IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 20-0768

Filed August 19, 2020

IN THE INTEREST OF B.T.,

Minor Child,

A.K., Mother,

Appellant.

________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Woodbury County, Mark C. Cord III, 

District Associate Judge.

A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights. AFFIRMED.

Jessica R. Noll of Deck Law PLC, Sioux City, for appellant mother.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Ellen Ramsey-Kacena, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellee State.

Meret Thali, Sioux City, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child.

Considered by Bower, C.J., and May and Ahlers, JJ.
2

MAY, Judge.

A mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights to her child, 

B.T.1 She claims (1) the State failed to establish statutory grounds authorizing 

termination and (2) termination is not in B.T.’s best interest. We affirm.

We review termination proceedings de novo. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 

(Iowa 2010). “We will uphold an order terminating parental rights where there is 

clear and convincing evidence of the statutory grounds for termination. Evidence 

is clear and convincing when there is no serious or substantial doubt as to the 

correctness of the conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” In re T.S., 868 

N.W.2d 425, 431 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (citing In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 706 

(Iowa 2010)).

We generally use a three-step analysis to review the termination of parents’ 

rights. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). We must determine: 

(1) whether grounds for termination have been established, (2) whether 

termination is in the child’s best interests, and (3) whether we should exercise any 

of the permissive exceptions to termination. Id. at 472–73. “However, if a parent 

does not challenge a step in our analysis, we need not address it.” In re J.P., 

No. 19-1633, 2020 WL 110425, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020).

We start with the statutory grounds authorizing termination. The juvenile 

court found grounds for termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(b), (d), 

(e), (h), (i), and (l) (2020). When, as here, the juvenile court terminates on multiple

statutory grounds, we may affirm on any ground supported by the record. See In 

 

1 The juvenile court also terminated the father’s parental rights, but he does not 

appeal.
3

re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). We focus on section 232.116(1)(h). It

authorizes termination when:

(1) The child is three years of age or younger.

(2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of 

assistance pursuant to section 232.96.

(3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of 

the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, 

or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home 

has been less than thirty days.

(4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child 

cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided 

in section 232.102 at the present time.

The mother only challenges the fourth element. It is satisfied when the 

State establishes the child cannot be safely returned to the parent at the time of 

the termination hearing. In re. T.W., No. 20-0145, 2020 WL 1881115, at *2–3 

(Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 15, 2020). 

On appeal, the State highlights the mother’s apparent concession at the 

termination hearing that the child could not return to her care. The mother 

suggested B.T. could be returned to her in six months’ time. 

Even if we disregard the mother’s apparent concession, though, we would 

still conclude the State has met its burden. The mother failed to consistently attend 

visitation. She tested positive for methamphetamine during this case and never 

completed substance-abuse treatment. She also never completed a mental-health 

evaluation, although the juvenile court ordered her to. The mother is unemployed 

and continues to live with her mother and her mother’s boyfriend. He is on the 

sex-offender registry. 
4

So B.T. could not have been safely returned to the mother’s care. This step 

in our analysis satisfied.2

Our next step centers on the child’s best interest. See Iowa Code 

§ 232.116(2). We “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best 

placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the 

physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” P.L., 778 

N.W.2d at 40 (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). “It is well-settled law that we 

cannot deprive a child of permanency after the State has proved a ground for 

termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be 

a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” Id. at 41.

Like the juvenile court, we conclude termination is in the child’s best interest. 

As explained, the mother has unresolved substance-abuse issues. She does not 

have a stable home. And she does not have a job. Considering the mother’s 

history of instability, we are not confident she will be able to adequately meet the 

child’s needs in the future. See In re C.W., 554 N.W.2d 279, 283 (Iowa Ct. App. 

1996). The second step in our analysis is complete.

Finally, we consider whether to apply a section 232.116(3) exception to 

termination. Section 232.116(3) exceptions are permissive, not mandatory. In re 

A.R., 932 N.W.2d 588, 591 (Iowa Ct. App. 2019). And the burden of establishing 

 

2 The mother does not squarely challenge the reasonable-efforts mandate. But in 

her recitation of relevant facts, she implies she did not receive the services 

necessary to facilitate reunification. To the extent she attempts to challenge the 

reasonable-efforts mandate, we find her argument not sufficiently developed for 

appellate review. See In re K.M., No. 19-1637, 2020 WL 110408, at *3 n.6 (Iowa 

Ct. App. Jan. 9, 2020); In re O.B., No. 18-1971, 2019 WL 1294456, at *2 (Iowa Ct. 

App. Mar. 20, 2019).
5

a section 232.116(3) exception rests with the parent. See A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 

476. 

As part of her best-interest argument, the mother refers to section 

232.116(3) and emphasizes her “very strong connection and bond” with B.T. From 

this, we infer the mother is relying on section 232.116(3)(c). It authorizes the court 

to forgo termination if “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination

would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parentchild relationship.” Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(c).

We decline to apply section 232.116(3)(c). By the time of the termination 

hearing, B.T. was a little over thirteen months old. And he had already spent 

almost ten months out of the mother’s care. So we think the mother has overstated 

her bond with B.T. And any lingering bond between them does not outweigh B.T.’s 

pressing, imperative need for a safe and stable home. 

The juvenile court was right. We affirm.

AFFIRMED.