DEPARTMENT OF 

JUSTICE

Continued Actions Needed 

to Enhance Program 

Efficiency and Resource 

Management

Statement of Diana Maurer, Director 

Homeland Security and Justice

Testimony 

Before the Committee on the Judiciary, 

House of Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 1:00 p.m. EDT

Tuesday, March 21, 2017

GAO-17-471T

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-471T, a testimony

before the Committee on the Judiciary, House 

of Representatives

March 2017

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Continued Actions Needed to Enhance Program 

Efficiency and Resource Management

What GAO Found

DOJ has not fully addressed most GAO recommendations related to its law 

enforcement activities. The Department of Justice (DOJ) undertakes a number 

of activities to enforce the law and defend the interests of the United States. Key 

findings and recommendations from six recent GAO reports include, among 

other things, that DOJ should: better adhere to policies on collecting firearms 

data, assess opportunities to more efficiently share information on missing 

persons, better ensure the privacy and accuracy of face recognition technology, 

provide more information to entities that handle controlled substances, and 

improve the handling of whistleblower complaints. Collectively, these reports 

resulted in 28 recommendations. As of March 2017, DOJ has fully implemented 

5 of these recommendations, begun actions to address 11, has not taken actions 

for 8, and disagreed with 4 recommendations. 

DOJ has not fully addressed most GAO recommendations related to the 

custody and care of federal prisoners and inmates. DOJ is responsible for 

the custody and care of federal prisoners and inmates, for which the President’s 

Budget requested $8.8 billion for fiscal year 2017. GAO’s recent reports highlight 

areas for continued improvements in DOJ incarceration and offender 

management, including better assessing key initiatives to address overcrowding 

and other federal incarceration challenges, better measuring the outcomes of 

alternatives to incarceration, improving the management of new prison 

activations, better estimating cost savings for prisoner operations, and improving 

notification to tribes about registered sex offenders upon release. Since August 

2014, GAO has made 17 recommendations to DOJ in five reports related to 

these issues, and DOJ generally concurred with them. As of March 2017, DOJ 

has fully implemented 7 of the recommendations, partially implemented 8, and 

has not taken actions for 2 recommendations. 

DOJ has implemented most GAO recommendations to improve grant 

administration and management. DOJ supports a range of activities—

including policing and victims’ assistance—through grants provided to federal, 

state, local, and tribal agencies, as well as national, community-based, and nonprofit organizations. Congress appropriated $2.4 billion for DOJ grant programs 

in fiscal year 2016. Four recent GAO reports highlight DOJ’s overall grant 

administration practices, management of specific programs, and efforts to reduce 

overlap and duplication amongst its grant programs. The four reports include 17 

recommendations to DOJ, and the department generally concurred with all of 

them. As of March 2017, DOJ has fully implemented 15 of the 17 

recommendations and partially implemented the remaining two. 

DOJ has partially implemented GAO recommendations designed to 

improve management of funds collected through alternative sources. DOJ 

has the ability to fund programs using money it collects through alternative 

sources, such as fines, fees, and penalties in addition to its annual 

appropriations. For example, in 2015, we reported that DOJ collected $4.3 billion 

from seven alternative sources of funding in 2013. This statement highlights 

three reports that address DOJ’s collection, use, and management of these 

funds. One of the three reports includes three recommendations, which DOJ has 

partially implemented.

View GAO-17-471T. For more information, 

contact Diana Maurer at (202) 512-8777 or 

maurerd@gao.gov. 

Why GAO Did This Study

In fiscal year 2016, DOJ’s $29 billion 

budget funded a broad array of 

national security, law enforcement, and 

criminal justice system activities. GAO 

has examined a number of key 

programs where DOJ has sole 

responsibility or works with other 

departments, and recommended 

actions to improve program efficiency 

and resource management. 

This statement summarizes findings 

and recommendations from recent 

GAO reports that address DOJ’s (1)

law enforcement activities, (2) custody 

and care of federal prisoners and 

inmates, (3) grant management and 

administration, and (4) use of 

alternative sources of funding. 

This statement is based on prior GAO

products issued from February 2012 to 

November 2016, along with selected 

updates obtained as of March 2017. 

For the selected updates on DOJ’s 

progress in implementing GAO

recommendations, GAO analyzed 

information provided by DOJ officials 

on actions taken and planned. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO has made several 

recommendations to DOJ in prior 

reports to help improve program 

efficiency and resource management. 

DOJ generally concurred with most of 

these recommendations and has 

implemented or begun taking action to 

address them.
Letter

Page 1 GAO-17-471T

Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers, and Members of the 

Committee:

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss our 

prior work on ways in which the Department of Justice (DOJ) can 

increase efficiencies and better manage its resources across key 

programs. In fiscal year 2016, DOJ’s enacted budget was about $29 

billion and its appropriation was among the top 10 of all federal agencies. 

DOJ has a leading role in administering a wide variety of programs to 

fulfill its mission to, among other things, enforce the law and provide 

federal leadership in preventing and controlling crime. With the federal 

government currently facing an unsustainable long-term fiscal path, it is 

increasingly important for DOJ and other executive branch agencies to 

improve the efficiency and effectiveness of government programs.

As requested, my testimony today is based on our recent work examining 

programs across an array of DOJ components. In some of these program 

areas, DOJ has sole responsibility, while in others DOJ works with other 

departments and agencies. This statement addresses four key areas in 

which we have issued reports and highlights our recommendations to 

DOJ to enhance program efficiency and resource management.1

Specifically, this statement addresses DOJ’s (1) law enforcement 

activities; (2) custody and care of federal prisoners and inmates; (3) grant 

management and administration; and (4) use of alternative sources of 

funding, such as fines, fees, and penalties. In each of these areas, we 

discuss a number of our products that encapsulate how DOJ is 

accomplishing its mission.

This statement is based on reports we issued from February 2012 to 

November 2016, and includes updates on selected reports as of March 

2017. For our prior work, we analyzed documentation, such as program 

policies and procedures, and interviewed DOJ officials responsible for the 

identified DOJ programs. More information about the scope and 

methodology of our prior work can be found in those reports. To update 

the status of DOJ’s efforts to address the recommendations we made in 

these reports, we collected information from DOJ program officials on 

actions they have taken or planned in response. We conducted our work 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

 1

Some of the reports included in this statement contain additional findings and 

recommendations that we do not address because they relate to functions and activities of 

other agencies and therefore were not in DOJ’s jurisdiction.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-471T

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

As part of its mission to enforce the law and defend the interests of the 

United States, DOJ undertakes a number of law enforcement activities 

through its component agencies. The following six reports—which we 

issued in 2015 and 2016—contain key findings and recommendations in 

this area, and highlight potential areas for continued oversight. 

Collectively, the reports resulted in 28 recommendations to DOJ; the Drug 

Enforcement Administration (DEA); the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

(FBI); the National Institute of Justice (NIJ); the Bureau of Alcohol, 

Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF); and other DOJ components. As 

of March 2017, DOJ and its component agencies have implemented 5 of 

the 28 recommendations. DOJ and its components have also begun 

taking actions to address 11 of the remaining recommendations, which 

remain open. DOJ or its components have not taken actions for 8 of our 

recommendations and disagreed with the remaining 4 recommendations.

DOJ and ATF have not always complied with federal law and ATF 

firearm-related policies. In June 2016, we reported that ATF did not 

always comply with the appropriations act restriction prohibiting 

consolidation or centralization of federal firearm licensee records, and did 

not consistently adhere to ATF policies. To carry out its enforcement 

responsibilities, ATF maintains 25 firearm-related databases, 16 of which 

contain firearms purchaser information from a federal firearm licensee. 

While ATF has the statutory authority and responsibility to obtain firearms 

transactions records from federal firearms licensees under certain 

circumstances, ATF is restricted from using appropriated funds to 

consolidate or centralize federal firearm licensee records. We examined 

four federal firearm licensee databases—selected based on factors such 

as the inclusion of retail purchaser information and original data—and 

found that two of the four did not always comply with ATF appropriations 

act restrictions and two of the four did not adhere to ATF policies.2 ATF 

addressed the violations of the appropriations act restrictions during the 

 2

Of the four databases, one complied with both ATF appropriations act restrictions and 

ATF policies, one did not comply with appropriations act restrictions, one did not comply 

with ATF policies, and one did not comply with either.

DOJ Has Not Fully 

Addressed Most GAO 

Recommendations 

Related to its Law 

Enforcement 

Activities
Page 3 GAO-17-471T

course of our review. To address identified policy deficiencies, we made 

three recommendations that ATF provide guidance to federal firearm 

licensees, align system capabilities with ATF policies, and align timing 

and ATF policy for deleting records related to multiple firearm sales. ATF 

concurred with the recommendations. As of March 2017, ATF has 

implemented one recommendation and reported progress towards 

implementing the other two recommendations by improving practices and 

modifying data systems to better align with ATF policy.3

DOJ should study options for reducing overlap and fragmentation 

on missing persons databases. In June 2016, we reported that DOJ 

could facilitate more efficient sharing of information on missing persons 

and unidentified remains. The FBI’s National Crime Information Center 

database includes criminal justice agency information and is restricted to 

authorized users. DOJ’s NIJ oversees the National Missing and 

Unidentified Persons System, a database open to the public for access to 

published case information. We found that data contained in these 

systems were overlapping and fragmented, creating the risk of 

duplication. Because there is no mechanism to share information 

between the systems, users relying on only one system may miss 

information that could be instrumental in solving these types of cases. 

Although federal law precludes full integration, there may still be 

opportunities to share information between the systems, which could 

reduce overlap and fragmentation of data on missing and unidentified 

persons. 

To allow for more efficient use of missing and unidentified persons 

information, we recommended that the FBI and NIJ evaluate options to 

share information between the two systems. DOJ disagreed with our 

recommendation, citing that it lacks legal authority. In March 2017, DOJ 

reiterated its position that any such sharing was prohibited by the law. 

Specifically, DOJ stated that the FBI’s system can only share information 

with authorized users, dissemination is limited to those individuals 

performing law enforcement, and that additional efforts to examine other 

options would waste taxpayer funds. We continue to believe that our 

recommendation is valid and that DOJ should further study options for 

sharing information within the confines of its legal framework. For 

example, our work identified a variety of solutions to address the 

 3

GAO, Firearms Data: ATF Did Not Always Comply with the Appropriations Act Restriction 

and Should Better Adhere to Its Policies, GAO-16-552 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2016).
Page 4 GAO-17-471T

fragmentation and overlap between the two systems such as developing 

a notification alert for the FBI’s system when related case data was also 

present in the other system.4

DOJ and the FBI have not addressed privacy and accuracy concerns 

related to the FBI’s use of face recognition technology. Whenever 

agencies develop or change technologies that collect personal 

information, federal law requires them to publish certain privacy impact 

statements. In May 2016, we reported that the FBI did not publish 

updated privacy impact assessments (PIA) and a System of Records 

Notice (SORN) for a face recognition service that allows law enforcement 

agencies to search a database of over 30 million photos to support 

criminal investigations.5 Users of this service include the FBI and selected 

state and local law enforcement agencies, which can submit search 

requests to help identify an unknown person using, for example, a photo 

from a surveillance camera. DOJ issued an initial PIA in 2008, before the 

FBI and state and local law enforcement agencies began using this 

service on a pilot basis. However, the FBI did not update the PIA until 

September 2015, during the course of our review and after the system 

underwent significant changes. Further, although the FBI, state, and local 

law enforcement agencies had been using the system since 2011; DOJ 

did not publish a SORN until May 2016, after completion of our review. 

Similarly, DOJ did not publish a PIA for the FBI’s internal use of additional 

face recognition technologies until May 2015, during the course of our 

review and almost 4 years after the FBI began its new use of face 

recognition searches. In addition, we found that the FBI had not audited 

the actual use of face recognition technology and, as a result, could not 

demonstrate compliance with applicable privacy protection requirements.

We also reported that the FBI had conducted limited testing to evaluate 

the detection rate of the face recognition searches, but had not (1) 

assessed how often errors occurred or (2) taken steps to determine 

whether systems used by external partners are sufficiently accurate for 

 4

GAO, Missing Persons and Unidentified Remains: Opportunities May Exist to Share 

Information More Efficiently, GAO-16-515 (Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2016).

5

PIAs are assessments of the use of information technology to process personal 

information and are required by the E-Government Act of 2002. Sec. 208(b), Pub. L. No. 

107-347 (Dec. 17, 2002); 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note. SORNs are Federal Register notices 

required by the Privacy Act to give the public notice about the collection and use of 

personal information covered by the act. Pub. L. No. 93-579 (Dec. 31, 1974), as amended; 

5 U.S.C. § 552a(a)(e)(4).
Page 5 GAO-17-471T

the FBI’s use.6 By taking steps to evaluate the detection rates of the 

various systems, the FBI could better ensure the data received were 

sufficiently accurate and do not include photos of innocent people as 

investigative leads. We made three recommendations to DOJ and the FBI 

to determine why privacy-related documents were not published as 

required and to audit the use of the face recognition technology to better 

ensure face image searches are conducted in accordance with policy 

requirements. We made three additional recommendations to the FBI to 

verify that the systems are sufficiently accurate and are meeting users’

needs. DOJ and the FBI partially agreed with two recommendations and 

disagreed with one recommendation concerning privacy. The FBI agreed 

with one recommendation and disagreed with two recommendations 

concerning accuracy. In response, we clarified one recommendation 

regarding accuracy testing and updated another regarding the SORN 

development process, based on information DOJ provided after reviewing 

our draft report. As of March 2017, DOJ has begun taking actions to 

address three of our six recommendations, such as initiating audits to 

oversee the FBI’s use of its face recognition technology.7

DEA should better administer the controlled substance quota setting 

process. In February 2015, we found that DEA had not effectively 

administered the quota setting process that limits the amount of certain 

controlled substances available for use in the United States. Each year, 

manufacturers apply to DEA for quotas needed to make drugs. We found 

that DEA did not respond within the time frames required by its 

regulations for any year from 2001 through 2014, which, according to 

some manufacturers, caused or exacerbated shortages of drugs. We 

recommended that DEA take seven actions to improve its management of 

the quota setting process and address drug shortages. DEA concurred, 

and as of March 2017 has implemented four of the seven 

recommendations, one related to establishing an agreement to facilitate 

information sharing with the Food and Drug Administration regarding drug 

shortages and the three others related to strengthening internal controls 

in the quota setting process. DEA has also taken some actions towards 

addressing the remaining three recommendations—including working 

with the Food and Drug Administration to establish a work plan to 

 6

The FBI has access, or can request to search databases owned by the Departments of 

State and Defense and 16 states, which use their own systems.

7

GAO, Face Recognition Technology: FBI Should Better Ensure Privacy and Accuracy, 

GAO-16-267 (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2016).
Page 6 GAO-17-471T

specifically outline the information the agencies will share and the time 

frames for doing so—but needs to take additional actions to fully 

implement them.8

DEA needs to provide additional guidance to entities that handle 

controlled substances. In June 2015, based on four nationally 

representative surveys of DEA registrants—distributors of controlled 

substances, individual pharmacies, chain pharmacy corporate offices, 

and practitioners—we reported that many registrants were not aware of 

various DEA resources, such as manuals for pharmacists and 

practitioners. In addition, some distributors, individual pharmacies, and 

chain pharmacy corporate offices wanted improved guidance from, and 

additional communication with, DEA about their roles and responsibilities 

under the Controlled Substances Act. We recommended that DEA take 

three actions to increase registrants’ awareness of DEA resources and 

improve the information DEA provides to registrants. DEA concurred and, 

as of March 2017, has taken some actions towards addressing our three 

recommendations, such as conducting and participating in conferences 

and other industry outreach events. However, DEA needs to take 

additional actions to fully implement the recommendations, including 

establishing a means of regular communication with registrants, such as 

through listservs, which would reach a larger proportion of registrants 

than conferences and other events.9

DOJ should improve handling of FBI whistleblower retaliation 

complaints. In January 2015, we reported that unlike employees in other 

executive branch agencies, FBI employees did not have a process to 

seek corrective action if they experienced retaliation in certain 

circumstances. Specifically, FBI employees could not seek corrective 

action if they experienced retaliation based on a disclosure of wrongdoing 

to their supervisors or others in their chain of command who were not 

designated DOJ or FBI officials. We suggested that Congress consider 

whether FBI employees should have a means to obtain corrective action 

for retaliation for disclosures of wrongdoing made to supervisors and 

others in the employee’s chains of command. In response to our report, in 

 8

GAO, Drug Shortages: Better Management of the Quota Process for Controlled 

Substances Needed; Coordination between DEA and FDA Should Be Improved, 

GAO-15-202 (Washington, D.C.: February 2, 2015).

9

GAO, Prescription Drugs: More DEA Information about Registrants’ Controlled 

Substances Roles Could Improve Their Understanding and Help Ensure Access, 

GAO-15-471 (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2015).
Page 7 GAO-17-471T

December 2016, Congress passed and the President signed the FBI 

Whistleblower Protection Enhancement Act of 2016, which, among other 

things, provides a means for FBI employees to obtain corrective action in 

these cases and brings FBI whistleblower protection in line with the 

protection in place for employees of other executive branch agencies for 

reporting wrongdoing to their chain of command.10 This change will help 

ensure that whistleblowers have access to recourse, that retaliatory 

action does not go unpunished, and that other potential whistleblowers 

are encouraged to come forward.

We also reported that (1) DOJ and FBI guidance for making a protected 

disclosure was not always clear; (2) DOJ did not provide whistleblower 

retaliation complainants with estimates of when to expect DOJ decisions 

throughout the complaint process; (3) DOJ offices responsible for 

investigating complaints have not consistently complied with certain 

regulatory requirements, such as obtaining complainants’ approvals for 

extensions of time; and (4) although DOJ officials have ongoing and 

planned efforts to reduce the duration of retaliation complaints, they have

limited plans to assess the impacts of these actions. To address these 

deficiencies, we made eight recommendations that DOJ clarify guidance, 

provide complainants with estimated complaint decision time frames, 

develop an oversight mechanism to monitor regulatory compliance, and 

assess the impact of efforts to reduce the duration of FBI whistleblower 

complaints. DOJ concurred with these recommendations, but as of March 

2017 has not provided documentation of actions taken to address them.11

 10Pub. L. No. 114-302, 130 Stat. 1516.

11GAO, Whistleblower Protection: Additional Actions Needed to Improve DOJ’s Handling 

of FBI Retaliation Complaints, GAO-15-112 (Washington, D.C.: January 23, 2015).
Page 8 GAO-17-471T

As part of their mission to enforce and control crime, DOJ and its 

components—including the Bureau of Prisons (BOP) and the U.S. 

Marshals Service (USMS)—are responsible for the custody and care of 

federal prisoners and inmates. To carry out these responsibilities, the 

President’s Budget requested $8.8 billion for fiscal year 2017. Our recent 

reports on DOJ’s programs for incarceration and offender management 

highlight areas for oversight, including better estimating costs and 

measuring outcomes. Since August 2014, we have made 17 

recommendations to DOJ, BOP, and USMS to improve the custody and 

care of federal prisoners and inmates. As of March 2017, DOJ or its 

component agencies have implemented 7 of the 17 recommendations, 

have begun taking actions on 8 recommendations that remain open, and 

have not taken actions for the remaining 2 recommendations.

DOJ could better assess federal incarceration initiatives. In June 

2015, we reported that DOJ could better measure the efficacy of three 

key new initiatives designed to address federal incarceration challenges, 

such as overcrowding and rising costs. We found that the Smart on Crime 

Initiative indicators were well-linked to overall goals, which includes 

prioritizing prosecution of the most serious offenses, but many lacked 

clarity and context.12 The Clemency Initiative, which encourages certain 

inmates to petition to have sentences reduced by the President, does not 

track how long it takes for the average petition to clear each step in the 

review process. In addition, BOP created the Reentry Services Division in 

2014 to improve inmate reentry into society, but we found that it lacked a 

plan to prioritize evaluations among all 18 of the programs it lists in its 

national reentry directory. To address these deficiencies, we made three 

recommendations to improve measurement of the initiatives. DOJ 

concurred with two of the recommendations and partially concurred with 

the third. In May 2016, BOP finalized an updated evaluation plan for the 

Reentry Services Division that was consistent with our recommendation 

and we consider that recommendation to be implemented. As of March 

2017, DOJ has not provided documentation of actions on the remaining 

two recommendations.13

 12The Smart on Crime Initiative involves multiple DOJ components and has five key goals, 

one of which involves prioritizing the prosecution of the most serious cases.

13GAO, Federal Prison System: Justice Could Better Measure Progress Addressing 

Incarceration Challenges, GAO-15-454 (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2015).

DOJ Has Not Fully 

Addressed Most GAO 

Recommendations 

Related to the 

Custody and Care of 

Federal Prisoners 

and Inmates
Page 9 GAO-17-471T

DOJ and BOP could better measure the outcomes of alternatives to 

incarceration. In June 2016, we reported that in part to help reduce the 

size and costs of the federal prison population, DOJ has used a variety of 

alternatives to incarceration before sentencing, but it does not reliably 

track the use of some of these alternatives. For instance, we reported that 

DOJ has used two types of pretrial diversion as alternatives to 

incarceration—one at the discretion of the U.S. Attorney’s Office and the 

other involving additional stakeholders, such as judges and defense 

counsel. However, DOJ data on the use of pretrial diversion are 

unreliable because DOJ’s database does not distinguish between these 

different types of pretrial diversions and DOJ does not have guidance in 

place to ensure that its attorneys consistently enter the use of pretrial 

diversion into the database.

In addition, over the past 7 years, BOP has increased its use of 

incarceration alternatives, such as the placement of inmates in residential 

reentry centers (also known as halfway houses) and home confinement. 

However, we found that while BOP has tracked data on the cost 

implications of using these alternatives, it does not track the information 

needed to help measure the outcomes of incarceration alternatives. 

Similarly, we found that DOJ has not measured the outcomes or identified 

the cost implications of pretrial diversion programs. To address these 

deficiencies, we made six recommendations that DOJ enhance its 

tracking of data on the use of pretrial diversions and that DOJ and BOP 

obtain outcome data and develop measures for alternatives used. DOJ 

concurred and, as of March 2017, has fully implemented the two 

recommendations on tracking data by revising its system to separately 

track the different types of pretrial diversion programs and providing 

guidance to its attorneys on the appropriate way to enter data. DOJ and 

BOP have partially addressed the remaining four recommendations.14

BOP faces challenges in activating new prisons. In August 2014, we 

found that BOP was behind schedule in activating six new prison 

institutions designed to handle the projected growth of the federal inmate 

population, and that BOP did not have a policy or best practices to guide 

the activations or activation schedules. Activation of the prisons—the 

process by which BOP prepares institutions for inmates—was delayed, in 

part, because of schedule challenges, such as staffing, posed by 

 14GAO, Federal Prison System: Justice Has Used Alternatives to Incarceration, But Could 

Better Measure Program Outcomes, GAO-16-516 (Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2016). 
Page 10 GAO-17-471T

locations of the new institutions. We also found that BOP did not 

effectively communicate to Congress on how the locations of the new 

institutions may affect activation schedules. To address these 

deficiencies, we recommended that (1) DOJ use its annual budget 

justification to communicate to Congress factors that might delay prison 

activation; (2) BOP analyze institution-level staffing data and develop 

effective, tailored strategies to mitigate staffing challenges; (3) BOP 

develop and implement a comprehensive activation policy; and (4) BOP 

develop and implement an activation schedule that reflects best practices. 

DOJ and BOP concurred, and as of March 2017 have implemented two of 

the four recommendations by enhancing recruitment approaches to 

address staffing challenges and developing a policy to guide future 

activations. Additional actions are needed to address the remaining two 

recommendations.15

U.S. Marshals Service could better estimate cost savings and 

monitor ways to achieve efficiencies. In May 2016, we found that the 

U.S. Marshals Service’s largest prisoner costs were housing payments to 

state, local, and private prisons. For example, in fiscal year 2015, USMS 

spent approximately $1.2 billion on these costs. USMS has implemented 

actions that it reports have saved prisoner-related costs from fiscal years 

2010 through 2015, which include automating detention management 

services, developing cost-saving housing options, investing in alternatives 

to pre-trial detention to reduce housing and medical expenditures, and 

improving medical claim management. For actions with identified savings 

over this time period, however, we found that about $654 million of the 

USMS’s estimated $858 million in total savings was not reliable because 

the estimates were not sufficiently comprehensive, accurate, consistent, 

or well-documented. For example, USMS identified $375 million in 

savings from the alternatives to pre-trial detention program for fiscal years 

2010 through 2015, but did not verify the data or methodology used to 

develop the estimate or provide documentation supporting its reported 

savings for fiscal years 2012 onward. We also found that USMS has 

designed systems to identify opportunities for cost efficiencies, including 

savings. For example, the agency requires districts to conduct annual 

self-assessments of their procedures to identify any deficiencies that 

could lead to cost savings. However, USMS cannot aggregate and 

analyze the results of the assessments across districts. 

 15GAO, Bureau of Prisons: Management of New Prison Activations Can Be Improved, 

GAO-14-709 (Washington, D.C.: August 22, 2014).
Page 11 GAO-17-471T

To address these deficiencies, we recommended that USMS (1) develop 

reliable methods for estimating cost savings and validating reported 

savings achieved, and (2) establish a mechanism to aggregate and 

analyze the results of annual district self-assessments. USMS concurred, 

and as of March 2017 has provided us with information on how it plans to 

move forward in addressing the recommendations, but needs to take 

additional actions to fully implement them.16

DOJ has improved outreach to states to notify tribes about 

registered sex offenders who plan to live, work, or attend school on 

tribal land. In November 2014, we found that most eligible tribes have 

retained their implementation authority, and have either substantially 

implemented or were in the process of implementing the Sex Offender 

Registration and Notification Act (SORNA). In our survey of tribes that 

retained their authority to implement the act, the four most frequently 

reported implementation challenges were the inability to submit convicted 

sex offender information to federal databases, lack of notification from 

state prisons upon the release of sex offenders, lack of staff, and inability 

to cover the costs of SORNA implementation. SORNA established the 

Office of Sex Offender Sentencing, Monitoring, Apprehending, 

Registering, and Tracking (SMART Office) within DOJ to administer and 

assist jurisdictions with implementing the law. However, we found that 

some states had not notified tribes when sex offenders who will be or 

have been released from state prison register with the state and indicate 

that they intend to live, work, or attend school on tribal land, as SORNA 

requires. We found that the SMART Office has taken some actions, but 

could do more to encourage states to provide notification to tribes. To 

address this deficiency, we made two recommendations to DOJ related to 

the SMART Office encouraging states to notify tribes about offenders who 

plan to live, work, or attend school on tribal land upon release from 

prison. DOJ concurred with these recommendations and has fully 

implemented them.17

 16GAO, Prisoner Operations: United States Marshals Service Could Better Estimate Cost 

Savings and Monitor Efforts to Increase Efficiencies, GAO-16-472 (Washington, D.C.: May 

23, 2016).

17GAO, Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act: Additional Outreach and 

Notification of Tribes about Offenders Who Are Released from Prison Needed, 

GAO-15-23 (Washington, DC: November 18, 2014).
Page 12 GAO-17-471T

DOJ supports a range of activities—including policing and victims’

assistance—through grants provided to federal, state, local, and tribal 

agencies, as well as national, community-based, and non-profit 

organizations. Congress appropriated $2.4 billion for DOJ discretionary 

grant programs in fiscal year 2016. The Office of Justice Programs (OJP) 

is the largest of DOJ’s three granting components and operated with an 

enacted discretionary budget of approximately $1.8 billion in fiscal year 

2016. The four reports discussed below highlight DOJ’s overall grant 

administration practices, management of specific programs, and efforts to 

reduce duplication in grant programs across the federal government. The 

four reports included 17 recommendations to DOJ. The department 

concurred with these recommendations, and as of March 2017 had taken 

actions to fully implement 15 of the 17 recommendations. DOJ has also 

begun taking actions on the remaining 2 recommendations, which are still 

open.

DOJ has addressed recommendations to reduce the risk of grant 

program overlap and unnecessary duplication. In July 2012, we found 

that DOJ had not assessed its grant programs department-wide to identify 

overlap, which occurs when multiple agencies or programs have similar 

goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve them, or target 

similar beneficiaries. We reported that DOJ published 253 fiscal year 

2010 grant solicitations to support crime prevention, law enforcement, 

and crime victim services. We also found that DOJ did not routinely 

coordinate grant awards to avoid unnecessary duplication, which occurs 

when two or more agencies or programs are engaged in the same 

activities or provide the same services to the same beneficiaries without 

being knowledgeable about each other’s efforts. Further, we reported that 

DOJ could take steps to better assess the results of all the grant 

programs it administers. As result, we made eight recommendations to 

DOJ. The department concurred with these recommendations and has 

fully implemented them.18

DOJ has addressed recommendations for improving management of 

the bulletproof vest partnership. In February 2012, we found that 

DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance—within the Office of Justice 

Programs—could enhance grant management controls and better ensure 

consistency in management of the bulletproof vest partnership grant 

 18GAO, Justice Grant Programs: DOJ Should Do More to Reduce the Risk of 

Unnecessary Duplication and Enhance Program Assessment, GAO-12-517 (Washington, 

D.C.: July 12, 2012).

DOJ Has 

Implemented 

Most GAO 

Recommendations 

to Improve Grant 

Administration and 

Management
Page 13 GAO-17-471T

program.19 For example, we found that DOJ could better manage the 

grant program by improving grantee accountability in the use of funds for 

body armor purchases, reducing the risk of grantee noncompliance with 

program requirements, and ensuring consistency across its efforts to 

promote law enforcement officer safety. We made five recommendations 

to DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Assistance. The department concurred with 

these recommendations and has fully implemented them.20

DOJ could better manage the Victims of Child Abuse Act grant 

program. In April 2015, we found that OJP’s Office of Juvenile Justice 

and Delinquency Prevention (OJJDP) had several administrative review 

and approval processes in place that contributed to delays in grantees’

ability to begin spending their award funds. For example, for the 28 

Victims of Child Abuse Act (VOCA) program grants awarded from fiscal 

years 2010 through 2013, grantees had expended less than 20 percent, 

on average, of each grant they received during the original 12-month 

project period. In particular, we found that OJJDP’s processes for 

reviewing grantees’ budgets and conference planning requests were 

contributing to delays in grantees’ ability to begin spending their funds. 

Further, we found that OJJDP’s guidance on grant extensions was 

unclear and irregularly enforced. For example, OJJDP approved 72 of 73 

extension requests from fiscal years 2010 through 2013 without the 

required narrative justification. We also found that OJJDP did not have 

complete data to assess VOCA grantees’ performance against the 

measures it had established because the tools it used to collect this 

information did not align to the measures themselves. As a result, we 

made four recommendations to OJP and the office concurred. As of 

March 2017, OJP has implemented two recommendations by establishing 

and enforcing clear guidance related to grant extensions and enhancing 

its performance management capacity. DOJ has partially taken action to 

address the remaining two recommendations.21

 19DOJ’s Office of Justice Programs is the primary office within DOJ with responsibilities for 

administering grants.

20GAO, Law Enforcement Body Armor: DOJ Could Enhance Grant Management Controls 

and Better Ensure Consistency in Grant Program Requirements, GAO-12-353 

(Washington, D.C.: February 15, 2012).

21GAO Victims of Child Abuse Act: Further Actions Needed to Ensure Timely Use of Grant 

Funds and Assess Grantee Performance, GAO-15-351 (Washington, D.C.: April 29, 

2015).
Page 14 GAO-17-471T

DOJ and other federal agencies have taken steps to avoid 

duplication among human trafficking grants. In June 2016, we 

identified 42 grant programs with awards made in 2014 and 2015 that 

may be used to combat human trafficking or assist victims of human 

trafficking, 15 of which are intended solely for these purposes. Although 

some overlap exists among these human trafficking grant programs, 

federal agencies have established processes to help prevent 

unnecessary duplication. For instance, in response to recommendations 

in a prior GAO report, DOJ requires grant applicants to identify any 

federal grants they are currently operating under as well as federal grants 

for which they have applied. In addition, agencies that participate in the 

grantmaking committee of the Senior Policy Operating Group—an entity 

through which federal agencies coordinate their efforts to combat human 

trafficking—are to share grant solicitations and information on proposed 

grant awards, allowing other agencies to comment on proposed awards 

and determine whether they plan to award funding to the same 

organization.22

DOJ has the ability to fund programs using money it collects through 

alternative sources, such as fines, fees, and penalties, in addition to the 

budget authority Congress provides DOJ through annual appropriations. 

For example, the Crime Victims Fund, which is financed by collections of 

fines, penalties, and bond forfeitures from defendants convicted of federal 

crimes, obligated almost $2.4 billion for a variety of grants and programs 

to assist victims of crimes in fiscal year 2015. The following three reports 

highlight DOJ’s collection, use, and management of these funds. One of 

the three reports contains three recommendations, which have been 

partially implemented.

DOJ could better manage alternative sources of funding. In February 

2015, we reported that DOJ could better manage its alternative sources 

of funding—collections by DOJ from sources such as fines, fees, and 

penalties—which, in fiscal year 2013, made up about 15 percent of DOJ’s 

total budgetary resources. Specifically, DOJ collected about $4.3 billion 

from seven major alternative sources of funding—including the Assets 

Forfeiture Fund, the Crime Victims Fund, and non-criminal fingerprint 

checks fees, among others. We found that two of these funds could be 

 22GAO, Human Trafficking: Agencies Have Taken Steps to Assess Prevalence, Address 

Victim Issues, and Avoid Grant Duplication, GAO-16-555 (Washington, D.C.: June 28, 

2016).

DOJ Has Partially 

Implemented GAO 

Recommendations 

Designed to Improve 

Management of 

Funds Collected 

through Alternative 

Sources
Page 15 GAO-17-471T

better managed. For example, DOJ has the authority to deposit up to 3 

percent of amounts collected from DOJ’s civil debt collection litigation 

activities, such as Medicare fraud cases and referred student loan 

collections, into the Three Percent Fund. Collections are used to defray 

DOJ’s costs for conducting these activities. However, the department had 

not conducted analyses of the fund that include elements such as 

projected collections or the impact of previous obligations rates on 

unobligated balances. In addition, the FBI’s Criminal Justice Information 

Services collects fees for providing non-criminal justice fingerprint-based 

background checks. We found that the FBI was not transparent in how it 

sets its fees, and did not evaluate the appropriate range of carryover 

amounts for a portion of those fees, even though unobligated balances 

had been growing.

As a result, we recommended that (1) DOJ develop a policy to analyze 

unobligated balances and develop collection estimates for the Three 

Percent Fund; (2) the FBI publish a breakdown of how it assesses its 

fingerprint check fees to better communicate the cost of the service to 

users; and (3) the FBI develop a policy to analyze and determine an 

appropriate range for unobligated balances from a portion of those fees. 

DOJ partially concurred with the first recommendation and generally 

concurred with the other two recommendations. As of March 2017, DOJ 

is working to improve how it analyzes unobligated funds needed for future 

fiscal years for the Three Percent Fund; however, it provided various 

reasons why it does not calculate revenue estimates. Our report 

recognized DOJ’s concerns and we continue to believe that DOJ could 

develop an estimated range of potential collections based on historical 

trends and current collection activities. The FBI has partially implemented 

our recommendations to be more transparent with its fees and improve 

how it analyzes unobligated balances from a portion of the fingerprint 

checks fees.23

DOJ distributes fines, penalties, and forfeitures from financial 

institutions to support program expenses and victims of related 

crimes. In March 2016, we reported that since 2009, the federal 

government had assessed financial institutions about $12 billion in fines, 

penalties, and forfeitures for violations of the Bank Secrecy Act’s antimoney-laundering regulations, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, and 

 23GAO, Department of Justice: Alternative Sources of Funding Are a Key Source of 

Budgetary Resources and Could Be Better Managed, GAO-15-48 (Washington, D.C.: 

February 19, 2015).
Page 16 GAO-17-471T

U.S. sanctions programs requirements. Of this amount, about $3.2 billion 

was deposited into DOJ’s Assets Forfeiture Fund (AFF). Funds from the 

AFF are primarily used for program expenses, payments to victims of the 

related crimes, and payments to law enforcement agencies that 

participated in the efforts resulting in forfeitures. For example, as of 

December 2015, approximately $2 billion of forfeited funds deposited in 

the AFF was planned for distribution to victims of fraud.24

DOJ retained a portion of selected mortgage-related financial 

institution settlement payments for its Three Percent Fund. In 

November 2016, we reported that federal agencies have collected billions 

of dollars in settlement payments and penalties from financial institutions 

for violations alleged to have been committed during the mortgage 

origination process, servicing of mortgages, and in the packaging and 

sale of residential mortgage-backed securities. Several federal agencies 

have responsibility for regulating financial institutions in relation to these 

activities, and these agencies may engage DOJ to pursue investigations 

of financial institutions and individuals for civil or criminal violations of 

various laws and regulations. We reviewed a sample of nine cases where 

federal agencies, in some instances including DOJ, either reached 

settlements with or assessed penalties against financial institutions in 

connection with alleged mortgage-related violations. Financial institutions 

in these nine cases were assessed a total of about $25 billion, generally 

in penalties, settlement amounts, and consumer relief.

In the cases involving DOJ, the department generally retained 3 percent 

of the settlement and penalty amounts paid and deposited this amount in 

its Three Percent Fund. For example, in 2016, one financial institution 

agreed to pay $1.2 billion to settle DOJ’s claims brought on behalf of the 

Federal Housing Administration. DOJ collected the entire $1.2 billion 

settlement amount from this case and retained $36 million (3 percent of 

the total collection) and deposited this amount in its Three Percent Fund. 

DOJ distributed $622.7 million to the Federal Housing Administration and 

deposited the remaining amount—$541.3 million—in an account in the 

Treasury General Fund.25

 24GAO, Financial Institutions: Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures for Violations of Financial 

Crimes and Sanctions Requirements, GAO-16-297 (Washington, D.C.: March 22, 2016).

25GAO, Financial Institutions: Penalty and Settlement Payments for Mortgage-Related 

Violations in Selected Cases, GAO-17-11R (Washington, D.C.: November 10, 2016).
Page 17 GAO-17-471T

Chairman Goodlatte, Ranking Member Conyers, and Members of the 

Committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to 

respond to any questions that you may have.

For further information about this statement, please contact Diana Maurer 

at (202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. 

Individuals who made key contributions to this statement include Eric 

Erdman (Assistant Director), Claudia Becker, Joy Booth, Willie Commons 

III, Tonnye’ Connor-White, Karen Doran, Chris Hatscher, Rebecca 

Hendrickson, Paul Hobart, Valerie Kasindi, Beth Kowalewski, Susanna 

Kuebler, Dawn Locke, Kristy Love, Tarek Mahmassani, Jeremy Manion, 

Mara McMillen, Adrian Pavia, Geraldine Redican-Bigott, Christina Ritchie, 

Michelle Serfass, Jack Sheehan, Janet Temko-Blinder, and Jill Verret. 

Key contributors for the previous work on which this testimony is based 

are listed in each product.

GAO Contacts

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 18 GAO-17-471T

Financial Institutions: Penalty and Settlement Payments for MortgageRelated Violations in Selected Cases. GAO-17-11R. Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 10, 2016.

Firearms Data: ATF Did Not Always Comply with the Appropriations Act 

Restriction and Should Better Adhere to Its Policies. GAO-16-552. 

Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2016.

Human Trafficking: Agencies Have Taken Steps to Assess Prevalence, 

Address Victim Issues, and Avoid Grant Duplication. GAO-16-555. 

Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2016.

Federal Prison System: Justice Has Used Alternatives to Incarceration, 

But Could Better Measure Program Outcomes. GAO-16-516. 

Washington, D.C.: June 23, 2016.

Missing Persons and Unidentified Remains: Opportunities May Exist to 

Share Information More Efficiently. GAO-16-515. Washington, D.C.: June 

7, 2016.

Prisoner Operations: United States Marshals Service Could Better 

Estimate Cost Savings and Monitor Efforts to Increase Efficiencies. 

GAO-16-472. Washington, D.C.: May 23, 2016.

Face Recognition Technology: FBI Should Better Ensure Privacy and 

Accuracy. GAO-16-267. Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2016.

Financial Institutions: Fines, Penalties, and Forfeitures for Violations of 

Financial Crimes and Sanctions Requirements. GAO-16-297. 

Washington, D.C.: Mar. 22, 2016.

Prescription Drugs: More DEA Information about Registrants’ Controlled 

Substances Roles Could Improve Their Understanding and Help Ensure 

Access. GAO-15-471. Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2015.

Federal Prison System: Justice Could Better Measure Progress 

Addressing Incarceration Challenges. GAO-15-454. Washington, D.C.: 

June 19, 2015.

Victims of Child Abuse Act: Further Actions Needed to Ensure Timely Use 

of Grant Funds and Assess Grantee Performance. 

GAO-15-351.Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2015.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 19 GAO-17-471T

Department of Justice: Alternative Sources of Funding Are a Key Source 

of Budgetary Resources and Could Be Better Managed. GAO-15-48. 

Washington, D.C.: Feb. 19, 2015.

Drug Shortages: Better Management of the Quota Process for Controlled 

Substances Needed; Coordination between DEA and FDA Should Be

Improved. GAO-15-202. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2, 2015.

Whistleblower Protection: Additional Actions Needed to Improve DOJ’s 

Handling of FBI Retaliation Complaints. GAO-15-112. Washington, D.C.: 

Jan. 23, 2015.

Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act: Additional Outreach and 

Notification of Tribes about Offenders Who Are Released from Prison 

Needed. GAO-15-23. Washington, DC: Nov. 18, 2014.

Bureau of Prisons: Management of New Prison Activations Can Be 

Improved. GAO-14-709. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 22, 2014.

Justice Grant Programs: DOJ Should Do More to Reduce the Risk of 

Unnecessary Duplication and Enhance Program Assessment. 

GAO-12-517. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2012.

Law Enforcement Body Armor: DOJ Could Enhance Grant Management 

Controls and Better Ensure Consistency in Grant Program Requirements. 

GAO-12-353. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2012.

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