the 

Russian MiG-25, maximum velocity Mach 2.3 (1,520 mph or 2,446 kph). 

However, as with any mobile system controlled by complex software we cannot predict 

how it will react in all circumstances. A series of unpredictable events could occur, or there 

could be an undetected bug in the program or a hardware fault. A hypersonic drone could 

be off target by 5 km in less than a second.

A simple example of just two interacting software algorithms running out of control 

happened on the Amazon website. The out-of-print 1992 book Making of a Fly usually 

sells for around $50. But on 19 April 2011 Bordeebooks was selling it for $23,698,655.93 
185

(plus $3.99 shipping) on the Amazon website.8 This astonishing price was created because 

an automatic algorithm from bookseller Profnath was interacting with Bordeebooks’ 

automatic algorithm. The story is that when Bordeebooks does not have a book in stock, 

they automatically list it at 1.27059 times the price of the highest other seller. So when 

a customer orders it from them, they can buy and sell at a profit. The problem was that 

Profnath’s algorithm made their prices 0.9983 times the highest price of other booksellers. 

So each time Bordeebooks increased their price, so did Profnath, and they spiralled out of 

control. 

This was quite harmless, as no one was prepared to pay these kinds of prices. However, 

imagine two or more complex algorithms interacting on high-speed armed robots. Without 

any knowledge of the other algorithms, there is no way to tell what would happen. They 

might just crash into one another or into the ground, or they might end up unleashing their 

destructive power in completely the wrong place. The point is that software algorithms 

on autonomous armed drones spiralling out of control is something to be very seriously 

concerned about.

As I have written elsewhere, allowing robots to make decisions about the use of lethal 

force could breach both the principle of distinction and the principle of proportionality 

as specified by international humanitarian law.9 These are the pillars of the laws of war. 

Currently and for the foreseeable future no autonomous robots or artificial intelligence 

systems have the necessary properties to enable discrimination between combatants and 

civilians or to make proportionality decisions.

Under the principle of distinction, only combatants/warriors are legitimate targets of 

attack. All others, including children, civilians, service workers, and retirees, should be 

immune from attack. The same immunity covers combatants who are hors de combat—those 

who are wounded, have surrendered, or are mentally ill.10 The principle of proportionality 

applies in circumstances where it is not possible to fully protect non-combatants in an 

action. It requires that the loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks must not 

be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

Distinguishing between civilians and combatants is problematic for any robot or 

computer system. First, there is the problem in the specification of “civilian-ness.” A 

computer can compute any given procedure that can be written as a program. We could, for 

example, give the computer or a robot an instruction such as, “if civilian, do not shoot.” This 

would be fine if and only if there was some way to give the computer a precise specification 

of what a civilian is. The laws of war do not help. The 1949 Geneva Convention requires 

the use of common sense to determine the difference between a civilian and combatant, 

while the 1977 Protocol essentially defines a civilian in the negative sense as someone who 

is not a combatant. 

Two major software components are necessary for robots to distinguish between 

combatants and non-combatants. The first is highly accurate and discriminative sensing 

and visions systems. While technology has improved dramatically over the past 50 years, 

the development of software for vision systems has been very slow. Currently we have 

vision systems that can detect whether something is a human or not by its shape, although 

these can easily be fooled by a mannequin or a dancing bear. We have face recognition 
186

systems that are effective so long as individuals stay still long enough to be identified, and 

we have various biometric tests for people who are stopped. In the fog of war all of these 

methods would run into insurmountable difficulties.

The second necessary component is reasoning from situational awareness. It is unclear 

as to when we might even get a foot in the door for this problem. There are always optimists, 

but the truth is that such systems are in the realm of “hope ware” rather than software. 

There is no way to be certain that they will never be achieved, but equally there is currently 

no evidence to suggest that they will ever be achieved. If they are achieved, it could be in 

hundreds of years.

In terms of the laws of war, we must go on the information and evidence that we 

currently have. We should not rely on technological fixes that are just around the very 

elastic corner that we may never reach. The bottom line is that autonomous robots that 

can kill without a human making the lethality decisions are indiscriminate weapons. They 

may properly belong in the United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons 

(CCW or CCWC).11

Military Necessity

The statement “Armed robots will always have a person somewhere in the loop for 

lethal targeting decisions” is often repeated by Western powers. But saying “somewhere 

in the loop” is not the same as saying that a human will always make the lethal targeting 

decisions. There are clearly instances where military necessity may override having anyone 

in the loop. In the extreme, if the very survival of the State was at stake and it was possible 

to use autonomous armed robots to save the day, it is fair to say that they would be used. 

In these circumstances the use of autonomous killing machines may even be considered 

a legitimate action—or, at least, such an action might not be considered to be illegitimate 

if judged relative to the International Court of Justice’s decision, or more properly nondecision, regarding the use of nuclear weapons by States. As is well known, the Court ruled 

that, in the current state of international law and given the facts at its disposal, it was not 

possible to conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be 

lawful or unlawful in extreme circumstances of self-defense (circumstances in which the 

very survival of the defending State would be at stake).12 It would not be too fantastic to 

imagine the phrase “autonomous armed robots” being substituted for “nuclear weapons.” 

Armed robots are a lesser beast than nuclear weapons—unless they are armed with nuclear 

weapons of course. So the substitution is easy. However, it is likely that it would take much 

less than the imminent collapse of a State before indiscriminate autonomous robots were 

deployed. History is littered with much examples in which humanitarian considerations 

have been overridden for the protection of soldiers rather than for the survival of the State 

from imminent collapse.

The attacks on the French market town of St. Lô during the Normandy invasion by 

allied forces in 1944 provide a good example of the indiscriminate use of air power. 

Although the town was full of friendly French civilians, an elite German Panzer division 

residing there was blocking the allied forces from breaking out of Normandy. Canadian, 

US and British forces took very heavy casualties. In response, according to Cohen, “The 
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town was attacked on 25 July, by 1,500 heavy bombers, 380 medium bombers, and 550 

fighter bombers, one of the largest air attacks in World War II. Panzer Lehr was virtually 

wiped out, and the town was turned into rubble.”13 The path was cleared for the allied 

advance, but many thousands of French citizens lost their lives in the process.

These actions were (and are still being) defended on the grounds that they were necessary 

to achieve military success. It is argued that the bombings were directly proportional to 

the military advantage gained. On the other hand, Walzer has robustly argued against the 

actions on moral grounds and in terms of just war.14

Another case of “military necessity” was the practice of US troops in Korea and 

Vietnam of firing back at targets in areas laden with civilians when they came under enemy 

fire. When the troops were pinned down they automatically employed tanks to return fire 

into hillsides as well as call for air strikes and artillery support. These actions, while saving 

the lives of US troops, indiscriminately killed civilian men, women and children.15

Cohen points out that this was not an illegal act. The law of war is not necessarily 

moral; it “allows troops under fire to fire back without ascertaining that there are no 

civilians mingled with the troops who are firing upon them. It allows troops under fire to 

fire back even if they know civilians are mingled with the enemy.”16 Does this means that 

if soldiers are fired on, then lethally autonomous robots could be deployed in the same way 

as artillery or indiscriminate air strikes?

If countries at war or in conflict have armed autonomous robots that will save many of 

their soldiers’ lives, will the deployment of those robots be deemed a military necessity? 

If it impacts both on the protection of soldiers’ lives and on the ultimate success of the 

mission, then there will be a great temptation to use the technology. Imagine a situation 

where UAV deployment is what is giving State A the edge in an armed conflict with State 

B. Now imagine that State A has its communications disabled and its radio and GPS signals 

jammed. If State A can return to its advantageous position using its stock of (indiscriminate) 

autonomous armed UAVs to maintain its advantage, will it not do so? 

Pushing the point home further, suppose that, having disrupted the remote control of 

State A’s UAVs, State B now deploys autonomous attack craft; will State A not follow suit? 

Will concerns about keeping a person in the loop or unleashing possibly indiscriminate 

weapons prevent the use of lethal autonomous UAVs? It seems unlikely that a country will 

lose a war because it decides that moral superiority is more important than victory.

Actions Short of Warfare?

Legal and political loopholes for drones are already being created in the US that give 

us some insight into what the future might hold when every major power is regularly 

deploying armed robots. Will drones change the definition of what constitutes a war? Will 

their use be considered to be an act of war, a policing action, or action short of war (under 

jus ad bellum)? US operations in Libya have sparked an argument between President 

Obama and the US Congress over the War Powers Resolution. The US 1973 War Powers 

Resolution limits the ability of a president to wage war without Congressional approval. 

The president is required to obtain congressional approval or terminate a mission within 

60 days:
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[i]n the absence of a declaration of war, in any case in which United 

States Armed Forces are introduced—(1) into hostilities or into situations 

where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the 

circumstances; (2) into the territory, airspace or waters of a foreign nation, 

while equipped for combat, except for deployments which relate solely to 

supply, replacement, repair, or training of such forces.17

The President did not seek Congressional approval for the United States’ role in 

NATO’s Libya mission within the statutory 60 days. Harold Koh, the most senior lawyer 

in the State Department, has strongly defended the legality of US military involvement 

in Libya without Congressional approval. The argument was that since April 2011 the 

US’s role in the NATO-led mission in Libya has mainly involved assisting in operations 

(refuelling and providing intelligence) and this complies with (2) above, or carrying out 

missile strikes with armed drones. 

A report to the US lawmakers explaining why the president did not need to seek 

Congressional approval stated: “US operations do not involve sustained fighting or active 

exchanges of fire with hostile forces, nor do they involve the presence of US ground troops, 

US casualties, or a serious threat thereof.”18

The actual wording of the 1973 War Powers Resolution concerns the introduction of 

armed forces into hostilities or into the territory, airspace, or waters of a foreign nation, 

while equipped for combat. The argument here would have to be that use of drone strikes in 

Libya did not constitute the introduction of US armed forces into hostilities or into foreign 

airspace.

There are at least two important questions that need be addressed here. The first is 

this: are drones now considered to be action short of warfare? As the White House told the 

New York Times: “American involvement fell short of full-blown hostilities.”19 The second 

question is, does the use of remotely piloted armed aircraft constitute the introduction of 

armed forces or not?

Although the US Congress has only been concerned about involvement in Libya, the 

use of drones for targeted killing has been carried out in at least three other countries that 

the US is not at war with: Somalia, Yemen, and Pakistan. Other than Libya, US drone 

operations in these countries are carried out by the intelligence services. Following the 

withdrawal of the QH-50 Drone Anti-Submarine Helicopter (DASH) in 1979, the Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA) was the first in the US to use armed drones. In 2002 they killed 

five men travelling in a Sport Utility Vehicle in Yemen.20

Department of Defense lawyers considered this to be a legitimate defensive pre-emptive 

strike against Al-Qaeda. Since then, the use of drones for targeted killings or “decapitation 

strikes” in States that are not at war with the US has become commonplace. 

Although the US will neither confirm nor deny the strikes officially, the Asia Times has 

called the CIA drone strikes “the most public ‘secret’ war of modern times.”21 The former 

Director of the CIA, Leon Panetta, has certainly been vocal about the operations. In 2008 

he told the Pacific Council on International Policy, “it’s the only game in town in terms of 

confronting and trying to disrupt the Al-Qaeda leadership.”22 Revealing the CIA’s intentions 
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regarding the expansion of targeted drone kills, Panetta went on to say of Al-Qaeda that, 

“If they’re going to go to Somalia, if they’re going to go to Yemen, if they’re going to go 

to other countries in the Middle East, we’ve got to be there and be ready to confront them 

there as well. We can’t let them escape. We can’t let them find hiding places.”23

Apart from Libya, none of the drone strikes in countries not at war with the US have 

even been considered by Congress under the War Powers Resolution. This is a dangerous 

precedent which is, at best, legally questionable under international humanitarian law as 

pointed out by Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial killings. He challenged 

the legality of the targeted killings at a UN General Assembly meeting in October 2009. 

A request was issued for the US to provide legal justification for the CIA’s targeting and 

killing of suspects with a question about who was accountable. The US refused to comment 

on what they said were covert operations and a matter of national security. 

US Department of State legal advisor Harold Koh rebutted Alston indirectly, stating 

that “US targeting practices including lethal operations conducted by UAVs comply with 

all applicable law including the laws of war.”24 However, there are no independent means 

of determining how the targeting decisions are being made. It remains unclear as to what 

type and level of evidence is being used to make decisions that effectively amount to death 

sentences by Hellfire missiles for Non-State actors. The suspects are not provided with an 

opportunity to a appeal or even to surrender. It is also unclear as to what other methods, if 

any, are exhausted or attempted to bring the suspects to justice. The whole process is taking 

place behind a convenient cloak of national secrecy. 

US law professor Kenneth Anderson questioned the CIA’s use of drones in a prepared 

statement to a US Senate hearing: 

[Koh] nowhere mentions the CIA by name in his defense of drone 

operations. It is, of course, what is plainly intended when speaking of selfdefense separate from armed conflict. One understands the hesitation of 

senior lawyers to name the CIA’s use of drones as lawful when the official 

position of the US government, despite everything, is still not to confirm 

or deny the CIA’s operations.25

A subsequent report by Alston in 2010 to the UN General Assembly describes drone 

strikes as violating international and human rights law because both require transparency 

as to the procedures and safeguards that are in place to ensure that killings are lawful and 

justified: “[A] lack of disclosure gives States a virtual and impermissible license to kill.”26 

Some of Alston’s arguments also revolve around the notion of “the right to self-defence” 

and whether drone strikes are legal under Article 51. 

It appears that the US does not consider the CIA strikes or the deployment of armed 

drones in Libya as acts of war. How far will this go? All of the countries that have been 

subject to strikes are militarily inferior and pose little threat to western nations. It seems 

unlikely that more militarily sophisticated countries such as China or Russia would see 

such actions on their territory as actions short of war. The precedent is now in place and it 

will be interesting to see what happens when other countries start doing the same.
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Conclusion

After nearly a century of development, the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle has become 

perhaps the most desired asset amongst the modern militaries of the world. The military 

successes of UAVs in post-9/11 conflicts has created a rapid proliferation of the technology. 

Although there is currently a ‘man-in-the-loop’ for lethal targeting operations, that role 

will shrink incrementally until there is a capability for fully autonomous operation. The 

autonomous functions are likely to be ready long before robots will be able to distinguish 

between combatants and non-combatants in any way that requires battlefield awareness. 

They will not be able to reason appropriately or to make proportionality decisions barring 

some incredible and unpredictable technological breakthrough. 

Concerns over the proliferation of the technology were expressed in this paper. The 

United States and Israel are currently well ahead of the field in terms of armed robot planes, 

but that may change in the near future. Russia has plans for armed unmanned combat 

aircraft, Iran claims to have them, and China is catching up quickly. More than 50 countries 

have been buying and developing the technology. It was pointed out that China will soon 

start selling and exporting its armed drones on the international market.

If they are not stopped, autonomous drones will likely be the tool of choice in future 

wars. While there is a lot of talk that humans will remain in the loop to make lethal targeting 

decisions until the robots can be shown to be capable of obeying the principle of distinction, 

it is likely that military necessity will dictate that this constraint is dropped whether the 

robots are fully compliant with international humanitarian law (IHL) or not. The mantra 

could then change to “Don’t worry, there will be technological fixes in the future.” This 

is similar to what the US has said about not signing the treaty banning cluster munitions. 

The eventual proliferation of autonomous armed robots raises many questions of 

concern. What will happen when two complex algorithms meet in battle? Will the use of 

drones lead to lowering the bar to war because they appear to make it “risk free”? Early 

indications from the current US administration is that drone use is already being considered 

an action short of warfare. What dangerous precedents are being set up by the current spate 

of CIA decapitations for when other countries have similar technology?

It is unclear what changes will need to be made to current international humanitarian 

law. IHL clearly covers the requirements for discrimination and proportionality. 

However, the mapping between the new technologies and IHL can be problematic when 

the operational detail of the new technology is not clear and keeps changing. Some 

clarifications and additions to IHL may be required, but it will be difficult to future-proof 

them. Armed autonomous robots are indiscriminate and disproportionate weapons and we 

must treat them as such now. As such the United Nations should consider placing them on 

the prohibited list of weapons under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. We 

rely on possible future technological fixes at our peril.
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Notes

1. Parts of this paper previously appeared in Noel Sharkey, “Drone Proliferation and the 

Protection of Civilians” in G.L. Beruto, (ed.) International Humanitarian Law and New Weapon 

Technologies. (Milan, 2012).

2. See Teal Group Corporation website: http://bit.ly/psA7rB, (accessed 1 September 2011).

3. I have personally read valid robotics reports for each of the following countries, and there 

may be many more: Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Columbia, Croatia, 

Czech Republic, Ecuador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, 

Italy, Japan, Jordan, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, 

Peru, Philippines, Poland, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Singapore, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, 

Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, 

USA, Vietnam.

4. 2010 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 

November 2010, 79. http://www.uscc.gov, (accessed on 23 October 2013).

5. William Wan and Peter Finn, “Global Race On to Match US Drone Capabilities.” Washington 

Post. 4 July 2011, http://wapo.st/mfRa62, (accessed 10 August 2011).

6. Noel Sharkey, “Cassandra or the False Prophet of Doom: AI Robots and War” IEEE Intelligent 

Systems 2008 23(4): 14. 

7. “USN Wants to Replace F-35s with UAVs” Strategy Page, 11 September 2011. www.

strategypage.com/htmw/htnavai/articles/20110911.aspx., (accessed 11 September 2011).

8. Mike Eisen, “Amazon’s $23,698,93 book about flies” it is NOT junk blog. 22 April 2011. 

www.michaeleisen.org/blog/?p=358, (accessed 10 September 2011).

9. Noel Sharkey, “Cassandra or the False Prophet of Doom,” 14; Noel Sharkey, “Grounds 

for Discrimination: Autonomous Robot Weapons” RUSI Defence Systems (2008) 11(2): 86; Noel 

Sharkey, “Saying No! to Lethal Autonomous Targeting” Journal of Military Ethics (2010) 9(4): 299.

10. But see also John S. Ford, “The Morality of Obliteration Bombing” Theological Studies 

(1944) 5: 261.

11. United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional 

Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, in 

force since 2 December 1983 and an annex to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949.

12. International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (General 

List No 95) (8 July 1996).

13. Sheldon M. Cohen, Arms and Judgment: Law, Morality, and the Conduct of War in the 

Twentieth Century (Boulder, 1989), 34.

14. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York, 2006).

15. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars.

16. Sheldon Cohen, Arms and Judgment, 22. 

17. War Powers Resolution of 1973, Public Law 93-148, 93rd Congress, HJ Res. 542, 7 

November 1973, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/warpower.asp (accessed 27 July 2011).

18. Letter from the President on the War Powers Resolution, 15 June 2011 www.whitehouse.

gov/the-press-office/2011/06/15/letter-president-war-powers-resolution, (accessed 17 August 

2011).

19. Charlie Savage and Mark Landler, “White House Defends Continuing US Role in Libya 

Operation” New York Times, 15 June 2011. www.nytimes.com/2011/06/16/us/politics/16powers.

html?pagewanted=all, (accessed 3 August 2011).

20. Israel may have been using armed drones for longer but they denied this for several years 

despite eyewitness testimony. It cannot be verified here.
192

21. Nick Turse, “Drone Surge: Today, Tomorrow and 2047” Asia Times, 26 January 2010, 

www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LA26Df01.html., (accessed 17 July 2011).

22. Leon Panetta, “Director’s Remarks at the Pacific Council on International Policy, Central 

Intelligence Agency,” 18 May 2009. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/

directors-remarks-at-pacific-council.html, (accessed 23 October 2013).

23. Leon Panetta, “Director’s Remarks at the Pacific Council on International Policy.”

24. Harold Koh, ‘The Obama Administration and International Law.’ Speech delivered at the 

Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law, Washington, DC, 25 March 2010.

25. Kenneth Anderson, Submission to US House of Representatives Committee on Oversight 

and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee 

Hearing, Drones II, 28 April 2010, [20].

26. Philip Alston, Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, 

Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Addendum, 

Study on Targeted Killings. 28 May 2010. UN Doc A/HRC/14/24/Add.6.
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Chapter 17

Developing and Integrating Unmanned Systems for Military Operations

by E. W. Powers

Abstract

Background 

The integration of unmanned systems into military operations requires a comprehensive 

approach and detailed planning with regard to myriad challenges. These challenges 

include: technical, tactical, and economic hurdles, categories of Unmanned Aerial Systems 

(UAS) and whether to weaponize, force structure, Concept of Employment, Concept of 

Operations, Concept of Supportability, Command and Control, training, command and 

control (C2) networks, selection of controllers/operators, standardized Control Stations, 

and ethical and legal implications.

Results 

Once a decision has been made to incorporate unmanned capabilities, how do we 

proceed to achieve our goals? Many of the questions and challenges have already been 

confronted and overcome by other nations and services. It makes sense to incorporate their 

lessons learned and to implement many of their solutions tailored to the individual cultures 

of services and the specific needs of the nation.

Conclusions 

Most of the challenges faced by a military seeking to incorporate unmanned systems 

into their operational concepts have already been studied. Thus, it seems logical that any 

military anticipating an increase in the use of unmanned systems would review what other 

organizations have experienced in order to lessen their own learning curves and provide for 

a smoother transition to their incorporation and employment.

Introduction

Broadly defined, military robots date back to World War II and the Cold War in the 

form of the German Goliath tracked mines and Soviet teletanks.1, 2 In more recent history, 

Unmanned Ground Systems (UGS) have demonstrated their ability to contribute to combat 

operations through their use in OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM (OIF) and OPERATION 

ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF). Since operations in Iraq and Afghanistan began, more 

than 6,000 unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) have been procured and deployed.3 

While not at the investment level of UAS, UGS have proven their ability to contribute 

to combat operations, particularly with regard to locating and neutralizing improvised 

explosive devices (IEDs). Unmanned Systems (UMS) technology is rapidly maturing. The 

advancement of UGS is dependent on a wide variety of technologies that are maturing at 

varying paces. 

Warfighters today use many systems that would be considered unmanned systems, e.g. 

remote weapon systems, unattended ground sensors, networked munitions, ground based 

operational surveillance systems, etc. For the purposes of this treatise, a typical UGS may 

consist of:
194

1. Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV)—A powered physical modular system with no 

human operator aboard, designed to be able to control its sensing and action for the 

purpose of accomplishing assigned tasks in the physical environment. The UGV 

can include any and all associated supporting components such as operator control 

units (OCUs), power supply, common integrating software, payloads, intelligence, 

with human interface and command override capability.

2. Operator Control Unit (OCU)—A mobile device that allows the operator to control 

a UGV and receive data fed from the UGV sensors. Additionally, the OCU should 

be capable of controlling multiple types of networked tactical sensors and UAVs 

that are outside the scope of this roadmap.

3. Robotic Appliqué Kits (RAK)—An appliqué kit designed to provide fully integrated, 

safe and secure operation of existing vehicles with minimum modification to the 

host vehicle. The RAK system is nominally comprised of a portable OCU, vehicle 

mounted control modules, feedback interface, and an electro-hydraulic system. 

4. Human Element—Although UGVs will have varying levels of autonomy, to 

include fully programmable mission planning, there remains a “man-in-the-loop” 

overseeing the actions of the UGV with the ability to change mission profiles on 

the move, and assume operator control.

5. Payload—the payload is the component of the UGV that allows it to accomplish its 

mission. Payloads include optical sensors for daylight navigation, IR and thermal 

sensors to “see” thermal images in day or night conditions, sensors that can detect 

various signatures with the capability of relaying them to an operator via the 

system’s data links. Non-sensor type payloads include communications packages, 

weapons, explosives, electronic jammers, detection systems, manipulator arms, 

and cargo delivery.

Challenges

Why are unmanned vehicles so attractive? There are numerous reasons, but chief 

among them are the following:

1. Unmanned systems provide cost effective persistence, reach, striking 

power, and access.

2. Unmanned systems improve our understanding of air, sea, ground, 

and undersea domains.

3. Unmanned systems overcome the limits of human physiology.

4. Unmanned systems limit risk to military personnel.

5. Unmanned systems are force multipliers.

Despite the myriad reasons for increasing procurement and employment of UMS, there 

remain numerous challenges.

Technical

Critical unmet research needs in robotics for military applications include safe 

operations around humans, 360o

 platform mobility, tele-operations, and human-machine 
195

interface. Issues to be addressed include developing advanced autonomous UMS that 

are able to make decisions in the field and execute tactical behavior changes to achieve 

goals; ability to respond to varying degrees of autonomous control exerted by controllers; 

platform mobility including power, energy, storage, and hybrid technologies; controllers, 

whether machine or human; and reliability, manufacturing, and repair.

In order to ensure that UGS are integrated into our structure and our concepts of 

operations, technology and platform matches must be monitored to ensure we do not ask 

for too much too soon and end up with a system that is unable to support our operations.

Tactical

UGS will likely become ubiquitous throughout the force. How these capabilities are 

organized and distributed will require a thorough review of ways and means to determine 

the optimal placement of each UMS based primarily on its function and how it can be best 

positioned and controlled to provide the best support.

Incorporation of UMS is an unresolved issue of when and how rather than “if.” If UMS 

are to be utilized to their maximum utility, they will support and complement both airborne 

and land based systems. To provide maximum flexibility and basing options, it may well 

be that UMS must be multi-sited within the force. 

Economic

As the cost of weapons systems, particularly manned aircraft skyrocket, it becomes 

more and more logical to procure weapons that are less expensive and, more importantly, 

reduce risk to our military personnel. The cost of one F-35 approximately equals one multimission UAS system consisting of 10–12 UAVs plus associated equipment. 

Concepts of...

Employment

UGS-equipped platoons and squads will operate against enemies who know the complex 

terrain and understand friendly rules of engagement. They will be willing to fight in heavily 

populated urban areas and will rejoice in collateral damage caused by our operations. They 

will attempt to use the advantage of long, straight streets for long range direct fires and will 

use ground level, upper story, and subterranean avenues of approach and firing positions to 

engage from unexpected aspects. They will attempt to cut off and isolate Marines, working 

to overrun small units with the intent of capturing or killing Americans for information 

operations. Enemies will use obstacles to stop or channelize Marine forces in order to delay 

the force or inflict casualties. They will attempt to use time to their advantage focusing on 

delaying units long enough to tax their ability to resupply.

Operations

UGVs will likely be the predominant vehicles conducting missions within buildings, 

tunnels, and through hostile city streets. This requires that UGVs be able to operate in 

Global Positioning System (GPS)-denied areas, traverse stairs, deal with elevators, open 

doors and possibly even open windows, desk and file drawers, and cupboards. UGVs 

will need to navigate within and through city streets that may be busy with traffic and 
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pedestrians. Urban streets also mean UGVs will have to contend with curbs, trash, water 

drains, etc. UGVs will have the unique requirement of dealing with changing terrain due 

to weather; UGVs must be able to travel on ground that is hard and stable one minute, and 

then becomes mud several minutes later. They must be able to navigate and maneuver in 

spite of dust kicked up by their own movement or windy conditions, as well as when the 

ground becomes slippery due to rain or freezing conditions. Snow accumulation becomes 

a terrain feature with which UGVs will have to contend, not only in terms of being able to 

travel while snow is falling, but also over roads covered in snow or ice. UGVs will have 

to be equipped with the sensors and perception algorithms to make decisions about when 

it is permissible to travel in these types of terrain or when it is better to delay the mission.4 

Supportability

Requirements for austere basing drive key UGS supportability requirements with 

reliability, availability, and maintainability as integral design elements. 

Reliability studies show that the Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) for a UGV is 

currently 6 to 24 hours, well below the desired 96 hours.5

 Metrics for MTBF will need 

to be established to ensure that UGVs can reliably accomplish their missions once they 

have been deployed and employed. UGVs must routinely be ready for use. Availability 

will depend on several factors, most importantly reliability, the ability of manufacturers to 

provide vehicles, and the efficiency of the parts supply system. 

UGVs will almost certainly be used in austere environments with little infrastructure 

support. Accordingly, they must be simple to maintain in an expeditionary environment, 

requiring primarily remove and replace maintenance actions to ensure that they remain 

simple and supportable by Marines using them in the field.

Command & Control (C2)

Command and control is the exercise of authority and direction over assigned or attached 

forces in the accomplishment of a mission; it is how the commander transmits his intent 

and decisions to the force and receives feedback. Command and control involves arranging 

personnel, equipment, and facilities to allow the commander to extend his influence over 

the force during the planning and conducting of military operations.

UGS will enhance situational awareness of commanders and leaders by providing nearreal-time relevant information of the operational environment through the use of an open 

architecture. UMS must be able to ‘plug and play’ into the C2 system regardless of whether 

the operation is joint, coalition, or multi-national. These systems will feature a common 

control standard that facilitates interoperability with current and future communications 

systems and will continue to perform in a degraded or interrupted C2.

UMS should also be able to unplug from the common C2 system for limited duration 

when conducting small unit distributed operations. This will require a high-data-rate wireless 

local-area network, or network on the move. Without C2 architecture improvements, UGS 

and other new systems will not be employed to their full potential; at worst they could lead 

to risky commitments of weapons and forces beyond a commander’s ability to effectively 

control or support them. 
197

In the future, UAS and UGS may need to be capable of autonomous cooperation. The 

UAS will preview the ground vehicle’s intended corridor of advance, building a threedimensional model of the terrain. The ground vehicle then plans a detailed route, avoiding 

obstacles that the UAS sees in the path of the ground vehicle. As the ground vehicle moves 

along, it compares its three-dimensional perceptions with the UAS three-dimensional map, 

registering the aerial and ground world models. 

Training and Education

Effective training for the individuals selected to operate various UMS is the key to 

successful integration of UMS into military formations. 

Training facilities must be equipped with the exact same controllers and vehicles as 

operators will use in combat operations. While simulators can provide an excellent basic 

framework for the strengths, limitations, and procedures required to efficiently operate 

UMS, the training cannot be so generic in nature that operators must learn or relearn the 

layout of equipment or the inputs required to successfully employ UMS.

The controllers/operators of remotely piloted aircraft (RPAs) must be selected based on 

a comprehensive analysis of their capabilities and their potential for successfully operating 

UMS. The question of whether they should be officers or enlisted, specifically trained to 

a military occupational specialty, or control UMS as a collateral duty is a moot point. The 

essential consideration is selecting the right people to operate UMS.

We must then identify, track, and manage critical skills related to unmanned 

capabilities, both for operators and maintainers. The manning required for UGVs may 

become a contentious topic. Although the long term goal is for UGS to reduce personnel 

requirements, the short term reality is that while they may reduce the number of personnel 

put at risk, there may be an increase in personnel requirements to operate and support UGS.

In addition to operators, the users of UMS capabilities and services must also be 

thoroughly trained in the employment, capabilities, and limitations of UMS. Whether they 

are Forward Air Controllers (FAC), Joint Tactical Air Controllers (JTAC), Forward Air 

Controllers, Airborne (FACA), Forward Observers (FO) or personnel who may be required 

to ask for UMS support, they must be trained, qualified, and certified to perform the actions 

for which they are authorized.

This brings up an important point if any UMS has a lethal role. One important 

question that must be answered is, “Who owns the weapon?” Implied in this question is 

precisely who has the authority to approve the lethal use of a UMS? Depending upon ROE, 

commander’s intent, and the political situation, anyone fulfilling that role must be aware 

of the employment considerations and the impact of using lethal force with UMS. This, 

of course, leads directly to the issue of UMS autonomy. While we do not currently allow 

autonomous engagement of personnel, a strong argument can be made for autonomous 

engagement of other UMS, structures, or equipment. This will be one of the topics of 

heated discussion as the autonomy of UMS matures during the next decade.

A result of the relative immaturity of UGS on the battlefield is a lack of understanding 

and appreciation for the worth and value of UGS in operations. Operators and experienced 

users have great appreciation and respect for what these systems bring to the fight. Senior 
198

leadership should not have to wait until they are in the fight to learn the value of having 

this capability. They should be exposed to what the UGS can offer, how they operate, 

when they cannot operate, and how they can be incorporated into the scheme of maneuver 

at the earliest opportunity. UGS employment should be taught as part of career and toplevel school curriculums. A high degree of inefficiency is introduced when commanders 

routinely request a higher degree of “control” over an asset than is tactically necessary. 

Leadership will be best served if they understand and appreciate UGS employment and 

operations. 

Legal and Ethical Implications

The hope that technology will reduce the violence of war is a venerable one. The poet 

John Donne suggested in 1621 that the invention of better cannons would help limit the 

cruelty and crimes of war, “and the great expence of bloud is avoyed.” Richard Gatling 

hoped his new fast-firing gun would serve to reduce the bloodshed of war, while Alfred 

Nobel believed the explosives he invented would make war unthinkable. 

The military use of UMS has been thoroughly reviewed and found to be in compliance 

with the western view of legal warfare. The primary considerations are:

1. Conform to major tenets of laws of war.

2. Proportionality: no unnecessary violence.

3. Do not intentionally kill civilians.

4. Operator conforms to rules of engagement. 

5. Man-in-the-loop in target identification to assure enemy combatant; 

man-in-the-loop during engagement to minimize civilian casualties.

6. Adheres to the Principle for Humanity or Unnecessary Suffering.

7. Weapons should not cause undue suffering. 

8. Legal review by HQDA: consistent with international legal obligations. 

Existing documents that guide the use of UMS include the 1988 Intermediate-Range 

Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty which prohibits testing, production, or launch of nuclear and 

conventional ground-launched cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km and 

the Missile Technology and Control Regime (MTCR) which restricts the proliferation of 

missiles, rocket systems, and/or UAVs capable of carrying 500 kg payload 300 kilometers, 

and systems intended to deliver WMD.

Unmanned systems seem to offer several ways of reducing the mistakes and unintended 

costs of war. They have far better sensors and processing power, which creates a precision 

superior to what humans could marshal on their own. Such exactness can lessen the 

number of mistakes made, as well as the number of civilians inadvertently killed. Now, 

some analysts believe that “robot warriors” can help reduce the flow of blood and perhaps 

make war more moral. 

However, when considering lethal engagements and the taking of life, current policy 

demands that there be a human-in-the-loop to make the final life or death decision. The 

near future may see a human-on-the-loop methodology that requires human intervention 
199

only in the case of uncertainty or to comply with ROE. The lethal engagement of enemy 

personnel requires that the operator conforms to ROE and that there is a man-in-the-loop 

positive identification (PID).

Recommendations

In order to set the conditions for successful implementation of UMS, there are several 

important steps that must be accomplished.

First we must examine future scenarios and desired capabilities to determine what we 

think will be the most likely and most dangerous scenarios so that we can organize, train, 

and equip our forces accordingly.

Next we must identify the capability we have today. By comparing and contrasting 

current capabilities with what we think the future scenarios will require, we will be able 

to formulate the difference and what equipment will help in successfully dominating the 

future environment. 

 Given that we have determined the shortfall between today’s capabilities and what 

we think will be required in the future, we can identify actions required to get to future 

capabilities. We must match those compelling future requirements to UMS capabilities 

then identify and sequence actions to enable fielding of UMS capabilities. Then, of course, 

the hope is that the future we have identified and the future that actually occurs bear some 

similarity.

We must identify those lessons learned that are relevant and that will speed our learning 

and acquisition processes. For example in planning the employment of armed UMS we 

must consider such intangibles as positive identification, target location, collateral damage 

estimates, and the availability of trained controllers and operators. There are myriad reports 

and lessons to be gleaned regarding the use of UMS in a Joint/Multi-National/Coalition 

environment. These lessons are particularly of use in training and in planning for future 

operations employing UMS.

Conclusion

Unmanned systems must be useful to the Warfighter. They can conduct persistent 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), provide logistics support to small 

units and dispersed formations, and can provide force application, including targeting 

and kinetic and non-kinetic fires, while protecting the force through standoff from threat 

capabilities. UGS will enable sustainment and force support operations through the increased 

automation of critical missions, including: assured mobility, transportation, distribution, 

maintenance, explosive ordnance disposal, crash-fire-rescue operations, communications, 

and health services. UMS will enable employment of integrated teams of air, ground, and 

maritime unmanned and manned systems for combat, combat support, and combat service 

support capabilities to defeat adversaries under any foreseeable conditions.6

The UGS enhances the ability to execute high-tempo combat operations with 

confidence. This includes agile support to ground forces through simultaneous insertions 

of sustainment items at multiple objectives—followed by robust sustainment of that force. 

UGS provide in-theater commanders at all levels with more options and greater flexibility 
200

in the execution of the campaign plan. The capabilities offered by the UGS directly result in 

shorter campaigns, fewer casualties, and mission success. They not only offer commanders 

a quantum leap forward over today’s capabilities, but a force multiplier that transforms 

emerging operational concepts into reality.
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Notes

1. The Goliath tracked mine (complete name: Leichter Ladungsträger Goliath (Sd.Kfz. 

302/303a/303b)) was a remote controlled German-engineered demolition vehicle, also known as 

the beetle tank. Employed by the Wehrmacht during World War II, this caterpillar-tracked vehicle 

was approximately four feet long, two wide, and one tall. It carried 75–100 kg (165–220 lb) of high 

explosives and was intended to be used for multiple purposes, such as destroying tanks, disrupting 

dense infantry formations, and demolition of buildings and bridges.

2. Teletanks were a series of wireless remotely controlled unmanned tanks produced in the Soviet 

Union in the 1930s and early 1940s. They saw some use in combat during the Winter War. A teletank 

is controlled by radio from a control tank at a distance of 500–1,500 meters, the two constituting 

a telemechanical group. Teletanks were equipped with DT machine guns, flamethrowers, smoke 

canisters, and sometimes a special 200–700 kg time bomb in an armored box, dropped by the tank 

near the enemy’s fortifications and used to destroy bunkers.

3. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap (FY 2009-

2034), 2nd Edition, 6 April 2009.

4. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Unmanned Systems Integrated Roadmap.

5. Jennifer Carlson and Robin Murphy, “How UGVs Physically Fail in the Field”, IEEE 

Transactions on Robotics, Vol. 21, No. 3, June 2005: 423-437.

6. Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC)-TRADOC, Initial Capabilities Document for 

Unmanned Systems (Air, Ground, and Maritime), 2010.

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Chapter 18

The Use of Robots on the Battlefield: Benefits, Constraints, and Limitations 

for Soldiers

by Gérard de Boisboissel

Introduction

Future conflicts will combine—barring the use of customary armed forces in 

conventional warfare—conflict asymmetry with unclear, moving boundaries and criminal/

terrorist acts that will be on par with military action.

Military power will thus have to adapt and be more flexible just as recent conflicts have 

already shown how wars are now conducted. It can therefore be recalled that:

1. The Joint Tactical Group of Kapisa—also known as “Task Force 

Korrigan”—was a French battalion stationed in Afghanistan’s 

Kapisa Province. It adopted the strategy of World War II German 

KampfGruppen as a basis for their tactics in the Afghan war. 

2. The area a soldier should control on the battlefield has considerably 

increased in the last century due to the scarcity of military resources 

and the relative insecurity in insurgent areas.

3. Most military operations at the international level are intended to be 

joint/combined operations. This requires a great deal of coordination 

and constant information exchanges with a clearly defined hierarchy 

within the Coalition Force. 

These are just a few examples of the changes that have arisen in recent conflicts. 

Robots are new components and are changing the nature of war. As tools at the service of 

soldiers, they undeniably bring new capabilities to armed forces, but only if implementation 

constraints are not obstacles to their acceptance or use.

Expectations and Advantages of Unmanned Systems

To start with, it is worth considering what we expect from robotic systems:

1. First, robots are used for protection, i.e. to reduce the exposure of a 

soldier to risks. For instance, assistance in demining, help in mission 

reconnaissance, protection of convoys in risk zones, clearance of 

contaminated areas (CBRN: Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and 

Nuclear areas). They create a greater distance (standoff) from combat 

threats, are the first to take on the shock before infantry, and can detect 

the exact location from where shots are fired. They can respond in 

real-time in a few milliseconds, as Counter Rocket Artillery Mortar 

systems do, with an embedded decision-making system.

*This article originally published in Vaclav Krivanek and Alexandr Stefek (eds.) International 

Conference in Military Technology Proceedings (ICMT), (Brno, 2013), 1359-1370.*

*
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2. Robots are also there to increase the effectiveness of a fighting soldier, 

bringing tactical advantages in executing his/her mission. They are 

used most notably to extend areas of control and coverage of a tactical 

unit, see Figure 12. This is done by using remote effectors, sensors, and 

weapons placed on-board each robot. In a sense, they are the “remote 

organs” of a soldier’s eyes, ears, arms, touch, and even mouth.

3. Robots can have much higher deployment speeds than Man. This 

can help in anticipating enemy actions or reacting immediately to 

a threat with greater efficiency. Robots can also help in maneuvers 

by identifying terrain features to facilitate progression, carrying out 

terrain preparation, or securing a given area. They are more accurate 

than humans for performing specific data processing needs, including 

threat warnings and identifying targets.

4. Finally, robots are a help in reducing human energy: they can replace 

soldiers in repetitive, tedious tasks (surveillance missions and regular 

patrols, transport logistics and general supplies), making room for 

operational forces to act when needed. Robots can also help the fighter 

by carrying supplies, ammunition and even weapons during longdistance missions (ground grid level, infiltration). On a more strategic 

level, robots reduce attrition as combat operations continue, enabling 

fighting units to stay on the battlefield much longer than before, see 

Figure 13.

Such expectations provide a wide range of benefits for military forces. The spectrum 

is still very broad and the assumption is that each country will develop specific national 

systems. In this regard, at the “Robots on the Battlefield” International Symposium 

Figure 12. Robots Extend the Unit Control Area.

 Source: Created by Author.

Unit Control Area Extension Zone 

Using Robots
205

organized by the Saint-Cyr Military Academy in 2011, the French Chief of Staff proposed 

the following:

1. Enhance the capabilities of combined Task Forces in Contact 

Intelligence solutions. 

2. Improve the capacity to detect, identify, neutralize, and destroy mine/

explosive threats.

3. Complement the destructive capability of Task Forces in fire delivery 

and the use of weapons. 

4. Participate in forward logistics (supplying soldiers during combat).1

Forward-looking tactical scenarios are presented below.

Forward-looking Scenarios for the Use of Robots by a Combat Section or 

Platoon

Lieutenant O’Kill Scenario: Use of a Robotics Screen prior to the Advance of his 

Platoon

We are in the year 2030. Lieutenant O’Kill’s mission is to make a reconnaissance of an 

axis point in a valley. He has been instructed to protect the life of his men as far as possible. 

He liaises with the Theater of Operations Command through satellite communications and 

 Source: Created by Author.

Figure 13. Robots Reduce a Unit’s Attrition Through Time. 2

Main Effort

Sustained Effort 

Reduce

Vulnerability

Time

Tactical Efficiency

Attrition

of the Unit

Main Effort

Sustained Effort 

Reduce

Vulnerability

Time

Tactical Efficiency

Attrition

of the Unit
206

has several robotized squads at his disposal: a fire support and protection squad with armed 

Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs), two recon squads equipped with UGVs and semiremotely piloted Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), and an Explosive Ordnance Disposal 

squad (EOD) to deal with potential IED (Improvised Explosive Devices), and robots to 

support and alleviate the burden on combat troops.

Lieutenant O’Kill requests the Theater of Operations Command to take over the 

control of his unit’s robots, to serve as a flank guard on the east side of the valley. The unit’s 

mission is deemed secondary due to visibility and its position in an open field. Hence, 

Lieutenant O’Kill does not want to take any chances. To proceed with greater security, 

he gives the order for robot operators to dismount from vehicles and places them near his 

command, see Figure 14.

The remote control of the robots is set to match the maximum firing range of weapons 

supplied to the unit (600 meters). The UGV is hence set at this range (with encryption 

depending on distance and the type of robot) and the UAV range is set at 2000 meters. 

Before giving his troops the order to move forward, Lieutenant O’Kill launches UAVs 

to observe the area and its surroundings. He then sends a UGV for a reconnaissance mission 

Figure 14. Deployment of Robots.

 Source: Created by Author.
207

along the axis, just ahead of the platoon. If an IED is detected, EOD operators are then in 

charge to send a robot to destroy the device(s) as illustrated in Figure 15. 

Let us now analyze the constraints faced by Lieutenant O’Kill’s platoon and offer some 

remarks:

1. Preparatory phase: the lieutenant should configure each robot for its 

specific mission.

2. Platoon transport: both soldiers and robots have to be transported to 

the field of operations. Yet, there is limited room in combat vehicles. 

The next generation of combat vehicles will need extra space for the 

transport of robots or a separate transport should be envisaged. 

3. Mini UAV Operators can operate remotely within vehicles, but UGV 

Operators should operate dismounted from vehicles for two reasons: 

a) for better visibility and b) to monitor operations.

4. Lieutenant O’Kill has multiple responsibilities: field reconnaissance, 

surveillance, flank protection, and supporting and protecting his 

soldiers. He therefore needs to perform a multi-robot control exercise. 

This requires an operator within his platoon to achieve the results he 

wants in the field. He has the support of the Theater of Operations 

Figure 15. Lieutenant O’Kill’s Scenario.

 Source: Created by Author.
208

Command providing him remote operators, via satellite, for protecting 

his flank. Robots used for flank protection can be dispatched to units 

when requested, from a pool of robots in reserve.

5. There are several operators in this scenario. This is a risk as they need 

to be replaced if unfit for combat. Can the Army afford hiring extra 

operators and train them for such a task? The best solution is to train 

operators who are able to control several robots. 

6. Lieutenant O’Kill’s disposition is complex, but must nevertheless 

remain very discreet and fluid in use. 

7. Managing various robotic systems in the platoon implies repeating 

main mission orders for each robot operator.

Lieutenant Safetown’s Scenario: Use of Robots in an Urban Offensive

We are in 2025. Lieutenant Safetown has been ordered to make a reconnaissance of a 

town where insurgents have been spotted the previous day. The risk is high of being shot 

by a sniper or by insurgents hiding in a building. The tension is high within the platoon and 

everyone fears for his/her life and the lives of their comrades in arms.

Figure 16. Lieutenant Safetown’s Scenario in an Urban Area.

 Source: Created by Author.

3

COVER

1

RECON

Robots

2

SUPPORT

RADIO RELAY

SUPPORT

3

COVER

1

RECON

Robots

2

SUPPORT

RADIO RELAY

SUPPORT
209

Lieutenant Safetown launches a radio relay balloon on a high point at the rear of his 

position. He sends a mini UAV to observe the rooftops of the city. He then deploys two 

cover robots for observation and a fire support robot to face the primary axis. Afterwards, 

combat squads are sent, advancing in phase line, and making a reconnaissance of city 

buildings. Robots are thus used to secure the mission’s advance, see Figure 16.

As an entrenched enemy has been identified in a house, a cover robot is sent to that 

location for combat deception (track vehicle noise, helicopter noise, etc.). Lieutenant 

Safetown then re-positions a fire support robot closer to the action.

Let’s look at Figure 17 to analyze constraints faced by Lieutenant Safetown’s platoon 

and list key ideas:

1. On an organizational level, a decision has to be made at the outset who 

will be responsible for operating robots in the platoon and who can 

replace him/her. Robotic systems should be simple to operate as they 

are managed by soldiers under stress in case of threat.

2. In a combat zone, a soldier is affected by high adrenaline levels and 

performs basic repeated practices. S/he feels everything but can hardly 

speak and, above all, it is his/her weapon that assures his/her safety. 

Figure 17. Final Assault Using Robots.

 Source: Created by Author.

1

SUPPORT

3

2

COVER

SECURE

SUPPORT

1

SUPPORT

3

2

COVER

SECURE

SUPPORT
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Giving orders to robot operators by word is not only complicated but 

is a major constraint. It also goes against the principle of discretion. 

3. The key factor in controlling robots is the design of a communications’ 

protocol in the structure of orders. Such a protocol must be kept simple. 

Orders must be kept to basics, of the type “Order given and Out.” 

4. The most appropriate technical solutions for controlling robots 

have not yet been fully tested. One option is to issue commands via 

digital weapons as the one used by the French FELIN system for 

foot-soldiers.3

 As the robot needs to know where it has to perform an 

action, a control function integrated in the weapon (a laser designator 

providing targeting) enables an operator to maintain his/her hands on 

a weapon. Other possible options are headsets with increased reality 

features as well as brain control (which could be operational by 2030), 

although he/she should remain fully focused on his/her task, despite 

the fight. Commanding by gestures is also a possibility as gestures are 

commonly used by soldiers in groups; they also correspond to basic 

repetitive acts in combat. Leap motion technology is an interesting 

example provided that the module can adapt to an operator’s 

movements.4

 A touch screen could be used and placed, for example, 

on his/her forearm. 

Limitations and Constraints in the Use of Robots

We have demonstrated the advantages of using robots and have seen examples of their 

use on the battlefield. We will now focus on the constraints and limitations in their use. 

First, there are physical limitations (open field and indoor limitations) which, with current 

technological constraints (maneuverability, speed, etc.) are barriers for the deployment of 

robots on the battlefield. Second, engineers should ensure human constraints in combat - 

and the consequence of conducting battles with robots—have been clearly defined prior to 

any development. In the heart of a battle, an operator must be able to master his/her robot 

and not just rely on it. Other examples of general constraints in the use of military robotic 

systems are given hereafter. 

Operational Constraints

In a classic daytime mission, it would be ideal if equipment had between 12 and 24 

hours of autonomous power. It is an imperative need to have back-up power during any 

mission. This can be done in the field if the procedure is simple and, if not, should be 

planned in advance (changing batteries, automatic charging on platforms, etc.) 

The ideal robot is one posing no constraints in its use. It should move at the same 

pace as the platoon and not be the cause of delays, nor hasten the advance of the platoon. 

It should move discreetly and avoid identifying friendly devices. During night operations, 

additional discretion is required and the robot must not be noisy so that it endangers the 

mission.

The traditional organization of combat units should not be burdened by the use of 

military robotics, but can be adapted. One could imagine a three party manned combat unit 
211

that could be split as follows: a) an infantryman controlling intelligence robots, b) another 

infantryman controlling support robots, and c) a leader controlling a fire support robot.

Environmental Constraints

Robots should be operational at any time and in all weather conditions (heat, cold, rain, 

snow, mud). At night, operators should also be capable of grasping a robot’s exact position. 

If UAVs, Unmanned Surface Vehicles (USVs), and Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUVs) 

can operate in a homogeneous and fluid environment, this is not the case with UGVs. They 

are totally dependent on the nature of the ground for their movements. Physical obstacles 

humans are able to cross can be impassable for robots as illustrated in Figure 18. 

The ability to perform jumps or leaps, or even occasionally fly, would solve some of these 

problems.

Communication Transmission Constraints

Outside recurrent transmission problems (e.g. speed, range, penetration), spectrum 

sharing should be checked before commencing a mission to ensure communications 

frequencies are available and unscrambled. As frequencies are shared within Coalition 

Forces, each unit should ensure the availability of the frequencies used on the battlefield 

before any movement.

When a unit moves into unknown terrain, military infrastructure has not yet been 

deployed. The lieutenant should consequently ensure the radio coverage of robots. A mesh 

network topology could be a solution where each robot acts as a node that can receive, 

send, and relay data. There is then no need to use centralized communications’ relays that 

can be vulnerable and, depending on the tactical situation, it also enables scalable radio 

cover. 

The bandwidth used on a battlefield is asymmetric between a) the download link 

(operator to robot), b) the robot to robot link (position, alarms, and optional relays), and 

c) the upload link (robot to operator) for large data transmissions. Naturally, all forms of 

latency in executing commands should be avoided for a proper control of robots. 

Figure 18. Natural Obstacles.

 Source: USDA Forest Service.
212

Human Limitations

Such limitations are linked with the physical limits of the soldier. During combat, a 

soldier’s hands should not be hindered by control devices which should be simple to use, 

not disturbing his/her attention. Data should be kept simple because “too much information 

kills information” and can distract an operator. 

All this reveals the need for a quality recruitment of robot operators. They should 

be both hardened soldiers and good technicians with a quick mind, to grasp challenging 

situations. 

During combat, platoon leaders rarely use all the capabilities they may have. They need 

to overcome stress and hence tend to focus their attention on available human resources 

and accessible equipment rather than the technological resources at their disposal.

Requirements for the Use of Military Robots

In this section, we shall analyze the key requirements for the use of military robots in 

a combat unit.

Adaptation Phase

An operator should acquire a natural exchange with robots. This will ascertain smooth 

operations in a combat zone. Each unit should also be informed of the tactical potential and 

limitations of robots. Prior to combat operations, soldiers will require training to understand 

how to maneuver with robots in the field. Moreover, as Professor Serge Tisseron has 

warned, soldiers should have a certain form of aversion in using robots on a battlefield, as 

they should not endanger their lives to save what are simple tools at their disposal..5

Modular Design of Robots

1. A robot cannot match all the needs of land forces. To illustrate: Robots 

should be configured appropriately for each mission where adaptable 

modules could be mounted for a more versatile use.

2. Modularity would help in adapting to the terrain and reacting 

immediately to a given threat. It would contribute to the platoon’s 

reorganization.

3. Robots should be dispatched to other platoons with no sense of 

ownership. They would be part of a pool of robots serving and 

supporting all units according to needs. This would significantly 

decrease costs. 

Controlling Robots

In overseas operations, “friendly fire” unfortunately causes collateral damage. 

Accordingly, it is of utmost importance to control robots when placed in autonomous mode 

to avoid the risk of casualties. An operator must always have a final say for any lethal 

decision. A soldier must be accountable for his/her actions in combat and respect the rules 

of armed conflict (this is not the case of an automatic Counter-Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar 

[C-RAM] system as its decision-taking time is much faster than that of humans). Similarly, 
213

if a robot performs some discrimination in target recognition, it must be controlled by an 

operator to confirm a target and obviate blunders.

High information exchanges should be managed. With high stress levels, a soldier’s 

attention is low. Data received should therefore be limited when contact has been made, 

with key data alone transmitted to the soldier (depending on the gravity of the situation). 

A soldier should not be technologically dependent on robots. It is therefore important 

to have the possibility of switching to a downgraded mode whenever necessary. Switching 

from one mode to another would be practiced during training sessions including examples 

of mechanical failures (break-down, destruction, no return, etc.).

Cooperating with Other Operators

Future battlefields will be digitized. Military equipment will have communications 

modules, even with low technology. This is obviously the case with robots and their large 

numbers on battlefields will require more operators to control them.

An increasing volume of data transiting via networks will need to be structured in such 

a way that an adequate amount of information is delivered at command level. Specific 

rules will be established to deliver the right level of information to the correct echelon 

of command for decisions to be made. Such decisions should not be made at operational 

command level, leaving lower ranks with no control; for example, the commanding officer 

should be prevented from taking over the control of a mission under the responsibility of 

a platoon leader.

It is recommended that robot operators interact with one another on the battlefield 

and get to know each other for improved coordination. Regular meetings could be held 

to promote mutual trust amongst them. In this way, endangering friendly dispositions can 

be avoided and the risk of friendly fire lessened. This will also be done by improving the 

perception of robotic systems and detecting friendly forces by such systems.

If there is a growing enemy threat to a unit in the field, a specific procedure can be 

developed for robots to assist friendly forces in close proximity. For instance, the program 

mode in drones could be modified to allow the vehicles to expeditiously identify a threat or 

spot an enemy (circle above the enemy unit, for example, or signal by waggling its wings).

Avoiding Compromise

After analyzing world conflicts over the ages, we have learned that we should prevent 

friendly military equipments from falling into enemy hands. We should therefore prevent 

an enemy from recovering data from a captured robot. This can be done by:

1. Destroying the robot before its capture by the enemy (remote 

destruction);

2. Encrypting stored data in the robot (implementing access codes).

It is important to note that embedding voice signature modules in robots, capable of 

recognizing the voice of their owner(s), may not be a viable solution since robots need to 

be inter-changeable among units.
214

Configuring and “Educating” Military Robots

A machine does what it is programmed to do. It should be programmed to be secure and 

comply with the Rules of Engagement of the Armed Forces. Security rules should therefore 

be defined for robots. When designing a robot’s embedded software, all commands a 

robot can process and overall events that could occur in the field should be listed. It is 

then possible to deduct dangerous scenarios from the program, thus avoiding mistakes in 

software design. 

Compliance with the Rules of Engagement should also be analyzed. Every mission 

and all types of conflict have specific rules. It is the role of the Military Force Doctrine 

Development Center to define such rules.6

1. Rules could be translated into a software language and serve as a 

safeguard for the execution of orders given to robots.

2. Given the non-human nature of robots, contacts with the population 

should be avoided in certain missions. It depends on the tension and 

danger of a mission and also how soldiers are perceived.7

 One can 

understand such rules differ from the ones in the civilian world. Only 

military authorities may establish them and robots just have to follow 

them.

Ethics is the science of thinking and making a decision, on a case by case basis, of 

what should be done. It is hence the art of solving complicated moral dilemmas according 

to Thierry Pichevin.8

 If ethical cases are complex for humans, it is difficult to give credence 

to algorithms being coded in an ethical manner. Writing algorithms with ethical safeguards 

should nonetheless be considered in the future, more especially for target discrimination. 

For example, if a robot is unclear in identifying a target (children, civilians, etc.), a protocol 

confirming the target should be implemented with a human kept in the loop.

Before each mission, robots have to be configured. This is only one aspect in 

mission preparation which can be secured with a back-up system and a copy of the initial 

configuration. It will enable a rapid reconfiguration of a blank robot in case of failure or 

destruction. 

In case of loss of contact with a robot, it should be able to return to its home base 

independently or go into “sleep mode” thus obviating its use by the enemy. 

Conclusions

Having listed expected advantages in the use of robots as well as their limitations and 

constraints, a critical step in the process of supplying military robots still remains: testing.

Robots have to be controlled and tested. Without going into the details of industrial and 

certification tests, a robot should undergo tests in an operational environment. Furthermore, 

its announced features should be tested and approved in field conditions.

More importantly, there is also the need for humans to be tested. This would include 

configuration and reconfiguration tests based on tasks assigned to robots, modularity 

tests covering the addition and deduction of optional modules, inter-operability tests with 
215

robotic systems and handling tests by operators (who must be regular soldiers). Empathy 

tests could also be included to ensure there is no rejection of the machine by an operator or 

too emotional a relation with the robot.

Only then can military unit training commence, with robots included in military 

exercises. In spite of the extraordinary contribution robots may have in protecting fighters, 

providing tactical advantages and preserving manpower, one should not forget that it is 

the soldier who is the centerpiece of the military operation - even if his/her actions can 

sometimes be pushed aside by robots.

Finally, although benefits out-weigh constraints, robots should never be used as an 

excuse for stopping or cancelling a mission.
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Notes

1. Eric Ozanne, “La robotisation du groupement tactiques interarmes” in Didier Danet, JeanPaul Hanon, and Gérard de Boisboissel (eds.) La guerre robotisée. (Economica, 2012), 306-307.

2. Figure 13 inspired by Michel Yakovleff, Tactique Théorique, (Economica, 2009). 

3. FELIN = Fantassin à Equipement et Liaisons Intégrés (integrated equipment and 

communications for the infantryman) which is similar to the “Land Warrior Integrated Soldier 

System.”

4. Leap motion : https://www.leapmotion.com/.

5. Serge Tisseron, “Tester l’empathie des combattants pour les robots (TEPR) afin d’eviter les 

comportements inadaptes au combat” in Didier Danet, Jean-Paul Hanon, and Gérard de Boisboissel 

(eds.) La guerre robotisée (Economica, 2012), 225.

6. Such rules have been defined in France by the Centre de Doctrine et d’Emploi des Forces 

(CDEF).

7. The visual effect of a modern soldier can be quite impressive, even frightening, for civilians. 

This is called “langage de la tenue” in French (dress language).

8. Thierry Pichevin, “Drones armes et ethique” in Didier Danet, Jean-Paul Hanon, and Gérard 

de Boisboissel (eds.) La Guerre robotisée, (Economica, 2012), 235.
217

Chapter 19

Is the Insect the Future of Robots?

by Alexandr Štefek

 Introduction

At the current stage of robot development we are forcing technology toward a reliable 

design. The need is not always achievable. As a good example, imagine a situation in which 

the operator or user has connection with a robot via wireless communication. Especially in 

buildings area robots can easily lose this connection. One of the possible solutions is to use 

autonomy for finding a new place where the connection is established. But is it not possible 

to use other robots in same area to retranslate the signal? Robots under control of the same 

master will use the same type of communication.

Robots are used in reconnaissance tasks and if those robots are smaller they will have 

a higher probability of success in avoiding enemy sensors. It is really hard to build small 

reliable robot. But it is possible to build a set/swarm of robots which will try to solve same 

problem. Losing one robot from a small swarm will be noticeable but still the task can be 

finished. Even without any cooperation the swarm has higher reliability and we can expect 

better results. Let’s imagine that those robots cooperate. They can help each other to reach 

the overall goal.

The swarm approach is applicable in many military areas. There exist small low cost 

sensors which can be spread across a wide area to cover passages or other critical sections 

and secure them against enemy disruption. A single sensor is not able to do anything but in 

cooperation with other sensors it is able to detect disrupting and send this information to the 

consumer/observer. Sensors together create a net with an ability to interchange information 

with a neighbor. In fact this net behaves like single entity with high performance in the 

sensing task.

Even if we are still not able to create useful small cooperating robots, we can use 

natural inspiration to solve some problems which are unsolvable by deterministic methods. 

One of the main problems with which we are in touch nearly every day is the optimization 

problem. Optimization is a process where solutions are examined and compared together 

so it is possible to put one (optimal) solution above others. Methods which are inspired by 

insect behavior are general and very powerful. To this set of methods belong the Particle 

Swarm Optimization method (PSO), and the Gravity Search Algorithm (GSA), variations 

and improvements, and many others. If we will be able to take those methods into the real 

world we will notice stochastic behavior of many entities but the swarm will approach the 

desired solution.

First Look at the Current State of Robot Development

It is common to develop a single robot entity with all needed capabilities, tools, and 

equipment. This robot has to reach a goal at any cost and return to its base to give gained 

material, rescued items, captured data, and information. When one part of robot fails or is 

destroyed by enemy entities, it is possible that the robot will not be able to attain the desired 

goal and the whole mission will fail.
218

A single entity type robot which was developed according to inspirations by man’s 

abilities will not be able to reach the goal. This leads to the process in which we want to 

develop a better robot with greater robustness with many spare subsystems which are able 

to replace malfunctioning or destroyed subsystems. This new robot would have a higher 

chance to reach the desired goal. But the development of these robots is very demanding. 

It is not easy to analyze all subsystem linkages and evaluate them to recognize which 

subsystems have been duplicated to reach the desired reliability.

Limited Subsystems

In Nature, limited functionality is pretty common. Recall the battle of Stalingrad 

during the Second World War where the Russian side did not have enough weapons. Soviet 

commanders created units in which two soldiers carried just one weapon. When one man 

died or was not able to use weapon due to injury, the second man was commanded to take 

up the weapon and shoot with it.

Let’s have a look at ants—they cooperate in an effort to pull food to the ant hill or when 

they are defending their home, Figure 19. Insect groups consist of members with different 

abilities. Well known is the situation in the anthill. There exist warriors, workers, and the 

queen. Isolation of one type will create group of ants which is not able to survive.

Cooperation is very common in other social groups, Figure 20. For example, grey 

wolves hunt in packs. A lone wolf cannot slay bison or deer but together they are able to 

hunt much bigger animals. In this case the synergy effect occurs.

Figure 20. Cooperating Wolves (Canus Lupus).

 Source: National Park Service, US Department of the Interior website.

Figure 19. Cooperating Ants.

 Source: US Department of Agriculture website.
219

In those groups, if one element is destroyed or injured, the rest will remain active and 

will try to reach the assigned goal with a high chance of success.

Cooperation is very important in human society as well.

In fact an army is a highly organized social structure. Each part of army (squad, platoon, 

company) consists of a set of soldiers. When one soldier is injured, the remaining soldiers 

take over his task and continue to fulfilling the command’s mission.

Levels of Cooperation

Cooperation has different levels. It is possible to identify three basic levels:

1. Cooperative Thinking

2. Cooperative Sensing

3. Cooperative Acting

The most common level of cooperation is cooperative thinking. This is widely used in 

many applications. Cooperative acting is not common in real applications. Only social and 

natural groups cooperate in actions. 

Cooperative Thinking

Cooperative thinking is used in information processing. The common accepted term 

for this is a multi-agent system.

Multi-agent systems (MAS)

Multi-agent systems are systems in which many items are acting. Those items 

(subsystems) can use the same algorithms for behavior or they can have different roles. 

The important part of multi-agent systems is the communication subsystem. 

Figure 21. Army Unit on Patrol.

 Source: US Army website.
220

Multi-agent systems are theoretical tools that have been used widely for a long time.

The characteristics of MASs are that:1

1. Each agent has incomplete information or capabilities for solving the 

problem and, thus, has a limited viewpoint;

2. There is no system global control;

3. Data are decentralized; 

4. Computation is asynchronous;

The Computer Science Point of View

Cooperative thinking is a process of sharing computing resources. The task is running 

somewhere in the system even on robots which are not using the results of the computation. 

Moreover for increasing robustness, the process can be copied across robot groups. If one 

robot fails or is disconnected from the group, there are still copy processes which enable 

the rest to finish the computation. In the phase of disconnection identification there is a 

need for recovery, to make a new copy of the processes which were running on the lost 

robot. Because the copies are still running, the copy process is feasible.

This backup increases robustness and reliability. The basic principles of concurrent 

processes are well known and discussed in computer science, specifically in the concept of 

in cloud computing. 

Figure 22. Relations in Applications. 

 Source: Created by Author.

Top—”Virtuality”—describes applications in computers. Bottom—“Reality”—represents work 

with real things.
221

Cloud Computing

Cloud computing has some approaches which are identical to cooperative thinking. If 

the thinking process is divided into many threads, they are executed in parallel. In fact it 

does not matter where the threads are executed as long threads can access all the requested 

information.

The division of thinking into threads allows multiple executing threads. This grants 

an ability to continue in execution even if one thread fails. The reasons for failure can 

be different. If the computing environment is bordered by cooperating robots, then each 

thread is executed on more than one robot. If a robot is destroyed by enemy activity (in 

a military environment) or a hostile environment, there still exists a copy of the process 

which was executed by the destroyed robot. 

Runtime Compilation and Execution

Runtime compilation is a technique widely used in the process of expression 

evaluation. With introduction of JAVA language this technique becomes a foundation for 

program development. The .NET environment (Microsoft technology) uses nearly the 

same principles.

Runtime compilation allows for the compilation of parts of code or whole libraries into 

executable form and executing them. There are two levels of compilation. The higher level 

compiles source code into Common Language runtime (CLR) and the lower compiles into 

the native code of the current processor. Two levels of compilation allow the developing 

processor an independent code. It is possible to develop an environment which will provide 

a standard set of services on each robot platform. This will offer environments for task 

execution on all robots. Moreover the running task will be isolated from platform.

There is an important question at this point. What is the difference between runtime 

compilation and execution and “standard approach” where all programs are stored on all 

devices/robots? This is a hard question to answer. Imagine that some knowledge is stored 

as algorithms which can mutate.

Figure 23. Shared Computing Environment.

 Source: Created by Author.
222

See Figure 23. R1 (R2,...Rn)—robot level, this level can vary. A1 (A2,...An)—abstract 

level, this level grants standard abilities for level C1 (C2,...Cn). C levels are same on all 

robots.

Runtime Compilation and Execution—Technological Background

Runtime compilation is technology which can serve in program modification during 

program execution. This technology was developed and supported on many platforms. 

One of them is .NET platform. Code 1, Figure 24, shows the basic structure for runtime 

compilation on the .NET platform.

Adaptive Algorithms

Some problems can be solved by different algorithms. Choosing the right algorithm 

can be a problem, the solution of which is not easily predictable. One published paper 

describes examples in which the decision was random. The impact of the algorithm was 

evaluated and the next behavior was adapted to the last set of experiences.

Adaptive algorithms/adaptive behavior can be used on a problem to find an optimal 

path. This problem is already solved, but it can be generalized to a problem where the 

destination point is moving.

Let’s imagine comparable algorithms for choosing the right direction on a crossroads. 

Different algorithms have different impact on ability to find the best path from a start point 

to a destination point, but all of them are able to choose a path. Figure 25 describes the 

decision situation. The agent at node A has to decide where to move (nodes B, C, D). Every 

path has an associated fitness value. This value varies in time and evaluates the intensity of 

usage. At decision time, the agent does not know which path is optimal. Because the paths 

were evaluated by other agents, there are 4 possible algorithms for selection.

Figure 24. Code 1: Runtime Compilation.

 Source: Created by Author.
223

Mentioned algorithms for selection are:

1. Choose best path (ChooseBestEdge). 

2. Choose path randomly without any weight (ChooseRandomEdge). 

3. Choose path weighted randomly (WeightChooseRandomEdge). 

4. Choose shortest path (ChooseEdgeOnShortestPath).

At node A the agent will choose the algorithm for decision (from enlisted algorithms 

according to random number). Then it uses the selection decision algorithm. At node B 

the agent will again choose the algorithm and use it for the decision. This behavior has 

adequate terms in game theory (pure and mixed theory). 

When an agent reaches a goal and if its path is one of best, this set of algorithms is 

stored in the genetic bank.

In our example above, when the process of cooperative thinking was started, the 

probabilities were set to: 

In the early stages, the probabilities in one of sets of algorithms are:

In the middle of the process, the sets will adapt so one of them has the following 

probabilities:

Figure 25. Decision at Node.

 Source: Created by Author.
224

And finally at the end:

The behavior was adapted to fill the desired role. 

Cooperative Thinking—Solving Optimization problem

As an example of cooperative thinking, an optimization problem and its solution was 

chosen. This decision was made as a result of natural entities modelling. In nature (as 

mentioned earlier) there exists many groups/flocks/herds/swarms which optimize in an 

effort to survive. From some points of view, there are methods which use an analogy from 

this behavior. 

Currently there is enough computer performance for Monte Carlo-based methods of 

creating computational algorithms. Just roll the dice, do some statistical calculations and 

the results will appear. Of course a stochastic approach does not grant the optimal solution. 

But there are many problems which are not solvable by deterministic algorithms. In those 

cases the suboptimal solution is acceptable.

The next paragraphs will introduce some methods in which the collaboration leads to 

practical results.

Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) Method

The PSO method uses the behavior of a flock of birds as a model. Each bird is flying 

through space (set/space of solutions) searching for food and sensing “food intensity.” A 

bird remembers the place with best intensity and when a better place (with higher intensity) 

is revealed the best place is updated and information about this location is spread across the 

flock. A bird is flying randomly but tends to return to a personal best position (solution) and 

travels to a best position discovered by the flock.

This model of behavior was first implemented by J. Kennedy and R. Eberhart.2

 This 

implementation is very popular currently and has been greatly improved. Let’s first show 

the mathematical model of PSO.

The mathematical model uses motion of law from physics. See Equation 1 in Figure 

26.

Where xl

is the best solution for particle and xs is the best solution for whole swarm, ci 

are setup coefficients, r represents random numbers from interval (0;1), xn, vn define current 

state of particle and xn+1, vn+1 define the next state of particle. 

Figure 26. Equation 1.

 Source: Created by Author.
225

In the process of space exploration the particles tends to return back to the best known 

position (solution) and tend to visit the best known swarm solution. This process is controlled 

by coefficients c1

 and c2. Coefficient c0 defines the slowing speed. In fact, these equations 

define (in general) the unstable system. The c0

 coefficient plays the role of stabilizer. If this 

coefficient is c0

≥1 then the kinetic energy in the system is growing infinitely and this means 

that the system is unstable and cannot produce the desired solution. 

The social aspect of this model was studied deeply by a group of scholars.3

As mentioned above, this model is very popular even if it has some real problems. 

The main problem is a particle stuck in local optimum. The method is unable to leave this 

“hole.” This problem was solved by Repulsive PSO (RPSO). RPSO uses some random 

solutions. According to RPSO the equation was updated to: 

Where xl

 is the best solution for the particle and xs is the best solution for the whole 

swarm xr

 is a random solution, ci are setup coefficients, r represents random numbers from 

interval (0;1), xn

, vn define current state of particle and xn+1, vn+1 define the next state of the 

particle. 

GSA—The Gravity Search Algorithm

The gravity search algorithm uses similarity with gravitational fields in the universe. 

Bigger planes generate a gravity field with greater intensity.

Where G is a substitution of the gravity constant, Mi

, Mjare particle masses, xi and xj 

are particle positions, and Fij and Fi are forces. The mass of particles (planets) is weighted 

by the value of the fitness function at point where the planet is. The masses are normalized. 

The normalization of mass is based on the fitness function value. The particle with better 

fitness function value has a bigger mass. The normalization process is described in Figure 

29, Equation 4.

Figure 27. Equation 2.

 Source: Created by Author.

Figure 28. Equation 3.

 Source: Created by Author.
226

Where min is the current minimum of the fitness function, max is the current maximum 

of fitness function, mi

 are masses and Mi are normalized masses. The gravity coefficient is 

not constant and varies in time according to the equation in Figure 30, Equation 5.

Where G0

 is the base gravity constant, a(t) can be a function but usually it is constant, 

G is a gravity constant for current state of optimization process. 

In the optimization process the set of particles which are acting as a gravity source 

(according to Equation 2 in Figure 27) is decreasing. This process reduces the ability to 

find a better solution as time goes on.

Conclusion

All methods use a set agent which is moving, sensing the current stage and exchanging 

the discoveries. This process is made on low level for individual particles but in fact this 

can be done with agents representing methods itself. There are some studies about topology 

of agent communication in which experiments prove that complete connection does not 

behave well in optimization problems where the fitness function has local optimums. The 

communication restriction to a neighbor inflicts situations in which not all agents know the 

current best solution. This allows agents to stay a bit longer in a place in order to better 

explore it. In the original model, agents are slowly moving towards the new best solution 

immediately after recovering. As mentioned above, this leads to being stuck in a local 

optimum, which was enough strong to pull all agents into a “hole.”

The same principles are usable in method cooperation.

Figure 29. Equation 4.

 Source: Created by Author.

Figure 30. Equation 5.

 Source: Created by Author.
227

Cooperative Sensing

Cooperative sensing is a useful ability which grants access to all robots in one group to 

whole set of sensors carried by different robots. In fact it allows complete information of a 

wide area where the set of robots are trying to finish a task.

This ability can be used in commanding the robot group. A common problem is the 

loss of the connection with one single entity/robot. Especially in buildings during rescue 

or reconnaissance operations, this is a very common situation due to signal propagation. 

In a situation where robots are using hex networks, they are able to retranslate a signal and 

allow commands to robots which are unreachable. 

A typical situation is depicted in Figure 31. 

The units in front of group (A and B) are sensing the obstacle/enemy from different 

views. Sensed information is distributed across group and rear unit (E) is able to get and 

process it.

The individuals in the group can act as sources of sensor information and as retranslators. This functionality combination allows the creation of ad hoc sensor nets and the 

gathering of sensor information from any node set. The communication and other aspects 

have been discussed.4

 Source: Created by Author.

Figure 31. Cooperative Sensing—Sharing the Sensor Information.
228

Some applications using cooperative sensing are already in use, especially in the 

defense of important objects and areas. There are sets of sonic sensors with a fusion 

algorithm which helps in shooter localization. The precision of localization is very good.

Cooperative Navigation

Cooperative navigation takes advantage of image processing of pictures where some 

objects are well known. This means that dimensions can be taken into account and the 

distance and orientation can be computed. With the fusion of other types of sensors 

(ultrasonic, infrared, laser), this can be used in precise navigation. Part of a group is moving 

and the rest of group is playing role of a steady base. Fixed units are able to measure the 

movements of other units. Practical experiments with this approach have been conducted 

and results published.5

Figure 32, Equation 6 describes the projection of a real object at an image sensor. If 

the size and resolution (S) of the image sensor is known, then it is possible to compute the 

distance to object A.

Where d is the distance to object A (millimeters), f is focus length (millimeters), o is 

the real size of object A’s projection on the optical sensor (millimeters). It is possible to 

compute o according to Figure 33, Equation 7: 

Figure 32. Equation 6.

 Source: Created by Author.

Figure 33. Equation 7.

 Source: Created by Author.
229

Where o is real size of object A’s projection on an optical sensor (millimeters), op is 

length of object A in a picture (in pixels), s is real size of sensor (millimeters) and sr

 is 

sensor resolution (in pixels).

The equations and Figure 34 can be generalized and used for computing the orientation 

and till (two dimension) of object A. This leads to a system construction where one object 

does not move during the moves of the observed object. This observation helps in increasing 

the precision of the navigation process.

Cooperative Acting

Cooperative acting is really an old idea. Just recall the science fiction movie and 

television series StarGate in which humans are fighting replicators. Replicators share the 

sensor information, are able to create new copies of themselves, are able to join together 

and create a much bigger entity if needed. Those abilities make them very powerful and 

very difficult to destroy. Imagine that it is possible to have same the type of entities under 

command on the battlefield.

Unfortunately (or fortunately), this is just science fiction which may become reality 

in the distant future. But the current state of the art shows some achievements. Projects 

already exist in which scientists are working on the ability to join single entities into a 

 Source: Created by Author.

Figure 34. Cooperative Navigation - Using the VideoSensor for Distance Recognition.
230

bigger group to be able reach more complicated goals. Two practical goals are set as the 

group objectives—crossing obstacles and pulling objects.

Crossing Obstacles

In reality, there will always be objects and obstacles that are too big in relation to 

the robot. There exist two possible solutions—the robot avoids the obstacle and the robot 

crosses the obstacle. If the robot is “big enough” for crossing, the problem has an easy 

solution. In the case where the robot is too small there still exists the possibility (in some 

designs) to connect more robots to create bigger one with the ability to cross the obstacle.

This approach has been tested by some scientists with great success.

Pulling Objects

In some cases robots are asked to make an effort to change the physical world. This is 

especially important in a rescue mission. If the goal is to rescue a man, it is possible to build 

robot which is big and powerful enough. The connection of many small robots in filling the 

rescue task will be a general solution to the problem of building adequate size and power.

Connecting many robots to make one entity to improve the ability to pull an object has 

already been tested. One of those tests was executed in project Swarm-bots.

Swarmanoid Project

The Marco Dorigo Swarmanoid project which developed the concept of swarm-bots, 

swarms of self-assembling entities which is one of the most important projects in the study 

of robot cooperation.6

 This project was conducted by five research institutes.7

The project ran from 10 January 2006 to 30 October 2010 and was supported by 

The European Commission. It was focused on building robots that can successfully and 

adaptively act in human-made environments. The project is the first which studied how to 

design, realize, and control a heterogeneous swarm robotic system capable of operating in 

a fully 3-dimensional environment.8

Conclusion

Cooperation is common in nature, and important in human society. Many animals, 

insects create structured groups. Different members have different abilities. In recent 

years, significant effort has been invested in experiments with cooperating robots. 

Those experiments were successful in many aspects and have great potential for future 

implementation. Especially in the military area there exist many tasks for which this 

concept will be very helpful. But still there are gaps which have to be filled, and questions 

which have to be answered. 
231

Notes

1. Katia P. Sycara, “Multiagent Systems” AI Magazine Volume 19, No.2 Summer1998: 79-92, 

http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~softagents/papers/multiagentsystems.pdf, (accessed 5 November 2013).

2. James Kennedy and Russell Eberhart. “Particle swarm optimization.” In Proceedings of 

IEEE International Conference on Neural Networks, IEEE Press, 1995, 1942-1948.

3. James Kennedy and Russell Eberhart, Swarm Intelligence. Morgan Kaufmann, 2001. 

4. Jaroslav Cechak, “Seismic Sensor Communication” in Advances in Military Technology 

Vol. 5 No. 2, 2010: 101-108, http://aimt.unob.cz/articles/10_02/10_02%20(9).pdf, (accessed 5 

November 2013).

5. Yves Bergeon, “Calculation of the distance covered by a robot thanks to image analysis with 

a two-robot team,” in Proceedings of the 2011 ICMT Conference, 2011. 

6. Marco Dorigo et al. Swarmanoid: Towards Humanoid Robotic Swarms, http://www.

swarmanoid.com/index.php, (accessed 5 November 2013). Marco Dorigo et al. Swarm-bots: 

Swarms of self-assembling artifacts, http://www.swarm-bots.org/, (accessed 5 November 2013). 

7. IRIDIA—Institut de Recherches Interdisciplinaires et de Développements en Intelligence 

Artificielle—Université Libre de Bruxelles (Belgium); IDSIA—Istituto Dalle Molle di Studi 

sull’Intelligenza Artificiale (Switzerland); EPFL-LSRO—Institut de Production et Robotique—

Laboratoire de systèmes robotiques (Switzerland); EPFL-LIS—Laboratory of Intelligent Systems—

École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (Switzerland); CNR-ISTC—Consiglio Nazionale delle 

Ricerche Institute of Cognitive Science and Technology (Italy)

8. Marco Dorigo et al. Swarmanoid: Towards Humanoid Robotic Swarms.

Additional References

E. Rashedi, H. Nezamabadi-pour, S. Saryazdi. “GSA: A Gravitational Search Algorithm” in 

Information Sciences Vol. 179 No. 13, 2009: 2232-2248. 

Z. Krupka, A. Stefek, “Method Cooperation in Optimization Process” in Proceedings of 

Mechatronika 2010 Conference: 21-23. 

Z. Krupka, A. Stefek, “Particle Swarm Optimization—Experiments and Results” in Proceedings 

of Advances in Mechatronics 2009 Conference. 

233

Chapter 20

Robotization of the Combined Arms Task Force: Perspectives

by Eric Ozanne

Introduction

The first robotized ground systems were used during World War II. After this conflict, 

the perspective of a conventional confrontation in central Europe between the Western 

countries and the Soviet bloc, like the decolonization conflicts, did not help develop a 

capacity which was still in its infancy in 1945. Recent conflicts (Iraq, Afghanistan, Middle 

East) combined with the significant technological progress over the last years have been 

favorable to the rapid development of these systems. This framework was all the more 

favorable since ground robots seem to immediately bring solutions to western armed forces 

belonging to societies the resilience capacity of which is weakening and which less and 

less accept casualties in combat, whatever the stake of the conflict. 

The French Army, supported by the Procurement Agency (DGA), has carried out 

conceptual and technical studies in the 1980s, then deeper ones during the first decade 

of the 21st century. Some robotized systems have been created and are still fielded in the 

forces, like the AMX30B2, the remotely operated mine-clearing tank. 

This research conducted by the Army has recently been relaunched within the framework 

of the second step of the SCORPION1

 armament program and were first materialized in 

2011 with the drafting of an exploratory project on ground robotics made by the Army 

Staff/Plans, followed by a staff objective2

 on the robotization of the combined arms task 

force.

This assessment of the Army requirement and these conceptual reflections in a short/

medium-term vision are just a first step in the robotization of the land forces, both in terms 

of ambition and scope, since they are limited to the combined arms task force. The research 

is thus continuing, the reflection being extended to all the forces and other concepts of 

employment of robotized systems are being envisaged. 

Overall Framework and Concept

Overall Framework of the Research

The studies have been carried out in 2011 in the framework of a working group 

preparing the second step of operation SCORPION.3

 They were based on all the research 

conducted over the last ten years, including those led by the Centre de Recherche des 

ecoles St-Cyr Coëtquidan (CREC), and have been carried out in coherence with the ground 

robotics exploratory concept of the Army Staff. The research is limited to the ground and 

air assets of contact robotics meeting the specific needs of the combined arms task force 

and aimed at being implemented by non-specialized units. 

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the French MoD.
234

The Operational Environment by 2025

The expression of a new military requirement is partly based on the possibilities offered 

by technology by the considered timeline. Nonetheless, this requirement must first and 

foremost meet identified threats with which the Army could be confronted in the framework 

of its operational contacts. The concepts of employment and technical specifications of 

these future items of equipment thus result from these threats. 

Identifying future threats is indisputably a more difficult exercise today than it used to 

be. Without depriving some great military thinkers of the 20th century of their visionary 

talent, it was easier to envisage a revolutionary employment for the main battle tank in 

the 1930s or for the nuclear weapon in the 1960s given the geostrategic context and the 

existence of a clearly identified adversary whose courses of actions and capabilities were 

well known, than to imagine the employment of robotized systems today. 

The future operational engagement can however be characterized by an atmosphere of 

uncertainty and unpredictability, with very variable levels of confrontation. The emergence 

of asymmetrical situations will remain very high without ruling out a comeback of, if not 

symmetrical, at least dissymmetrical confrontations. The theaters of engagement should be 

extended while actions among populations in urban terrain will become the rule, as well as 

the multiplication of stakeholders within the theaters of operations. The easy access to new 

technologies and the increasing place of psychological effects (especially cyberspace) will 

be determining characteristics in order to conceive the robotization of the land force. Lastly, 

this future operational environment will certainly be characterized by strong constraints 

induced by our societies themselves: a budgetary constraint which implies that we remain 

reasonable regarding the design of equipment, a statutory and environmental constraint 

which is of paramount importance in the specifications of military equipment, as well as 

societal constraints which place a value on human life which is increasingly incompatible 

with the risks of the military profession. 

The research and reflections conducted in view of combined arms task force robotization 

must indeed be placed in the perspective of this future envisaged operational context. 

Concept

The robotization of the combined arms task force, and more generally that of the land 

forces is not an end in itself. Robotized systems support ground maneuver in which man 

keeps his entire place, and they deliver an effect in the field on the adversary or for the 

benefit of the force. Fully integrated into SCORPION, they participate in the fulfilment 

of all the missions of the combined arms task force. These robotized systems do not have 

decision-making autonomy and the principle of “man in the loop” is required. 

Combat Robotization Meets Three Objectives:4 

1. The first objective is to improve the protection of the soldier by 

limiting his/her exposure to battlefield dangers. The objective is not 

to replace men by robots in combat, but to preserve the potential of 

the combatants or of major items of equipment by permitting them to 

deploy in the best possible conditions.
235

2. The second objective is to increase the combatant’s capacities and 

therefore the operational efficiency of units. Indeed, the combatant’s 

efficiency is limited both by the tolerance of man for his environment 

(heat, humidity, CBRN threat, night, etc.) or his physical capacities 

(height, volume, weight, mobility, etc.), and by his own senses or 

“sensors,” even if he can be equipped with efficient perception 

assets. The robotization of contact should thus extend the operational 

capabilities of the combined arms task forces, in terms of rapidity 

and accuracy of fire, and in terms of quantitative and qualitative 

improvements of communication tools as well as reconnaissance and 

acquisition assets. 

3. The last objective is to permit the fulfilment of repetitive and dull 

tasks. The efficiency of a robot, adapted to a given environment and 

predefined tasks, is highly superior to that of men. The robot can 

perform its mission for extended periods of time and is perfectly 

regular in its fulfilment. Besides, robotics would make it possible to 

lighten the burden of the soldier in some physical security or logistic 

support tasks. 

Tactical Priorities

A comprehensive study of “robotizable” actions over the entire spectrum of missions of 

the combined arms task force has been carried out. These actions have then been prioritized 

and cross-checked with the technological maturity of the various systems. The defined 

tactical priorities are going to guide the equipment policy of the forces for the coming 

years. The robotization of contact must thus be in priority: 

1. Enhance the capabilities of the combined arms task force in the field 

of contact intelligence. Battlefield digitization has made it possible 

to disperse some of the fog of war by providing in due time a true, 

precise, and shared situational picture. Robotized assets should thus 

contribute to further disperse this fog by providing this time a better 

vision of the enemy situation in contact. This awareness of the tactical 

situation down to the lowest echelons will enable the combat units to 

engage as late as possible in the best possible conditions. 

2. Improve the capacity to detect, identify, neutralize, and destroy the 

mine and explosive ordnance threat if need be. It is in this single 

domain that the Army has had robotized systems for many years. The 

objective is to reinforce the destruction and neutralization capabilities 

of the existing systems while limiting physical human intervention as 

far as possible. 

3. Complement the destruction capabilities of the combined arms task 

force (fire delivery, armament implementation). This intentional third 

priority leaves the door open to research and reflections on armed 

robots, the implementation of which provokes at once ethical and 
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legal questions. These armed or shooter robots would first be aimed 

at applying effects in the field (breach a wall, clear a barricade, etc.) 

before envisaging a larger employment. 

4. Participate in forward logistics (lightening/supplying combatants 

in contact). Though the individual logistic overload has been a 

permanent feature in the history of the infantryman since the Greek 

phalanxes, it has considerably increased over the last ten years, due 

to the “come back of [personal] armor,” the variety of armaments, 

ammunition consumption, and new technologies. This logistic burden 

currently reaches more or less 50 kilos for each dismounted combatant 

(the historic average was between 35 and 40 kilos), and even more, 

depending on the operational employments (machine gunner, mortar 

loader, etc.). Robotized systems will undoubtedly bring solutions 

to this issue, be they MULE robots or exoskeleton-types. Since the 

latter are not robots as such, they are not dealt with in the contact 

robotization operation of SCORPION, but they are taken into account 

within the framework of the research and reflections on the evolutions 

of the FELIN system. 

Meeting the Need

Envisaged Systems

What characterizes robotized systems is their diversity and distribution within the 

combined arms task force. These systems should first equip the “dismounted combat,” 

“mounted combat,” and “battlespace exploitation” operational functions. 

Two components have been defined as well as a classification of robots by weight. 

This segmentation is not rigid and is just a first attempt to characterize the systems. Their 

implementation complexity, their functional autonomy and range of action increase, 

ranging from the micro-robot/micro UAV to the heavy tactical robot. In all cases, these 

robotized systems do not have any decision-making autonomy and man always remains 

in the loop. Moreover, these capabilities make up a more or less comprehensive list of the 

robotized systems which could equip a combined arms task force by step 2 of SCORPION; 

some assets could seem redundant (puppet-type systems and tactical or heavy robots). 

Choices in terms of equipment policy will be made in due time. 

The combined arms task force would first have a dismounted component including: 

1. Micro-robots (maximum 5kgs) implemented by single operators who 

can easily transport them on a long-lasting basis. These systems are 

actually the “off-site eyes” of the infantryman or the dismounted 

combatant. Their employment has to be prioritized for inside a building 

or subterranean networks in order to carry out contact intelligence 

missions (observe inside a building, a subterranean network, a pipe, 

a room or a corridor before entering into them). Equipped with a 

camera, their range of action is limited to a hundred meters and a 

PALM-type control station also permits receiving of images. Easy 
237

to implement and robust, they can be launched by a soldier (on the 

floor of a building, in a stairwell, etc.). This type of robot has been 

regularly used for twenty years or so by some specialized units in the 

French security forces. They are also fielded in some foreign forces 

(especially the US Army) in theaters of operations (Afghanistan, Iraq). 

They should equip the infantry and engineer platoons down to group 

[squad] level. 

2. Minirobots (maximum 50 kgs) usually transported in the vehicles of 

the combined arms task force, they can be carried over a short distance 

by one or two personnel, and can be equipped with several payloads. 

These systems will be the “off-site eyes and tools” of the dismounted 

combatant. Used outside buildings, their employment in urban terrain 

will nonetheless be prioritized. With a range of several hundred meters, 

they will carry out contact intelligence missions (scout the advance of 

a platoon in urban terrain, detect targeted optics, lay sensors, etc.), 

will be able to deliver effects in the field (process a booby-trap, 

breach a wall, or clear a barricade, etc.) or on the opponent (generate 

a smoke screen, etc.). Robust and easy to implement, they will have 

some functional autonomy. These systems should equip the infantry 

and engineer units down to platoon level. These minirobots could also 

participate in the surveillance and protection of the sites used by the 

forces. 

3. Micro-UAVs (one or two kilos), equipped with a camera, easy 

to implement, able to be easily carried by a man, these systems 

will constitute the “flying binoculars” of the platoon leader or unit 

commander. With a range of one to two kilometers, which corresponds 

to the operational need of dismounted units in contact, they will permit 

to see behind the wall, the building. or the surrounding terrain. 

The combined arms task force could also be equipped with a dismounted component 

comprising:5 

1. Micro-UAVs which would be more efficient than those of the mounted 

component. These systems would have a wider range (4-5 kms) and 

could be fielded for the scout units of the mounted combat operational 

function and the infantry regimental reconnaissance platoons. These 

systems will have to be able to be implemented from inside the 

vehicles in order not to slow down the maneuver tempo. 

2. Versatile tactical robots, which are more complex systems, 

characterized by a high level of functional autonomy and the ability 

to meet a wider spectrum of missions owing to their capacity to carry 

varied payloads. Their mobility would enable them to integrate and 

follow the infantry and armored mounted maneuver of the combined 

arms task force. The versatile tactical robots could carry out contact 
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intelligence, transport, and forward supply missions, as well as area 

surveillance. They could also be equipped with payloads enabling 

them to deliver effects on the opponent. Their implementation might 

be more complex but could be ensured by non-specialized units. 

These assets could be gathered at the combined arms task force or 

combined arms company team level and employed together or given 

as reinforcements down to platoon level. 

3. Puppet-type systems, which will make it possible to temporarily 

robotize the vehicles of a combined arms task force, depending 

on the missions and the operational requirement. The mission 

equipment would be removed after the mission and the vehicle put 

in a normal configuration again. This contingency robotization would 

make it possible to fulfil all the missions of a combined arms task 

force. Nonetheless, it would be preferably implemented for contact 

intelligence missions, convoy escort (a robotized vehicle to scout 

the convoy’s route), forward supply, or battlespace exploitation. 

Robotized vehicles would have a limited functional autonomy. Their 

remote operation would be preferably achieved by their usual users 

(driver, vehicle commander, gunner) from portable or dismountable 

control stations. The switch to the remote operation configuration 

could be eased by the introduction of modern vetronics in the new 

vehicles, making it possible to remotely implement all their sensors 

and shooters. 

4. Heavy tactical robots which will have a high functional autonomy, 

designed and developed in order to fulfil specific missions. More 

complex, their implementation from portable or dismountable stations 

would a priori require the competence of specialists for whom it 

would be the main job. It would essentially be robots dedicated to 

the shaping the battlefield or to aid mobility, with capacities to open 

routes, clear areas, conduct earthworks, etc.

Interoperability—Environment

These new assets, implemented down to group [squad] level, will have to be integrated 

within the combined arms task force capabilities. Their environment will comprise of: 

1. Transport and combat platforms (multirole armored vehicle (VBMR), 

armored infantry fighting vehicle (VBCI), wheeled-gun armoured 

vehicle (ERBC), etc.)

2. Aircraft (close support and combat TIGER helicopters, CAIMAN, 

etc.)

3. Direct support engineer platforms (MAC), 

4. Intelligence systems, 

5. FELIN combatant systems, 
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6. Weapon systems and infantry weapons (rocket launchers, assault 

rifles, machine guns,)

7. The SCORPION combat and information system (SICS). 

The air and ground assets of contact robotization will thus have to be interoperable 

with all these capabilities. Moreover, they will have to be taken into account in the existing 

training systems, then integrated in the future simulation environment of the SCORPION 

combined arms task force. Lastly, the employment of flying robotized systems will have 

to be integrated in the I3D6

 and to take into account the co-ordination with other effectproducers and sensors playing a role in the 3D environment of the battlefield.

The appropriation of robots by the personnel of the combat, combat support, or combat 

service units is a significant challenge for robotics. In order to be so, the robot must be easy 

to use, solid, and inspire total confidence in the personnel who are going to maneuver and 

act with it. The success of this appropriation first lies in the man-machine interface which 

is of paramount importance. It must be not only naturally intuitive and accessible to the 

combatant, but also comprehensive enough for the operator to perceive the environment 

of the robot and its reactions; failing that, he will not be able to control it in a realistic way 

in the stress of combat. Lastly, this necessary appropriation will be based on adapted and 

regular training for the employment of the robot in an operational framework. 

Conclusion

The robotization of the combined arms task force has been initially conceived 

to be part of step 2 of the SCORPION program by 2020. The research conducted has 

clearly shown that the dismounted component could be quickly implemented given the 

technological maturity of this equipment, which is available off-the-shelf and which, for 

most of the equipment, have been combat proven. In the same way, it appears that the 

mounted component still needs to be developed, especially in the field of the functional 

autonomy of robotized platforms. It seems reasonable to envisage acquisitions by 2020 for 

these systems. 

In an incremental approach, the French Army has thus initiated the robotization process 

of the combined arms task forces through procurements for the operations outside national 

territory. The capacity to neutralize mines and explosive devices through robotized assets 

should thus be rapidly augmented. 

Moreover, in 2012, a tactical assessment of various systems (micro-robots, minirobots, and micro-UAVs) aimed at increasing the contact intelligence capabilities was 

carried out within infantry and armored units. The objective was to assess the operational 

added-value of these systems as well as the combination of their effects, in order to define 

an appropriate distribution within the combined arms task force and to evaluate the impact 

of robotization in terms of doctrine, organization, collective and individual training. 
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This tactical assessment must make it possible to then launch the robotization process 

of the Army, avoiding some pitfalls and permanently seeking: 

1. To limit to a maximum the increase of the physical and cognitive 

burden of the combatants.

2. To integrate these new assets, both in vehicles and in information and 

combat systems. 

3. To integrate these new assets into maneuver, which must not be limited 

by their use. 
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Notes

1. SCORPION is a decisive armament program for the French Army. Conceived following 

an incremental logic process, articulated in two steps, it is aimed at completely transforming the 

capabilities of the combined arms task forces between 2011 and 2026. 

2. The staff objective is a first official expression of the operational requirement. 

3. This working group included members of the Army Staff, the Procurement Agency, the Army 

Technical Branch, the School of Infantry and the Land Force Command. 

4. This triple objective is translated in the Anglo-Saxon acronym “3D” or “Dull, Dirty, and 

Dangerous.”

5. Double meaning of the term: mounted within vehicles of the combined arms task force or 

tactical robots with a certain level of functional autonomy enabling them to integrate into a mounted 

maneuver of the combined arms task force. 

6. Stake holders in the 3rd dimension

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Chapter 21

Battlefield Robotization: Toward a New Combat Ecosystem

by Michel Yakovleff

Part I: The Major Choices Regarding Conception 

Every technological evolution has an impact on the battlefield; this historical fact is 

as constant as war itself. Iron replaced bronze then steel replaced iron. The development 

of chemistry has given birth to Greek fire, then to explosives and, combined with the 

development of metallurgy, resulted in the invention of firearms. Mechanization has ruled 

the horse out of the battlefield and opened the aerial domain. 

Miniaturization, computerization and other technological advances currently enable 

the emergence of robots, the number and capabilities of which seem to be likely to increase 

dramatically. We have long moved past the point of whether the introduction of robots into 

the battle is desirable or not. The point is to imagine the timeframes and circumstances of 

this new capability. We might otherwise repeat the futile quarrel between the cavalrymen 

and the supporters of motorization after the First World War. Nonetheless, acknowledging 

what is unavoidable does not necessarily make it pleasant. The danger is of course to exclude 

man from the battlefield. We could imagine that, in the long run, totally autonomous robots 

would fight each other, on behalf of human beings but not in their presence. This may be 

the ideal future of war, but certainly not that of humanity. Any reflection on robotization 

must include, as a watermark, this major conceptual and moral reserve. 

How Can We Define a Robot?

The robot as we mean it in the framework of this reflection has three major 

characteristics:1

1. It moves by itself, at least for the major part of its missions. A robot is 

an autonomous mobile device, both from a mechanical point of view 

(it does not have to be pushed, pulled, coupled, carried, launched, 

thrown, at least for the majority of the tasks it is likely to be entrusted 

with) and, more importantly, from a decision-making point of view. 

2. It acts, since it has a function in addition to that of moving (it observes, 

carries, fires etc.). This point is important because, in the current 

framework of robotics development, many robots do nothing but 

move. We are going to emphasize operational functions far more than 

movement. 

3. Most importantly, the robot has decision-making autonomy, meaning 

that it adapts its behavior to its environment, in a more or less predefined 

way, determined by the algorithms the designer has integrated. 

Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author 

and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the French MoD or NATO.
244

Some devices move but remain operated, likes UAVs or the robots used by the bomb 

disposal experts. In that case, and in line with our reflection, using the word “robot” is 

excessive. A remotely-operated device, whatever its degree of sophistication, is not a robot. 

On the other side, some devices are fully autonomous but cannot move. The mine is the 

most basic example. It has generated the family of remote sensors, the only difference from 

the mine being that they send information instead of exploding. In that case, functional 

autonomy deprived of any movement capability excludes them from the family of robots. 

How Can We Define the Functional Autonomy of the Robot? 

By definition, the robot has an autonomous perception of its environment as well as a 

reasoning and decision-making capability which interacts with it. The decisions it makes 

stem from predetermined algorithms but limit human intervention to the maximum; it 

would otherwise be a remotely-operated device again. 

In principle, robots will be all the more useful as they will be more autonomous, 

precisely because their autonomy makes the work of men lighter. In the same way, the 

more a dog can do, the more useful it is. 

With the so called “artificial intelligence” technologies, we know how to design objects 

in simulation systems, able to fulfil a tactical mission autonomously. They apply doctrine, 

they implement the know-how necessary for the mission, they perceive their environment 

and their peers, and are able to accumulate experience from their operations owing to 

retroactive loops. For instance, in a simulation system, we are able to make up a combined 

arms unit with main battle tanks (MBTs) and crews to reconnoiter an axis, deploy in front 

of an obstacle, look for a bypass route – while ensuring they cover the unit during its 

search—equip a breach, and cross and come back to the assigned axis in order to continue 

the mission. In case of an encounter with the enemy, they open fire, call for combat support, 

conceal themselves, maneuver, etc. 

We have been able to do that for approximately ten years on a computer in such a credible 

way that these programs make it possible to focus minimal control on these operations in a 

CAX-CPX exercise, for example, therefore saving many tactical subunits necessary to feed 

the echelon playing the events. There is no conceptual obstacle to be overcome to apply 

these algorithms to real objects operating in the physical world. The robot we will soon 

see on the battlefield—if it is not present already—is thus able to receive a mission and to 

fulfil it with no more interaction with its human master than the personnel it is supposed to 

replace; this would be the major efficiency criteria which would justify choosing a robot 

instead of a man. It must at least be able to do as well for the best part of its mission. 

The limit to autonomy is very clear if the robot in question has an attack capability: it 

should not be able to fire without a positive order. Here, the comparison with the military 

working dog is enlightening: when a well-trained dog perceives a threat, it sends a signal 

to its master (it growls, lowers its ears, etc.) but it needs an explicit order to attack. On the 

other hand, the robot must be able to protect itself without asking its master, by achieving 

an evasive maneuver. For instance, depending on the plasticity of the robots, we could 

envisage a leap backwards, an evasive action, or even a defensive distortion comparable 

with the lying of a man under fire: the robot would for instance spread all its sensors and 
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“limbs” in order to limit its vertical profile or, on the contrary, it would pile them up in 

order to hide behind a post. In that respect, a modular articulated conception inspired by 

the Rubik’s cube seems to be an orientation to be privileged. 

The Context of Engagement 

In order to justify the investment it requires, battlefield robotization must bring real 

added-value by doing a task better than man, by doing the task differently, or by doing 

a task which still has to be invented but which will unavoidably appear, in accordance 

with the logic followed by information technologies which have seen the emergence of 

requirements and functions not envisaged in the beginning. 

For reasons which will be detailed later, we consider that combat robots will bring 

the best added-value in operations in urban areas, at short range, in conjunction with 

dismounted troops. This does not exclude the usefulness of robots in other functions, with 

a much higher range of action than that of dismounted infantry. Nonetheless, for Western 

countries, which will always have an issue with troop numbers and are anxious to protect 

their soldiers, priority will inevitably be given to situations of critical force ratio and 

dangerous environments. 

Three differentiated roles can thus be given to robots: sensor, attack (aggressor), 

and servant (logistics). As we show below, we consider that these tactical robots will be 

essentially focused on a sensor role, with a significant portion dedicated to the “servant” 

role. The number of aggressor-robots would be marginal. This idea may be counterintuitive, 

in view of the current efforts to develop aggressor-robots. We think that this priority is 

wrong. 

The central problem is indeed that of detection and discrimination. No robot will be 

able to detect and identify any type of hostile intent. It will however be able to detect 

presence or movement, whether recent or on-going. In order to discriminate, cross-checking 

between various sensors will be of paramount importance. Therefore, when we think about 

battlefield robotization, we think about groups or even multitudes of robots. 

The primary objective of these groups of robots will be to extend and deepen the 

information gathering area forward, but also on the flanks and in the rear, both on high 

terrain and underground. The first conceptual conclusion is therefore that the battlefield 

robotization concept itself requires many robots, and we think that they would generally be 

single-sensor and of limited size. 

We cannot envisage using human resources to control this many robots, even if this has 

recently been tested (in France). These robots thus have to be individually autonomous as 

soon as they have been given a mission, but, more importantly, they have to be collectively 

autonomous. In the field of artificial intelligence, this behavior is called the swarm. Each 

component has an extended autonomy of action, especially to guarantee its own survival, 

but each one permanently envisages its action in the extended context of the entire set. 

Many individual wills are thus integrated into a collective will. 

Thus the second conceptual conclusion is that robots will act in swarm. As a consequence, 

the development of battlefield robots cannot be envisaged without the development of 
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both the individual and collective algorithms governing the mission. It is important to start 

with that, before developing devices, rather than following the opposite logic, which is to 

develop robots then to put them into a synergistic system. 

The Impact of Combat Robots on Future Combat 

In order to do better, we can easily envisage that a unit conducting reconnaissance or 

surveillance over an area will act more quickly and ensure better safety for its personnel 

if it is surrounded by a swarm of sensors. Though it can never be eliminated, the risk 

of tactical surprise will be strongly reduced. Besides, a surveillance swarm enables the 

unit—the human part of it—to focus its attention on the most dangerous area, while for 

instance avoiding dedicating strength to the rear guard or the flank guard. The ratio of 

soldiers useful for the main combat action will be enhanced. Knowing that a moving 

platoon maintains 30% of its strength in second echelon to cover itself rearward and to 

provide a maneuver reserve, suppressing or reducing this requirement generates a more 

favorable offensive ratio. Logistics is manpower-consuming, increasingly so as we get 

nearer to the zone of contact. In the rear, the large logistic bases would require use of few 

personnel owing to mechanization (especially with sorter-packers and loader automation). 

The massive robotization of this function can be envisaged. It will free a small number 

of personnel but the gain will remain significant. But closer to the frontline, the transfer 

of fuel from tank-trucks to jerry cans and carrying them forward is awfully manpowerconsuming. What is true for POL is also true for ammunition, supplies, etc.2

 Bringing a 

wounded man to the proper level of medical aid requires approximately ten personnel for 

one or two hours. Though the medical treatment itself should remain a human task, all the 

transport mechanics could be entrusted to robots. This is where robotization would allow 

the process to be more efficient. 

To do things another way, many possibilities brought by this new combatant ecosystem 

remain to be explored. Since we have established that artificial intelligence will be its 

determining aspect, this exploration can start today, in simulation, even before having 

designed the devices. Operational research needs to anticipate the development of devices. 

It is not so expensive and will undoubtedly prove to be crucial to explore the most exotic 

routes, clear up doubts, and confirm options. The most probable result is that the decrease 

of the uncertainty and unknown tactical factors weighing on any unit feeling its way 

searching for the enemy will deeply modify its aggressiveness and more particularly its 

tactical movement speed outside the disputed area. The speed of movement under the 

threat of a probable enemy presence is currently limited by the necessity to keep a support 

element ready to react as soon as the enemy unveils himself. If the considered unit knows, 

with a higher degree of certainty, that it is not under immediate threat, and if it discovers the 

enemy earlier and with more precision than before, it will have a higher speed of maneuver. 

Its task organization will undoubtedly be modified, owing to the better ratio between the 

parts reserved to the offensive and those preserved to react to an unexpected event. In the 

long run, these changes should also have consequences on the allocation of weapons. In the 

same way, during an operational pause, the entire unit will be able to rest and recuperate, 

without needing to maintain sentries, if it trusts its robotic escort enough. Keeping in mind 
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that the security function generally requires 10% of unit strength, this is another situation 

in which a significant part of combat potential is preserved and can thus be reinvested. 

New ideas, that we do not envisage today, will undoubtedly emerge sooner or later. 

When the first computers were developed, they met the need to handle a mass of data. 

Nobody could imagine the office automation applications or even the games existing today. 

This logic will inevitably apply. The most imaginative will seize a significant advantage 

over the hesitant or uninspired. There again, operational research will prove to be fertile. 

War between robots will certainly be an explored path. The history of aviation is 

enlightening in that respect. At the beginning, aviation was used to observe and the pilots 

used to greet each other while fulfilling their mission. Then, one of them decided to get rid of 

an intruder, drew his gun and fired at him, triggering an escalation and specialization which 

is still continuing one century later. Today, the fighter component is the most symbolic part 

of modern aviation. We can thus presume that two “robotized” units will consider that one 

of the tasks required is elimination of the adversary’s robots. The human combatant will 

therefore, sooner or later, be tempted to leave the battlefield to robots only. We would then 

reach the ethical limits of the exercise, which will have to be envisaged with scepticism. 

Partial Conclusion

As a conclusion, battlefield robotization should see the emergence of a robot-based 

ecosystem operating in swarms. The development of artificial intelligence will be of 

paramount importance to exploit all the potential of these devices. Operational research 

can already determine the desirable characteristics both of the individual devices and of 

their collective action for and near humans. This operational research has to be conducted 

before the development of devices as such. In Part II below, we will examine the most 

probable physical characteristics of these devices as well as the way to control them. In 

Part III, we will envisage the tactical, psychological and ethical consequences of their 

introduction in the combat environment. 

Part II: The Major Characteristics of Robots

The major characteristics of robots we propose to think about are the function, size, 

appearance, range of action, and speed, all of which allow us to foresee that stealth will 

undoubtedly be a crucial issue for the designers. 

The “Aggressor,” “Sensor,” and “Servant” Functions

Let us start by asserting that, given the current technology and its predictable 

evolution, the issue for the designers is not the attack capability. We already know how to 

kill and neutralize, from any reasonable distance, with an accuracy which should reach its 

functional limits soon. Indeed, as soon as we are able to limit and nearly cancel collateral 

damage, provided we use the appropriate ordnance at the appropriate moment, it is no 

longer useful to enhance the intrinsic accuracy of a weapon system. We already have the 

necessary accuracy. It is currently the case, or nearly the case. 

Having made that provision, we can imagine that future robots will fulfil, at least in 

an initial phase of battlefield robotization, one of the three following functions: attack 

(aggressor robot), sensor, or servant (logistics). 
248

First of all, the pre-eminence of the “attack” robot, the machine that is armed, seems 

to be debatable. Without completely excluding it, two reasons limit its interest. The first 

one—the most determining by far—is the one mentioned in part I, namely, the necessity 

to include man in the decision-making loop. Since the robot has to ask its master before 

firing, you might as well place the master in a situation where he can decide and fire as 

it will always be quicker. It will also be safer from a discrimination and proportionality 

viewpoint. 

The second reason pertains to mechanics. Even if you admit that discrimination remains 

the responsibility of man and that the robot just has to send out sufficiently discriminating 

pictures of possible objectives, the complexity of a firing platform, its aiming performance, 

its ability to absorb recoil, to reload, etc. imply a significant technological breakthrough 

if we want to replace the current systems: either man himself, for small calibre, or the 

operated or remotely-operated device for more powerful armaments. Currently and in the 

medium term, the law of decreasing returns is in force and the best firing platform remains 

man or the operated/remotely-operated device. We could devise attack robots with nonlethal functions or payload, such as the ram robot (to break through a door or a wall) or 

the smoke dispenser robot. This does not change fundamentally the envisaged taxonomy. 

However, some environments do not enable man to fight on a sustained basis, such 

as contaminated or undersea areas. In these two specific contexts where discrimination is 

easier since the non-combatant cannot be part of the environment, we could conceptually 

admit the interest of “true attack” robots. They could contest the area against the opponent 

without endangering the life or health of human beings. A possible employment would be 

for instance the submarine defense of oil rigs with “shark-robots” aimed at eliminating 

the threat of scuba divers. That being said, the real added-value of such a robot, compared 

with a miniature torpedo tube anchored into one leg of the platform and operated from 

the bridge or from a distance, seems questionable. This illustration leads us to conclude 

that complex or new situations do not always justify the invention of robots and that it is 

preferable to explore proven solutions first. One does not robotize for fun but to make up 

for an absence of a solution. 

The “sensor” robot seems to be the prevailing path, at least in the medium term. Once 

again, in the framework of this reflection, it is worth noting that UAVs or remote sensors 

are not robots, even if they are very efficient sensors. 

By extending intelligence collection areas for a unit, by making it possible in areas 

where soldiers cannot go, or only with difficulty or heavy risks, the robot would bring an 

undisputable added-value which can already be perceived with current technologies. We 

are currently able to develop optical, sound, seismic, radio, and radar sensors, with a much 

higher definition than human capabilities. For instance, optic observation can cover ranges 

which are invisible to human eye. In the short term, by developing mass spectrograph 

technology, we should develop “sniffer” robots, able to identify chemical components 

in the air, on or under the ground, being thus able to spot a buried explosive device or 

chemical contamination. Similarly, seismic or tactile technology can detect modifications 

of the ground texture, indicating works such as buried mines or the presence of an electric 
249

wire. The basic technologies already exist and their miniaturization, at reasonable costs, 

should give results in the near future. 

Regarding the “servant” robot, there are already some of them under the form of loadcarrier “mules,” able to follow man along a mountain path. The current mine-clearing robot 

is not a robot as we define it in this article yet, but a sophisticated remotely-operated device. 

It may be interesting to make it autonomous, able to reconnoiter a route or an area and 

to defuse or neutralize any encountered device, possibly without any human intervention 

(though it would be possible to include an execution order between the discovery and the 

neutralization of a device). 

Many forward logistic operations lend themselves to robotization, for the same reason 

that robotics has invaded civilian logistics, in particular in huge distribution centers. Be 

it to sort and allocate ammunition, spare parts, supply, to pack and store, to count and 

check, there are already robots proving to be quicker, more enduring and more reliable 

than man. Bringing “customized” logistics as close as possible to the soldier is also a likely 

possibility and which already exists as a prototype. 

A variation of the “servant” robot could be the radio relay-robot, inserted in the depth of 

the enemy zone. For all that, a discussion on the actual need to robotize this function shows 

the limits of the exercise. Indeed, a re-transmitter can be projected to a distance as a rocket 

submunition, or dropped from an aircraft. In such a case, the robot would not consume any 

energy from its own reserve for insertion, which would not be the case of a vehicle-robot 

autonomously conducting a long range infiltration.3

 Besides the fact that it could be seen 

while moving, tracked and even “turned” (in the meaning spies give to the word), the most 

critical factor would be the energetic ratio which would just be unacceptable. Though this 

discussion might seem superficial, it shows that many solutions, already existing or easy to 

develop, are intrinsically more cost-effective than robotization. 

We can draw a first typological conclusion from what is mentioned above. In a booming 

tactical family, the sensor robot should represent the large majority of the products deployed. 

The attack robot will undoubtedly exist in a near future, but should remain marginal in 

numbers for a long time because it will be limited to particular cases. There should be 

more numerous “servant” robots, since the state of the art seems to be close to meeting 

operational requirement. If we make an attempt at prediction: within the ten coming years 

(2020-2025), the robots on the land battlefield will most likely be 70-80% sensors, servants 

20-10%, attack 5-10%. 

What Size Will These Robots Be?

The size of each robot will of course depend on its function. 

The size of an “attack” robot will mostly depend on its armament. Except if there 

is a technological breakthrough, such robots should not be significantly smaller than the 

current remotely-operated platforms, since they would have to embark a base stabilized on 

the three axes, able to absorb the recoil, carrying its fire control apparatus and ordnance, all 

that being placed on the fully mobile platform which means that we are talking about a robot 

and not a sledge. In the light of what is currently done, for instance, to carry a mediumcaliber machine gun or an antitank missile launcher, the ratio seems to be one half. We 
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mean that a remotely-operated device able to carry and haul a machine-gun measures up to 

one meter and weighs approximately 50 kilos; a larger device carrying antitank armament 

takes half the volume of the corresponding armoured vehicle, simply because it does not 

need the internal space necessary for the crew. Between the remotely-operated device and 

the robot, the difference in volume seems minimal, or even negligible, the sole difference 

being the presence or absence of internal algorithms, making the device autonomous. To 

be specific, the volume of the box ensuring the liaison with the pilot of a remotely operated 

device is not so different from that of a device enabled with artificial intelligence. All the 

rest—mobility, protection, power, armament, signals—does not stem from robotization as 

such but from the miniaturization of each component. 

A comparison with UAVs is enlightening: the huge UAVs, which operate at high altitude 

and for long durations, have a size comparable with that of airliners. Remote operation has 

not led to a significant decrease of volume and weight but to the useful duration in zone 

(so-called “loitering time”), since the pilot is no longer inside thus dispensing with the 

physical limit of human endurance and increasing the fuel payload. 

The size of “sensor” robots obviously depends on the sensor and, in this field, we can 

see that miniaturization is rapidly progressing. Some cameras weigh only a few grams 

and can fly on devices the size of a big insect. The other envisaged sensors (radar, radio, 

sound, seismic, chemical) should follow the same path, without necessarily going as far in 

miniaturization as the optic range. 

Addressing that from a non-scientific neophyte’s viewpoint, it seems that a first 

generation of sensor robots will become operational for payloads ranging from a few 

hundred grams to a few kilos. This would make the development of portable robots possible, 

from pocket size to backpack size. There is hardly any reason for conceiving right now a 

hundred-kilo device to carry a high-power lens, with a definition and range useful for man. 

The robot will therefore be single-sensor, allowing for exceptions, mainly for reasons 

of simplicity and reliability. We may be tempted, initially, to place several sensors side by 

side on the same mobile platform (for instance one or several optical sensors combined 

with a mass spectrograph). At first glance, this seems to be a mistake because the 

essential complexity of the robot will not be the sensor but the platform which makes 

it mobile and “survivable.” The potential interferences between very different sensors 

will disproportionately complicate the overall integration. Synergy will have to be sought 

elsewhere, through the swarm effect; we will come back to that. Except in some cases, the 

trend will finally go toward single-sensor, usually light robots of modest size, generally 

transportable by one man. 

The first really functional generation of sensor robots should include devices in sizes 

ranging from the mouse to the big dog, the average being the cat. This idea has significant 

tactical consequences which will be discussed later. 

Regarding “servant” robots, they could be more bulky since they would essentially 

be used to carry loads or manipulate things (bomb disposal devices, for instance). In 

rear depots for instance, these robots could be very big, ranging from one to ten tons, to 

manipulate heavy loads. In combat areas, endurance, stealth and the range of required 
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loads would imply a more limited volume. The size should start with that of a big dog and 

go up to that of a mule. Beyond that, the size would be comparable with that of a manned 

vehicle and it is difficult to envisage the conditions which would make the robot more 

efficient than current operated vehicles, future remotely operated land vehicles, or even a 

column of vehicles connected to an operated one (in automated convoy). 

Hence this second typological conclusion: the more numerous robots, by far, should 

be the smallest ones, but not necessarily the miniature ones, the “big ones” being generally 

limited to attack or support roles. This conclusion has consequences, because if the most 

widespread robot tends to be the cheapest one, nearly by principle, the development and 

deployment of this capability will be easier. 

What Will They Look Like?

Regarding the shapes of robots, and especially those of the smallest ones, they will 

mainly be inspired from nature because it is expedient to start with that. A 7 July 2011 

article in The Economist titled “Robots: Zoobotics” offers very convincing arguments in 

favor of a logic based on the way species evolve. Indeed, shapes and forms encountered 

in nature result from millions of years of selection, an experience it would be vain to 

ignore. Some flying devices, able to make prolonged stationary flight, are already inspired 

by insects. A submarine device used for some tasks could be based on the octopus, the 

plasticity of which enables it to get everywhere while benefitting from a remarkable 

mechanical strength compared with its mass. A prototype is already being developed, in 

order to make a robot able, for instance, to operate submarine devices. A device supposed 

to penetrate everywhere, but without being obliged to do it quickly, could look like a snake 

or a centipede. For small size ground robots, the shapes of spiders are a good compromise 

between the ability to get everywhere and, if need be, to leap ahead, the legs acting as 

planes for the aerial phase; the initial impulse could be obtained through a bound or the 

emission of a gas or compressed air jet.

Third typological conclusion: the conceptual borrowing from the animal world should 

be the starting point. Apart from robots moving on wheels or tracks—undoubtedly the 

biggest ones—the large majority of shapes will stem from nature. They will thus give rise 

to human reactions marked by culture or a personal experience; that is something on which 

we will come back later because it has implications on the acceptability of this new family 

of soldiers. 

Range of Action and Speed

Theoretically, we should be able to conceive ground sensor robots with a long range 

and a high endurance, able to cover hundreds of kilometers, following the same logic as 

that which prevailed for the development of UAVs. We can imagine a robot dedicated 

to route reconnaissance, leaving Frankfurt in the morning and arriving at Berlin in the 

evening, without any human intervention. This has been done in the United States, within 

the framework of three competitions organized by the US Defense Advanced Research 

Projects Agency (DARPA) and the progress made between competitions was amazing.

Even then, apart from a reconnaissance limited to the most technical aspects (e.g. 

conditions of the road), excluding any risk of making a hostile encounter, nothing will 
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replace the immediate and continuous action of man. We currently can conduct combat 

reconnaissance with men. Replacing the lead man with a robot could be so all-consuming 

for Soldiers—to follow, understand and decide—that in the end, replacing the lead man 

becomes meaningless or does not bring any real tactical gain. 

However, radiological reconnaissance, in a contaminated area, but without any 

interactive opposition (without any enemy) can be envisaged right now. For instance, in 

Japan, after the tsunami and with the risk of nuclear contamination, robots could have 

been used to determine as quickly as possible the map of possible routes or the level of 

radiological contamination over an area. For all that, we are able to do that from a distance 

with UAVs, the air or spatial imagery and radiological sampling conducted from helicopters. 

We are able to do it now (and we indeed do it), with proven technologies, at acceptable cost 

since they involve already existing devices which can also fulfil other missions—such as 

helicopters—which would not be the case with most robots. In a nutshell, the economic 

and functional calculation of this change is not conclusive. It is another illustration of that 

which is possible, even at reasonable cost, is not necessarily the best solution. 

This leads us to our fourth typological conclusion: the long-range land robot seems 

to be conceptual nonsense, or at least without any obvious operational added-value. Apart 

from very specific cases, it seems reasonable not to dedicate too many resources to this 

type of research. 

Regarding the moving speed of robots, we must consider two aspects: maximum speed 

and tactical speed. The maximum speed is necessary for the last leap or to escape a threat. 

In this case, the word “leap” is appropriate because in most cases, the way of moving of the 

robot would be similar to a leap (aerial phase resulting from an impulse, to be distinguished 

from a flight during which the aerial phase is maintained). The energetic ratio of a device 

designed to reach a high instantaneous speed, but without having to make it endure, is very 

different from that of a device able to move at this same high speed over a long period of 

time. 

The tactical speed is the speed to be maintained throughout the mission, and there, 

paradoxically, the need is reduced. An infantry unit can cover six kilometers in an hour, 

but in reality it maneuvers at three kilometers per hour and fights at one kilometer per 

hour (because the movement of dissociated elements, which stop to support, search, and 

observe, makes the whole of them move at this low speed). A robot supposed to accompany 

walking men therefore does not need to be able to reach 60 km/h. It is useful for the robot to 

reach this speed for a leap, but it is unnecessary for it to maintain that speed for more than 

a few minutes; it would otherwise separate it from its human escort. If the unit moves at 60 

km/h, its robots will travel by vehicle and will get off to conduct dismounted combat. In 

concrete terms, for a robot meant to accompany men, a maximum speed comparable with 

that of a dog would be largely sufficient. 

The tactical endurance of these devices does not need to exceed too much that of the 

human unit they accompany; we are therefore talking about a few hours of autonomy, one 

day at most, because the resting time of the unit should allow a reload of the batteries or a 

refuel of the devices. 
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The fifth typological conclusion stems from what has just been stated. In the field of 

conception, aiming at reaching high enduring speed is most likely useless. However, being 

able to move during several hours at 8 to 10 km/h speed (to maintain a margin relative to a 

walking man) while being able to make repeated leaps is an exploitable basis for program 

specifications and remains within reach of reasonably achievable technology. 

The Issue of Stealth

Robots of limited size, moving on the ground, and sometimes making leaps, can be 

silent if current technologies improve a little. They could thus be quite stealthy, at least in 

a normally noisy urban environment. But in a quiet town or in a peripheral area at night, 

significant improvements have to be made to make a swarm undetectable from a short 

distance. It is nevertheless an important condition for any system focused on intelligence 

acquisition. 

It will certainly be much more complicated for flying devices. The laws of physics 

brutally apply. For instance, the apparatus required to muffle sound is bulky, reduces the 

energy output and makes the device heavier, requiring additional power which induces more 

noise. After all, after one century of mass aeronautics, there is no noiseless commercial or 

military aircraft yet. There is constant and real progress but we will not have silent aircraft 

soon. It is a gamble on the future to assert that a long-lasting and resolute effort should be 

able to produce noiseless or nearly noiseless flying robots. It is not impossible that at a 

certain level of silence, the law of decreasing efficiency applies and that the flying robot, 

capable of operating in very adverse flying conditions and stealthy enough not to draw 

attention just cannot be achieved. However, a technological breakthrough is not impossible. 

Yet, the work on the acoustic trace of robots of all types will certainly represent a major 

component of the conceptual effort, as is already the case for submarines. 

This is not a minor detail. The objective is to integrate the acoustic criterion as a major 

initial component of the device design, and not as a consequence of technological choices 

focused on the scope of action, speed, protection or other essential elements. In the field of 

acoustics, it is very difficult to make up for a major fault, inherent to the conception itself 

of the device. It is not inconceivable that the acoustic signature of the robots will be the 

most significant technological obstacle to overcome, thus delaying the emergence of this 

family of devices. 

To fine tune their characteristics, we have to imagine them in a tactical situation, which 

will be the subject of the third part of this article. 

Part III: Tactical, Psychological, and Ethical Consequences 

It is generally agreed that future ground combat will mostly be in the city (urban areas), 

amongst populations, against an asymmetric enemy merging with the population at least 

until combat, and often during and after it. 

What Could Robots Be Used For in This Context?

In the previous part, we have asserted that the most widespread robot would be the 

sensor robot, generally single-sensor, acting in a swarm to complement the dismounted 

unit. The latter would be preceded by several robots, the angles of observation of which 
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would overlap while multiplying the types of observation (visual, seismic, electromagnetic 

and even olfactory). On the flanks, other devices would ensure security from a predefined 

distance depending on the threat and the human environment, which would not necessarily 

be hostile. It would be the same for the rear. In urban terrain, it would be useful for the 

deployed “bubble” to observe the high ground, hence the interest in having a climbing 

and movement capacity on a vertical wall as well as a capability to jump from one wall to 

another. Lastly, the surveillance could be made subterranean, with robots moving through 

underground passages thanks to their limited size and their ability to operate in the water. 

What Relationship Between the Robot and its Master? 

As already outlined, it is unrealistic to pretend to desire control of each robot element 

individually. Thus artificial intelligence is an imperative. In order to limit the burden 

on human attention, the dialogue between the individual components should also be 

autonomous. For instance, a robot could change side of a street while moving to better 

cover the dead angle of one of its fellow machines without any human intervention. The 

sensors would be constantly distributed by the artificial intelligence. 

Similarly, and though it may seem counter-intuitive, robots should not transmit 

information in real time to men. The flow of information would be transmitted only in case 

of an alert and through a filter that has yet to be defined. In other words, the moving unit’s 

human component would in most cases not observe through the eyes of the scouting robots 

but with its own eyes. It could of course use the transmitted picture on call. 

The behavior of each individual robot and that of the swarm would be defined by a 

combination of reflex actions and orders. A single operator would therefore give the overall 

mission to the swarm, the direction, the objective, and other instructions, as we already 

do with humans. The swarm, and each of the individuals which compose it, would act on 

its own initiative depending on what it can do (artificial intelligence) and on the signals 

received from the environment (including the behavior of the unit it moves with). From 

time to time, it would receive a precise order, usually a refocusing or new instructions, 

which would induce a new behavior. In that context, a single operator would be able to 

control the entire swarm. 

Yet, if a threat appears, some of the robots should be controlled individually since a 

single operator would not be sufficient to adapt the maneuver. 

There is a major limitation to the deployment of a swarm: the necessary bandwidth 

for the information flow in both directions. This bandwidth must be protected because 

it will be attacked, almost by principle. This limitation cannot be removed today but it 

undoubtedly will be one day or another. By the way, the concept proposed below is aimed 

at limiting the need for bandwidth, at least apart from the active phases of combat. 

Hence a Concept of a Three-Phase Man-Robot Dialogue

1. Routine, no danger assessed. In this mode, the ideal set up is a single 

operator. Except for a few glances, the unit lets the swarm operate as 

it wishes. The swarm adapts its tempo to that of the unit, abiding by 

parameters defined for the mission, including the security distance on 

each side (forward, flanks, rearward, upper locations and subterranean). 
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2. Alert posture induced by the detection of an indicator or warning. The 

swarm, like a dog, suddenly stops and adopts a security posture. The 

unit takes defensive measures and appeals to the sensors which have 

signalled something. Consequently, if each soldier has “his” appointed 

robot, he captures the picture or the radar screen on his own screen 

and interprets what he can see. The commander, in contact with the 

collective artificial intelligence, interprets the cross-checked data. 

3. Maneuver, depending on the interpretation of the piece of information. 

If need be, the tactical commander can modify the maneuver of the 

sensors in order to optimize operations over a given area. It is worth 

noting that the embedded artificial intelligence increases its operational 

experience and improves its quality, to such an extent that when a 

similar situation occurs later, it adapts its behavior without further 

human intervention. We can already do that with a computer, in a 

synthetic world, nothing prevents us from extending this capability to 

the physical field. In that situation, some sensors are operated in real 

time, and the information they feed is exploited in real time. 

As already noted, we do not really envisage the combat robot, participating in firing 

in case of engagement. In the preferred case, the well-informed human unit assesses the 

threat and, if the need arises, conducts the firing. Meanwhile, the swarm participates in 

giving information on its result (live and non-stop battle damage assessment or BDA), 

while maintaining surveillance over adjacent areas. 

This conclusion may seem counter-intuitive but it is essential: the dialogue between 

the robot and its master should be as limited as possible. It is not a paradox: the human 

component must retain as much freedom of action as possible and not be consumed by 

running the robotic component (and, incidentally, use less bandwidth). In concrete terms, 

the approach to be preferred is a three-level dialogue, adapted to circumstances. 

Some Ideas on the Tactical Structure

Until now, we have envisaged close combat, in urban terrain, dismounted (at least for 

humans). In that respect, the basic tactical element would be the platoon (approximately 

30 personnel), accompanied by its robotic ecosystem which would essentially provide 

information, with a possible logistic component. Let us leave aside for the moment the 

fact that what 30 personnel do today will certainly be done with less in such a context. 

The same tactical effect could be obtained, in the case of a “robotized” platoon, by 10 or 

15 fewer personnel. If we seek to save on manpower at all costs, the downsizing will still 

be limited by the number of robots to be implemented, which should result in the ratio of 

one man-one robot, even in the case of a super-efficient artificial intelligence. In the end, in 

contact, one soldier will be needed with each robot to observe with its eyes and if need be 

to maneuver it. After all, a dog-handler only handles one dog. 

In case our conclusion about the preeminence of the sensor robot is confirmed, it seems 

more relevant to reverse the proposal and to preserve troop strength since the combat 

capability will remain the prerogative of man. At a given level of manpower, robotization 
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at the tactical level will considerably increase the efficiency of a unit; it is another way to 

compensate for numerical inferiority which is a key element of the engagement of Western 

armed forces in modern conflict, be it asymmetric or not. 

The platoon would be equipped with its own set of robots, at least as long as the 

endurance of men and robots is the same. The operational resting periods will be profitable 

to both. If the swarm of robots has a much higher endurance, the same lot could be handed 

on to successive platoons. But it will be more expedient to limit the endurance of robots to 

a given mission, with some reserve for comfort. 

The company having three or four of these platoons should have some broader 

capability. For instance, if a platoon acts in a half-square kilometer area, its parent unit 

should observe in the next half-square kilometre zone and even widen that area a little. 

That being said, this observation capability already exists, with devices operated from a 

distance (the UAVs). Some of them could be robotized (meaning that they could be made 

autonomous), but the tactical added-value is not convincing. We should be able to make do 

with an observation capability from the air and space, with a dozen-kilometer range, during 

a long period of time—a capability which currently exists. 

In the end, battlefield robotization brings the highest added-value in “retail combat,” 

in close contact, much more than in the context of extended or long range engagements. 

Robotizing a long-range, long-lasting combat capability does not appear to be a profitable 

objective at the moment. 

To conclude on the tactical employment of robots, it should mainly concern the lower 

echelon, certainly the current platoon level, which would be “robotized” with a swarm 

allocated to it; three or four platoons would constitute a company with its own observation 

and detection capability into forward zones (using remotely operated devices rather than 

robots); at the higher echelons, combined arms maneuver would not be significantly 

impacted; yet, the logistic function, above all in the forward area, would make massive use 

of “servant” robots. 

We still have to envisage this unit in combat, in urban terrain, in the presence of the 

population. That leads us into the psychological and ethical aspects of this new capability. 

The Psychological Aspects of Robot-Assisted Combat

These aspects are linked to the issue regarding the acceptability of robots. We have 

mentioned the picture of the unit moving in town, surrounded with its swarm of robots. The 

shapes and forms we discussed are not necessarily perceived as friendly, like the spiderrobot. Even a robot looking like a cat or a dog will not necessarily be warmly welcomed. 

Let us not even speak about the snake or ground octopus. Let us not forget either that these 

devices will certainly be noisy, at least at the beginning. 

The current soldier, caparisoned and helmeted, wearing dark glasses making him look 

like a wasp, loaded with devices like outgrowths making his human aspect unrecognizable, 

is not well accepted by the population, to say the least. It is nonsense to believe that this 

refusal is “cultural,” because the Afghan or Iraqi populations are uncomfortable with the 

intrusion of Western soldiers. The same Western soldiers, deployed with the same gear and 
257

the same attitude in the capital city of their own country would hardly be better perceived 

or accepted. Visually speaking, the increasing gap between the civilian and the combatant 

is already a major psychological issue. What will happen when our “extra-terrestrial” 

human combatant is completely surrounded by a buzzing, leaping, crawling, mewling, 

whistling swarm? 

The odds are that our robotized platoon will have many difficulties in making contact, 

in a serene and friendly way, with a sceptical or undecided population, not to speak of a 

hostile one. In that case, robotization could be a disadvantage, or at least a strong constraint 

requiring heavy tactical adaptations to make up for the psychological effect which goes 

against the mission. 

The Ethical Aspects 

Until now, we have structured this discussion from a purely technical perspective. But 

combat is a human issue and must remain so. We have said above that the long-range robot, 

able to conduct fully autonomous missions in depth (for instance to control a gap, or harass 

enemy in the rear) seems to be a conceptual nonsense. So it is from an ethical viewpoint 

as well. 

Indeed, if we envisage a harassing-robot squadron, attacking the rear enemy position, 

without any or hardly any human intervention, we can conceive that the enemy will design 

robots to defend his own rear and to track and kill the infiltrated individual, be it a human 

or a robot. In that case, the result is war between robots, for the sake of humans but out of 

their presence. This will be a totally new aspect of war, and in reality an absolute horror. 

The advantage of the robot accompanying the infantryman, at the infantryman’s tempo, 

is that it does not dissociate the combatant from his ultimate responsibility. The swarm is 

certainly a dreadful form of development of combat but it does not distort it to the same 

extent as the gangs of bloodthirsty robots mentioned above. 

Isaac Asimov, one of the most famous science-fiction writers, has studied the ethics of 

robots and established the three major laws of robotics: 

1. A robot cannot harm a human being nor, remaining passive, authorize 

that a human being be exposed to danger. 

2. A robot must obey the orders given to him by a human being, except 

if these orders come into conflict with the first law. 

3. A robot must protect its own existence as long as this protection does 

not come into conflict with the first or the second law. 

Combat robots, such as we envisage them, obviously go against these laws, owing to 

their very design. Yet, ethical research could start with this foundation. 

Let us note first that the robots we have talked about are not mere machines. They are 

devices equipped with a huge autonomy regarding decision-making; it is even their major 

advantage. Whoever says “decision” says “responsibility.” Here again, the comparison 

with the employment of animals is enlightening. A dog-handler remains responsible for his 

dog. How can the decision-making autonomy of machines be reconciled with the necessary 

responsibility of their masters? 
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Whatever the complexity of the algorithms which will determine the behavior of robots, 

human responsibility will remain fully engaged, at least at three levels: the designer and 

especially the person who has oriented the artificial intelligence; the tactical commander, 

who has decided the mission, the tasked unit, and the defined boundaries (including the 

rules of engagements to which paragraphs dedicated to robots will be added); and the 

robot’s master as such, the one who is connected and who commands it directly. The 

creation of a “robotized” unit will have to include a significant part of training dedicated to 

ethics, envisaging the moral limitations of employment of these devices. 

Apart from the attack robot, which clearly goes against the ideas of Asimov, even the 

sensors or “servant” robots will explore the limits of these laws as soon as they have to 

protect themselves. 

As a general rule, we can think that the self-protection of the robot should preserve 

it from an innocent gesture or from indirect malevolence like that of a curious child or of 

an exasperated passer-by, which is different from the adversary who knows who or what 

he is faced with. The first measure of protection and a priori the less dangerous to an 

innocent person is dodging (which does not mean fleeing—in that case, the robot avoids 

the blow but remains in the area). Dodging may consist in adopting a less vulnerable shape, 

thanks to the plasticity already mentioned above. Here again, the animal world may offer 

inspiration in the form of the armadillo or the hedgehog, developing robots which curl up 

or enter inside a shell, but also leaping robots which stave off the knock by jumping and 

eventually tire the aggressor. An additional degree of defense could consist of a non-lethal 

reaction capability like the spines of the hedgehog, the electric discharge of some fishes 

or the emission of smelly gas (skunk effect). Faced with clearly hostile deeds, most of the 

robots will remain highly vulnerable because of the ratio between their weight and their 

payload. The armored robot, able to take a sub-machine gun burst, will be deprived of any 

agility. The protection of the system rather lies in the bulk effect: the swarm can lose one 

or two bees and the clear aggression against a robot is a combat act just like any other one, 

which may lead to the engagement of soldiers. 

Let us return to the civilian population. It could attack the robots while avoiding 

provoking soldiers directly. Let us suppose that an exasperated grocer kicks a spider robot 

stationed in front of his shop. Will he have to be arrested? According to which legal rule? 

If demonstrators, masked and carrying bats attack the robots which are watching them, in 

front of a check point, what will the acceptable options be for the unit? From an ethical 

viewpoint, can we fire at a crowd to protect a robot? 

These are the first considerations that will have to be envisaged before deploying the 

robotized units we have conceived. It is highly desirable that this reflection take place in 

close co-ordination with the development of algorithms governing the behavior of robots, 

since they will have consequences on the behavior of the unit and, finally, on its tactics. 
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Summary of Conclusions:

1. Combat robotization is on-going.

2. A priori, robotization will mainly concern “retail combat,” in urban 

terrain, rather than long-range missions (a few hours, a few kilometers). 

3. The sensor robot should prevail, followed by the support robot and in 

some cases the attack robot. 

4. The shapes and forms of the robots will be, for most of them, 

derived from animals. This conclusion has material and functional 

consequences but, more importantly, psychological ones, because the 

atavistic burden will weigh on the acceptability of these new bodies. 

5. Most of these robots should be small, with limited range and endurance 

and a high capability to cross obstacles, generally by leaping. 

6. These robots will act in swarms; the development of the algorithm 

should precede the definition of each individual robot. 

7. The intrusion of these robots on the battlefield should be preceded 

by ethical reflections, which would in turn have consequences on the 

technological and cybernetic spheres. 
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Notes

1. French Army General Staff 2011 definition of a robot: A mobile and reusable ground platform, 

equipped with sensors and effect-producers, aimed at achieving, with a certain level of autonomy, 

basic actions within the framework of the land maneuver. End-state of land military robotics: enable 

the soldier to focus on what he/she is only able to achieve, since the robot fulfils some clearly 

identified tasks in support of or instead of the combatant.

2. Battle and logistics. During the first battle of Grozny (winter 1994-1995), one third of the 

strength located in the city was consumed by forward logistics and especially the transfer of supply. 

One heavy consequence was that the soldiers, even taken out of combat, could not have a rest 

because they were employed for these logistic actions. The wearing out of the troops, physically but 

above all psychologically, had heavy consequences on the battle. 

3. Single rocket launcher. Many nations already operate rocket ammunition able to reach 100 

kilometers with an accuracy of nearly one meter. This type of vector could be adapted to deploy a 

re-transmitter, at a lower cost than that needed to develop a specific robot. Detection might be more 

difficult than for a ground device, inevitably bound to make encounters. Regarding interception, it 

would be much more difficult against a rocket, which could drop its load at any time on a path which 

would continue for few more dozen kilometers.


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