Africa Security Brief

a publication of the africa center for strategic studies

No. 34 | March 2018

Africa Security Brief No. 34 1

Nearly a decade after the Arab uprisings, tempers in the outlying regions of the Maghreb are on the boil. Scarred by a 

history of states’ neglect, with poverty rates often more than 

triple that of urban areas, these frontiers of discontent are 

being transformed into incubators of instability. Bitterness, 

rage, and frustration directed at governments perceived as 

riddled with abuses and corruption represent a combustible mix that was brewed decades ago, leading to the current hothouse of discord and tumult. Into the vacuum of 

credible state institutions and amid illicit cross-border flows 

of people and goods, including arms and drugs, militancy 

and jihadist recruitment are starting to take root, especially among restless youth. The center of gravity for this toxic 

cocktail is the Maghreb’s marginalized border areas—from 

Morocco’s restless northern Rif region to the farthest reaches 

of the troubled southern regions of Algeria and Tunisia. 

Governmental response has been parochial with an overemphasis on heavy-handed security approaches that often end 

up further polarizing communities and worsening youth 

disillusionment. At a time when governments are playing 

catch up against a continually shifting terror threat—and 

with the menace of returning Maghrebi fighters from Iraq, 

Syria, and Libya—the disconnect between the state and its 

marginalized regions threatens to pull these countries into a 

vicious cycle of violence and state repression. Breaking this 

spiral requires governments in the region to rethink their 

approach to their peripheral regions.

The transnational nature of security threats in the region 

also underscores the necessity for governments to develop 

their intelligence sharing and border security cooperation. 

Unfortunately, shared threats have been compounded by 

The Maghreb’s Fragile Edges

BY ANOUAR BOUKHARS

HIGHLIGHTS

•The social and economic marginalization of communities in the periphery of each country of the 

Maghreb is an ongoing source of instability in the region.

•Security forces must distinguish between the threats posed by militants and ordinary citizens 

expressing grievances. A heavy-handed response is likely to backfire, deepening distrust of central 

governments while fueling militancy. 

•Economic integration of peripheral communities is a priority. Such initiatives must deliver at the 

local level, however. Otherwise, perceptions of corruption and exploitation will reinforce perceived 

grievances. 
2 Africa Center for Strategic Studies

enduring interstate rivalries and closed borders. Since the 

mid-seventies, Morocco and Algeria have remained trapped 

in a zero-sum world. Their acrimonious rivalry over regional dominance and bitter feud over the Western Sahara 

have blocked progress on many of the burning issues that 

bedevil the Maghreb and Sahel. Whatever regional cooperation agreements there are tend to be limited and ad hoc. 

The challenge today is to broaden and make concrete these 

opportunities for cross-border cooperation. 

ALGERIA BUFFETED

For decades, an illusion of relative tranquility pervaded 

Algeria’s vast peripheral regions. This provided an eerie 

counterpoint to the intermittent agitation that animated 

the densely populated spaces in the country’s north. The 

Algerian south was suddenly catapulted to the forefront of 

public consciousness and national security concerns with 

the unprecedented terrorist targeting of Algeria’s energy 

infrastructure in 2013 at the In Amenas gas facility near the 

southeastern border with Libya. Forty workers were killed 

and hundreds held hostage. 

Algeria’s oil and gas industry represents roughly 35 percent 

of GDP and 75 percent of government revenue. This strategic economic sector is largely based in the south, which encompasses more than 80 percent of the national territory but 

less than 9 percent of the population. This region, accordingly, looms large in Algeria’s security calculations. Yet, despite its strategic vitality, the south is often trivialized as a 

space of folkloric fascination and exotic, sometimes sinister, 

goings-on. The media tends to reinforce this narrative by inflating the stereotypes of Saharan communities as truculent 

tribes of dubious loyalty to the state.1

For Saharan communities, this prevalent discourse smacks 

of racial prejudice and a deliberate intention to justify 

their political and socioeconomic exclusion. It is not the terrain, climate, or presumed inherent laziness, lack of skills, 

and dubious nationalist credentials of the people of the 

Anouar Boukhars is a nonresident scholar in the Carnegie 

Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East Program 

and associate professor of international relations at McDaniel College in Westminster, Maryland. 

NIGER

ALGERIA

LIBYA

CHAD

MAURITANIA MALI

Western

Sahara

MOROCCO

TUNISIA

Bordj Badji Mokhtar 

In Amenas

Gadamis

Benghazi

Misrata

Tamanrasset

Ghardaïa

Béchar

Tétouan

Tangier

Jerada

Rabat Oujda

Casablanca

Marrakesh

Agadir

Tindouf

Nouakchott

Al Hoceima 

Saïdia

Oran

Ouargla

Algiers Annaba Tunis

Sousse Mt. Chaambi Mt. Semmama

Dehiba

Tataouine

Ben Guerdane

Tripoli

POPULATION DENSITY

(number of inhabitants per km2)

less than 10

10 to 50

50 to 100

100 to 300

more than 300

Countries of the Maghreb Region 

Note: Population densities are shown for illustration purposes and should not be relied upon for accuracy.
Africa Security Brief No. 34 3

Sahara that make them poor or engage in illicit flows at Algeria’s southern border with Mali and Libya. Rather, from 

the perspective of these communities, it is the neglect and 

pauperization of a rich region that has retarded its development and made it heavily dependent on smuggling and 

contraband as sources of daily subsistence. 

The government’s laissez-faire approach to informal 

cross-border trade also contributed to making contraband 

a dominant economic activity in the south.2 This was a calculated strategy designed to tame the vast southern frontier, as contraband trade provided a lifeline to populations 

deprived of the financial benefits of their region’s natural 

resource endowments. The debut of terror groups and criminal organizations in the Sahara in the early 2000s revealed 

the potential pitfalls of this strategy, however. Regional terrorist networks and criminal organizations perfected the 

modes of operations, routes, and delivery methods that 

were first used by smugglers of innocuous commodities like 

petrol, cooking oil, corn flour, and powdered milk, and then, 

in the 1990s, by traffickers of cigarettes and weapons.

The shortcoming of Algeria’s lax management of its borderlands came after 2011. The Arab uprisings were a major 

catalyst in the awakening and politicization of the south. 

Protests against social exclusion, high unemployment, and 

environmental depredation have mushroomed across the 

Algerian Sahara since that time.3

Unfortunately, political disgruntlement and frustration 

with injustices are not always channeled into social mobilization and nonviolent protests.4

 Some, especially disaffected youth, gravitate toward the transnational criminal, 

smuggling, and jihadi networks that have been established 

in Algeria’s south and its Sahelian periphery. The daring 

kidnapping of the governor of Illizi Province in southeastern Algeria in 2012 by locals involved in the protests against 

poor living conditions is illustrative. His subsequent transfer to Libya to be sold to elements of al Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb (AQIM) demonstrates the interconnectedness between grievances, criminality, and jihad. 

Mounting sectarian and ethnic tensions, worsened by economic upheavals, have compounded troubles in Algeria’s 

south. The lethal intercommunal clashes that erupted in 

August 2013 in the border town of Bordj Badji Mokhtar exposed deep rifts between the Tuareg Idnan and Arab Berabiche communities. Never before had the area seen such an 

escalation of violence, which started when a young Tuareg, 

accused of theft, was murdered in an apparent vendetta.5

The region of Ghardaïa was also engulfed in waves of deadly violence between the Chaamba Arabs present in most of 

the Algerian south and the Mozabite Berbers of the Muslim 

Ibadi sect, an insular group with its own system of values, 

codes of conduct, and rules.6 The cause of the violence was 

attributed to disputes over resources, land, and migration. 

Unfortunately for Algeria, the vast south is not the only 

border region exposed to internal and external shocks. Similar threats are mirrored along the Tunisian, Malian, and 

Libyan borders. Government tolerance of contraband and 

smuggling of commodities has provided terrorists and other criminal actors opportunities to exploit these informal 

cross-border routes. Algerian militants, for example, have 

used the limited oversight to build a safe haven in Mount 

Chaambi, Tunisia—a few miles from the Algerian border.7

Paradoxically, the only respite for Algeria can be found 

at its closed frontier with Morocco. In recent years, getting across the border has become quite difficult as both 

countries have tightened their control of smuggling routes 

and goods. In 2013, Algeria started digging trenches along 

its border with Morocco to deter smuggling of fuel. Not 

to be outdone, Morocco reacted a year later by building 

a 150-km-long security fence to strengthen its defenses 

against the flow of human smuggling and possible infiltration of terrorists from Algeria. Algeria accuses Morocco of 

flooding it with cannabis while Morocco complains about 

the flow from Algeria of African migrants and recreational 

drugs, namely amphetamine pills (Rivotril or Qarqobi in 

Moroccan colloquial Arabic).8

Despite the mutual recriminations, both countries’ fortification of their shared border seems to keep terrorist and violent criminal groups at bay even if smugglers continue to 

find ways to circumvent border controls. 

“

for Saharan communities, 

this prevalent discourse 

smacks of racial prejudice 

and a deliberate intention 

to justify their political and 

socioeconomic exclusion
4 Africa Center for Strategic Studies

MOROCCO STABLE BUT STILL VULNERABLE 

At first glance, Morocco’s borders seem to be the least exposed to the security dangers plaguing its neighbors in the 

Maghreb. The Kingdom has effectively minimized security 

challenges while continually enhancing its capabilities to 

prepare for risks that are increasingly volatile and unpredictable. With the exception of the Marrakesh bomb blast 

in 2011, Morocco has been safe from the terrorist attacks 

that have roiled Algeria and Tunisia. The country’s proactive security approach has made it harder for AQIM and 

other terrorist groups to establish a foothold in the country. That said, few security experts doubt that there are still 

security gaps in need of filling. The robustness of the drug 

and human smuggling networks active on Morocco’s borders is a cause of great concern. There is also a worrying 

increase in social tensions in 

the country’s peripheral regions, as exemplified by the 

monthslong protests that 

rocked the central Rif region 

of northern Morocco after 

the gruesome death of a fishmonger in October 2016.9

The most problematic regions 

in Morocco are located in the 

outlying south and north. A 

sizable chunk of the first is still mired in an unresolved dispute over Western Sahara. The vicissitudes of this dispute 

place the territory on a knife’s edge. Challenged from within 

by simmering pockets of dissent and from without by the increasing reach of violent extremist organizations and criminal networks operating in neighboring Sahelian countries, 

Western Sahara is one of the most heavily guarded and militarized places in Morocco. Parts of it have been sealed off 

since the 1980s with a 2,700-km trench-cum-wall (known as 

“the Berm”) that has effectively thwarted Algerian-backed 

Polisario fighters and transformed the balance of power in 

Morocco’s favor. 

Nonetheless, the Polisario-controlled refugee camps in 

southwest Algeria boil with simmering anger and discontent. Former United Nations Secretary-General Ban Kimoon worried about the vulnerability of young Sahrawis 

to recruitment by “criminal and terrorist networks.” In response, Moroccan authorities began fortifying their military 

presence on the border with Mauritania, as well as stepping 

up socioeconomic investments in the south of the country. 

In February 2016, King Mohammed VI launched an ambitious $1.8 billion plan to upgrade the region’s infrastructure 

and integrate it with the north of Morocco.

Similar government efforts to ease social tensions and mitigate the evolving threat of terrorism have been directed toward the Rif, a region with large pockets of alienation that 

extends from the bustling cities of Tangier and Tétouan in 

the northwest to the Algerian border in the northeast. The 

central part of the region, mostly Berber, is famous for its 

historic rebellious streak against central authorities. Meanwhile the western part, largely Arabophone, has gained notoriety for being a hub for migrant smuggling, drug trafficking, and recruiting aspiring militants to the conflict zones 

of Iraq and Syria. Out of the 

1,500 Moroccans who reportedly joined the ranks of the 

self-proclaimed Islamic State 

and al Qaeda-aligned forces in Syria and Iraq, an estimated 600–700 hail from the 

north of the country.10 

In response to these patterns, 

the government has increased 

its investment in vocational 

training, sociocultural centers, and rehabilitation programs to combat the increase in drug use and improve the 

lives of at-risk youth in the underprivileged neighborhoods 

of the northern cities. Since he assumed the throne in 1999, 

King Mohammed VI has also placed the economic development of the Rif, meaning “the edge of cultivated land,” as 

a top national security priority. The western Rif region, in 

particular, has seen a noticeable turnaround with significant 

investments in ports, roads, railways, air transportation, 

and water supply, as well as a range of other measures to attract private-sector investors to the newly created economic 

enclaves and industrial parks. 

The success in transforming the Tangier-Tétouan axis into 

an important manufacturing hub and commercial gateway 

has not, however, been replicated in the central Rif region 

where hundreds of villages still rely on rudimentary subsistence farming or cannabis growing to survive. To be sure, 

the new Mediterranean coastal road, known as “rocade 

du Rif,” which connects Tangier to Saïdia on the Algerian 

border, and the selective building and upgrading of main 

roads have improved the region’s road networks. But other 

“

the most organized and 

resourced trafficking networks 

have moved from trafficking 

in the highly lucrative petrol 

trade to the smuggling of 

cigarettes, medicine, migrants, 

and drugs
Africa Security Brief No. 34 5

promised big infrastructural plans such as the Manarat al 

Moutawassit (“Beacon of the Mediterranean”) development 

project in al Hoceima have been derailed. 

The Moroccan government is also struggling to lift the 

northeast out of isolation. This region has been battered by 

the fortification of the closed border with Algeria.11 Seventy 

percent of the region’s economy depends on the informal 

sector, which employs about 10,000 people.12 The rest of the 

economy is based on remittances from Moroccans living 

abroad as well as on agriculture and mining (coal and iron), 

though these sectors have been lagging. Protests over the 

deaths of three young men extracting coal from abandoned 

mines in the restive eastern town of Jerada in January 2018 

demonstrate the tension.13

The erection of security walls has not stemmed the illicit 

flow of all products between Algeria and Morocco. The most 

organized and resourced trafficking networks have moved 

from trafficking in the highly lucrative petrol trade to the 

smuggling of cigarettes, medicine, migrants, and drugs.14

Those that suffer the most are the majority of contrabandists 

who lack the resources and connections to circumvent state 

control or buy off border agents. 

The Moroccan government has been trying for years now 

to develop an economic strategy to break the northeast’s 

geographic isolation and enhance its investment attractiveness. The most ambitious is the ongoing construction of the 

Nador West Med Port Complex and the free zone associated with it. The mega project aspires to replicate the success 

of the Tangier Med Port Complex in helping to strengthen 

the economic development of the northeast through the 

development of commercial, industrial, logistical, and services activities.

Nonetheless, while important progress has been made, the 

isolated communities in Morocco’s periphery remain a potential incubator for further instability. 

TUNISIA BESIEGED

Tunisia is rightly lauded for the democratic progress it has 

made since the popular uprising that toppled longtime 

strongman Zine El Abidine Ben Ali in January 2011. But regional asymmetries pose significant challenges to the country’s nascent democracy. Poverty rates of 26–32 percent in 

rural areas are three times that in Tunis.15 The period since 

Ben Ali was ousted has not led to significant improvements 

in the economic situation of the border regions. Outside the 

wave of government hiring in the early days after the revolution and timid efforts to lure investors to these remote regions, their economic plight shows no sign of improvement. 

There is hope that the regionalization process—aimed at devolving power to regional and municipal authorities—can 

lead to a serious reassessment of regional development policies and a fair allocation of resources to these marginalized 

areas. Failure to do so threatens to aggravate social tensions 

at a time of returning battle-hardened Tunisian jihadists 

from Syria and Libya.16

The fall of Ben Ali created a security vacuum and disrupted cross-border markets and trade networks, allowing for 

the creation of new opportunistic groups unknown to security officials and more willing to trade in drugs and firearms.17 For example, the transformation of Tunisia into a 

transit point between Algeria and Libya for the trafficking 

of cannabis, stimulant drugs, and alcohol affected the old 

contrabandists of legal commodities who saw a significant 

decrease in profits. The squeeze pushed some into the criminal marketplace to avoid insolvency.18

The encroachment of criminal activity was accompanied by 

a similar creeping intrusion of terrorist groups who sought 

to first establish a presence on the border to facilitate the 

departure of Tunisian recruits to Syria. This evolved into the 

creation of safe havens for those willing to fight in Libya and 

later return to undertake terrorist attacks in Tunisia proper, 

as happened with the perpetrators of the 2015 Bardo National Museum and Sousse attacks. On the western border with 

Algeria, a number of Tunisian militants managed in 2013 to 

gain a foothold in the rugged areas of Mount Chaambi and 

Mount Semmama, where soldiers have been killed and IEDs 

planted on local roads.19

“

this growing disconnect 

between the state and its 

periphery is dangerous, 

threatening to perpetuate 

hard-line security approaches, 

the effects of which often 

result in more social tension 

and political violence
6 Africa Center for Strategic Studies

A rash of attacks on Tunisian security services, amplified by 

the dramatic assault by dozens of Islamic State-trained militants on security forces in the town of Ben Guerdane near 

the Libyan border in March 2016, has led to an increasing 

militarization of the border. This security-first approach 

has collided with the harsh reality of communities whose 

livelihoods depend on the free movement of people and 

goods.20 For example, the transborder dimension of social 

and tribal relations between Tunisia’s southeast and Libya’s 

west makes any disruptions to cross-border trade an explosive affair. In February 2015, the government’s closure of the 

border posts of Ben Guerdane and Dehiba triggered massive 

protests and the organization of a general strike. These protests were less about the state controlling its frontiers and 

more about the lack of viable alternatives to illicit cross-border trade and the government’s apparent nonresponsiveness to the population’s demands. 

The government is seen as impeding one of the few sources 

of revenue available to border communities. This breeds 

bitterness among locals who believe that government security measures come at the expense of their well-being. 

After all, the intensification of border enforcement is affecting only the most vulnerable people who are dependent 

on trade in contraband and lack the means and networks 

to circumvent border checks. The most powerful and resourced smuggling rings use the main roads and benefit 

from the connivance of Tunisian border patrol agents and 

other security officials.21

The rising militarization of the border seems to have the 

opposite effect of that intended. Instead of effectively curbing criminal activity and the trafficking of harmful substances, a militarized border has created more openings 

for corruption. For example, the inability of customs and 

border agents to provide security in the border region has 

led to an expanded role for the Army.22 The assumption of 

this new role elevates the potential for corruption within 

the Army, a development that risks tainting the image of 

one of the few state institutions that enjoys credibility and 

popular acceptance. It has also increased competition and 

distrust between the different services in charge of monitoring the borders. 

The escalation of illicit activities along the borders, therefore, 

has justified the government’s militarization of the border 

and its clamping down on cross-border trade, but this has 

only served to exacerbate corruption, underdevelopment, 

and inequality. This pattern risks a deepening cycle of violence, organized criminality, and a backslide into repressive 

authoritarianism. 

WAYS FORWARD

While the degree of vulnerability to security threats facing 

governments in the Maghreb varies, none of these countries 

is immune from the mounting pressures of transnational 

militant organizations, criminal networks, and social tensions in their border areas. 

The strengthening of states’ abilities to exert control over the 

entirety of their territories as well as the improvement of regional cooperation is, however, only one piece of the puzzle 

in tackling insecurities along the borders of the Maghreb. 

Security responses can never be a substitute for tackling the 

underlying drivers of insecurity: the political and socioeconomic marginalization of border communities. Many youths 

in the Maghreb’s border and peripheral regions have grown 

deeply frustrated, angry, and hostile toward state authority. 

This growing disconnect between the state and its periphery 

is dangerous, threatening to perpetuate hard-line security 

approaches, the effects of which often result in more social 

tension and political violence. 

Following are some of priorities for action that emerge from 

this review:

• Tackle the deep-seated grievances and resentments 

prevalent among peripheral communities and disadvantaged groups. Strengthening government security 

capacities and boosting border controls are crucial but 

insufficient to protect against internal and cross-border 

threats. Morocco, in particular, but also Algeria and increasingly Tunisia deserve a pat on the back for neutralizing or containing the threat of terrorism within their 

borders. The significant weakening of the Islamic State in 

the region is a testament to the effectiveness of military 

and security responses. If history is any guide, however, 

“

Overcoming this trust deficit 

between the security services 

and local communities is 

crucial for enhancing the 

effectiveness of the provision 

of security
Africa Security Brief No. 34 7

the threat of terrorism will linger and remain a challenge 

in the Maghreb unless governments get serious about 

addressing the longstanding grievances and resentments 

prevalent among peripheral communities and disadvantaged groups. As the Tunisian experience amply demonstrates, anger at the persistence of social exclusion and 

regional disparities, combined with exposure to radical 

Salafi preachers, are important factors in understanding 

youth radicalization.

• Resist replicating the old combination of repression 

and co-optation to smother popular mobilization. From 

Tataouine in southern Tunisia to Ouargla in southern 

Algeria and the Rif city of al Hoceima in Morocco, this 

approach has shown its limits in subduing the cities and 

towns in upheaval. Emergency measures and promises 

of infrastructure projects may contribute to a lull in social 

mobilization, but their effects quickly evaporate if they 

fail to also genuinely respond to peoples’ demands for 

economic opportunity and ethical governance. The King 

of Morocco acknowledged as much in a speech during 

the opening session of Parliament on October 13, 2017: 

[W]e have to admit that our national development 

model no longer responds to citizens’ growing demands and pressing needs; it has not been able to 

reduce disparities between segments of the population, correct inter-regional imbalances or achieve 

social justice. 

• Improve community engagement skills of the police, 

gendarmerie, and other security forces to enhance 

state-society relations. The persistent stigmatization 

of borderland and peripheral communities as troublemakers and outlaws and the trauma associated with aggressive and intrusive policing instill in young people 

profound feelings of humiliation and bitterness toward 

state authority. Overcoming this trust deficit between the 

security services and local communities is crucial for enhancing the effectiveness of the provision of security. The 

adoption of new rules and regulations to professionalize 

police training, recruitment, and promotion to advance 

cultural sensitivity to these communities is critical. 

• Recognize the historical specificity and geographic 

particularity of border regions. In all countries of the 

Maghreb, border regions have suffered from decades of 

state neglect. Historic narratives have been manipulated 

to portray some outlying regions as archaic zones, full of 

dissidents and outlaws. Textbooks misrepresent traumatic events and downplay the significance of these regions’ 

roles in their countries’ histories. To heal past wounds, 

governments should develop an initiative to validate 

these communities’ contributions in history books, statutes, memorials, and exhibitions. If accompanied by development activities that cater to regional needs—and in 

the case of Tunisia and Algeria, the improvement in the 

management of natural resources and the investment of 

a fair portion of the profits from local resources into local 

projects—such gestures can help mitigate the sentiments 

of anger and resentment among peripheral communities. 

They can also help counter extremist recruitment.

• Avoid overregulating the religious sphere and propagating religious boards as a means to combat extremism. 

Overhauling the management of religion and reforming 

religious education in order to be in conformity with the 

tolerant and inclusive teachings of North African Islam 

is a worthy goal to combat the creeping menace of exclusivist ideologies. The risk with this approach, however, is that government policy becomes one of patronage 

of religious beliefs and practices. Perceived government 

propaganda to prop up state-sanctioned Sufism (Islamic 

mysticism) and religious authorities that pledge loyalty 

to state rulers suppress the development of competent 

clerics and credible religious institutions that can tear 

down violent interpretations of Islam. Worse, it taints 

the religious establishment by association with untrusted 

government authorities. Part of the lure of militant ideologies and violent extremist groups lie in their anti-systemic rhetoric and their ability to tap into anti-establishment anger. This was clearly demonstrated in the case of 

Tunisia when becoming a member of Ansar al Sharia was 

tantamount to joining a revolutionary movement intent 

on rupturing the generational and institutional order. 

• Enhance regional cooperation. Given the decades-long 

rivalry between Morocco and Algeria, strengthening 

regional cooperation will likely require pursuing incremental objectives. These include focusing on specific security matters such as the exchange of intelligence information on drugs, arms, and human smugglers as well as 

Maghrebi fighters in Syria and Libya. The Algerian-Tunisian border security cooperation reflects this kind of 

cautious collaborative approach. 
Kate Almquist Knopf, Director

National Defense University

Fort Lesley J. McNair

Washington, DC 20319-5066

+1 202-685-7300

www.africacenter.org

Africa Security Briefs

Joseph Siegle, Ph.D.

Director of Research

sieglej@ndu.edu

+1 202-685-6808

ISSN 2164-4047

The Africa Center for Strategic Studies is an academic institution established by the U.S. Department of Defense as an objective

forum for research, academic programs, and the exchange of ideas. The Africa Security Brief series presents research and

analysis with the aim of advancing understanding of African security issues. The opinions, conclusions, and recommendations 

expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Africa Center.

NOTES

1 “Le Grand Sud, l’autre Algérie,” Jeune Afrique, May 14, 2012. 

2 Tarik Dahou, “Les marges transnationales et locales de l’État 

algérien,” Politique africaine No. 137 (2015), 7-25.

3 Naoual Belakhdar, “’L’éveil du sud’ ou quand la contestation vient 

de la marge,” Politique africaine No. 137 (2015), 27–48.

4 Salim Chena, “L’Algérie et son Sud: Quels enjeux sécuritaires?” 

Institut français des relations internationales (November 2013).

5 Isabelle Mandraud, “Menaces sur le ‘Sud tranquille’ algérien,” Le 

Monde, September 3, 2013. 

6 Houria Alioua, “Folie meurtrière au Mzab : 25 morts,” El Watan, July 

8, 2015. 

7 Sherelle Jacobs, “Shadow of Jihadi Safe Haven Hangs Over Tunisia, 

Algeria,” World Politics Review, May 21, 2013.

8 Querine Hanlon and Matthew M. Herbert, “Border Security 

Challenges in the Grand Maghreb,” Peaceworks No. 109 (Washington, 

DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2015).

9 Aida Alami, “Morocco’s Stability Is Roiled by Monthslong Protests 

Over Fishmonger’s Death,” New York Times, August 26, 2017.

10 Nadia Lamlili, “Maroc : de Tanger à Ceuta, sur les traces des 

jihadistes,” Jeune Afrique, December 14, 2015.

11 Marie Verdier, “Oujda, un drame frontalier dans le nord-est du 

Maroc,” La Croix, July 13, 2017.

12 Michel Lachkar, “Le futur port de Nador, espoir de désenclavement 

du Nord-Est marocain,” Géopolis Afrique, June 6, 2016. 

13 “New protests emerge in eastern Morocco,” Economist Intelligence 

Unit, January 25, 2018.

14 Chéro Belli, “Une frontière poreuse, malgré les barrières entre 

l’Algérie et le Maroc,” Dune Voices, February 1, 2017. 

15 “Note d’orientation sur les disparites regionales en Tunisie,” World 

Bank (July 2015). 

16 “Tunisia says 800 returning jihadists jailed or tracked,” Agence 

France-Presse, December 31, 2016.

17 Anouar Boukhars, “The Potential Jihadi Windfall from the 

Militarization of Tunisia’s Border Region with Libya,” CTC Sentinel

11, no. 1 (2018), 32-36.

18 Hamza Meddeb, “Les ressorts socio-économiques de l’insécurité 

dans le sud tunisien,” Fondation pour la recherche stratégique 

(June 2016). 

19 Sarah Souli, “Border Control: Tunisia Attempts to Stop Terrorism 

with a Wall,” VICE, November 16, 2015.

20 Anouar Boukhars, “The Geographic Trajectory of Conflict and 

Militancy in Tunisia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 

(July 2017).

21 Aymen Gharbi, “Tunisie: Entretien sur l’économie de Ben Guerdane 

avec Adrien Doron, chercheur en géographie,” Huffington Post 

International, March 22, 2016.

22 Meddeb. 

23 “Full Text of HM the King’s Speech at Parliament Opening,” 

Morocco’s Ministry of Culture and Communication Web site, October 

13, 2017, available at <http://www.maroc.ma/en/discours-royaux/

texte-integral-prononce-par-sm-le-roi-mohammed-vi-devant-lesmembres-des-deux>.