United States Court of Appeals 

For the First Circuit 

No. 17-1977 

UNITED STATES, 

Appellee, 

v. 

ALETSYS CALDERÓN-LOZANO, 

Defendant, Appellant. 

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 

FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO 

[Hon. Francisco A. Besosa, U.S. District Judge] 

Before 

Lynch and Lipez, Circuit Judges, 

and Katzmann, Judge. 

Davis Ramos Pagan, was on brief, for appellant. 

Rosa Emilia Rodríguez-Vélez, United States Attorney, Mariana 

E. Bauzá-Almonte, Assistant United States Attorney, Chief, 

Appellate Division, and B. Kathryn Debrason, Assistant United 

States Attorney, on brief, for appellee. 

January 10, 2019 

 

 

 Of the United States Court of International Trade, sitting 

by designation. 
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KATZMANN, Judge. Aletsys Calderón-Lozano (“CalderónLozano”) received a guideline sentence of 46 months of imprisonment 

for conspiracy to launder monetary instruments in violation of 18 

U.S.C. § 1956(h). On appeal, Calderón-Lozano challenges the 

procedural and substantive reasonableness of his sentence. We 

affirm the district court’s sentence. 

Between February 25 and 26, 2016, Calderón-Lozano and an 

undercover Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”) agent arranged 

a meeting to deliver money. As agreed, Calderón-Lozano sent his 

associate (and co-defendant) to deliver $80,000 to the agent. The 

$80,000 was then deposited into a bank account and divided between 

two accounts in the amount of $52,000 and $23,080 respectively. 

On March 23, 2016, Calderón-Lozano arranged another money delivery 

with the undercover agent. This time, Calderón-Lozano himself 

delivered $100,000. The money was again deposited and divided 

between two bank accounts, in the amount of $59,951 and $34,067 

respectively. After his arrest, Calderón-Lozano told 

investigative agents that “his job in Puerto Rico is to collect 

money from drug sales and deliver it to people.” When CalderónLozano entered a straight guilty plea to the conspiracy count, his 

lawyer stated that the defendant was not pleading guilty to the 

specific unlawful activity of drug importation. The district 

court, although noting that the defendant had admitted to his 
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involvement in the drug trafficking deliveries to agents, 

indicated that it would decide the issue at sentencing. 

The third and final amended presentence report (“PSR”) 

provided an imprisonment range of 87 to 108 months under the U.S. 

Federal Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”). This calculation 

included a six-level enhancement for knowing or believing that the 

laundered funds were drug proceeds pursuant to U.S.S.G. 

§ 2S1.1(b)(1). 

In his sentencing memorandum, Calderón-Lozano discussed 

his difficult childhood and current familial ties. He also 

requested a variant sentence, stating that “[a]lthough there is no 

cooperation agreement in this case, the Court should consider the 

information [he] provided to federal agents when he was arrested.” 

Calderón-Lozano did not object to the PSR’s six-level increase for 

knowing or believing that the laundered funds were drug proceeds 

pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(1). 

At sentencing, Calderón-Lozano again argued for a 

variant sentence. Calderón-Lozano urged the district court to 

disregard his statements to HSI agents in assessing whether he 

knew that the money was from drug trafficking. Calderón-Lozano 

conceded that he told the agents that “his job in Puerto Rico is 

to collect money from drug sales and deliver it to people.” He 

also conceded that he does not have a proffer letter, that the 

“government is legally and rightfully using” his “post-arrest, 
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pre-counsel statements, and that these statements are sufficient 

to prove the six-point enhancement.” He later clarified that he 

was “not objecting to the fact that there is a factual basis for 

the six point enhancement [as] [t]here clearly is,” but instead 

was “making an equity argument.” He argued for a sentence within 

the total offense level (“TOL”) of 17 for a guideline range of 24 

to 30 months. 

The United States (“the government”) opposed a variance. 

The government argued that Calderón-Lozano failed to object to the 

six-level enhancement in the PSR and that the statements are postarrest statements, not part of a cooperation agreement. Noting 

that “Mr. Calderón[-Lozano] was approached on numerous times to 

see if he wanted to sit down and cooperate, and on each occasion, 

he declined,” the government asserted that “[t]here is simply just 

no authority to argue that a post-arrest statement should qualify 

for a variant sentence.” Finally, the government argued that 

Calderón-Lozano’s statements were not useful and “led to nothing.” 

Accordingly, the government recommended a sentence of 46 to 57 

months, within the guideline range for a TOL of 23. 

Ultimately, the district court followed the guideline 

calculations in the PSR and calculated a TOL of 23, which included 

the six-level drug-trafficking enhancement. The district court 

found specifically that “[b]ecause Mr. Calderón[-Lozano] knew or 

believed that the laundered funds were the proceeds of or were 
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intended to promote an offense involving the manufacture, 

importation, or distribution of controlled substances, the offense 

level is increased by another six levels pursuant to sentencing 

guideline section 2S1.1(b)(1).” With a TOL of 23 and a criminal 

history category of I, the district court calculated CalderónLozano’s guideline sentencing range to be 46 to 57 months of 

imprisonment. Before imposing his sentence, the district court 

expressly stated that it considered the relevant 18 U.S.C. 

§ 3553(a) sentencing factors. Reiterating that the six-level 

enhancement applied because Calderón-Lozano’s statements were 

merely unhelpful post-arrest statements, the district court 

sentenced Calderón-Lozano to a low-end guideline sentence of 46 

months of imprisonment. Calderón-Lozano objected to the district 

court’s denial of his variance request and objected to the sentence 

as procedurally and substantively unreasonable. This appeal 

ensued. 

I.

Calderón-Lozano argues that the district court abused 

its discretion by applying a six-level enhancement pursuant to 

U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(1) when it was not proven that he knew that 

his crime involved drug trafficking proceeds. 

This Court reviews criminal sentences for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Flores-Machicote, 706 F.3d 16, 20 

(1st Cir. 2013). “[W]here there is more than one plausible view 
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of the circumstances, the sentencing court’s choice among 

supportable alternatives cannot be clearly erroneous.” United 

States v. Dunston, 851 F.3d 91, 101-02 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting 

United States v. Ruiz, 905 F.2d 499, 508 (1st Cir. 1990)). We 

review unpreserved challenges to guideline calculations under the 

more daunting plain error standard. United States v. Arsenault, 

833 F.3d 24, 28 (1st Cir. 2016). Because Calderón-Lozano twice 

failed to object to the factual basis for the enhancement by not 

objecting to the PSR and at the sentencing hearing, he did not 

preserve his challenge to the guideline calculations, and his claim 

can be reviewed under the plain error standard. 

In any event, the district court did not err, much less 

plainly err, in applying the six-level drug-trafficking proceeds 

enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(1) because there was 

sufficient evidence that Calderón-Lozano knew that the sentencing 

court is entitled to rely on the uncontested facts in the PSR. 

United States v. González, 857 F.3d 46, 61-62 (1st Cir. 2017) 

(internal quotations and citations omitted). The PSR included 

information that Calderón-Lozano gave to the HSI agents showing he 

had knowledge that the laundered funds were proceeds of an offense 

involving narcotics. Calderón-Lozano admitted to the HSI agents 

“that his job in Puerto Rico . . . was to collect money from drug 

sales and deliver it to people that would launder the money and 

wire transfer it to different parts of the world.” He also 
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“admitted that his roommate in Puerto Rico would coordinate the 

drug shipments from Saint Maarten, and that he was present during 

said coordination.” He further “admitted that once the drugs came 

in, he was responsible for picking up the money and delivering it 

to associates with capacity to launder the drug proceeds.” These 

uncontested admissions, as listed in the PSR, provided the district 

court ample evidence to establish by a preponderance of the 

evidence that Calderón-Lozano knew that the laundered funds were 

drug-trafficking proceeds.1 See United States v. Dixon, 449 F.3d 

194, 200-01 (1st. Cir. 2006). 

II.

Calderón-Lozano also asserts that his 46-month sentence 

is both procedurally and substantively unreasonable. 

We review preserved claims of sentencing error for abuse 

of discretion. United States v. Córtes-Medina, 819 F.3d 566, 569 

(1st Cir. 2016). “In reviewing a sentence, [this Court] seek[s] 

to ensure that it is both procedurally sound and substantively 

reasonable.” United States v. Dávila-González, 595 F.3d 42, 47 

 

1

 Calderón-Lozano’s assertion that “the PSR also states that 

[he] made no statements as to the relation of said money with drug 

trafficking (PSR29),” is misleading. Paragraph 29 states that 

Calderón-Lozano made no such statements during his acceptance-ofresponsibility interview on June 27, 2017, but does not address 

the interview that Calderón-Lozano conducted with HSI agents. 

According to PSR Paragraph 23, Calderón-Lozano’s statements to HSI 

agents “showed his knowledge that the laundered funds were proceeds 

of an offense involving narcotics.” 
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(1st Cir. 2010). Procedural errors include “failing to calculate 

(or improperly calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the 

Guidelines as mandatory, failing to consider the [18 U.S.C.] 

§ 3553(a) factors, selecting a sentence based on clearly erroneous 

facts, or failing to adequately explain the chosen sentence . . . 

.” Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 45-46 (2007). When 

reviewing a sentence, we remain “mindful that deference to the 

trial court is a lineament of appellate review of federal criminal 

sentences.” United States v. Del Valle-Rodríguez, 761 F.3d 171, 

176 (1st Cir. 2014). Because Calderón-Lozano objected to the 

district court’s denial of his variance request based on its 

alleged failure to consider his willingness to cooperate, he 

preserved this issue for appeal. Accordingly, this claim is 

reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Córtes-Medina, 819 F.3d at 

569. 

The district court did not abuse its discretion because 

it considered all relevant § 3553(a) sentencing factors, including 

Calderón-Lozano’s alleged attempts to cooperate with the 

government. Section 3553(a) requires the sentencing court to 

“impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to 

deter criminal conduct, protect the public from the defendant’s 

future crimes, and meet the defendant’s educational and medical 

needs. The district court, however, “is not required to address 

[each] factor[], one by one, in some sort of rote incantation when 
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explicating its sentencing decision.” Dixon, 449 F.3d at 205. 

Moreover, “[a] criminal defendant is entitled to a weighing of the 

section 3553(a) factors that are relevant to [his] case, not to a 

particular result.” United States v. Carrasco-De-Jesús, 589 F.3d 

22, 29 (1st Cir. 2009). In imposing the low-end guideline 

sentence, the district court expressly stated that it considered 

the “nature and circumstances” of the offense as well as “the other 

sentencing factors set forth in Title 18, United States Code 

section 3553(a).” A district court’s explicit statement that it 

considered the § 3553(a) factors is “entitled to significant 

weight.” United States v. Arroyo-Maldonado, 791 F.3d 193, 199 

(1st Cir. 2015) (citing United States v. Santiago-Rivera, 744 F.3d 

229, 233 (1st Cir. 2014)). The district court weighed those 

mitigating factors against Calderón-Lozano’s participation in the 

instant offense, which was “the coordination of a $100,000 pickup, 

and delivery and pick up of $80,000 [of] . . . laundered funds 

which were proceeds of . . . distribution of narcotics.” Noting 

Calderón-Lozano’s admissions to the HSI agents, the district court 

found that he knew the money laundered was the proceeds of drug 

trafficking. Rather than viewing his post-arrest statements as 

mitigation, as Calderón-Lozano suggests, the district court 

properly factored Calderón-Lozano’s admissions into his role in 

the offense. The district court expressly referenced its 

consideration of these statements during its § 3553(a) analysis. 
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The district court also considered the government’s argument that 

although Calderón-Lozano had several opportunities to cooperate, 

he declined to do so, and thus declined to take advantage of a 

cooperation agreement. 

Nor is there any evidence that the district court 

misunderstood its discretion to consider Calderón-Lozano’s alleged 

cooperation. See United States v. Landrón-Class, 696 F.3d 62, 77-

78 (1st Cir. 2012). Calderón-Lozano’s post-arrest statements here 

were “vehemently argued by [both] counsel[s] and specifically 

acknowledged by the court immediately before it imposed sentence.” 

United States v. Ruiz-Huertas, 792 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 2015). 

See also Landrón-Class, 696 F.3d at 77-78. Thus, the district 

court properly weighed the § 3553(a) sentencing factors and did 

not abuse its discretion in imposing a 46-month imprisonment 

sentence. 

Calderón-Lozano’s sentence is also substantively 

reasonable because the district court provided “a plausible 

sentencing rationale and a defensible result,” United States v. 

Martin, 520 F.3d 87, 96 (1st Cir. 2008), considering the severity 

of the instant offense and that Calderón-Lozano’s sentence is well 

below the statutory maximum of 20 years of imprisonment. Moreover, 

because Calderón-Lozano’s sentence is at the low end of the 

properly calculated guideline sentencing range, it “deserves ‘a 

presumption of reasonableness.’” United States v. Llanos-Falero, 
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847 F.3d 29, 36 (1st Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 2229 

(2017) (quoting Cortés-Medina, 819 F.3d at 572). Thus, CalderónLozano’s 46-month sentence was “not greater than necessary,” 

§ 3553(a), but rather, was “within the wide universe of reasonable 

sentences.” See United States v. Rivera-Berríos, 902 F.3d 20, 27 

(1st Cir. 2018). 

The sentence is affirmed.