IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Philadelphia Corporation for Aging :

and Liberty Mutual, :

Petitioners :

:

v. : No. 1226 C.D. 2017

: SUBMITTED: February 2, 2018

Workers' Compensation Appeal :

Board (Canty), :

Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge

HONORABLE CHRISTINE FIZZANO CANNON, Judge

HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY

SENIOR JUDGE LEADBETTER FILED: April 2, 2018

Philadelphia Corporation for Aging and Liberty Mutual (collectively,

“Employer”) petition for review of an order of the Workers’ Compensation Appeal 

Board (Board) that reversed the order of a Workers’ Compensation Judge (WCJ), 

after remand, granting Employer’s petition to terminate the workers’ compensation 

benefits of Adrian L. Canty (Claimant). We affirm.

Claimant sustained an April 2012 work-related injury in the nature of

cervical, dorsal, and lumbar strains as the result of a car accident during the course 

of her employment as an assessment worker for Employer. (WCJ’s September 21, 

2016, Decision, Findings of Fact (F.F.) Nos. 4(a) and 12.) Following the initial 

litigation, the WCJ granted her claim petition and dismissed Employer’s first 

termination petition. Employer filed a second termination petition in September 
2

2014, alleging that Claimant had fully recovered from her work injury as of August 

13, 2014, the date of Steven Hausmann, M.D.’s independent medical examination

(IME). In July 2015, the WCJ granted Employer’s second termination petition, 

concluding that, as of the date of the IME, Claimant was fully recovered from her 

work injuries and able to return to her pre-injury job.

In May 2016, the Board remanded the matter to the WCJ to determine 

whether Employer had met its burden of establishing a change in Claimant’s

physical condition between the denial of the first termination petition and the second 

in accordance with Lewis v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (Giles & 

Ransome, Inc.), 919 A.2d 922 (Pa. 2007). The WCJ issued a September 2016 

decision with three new fact-findings and, once again, concluded that Employer had 

met its burden. The Board reversed and Employer’s petition for review followed.

On appeal, Employer maintains that the Board erred in determining that 

the WCJ’s decision was not supported by substantial competent evidence. In 

addition, Employer asserts that the Board improperly reweighed the evidence and 

disregarded the WCJ’s credibility determinations, which Employer contends support 

a conclusion that Claimant’s ongoing complaints are unrelated to the work injury. 

Employer’s position is without merit.

In order to terminate benefits based on the theory that a claimant’s 

disability has reduced or ceased due to an improvement in physical ability: “[I]t is 

first necessary that the employer’s petition be based upon medical proof of a change 

in the claimant’s physical condition. Only then can the [WCJ] determine whether 

the change in physical condition has effectuated a change in the claimant’s disability, 

i.e., the loss of his earning power.” Id. at 926. Where termination has been denied 

and the employer seeks a subsequent termination, the employer must establish that 
3

a change in physical condition has occurred since the preceding disability 

determination. Id. “Absent this requirement ‘a disgruntled employer (or claimant) 

could repeatedly attack what he considers an erroneous decision of a [WCJ] by filing 

petitions based on the same evidence ad infinitum, in the hope that one [WCJ] would 

finally decide in his favor.’” Id. (citations omitted). In summary, a simple finding 

of full recovery is insufficient. The WCJ must render a fact-finding accepting as 

credible a medical expert’s opinion of full recovery and that this constitutes a change 

in the claimant’s physical condition since the last disability adjudication. Delaware 

Cty. v. Workers’ Comp. Appeal Bd. (Browne), 964 A.2d 29, 35 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008).

In the present case, the WCJ issued three new fact-findings in response 

to the Board’s directive to address Lewis. One finding recited the remand and the 

reason therefore and the remaining two were as follows:

17. The undersigned finds that the weight of the 

medical evidence shows an improvement in the 

Claimant’s condition – a change in [her] condition – from 

the time of the first decision denying termination until the 

time of the second decision of July 20, 2015 granting 

termination. Among other things, [Michael Molter, D.O.],

one of [her] treating doctors, found [her] at maximum 

medical improvement [MMI] just prior to Dr. Hausmann’s 

August 13, 2014 examination. Additionally, the 

undersigned in my June 10, 2013 decision found [her] less 

than fully recovered, accepting Dr. Hausmann in part.

18. Two years had passed between the October 5, 

2012 and August 13, 2014 Dr. Hausmann examinations. I 

find Claimant improved in that interval – her condition

changed – warranting a termination as of August 13, 2014.

(F.F. Nos. 17 and 18.) For the following reasons, we agree with the Board that 

Employer failed to meet its burden.
4

As the Board noted, the WCJ on remand relied, in part, on the opinion 

of Claimant’s treating doctor, Dr. Molter. He opined that, just before Dr. 

Hausmann’s 2014 IME, Claimant was at her maximum medical improvement 

(MMI). The Board rejected the WCJ’s reliance on Dr. Molter, however, concluding 

that a determination of “MMI does not signify a change in physical condition, but 

rather that a claimant’s condition has stabilized and her condition is unlikely to 

improve any further.” (Board’s August 10, 2017, Decision at 6.) The Board’s 

analysis is sound.

As even the WCJ acknowledged, MMI “is the point where no further 

treatment is going to be effective for the patient and that is where they’re [sic] at; no 

other treatment is available.” (F.F. No. 9(p).) In that regard, the WCJ in his finding 

pertaining to Dr. Molter stated:

9(o). Dr. Molter found that they could do nothing 

else, so he found Claimant to be at [MMI]. There was no 

other treatment available, so that would make her 

recovered as much as she’s going to [be] from her 

accident. There are still the subjective complaints, but 

there isn’t any indication that she has any condition that 

was curable in any way.

. . . .

(q). Dr. Molter didn’t find Claimant to be fully 

recovered, but her injuries were basically soft tissue 

injuries and the abnormalities on the diagnostic study 

couldn’t be construed as being related. So the soft tissue 

injuries heal within eight to twelve weeks. They cannot 

really say why Claimant is still in pain. In terms of 

medical treatment for any specific traumatic injuries that 

occurred, there’s nothing further available because those 

injuries have healed at this point and fully resolved.

(Id., No. 9(o) and (q) (emphasis added)).
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By way of analysis, the meaning of the MMI determination was that 

there was nothing more to do for Claimant, not that there necessarily was a complete 

healing and resolution of her work injuries. Accordingly, notwithstanding the 

WCJ’s reference to the nature of soft tissue injuries, the above finding simply does 

not support his conclusion that the MMI determination was tantamount to a change 

in Claimant’s medical condition and full recovery since the last disability 

adjudication. 

Moreover, as the Board observed, the testimony of Dr. Hausmann, 

which the WCJ also found to be credible and relied upon, “indicated that both his 

examinations of Claimant in 2012 and 2014 established substantially the same 

findings and with residual symptoms.” (Board’s Decision at 6) (emphasis added). 

In pertinent part, Dr. Hausmann testified as follows:

Q. Based upon the history that you took at your 

second IME and your physical examination and additional 

records that you had to review at that time, within a 

reasonable degree of medical certainty, did you form any 

opinions?

A. Well, my opinion was that she had strain injuries 

to the neck, mid and lower back. The prior scoliosis I felt 

made her slower to recover. I didn’t find any traumatic 

damage. I noted that the impact was fairly minor, and I 

didn’t see anything on the CAT scan to show any bony 

injury.

At that point, I didn’t think that any further 

treatment was appropriate. I thought at that point that she 

had reached a point of [MMI] and that she was going to be 

left with certain symptoms. And I felt that she could return 

to work as a social worker at that time and I felt that she 

was recovered with symptoms.

Q. I’m sorry, go ahead.

A. Recovered with residual symptoms.
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(Deposition of Dr. Hausmann, Notes of Testimony at 15-16; Reproduced Record at 

13a) (emphasis added).

The above evidence does not establish the requisite change in medical 

condition nor an unequivocal medical opinion as to full recovery. Even had there 

been shown a change in medical condition, “[d]isability is presumed until 

demonstrated otherwise and it is the employer’s burden to prove that all disability

related to a compensable injury has ceased.” Browne, 964 A.2d at 34 (citation 

omitted).

Accordingly, we affirm.

_____________________________________

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

Senior Judge
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Philadelphia Corporation for Aging :

and Liberty Mutual, :

Petitioners :

:

v. : No. 1226 C.D. 2017

:

Workers' Compensation Appeal :

Board (Canty), :

Respondent :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 2

nd day of April, 2018, the order of the Workers’ 

Compensation Appeal Board is hereby AFFIRMED.

_____________________________________

BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER,

Senior Judge