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OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS 

ELECTROMAGNETIC RISKS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

OVERSIGHT AND 

MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 17, 2016 

Serial No. 114–69 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 


Congress.#13
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN V. O’HARA, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania, Chairman 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

RYAN CONSAUL, Subcommittee Staff Director 

KRIS CARLSON, Subcommittee Clerk 

CEDRIC C. HAYNES, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS

The Honorable Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 2 

The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Oversight 

and Management Efficiency: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 4 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

WITNESSES

Mr. Chris P. Currie, Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 11 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 13 

Mr. Brandon Wales, Director, Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis, 

National Protection and Programs Directorate, U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 18 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 20 

Mr. Joseph McClelland, Director, Office of Energy Infrastructure Security, 

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, U.S. Department of Energy: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 22 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 24 

Mr. Judson M. Freed, Director, Emergency Management and Homeland Security, Ramsey County, Minnesota, On Behalf of the National Association 

of Counties: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 26 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 28 

FOR THE RECORD

The Honorable Scott Perry, a Representative in Congress From the State 

of Pennsylvania, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency: 

Statement of Patricia Hoffman, Assistant Secretary, Office of Electricity 

Delivery and Energy Reliability, U.S. Department of Energy ...................... 6 

APPENDIX

Questions From Chairman Scott Perry for Chris P. Currie ................................. 45 

Questions From Chairman Scott Perry for Brandon Wales ................................. 47 

Question From Chairman Scott Perry for Joseph McClelland ............................ 47 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF FEDERAL EFFORTS TO 

ADDRESS ELECTROMAGNETIC RISKS 

Tuesday, May 17, 2016 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND

MANAGEMENT EFFICIENCY, Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Scott Perry [Chairman of 

the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Perry, Duncan, Clawson, Carter, 

Loudermilk, Watson Coleman, and Torres. 

Also present: Representative Franks. 

Mr. PERRY. The Committee on Homeland Security Subcommittee 

on Oversight and Management Efficiency will come to order. 

The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony regarding the 

Federal Government’s efforts to address risks associated with electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, events. 

The Chair asks unanimous consent to allow the gentleman from 

Arizona, Mr. Franks, the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

The Chair now recognizes himself for an opening statement. 

America’s energy infrastructure is the heart that pumps the 

American economy. Long-term power outages resulting from an attack on our critical infrastructure could cripple our Nation’s economy and put America’s health and safety in jeopardy. Because the 

Nation’s critical infrastructure is so vital to America’s way of life, 

the Federal Government has recognized the necessity of securing 

our infrastructure from an array of risks, including the threat of 

EMP, electromagnetic pulse, attack. 

The most serious EMP risk would come in the form of an EMP 

resulting from a nuclear detonation at high altitude. Such an attack could cause long-term damage to the power grid. While many 

believe the likelihood of such an attack is low, the damage and economic aftershocks that would follow demand that we address these 

risks. We cannot discount that other nation-states, such as North 

Korea, or sophisticated terror groups might want to utilized EMP 

to wreak havoc on our economy. 

The Departments of Homeland Security and Energy and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission have an active role in protecting our critical infrastructure. According to a GAO, Government 

Accountability Office, report released last month, Federal agencies 

2 

have taken action—it is important to note—have taken action to 

prepare and mitigate EMP risks, but there is still room for improvement, as always. 

According to GAO, DHS and Department of Energy have addressed some but not all of the recommendations in a 2008 report 

from the Congressionally-authorized EMP Commission. Unfortunately, DHS has yet to clearly identify a lead office or official within the Department to coordinate efforts internally and with other 

Federal and industry stakeholders. How can DHS protect us 

against EMP risks if they don’t know who is in charge? I expect 

to hear from DHS’s witness today on how the Department has corrected this failure. 

GAO has also found that Federal partners must do a better job 

of collaborating their planning activities. Additionally, GAO made 

recommendations to improve how DHS analyzes EMP risks and 

how DHS and DOE identify and implement key research and development priorities. 

Overall, GAO found that the Federal Government’s efforts to prepare for and mitigate EMP risks are at best a mixed bag. The 

progress made to date is certainly due in part to Congress’ oversight efforts and the recommendations made in 2008 by the EMP 

Commission. DHS and DOE must make more headway in their efforts to address EMP. Effectively engaging the private sector to assist with planning and building system resiliency will be an essential component of these efforts. 

Congress must also do its part. In November 2015, the House 

passed H.R. 1073, the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, authorized by Congressman Trent Franks of Arizona, which would require better planning research and development for EMP risks. 

Unfortunately, like many other bills passed by this committee, it 

remains stuck in the Senate. 

I certainly appreciate the hard work of our watchdogs at GAO for 

their report and the witnesses for appearing before this subcommittee today. I look forward to hearing how Federal agencies 

will work to improve themselves in light of GAO’s findings to better 

protect the American people from EMP risks. 

[The statement of Chairman Perry follows:] 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN SCOTT PERRY

MAY 17, 2016 

America’s energy infrastructure is the heart that pumps the American economy. 

Long-term power outages resulting from an attack on our critical infrastructure 

could cripple our Nation’s economy and put Americans’ health and safety in jeopardy. Because the Nation’s critical infrastructure is so vital to Americans’ way of 

life, the Federal Government has recognized the necessity of securing our infrastructure from an array of risks, including the threat of an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) 

attack. The most serious EMP risk would come in the form of an EMP resulting 

from a nuclear detonation at high altitude. Such an attack could cause long-term 

damage to the power grid. While many believe the likelihood of such an attack is 

low, the damage and economic aftershocks that would follow demand that we address these risks. We cannot discount that other nation-states, such as North Korea, 

or sophisticated terror groups might want to utilize an EMP to wreak havoc on our 

economy. 

The Departments of Homeland Security and Energy, and Federal Energy Regulatory Commission have an active role in protecting our critical infrastructure. According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report released last month, 

Federal agencies have taken action to prepare and mitigate EMP risks, but there’s 

3 

still room for improvement. According to GAO, DHS and the Department of Energy 

have addressed some but not all of the recommendations in a 2008 report from the 

Congressionally-authorized EMP Commission. 

Unfortunately, DHS has yet to clearly identify a lead office or official within the 

Department to coordinate efforts internally and with other Federal and industry 

stakeholders. How can DHS protect us against EMP risks if they don’t know who 

is in charge? I expect to hear from DHS’s witness today on how the Department 

has corrected this failure. GAO also found that Federal partners must do a better 

job of collaborating their planning activities. Additionally, GAO made recommendations to improve how DHS analyzes EMP risks and how DHS and DOE identify and 

implement key research and development priorities. 

Overall, GAO found that the Federal Government’s efforts to prepare for and mitigate EMP risks are at best, a mixed bag. The progress made to date is certainly 

due, in part, to Congress’s oversight efforts and the recommendations made in 2008 

by the EMP Commission. DHS and DOE must make more headway in their efforts 

to address EMP. Effectively engaging the private sector to assist with planning and 

building system resiliency will be an essential component of these efforts. 

Congress must also do its part. In November 2015, the House passed H.R. 1073, 

the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act, authored by Congressman Trent Franks 

of Arizona, which would require better planning, research, and development for 

EMP risks. Unfortunately like many other bills passed by this committee, it remains 

stuck in the Senate. 

I appreciate the hard work of our watchdogs at GAO for their report and the witnesses for appearing before the subcommittee today. I look forward to hearing how 

Federal agencies will work to improve themselves, in light of GAO’s findings, to better protect the American people from EMP risks. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chair now recognizes the Ranking Member of 

the subcommittee, the gentlelady from New Jersey, Mrs. Watson 

Coleman. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Perry. Thank you for 

holding today’s hearing. 

Thank you to Messrs. Chris Currie, Brandon Wales, Joseph 

McClelland, and Jud Freed for your testimony today. 

The Department of Homeland Security is tasked with the overall 

safety and security of the United States. Last week, the Department revealed a new mission statement: ‘‘With honor and integrity, 

we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values.’’ 

One risk to the homeland is an EMP, or electromagnetic pulse— 

is a burst of electromagnetic radiation that results from suddenly 

fluctuating magnetic fields. An EMP can be either man-made or 

natural and can damage high-voltage transformers and possibly 

contribute to grid failure and electric power blackouts. 

EMPs are considered a high-impact, yet low-probability risk occurrence. As DHS tries to prioritize its efforts across a wide spectrum of potential dangers to the Nation, it should take seriously all 

risks impacting the homeland, not only EMPs but also climate 

change impacts, solar storms, and a wide range of natural disasters. 

Last month, the Government Accountability Office released a report reviewing the Department’s assessment and coordination efforts in the EMP space. According to GAO, DHS components, including NPPD, FEMA, and S&T, conduct independent activities addressing EMPs, including research and development, stakeholder 

coordination, and mitigation. However, no specific component has 

been tasked with lead responsibility for coordinating activities 

within the Department or with Federal and industry stakeholders. 

Further, the Department has not fully leveraged opportunities to 

4 

collect key inputs often used in a risk assessment, such as threat 

vulnerability and consequences information. 

Risk assessments are a beneficial means of incorporating methods or tools to reach a specific identifiable conclusion. Specifically, 

with the use of a risk assessment, the Department can better characterize the risk of EMPs in the overall protection mission. 

In 2007, this committee passed the 9/11 Commission Act, which 

required the Department to produce the Quadrennial Homeland 

Security Review, a document produced every 4 years for the purpose of comprehensively examining the Department’s homeland security strategy and risk priorities. Thus far, 2 QHSRs have been 

created, and it is my view that the latest 2014 release showed improvement from the 2010 review, but the Department still needs 

improvement in the way it assesses its risk, such as EMPs. 

In the coming weeks, I will introduce legislation that addresses 

the importance of risk assessment in the development of the 

QHSR, specifically the need for detailed documented methods for 

gauging homeland security threats. In order to determine roles and 

responsibilities for the Department, as GAO suggests, DHS must 

first determine where EMP fits in the overall protective strategy 

for the Department. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Watson Coleman follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN

MAY 17, 2016 

The Department of Homeland Security is tasked with the overall safety and security of the United States. Last week, the Department revealed a new mission statement: With honor and integrity, we will safeguard the American people, our homeland, and our values. 

One risk to the homeland, an EMP, or Electromagnetic Pulse, is a burst of electromagnetic radiation that results from suddenly fluctuating magnetic fields. 

An EMP can be either man-made or natural and can damage high-voltage transformers and possibly contribute to grid failure and electric power blackouts. EMPs 

are considered a high-impact, low-probability risk occurrence. 

As DHS tries to prioritize its efforts across a wide spectrum of potential dangers 

to the Nation, it should take seriously all risks impacting the homeland, not only 

EMPs but also climate change impacts, solar storms, and a wide range of natural 

disasters. 

Last month, the Government Accountability Office released a report reviewing the 

Department’s assessment and coordination efforts in the EMP space. According to 

GAO, DHS components, including NPPD, FEMA, and S&T conduct independent activities addressing EMPs including research and development, stakeholder coordination, and mitigation. 

However, no specific component has been tasked with lead responsibility for coordinating activities within the Department or with Federal and industry stakeholders. Further, the Department has not fully leveraged opportunities to collect key 

inputs often used in a risk assessment, such as threat, vulnerability, and consequences information. 

Risk assessments are a beneficial means of incorporating methods or tools to 

reach a specific, identifiable conclusion. Specifically, with the use of a risk assessment, the Department can better characterize the risk of EMPs in its overall protective mission. 

In 2007, this committee passed the 9/11 Commission Act, which required the Department to produce the Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, a document produced every 4 years for the purpose of comprehensively examining the Department’s 

homeland security strategy and risk priorities. 

Thus far, 2 QHSRs have been created. It is my view that the latest 2014 release 

showed improvements from the 2010 review, but the Department still needs improvement in the way it assesses its risks, such as EMPs. 

5 

In the coming weeks, I will introduce legislation that addresses the importance 

of risk assessments in the development of the QHSR, specifically the need for a detailed, documented method for gauging homeland security threats. 

In order to determine roles and responsibilities within the Department as GAO 

suggests, DHS must first determine where EMPs fit in the overall protective strategy for the Department. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chair thanks the gentlelady. 

Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

MAY 17, 2016 

An electromagnetic pulse or EMP is a burst of electromagnetic radiation created 

when a nuclear weapon is detonated or when a non-nuclear EMP weapon is used. 

Additionally, naturally-occurring solar weather can generate effects similar to other 

EMP events. 

An EMP could cause catastrophic damage to our Nation’s critical infrastructure. 

An EMP is a high-impact, low-probability risk. Over the past 10 years, 92 percent 

of counties have had at least 1 Presidential disaster declaration issued; however, 

none of them were for an EMP. 

This does not mean that we should be dismissive of the threat; however, we have 

the responsibility to examine the Federal Government’s efforts, while making sure 

that we do not use our platforms to promote fear in the minds of the American public. 

As the lead agency coordinating the Federal Government’s efforts to promote the 

security and resiliency of the Nation’s critical infrastructure, the Department of 

Homeland Security must take this threat, and all threats to the Nation’s critical infrastructure, seriously. 

Last month, the Government Accountability Office issued a report detailing the 

Department’s work in the EMP space and determined that DHS has not fully identified its risk assessments when it comes to an EMP attack. 

GAO also found that DHS officials could not identify any DHS representatives or 

offices as having broader designated responsibility for performing key oversight or 

coordination roles regarding electromagnetic risks within DHS’s overall infrastructure protection efforts. According to GAO, stakeholders are unclear who within DHS 

is responsible for addressing electromagnetic risks. 

This leaves me to ask an age-old question that I have asked the Department on 

several occasions with regard to various responsibilities across several components— 

‘‘Who’s in Charge?’’ While the Department of Homeland Security is 2 years into its 

‘‘Unity of Effort’’ initiative, GAO’s findings, while not shocking, are concerning. 

This is also troubling because as part of the Department’s effort to become more 

unified, the National Protection and Programs Directorate is looking to Congress for 

authorization for a reorganization. This reorganization includes having an infrastructure directorate that works with the public and private sectors on threats to 

physical and cyber infrastructure. 

Congressional leaders need to know what if any impact a NPPD reorganization 

would have on the Department’s responsibilities with oversight of the threat from 

EMP and where EMP fits in the Department’s overall infrastructure protection 

strategy. We also need to know how the infrastructure directorate would plan on 

working with Federal, State, and local stakeholders when it comes to infrastructure 

security. 

I look forward to the testimony from today’s witnesses that can provide greater 

context to how the Government, in particular DHS, is dealing with the threat from 

EMP, including how DHS will address risk assessments and continue to work with 

outside stakeholders. 

Finally, I am pleased that the Ranking Member of this subcommittee has taken 

the initiative to introduce legislation that addresses the importance of risk assessments, and I look forward to cosponsoring her legislation. 

Mr. PERRY. We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today. The witnesses’ entire written statements 

will appear in the record. The Chair will introduce all of the witness first and then recognize each of you for your statements. 

6 

1 American Public Power Association (APPA), ‘‘U.S. Electric Utility Industry Statistics’’ http:// 

www.publicpower.org/files/PDFs/USElectricUtilityIndustryStatistics.pdf. 

At this time, I ask unanimous consent that the statement from 

the Department of Energy for the record from Patricia Hoffman is 

entered in the record. 

Without objection. 

[The information follows:] 

STATEMENT OF PATRICIA HOFFMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF ELECTRICITY

DELIVERY AND ENERGY RELIABILITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

MAY 17, 2016 

Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for continuing to highlight the importance of a resilient electric power grid. I appreciate the opportunity to address the Department of Energy’s 

role in in helping to ensure a resilient, reliable, and flexible electricity system in 

an increasingly challenging environment. 

Our economy, National security, and even the health and safety of our citizens 

depend on the reliable delivery of electricity. The mission of the Office of Electricity 

Delivery and Energy Reliability (DOE–OE) is to strengthen, transform, and improve 

energy infrastructure to ensure access to reliable, secure, and clean sources of energy. We are committed to working with our public and private-sector partners to 

protect the Nation’s critical energy infrastructure, including the electric power grid, 

from disruptions caused by natural and man-made events, such as severe weather, 

physical attacks, cyber attacks, and electromagnetic pulses (EMP). 

The electrical grid is more than just infrastructure. It is an ecosystem of asset 

owners, manufacturers, service providers, and Government officials at Federal, 

State, and local levels, all working together to run one of the most reliable power 

grids in the world. Ninety percent of the Nation’s energy infrastructure is in private 

hands, and 3,306 electricity providers serve approximately 148 million customers 1

through a network of 450,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines. 

There are plenty of risks beyond cyber, including physical, severe weather, natural disasters, aging infrastructure, and infrastructure interdependencies. In the 

face of these diverse threats, we can help ensure that the grid is poised to recover 

quickly following an incident. Fostering partnerships with public and private stakeholders plays a critical and necessary role in this work. 

THE ECOSYSTEM OF RESILIENCE

A crucial factor to meeting these challenges is to be proactive and cultivate what 

I call an ecosystem of resilience: A network of producers, distributors, regulators, 

vendors, and public partners, acting together to strengthen our ability to prepare, 

respond, and recover. We continue to partner with industry, other Federal agencies, 

local governments, and other stakeholders to quickly identify threats, develop indepth strategies to mitigate those threats, and rapidly respond to any disruptions. 

Our resilience efforts are further bolstered by our broader grid modernization activities, including our support of the research, development, and demonstration of 

advanced technologies and our work with State, local, Tribal, and territorial stakeholders to help them improve their local resilience and energy emergency response 

capabilities. Of the $4.5 billion that we invested in grid modernization through the 

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), $3.4 billion was used to help industry accelerate the deployment of advanced technologies that are now reducing 

costs and keeping the lights on more reliably and efficiently. This smarter grid is 

helping to prevent outages, reduce storm impacts, and restore service faster when 

outages occur. 

Our model is partnerships first. We are all in this together. It is through working 

together that we continue to strengthen our ability to bounce back following an 

event. 

PARTNERSHIPS FOR READINESS

DOE–OE has been working with utility owners and operators, regulators, and 

State and local officials across the country concerning threats to cybersecurity and 

other risks. Through these partnerships, we are providing tools, best practices, new 

technologies, and funds to support their many on-going efforts. 

7 

We directly support preparedness efforts at the community level, in part through 

products and tools produced by our Infrastructure Security and Energy Restoration 

(ISER) division, to inform and educate State and local officials in their energy emergency preparedness activities. This is done through forums, training, and tabletop 

exercises for Federal, State, and local energy officials. 

In early February, DOE Secretary Ernest Moniz signed an updated Energy Emergency Assurance Coordinators (EEAC) Agreement with the National Association of 

State Energy Officials (NASEO), National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC), National Governors Association (NGA), and National Emergency 

Management Association (NEMA). This updated EEAC Agreement lays out concrete 

items to improve our collective ability to share information, which is essential for 

making sound response and restoration decisions during emergencies. To support 

this effort, DOE and State officials will develop information-sharing protocols and 

processes to streamline response operations. We will also test these processes and 

information-sharing mechanisms through routine drills and exercises. 

The President’s fiscal year 2017 budget request includes $15 million for a State 

Energy Assurance program to foster regional hazard preparedness. This program 

would focus on providing State, local, Tribal, and territorial governments with analysis, training, and exercising of shared regional risk factors where entities depend 

on each other for energy supplies and must work together to resolve energy disruptions to restore energy infrastructure. 

This new program would be facilitated through competitive regional cooperative 

assistance awards to State and local partners. As needed, DOE, including our National Laboratory expertise and capability, would be available to the awardees to 

enhance preparation and allow for real-world energy emergency support. Lessons 

learned would be shared with other communities to leverage the program across the 

Nation and help improve resiliency planning. 

DOE–OE also focuses on enabling our State, local, and utility partners with information. EAGLE–I (Environment for Analysis of Geo-Located Energy Information), 

for example, is a DOE-designed and operated web tool that automatically gathers 

electrical grid service status data from company websites every 15 minutes, and organizes it into an easy-to-read picture of electrical service status Nation-wide. Now 

covering 75 percent of all U.S. electricity customers, it provides real-time information about the grid—what is up, what is down, the number and location of outages, 

when service is restored—to DOE and, through our information-sharing efforts, with 

other Federal agencies. 

Geomagnetic Disturbances (GMD) or Space Weather 

President Obama and the administration recognize the threat posed by a GMD 

from space weather and the administration continues to prioritize work to address 

these concerns. In April 2015, the Quadrennial Energy Review highlighted methods 

to reduce our electric grid’s vulnerabilities to multiple forms of risks. The Secretary 

of Energy has prioritized DOE efforts to help understand and mitigate these risks 

for the electricity subsector (subsector). 

In 2015 the administration issued the National Space Weather Strategy and follow-up National Space Weather Action Plan to better understand and address the 

risks of geomagnetic storms. The plans gave DOE primary responsibility for 2 of the 

actions in the Action Plan. First, by the end of 2016, DOE will coordinate with regulatory agencies and the electric power industry to define data requirements that facilitate a centralized reporting system to collect real-time information on the status 

of the electric power transmission and distribution system during geomagnetic 

storms. Second, also by the end of 2016, DOE, in coordination with Departments 

of Homeland Security and Commerce, and stakeholders in the subsector, will develop plans to provide monitoring and data collection systems to inform a systemwide, real-time view of geomagnetically induced currents (GICs) at the regional level 

and, to the extent possible, display the status of power generation, transmission, 

and distribution systems during geomagnetic storms. 

For several years DOE has taken actions and funded efforts to better understand 

the risk from space weather. Our space weather strategy included analysis, enhancing science, and collaboration with stakeholders both domestically and internationally. Efforts include: 

• Encouraging the development of a North American Reliability Corporation 

(NERC) GMD task force and supporting it to better understand space weather. 

The task force developed standards for GMD. In addition to monitoring geomagnetic disturbances, industry is prepared to take action as needed, including 

reducing load if necessary and changing operational settings to respond to system needs. 

8 

• Funding the Electric Power Research Institute’s (EPRI) SUNBURST program, 

a geomagnetically-induced current monitoring system. When our support began 

there were only 10 monitors, all in the Eastern Interconnection. Now there are 

over 40 and they are in all 3 major grids in the Continental United States • Funding a new program to evaluate and install variometers to collect and share 

data on changes on magnetic fields during GMDs. Our program will put in 12 

variometers to help system owners and operators better model the expected potential currents going into transformers causing grid and possible system damage. With the data grid operators can take informed risk-based decisions on actions to mitigate and protect against GMDs. Prior to the deployment of the first 

variometer, the United States Geological Survey had only 6 magnetometers to 

measure such data. • Funding a study at Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) to evaluate the susceptibility of the eastern grid to GMD. The study will be completed by year’s 

end. • Organizing, attending, and participating in several space weather workshops 

with government and industry stakeholders, including those from some of our 

allies such as Canada, the United Kingdom, and Ireland. 

Electromagnetic Pulses (EMP) 

DOE has increased its efforts to better understand the EMP threat to the electric 

grid and what measures can mitigate its potential adverse impacts. DOE plans to 

take the necessary steps to develop cost-effective strategies for all hazards to mitigate, respond to, and recover from potential disruptions. We have a multi-pronged 

approach to addressing EMP threats, allowing the subsector to advance readiness 

for potential EMP impacts through research to quantify the threat, scientific development of mitigation strategies, and analysis of the policies needed for the future. 

A recent GAO Report 16–243 from March 2016 presented recommendations to 

Federal agencies on methods to address EMP. DOE concurred with the report’s recommendations to DOE, including that the ‘‘Secretary of Energy direct responsible 

officials to engage with Federal partners and industry stakeholders to identify and 

implement key EMP research and development priorities, including opportunities 

for further testing and evaluation of potential EMP protection and mitigation options.’’ 

The Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act of 2015 (FAST Act, Pub. L. 114– 

94) also gives the Department impetus to enhance planning for events such as EMP. 

In the Act, Congress enhanced the Secretary of Energy’s abilities to take emergency 

actions related to grid operations during a grid security emergency caused by any 

high-impact event such as an EMP attack. 

Other on-going or planned activities related to EMP include: 

• The Department is analyzing the vulnerability of the grid to an EMP event and 

the potential impact on reliability and delivery of electric power. The analysis 

will examine options such as hardening, blocking, stockpiles, and planning. • The Department is conducting a risk analysis for ‘‘extreme events’’ including 

EMP electricity industry planning. • The Department is working jointly with the Department of Homeland Security 

through Los Alamos National Laboratory and DHS’s National Infrastructure 

Simulation and Analysis Center to begin developing methods to analyze the impact and consequences of different sources of EMP and GMD events on U.S. 

electric power infrastructure and to use those methods to determine events of 

concern. DOE is committed to helping forge the grid of the future that will be more resilient to all hazards, including EMP. Continued progress in grid modernization is 

vital to helping us protect the grid from EMP. 

PARTNERSHIPS FOR RESPONSE

Our partnerships with private and public stakeholders also focus on quickly identifying threats, developing in-depth strategies to mitigate them and rapidly responding to any disruptions. With 90 percent of the Nation’s power infrastructure privately held, coordinating and aligning efforts between the Government and the private sector is the only viable path to success. 

Under Presidential Policy Directive–21: Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience and the FAST Act, DOE is the Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) for electrical infrastructure. The SSA plays the pivotal role of ensuring unity of effort and message 

across Government partners, including the Department of Homeland Security, the 

Department of Defense, and DOE offices. 

As the Energy SSA we also serve as the day-to-day Federal interface for the 

prioritization and coordination of activities to strengthen the security and resilience 

9 

of critical infrastructure in the electricity subsector. This involves building, maintaining, and advancing our relationships and collaborative efforts with the energy 

sector. We have invested in public/private partnership programs and initiatives that 

involve sharing real-time information, assessing vulnerabilities, clarifying responsibilities, and engaging in training and exercises. 

In addition, the Department of Energy serves as the lead agency for Emergency 

Support Function 12 (ESF–12) under the National Response Framework. As the 

lead for ESF–12, the DOE is responsible for facilitating the restoration of damaged 

energy infrastructure. During a response operation, the Department works with industry and Federal/State/local partners to: 

• Assess disaster impacts on local and regional energy infrastructure; 

• Coordinate asset delivery to repair damaged infrastructure; 

• Monitor and report on restoration efforts; and 

• Provide regular situational awareness updates to key decision makers in the administration and our interagency partners. 

To achieve these operational priorities, the Department deploys responders who 

work directly with the affected utilities and local officials on the ground during a 

disaster. The responders provide expertise on a variety of energy issues, and have 

direct access to our subject-matter experts in Washington, DC who work with our 

interagency partners to coordinate the appropriate waivers, when needed, to further 

speed restoration efforts. In extreme cases, the Department can use its legal authorities under the Federal Power Act, Defense Production Act, and other statutes 

to assist in response and recovery operations. 

The National electricity infrastructure spans 19,000 power plants, 450,000 miles 

of transmission lines, 55,000 substations, and 6 million miles of distribution lines. 

The grid is truly a National system of complex systems, where small variations in 

power output or quality can be felt almost instantly several States away. That said, 

every piece of that infrastructure is local. 

Threats ranging from a fallen tree to a dedicated hacker from overseas can threaten the broader transmission system and the distribution system. When the power 

goes out, the local utility is the first responder. Should any threat or emergency exceed local public or private resources or require a full-blown National response, a 

utility CEO, a representative trade association member of the Electricity Subsector 

Coordinating Council (ESCC), the Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis 

Center (E–ISAC), or the Federal Government can request what is called a Crisis 

State Activity. Crisis State Activities are coordinated through the ESCC because, as 

with preparedness, we respond through partnerships. The ESCC is a group of leaders from across the electricity subsector that meet regularly with Government to coordinate and share information. Together, we work toward collective actions to address the threat or risk. 

Congress enacted several important new energy security measures in the FAST 

Act. The Secretary of Energy was provided a new authority, upon declaration of a 

Grid Security Emergency by the President, to issue emergency orders to protect or 

restore critical electric infrastructure or defense critical electric infrastructure. This 

authority allows DOE to respond as needed to the threat of cyber and physical attacks on the grid. DOE is developing a proposed rule of procedure regarding this 

new authority. 

The FAST Act codifies DOE’s role as the lead SSA for energy sector cyber incident 

coordination. These actions provide a central point of contact for the energy sector 

and can expedite recovery from cyber and physical incidents.The FAST Act protections afforded to critical electric infrastructure information provide essential information-sharing tools to enhance the Federal Government’s situational awareness 

while assuring the private sector that sensitive information on vulnerabilities will 

be safeguarded. DOE looks forward to consulting on the forthcoming Federal Energy 

Regulatory Commission (FERC) critical electric infrastructure information ruling. 

The FAST Act will also enable a more robust response for energy incidents, and 

DOE is on track to implement the energy security provisions. 

PARTNERSHIPS FOR INNOVATION

Innovation and preparedness are vital to grid resilience. In January 2016, the 

DOE built upon its Grid Modernization Initiative—an on-going effort that reflects 

the Obama administration’s commitment to improving the resiliency, reliability, and 

security of the Nation’s electricity delivery system—by releasing a comprehensive 

new Grid Modernization Multi-Year Program Plan (MYPP). The MYPP, developed 

in close collaboration with a wide range of key external partners, lays out a blueprint for DOE’s research, development, and demonstration agenda to enable a modernized grid, building on concepts and recommendations from the first installment 

10 

of the Quadrennial Energy Review (QER) and Quadrennial Technology Review 

(QTR). 

For example, large power transformers are critical to grid resilience, and are ripe 

for innovation. These important grid assets can weigh hundreds of tons, are expensive, and are typically custom made with procurement lead times of a year or more. 

A significant number of damaged transformers from any type of hazard could result 

in a long-term impact on the overall resilience of the grid. The QER recognized the 

risks associated with the loss of large power transformers. The QER recommended 

that DOE work with other Federal agencies, States, and industry on an initiative 

to mitigate these risks. Approaches envisioned in the QER include the development 

of 1 or more strategic transformer reserves through a staged process, beginning with 

an assessment of technical specifications and whether new Federal regulatory authorities or cost-share are necessary and appropriate. 

The Transformer Resilience and Advanced Components (TRAC) program includes 

a number of R&D activities to improve the resilience of transformers. Replacing 

aging grid assets with outdated technology leads to infrastructure lock-in that increases the total cost of grid modernization. The typical lead time between a large 

power transformer order and delivery ranges from 5 to 12 months for domestic producers and 6 to 16 months for producers outside the United States. The President’s 

fiscal year 2017 budget request of $15 million for TRAC will help develop cost-effective, next-generation components that are inherently more resilient. 

The FAST Act (Sec. 61004) also addressed this issue and requires DOE in consultation with FERC, the ESCC, Energy Reliability Organization (ERO), and owners 

and operators of critical electric infrastructure to submit a plan to Congress evaluating the feasibility of establishing a Strategic Transformer Reserve for the storage, 

in strategically-located facilities, of spare large power transformers in sufficient 

numbers to temporarily replace critically damaged large power transformers. The 

plan is to include an analysis of the degree to which electricity subsector initiatives 

including utility ownership, sharing agreements, etc., satisfy needs and funding options including fees on owners and operators and public-private cost share with industry. In January, DOE–OE awarded the analysis project to a team led by the Oak 

Ridge National Laboratory. The team includes researchers from the University of 

Tennessee–Knoxville, Sandia National Laboratories, the Electric Power Research Institute, and Dominion Virginia Power. 

Secretary Moniz also announced last January an award of up to $220 million over 

3 years, subject to Congressional appropriations, to DOE’s National Laboratories 

and partners to support critical research and development in advanced storage systems, clean energy integration, standards and test procedures, and a number of 

other key grid modernization areas. This Grid Modernization Laboratory Consortium effort recognizes regional differences and will strengthen regional strategies 

while defining a diverse and balanced National strategy. In addition to projects that 

address the needs of incorporating individual grid technologies like solar or energy 

storage, DOE is also developing cross-cutting projects that have an impact across 

multiple technologies. As Secretary Moniz said at the announcement, ‘‘Modernizing 

the U.S. electrical grid is essential to reducing carbon emissions, creating safeguards against attacks on our infrastructure, and keeping the lights on.’’ 

Energy storage is a key technology for whole-grid resilience. Energy storage fundamentally changes the relationship between when energy is produced and when it 

is consumed. The President’s fiscal year 2017 budget request supports OE’s work 

on materials research, device development, demonstrations, and grid analysis to 

help transition selected energy storage technologies from R&D to industrially relevant scales with improved safety, industry acceptance, and reduced cost. Improved 

energy storage technologies will enable the stability, resiliency, and reliability of the 

future electric utility grid, as well as increased deployment of variable renewable 

energy resources. 

We have been proactive in advancing technologies to modernize and make our 

grids smarter and more adaptive to the challenges posed by threats to the grid. For 

example, DOE–OE has made key investments in the area of synchrophasor technology, which reduces grid vulnerabilities by providing timely and accurate power 

outage information and better self-healing capabilities, and has also invested in 

microgrids, which keep local communities up and running during regional and other 

outages and help supply power to affected areas. 

Many of these projects are working in local jurisdictions throughout the United 

States. Supporting the research, development, and deployment of next-generation 

technologies enhances the grid’s ability to recover quickly from disruptions. 

11 

CONCLUSION

Threats continue to evolve, and DOE is working diligently to stay ahead of the 

curve. The solution is an ecosystem of resilience that works in partnership with 

local, State, and industry stakeholders to help provide the methods, strategies, and 

tools needed to help protect local communities through increased resilience and 

flexibility. To accomplish this, we must accelerate information sharing to inform better local investment decisions, encourage innovation and the use of best practices 

to help raise the energy sector’s security maturity, and strengthen local incident response and recovery capabilities, especially through participation in training programs and disaster and threat exercises. 

Building an ecosystem of resilience is—by definition—a shared endeavor, and 

keeping a focus on local communities remains an imperative. Because DOE has 

spent decades building—and continues to build—local partnerships and investing in 

technologies to enhance resilience, the grid is better able to withstand and recover 

quickly from disasters and attacks. 

Mr. PERRY. All right. Mr. Chris Currie is the director of GAO’s 

Homeland Security and Justice Team, where he leads the agency’s 

work on emergency management, National preparedness, and critical infrastructure protection issues. In this role, he evaluates Federal efforts and programs to prevent, plan for, and respond to natural and man-made disasters. Prior to this position, he served as 

an acting director in GAO’s Defense Capabilities and Management 

Team, where he led reviews of Department of Defense programs. 

Welcome. 

Mr. Brandon Wales is the director of the Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis at the Department of Homeland Security. His 

office provides integrated analysis of cyber and physical risk to the 

Nation’s critical infrastructure. Previously, Mr. Wales was the director of the Homeland Infrastructure Threat and Risk Analysis 

Center. 

Welcome. 

Mr. Joseph McClelland is the director of the Office of Energy Infrastructure Security at the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, or FERC. His works with Federal and State agencies and the 

energy industry to minimize risk to the Nation’s energy infrastructure. Mr. McClelland joined the Commission in 2004 and has more 

than 20 years of experience in the electric utility industry. He is 

a graduate of the Pennsylvania State University. 

Welcome. 

Mr. Judson Freed is the director of the Office of Emergency Management and Homeland Security for Ramsey County, Minnesota— 

thanks for traveling here today, sir—and is testifying on behalf of 

the National Association of Counties in his capacity as the vice 

chair of its subcommittee on homeland security and emergency 

management. The association represents elected and appointed officials in over 3,000 counties across the Nation. 

Thank you all for being here today. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Currie for your statement, sir. 

STATEMENT OF CHRIS P. CURRIE, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. CURRIE. Well, thank you, Chairman Perry, and thank you, 

Ranking Member Watson Coleman, as well, and other Members of 

the subcommittee. I appreciate the chance to be here to discuss our 

recent report on Federal efforts to address electromagnetic risks. 

12 

Within the United States, there are 16 critical infrastructure sectors—for example, water, transportation, communications, and, of 

course, energy. The energy sector ties all of these sectors together, 

and without it the others can’t function. This makes protecting it 

a National security priority. 

One of the greatest threats to the electric grid is an EMP, or 

electromagnetic pulse; also, a natural solar weather event. These 

are also called GMDs, or geomagnetic disturbances. Both could 

cause large power outages over a long period of time. 

The concern was so great that Congress established the EMP 

Commission in 2001. It issued reports in 2004 and 2008, and most 

of the recommendations were aimed at the Departments of Homeland Security and Energy. 

Now, DHS and DOE are not required in law to implement the 

Commission recommendations; however, we found that many of the 

recommendations align with responsibilities that both departments 

already have. For example, various laws and Presidential directives 

already require DHS and DOE to assess the risks to critical infrastructure assets and prioritize those. 

DHS, DOE, and FERC have all taken some action, as the Chairman noted, to address electromagnetic risks. Most of these actions 

are indirect, since electric infrastructure is mainly owned by the 

private sector. But here are some examples: 

DHS and DOE have invested in research to study the vulnerability of large, high-voltage transformers to EMPs, GMDs, and 

other natural disasters. These transformers are particularly critical 

to our electric grid. They are also expensive, large, and difficult to 

replace quickly. 

In the response area, FEMA is developing a specific plan to address long-term power outages, and while it is not specific to electromagnetic risks, this plan would describe how the Federal Government would respond and recover from a long power outage. 

Just to be clear, while some of these actions align with certain 

EMP Commission recommendations, there has not been a comprehensive, holistic effort to address them. There are still whole or 

part recommendations that remain open. 

Now, the next question is, what more should we expect the Federal Government to do? We found several areas where Federal efforts need to be strengthened. 

First, it wasn’t clear and, frankly, there was a bit of confusion 

within DHS for who exactly should be responsible for electromagnetic risks. As I mentioned, various components took action, 

but there is no designated lead for coordinating all of these efforts 

together. We think this is important, not just to clarify things within DHS, but also so DHS’s partners, like DOD, DOE, FERC, and 

the industry, know who to work with. We recommended that DHS 

designate roles and responsibilities, and they fully agreed with 

that. 

We also found that much more needs to be done to identify and 

prioritize key electric-sector infrastructure. Neither DHS nor DOE 

could identify actions in this area. While FERC did conduct a review in 2013 of certain critical electric-sector substations, DHS and 

DOE were not involved at that time. What we recommended is that 

DHS and DOE review FERC’s assessment and determine what 

13 

1GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Federal Agencies Have Taken Actions to Address 

Electromagnetic Risks, but Opportunities Exist to Further Assess Risks and Strengthen Collaboration, GAO–16–243 (Washington, DC: Mar. 24, 2016). 2 Established pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, the 

EMP Commission was responsible for assessing the following: (1) The nature and magnitude of 

potential high-altitude EMP threats to the United States; (2) the vulnerability of U.S. military 

and civilian systems to an EMP attack in terms of emergency preparedness; (3) the capability 

of the United States to repair and recover from damage inflicted by an EMP attack; and (4) 

the feasibility and cost of hardening selected military and civilian systems against EMP attack. 

See Pub. L. No. 106–398, §§ 1401–09, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A–345–348 (2000). See also Pub. L. 

No. 109–163, § 1052, 119 Stat. 3136, 3434–35 (2006) (reestablishing the EMP Commission to 

continue its efforts to monitor, investigate, make recommendations, and report to Congress on 

the evolving threat to the United States in the event of an EMP attack resulting from the detonation of a nuclear weapon or weapons at high altitude) and Pub. L. No. 110–181, Div. A, § 1075 

122 Stat. 3, 333 (2008) (providing, among other things, that the EMP Commission and the Secretary of Homeland Security shall jointly ensure that the work of the EMP Commission with 

respect to EMP attack on electricity infrastructure, and protection against such attack, is coordinated with DHS efforts on such matters). The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 

Year 2016 once again reestablishes the EMP Commission but with an expanded purpose that 

includes the evolving threat from, among other things, non-nuclear EMP weapons and natural 

EMP generated by geomagnetic storms. See Pub. L. No. 114–92, § 1089, 129 Stat. 726, 1015– 

16 (2015). 

more needs to be done to assess and prioritize assets. Both agencies fully agreed with us and are now taking some action to address that. 

Last, more needs to be done to coordinate and prioritize efforts 

across the departmental stovepipes. This includes areas like research and the testing and development of mitigation and protection technologies. Recently, there’s been more focus and coordination on natural solar events through efforts like the White House 

National Space Weather Action Plan, but this plan addresses only 

natural events, not EMPs. 

We recommend that DHS and DOE better coordinate with each 

other and the industry—and that is critical—to identify and implement EMP research and development priorities. Importantly, this 

would include coordinating to test and evaluate potential EMP protection options. Both agencies agreed and told us they plan to work 

with industry over the next year or so to develop that. 

So we will continue to monitor DHS and DOE’s progress in implementing these recommendations moving ahead. That completes 

my prepared remarks. I would be happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Currie follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRIS P. CURRIE

MAY 17, 2016 

CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION.—FEDERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS

ELECTROMAGNETIC RISKS

GAO–16–641T

Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our March 2016 report on Federal efforts to address electromagnetic risks to the electric grid.1 Electromagnetic 

risks caused by a man-made electromagnetic pulse (EMP) or a naturally-occurring 

solar weather event could have a significant impact on the Nation’s electric grid as 

well as other infrastructure sectors that depend on electricity, such as communications. The impact of these events could lead to power outages over broad geographic 

areas for extended durations. Addressing these events necessitates effective collaboration among multiple Government agencies and industry partners, as no single 

Federal program or entity has sole responsibility for addressing electromagnetic 

risks. In April 2008, the Commission to Assess the Threat to the United States from 

Electromagnetic Pulse Attack (EMP Commission)2 issued a report that included 

14 

3DHS, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Partnering for Critical Infrastructure Security 

and Resilience (Washington, DC: December 2013). Sector-specific agencies are the Federal departments and agencies responsible for providing institutional knowledge and specialized expertise, as well as leading, facilitating, or supporting the security and resilience programs and associated activities of their designated critical infrastructure sector in the all-hazards environment. 4Presidential Policy Directive–21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience (Feb. 12, 

2013) (identifying, among other things, the 16 critical infrastructure sectors and the sector-specific agencies). 5GAO–16–243. 

over 90 recommendations addressing the preparation for, and protection and recovery from, a possible EMP attack against U.S. critical infrastructure. The majority 

of these recommendations were made to the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) and to the Department of Energy (DOE). 

According to experts, a nuclear EMP is the burst of electromagnetic radiation resulting from the detonation of a nuclear device, which can disrupt or destroy electronic equipment. Non-nuclear EMP weapons can also be designed to intentionally 

disrupt electronics, but these generally have short range and are not a threat to 

multiple assets. In addition to man-made EMPs, naturally-occurring solar weather 

events of sufficient intensity can also cause electromagnetic impacts that can adversely affect components of the commercial electric grid, as well as other infrastructure such as satellites and undersea cables. The resulting impact of a solar weather 

event is commonly referred to as a geomagnetic disturbance (GMD). In 1989, a GMD 

caused wide-scale impacts on the Hydro-Quebec power system in Canada which 

caused this regional electric grid to collapse within 92 seconds and left 6 million customers without power for up to 9 hours. 

The National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) outlines the roles and responsibilities of DHS and applicable sector-specific agencies for each of the 16 critical 

infrastructure sectors.3 DHS has the lead role in coordinating the overall Federal 

effort to promote the security and resilience of the Nation’s critical infrastructure 

and DOE—as the sector-specific agency for the energy sector, which includes critical 

electrical infrastructure—shares responsibility with DHS. Other Federal agencies 

working to address the threat of EMP and GMD include the Department of Defense 

(DOD) and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), as well as the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the U.S. Geological 

Survey (USGS), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). 

As noted in Presidential Policy Directive 21, the energy and communications sectors are uniquely critical due to the enabling functions they provide to other critical 

infrastructure sectors.4 The U.S. electric power delivery system is a highly complex 

network of substations and electric lines that transport electricity from generators 

to residential, commercial, and industrial consumers. Approximately 85 percent of 

the Nation’s critical electrical infrastructure is owned and operated by private industry. 

My statement today summarizes the findings from our March 2016 report, and 

like the report, addresses: (1) The extent to which key Federal agencies have taken 

actions to address electromagnetic risks to the electric grid, including how these actions align with selected recommendations from the 2008 EMP Commission report 

and (2) the extent to which additional opportunities, if any, exist to enhance Federal 

efforts in addressing those risks to the electric grid. To conduct this work, we reviewed program documents, research reports, applicable risk assessments, and other 

supporting documentation related to electromagnetic risks and interviewed agency 

officials at DHS, DOE, DOD, FERC, and NOAA. We also interviewed officials from 

industry associations, subject-matter experts from research organizations, product 

manufacturers, and electric utility operators. More detailed information on our 

scope and methodology can be found in our March 2016 report.5 We conducted the 

work on which this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted Government auditing standards. 

FEDERAL AGENCIES HAVE TAKEN VARIOUS ACTIONS TO ADDRESS ELECTROMAGNETIC

RISKS; SOME ACTIONS ALIGN WITH THE 2008 EMP COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS

DHS, DOE, and FERC have taken various actions to address electromagnetic 

risks to the electric grid, and these actions generally fall into 4 categories: (1) Standards, guidelines, tools, and demonstration projects; (2) research reports; (3) strategy 

development and planning; and (4) training and outreach. Additionally, some of the 

actions DHS and DOE have taken generally aligned with recommendations made 

by the EMP Commission. 

Because Federal agencies generally do not own electric grid infrastructure, Federal actions to address GMD risks are more indirect through such things as develVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:23 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\114THCONGRESS\16OM0517\HM138090.TXT HEATH
15 

6GAO–16–243. 

7The 7 EMP Commission recommendations related to the electric grid include the following: 

(1) Conducting research to better understand infrastructure systems and interdependencies; (2) 

expanding activities to address the vulnerability of control systems; (3) identifying clear authority and responsibility to respond to an EMP attack; (4) engaging Federal and industry entities 

to determine liabilities and funding; (5) establishing monitoring efforts and defining testing 

standards and metrics; (6) providing capabilities to help protect the electric grid from an EMP 

attack and recover as rapidly and effectively as possible; and (7) utilizing industry and Governmental institutions to assure cost-effective outcomes. 8With regard to the last multi-part recommendation identified above, DHS and DOE took 

some actions that aligned with 5 of the 15 subparts of this recommendation. Some of the subparts include such efforts as developing National and regional restoration plans and assuring 

the availability of critical communication channels, among other efforts. 9GAO–16–243. 

oping standards and guidelines, and conducting research that could benefit electric 

grid owners and operators. Federal agencies have also been involved in strategy development and planning, as well as training and outreach efforts, as a means of preparing Federal officials and others to respond to both EMP and GMD events, and 

enhancing knowledge about electromagnetic risks. For example, DHS’s Science and 

Technology Directorate (S&T) led the design and development of a prototype transformer that can be more easily transported to another location to help restore electric power in a timelier manner. DHS has also participated in various training and 

outreach events to enhance understanding of EMP and GMD events. DOE’s primary 

efforts include supporting research to enhance the understanding of the potential 

impacts to the electric grid from electromagnetic events. More detailed information 

on key Federal agencies’ actions taken since 2008 to address electromagnetic risks 

can be found in Appendix II of our March 2016 report.6

Although DHS and DOE did not report that any of their actions were taken in 

response to the EMP Commission recommendations, some actions taken by both 

agencies have aligned with some of the recommendations. Specifically, of the 7 recommendations made by the EMP Commission related to the electric grid,7 some of 

the actions that DHS and DOE took aligned with 4 of them: Conducting research 

to better understand the interdependencies of critical infrastructures, addressing 

the vulnerability of control systems to an EMP attack; identifying responsibilities 

for responding to an EMP attack; and utilizing industry and other Governmental 

institutions to assure the most cost-effective outcomes.8 For example, with respect 

to the recommendation on conducting research to better understand interdependencies of critical infrastructures, DHS’s Sector Resilience Report: Electric Power Delivery includes some assessment of how various critical infrastructures—including 

the energy, communications, and transportation sectors, among others—are interdependent in maintaining operations. For more detailed information regarding how 

identified Federal actions align with these 7 EMP Commission recommendations, 

see Appendix III of our March 2016 report.9

ADDITIONAL OPPORTUNITIES EXIST TO ENHANCE FEDERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS

ELECTROMAGNETIC RISKS TO THE ELECTRIC GRID

DHS Has Not Clearly Identified Roles and Responsibilities for Addressing Electromagnetic Risks 

In our March 2016 report, we found that DHS had not clearly identified internal 

roles and responsibilities for addressing electromagnetic risks to the electric grid or 

communicated these to external Federal and industry partners. While multiple DHS 

components and offices, including the National Protection and Programs Directorate 

(NPPD), the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), and S&T, had each 

conducted independent activities addressing electromagnetic risks to the electric 

grid, none had been tasked with lead responsibility for coordinating related activities within the Department or with Federal and industry stakeholders. As a result, 

during the course of our review for our March 2016 report, we experienced on-going 

challenges in identifying applicable DHS personnel and related Departmental actions. For example, NPPD officials had difficulty identifying their specific roles and 

activities addressing electromagnetic risks to the electric grid, including efforts to 

collect or synthesize available risk information to provide input into Departmentwide risk assessments. 

Furthermore, industry representatives and other Federal officials told us it is not 

clear who within DHS is responsible for addressing electromagnetic risks. The 2008 

EMP Commission report recommended that DHS make clear its authority and responsibilities, as well as delineate the functioning interfaces with other Governmental institutions, regarding EMP response efforts. We concluded that designating 

internal roles and responsibilities within DHS regarding electromagnetic risks and 

16 

communicating these to Federal and industry partners could provide additional 

awareness of related activities and help ensure more effective and coordinated engagement with other Federal agencies and industry stakeholders, and could help reduce the risk of potential duplication, overlap, or fragmentation within the Department or across Federal agencies. 

In our March 2016 report, we recommended DHS designate roles and responsibilities within the Department for addressing electromagnetic risks and communicate 

these to Federal and industry partners. DHS concurred with our recommendation 

and reported that their Office of Policy is coordinating across the Department to 

identify and document applicable roles and responsibilities regarding electromagnetic issues to ensure full mission coverage while minimizing potential overlap 

or redundancy and expects to complete this effort by December 2016. These actions, 

if implemented effectively, should address the intent of our recommendation. 

DHS and DOE Have Not Fully Addressed NIPP Requirement to Identify Key Electrical Infrastructure Assets 

In our March 2016 report, we found that DHS and DOE had not taken actions 

to identify key electrical infrastructure assets as required given their respective critical infrastructure responsibilities under the NIPP. The NIPP explicitly states that 

to manage critical infrastructure risk effectively, partners must identify the assets, 

systems, and networks that are essential to their continued operation, considering 

associated dependencies and interdependencies of other infrastructure sectors. The 

2008 EMP Commission report also recommended that DHS and DOE prioritize 

nodes that are critical for the rapid recovery of other key sectors that rely upon electricity to function, including those assets that must remain in service or be restored 

within hours of an EMP attack. Neither DHS nor DOE reported any specific actions 

taken to identify critical electrical infrastructure as part of risk management efforts 

for the energy sector, including any systematic review of a 2013 FERC analysis of 

critical substations, or any further collaboration to determine the key elements of 

criticality that they believe should be considered when evaluating the vast array of 

infrastructure assets constituting the U.S. electric grid. The extensive size and scope 

of the electric power system necessitates collaboration among partners to ensure all 

individual expertise is effectively leveraged. 

As a result, we recommended in our March 2016 report that DHS and DOE direct 

responsible officials to review FERC’s electrical infrastructure analysis and collaborate to determine whether further assessment is needed to adequately identify critical electric infrastructure assets. DHS and DOE each concurred with our recommendation. DHS reported that NPPD is to collaborate with FERC to identify critical electrical infrastructure assets beginning with the evaluation of critical substations identified by FERC, and will explore elements of criticality that might not 

have been considered by FERC, in coordination with DOE. DOE stated that its Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability will review FERC’s electrical infrastructure analysis and will work with FERC and DHS to identify any additional 

elements of criticality and determine if further assessment is needed. Both DHS and 

DOE expect to complete these efforts by March 2017. These actions should address 

the intent of our recommendation. 

DHS Has Not Fully Leveraged Existing Opportunities to Collect and Analyze Information on Electromagnetic Risks 

We found in March 2016 that although DHS components had independently conducted some efforts to assess electromagnetic risks, the Department had not fully 

leveraged available risk information or conducted a comprehensive analysis of these 

risks. Within the Office of Policy, there is recognition that ‘‘space weather’’ and 

‘‘power grid failure’’ are significant risk events, which DHS officials have determined 

pose great risk to the security of the Nation. However, DHS officials were unable 

to provide detailed information about the specific risk inputs—namely threat, vulnerability, and consequence information—that were used to assess how electromagnetic events compared to other risk events, or how these inputs were used to 

inform DHS’s applicable risk-management priorities. Further, officials within NPPD 

were unable to identify any specific actions taken or plans to systematically collect 

or analyze risk information regarding electromagnetic impacts to the electric grid 

as part of Department-wide risk assessment efforts. 

According to the NIPP, to assess risk effectively, critical infrastructure partners— 

including owners and operators, sector councils, and Government agencies—need 

timely, reliable, and actionable information regarding threats, vulnerabilities, and 

consequences. Additionally, the electric grid remains vulnerable to other potential 

threats, such as physical and cyber attacks. We concluded that better collection of 

threat, vulnerability, and consequence information through existing DHS programs 

17 

10White House, National Space Weather Action Plan (Washington, DC: October 2015). Among 

other actions, the National Space Weather Action Plan lays out responsibilities for Federal entities to establish benchmarks for space weather events, which are intended to serve as inputs 

into such activities as developing vulnerability assessments, creating engineering standards, and 

developing more effective mitigation practices and procedures. 

and strengthened collaboration with Federal partners could help DHS better assess 

the relative risk ranking of electromagnetic events versus other risks and help inform asset protection priorities. Moreover, according to subject-matter experts, the 

impact to the electric grid from electromagnetic threats may vary substantially by 

location, network, and operating characteristics, and other factors. For example, key 

reports on GMD indicate that high-voltage transformers located at higher latitudes 

in the United States are likely subject to increased potential for adverse impacts 

from GMD events than those at lower latitudes. Further collection of information 

on sector interdependencies could also help DHS to assess the potential economic 

consequences associated with long-term power outages and provide information to 

help assess the cost-effectiveness of various mitigation strategies. 

In our March 2016 report, we recommended that DHS’s NPPD and Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP) work with other Federal and industry partners to collect 

and analyze key inputs on threat, vulnerability, and consequences related to electromagnetic risks. DHS concurred with our recommendation and reported that the Department has initiated efforts to assess electromagnetic risk and help determine priorities. For example, DHS stated the Department has a joint study with DOE under 

way that will analyze the hazard environments, impacts, and consequences of different sources of EMP and GMD on the electric grid to determine events of concern 

and potential means of mitigation. DHS expects to implement these efforts by December 2016 and if implemented effectively, should address the intent of our recommendation. 

Federal Agencies Have Not Fully Coordinated Efforts to Implement EMP Risk Management Activities 

We also found in March 2016 that key Federal agencies, including DHS and DOE, 

as well as industry partners had not established a fully coordinated approach to 

identifying and implementing risk management activities to address EMP risks. According to the NIPP Risk Management Framework, such activities include identifying and prioritizing research and development efforts, and evaluating potential 

mitigation options, including the cost-effectiveness of specific protective equipment. 

The publication of the National Space Weather Action Plan in October 2015 identified many key Federal activities in these areas regarding the GMD risk; however, 

no similar efforts had been proposed regarding EMP risks to the electric grid.10

DHS officials stated an EMP attack generally remains a lower-risk priority compared to other risk events with higher probability such as natural disasters or cyber 

attacks. DOE officials also noted resource limitations and competing priorities as 

the key driver for not pursuing additional risk management activities specifically related to EMP events. However, we found that even if an EMP attack is not determined to be among the highest-resource priorities for DHS and DOE relative to 

other risk events, there are opportunities for enhanced collaboration among Federal 

agencies and industry stakeholders to address identified gaps and help ensure that 

limited resources are more effectively coordinated and prioritized. For example, recent reports issued by DOE and a leading research organization for the electric industry identified gaps in the information available regarding likely EMP impacts to 

modern grid technologies and electronic control systems. They noted that such information remains important for developing applicable protective guidelines and equipment design specifications. 

In our March 2016 report, we recommended that DHS and DOE engage with Federal partners and industry stakeholders to identify and implement key EMP research and development priorities, including opportunities for further testing and 

evaluation of potential EMP protection and mitigation options. DHS and DOE concurred with our recommendation and each identified actions to convene applicable 

stakeholders to jointly determine mitigation options and conduct further testing and 

evaluation. DHS stated S&T will work with DOE and the Electricity Subsector Coordinating Council to develop a joint Government and industry approach to identify 

options for mitigating the consequences of an EMP event. DHS expects to implement this effort by September 2016. In addition, DOE stated it is working with the 

Electric Power Research Institute to develop an EMP Strategy that is scheduled for 

completion by August 31, 2016, and the strategy is to be followed by a more detailed 

action plan identifying research and development priorities and specific opportunities to test and evaluate EMP mitigation and protection measures. If implemented 

18 

effectively, DHS and DOE’s actions should address the intent of our recommendation. 

We will continue to monitor DHS and DOE actions taken to address our March 

2016 recommendations and have also recently initiated two additional reviews. One 

is evaluating the electromagnetic event preparedness of U.S. electricity providers 

and the other is a technical assessment of protective equipment designed to mitigate 

the potential impacts of a GMD on electrical infrastructure. We expect these 

projects to be completed by mid-2017. 

Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to 

any questions that you may have at this time. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Currie. 

The Chair recognizes Mr. Wales for his opening statement. 

STATEMENT OF BRANDON WALES, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF 

CYBER AND INFRASTRUCTURE ANALYSIS, NATIONAL PROTECTION AND PROGRAMS DIRECTORATE, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. WALES. Thank you, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and distinguished Members of the committee. It is 

my pleasure to be here to discuss the threat posed by electromagnetic pulse events, or EMP, to our Nation and our critical infrastructure. 

Over the past several decades, the risk to digital and physical infrastructures has grown. Today’s power grid and information networks may be more vulnerable to EMP than those from a few decades ago as the grid transitions from an analog to a digital system. 

My testimony today will focus on the Department of Homeland 

Security’s efforts to prepare for, respond to, and recover from a potential EMP attack, as well as touch on the joint DHS-Department 

of Energy effort to review the EMP science and provide a peer-reviewed estimate of potential risks. 

As you know, an EMP is the burst of electromagnetic radiation 

created when a nuclear weapon is detonated or when a non-nuclear 

EMP weapon is used. EMPs can be high-frequency, similar to a 

flash of lightning, or low-frequency, similar to an aurora-induced 

phenomenon. 

The consequences of an EMP can range from permanent physical 

damage to temporary system disruptions and can result in fires, 

electric shocks to people and equipment, and critical service outages. EMP in some of its forms can cause wide-spread disruption 

and serious damage to electronic devices and networks, including 

those upon which many critical infrastructures rely. 

All critical infrastructure sectors are at risk from EMP, particularly those sectors that rely heavily on the electric grid and communications and information technology, such as industrial control 

systems. The complex interconnectivity among critical infrastructure sectors means that EMP incidents will likely create cascading 

failures across sectors. 

We recognize that the Federal Government plays an important 

role supporting the critical infrastructure community manage risks 

from low-probability, high-consequence events, such as EMPs and 

severe geomagnetic disturbances. DHS and its interagency partners are using our unique resources, built over the past decade, to 

address the scale and degree of uncertainty associated with EMP 

risk. 

19 

DHS has been working on the topic of EMP for a number of 

years, and we will continue working collaboratively both internally 

and with external stakeholders in various arenas to address the 

recommendations issued by the Government Accountability Office 

on this issue. 

The Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis within DHS’s 

National Protection and Programs Directorate has partnered with 

the Department of Energy’s Office of Electricity Delivery and Energy Reliability to assess the impacts of EMP and geomagnetic disturbance events on electric power assets. 

This study, facilitated through DHS’s National Infrastructure 

Simulation and Analysis Center and DOE’s National Laboratories, 

is intended to develop scientifically rigorous, peer-reviewed methods for assessing electric power asset impacts from EMP events. 

This study will include participation from the intelligence community, the broader interagency, the academic community, and the 

private sector when possible. We expect to complete this study in 

mid-2017. 

Our work also benefits from the activities of DHS’s National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center, or NCCIC. 

The NCCIC is an essential conduit within DHS to share information between the interagency community and the private sector on 

risks to the communication and control elements of our infrastructure systems and has conducted past studies on EMP risks to communications infrastructure. 

In addition, the Office of Infrastructure Protection has a long history of working with the private sector to enhance electric grid security and resilience. This office conducts and facilitates vulnerability and resilience assessments to help critical infrastructure 

owners and operators and State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners understand and address risks to their critical infrastructure. 

I would also like to recognize my colleagues’ activities at the 

Science and Technology Directorate and the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency. 

The Science and Technology Directorate has a mission to deliver 

effective and innovative insight, methods, and solutions for the critical needs of the homeland security enterprise. Past research efforts on electric grid resilience have resulted in successes, such as 

the recovery transformer project, which is available to be deployed 

by the private sector today for risk reduction against a variety of 

hazards. 

Finally, the Federal Emergency Management Agency leads Federal efforts to respond to and recover from impacts of a wide-spread 

disruption in the power grid regardless of cause. Through the development of the Power Outage Incident Annex, a collaboration of 

the Federal Government and the private sector, FEMA is enhancing the existing response and recovery Federal interagency operational plans. 

The Department of Homeland Security has since its inception 

pursued a deeper understanding of the EMP threat as well as its 

potential impacts and effective mitigation strategies. These efforts 

have been undertaken in cooperation with other Federal agencies 

and the private sector, and we are committed to continuing to expand our focus on this issue as warranted by the risk environment. 

20 

The Department takes seriously the recent review and recommendations of the Government Accountability Office on Federal 

efforts to address EMP risk and welcomes further cooperation with 

other Government agencies to ensure we are appropriately responsive on this critical topic. 

I want to thank the committee for the invitation to speak here 

today and for your on-going support for our work in this area. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Wales follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BRANDON WALES

MAY 17, 2016 

Thank you, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Coleman, and distinguished Members of the committee. It is my pleasure to be here to discuss the threat posed by 

electromagnetic pulse events (EMP) to our Nation and its critical infrastructure, including its cyber, communications, and electric-grid assets. 

Over the past several decades, the risk to digital and physical infrastructures has 

grown. For example, today’s power grid and information networks may be more vulnerable to EMP than those of a few decades ago, as the grid transitions from an 

analog system to a digital system to improve efficiency. My testimony today will 

focus on the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) preparations to respond to 

and assist recovery from a potential EMP attack, as well as touch on the joint DHS/ 

Department of Energy (DOE) effort to review the EMP science and provide a peerreviewed estimate of the potential risks. 

The Federal Government plays an important role supporting the critical infrastructure community to manage risks from low-probability, high-consequence 

events, such as EMPs and severe geomagnetic disturbances (GMDs). DHS and its 

interagency partners will be using our unique resources built over the past decade 

to address the scale and degree of uncertainty associated with risks such as the ones 

I am here to discuss today. 

The Department takes seriously the recent review and recommendations of the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO) on Federal efforts to address EMP risk, as 

well as the recommendations issued by the 2008 EMP Commission, and welcomes 

further cooperation with other Government agencies to ensure we are appropriately 

responsive on this critical topic. 

BACKGROUND ON EMP

An EMP is the burst of electromagnetic radiation created, for instance, when a 

nuclear weapon is detonated or when a non-nuclear EMP weapon is used. EMPs can 

be high-frequency, similar to a flash of lightning, or low-frequency, similar to an aurora-induced phenomenon. The consequences of an EMP can range from permanent 

physical damage to temporary system disruptions, and can result in fires, electric 

shocks to people and equipment, and critical service outages. 

There are two general classes of EMP of concern: (1) Nuclear sources of EMP, 

such as High-altitude EMP (HEMP), and (2) Non-Nuclear sources of EMP (NNEP). 

HEMP results from a nuclear detonation typically occurring 15 or more miles above 

the Earth’s surface. The extent of HEMP effects depends on several factors including the altitude of the detonation, the weapon yield, and whether it was designed 

for EMP effects. On the ground, effects may be diminished by the electromagnetic 

shielding, or ‘‘hardening,’’ of assets. A high altitude burst could blanket the entire 

continental United States and could cause wide-spread impacts to multiple sectors, 

including to lifeline sectors such as the energy and communications. HEMP threat 

vectors can originate from a missile, such as a sea-launched ballistic missile; a satellite asset; or a relatively low-cost balloon-borne vehicle. 

Non-Nuclear EMP (NNEP) can be created by sources such as Radio Frequency 

Weapons or Intentional Electromagnetic Interference devices, which are designed to 

produce sufficient electromagnetic energy to burn out or disrupt electronic components, systems, and networks. NNEP devices can be either electrically-driven, where 

they create narrowband or wideband microwaves, or explosively-driven, where an 

explosive is used to compress a magnetic field to generate the pulse. The range of 

an NNEP is fairly short (typically less than 1 kilometer) and faraday casings with 

line filters and surge arresters can mitigate much of the EMP effects. 

21 

POTENTIAL IMPACTS ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE

In some of its forms, EMP can cause wide-spread disruption and serious damage 

to electronic devices and networks, including those upon which many critical infrastructures rely. There is uncertainty over the magnitude and duration of an electric 

power outage that may result from an EMP event due to ambiguity regarding the 

actual damage to electric power assets from an event. Any electric power outage resulting from an EMP event would ultimately depend upon a number of unknown 

factors and effects to assets that are challenging to accurately model, making it difficult to provide high-specificity information to electric system planners and system 

operators. These variables include characteristics such as the EMP device type, the 

location of the blast, the height of the blast, the yield of the blast, and design and 

operating parameters of the electric power system subject to the blast. Secondary 

effects of EMP may harm people through induced fires, electric shocks, and disruptions of transportation and critical support systems, such as those at hospitals or 

sites like nuclear power plants and chemical facilities. 

All critical infrastructure sectors are at risk from EMP, particularly those sectors 

that rely heavily on communications and sensor (e.g., radar) technology, information 

technology, the electric grid, or that use a Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition 

system. The complex interconnectivity among critical infrastructure sectors means 

that EMP incidents that affect a single sector are likely affect other sectors—potentially resulting in additional failures. 

DHS EFFORTS TO ADDRESS GAO RECOMMENDATIONS

DHS is working collaboratively, both internally and with external stakeholders, 

in various arenas to address the recommendations issued by GAO on this topic. 

DHS has been working on the topic of EMP for a number of years, and we will continue working on it in the future. An example of our previous work on the topic of 

EMP includes a 2010 study on ‘‘Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) Impacts on Extra 

High Voltage Power Transformers’’ conducted by the National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center for DHS. 

As part of DHS’s continuing commitment to this issue, there are resources across 

the Homeland Security enterprise engaged on this topic, including within the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD), and the Science and Technology Directorate (S&T). The 

scope of activity, as reviewed by GAO, falls into 3 areas of activity: (1) Risk assessment and analysis, (2) communication and coordination of threat information, and 

(3) research and development to mitigate EMP risks. 

NPPD’s involvement on EMP issues resides in a number of functional components 

including the Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis (OCIA), the Office of Infrastructure Protection (IP), and the Office of Cybersecurity and Communications 

(CS&C). OCIA has partnered directly with the DOE’s Office of Electricity Delivery 

and Energy Reliability to assess the impacts of EMP and Geomagnetic disturbance 

events on electric power assets. This study, facilitated through DHS’s National Infrastructure Simulation and Analysis Center and DOE’s National Laboratories, is 

intended to develop scientifically rigorous, peer-reviewed methods for assessing electric power asset impacts to EMP events. This study will include participation of the 

intelligence community, the broader interagency, the academic community, and the 

private sector, when possible. 

The EMP study by OCIA will leverage newly-started private-sector activities that 

are occurring through the Electric Power Research Institute, as well as previous 

government investments in research which have been sponsored by DHS and DOE. 

The estimated completion date of this risk analysis-based study of the electric power 

sector is approximately mid-2017. 

IP and OCIA continue to work collaboratively with the Department of Energy and 

the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC). As the GAO report indicates, 

collaboration can and should be increased with an emphasis on identification of critical infrastructure assets of the electric power sector. Once identified, this list of assets can be used to guide protection and preparedness activities at DHS and to help 

prioritize response and recovery actions by DOE and DHS after a large-scale event. 

DHS is also increasing our collaboration with DOE and FERC in the near term, including additional collaboration between staff-level subject-matter experts. 

CS&C, which oversees the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), has been assessing the potential risks to the communications 

and control elements of the electric grid from EMP, as well as radio frequency weapons, solar weather, and cyber threats for several years. As part of these efforts, the 

NCCIC developed the ‘‘EMP Protection Guidelines for Equipment, Facilities and 

Data Centers’’ report and provided related briefings to the Continuity of GovernVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:23 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00025 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\114THCONGRESS\16OM0517\HM138090.TXT HEATH
22 

ment community and to the Communications Sector, as well as other programs and 

sectors, to inform the community and help mitigate EMP and radio frequency weapons threats. The previously-mentioned joint study by OCIA and DOE’s Office of 

Electricity Delivery and Energy will seek to learn and build upon the knowledge 

and expertise gained from the NCCIC’s previous studies on this topic. 

FEMA continues to leverage the National Preparedness System to build, sustain, 

and deliver the capabilities needed to prevent, protect against, mitigate, respond to, 

and recover from the threats and hazards that pose the greatest risk, including 

risks to the energy sector. The tools and processes within the National Preparedness 

System include, but are not limited to, plans, training, and exercises for managing 

a variety of risks to the Nation’s infrastructure, including EMP and cyber 

vulnerabilities. 

FEMA is also actively developing their Power Outage Incident Annex to enhance 

the Response and Recovery Federal Interagency Operational Plans. The Annex, developed in partnership with the Federal interagency community and the private sector, will describe the process and organizational constructs through which the Federal Government will respond to and recover from the impacts of a wide-spread disruption in the power grid from any cause. 

Lastly, S&T develops near-term solutions to bridge capability gaps, and S&T has 

invested in multiple research programs for increasing the electric grid’s resilience 

against solar weather hazards. Previous research investments, such as the Recovery 

Transformer (RecX) project, are available for private-sector risk reduction on EMP 

and are available to be deployed by private-sector owners and operators today. 

CONCLUSION

DHS, for many years, has pursued a deeper understanding of the EMP threat, 

as well as its potential impacts, effective mitigation strategies, and a greater level 

of public awareness and readiness. These efforts have been undertaken in cooperation with other Federal agencies and private-sector owners and operators; and we 

are committed to continuing to expand our focus on this issue, as warranted by the 

risk environment. 

I want to thank the committee for the invitation to speak here today and for your 

on-going support for our work in this area. I welcome your questions. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Wales. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. McClelland. 

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH MC CLELLAND, DIRECTOR, OFFICE 

OF ENERGY INFRASTRUCTURE SECURITY, FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Mr. MCCLELLAND. Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Watson 

Coleman, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank 

you for the privilege to appear before you today to discuss electromagnetic threats to the electric grid in the United States. 

My name is Joe McClelland, and I am the director of the Office 

of Energy Infrastructure Security at the Federal Energy Regulatory 

Commission, or FERC. I am here today as a FERC staff witness, 

and my remarks do not necessarily represent the views of FERC 

or any individual commissioner. 

Under section 215 of the Federal Power Act, FERC is entrusted 

with the responsibility to approve and enforce mandatory reliability 

standards for the Nation’s bulk power system. These standards are 

developed and proposed by the North American Electric Reliability 

Corporation, or NERC. 

Section 215 of the Federal Power Act provides a statutory foundation to develop reliability standards for the bulk power system. 

However, the nature of a National security threat by entities intent 

on attacking the United States by exploiting vulnerabilities in the 

electric grid using physical or cyber means stands in stark contrast 

to the other major reliability events that have caused regional 

23 

blackouts and reliability failures in the past. Wide-spread disruption of electric service can quickly undermine the United States 

Government, its military, and the economy, as well as endanger 

the health and safety of its citizens. 

Congress took steps to address such a situation late last year. In 

the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act, or FAST Act, 

Congress assigned notable new authority to the Department of Energy, or DOE, and FERC, among other Federal agencies. 

Consistent with these requirements, FERC established our office, 

the Office of Energy Infrastructure Security, in late 2012 to provide 

a more agile and focused approach to growing cyber and physical 

security threats. Our office works collaboratively with industry to 

share information, including best practices, to help address threats 

from geomagnetic disturbances, GMD, or electromagnetic pulses, 

EMP. 

Just briefly, in 2001 Congress established a commission to assess 

and report on the threat from EMP. In 2004 and again in 2008, the 

Commission issued reports on these threats. 

One of the key findings in the reports was that a single EMP attack could seriously degrade or shut down a large part of the electric power grid. Depending upon the attack, significant parts of the 

electric infrastructure could be, ‘‘out of service for periods measured 

in months to a year or more.’’ 

In order to better understand and quantify the effect of EMP and 

GMD on the power grid, FERC, DOE, and the Department of 

Homeland Security sponsored a study conducted by the Oak Ridge 

National Laboratory in 2010. The results of the study support the 

general conclusion of prior studies that EMP and GMD events pose 

substantial risk to equipment and operation of the Nation’s electric 

grid and, under extreme conditions, could result in major, longterm electrical outages. 

Unlike EMP attacks that are dependent upon the capability and 

intent of an attacker, GMD disturbances are inevitable, with only 

the timing and magnitude subject to variability. The Oak Ridge 

study assessed a solar storm that occurred in May 1921 which has 

been termed a 1-in-100-year event and applied it to today’s electric 

grid. The study concluded that such a storm could damage or destroy over 300 bulk power system transformers, interrupting service to 130 million people, with some outages lasting for a period of 

years. 

To help address GMD and EMP threats, FERC has applied both 

regulatory and collaborative actions. With respect to regulatory actions, FERC has taken steps such as directing NERC to propose 

two reliability standards on GMD requiring new operational procedures and vulnerability assessments. 

With respect to collaborative actions, FERC works closely with 

Federal agencies, State agencies, and industry members in many 

ways. In general, such collaboration has included efforts to identify 

key energy facilities, conduct physical and cyber threat briefings 

and reviews to industry, including sessions on GMD and EMP, to 

assist with best practices for mitigation. 

Examples of such collaborative action includes FERC’s participation on the SWORM—Space Weather Operations, Research, and 

24 

Mitigation—Task Force created in late 2014 by the National 

Science and Technology Council. 

In addition, as required by the FAST Act, DOE, in consultation 

with FERC and others, is developing a plan to establish a strategic 

transformer reserve. Specific to the subject of today’s hearing, the 

strategic transformer reserve plan will identify ways to decrease 

vulnerabilities from physical and cyber threats, including both 

EMP and GMD. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today, and I would 

be happy to answer any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McClelland follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOSEPH MCCLELLAND

MAY 17, 2016 

Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Watson Coleman and Members of the subcommittee: Thank you for the privilege to appear before you today to discuss electromagnetic threats to the electric grid in the United States. My name is Joe 

McClelland and I am the director of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission’s 

Office of Energy Infrastructure Security (OEIS). I am here today as a Commission 

staff witness, and my remarks do not necessarily represent the views of the Commission or any individual Commissioner. 

In the Energy Policy Act of 2005, Congress entrusted the Commission with a 

major new responsibility to approve and enforce mandatory reliability standards for 

the Nation’s bulk power system. This authority is in section 215 of the Federal 

Power Act. It is important to note that FERC’s jurisdiction and reliability authority 

under section 215 is limited to the ‘‘bulk power system,’’ as defined in the FPA, 

which excludes Alaska and Hawaii, as well as local distribution systems. Under the 

section 215 authority, FERC cannot author or modify reliability standards, but must 

depend upon an Electric Reliability Organization (ERO) to perform this task. The 

Commission certified the North American Electric Reliability Corporation (NERC) 

as the ERO. The ERO develops and proposes for the Commission’s review reliability 

standards or modifications, which the Commission can either approve or remand. 

If the Commission approves a proposed reliability standard, it becomes mandatory 

in the United States and is applicable to the users, owners, and operators of the 

bulk power system. If the Commission remands a proposed standard, it is sent back 

to the ERO for further consideration. The Commission is required to give ‘‘due 

weight’’ to the technical expertise of the ERO when reviewing any of NERC’s proposed standards. 

Section 215 of the Federal Power Act provides a statutory foundation for the ERO 

to develop reliability standards for the bulk power system. However, the nature of 

a National security threat by entities intent on attacking the United States by exploiting vulnerabilities in its electric grid using physical or cyber means stands in 

stark contrast to other major reliability events that have caused regional blackouts 

and reliability failures in the past, such as events caused by tree-trimming practices. Wide-spread disruption of electric service can quickly undermine the U.S. Government, its military, and the economy, as well as endanger the health and safety 

of millions of citizens. 

I note that Congress took steps to address such a situation late last year, including in the Fixing America’s Surface Transportation Act (FAST Act) a section entitled, ‘‘Critical Electric Infrastructure Security.’’ That section assigned notable new 

authority to the Department of Energy (DOE) and the Commission, among other 

Federal agencies. Under this new authority, DOE can declare a grid security emergency and order actions to address it. As I will discuss further below, DOE is also 

to consult with the Commission regarding development of a Strategic Transformer 

Reserve Plan to reduce the threats from physical, cyber, EMP, GMD, severe weather, and seismic events. The Commission, in consultation with DOE, is to develop 

regulations governing the designation, protection, and appropriate sharing of Critical Electric Infrastructure Information. In addition, under the Cybersecurity Act of 

2015 also enacted late last year, Congress directed the Federal Government to share 

and receive cybersecurity threat and mitigation information, while restricting its 

regulatory use, with non-Federal entities including State governments and industry. 

Consistent with these requirements, the Commission established OEIS in late 

2012 to provide a more agile and focused approach to growing cyber and physical 

25 

security threats. The mission of OEIS is to provide expertise and assistance to the 

Commission, other Federal and State agencies and jurisdictional entities in identifying, communicating, and seeking comprehensive solutions to significant potential 

cyber and physical security risks to the energy infrastructure under the Commission’s jurisdiction. This includes threats from geomagnetic disturbances (GMDs) and 

electromagnetic pulses (EMPs). 

Specific to the subject of this hearing, GMD and EMP events are generated from 

either naturally-occurring or man-made causes. In the case of GMDs, naturally occurring solar magnetic disturbances periodically disrupt the earth’s magnetic field 

which, in turn, can induce currents on the electric grid that may simultaneously 

damage or destroy key transformers over a large geographic area. Regarding manmade events, EMPs can be generated by devices that range from small, portable, 

easily concealed battery-powered units all the way through missiles equipped with 

nuclear warheads. In the case of the former, equipment is readily available that can 

generate localized high-energy bursts designed to disrupt, damage, or destroy electronics such as those found in control systems on the electric grid. The EMP generated during the detonation of a nuclear device is far more encompassing and generates 3 distinct effects, each impacting different types of equipment; a short highenergy RF-type burst called E1 that destroys electronics; a slightly longer burst that 

is similar to lightning termed E2; and a final effect termed E3 that is similar in 

character and effect to GMD targeting the same equipment including key transformers. Any of these effects can cause voltage problems and instability on the electric grid, which can lead to wide-area blackouts. 

In 2001, Congress established a commission to assess and report on the threat 

from EMP. In 2004 and again in 2008, that commission issued reports on these 

threats. One of the key findings in the reports was that a single EMP attack could 

seriously degrade or shut down a large part of the electric power grid. Depending 

upon the attack, significant parts of the electric infrastructure could be ‘‘out of service for periods measured in months to a year or more.’’ It is important to note that 

effective mitigation against solar geomagnetic disturbances and non-nuclear EMP 

weaponry can also provide an effective mitigation against the impacts of a high-altitude nuclear detonation. 

In order to better understand and quantify the effect of EMP and GMD on the 

power grid, the Commission, DOE, and the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) sponsored a study conducted by the Oak Ridge National Laboratory in 2010. 

The results of the study support the general conclusion of prior studies that EMP 

and GMD events pose substantial risk to equipment and operation of the Nation’s 

electric grid and under extreme conditions could result in major long-term electrical 

outages. Unlike EMP attacks that are dependent upon the capability and intent of 

an attacker, GMD disturbances are inevitable with only the timing and magnitude 

subject to variability. The Oak Ridge study assessed a solar storm that occurred in 

May 1921, which has been termed a 1-in-100-year event, and applied it to today’s 

electric grid. The study concluded that such a storm could damage or destroy over 

300 bulk power system transformers interrupting service to 130 million people with 

some outages lasting for a period of years. 

To date, a few U.S. entities have taken some initial steps to address EMP on their 

systems, but much work remains. Internationally, the United Kingdom, Norway, 

Sweden, Finland, Germany, South Korea, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Israel, and Saudi Arabia have GMD and/or EMP programs in place or are in 

the early stages of addressing or examining the impacts of GMD or EMP. The costs 

of these initiatives can vary widely depending on factors such as the threshold of 

protection, the service requirements of the load, the type of equipment that is to be 

protected, and whether the installation is new or a retrofit. 

With these issues and challenges in mind, the Commission has used a two-fold 

approach to help address the GMD and EMP threats, applying both regulatory and 

collaborative actions. 

First, with respect to regulatory actions, the Commission has directed NERC to 

propose 2 reliability standards on GMD. The Commission approved the first of 

NERC’s proposals, a mandatory reliability standard that requires certain entities to 

implement operational procedures to mitigate the effects of GMD events. The Commission also has issued an order proposing to approve the second of NERC’s proposals, a reliability standard that would establish requirements for certain entities 

to conduct initial and on-going assessments of the vulnerability of their transmission systems against a benchmark geomagnetic disturbance. The Commission 

has received comments on its proposed order and held a related technical conference 

in March. The Commission is currently reviewing this record to determine how to 

move forward. 

26 

The Commission’s regulatory authority with respect to rates also may be relevant 

to addressing these issues. For example, the Commission has issued 2 orders to provide clarity on how it will address services provided by Grid Assurance, a company 

recently created by several electric utilities and energy companies. Grid Assurance 

is intended to enhance grid resilience and protect customers from prolonged outages 

by providing electric utilities that subscribe to Grid Assurance with timely access 

to an inventory of emergency spare transmission equipment, including transformers, 

that otherwise can take months or longer to acquire. 

Second, with respect to collaborative actions, the Commission works closely with 

Federal agencies, State agencies, and industry members in many ways. In general, 

such collaboration has included efforts to identify key energy facilities; conduct 

physical and cyber threat briefings, including on GMD and EMP, to industry members; assist with the identification of best practices for mitigation; and cooperate 

with international partners to convey threat and mitigation information as well as 

encourage adoption of best practices for mitigation. 

Some of the Commission’s collaborative actions are relevant to GMD and EMP 

threats. For example, in November 2014, the National Science and Technology 

Council (NSTC) created the Space Weather Operations, Research, and Mitigation 

(SWORM) Task Force to develop high-level strategic goals for enhancing National 

preparedness for a severe space weather event. This Task Force is co-chaired by 

members from the Office of Science and Technology Policy, DHS, and the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. The Commission has participated in the 

SWORM Task Force’s efforts from its inception. 

In addition, as required by the FAST Act, DOE, in consultation with the Commission and others, is developing a plan to establish a Strategic Transformer Reserve. 

The Strategic Transformer Reserve Plan is to identify the sufficient number, type, 

cost, and location of equipment needed to temporarily replace critically-damaged 

large power transformers and substations that are part of the critical electric infrastructure or that serve defense and military installations. Specific to the subject of 

today’s hearing, the Strategic Transformer Reserve Plan will decrease 

vulnerabilities related to physical and cyber threats, including both EMP and GMD. 

The Strategic Transformer Reserve Plan is not limited to transformers, but is also 

to include other critical electric grid equipment as necessary to provide or restore 

sufficient resiliency. 

The Commission’s efforts to date are consistent with the recommendations of the 

Government Accountability Office’s recently-released report on electromagnetic risks 

to the electric grid. I believe that building on previous collaboration among the Commission and other Federal agencies can enhance our collective response in addressing electromagnetic threats to the electric grid in the United States. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to testify today. I would be happy to answer 

any questions you may have. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. McClelland. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Freed for his statement. 

STATEMENT OF JUDSON M. FREED, DIRECTOR, EMERGENCY 

MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY, RAMSEY COUNTY, MINNESOTA, ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES 

Mr. FREED. Thank you, Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the subcommittee, for this opportunity to testify today on Federal efforts addressing electromagnetic risks. 

My name is Judson Freed, and I serve as director of emergency 

management and homeland security in Ramsey County, Minnesota. 

I also serve the justice and public safety committee of the National 

Association of Counties, which represents all of America’s 3,069 

counties, parishes, and boroughs. 

As a large urban county located in the northern Midwest, 

Ramsey County faces perennial threats ranging from tornadoes 

and ice storms to train derailments and multi-location terrorist attacks. In my role as the county’s emergency management director 

and homeland security director, I work to protect our local commuVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:23 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\114THCONGRESS\16OM0517\HM138090.TXT HEATH
27 

nities and their residents and their structures from the on-going 

threats posed by these and other disasters. 

Although all parts of government play a role in disasters, counties across the Nation often serve as the first line of defense before 

and after disaster strikes, and we are responsible for helping our 

communities recover in the aftermath. Any potential failing of our 

Nation’s power grid and the cascading impacts that would follow 

would heavily impact local governments and require an immediate 

on-the-ground response by county emergency managers and a 

range of other local officials. 

With that said, Mr. Chairman, I respectfully submit 3 principles 

for your consideration as you assess Federal efforts to mitigate 

against electromagnetic risks. 

First, the impact of Federal policy changes on local government 

should be closely considered, particularly when it comes to matters 

of emergency management. Local governments respond to the Federal Government’s actions not just in our role as intergovernmental 

partners with Federal agencies but also because our constituents 

demand that their local leaders keep pace with the Federal Government’s priorities and initiatives. 

Federal policy changes related to electromagnetic risks would impact local emergency management efforts. Consider the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act. The bill would require in part that the 

DHS Secretary conduct outreach to educate emergency response 

providers at all levels of government of the threat of electromagnetic pulse events. Requirements like this can accumulate 

quickly and have the potential to disrupt the on-going process of 

local emergency management planning and coordination. 

Second, electromagnetic risks should be viewed in the context of 

the whole wide variety of threats faced by our Nation and its local 

communities. Due to changes in things like weather patterns and 

population growth, especially in densely-populated areas like 

Ramsey County, our Nation is facing an arguably unprecedented 

number of threats and disasters. According to NACo’s analysis of 

data made available by FEMA, 92 percent of counties across the 

Nation have had at least 1 Presidential disaster declaration in the 

last 10 years. 

Further, due to globalization and advances in technology that 

have made us more interconnected than ever before, communities 

across the country also face novel cybersecurity threats from within 

and outside of the United States. We urge you to consider electromagnetic threats in the context of the full range of risks faced by 

our communities. 

Last, emergency management resources, both fiscal and administrative, are finite at all levels of government and should be allocated based on holistic and pragmatic risk assessment. Diverting 

limited resources from highly probable threats will make our Nation less prepared for the risks and disasters that have proven to 

be perennial visitors to all of our communities. 

In Ramsey County, we have worked hard to ensure that our 

emergency management decisions and policies are based on pragmatic and scientific risk assessment that takes into consideration 

both the potential consequences and the likelihood of various 

threats. This method of emergency management risk assessment is 

28 

one that was promoted in the 2014 Homeland Security QHSR and 

is widely accepted as a local best practice in counties Nation-wide. 

That said, we are by no means inattentive to the threats posed 

to our power grids. In my county, for example, we monitor space 

weather and provide weekly reports to our local public safety partners and leadership. We monitor the status of our region’s power 

grid and include our utility providers in our oversight and planning 

workgroups. 

We assess transmission line protection in light of severe weather 

and flooding, as well as geomagnetic incidents, and large-scale 

power failures would present significant and cascading challenges 

to our emergency response systems. We consider these risks in our 

disaster response and coordination efforts, and we base them on 

our broader risk assessment strategies and work to mitigate these 

risks at every opportunity. 

In closing, I would like to thank you again for the opportunity 

to provide the local perspective in this important conversation on 

Federal efforts to address electromagnetic risks, and I will welcome 

any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Freed follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JUDSON M. FREED

MAY 17, 2016 

Thank you Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members of 

the Subcommittee on Oversight and Management Efficiency for this opportunity to 

testify. 

My name is Judson Freed and I have served as director of emergency management and homeland security in Ramsey County, Minnesota since 2003. I am also 

vice chair of the Emergency Management Subcommittee of the National Association 

of Counties’ Justice and Public Safety Policy Steering Committee. 

ABOUT NACO

NACo is the only national organization that represents county governments in the 

United States, including Alaska’s boroughs and Louisiana’s parishes. Founded in 

1935, NACo assists America’s 3,069 counties in pursuing excellence in public service 

to produce healthy, vibrant, safe, and resilient communities. 

ABOUT AMERICA’S COUNTIES

Counties are highly diverse, not only in my State of Minnesota, but across the 

Nation, and vary immensely in natural resources, social and political systems, cultural, economic and structural circumstances, and public health and environmental 

responsibilities. If you’ve seen 1 county, you’ve seen 1 county, and there are 3,068 

more to go. 

Counties also often serve as our Nation’s first line of defense before and after disasters strike. While State statutes and organizational structures vary, local emergency management responsibilities are most commonly vested in county governments. Many counties, including Ramsey County, are required to maintain an emergency management agency to coordinate all activities related to emergency and disaster situations. These responsibilities go well beyond the functions of public safety 

and emergency services and involve a community-wide effort before, during, and 

after a disaster or emergency incident occurs. Emergency managers are charged 

with preparing their communities for disasters so that when these events inevitably 

take place, their toll on our residents, homes, and public and private structures is 

minimized. Following a disaster, local emergency managers, on behalf of their elected officials, work to mitigate damage and save lives. In the aftermath of disasters, 

we coordinate and help fund clean-up, recovery, and rebuilding so that our residents 

can return to their lives as quickly as possible. 

29 

ABOUT RAMSEY COUNTY, MINNESOTA

Ramsey County is a large, fully urban county located near Minnesota’s border 

with Wisconsin, and with a population of more than 550,000, is the second-most 

populous county in Minnesota. It is also the smallest county in Minnesota, and with 

its large population, among the most densely populated counties in the Nation. St. 

Paul, the capital of Minnesota, is our county seat. 

As a large, urban county located in the northern Midwest, Ramsey County faces 

perennial threats ranging from tornadoes and ice storms to train derailments and 

multi-location terrorist attacks. In my role as the county’s director of emergency 

management and homeland security, I work to protect our local communities and 

their residents and structures from the on-going threats posed by these disasters. 

FEDERAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS ELECTROMAGNETIC RISKS: THE LOCAL PERSPECTIVE

Counties are not merely stakeholders in this conversation, but a pivotal part of 

the Federal-State-local partnership of governments that together share the responsibility of protecting our Nation and its residents from disasters. Any potential failing 

of our Nation’s power grid—and the cascading impacts that would follow—would require an immediate on-the-ground response by county emergency managers, law enforcement, firefighters, EMS, 9–1–1 call centers, public health officials, and public 

records and code inspectors. As such, counties appreciate the potential threat posed 

by electromagnetic risks and commend the subcommittee for convening this hearing 

to assess Federal efforts to address these risks. 

Mr. Chairman, I will focus my remarks today on 3 principles that we believe the 

subcommittee should observe as you assess Federal efforts to mitigate against electromagnetic risks: • First, the potential impact of Federal policy changes on local governments 

should be closely considered, particularly when it comes to emergency management. Counties are charged with protecting local communities from threats both 

natural and man-made, and Federal actions that change National priorities can 

unintentionally compromise counties’ ability to carry out this responsibility and 

ultimately make our Nation less safe. • Second, electromagnetic risks should be viewed in the context of the wide variety of threats faced by our Nation and its local communities. We must prepare 

for an arguably unprecedented variety of risks—from hurricanes and tornadoes 

to terrorism and cybersecurity threats—and should not lose sight of this fact as 

we assess electromagnetic threats. • Third, emergency management resources—both fiscal and administrative—are 

finite at all levels of government and should be allocated based on holistic and 

pragmatic risk assessment. Diverting limited resources from highly-probable 

threats will make our Nation less prepared for the risks and disasters that have 

proven to be perennial visitors to our communities. 

By observing these principles—which are elaborated upon below—as you assess 

Federal efforts to mitigate against electromagnetic risks, the subcommittee can lessen the likelihood that policy changes made leave our country more prepared for one 

particular threat while decreasing our overall preparedness for the many different 

risks that face our local communities at any given time. 

The potential impact of Federal policy changes on local governments should be 

closely considered, particularly when it comes to emergency management..—As outlined in the opening section, counties play a critical role in protecting our local communities from natural and man-made threats. It has been said that ‘‘disasters are 

local,’’ and I can attest that a well-organized local emergency management structure 

is crucial to disaster preparation, mitigation, and recovery efforts. 

But many factors affect a local emergency manager’s ability to perform his or her 

functions in a streamlined and efficient manner. De-prioritization of emergency 

management efforts at the county level or insufficient support for emergency management from the State government are just 2 examples. Another example—most 

relevant to the conversation at hand—involves rapidly-changing priorities and policies at the Federal level. Counties respond to the Federal Government’s actions, not 

just in our role as intergovernmental partners working with our Federal counterparts towards the shared goal of serving American residents, but also because our 

constituents demand that their local leaders keep pace with the Federal Government’s priorities and initiatives. 

Policy changes related to electromagnetic risks would be no different in this regard. Consider the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act (H.R. 1073), which was 

passed by the House late last year. The bill would require, in part, that the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security ‘‘conduct outreach to 

educate... emergency response providers at all levels of government of the threat 

30 

of [electromagnetic pulse] events.’’ Imposing Federal requirements like this has the 

potential to disrupt the on-going process of local emergency management planning 

and coordination and could undermine our ability to preserve the safety of our communities. We urge Members to consider the cumulative impact of such requirements 

as Congress works to enact this legislation. 

Electromagnetic risks should be viewed in the context of the wide variety of threats 

faced by our Nation and its local communities.—Due to changes in weather patterns 

and population growth—especially in densely-populated areas like Ramsey County— 

our Nation is facing an arguably unprecedented number of threats and disasters. 

We must not lose sight of these various threats as we take on the work of assessing 

the risks posed by electromagnetic pulses and space weather events. 

According to NACo’s analysis of data made available by the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA), 92 percent of counties across the Nation have had at 

least one Presidential disaster declaration in the past 10 years. Overall, these disaster declarations are happening at unprecedented rates, and each disaster seems 

costlier than the last. Due to globalization and advances in technology that have 

made us more interconnected than ever before, communities across the country also 

face novel cybersecurity threats from within and outside the United States. 

While we appreciate the importance of protecting our Nation against a potentially 

devastating failure of our power grids resulting from an electromagnetic event, we 

urge you to consider this threat in the context of all of the risks and threats that 

we have been entrusted to protect our communities against, especially at a time 

when the full range of threats seems to be increasing year after year. 

Emergency management resources—both fiscal and administrative—are finite at 

all levels of government and should be allocated based on holistic and pragmatic 

risk-assessment.—As disasters increase in both frequency and cost, we must be pragmatic in resource allocation, so that our limited emergency management resources 

go as far as possible in preserving lives, homes, and public and private structures 

in our local communities. Rather than creating new priorities or costly mandates, 

we urge you to view electromagnetic risks as one element in the portfolio of major 

risks we face. 

In Ramsey County, we have worked hard to ensure that our emergency management decisions and policies are based on pragmatic risk assessment that takes into 

consideration both the likelihood and potential consequences of various threats. This 

method of emergency management is one that was promoted in the United States. 

Department of Homeland Security’s 2014 Quadrennial Homeland Security Review, 

and is widely accepted as a local best practice in counties throughout the country. 

Through this sort of risk assessment, we aim to make resource allocation decisions 

that will best protect our communities from threats and disasters. While low-priority events like electromagnetic pulses may be deprioritized in this way—and while 

we appreciate that these events are not unprecedented—we nonetheless believe that 

given our finite resources, we can best protect our residents, homes, and public and 

private structures through this manner of risk assessment. 

That said, we are by no means inattentive to the threats posed to our power grids. 

We monitor space weather reports and provide weekly reports to our public safety 

partners and leadership; we monitor the status of our region’s power grid and include our utility providers in our oversight and planning workgroups. We assess 

transmission line protection in light of severe weather and flooding—as well as geomagnetic incidents. Whether through space weather, terrorist threat, or an ice 

storm or hurricane, large-scale power failures would present significant and cascading challenges to our emergency response systems, and we consider these risks 

in our disaster response and coordination efforts, and based on our broader risk-assessment strategies, work to mitigate these risks at every opportunity. 

CLOSING

Thank you again Chairman Perry, Ranking Member Watson Coleman, and Members of the subcommittee for this opportunity to provide the local perspective in this 

important conversation on Federal efforts to address electromagnetic risks. 

Mr. PERRY. Thank you, Mr. Freed. 

The Chair now recognizes himself for a few minutes of questioning. I am going to start out with Mr. McClelland from FERC. 

Sir, given that FERC liaisons with industry frequently, please 

provide the subcommittee with the industry perspective as you see 

it on the threat posed by EMP. For example, does industry feel 

31 

they are well-prepared for an EMP event? Or do you think they 

are? 

Mr. MCCLELLAND. So that is a tough question to start. 

At this point, industry has been requesting better intelligence regarding the probability of an EMP strike. There isn’t much doubt 

as far as the science behind the strike, what could happen to the 

power grid in the event that a strike occurs. 

The question from industry’s perspective is, how do we rank this 

risk? How do we prioritize this assignment from the Federal Government? What is the probability that we will see a nation-state attack, a high-altitude electromagnetic pulse from a nuclear warhead? 

To follow up, because of that, there’s been very little done by industry to prepare for this attack. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. Thank you. 

I am going to move on to Mr. Currie. 

How has the lack of a lead DHS office or official responsible for 

EMP impacted DHS’s efforts? Has this led to inefficiencies or duplication? Can you enumerate? 

Mr. CURRIE. Sure. 

We didn’t actually find any instances of duplication across the 

departments, but what we said in our report was that, certainly, 

because of the lack of a coordination lead, there is higher risk of 

potential overlap, fragmentation, and duplication. 

I don’t think we really know, because there hasn’t been a crossdepartmental coordination effort to look at all the research that 

has been done, all the testing and development that has been done 

as part of a holistic plan. So we really don’t know. 

But the lack of a lead, I think, has just led to a lot of confusion, 

especially in industry, as well, about who is responsible for this 

and what they are supposed to be doing to address it. Mr. 

McClelland hit that point. It is, who are we supposed to go to, to 

understand these risks, and who are we supposed to go to to understand the research behind how we protect against these risks? 

Mr. PERRY. But you said that you don’t know that it has led to 

any inefficiency or duplication? I just want to make sure I understand you. 

Mr. CURRIE. Yeah, we did not find—we looked across all the Departmental efforts—and, actually, I just want to say that, when 

you go talk to the Department about these issues, they don’t have 

a list of EMP or electromagnetic actions. What we did is we looked 

across all the actions they were taking to protect critical infrastructure for the energy sector and we said, well, how does this apply 

to EMP and the EMP Commission? So we actually did that work. 

We didn’t find duplication of effort, but what we found is little 

coordination between the departments of those efforts. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. 

You are still, obviously, recommending that there should be a 

lead, one individual that is the go-to person that is coordinating the 

effort where the buck stops, right? 

Mr. CURRIE. Absolutely. Within DHS, it is critical, I think, that 

there be a stop within DHS. We actually found in DOE and FERC 

that it was pretty clear who was responsible for this, just not within DHS. 

32 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Wales, an EMP attack can be carried out by detonating a nuclear device above the atmosphere or through the use of EMP 

weapons. If you know, what nations and/or hostile nation-states or 

actors currently have the capability to launch such an attack? 

What steps is DHS taking to specifically protect critical infrastructure from an EMP attack? 

Mr. WALES. Sure. Thank you, sir. 

So any country that has a nuclear capability would have the capacity to generate an electromagnetic pulse from the explosion of 

a nuclear weapon. 

With that being said, the Department relies heavily on the expertise of the broader U.S. intelligence community to provide us information on the capabilities and intent of our potential adversaries. 

In an open hearing, I don’t think I am comfortable sharing the kind 

of information that they have provided to us in the past. 

But I will say that we are guided by the consensus view of the 

intelligence community as enumerated in the report released in 

2014 on the threat posed by a high-altitude EMP event against the 

United States over the next 5 years. 

Mr. PERRY. Let me just ask you, the steps that DHS is taking 

specifically to protect critical infrastructure, even if they are just 

recommendations for best practices, have you seen them? Do they 

seem adequate and appropriate to you? 

Mr. WALES. The question of whether the grid can withstand a 

large electromagnetic pulse today, I mean, clearly the answer is no. 

We are not prepared for that type of significant attack. 

I think that being said, industry does work to try to improve its 

overall level of resilience. The Department has, I think as I outlined in my testimony, provided information to help them make 

better decisions. Obviously, as outlined by GAO, there is more to 

be done, and we are committed to executing on GAO’s recommendations. We think that will further help industry be prepared. 

But, ultimately, given the current authority at the Department 

and DOE and elsewhere, the ultimate burden for preparing for that 

type of event on the systems that operate our grid are going to be 

the utilities themselves. The work that we do is to help them be 

as prepared as they can be by providing them the kind of information that can help them make better decisions. 

Mr. PERRY. Okay. Thank you. 

My time has expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady, 

Mrs. Watson Coleman. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Currie, you indicated that you think that Homeland Security 

should be sort-of the coordinating agent, there should be someone 

there that is the go-to person for this whole issue. What component 

do you think should have that responsibility? 

Mr. CURRIE. So we didn’t actually designate in the report who we 

thought it should be. 

I will tell you that, in law and Presidential Directive, it is pretty 

clear that NPPD, Mr. Wales’ parent organization, is responsible for 

critical infrastructure protection. 

33 

That was one of the key points in our report, is even though they 

didn’t have to implement the Commission’s recommendations—and, 

by the way, one of the Commission’s recommendations was to establish roles and responsibilities and make that clear—they are already responsible for doing that under the National Infrastructure 

Protection Plan. So it would likely be in NPPD. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Freed, as emergency management director, you are aware of 

a range of natural occurrences and threats impacting the homeland, in particular in your county. Please state the threats, the 

dangers, or the occurrences that are of specific concern in your district. Share with us, please, how does the EMP risk fit into this in 

the priority of areas? 

Mr. FREED. Thank you for that question. 

Under the methodology that DHS has worked to help us go forward on our risk assessment, we take a look at the various bad 

things that can happen in our county, their likelihood and impact, 

our capabilities to cope with those, and then basically look at the 

gaps between capability and worst case. We concentrate on worstcase, most-plausible events, and then go forward from there to 

kind-of develop the things that keep us up at night. 

We don’t actually rank them, but there is sort-of the big group 

that does. Among that big group, of course, in the upper Midwest, 

you can imagine, tornados; you can imagine, winter storms. But 

prolonged power failure, particularly during the wintertime in the 

upper Midwest, is 1 of our 3 very big events. There is also hazardous materials incidents and terrorist attack are things that in 

urban areas such as ours we worry about. 

The impacts of a power failure, however, are the impacts of a 

power failure whether it is caused by a high-altitude EMP, a geomagnetic disturbance, an ice storm bringing down the power lines. 

If there is a surge that destroys one of those EHV transformers, 

we are going to rely on the transformer stockpile or some other 

method. 

So I certainly don’t want to discount the absolute importance of 

the EMP and GMD preparedness; I just want to ask the committee 

to keep in mind that, you know, we need to address these things 

holistically. Preparing to cope with the threat to an EHV transformer, we can do that without increasing rules, regulations, training requirements for local government officials to make them all 

experts at E1, E2, and E3 effects of HEMP. I mean, that is sortof where we look at it, is more holistically. That is, you know, our 

ask to the committee to consider. 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. So do you have a relationship with the 

Department of Homeland Security in sort-of discussing and developing this, sort-of, risk-based management? Tell me to what degree 

do you interact with the Department. 

Mr. FREED. Much better in recent years than in past. 

I teach—I am a risk geek—— 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. I am sorry, I didn’t hear that. 

Mr. FREED. I am a risk geek. I teach risk at the collegiate level, 

undergraduate collegiate level. Very often, the assessment of risk 

is extremely superficial and inaccurate. The vulnerability-timesVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:23 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\114THCONGRESS\16OM0517\HM138090.TXT HEATH
34 

consequences measure—that is TVC—it is not an effective way at 

looking at risk. 

Through programs like the Urban Areas Security Initiative and 

what is called the THIRA requirement, which is a Threat and Hazard Identification and Risk Assessment, we have started to now, 

Nation-wide, adopt some of the risk-geekiness application of measurement. So instead of, ‘‘Well, that would be bad,’’ we now look at 

why it would be bad, and what are potential causes? 

The problem comes that we can’t prevent all of those causes, but 

we can mitigate widely against those events. Wherever possible, 

mitigating in a manner that protects us against multiple events is 

sort-of the key to doing this in an effective manner and an efficient 

manner as well. 

So that is what we try and do, is we try and take a look at those 

gaps and figure, if we do this training or buy this piece of equipment or implement this policy, procedure, or plan, can we cope 

with a lot of things or are we only protecting against one possibility? 

Mrs. WATSON COLEMAN. Thank you, Mr. Freed. 

My time is up. I yield back. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chair thanks the gentlelady. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. 

Loudermilk. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you to all the witnesses being here today. It is a very important subject and one that, even on the Science, Space, and Technology Committee, that we have addressed some of these. 

I do have some more technical questions. 

Mr. Wales, when we talk about the potential of an EMP attack, 

what specific damage would be done to power generation? Can you 

address that? Or anyone? What I am looking at is what damage 

would be done to generation versus the distribution system? 

Mr. WALES. In an EMP event, because EMP generates multiple 

types of waves that will affect different systems in different ways, 

we would expect disruption to both generation and distribution systems—generation, transmission, and distribution systems. Any system that has industrial control systems could be affected by some 

parts of the EMP event. The transmission lines could be affected 

by others. 

The scale will obviously depend upon the unique type of what is 

generating the EMP pulse, where it is, how it is detonated— 

ground, air, et cetera. So there are a lot of factors. 

In part, this is why we have launched this new project with the 

Department of Energy to better bound what types of EMP events 

are going to potentially create the most amount of damage to the 

power systems and which ones are likely to generate less impacts. 

Obviously, the thing that we are concerned about most would be 

permanent damage to large equipment like the high-voltage transformers that have much longer lead times for replacement and are 

often built for specific purposes. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Okay. That is kind-of what I was getting at. 

I have heard several of you talk about these transformers, and 

stockpiling these transformers. But in case of an EMP attack on 

the United States, is predominantly the damage to the power genVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:23 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00038 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\114THCONGRESS\16OM0517\HM138090.TXT HEATH
35 

eration going to be done in the microprocessors, the control systems? Or are we actually looking at the generators itself being 

fried, for lack of a more technical term? 

Mr. WALES. I think the issue would be more of a concern with 

the transmission substation being—— 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Okay. So hydroelectric dams, coal power facilities would still be able to generate power, it is just they wouldn’t 

be able to—— 

Mr. WALES. Possibly. Those would also be affected by the loss of 

their control systems from microprocessor disruptions from an 

EMP event. 

But I think the—we have a lot more generation in the country. 

We have a lot of excess generation that can be spooled up when we 

need it, and a lot of it is not on-line at any given moment. Therefore, the bigger concern is the transmission disruptions, the substations that could be damaged through an EMP. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Okay. 

Then my concern is around the protection of those replacement 

parts, per se. Is there a method of protecting—are we protecting, 

let’s say, the transformers that we talked about? Stockpiling the 

transformers? What type of protection do we have to ensure that 

even those would not be damaged? 

Mr. WALES. So there is a small amount of extra transformers 

that are maintained by industry, and they have a program to share 

those in the midst of a disruption. That is obviously meant for 

smaller-scale disruptions. They can get those in place. At times, 

utilities will also maintain an extra spare on site that may not be 

activated at any given moment that could be brought back up on 

line. 

But this is also why the Department invested in this recovery 

transformer project through our Science and Technology Directorate that actually piloted a modular transformer that can be 

moved in and gotten up and running more quickly than traditional 

transformers. That project successfully demonstrated that that 

could be done with the Houston CenterPoint utility back in 2014. 

That was a project that was worked jointly with industry. So that 

demonstration project is now available should industry want to 

purchase transformers like those that can be brought up on-line 

very quickly and more—— 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Those could be protected if they are not actively on the grid? 

Mr. WALES. Correct. Generally, if a system is not in use, it has 

a much higher degree of surviving an electromagnetic pulse. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Okay. 

You mentioned the 1920s geomagnetic disturbance. Would something like that, if it were to happen today, have a world-wide effect? Or would it be more limited to, what position the Earth was 

in, those that were facing the sun at the moment it happened? 

Mr. WALES. There are going to be some effects that may be global. So, as it scintillates satellites, it could affect multiple parts of 

our constellations. Depending on the length and intensity of a geomagnetic event, it could have wider-scale impacts. 

In general, I think the specifics of a geomagnetic event are going 

to determine the effect it has both on the country and any of our 

36 

neighbors. In general, we assume that the higher latitudes are 

going to be more directly affected than lower latitudes, but it also 

will depend upon things like the geology of those areas, how much 

they will carry geomagnetic effects. 

So these are some of the factors that need to be evaluated when 

trying to understand the impacts of a geomagnetic event on a country. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Okay. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, may I just add in closing that a Congressional investigation on the attack of Pearl Harbor determined that the Government felt that the Japanese attacking Pearl Harbor was possible but not probable. The same with the 9/11 attacks, that the 

terrorists hijacking aircraft and flying them into Government buildings and buildings in the United States was possible but was not 

probable. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from California, Mrs. 

Torres. 

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I have a question for Director McClelland. 

National electrical systems for countries across the globe are 

structured in many different ways. Mitigation for geomagnetic disturbances will have to be tailored to specific countries’ needs. 

Are you aware of any plans to propose international standards, 

given that there are so many different and individualized systems 

that will need specialized mitigation? 

Who would oversee such an effort? I am trying to understand 

this issue. Is this an issue unique to the United States, or is this 

an issue that we should be working with our partners across the 

world? 

Mr. MCCLELLAND. Thank you for the question. 

Currently, there are many independent initiatives internationally. So the United Kingdom, Norway, Quebec have all initiated, 

not to mention other countries as named in the—there is a Congressional research report for Congress in, I will say, March 26, 

2008, that specifically mentions mitigation efforts in, for instance, 

Russia from both GMD and EMP. 

So, independently, these nations are moving forward. They are 

protecting the most critical—they are identifying and prioritizing 

infrastructure, energy infrastructure, to protect their population, 

and they are moving forward with mitigation efforts. 

To date, the United States has coordinated and has shared information with other nations, but there is no international standards 

development and nothing compulsory that is being shared across 

the nations. But, as I said, the United States is falling behind. 

Other nations are moving ahead for mitigation on geomagnetic disturbances and, in some cases, electromagnetic pulse. 

Mrs. TORRES. So, back to my question, who do you think should 

oversee those efforts? Is that something that the United States 

solely should continue to pursue? Or is that something that should 

fall under U.N.-specific standards? Should there be a specific commission related to this issue? How broad is it and how much of a 

global impact, given our trade agreements and all of that that 

could impact our communities across the world? 

37 

Mr. MCCLELLAND. I do think international collaboration will be 

important. I think that the large storms—1859, 1921—they occurred over a period of days, so the entire Earth was affected by 

these storms, but no one had the interconnectedness of the power 

grids that they have today and, arguably, the vulnerability of the 

equipment. 

Traditionally, it has not been FERC. FERC is not an agency that 

works across those lines internationally. It would be the Department of Energy and the Department of Homeland Security. So I 

would defer to my colleague from the Department of Homeland Security to better describe what could be done internationally. 

Mr. WALES. DHS works on a number of issues collaboratively 

with international partners related to terrorism, cyber threats. I 

don’t think in any of those are we attempting to organize the international community in terms of a leadership role in taking certain 

action. But I think, as Joe indicated, our goal is to build collaborative ties with those countries, share information, and to make 

sure that, to the extent possible, we are implementing good, consistent actions. 

I would say it is a little bit different in the case of Canada, where 

we have, obviously, a shared electric power grid. There is far more 

collaboration there in attempting to implement pretty joint activities associated with power grid security and resilience. 

Mrs. TORRES. Okay. Thank you. 

Also, the electric grid doesn’t produce energy out of thin air. We 

all know that the electric sector is highly dependent on telecommunications, especially fuel supply and delivery infrastructure. 

These key independencies must be identified, understood, and 

prioritized. 

How would you prioritize fuel supply and delivery security as opposed to other infrastructure priorities? I don’t know if Mr. 

McClelland could answer that or if that would be—— 

Mr. WALES. I will help out Joe here. 

Mr. MCCLELLAND. Thank you. 

Mr. WALES. I don’t know that you can segment out some of those 

critical dependencies and interdependencies amongst infrastructure 

such as power generation, natural gas/petroleum movement, you 

know, communications, transportation. In many cases, you need all 

of them working together to successfully deliver the critical services 

that they provide to the American people, our economy, and our 

way of life. 

In many cases, when we are looking at the aftermath of a major 

disruption or major disaster, a Hurricane Sandy, we are trying to 

figure out how best to get most of those capabilities up together so 

they can be mutually reinforcing and allow the services to continue 

flowing. 

But I think the ones that you named are those kind of core set 

of lifeline services that we need and that we would prioritize in the 

aftermath of any type of disruption or for protection in preparedness activities. 

Mrs. TORRES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am out of time. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chair thanks the gentlelady. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Carter. 

38 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank each being of you for being here. This is a very important 

subject, something that we are obviously all concerned about. 

Mr. Wales, I will start with you. In response to the GAO’s findings, DHS has responded many times that it has not taken the 

EMP threat seriously. Can you explain to me why it is a low priority? It would seem to me that this should be a top priority. Am 

I missing something here? 

Mr. WALES. I would not characterize DHS’s position that we are 

treating this as a low priority. As I think I have outlined in my 

statement, there is activity occurring across DHS that in some 

cases is directly focused on addressing EMP-related threats and 

their risks. 

When you look at the activity that DHS co-chaired with the Office of Science and Technology Policy at the White House that developed a Space Weather Action Plan that applies across the interagency, I think that demonstrates that the Department is extremely focused on doing what it can to help improve the security 

and resilience against that issue. 

But I would also—— 

Mr. CARTER. Well, now that you mention that, one of the findings 

in the report is there was no central entity within DHS that was 

concentrating on that. Have you identified a central entity yet? 

Mr. WALES. So, in response to the GAO recommendations, the 

Department of Homeland Security identified its Office of Policy— 

the Cyber Infrastructure Resilience Policy Office will serve as the 

lead for coordinating DHS actions on EMP. 

That being said, the complexity of the issue means that the various components, the operational components, of the Department 

need to bring to bear its specialized skills and execution to address 

this issue. The work that FEMA does is not going to be done by 

other parts of the Department. The work that S&T does to sponsor 

research and develop prototypes is not going to be done by other 

parts of the Department. The work that we do in NPPD to work 

with industry, conduct studies, that is not going to be done by 

other parts of the Department. Policy’s job is to make sure that all 

of our efforts are aligned and moving in a common direction. 

I will just say one other thing on the, kind-of, initial question, 

and that is, as I think has been outlined by a number of people 

today, we have to view EMP in terms of the broader array of risks 

that we face as a country in our critical infrastructure. When we 

devote resources to one topic, that means that we are sacrificing 

focus and attention on other topics. 

Mr. CARTER. We understand that. We certainly understand that. 

But, again, it just seems that the Department is making this a low 

priority when it would appear to us that it needs to be a high priority and a top priority. 

Let me ask Mr. McClelland. 

Mr. McClelland, what changes would you suggest to be made immediately? I mean, if we are going to be better prepared, what do 

we need to do immediately, not only for perhaps a man-made but 

even a natural disaster? 

Mr. MCCLELLAND. The first order of business would be to 

prioritize the assets. I know that DHS has done work in that area. 

39 

With 55,000 substations across the United States, I think the argument legitimately back from industry would be, ‘‘We can’t protect 

every one of these facilities from EMP. It is simply too difficult and 

it is too expensive.’’ 

However, if the assets were prioritized around functionality—for 

instance, what do you need to provide skeletal service to major 

urban areas? What facilities does DOD absolutely have to have in 

service in order to remain mission-ready? What might be critical 

infrastructure service, such as off-site service to nuclear power 

plants? Identify those criticalities. It won’t be near 55,000 stations. 

It may just end up being a few hundred stations. 

Then from there, provide threat briefings and critical intelligence 

to the owners and operators of those facilities, because the Government can’t do it without them. We don’t own the facilities, and we 

have no authority to compel them to take action. 

Mr. CARTER. Understood. Understood. 

Mr. MCCLELLAND. Provide intelligence, and then provide cost recovery as well as best practices to—— 

Mr. CARTER. Okay. 

Mr. Freed, best practices. Are there any best practices out there? 

Mr. FREED. Best practices specific to protection against an electromagnetic incident? 

Mr. CARTER. Protection and response to a problem. 

Mr. FREED. The short answer is not really, not that has been promulgated down to us at the local level, but—not specifically, I 

guess, rather than not really. What there are best practices are in 

exactly what Mr. McClelland was saying, which is prioritizing—we 

refer to it as CIKR, Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources— 

prioritizing what is energized by which power substation; how are 

things transmitted? Then our mitigation efforts are also—there are 

best practices for that, the problem being that a lot of those repairs 

or those mitigation efforts are extremely, extremely expensive and 

time-consuming. For instance, if you bury a transmission line and 

then something happens to it, the cost of fixing it is significantly 

greater. So the private industries kind-of have to weigh the chances 

of that transmission line failing for some reason versus the cost of 

fixing it when it does. 

Mr. CARTER. So there are things that counties and municipalities 

can be doing to prepare for this? 

Mr. FREED. There are things that we are currently planning 

around. We do not own those transmission lines either. So I live 

in an area that gets ice storms and severe summer storms and 

floods on a regular basis. That has direct impact on our power 

transmission systems. Working on ways to mitigate against those 

in general and specifically protecting those power lines is something we can and do. 

Mr. CARTER. Thank you. Just one last point, Mr. Wales. I hope 

the Department is taking this seriously and considers this a top 

priority because I certainly think the impression you get and the 

message you get from this panel today is that we are taking it very 

seriously. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

40 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Clawson. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Thank you for your time today, gentlemen. 

Following along this line of questioning, let’s see if my logic is 

right. The electrical grid and the power market is a private market 

in the United States: Heavy regulation, private shareholders, customers, suppliers, et cetera. Normally, in our country, when there 

is a technical or security issue that overlaps with the private sector—Y2K comes to mind immediately. At least a couple, 2 or 3 of 

you all, are old enough to remember that. I certainly do. One or 

2 of you probably aren’t. We didn’t wait around for the Government. We were involved in fixing it for our own enterprise, and 

moreover, there were plenty of consulting companies and others 

that were involved in the fix in order to solve the problem because 

everybody had a profit incentive, which is normally what creates 

innovation and solution, as opposed to Government involvement. 

So, therefore, give me a summary here. I mean, the one thing— 

and I missed a lot of what has gone on today because I had constituents in my office, but nonetheless, if this is a real deal—and 

there seems to be some debate about it—but if there is a real deal, 

why isn’t there a real market response? Or is there a real market 

response, not just in terms of suppliers of product but also consultants and technical folks and all the people that would be working 

on this if it is the real deal? What is going on with the private sector, to anyone that would like to answer? 

Mr. MCCLELLAND. I can start. There are really 2 aspects here. 

There is geomagnetic disturbance, which is inevitable. That is 

going to happen. It is just a matter of the timing of when it occurs 

and the magnitude that will occur. An impact from a geomagnetic 

disturbance has been debated. So the Commission, along the agencies, Department of Energy and Department of Homeland Security, 

put out a report by Oak Ridge National Lab that said that, considering the current configuration of the system, if we took a 1921 

storm, the impacts would be devastating. We will see over 300 

transformers that could be potentially damaged or destroyed. These 

have a year-long lead time, in many cases custom-built for the site 

that they are installed with no spares. 

Mr. CLAWSON. By the way, if you have an incident, that 1-year 

lead time is going to go to 3 or 4. 

Mr. MCCLELLAND. Correct. 

Mr. CLAWSON. Because you don’t have enough capacity to make 

that, I mean, obviously. 

Mr. MCCLELLAND. You could even add to that that it is probably 

going to be a global event. The United States does not own or control the production facilities, so those transformers may go to the 

international host where the factory is first, and then if there is 

any left over, the United States gets on the production list. 

Industry, however, conducted its own study and said that the 

grid would collapse before there would be problems to the transformers. There would be wide-spread blackouts, but the grid would 

collapse. It has been the subject of some back-and-forth through an 

iterative process that the Commission exercises. The bottom line 

conclusion, though, is even if the grid collapsed—in 1989, Quebec 

collapsed. It was 90 seconds; 7 million people were out of power for 

41 

9 hours. Relatively little damage, but the estimated cost for that 

1 collapse was $1 billion, $1–2 billion. If we use the lower number 

and we put in mitigation techniques to protect against it, we could 

protect 2,000 transformers for an incident that was relatively 

minor impact. By the way, Quebec has now mitigated against geomagnetic disturbances. So, even with inevitability, there is still debate about what should be done and the costs that could be incurred, which the Commission can reimburse those costs. 

On the EMP side, it is even more debatable because industry 

would need—they want—some sort of a risk analysis: How likely 

is it that some of these countries, and Brandon explained it—anyone that has nuclear capability would conceivably have an ability 

to propagate an EMP attack—how likely is it we are going to see 

this, and which facilities should we protect? The approach the 

Commission has used is to prioritize—along with DHS—is to 

prioritize those assets and, for a relatively small number of assets, 

encourage best practices, not pass more regulation but encourage 

best practices along with cost recovery to protect against these 

threats. 

Mr. WALES. I will only add that the science of hardening things 

against EMP is well-known. The military has been doing it since 

the dawn of the nuclear age when they wanted to harden their own 

systems to be able to withstand EMP in the event of war with Russia, the Soviet Union. So the science is there on how to protect 

themselves. This is just an issue of whether it is a sufficient priority for industry to make the investment, and then what is the 

best way for them to fund that, since they would have to go ask 

permission for every State utility commission to recover the cost 

that it would take to put in place those mitigation measures? 

Mr. CLAWSON. I guess the only thing I would say is if I am in 

the private sector and I have some savvy investors, I might be 

thinking of an innovation that puts your science that you are talking about on its head. What innovators do is they find the next 

iteration of a more cost-effective solution so that we don’t sit 

around saying, ‘‘This is too expensive,’’ right? It just seems to me 

that somebody is out there doing something. If this is as big a deal 

as you say, there has got to be some X, Y, or Z company that is 

doing something for profit incentive to come up with a cheaper solution. 

I am out of time, so you can take me back. 

Mr. PERRY. The Chair thanks the gentleman. 

The Chair now recognizes our guest, Mr. Franks from Arizona. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I especially want to express gratitude just for the privilege of 

being your guest here today. The Chairman has, throughout the debate here for a number of years, been a champion in this area, and 

I am grateful. I suppose that it is not a small thing that the Chairman, in other venues or forums, is recognized as General Perry. 

When we discussed our military, their response, there has never 

been an argument with the military. We have spent billions of dollars hardening some of our critical military assets, our critical defense assets. That is telling in my mind, because the military does 

depend upon the civilian grid in CONUS for about 99 percent of 

its electricity needs, without which, even according to their own 

42 

perspective, they cannot effect their mission. So I think that is a 

telling point, and I appreciate the whole panel here. A lot of very 

good questions. 

I am encouraged. I know that this is a subject that is rather 

daunting. The Israelis now have begun to harden their grid. They 

said that this is an attractive problem. You ask them, ‘‘What does 

that mean?’’ and they say, ‘‘Well, it is an existential issue for us.’’ 

I am not sure how that makes it attractive. But they said, ‘‘This 

is one we can fix,’’ which is kind-of an unusual situation for them. 

I am almost more encouraged about the testimony that I have 

heard from Mr. Currie and Mr. Wales and some of the acumen and 

the very learned perspective that they have brought forth because 

that hasn’t been the case in the past. I say that with all due respect. It gives me some hope. 

I think there are 2 things that are critical that we do. Other than 

making sure that we have properly done the research that is necessary and things of that nature going forward, I think CIPA in the 

Senate has a good chance of precipitating some of that research, 

and I hope that political considerations or gridlock does not prevent 

that, because if it gets a fair vote, it goes forward. But I really am 

truly encouraged by the testimony that I have heard today. 

Of course, Mr. Chairman, I consider Joe McClelland a National 

treasure. He has, ever since the EMP Commission first reported to 

the Armed Services Committee years ago, been a lone voice in 

many ways, and now his voice, of course, has been confirmed in so 

many different ways, and I am grateful for that. 

If we can do 2 things, if we can come up with a National standard at which we should harden our grid, that we can all come to 

the conclusion based on sound science, and then use hardwarebased solutions, which is what the SHIELD Act attempts to do, I 

think we can disincentivize either a particular enemy or certainly 

protect against a natural impact. If an enemy recognizes the potential danger here, it has always been, at least historically speaking, 

their tendency to try to exploit that. 

Yes, I agree this is a low-probability, high-impact issue, but if 

one just does a cursory glance at history, you realize that those are 

the very kinds of things that we always find regret in not finding 

insight to at least prepare for them, because as we are now, I think 

we have an open invitation to some of our worst enemies if they 

choose to exploit that. 

So, with that, I am just going to ask one question and again express the sincerest gratitude to you, Mr. Chairman, to everyone 

here, and to the panel, again, for the encouraging things that I am 

hearing. 

So, Mr. McClelland, I will ask the question to you, sir, and it has 

been asked in different ways. But in terms of what should be done 

and what is being done—that is probably the one element I would 

add to—right now, what do you think is being done, and where are 

we? Are we making progress? Are we seeing people expand their 

understanding of this issue? 

Again, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MCCLELLAND. Let’s start with what is being done. The Commission has established threshold standards, so foundational practices for geomagnetic disturbances. They are based, though, on opVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:23 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00046 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 H:\114THCONGRESS\16OM0517\HM138090.TXT HEATH
43 

erator actions. So that assumes 2 things: That the operators have 

sufficient warning—and in the case of a solar flare, it is assumed 

that they would have sufficient warning—to take precautions to reconfigure the power grid to cause minimal impact to the power grid 

itself. That depends on the operator not making an error and, 

again, the forecast. But that would not be sufficient for an electromagnetic pulse attack. 

On the electromagnetic pulse side, more studies are being conducted by the industry. They are doing some research. They are 

now just starting to receive threat briefings, but very little has 

been done to protect the power grid and the other infrastructure 

against an electromagnetic pulse in the United States. 

Mr. PERRY. Well, thank you, Mr. Franks. 

I guess this is going to remain a work in progress. Gentlemen, 

we appreciate your time here today. We can see that there are 

some places for improvement within the context of this. In some 

people’s minds, I imagine this is an imminent threat; in other people’s minds, it is something less than that. Also, in the context that 

it is hard-to-tell industry, I think, to move forward when you don’t 

have your own house in order, right? So we have got to do the best 

we can, whether it is FERC, whether it is the Department of Energy, whether it is Homeland Security, to make sure our ducks are 

in a row before we go to industry and say, ‘‘This is what we would 

like to see,’’ and then help them get there one way or another. So 

we have got to keep all that in context. Again, I think this is just 

going to be a continuing issue we will have to revisit to see that 

the benchmarks are being met and we keep moving forward to 

make sure that the grid is adequately protected and we are prepared for the eventuality of the, in some cases, imminent; the naturally occurring; or the maybe not-so-imminent, the other. 

With that, the Chair thanks the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the Members for their questions. Members may have 

some additional questions for the witnesses, and we will ask you 

to respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee Rule VII(e), 

the hearing record will remain open for 10 days. 

Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

(45) 

A P P E N D I X 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN SCOTT PERRY FOR CHRIS P. CURRIE

Question 1a. The EMP Commission made 7 recommendations related to the electric grid which were mainly focused on DHS and DOE. GAO has reported that of 

those 7 recommendations, DHS and DOE have taken ‘‘some action’’ on 4 recommendations. In what ways have DHS and DOE further addressed those 4 recommendations? 

Question 1b. Do DHS and DOE intend to address the remaining 3? 

Answer. It is important to note that the actions DHS and DOE have taken to address electromagnetic risks are not part of a dedicated effort to implement the EMP 

Commission recommendations. Through our work, we identified actions taken by 

both agencies that aligned with some of the recommendations. Specifically, of the 

7 recommendations made by the EMP Commission related to the electric grid, some 

of the actions that DHS and DOE took aligned with 4 of them: 

1. Conducting research to better understand the interdependencies of critical infrastructures, 

2. Addressing the vulnerability of control systems to an EMP attack, 

3. Identifying responsibilities for responding to an EMP attack, and 

4. Utilizing industry and other governmental institutions to assure the most 

cost-effective outcomes—(5 of 15 subparts). 

However, while some of DHS’s and DOE’s actions have aligned with 4 of the EMP 

Commission’s recommendations, this does not mean that each component of these 

4 recommendations has been completed. Examples of some of the actions DHS and 

DOE have taken include the following: 

• Developing National and regional restoration plans and assuring the availability of critical communication channels.—DHS and DOE are in the process 

of developing the Power Outage Incident Annex (POIA) Plan. Although it’s not 

finalized—(expected completion is in 2016)—the POIA is intended to provide incident-specific information regarding how the Federal Government intends to 

respond to and recover from a loss of power resulting from deliberate acts of 

terrorism or natural disasters, including an EMP or geomagnetic disturbances 

(GMD) event. 

• Implementing efforts outlined in the National Space Weather Strategy and Action Plan.—DHS and DOE, among other Federal agencies, are in the process 

of identifying efforts and taking actions as outlined in the National Space 

Weather Strategy and Action Plan from October 2015. The strategy identifies 

goals and establishes the principles that will guide space weather efforts in both 

the near and long term, while the Action Plan identifies specific activities, outcomes, and time lines that the Federal Government will pursue accordingly. 

Specifically, the Action Plan calls for Federal agencies to establish benchmarks 

for space weather events and to improve protection and mitigation efforts, 

among other actions. 

• Conducting research on the susceptibility of transformers to geomagnetic disturbances (GMD).—In November 2015, DOE reported initiating a study by the Oak 

Ridge National Laboratory to quantify the risks associated with GMD on electric power system reliability. The study plans to identify power lines and their 

associated transformers within the eastern section of the power grid and to determine those that are most susceptible to the effects of GMD. DOE officials expect the study to be completed in July 2016. 

• Developing a National Transformer Strategy.—DOE developed a draft National 

strategy in 2015 to reduce the risk to grid reliability posed by the loss of critical 

large power transformers. The draft National strategy focuses on 3 areas: (1) 

Understanding and mitigating current and future risks to transformers, (2) enhancing protection of transformers, and (3) ensuring transformer replacement 

equipment is available. It also calls upon Federal Government entities, to partVerDate Mar 15 2010 12:23 Feb 22, 2017 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00049 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 H:\114THCONGRESS\16OM0517\HM138090.TXT HEATH
46 

ner with electricity operators, equipment manufacturers, and State and local 

authorities to develop risk assessments and modeling tools to guide their efforts 

and prioritize activities. As of December 2015, DOE officials reported that the 

strategy is undergoing review. 

DHS and DOE intent to address the remaining 3 EMP Commission recommendations remains unclear. There are some indications though that issues included in 

the recommendations are being given consideration. For example, both departments 

acknowledged the importance of providing capabilities to recover rapidly from an 

EMP attack—which is encompassed in 1 of the 3 remaining recommendations. In 

addition, DOE officials also identified ‘‘black start capabilities’’—the ability to restart power at a generation plant that has lost power without having to use an external energy source—as an example of how to restart energy production. This capability is also discussed in 1 of the Commission’s recommendations where some action 

has been taken but several actions remain incomplete. DHS officials have agreed 

that an analysis of black start capabilities is warranted. 

Question 2a. A recent Idaho National Laboratory study found that updated research and analysis on the effects of the early time pulse of an EMP event is needed. In your estimation, how much of the other existing EMP research is outdated? 

Question 2b. Given that research projects can take a lot of time to complete, what 

steps can the Federal Government take to fill any existing knowledge gaps caused 

by outdated information? 

Answer. 

• A key knowledge gap is in understanding how an EMP will affect the U.S. electric grid. The INL report noted that most information sources about the impact 

of EMP E1 on electric power grids are decades-old and do not account for modern grid technologies and electronic control systems. While we have been told 

that the DOD and the intelligence community have updated information on the 

EMP threat, additional opportunities may exist to leverage EMP threat information through I&A or direct collaboration with DOD, DOE, or other intelligence sources. For example, Classified analytical products are available that 

address specific components of threat, such as assessment of EMP-related missile technologies, which could provide an important input regarding adversary 

capabilities as part of DHS’s overall assessment of electromagnetic threats. Although I&A officials have direct access to these materials, neither I&A nor 

NPPD officials identified efforts to specifically leverage this information as part 

of any Department-wide risk assessment efforts. Acquiring more comprehensive 

information on potential EMP threats may be helpful because, as one EMP expert stated in recent testimony, there are misconceptions regarding the nature 

and impact of potential EMP attacks, which may have a negative effect on the 

ability of stakeholders to determine reasonable steps needed to protect critical 

infrastructure and mitigate potential impacts. Additionally, as we reported, 

while the NPPD Office of Infrastructure Protection conducts various assessments to identify vulnerabilities, interdependencies, and potential cascading impacts across different sectors of the Nation’s critical infrastructure, these have 

generally not been utilized to obtain specific information about vulnerabilities 

or consequences related to EMP or GMD events. Given the lack of comprehensive EMP-related information on the vulnerability of and consequences to the 

U.S. electric grid, further R&D to understand the effects, and techniques to protect against or mitigate the effects of EMP attacks is needed. In our report, we 

recommended that the Secretaries of Homeland Security and of Energy engage 

with Federal partners and industry stakeholders to identify and implement key 

EMP R&D priorities. 

• As we also stated in our report, a 2013 white paper developed by the Electric 

Power Research Institute also noted a lack of wide-spread and coordinated research and development efforts to protect the commercial electric grid against 

EMP attacks and mitigate their effects. The institute recommended that stakeholders define key characteristics of an EMP event—such as potential altitudes 

of detonation—for further study of corresponding impacts, as the lack of more 

specific parameters for determining potential EMP effects makes it difficult to 

develop applicable protective guidelines and equipment design specifications. 

However, according to Federal Energy Regulatory Commission officials, additional work is being done outside of the United States to further develop applicable standards and implement equipment designed to mitigate the effects of 

or protect against EMP risks. Given the on-going nature of this work, U.S. officials may have an opportunity to investigate how they might be able to coordinate with researchers outside the United States already conducting this work 

to determine if working jointly could speed the completion of this research for 

the benefit of both parties. 

47 

• Similarly, any proposed mitigation strategies resulting from efforts to address 

GMD, including the National Space Weather Action Plan, could also be reviewed to determine how effective they might be against a potential EMP attack 

so that fully-informed investment decisions can be made. For example, as one 

EMP expert noted in recent Congressional testimony, if designing protective 

equipment to withstand specified levels of E3 effects from an EMP attack, there 

may be collateral benefits for providing protection against GMD effects; however, the reverse may not be true. 

• We also reported that Federal agencies should improve their efforts to identify 

and prioritize key research and development, including an evaluation of protective equipment intended to help mitigate the impacts of an EMP event. As we 

recommended in our report, Federal agencies and industry stakeholders should 

work together to identify and implement key EMP research and development 

priorities, including EMP protection and mitigation options. Coordinating their 

efforts can also help to better ensure that limited resources are more effectively 

targeted toward the highest-priority research. 

QUESTIONS FROM CHAIRMAN SCOTT PERRY FOR BRANDON WALES

Question 1. According to GAO’s report, actions are underway to establish a Cyber, 

Infrastructure, and Resiliency group within the Office of Policy. How will this group 

differ from other offices, such as NPPD’s Office of Cybersecurity and Communications or Office of Cyber and Infrastructure Analysis, which have already performed 

work in regard to EMP threats? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 2. Is DHS reviewing those EMP Commission recommendations that have 

not been addressed? If so, what is being done to address them? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

Question 3. GAO recommended that DHS increase its collection and analysis of 

threat, vulnerability, and consequence information related to electromagnetic risks. 

GAO also provided a variety of methods through which this can be accomplished, 

including closer collaboration with DOD and leveraging existing assessment tools, 

such as the Infrastructure Survey Tool. What has DHS done to increase its collection and analysis of electromagnetic threat information? 

Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication. 

QUESTION FROM CHAIRMAN SCOTT PERRY FOR JOSEPH MCCLELLAND

Question. Has FERC assessed the potential costs of mitigating critical electric assets to withstand a GMD or EMP? If so, what are they and are there funding 

streams that could be shifted for some of these costs? 

Answer. FERC has not itself assessed the potential costs of mitigating critical 

electric assets to withstand a GMD or EMP event. A study conducted by the Oak 

Ridge National Laboratory in 2010, sponsored by FERC and other Federal agencies 

and to which I referred in my prepared testimony, includes some estimates of such 

costs. 

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