J-S38037-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RAYSHAWN EDWARDS 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 52 WDA 2021

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 21, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0008553-2011

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and COLINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED: APRIL 11, 2022

Rayshawn Edwards appeals from the order denying his Post Conviction 

Relief Act (PCRA) petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. Edwards is 

currently incarcerated for an aggregate term of twenty to forty years, which 

followed a non-jury trial wherein he was found guilty of, inter alia, thirddegree murder. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2502(c). On appeal, Edwards singularly 

challenges the appropriateness of the PCRA court’s notice of intent to dismiss 

his petition. Edwards contends that, in contravention of Pennsylvania Rule of 

Criminal Procedure 907, the court did not specifically articulate a legally salient 

basis to dismiss his petition without a hearing. Although the court did issue 

Rule 907 notice, inclusive of two reasons why it was dismissing Edwards’s 

petition, neither reason referenced, nor even alluded to, the actual contents 

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 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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of the petition. Consequently, we are constrained to vacate and remand this

matter for the PCRA court to properly issue Rule 907 notice.

The facts underpinning Edwards’s convictions are irrelevant for the 

purposes of his appeal. However, this matter’s procedural history is quite 

convoluted.

In his direct appeal, this Court affirmed his judgment of sentence, see 

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 1036 WDA 2012 (Pa. Super., filed 7/29/14) 

(unpublished memorandum), and our Supreme Court denied his petition, 

seeking to appeal from our decision, in an order dated March 23, 2016. 

Edwards did not, thereafter, appeal to the United States Supreme Court. See 

U.S. Sup.Ct. Rule 13(1). Accordingly, Edwards’s judgment of sentence 

became final on June 21, 2016, and he had until June 21, 2017, one year 

later, to file a timely PCRA petition. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). 

Edwards filed the at-issue PCRA petition on May 18, 2017. Concurrent 

with this submission, Edwards also filed a petition for leave to amend that 

petition, which was granted. The court allowed for amendment until August 

18, 2017. 

On November 29, 2017, having received no petition amendment from 

Edwards, the court issued a notice of its intent to dismiss the May 18, 2017 

petition, giving Edwards the ability to respond to the notice within twenty 

days. In response, Edwards filed a petition for extension of time nunc pro tunc, 

which was denied. Edwards then filed a response to the notice of intent to 

dismiss and additionally filed an amended PCRA petition. Ultimately, the court 
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denied Edwards’s PCRA petition, additionally finding that Edwards’s amended 

PCRA petition was a nullity for it failing to be timely filed. 

Instead of filing a notice of appeal from the order denying his petition, 

Edwards waited approximately three months before filing a petition for the 

reinstatement of his appellate rights. Edwards’s petition was initially denied, 

but granted after reconsideration. However, in an attempt to exercise his 

newly acquired rights and on appeal to this Court, we interpreted this 

reinstatement petition as a PCRA petition. As such, given the petition’s filing 

date, well after the PCRA’s one-year time bar, and the nature of relief that it 

sought, it was construed as an untimely PCRA petition that did not plead any 

exception to the PCRA’s time bar. See Commonwealth v. Edwards, 546 

WDA 2018 (Pa. Super., filed 7/3/19) (unpublished memorandum). Therefore, 

we vacated the order reinstating his appellate rights. 

Ultimately, after filing yet another PCRA petition asserting that his 

former PCRA counsel was per se ineffective for prohibiting merit review of his 

timely PCRA petition, Edwards obtained reinstatement of his right to appeal 

from the May 18, 2017 petition nunc pro tunc. In accordance with this 

reinstatement, Edwards then filed a timely notice of appeal. The parties have 

complied with their respective obligations under Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925. Hence, this appeal is ripe for review.

On appeal, Edwards’s sole question asks:

1. Did the PCRA court err in dismissing [his] initial petition 

because its notice of intent to dismiss the petition failed to 

identify any reason to do so?
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Appellant’s Brief, at 4. 

As with any PCRA petition’s dismissal, we “examine whether the PCRA 

court’s determinations are supported by the record and are free of legal error.” 

Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.3d 595, 603 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). 

In the context of a PCRA court’s ability to deny a request for an evidentiary 

hearing, “such a decision is within the discretion of the PCRA court and will 

not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Mason, 

130 A.3d 601, 617 (Pa. 2015).

Despite the wide latitude given to PCRA courts on its ability to determine

whether holding a hearing is necessary, we emphasize that the notice 

requirement contained in Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 907(1) is 

mandatory. See Commonwealth v. Feighery, 661 A.2d 437, 439 (Pa. 

Super. 1995). That Rule requires the court to “give notice to the parties of the 

intention to dismiss the petition.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). In addition, the court 

“shall state in the notice the reasons for the dismissal.” Id. With these dictates 

in mind, noncompliance with Rule 907(1) requires vacatur of the PCRA court’s 

order dismissing the petition. See Commonwealth v. Vo, 235 A.3d 365, 372 

(Pa. Super. 2020). 

To elaborate further as to what Rule 907 was designed to effectuate:

The purpose of a Rule 907 pre-dismissal notice is to allow a 

petitioner an opportunity to seek leave to amend his petition and 

correct any material defects, the ultimate goal being to permit 

merits review by the PCRA court of potentially arguable claims. 

The response to the Rule 907 notice is an opportunity for a 
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petitioner and/or his counsel to object to the dismissal and alert 

the PCRA court of a perceived error, permitting the court to 

discern the potential for amendment. The response is also the 

opportunity for the petitioner to object to counsel’s effectiveness 

at the PCRA level. When a PCRA court properly issues Rule 907 

notice in compliance with the rules of criminal procedure, an 

appellant is deemed to have sufficient notice of dismissal. 

Id. (citations, brackets, quotations, and emphasis omitted). 

The gravamen of Edwards’s argument is that, even though the court 

identified its bases for dismissing his PCRA petition in its Pennsylvania Rule of 

Appellate Procedure 1925(a) opinion, “the PCRA court’s [initial] notice merely 

identified that [he] had not filed an amended petition and had not sought 

further time to do so, neither of which explain why his initial petition was 

meritless as a matter of law.” Appellant’s Brief, at 10. As the notice did not 

identify any material defects with the petition itself, we agree. 

Unquestionably, Edwards’s petition, as it stands, is extremely terse. As 

best can be discerned, it states, without further elaboration, that he “intends 

to raise claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and potentially afterdiscovered evidence that have not been previously litigated.” Petition for PostConviction Relief and Petition for Leave to Amend, ¶ 5, 5/18/17.

However, in relevant part, the PCRA court’s notice of its intention to 

dismiss indicated that it would dismiss Edwards’s petition because of: 

“Petitioner’s failure to file an Amended Post Conviction Relief Act Petition by 

August, 18, 2017 and; Petitioner’s failure to request an extension of time to 

file the Petition.” Notice of Intention to Dismiss, 11/27/17.
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While Commonwealth v. Rush involves an interpretation of the notice 

requirements necessary in capital cases, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 9091, we find its 

text to be persuasive. See 838 A.2d 651 (Pa. 2003). There, the PCRA court 

issued a pre-dismissal notice indicating that “the issues raised in the PCRA 

petition filed by your attorney [were] without merit.” Id., at 659 n.9. However, 

our Supreme Court found that this notice “was not specific as to the reasons 

for the dismissal.” Id., at 658-59. Instead, “the PCRA court should have given 

[that a]ppellant notice that his claim was going to be dismissed [on the post 

hoc and precise basis proffered by the PCRA court] so that, if possible, 

[a]ppellant could have reviewed the claim for the potential for amendment 

under Rule 909[.]” Id., at 659. As such, given “the PCRA court’s failure to 

give [that a]ppellant specific pre-dismissal notice regarding this claim, it [was]

premature for this court to review the merits of [a]ppellant’s ineffectiveness 

claim and a remand [was] appropriate to correct this error.” Id. 

Directly on point, as the purpose of Rule 907 is to apprise the petitioner 

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1 The wording contained in Rules 907(1) and 909(B)(2)(a) is materially the 

same. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1) (“If the judge is satisfied from this review that 

there are no genuine issues concerning any material fact and that the 

defendant is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no purpose 

would be served by any further proceedings, the judge shall give notice to the 

parties of the intention to dismiss the petition and shall state in the notice the 

reasons for the dismissal.”); Pa.R.Crim.P. 909(B)(2)(a) (“If the judge is 

satisfied from this review that there are no genuine issues concerning any 

material fact, the defendant is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, 

and no legitimate purpose would be served by any further proceedings, ... the 

judge shall give notice to the parties of the intention to dismiss the petition 

and shall state in the notice the reasons for the dismissal.”)
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of material defects contained within his or her petition, a notice that does not, 

either explicitly or implicitly, reference the contents of the filing it is 

attempting to dismiss is inadequate. Stated differently, regardless of how 

deficient the Commonwealth and PCRA court believe his petition to be, we 

agree with Edwards that “the PCRA court was obliged to explain why 

Edwards’[s] initial petition was meritless as a matter of law, not why he had 

procedurally defaulted his ability to file an amended petition.” Appellant’s 

Brief, at 17 (emphasis in original). 

In its brief, the Commonwealth extensively details why Edwards’s 

petition is insufficient as a matter of law. See, e.g., Appellee’s Brief, at 14 

(“[T]he Commonwealth submits that said document did not remotely 

constitute an adequate PCRA petition as it satisfied none of the above criteria 

for entitlement to an evidentiary hearing.”). The PCRA court parallels this 

sentiment: “the claims raised by [Edwards] in the original PCRA petition were 

not reviewable. . . . [Edwards] raise[d] no specific claims of ineffective 

assistance of counsel.” See e.g., PCRA Court Opinion, 7/13/21, at 11. Even 

assuming these statements to be true, the Commonwealth fails to appreciate 

that Rule 907(1) notice requires the court to provide a rationale as to why the 

petition, itself, is inadequate and give a petitioner the ability to respond 

thereto. See id., at 10 (identifying the PCRA court’s admission that, faced 

with an untimely petition amendment, it “was left to review the timely filed 

original PCRA petition filed on May 18, 2017”). 
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Cognizant that the ultimate goal of Rule 907(1) notice is to facilitate 

merit review of the petition by the PCRA court and, correspondingly, that the 

PCRA court provided no substantive basis to dismiss the petition in its notice, 

we vacate the order dismissing Edwards’s petition and remand. If, upon 

remand, the court intends to dismiss Edwards’s petition without a hearing, it 

must properly issue Rule 907(1) notice that is referential to the PCRA petition 

before it. Thereafter, if notice of its proposed dismissal is given, Edwards may 

respond to that notice within twenty days. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(1). 

Order vacated. Case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction 

relinquished.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 04/11/2022