J-A02033-19

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

HOWARD JONES 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 865 MDA 2018

Appeal from the Order Entered April 26, 2018

In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-40-CR-0003238-2002

BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.

JUDGMENT ORDER BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED: JANUARY 3, 2019

Appellant Howard Jones appeals from the order denying his motion to 

enforce a plea agreement and preclude the application of an increased sexual 

offender registration period under the former version of the Sexual Offenders 

Registration and Notification and Act1 (SORNA). Appellant claims that (1) the 

trial court erred in concluding that a ten-year registration period under 

Megan’s Law II2 was not a material term of the plea agreement and (2) the 

application of SORNA’s lifetime registration period would violate ex post facto

principles. We reverse.3 

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1 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9799.10-9799.41 (subsequently amended Feb. 21, 2018).

2 See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9795.1(a)(1) (expired).

3 While this appeal was pending, Appellant received a letter from the 

Pennsylvania State Police indicating that he was no longer required to register 
J-A02033-19

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The relevant facts and procedures giving rise to this appeal are well 

known to the parties and need not be restated here. We briefly note that on 

March 23, 2017, Appellant filed a motion to enforce his 2003 plea agreement. 

On April 25, 2018, the trial court denied Appellant’s motion. 

Appellant timely appealed and complied with the trial court’s order to 

submit a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement. The trial court filed a responsive 

opinion finding that Appellant failed to establish that a ten-year registration 

requirement was a material term of his plea. The court further concluded that 

Appellant waived a challenge to SORNA based on ex post facto principles. 

Seven days after the trial court authored its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the 

Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 

1189 (Pa. 2017). The Muniz Court concluded that the registration 

requirements of SORNA were punitive in nature and that the retroactive 

application of SORNA to increase a sexual offender’s term of registration 

violated ex post facto principles under the United States and Pennsylvania 

Constitutions.4 Muniz, 164 A.3d at 1218, 1223. 

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as a sexual offender. Appellant filed an unopposed application to discontinue 

this appeal. In light of our disposition, however, we deny Appellant’s 

application as moot. 

4 The General Assembly subsequently amended SORNA. See 2018, Feb. 21, 

P.L. 27, No. 10 (Act 10). The amended version of SORNA clarifies that the 

registration requirements under Subchapter H apply to a defendant who 

committed an offense on or after its initial effective date of December 20, 

2012. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.11(c). Under Subchapter I, indecent assault–

person less than thirteen years of age, when committed “on or after April 22, 

1996, but before December 2012” requires the defendant to register for ten 

years. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9799.55(a).
J-A02033-19

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Appellant presents the following questions for our review: 

[1]. Whether the Trial Court Erred By Committing An Error Of Law 

Or An Abuse Of Discretion In Denying the Appellant’s Motion to 

Enforce Plea Agreement and Retroactively Subjecting the 

Appellant to the Requirements of the Adam Walsh Act (SORNA), 

Depriving the Appellant the “benefits of the bargain” Provided in 

the Negotiated Plea Previously Entered into by the Appellant and 

the Commonwealth?

[2]. Whether The Trial Court Erred by Violating the Ex Post Facto 

Clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions by 

Retroactively Applying the Requirements of the Adam Walsh Act 

(SORNA)?

Appellant’s Brief at 5.

Following our review, and in light of Muniz, we conclude that SORNA’s 

lifetime registration requirement does not apply to Appellant. See

Commonwealth v. Fernandez, 195 A.3d 299, 310 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en 

banc). Because there are no further disputes regarding the Appellant’s 

registration requirements, we reverse the trial court’s order to the extent it 

found that Appellant was subject to SORNA.

Order reversed. Application to discontinue appeal denied. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 01/03/2019