Joint Special Operations University

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JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS UNIVERSITY

In IS and Cultural Genocide: Antiquities Trafficking in the Terrorist State, the 

writing team of Retired Brigadier General Russell Howard, Marc Elliott, 

and Jonathan Prohov offer compelling research that reminds government and military officials of the moral, legal, and ethical dimensions 

of protecting cultural antiquities from looting and illegal trafficking. 

Internationally, states generally agree on the importance of protecting 

antiquities, art, and cultural property not only for their historical and 

artistic importance, but also because such property holds economic, 

political, and social value for nations and their peoples. Protection is in 

the common interest because items or sites are linked to the common 

heritage of mankind. The authors make the point that a principle of 

international law asserts that cultural or natural elements of humanity’s 

common heritage should be protected from exploitation and held in 

trust for future generations. The conflicts in Afghanistan, and especially 

in Iraq and Syria, coupled with the rise of the Islamic State (IS), have 

brought renewed attention to the plight of cultural heritage in the 

Middle East and throughout the world.

ISBN 978-1-941715-15-4

IS and Cultural Genocide: 

Antiquities Trafficking in the

Terrorist State

Russell D. Howard, Marc D. Elliott, and 

Jonathan R. Prohov

JSOU Report 16-11

JSOU Report 16-11 IS and Cultural Genocide: Antiquities Trafficking Howard, Elliott, and Prohov
Joint Special Operations University

and the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

The Joint Special Operations University (JSOU) provides its publications 

to contribute toward expanding the body of knowledge about joint special 

operations. JSOU publications advance the insights and recommendations 

of national security professionals and the Special Operations Forces (SOF) 

students and leaders for consideration by the SOF community and defense 

leadership. 

JSOU is the educational component of the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. The JSOU 

mission is to educate SOF executive, senior, and intermediate leaders and 

selected other national and international security decision makers, both 

military and civilian, through teaching, outreach, and research in the 

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JSOU conducts research through its Center for Special Operations 

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USSOCOM mission. USSOCOM synchronizes the planning of Special 

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Press publications are available for download from the JSOU Library 

web page located at https://jsou.libguides.com/jsoupublications.

Roby C. Barrett

Ph.D., Middle Eastern & South Asian History 

Public Policy Center Middle East Institute and 

JSOU Senior Fellow

James J.F. Forest 

Ph.D., Higher Education Administration

Associate Professor, School of Criminology and 

Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts 

Lowell and JSOU Senior Fellow

Mario Forestier

Chief Warrant Officer, U.S. Army, Ret.

Director, Joint Special Operations Command 

Center for Counterterrorism Studies

Thomas H. Henriksen

Ph.D., History, Hoover Institution 

Stanford University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Bernd Horn

Colonel, Canadian Dept. of National Defence, Ret.

Ph.D., War Studies

Director, CANSOFCOM Education and 

Research Centre

Russell D. Howard

Brigadier General, U.S. Army, Ret.

John D. Jogerst

Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

James Kiras

Ph.D., History, School of Advanced Air and Space 

Studies, Air University and JSOU Associate Fellow

William W. Mendel

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret. 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro

Major General, Brazilian Army, Ret.

JSOU Associate Fellow

James F. Powers, Jr.

Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

JSOU Senior Fellow 

Bryan C. Price

Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, Combating Terrorism Center at 

West Point

Richard H. Shultz, Jr.

Ph.D., Political Science

Director, International Security 

Studies Program, The Fletcher School, 

Tufts University and JSOU Senior Fellow

Robert G. Spulak, Jr.

Ph.D., Physics/Nuclear Engineering

Sandia National Laboratories 

and JSOU Associate Fellow 

Jessica Glicken Turnley

Ph.D., Cultural Anthropology

Galisteo Consulting Group 

and JSOU Senior Fellow 

Rich Yarger

Ph.D., History 

JSOU Senior Fellow

Joint Special Operations University

Brian A. Maher, Ed.D., SES, President

Francis X. Reidy, Interim Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research

Robert Nalepa, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret., Editor in Chief

Lisa Sheldon, B.A., Advertising, JSOU Press Editor

Cindy Snyder, B.A., Mass Communications/Journalism, Assistant JSOU Press Editor

Peter McCabe, Ph.D., Political Science, Colonel, U.S. Air Force, Ret.

Will Irwin, MMAS, Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Army, Ret.

Paul Lieber, Ph.D., Mass Communication & Public Affairs

David Ellis, Ph.D., International Relations, Comparative Politics, Resident Senior Fellows

Editorial Advisory Board
JSOU Report 16-11

The JSOU Press

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida

2016

IS and Cultural Genocide: 

Antiquities Trafficking in the 

Terrorist State

Brigadier General (Retired) 

Russell D. Howard, U.S. Army 

Marc D. Elliott 

Jonathan R. Prohov
Comments about this publication are invited and should be forwarded to the 

Director of the Center for Special Operations Studies and Research, Joint Special Operations University, 7701 Tampa Point Blvd., MacDill AFB FL 33621.

*******

The JSOU Center for Special Operations Studies and Research (CSOSR) is currently 

accepting written works relevant to special operations for potential publication. For 

more information, please contact the CSOSR Director at jsou_research@socom.mil. 

Thank you for your interest in the JSOU Press. 

*******

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Printed in November 2016.

ISBN 978-1-941715-15-4
The views expressed in this publication are entirely those of the 

authors and do not necessarily reflect the views, policy, or position 

of the United States Government, Department of Defense, United 

States Special Operations Command, or the Joint Special Operations 

University.

Authors are granted academic freedom provided their work does not 

disclose classified information, jeopardize operations security, or 

misrepresent official U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers 

authors to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the 

interest of furthering debate on key issues.
Recent Publications of the JSOU Press

Cultural Intelligence for Special Forces Personnel, JSOU Report 16-10, 

Russell D. Howard, Greta Hanson, and Carly Laywell

Training Surrogate Forces in International Humanitarian Law: Lessons from Peru, 

Colombia, El Salvador, and Iraq, JSOU Report 16-9, Patrick Paterson

Assessing Special Operations Forces Language, Region, and Culture Needs—

Leveraging Digital and LRC Learning to Reroute the “Roadmap” from Human 

Terrain to Human Domain, JSOU Report 16-8, Robert R. Greene Sands

The Asia Pivot: Implications for U.S. Special Operations Forces, JSOU Report 16-7,

Russell D. Howard and John P. Duvall, Jr.

Military Innovation in War: It Takes a Learning Organization. A Case Study of 

Task Force 714 in Iraq, JSOU Report 16-6, Richard Shultz

2017 Special Operations Research Topics

Unconventional Economics: Operational Economics in Unconventional Warfare, 

JSOU Report 16-5, Riley Post and Jeffrey D. Peterson

2016 Special Operations Essays, JSOU Report 16-4

The War Within: A Look Inside al-Qaeda’s Undoing, JSOU Report 16-3, 

Jarret Brachman

Improving the Sustainment of SOF Distributed Operations in Access-Denied 

Environments, JSOU Report 16-2, Robert Haddick

SOF Role in Combating Transnational Crime, edited by William Mendel and 

Dr. Peter McCabe

The Collapse of Iraq and Syria: The End of the Colonial Construct in the 

Greater Levant, JSOU Report 16-1, Roby C. Barrett

On the cover. The defaced 180-foot statue of Buddha, carved by monks in the cliffs 

in the Bamiyan Valley, Afghanistan, has since been destroyed by the Taliban. Photo 

by Newscom.

Back cover. ISIS militants smashed antiquities at a museum in Mosul, Iraq, in February 2015. The militants shoved statues off pedestals, and used hammers and drills 

to destroy what was left. During the destruction, a militant was quoted as saying, 

“These antiquities and idols behind me were from people in past centuries and were 

worshiped instead of God. When God Almighty orders us to destroy these statues, 

idols, and antiquities, we must do it, even if they’re worth billions of dollars.” Photo 

by Newscom.
v

Contents

Foreword .......................................................................................................... vii

About the Authors .........................................................................ix

Acknowledgements ......................................................................xi

Introduction................................................................................... 1

1. The Global Illicit Antiquities Trade and How It Supports 

Terrorism in the Middle East .......................................................... 5

2. Case Study: Antiquities Looting in Iraq up to 2010................... 17

3. Case Study: Looting and Trafficking in Syria Since 2011 .......... 25

4. Digging In and Trafficking Out: Plundering the Fertile 

Crescent for Profit and Ideology................................................... 31

5. Cultural Heritage as a Target and Victim of War ....................... 43

6. Conclusion and Policy Recommendations............................... 57

Appendix A: Acronym List ........................................................... 67

Endnotes ..................................................................................... 69

vii

Foreword

In IS and Cultural Genocide: Antiquities Trafficking in the Terrorist State, 

the writing team of Retired Brigadier General Russell Howard, Marc 

Elliott, and Jonathan Prohov offer compelling research that reminds government and military officials of the moral, legal, and ethical dimensions of 

protecting cultural antiquities from looting and illegal trafficking. Internationally, states generally agree on the importance of protecting antiquities, 

art, and cultural property not only for their historical and artistic importance, but also because such property holds economic, political, and social 

value for nations and their peoples. Protection is in the common interest 

because items or sites are linked to the common heritage of mankind. The 

authors make the point that a principle of international law asserts that 

cultural or natural elements of humanity’s common heritage should be protected from exploitation and held in trust for future generations.

Most military readers will recognize doctrinal and planning requirements concerning cultural sites and property. The conflicts in Afghanistan, 

and especially in Iraq and Syria, coupled with the rise of the Islamic State 

(IS), have brought renewed attention to the plight of cultural heritage in the 

Middle East and throughout the world. The authors describe trafficking 

and destruction of antiquities for dual purpose: to fund armed groups and 

organized crime, but also wanton destruction that fulfills the ideological 

goals of extremists. Without greater efforts to protect cultural heritage, the 

authors warn that the world will continue to suffer irreplaceable losses to 

the shared history of mankind. 

The authors offer a rational outline of a theoretical supply chain that 

spans continents and class, legal and illegal actors, and involve a shadowy 

network of accomplices. The gray networks are ancient but remain successful because they adapt to the environment. There are three key points that 

make this study important to SOF:

1. The trafficking trade reveals some of the IS’s operational infrastructure, linkages with partners and middlemen in loose and adaptive 

networks, and insight as to how the IS exploits and intimidates local 

civilian populations. 
2. The study reveals the lengths to which the IS seeks to expunge the 

landscape of non-Muslim cultural artifacts including large and immovable sites. Financial gain appears secondary or immaterial compared 

to the opportunity for destruction to fuel propaganda to advance 

their ideological goal. In the short run, SOF will be a force of choice 

to mitigate the threat and positively influence partners to blunt the 

assault on antiquities.

3. Interagency and international collaboration is vital to halting what 

amounts to cultural genocide, through legal prosecution, economic 

sanctions, customs enforcement, and diplomatic as well as military 

means. 

Readers should be mindful of the bravery of individuals, the local citizenry, who intervene to protect, defend, and preserve cultural heritage. The 

authors correctly acknowledge the private individuals and self-designated 

“Monuments Men” who place themselves at risk to preserve evidence of the 

common heritage of mankind. Finally, readers should take extra time to 

examine the comprehensive and practical recommendations at the conclusion. They are worthy of your careful consideration.

Francis X. Reidy

Interim Director, Center for Special Operations Studies and Research
ix

About the Authors 

Brigadier General (retired) Russ Howard is a senior fellow at the Joint 

Special Operations University (JSOU) and a senior advisor to Singapore’s Home Team Academy. General Howard was founding director of 

the Jebsen Center for Counter-Terrorism Studies at The Fletcher School of 

Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, and head of the 

Department of Social Sciences at West Point, where 

he was also founding director of the Combating Terrorism Center. 

General Howard’s Army positions include chief 

of staff fellow at the Center for International Affairs, 

Harvard University, and commander of the 1st Special 

Forces Group (Airborne), Fort Lewis, Washington. 

Other assignments include assistant to the Special 

Representative to the Secretary General during UN 

Operations in Somalia II, deputy chief of staff for I Corps, and chief of staff 

and deputy commander for the Combined Joint Task Force, Haiti/Haitian 

Advisory Group. He previously was commander of 3rd Battalion, 1st Special 

Warfare Training Group (Airborne) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and 

served as administrative assistant to Admiral Stansfield Turner and as a 

special assistant to the commander of U.S. Southern Command. 

As a newly commissioned officer, Howard served as an “A” team commander in the 7th Special Forces Group from 1970 to 1972. He left the active 

component and served in the U.S. Army Reserve from 1972 to 1980. During 

this period he served as an overseas manager of American International 

Underwriters, Melbourne, Australia, and China tour manager for Canadian Pacific Airlines. He was recalled to active duty in 1980 and served 

initially in Korea as an infantry company commander. Subsequent assignments included classified project officer, U.S. Army 1st Special Operations 

Command at Fort Bragg, and operations officer and company commander, 

1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group in Okinawa, Japan. 

General Howard has a B.S. in industrial management from San Jose State 

University and a B.A. in Asian studies from the University of Maryland. He 

also has an M.A. in international management from the Monterey Institute 
x

of International Studies and a master of public administration from Harvard University. He was an assistant professor of social sciences at the U.S. 

Military Academy and a senior service college fellow at The Fletcher School. 

His previous JSOU Press publications are Intelligence in Denied Spaces: New 

Concepts for a Changing Security Environment (2007), Educating Special 

Forces Junior Leaders for a Complex Security Environment (2009), Cultural 

and Linguistic Skills Acquisition for Special Forces: Necessity, Acceleration, 

and Potential Alternatives (2011), The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking: 

Scourge of the World or So Much Hype? (2013), and The Asia Pivot: Implications for U.S. Special Operations Forces (2016). 

Marc Elliott is a recent graduate of the Nonproliferation and Terrorism 

Studies master’s program at the Middlebury Institute of International 

Studies at Monterey (MIIS). His research interests 

at MIIS included global terrorism issues, antiquities trafficking, and terrorism finance in general, as 

well as anti-money laundering and Bank Secrecy Act 

compliance. Marc is also an accomplished student 

of advanced Arabic language studies. His analytical 

skills include social network analysis, open source 

intelligence, and geospatial tools. Marc previously 

received an honors undergraduate degree in the history of the Muslim world. He currently works in the 

financial crimes compliance sector and focuses on combating terrorism 

finance. 

Jonathan Prohov graduated with a master’s degree in nonproliferation 

and terrorism studies, while studying Arabic at the Middlebury Institute 

of International Studies at Monterey. He earned a Bachelor of Arts degree at 

the College of William and Mary in 2012 where he double majored in International Relations and Middle East Studies. Before coming to Monterey, he 

worked as a Research Assistant in the Stein Program on Counterterrorism 

and Intelligence at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. He is focusing on the Middle East as well as foreign fighters traveling to and from Syria 

and Iraq. He is currently working as researcher for the Monterey Terrorism 

Research & Education Program (MonTREP), focusing the trafficking of looted 

antiquities to fund the crisis in Syria and Iraq.
xi

Acknowledgements 

The authors wish to thank the Bradley Foundation for its grant supporting research that was used in this monograph.

1

Howard/Elliott/Prohov: IS and Cultural Genocide

Introduction

On 15 May 2015, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) conducted a raid 

in eastern Syria against Abu Sayyaf, a top finance official within the 

Islamic State (IS; also referred to as ISIS or ISIL) who is referred to as the 

organization’s emir of oil and gas.1 It was well known at the time that the IS 

was financing its activities by selling oil to illicit Turkish traders, through 

criminal rackets such as extortion, and, as several reports proposed but had 

not been able to prove, also by looting, trafficking, and selling valuable antiquities. The SOF raid confirmed the IS was not only engaged in the looting 

and trafficking of antiquities, but in the systematic destruction of cultural 

heritage sites in both Syria and Iraq, which they did primarily for ideological 

and propagandistic purposes. 

During the May 2015 attack on his compound, Abu Sayyaf was killed and 

SOF operators recovered more than 500 valuable antiquities. After being 

examined by experts, many of the artifacts were repatriated to Iraq in July 

2015.2 In addition to proving the IS’s exploitation of cultural heritage for 

profit, the results of the raid also suggest there will be future operations in 

which SOF will encounter looted and trafficked antiquities, and thus must 

be prepared to deal with this aspect of the IS’s illicit revenue stream. 

The purpose of this monograph is to put the security implications of the 

IS’s trafficking and destruction of antiquities in Syria and Iraq into context 

for SOF. While it is unlikely that the illegal trade of Middle Eastern artifacts 

can be stopped completely, the authors argue that the current unprecedented 

expansion in looting and trafficking can be mitigated, and that SOF can 

play a key role. This monograph also emphasizes the cultural ramifications 

of trafficking in illicit antiquities and the destruction of historic sites. It 

covers the extent of the IS’s trafficking in detail, and addresses the question 

of what must be done and by whom to at least reduce the supply and demand 

components of the problem. 

The monograph begins by reporting on the general nature of the global 

illicit antiquities market, and then describes specifically how it operates in 

the Middle East. Next, it uses the case study method to examine the relevant 

history of illicit trafficking in Syria and Iraq, and to promote understanding of the existing systems the IS has so successfully exploited. The cases 
2

JSOU Report 16-11

highlight how the IS has institutionalized existing trafficking schemes to 

profit at all levels of operations, followed by a discussion of the organization’s ideology as it relates to antiquities trafficking and the destruction of 

cultural heritage. The monograph concludes with an overview of general 

policy recommendations and offers specific suggestions on how SOF might 

become more involved in combatting the exploitation and destruction of 

cultural heritage.

The IS and Antiquities Trafficking

Policymakers and the media have been perplexed by the terrorist organization calling itself the IS since it conquered Mosul, Iraq, in June 2014. Among 

the many sensational IS actions that have captured global attention are its 

looting and trafficking of antiquities. Dramatic and sometimes absurdly 

worded headlines and assertions, such as those captioned here, have proliferated in the news: 

• “Unesco terms Isis’s destruction of heritage sites ‘cultural cleansing.’”3

• “Isis attacks on ancient sites erasing history of humanity.”4

• “Abu Bakr al Baghdadi’s ISIS has amassed a kitty of over $2 billion, 

thirty to fifty percent of which comes from the sale of artifacts stolen 

and vandalized from museums and archeological sites in Syria and 

Iraq.”5

Prior to the rise of the IS, there were numerous reports of illicit trafficking of valuable Syrian antiquities by several armed groups, which began 

with the outbreak of the Syrian civil war in 2011. When the IS began dominating world headlines in the summer of 2014, it was featured in nearly all 

reports pertaining to antiquities trafficking in both Syria and Iraq, and to 

the destruction of cultural heritage sites, despite the fact that other militant 

groups were heavily involved in both looting and destruction.6 Skepticism 

and caution were prudent in the midst of sensationalized reporting on this 

and other topics. 

However, as noted above, the valuable artifacts and declassified IS financial records seized in the Abu Sayyaf raid, as well as IS documents leaked 

to journalists, indicate the IS had integrated antiquities trafficking into its 

diverse financial portfolio and growing bureaucracy.7 For example, the IS 

Diwan al-Rikaz (Department of Precious Resources) oversees all antiquities looting and trafficking activities in both its Western and Eastern 
3

Howard/Elliott/Prohov: IS and Cultural Genocide

governorates by directing the “research and investigation of known sites,” 

“exploration and identification of [new] sites,” the “excavation” of sites, and 

the “marketing” of looted artifacts.8 The seized documents prove that the IS 

has systematic measures in place to control and profit from all antiquities 

activity in its conquered territory. This includes issuing excavation licenses 

and imposing a 20 percent khums (Islamic war booty) tax on all final sales. 

The IS can strictly enforce these measures by imposing Sharia (Islamic law) 

penalties on anyone who excavates or sells antiquities without the proper 

license or fails to pay the required taxes.9 This enforcement extends not only 

to looters and traffickers who are under their control, but also to active IS 

members.10 A sample of tax receipts seized in the Abu Sayyaf raid indicates 

that the IS generated US$265,000 in khums taxes from 11 transactions conducted between 6 December 2014 and 26 March 2015.11 The U.S. government 

“assesses that [IS] has probably earned several million dollars from antiquities sales since mid-2014, but the precise amount is unknown.”12 Taxing the 

sale of artifacts appears to be the primary way IS profits from antiquities, 

but other methods have been reported, such as direct sales to traffickers who 

move artifacts out of IS territory and into markets abroad.

The antiquities seized in the Abu Sayyaf raid most likely prove that the 

IS has merged its expertise in exploiting cultural heritage for profit with 

a complex and endemic criminal enterprise that specializes in trafficking 

antiquities throughout the Middle East.13 The raid evidence also demonstrates that, even as possible solutions to the IS’s exploitation of cultural 

heritage are being debated, existing SOF operations against the terrorist 

organization may well intersect with its involvement in the illicit antiquities trade. Therefore, it is critical that SOF be well-attuned to the nature of 

antiquities trafficking in the Middle East and in other parts of the globe 

where a dangerous nexus exists between organized crime groups and violent 

terrorist organizations, the IS in particular. 

As the IS attempts to lay the foundation for a caliphate (Islamic state), it is 

incorporating lucrative illicit revenue streams into its economy, which naturally include the ancient regional tradition of antiquities trafficking. During 

the time the authors spent researching and writing this monograph, they 

concluded that the IS is not the only group involved in the illicit antiquities 

trade in Syria and Iraq, and that the IS has exploited cultural heritage sites for 

a second and perhaps more sinister reason: to systematically destroy entire 

archeological sites and large immovable artifacts for ideological reasons. The 
4

JSOU Report 16-11

intense looting and demolition of Syrian and Iraqi cultural heritage sites is 

a phenomenon that has already done tragic and irreversible damage to the 

region’s rich culture and history. These conclusions were determined through 

a close examination of the literature on antiquities trafficking, especially in 

the Middle East, by tracking the latest developments in English and Arabic 

language sources that pertain to this topic, and by interviewing prominent 

scholars and journalists throughout the world who are actively involved in 

researching and documenting the trafficking of antiquities and destruction 

of cultural heritage sites. Perhaps the most concerning finding is that various 

terrorist organizations and their partners in organized crime have adopted 

new schemes to fund their ambitions, despite improved U.S. and global 

efforts to counter terrorist financing in recent years.
5

Howard/Elliott/Prohov: IS and Cultural Genocide

1. The Global Illicit Antiquities Trade and 

How It Supports Terrorism in the Middle 

East

Despite the recent focus on the IS and its antiquities looting activity, the 

illicit antiquities market is thriving well beyond Syria and Iraq, and 

certainly outside the Middle East. Artifacts from great ancient civilizations 

in India, Cambodia, China, Greece, Italy, and Peru, among many others, are 

also sought by wealthy buyers worldwide. To understand and act on the proliferation of looting and trafficking currently taking place in the Middle East, 

it is first important to understand the nature and scope of the global illicit 

antiquities trade, of which the Middle East is an integral part, from both 

the supply and demand perspectives. The existing scholarly literature and 

the lack of empirical data on the antiquities trade also must be understood 

to properly contextualize the characteristics of this global phenomenon. 

An Overview of the Trade and the Market for Illicit 

Antiquities

A 2011 report titled “The Fight against the Illicit Trafficking of Cultural 

Objects: The 1970 Convention. Past and Future,” which commemorated the 

40th anniversary of the 1970 United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 

Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Convention, noted the “black market of 

antiquities and culture constitutes one of the most persistent illegal trades in 

the world,” with the costliest antiquities experiencing a “100-fold” increase in 

value from excavation to final sale.14 The obvious questions are what makes 

this trade so valuable and why is there such demand. Jessica Dietzler, a 

researcher at the Scottish Centre for Crime and Justice Research, explains 

that the illicit antiquities trade is “highly sophisticated and lucrative ... for 

profit/status-driven individuals, whether collectors, professional dealers, or 

other middlemen.”15 This high-end black market persists because antiquities 

are a finite commodity sought primarily by wealthy consumers, in contrast to 

weapons and narcotics, which are easily reproduced and typically purchased 

by the general population.16 Asif Efrat, a scholar of illicit markets and trafficking at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya, claims that archeologists 
6

JSOU Report 16-11

believe the legal activities of museums and antiquities collectors are “intertwined” with a dark criminal underworld, where up to 90 percent of legally 

sold artifacts lack legitimate provenance (historical record) and are in fact 

items that were looted.17

It is difficult to describe precisely how the black market antiquities trade 

functions because it is a “macro level problem that happens on the micro 

level.”18 While many countries in Europe, the U.S., and even some Asian 

nations are the largest buyer markets for historical artifacts from many different cultures, the supply of these antiquities often comes from the thousands of looted tombs and temples, and from illicit diggings at archeological 

sites on nearly every continent. Moreover, because much of the antiquities 

trade is a ‘grey market’ phenomenon that often has shadowy connections to 

the black market in looted artifacts, a lack of empirical evidence prevents 

researchers from having a clear understanding of the trade and making more 

specific recommendations about how to curb it.19 Peter Campbell, archaeological director for the Albanian Center for Marine Research, argues that 

the discourse on the illicit antiquities trade is incomplete, primarily due 

to preconceived notions that antiquities trafficking is either a “gentlemen’s 

trade” or an abnormal network that does not involve organized crime.20

However, the discourse has recently begun to acknowledge that organized 

crime is involved in the trade.21 According to Campbell, while these criminal networks are decentralized and informal, the illegal trading goes “from 

looter to collector, [and] everyone handling illicit antiquities is part of organized crime.”22 It is important to note that antiquities, particularly the more 

valuable items that already have been excavated, can also be stolen from 

museums, private collections, or storehouses during times of crisis (such as 

the looting of the National Museum of Iraq in 2003), which enables thieves 

to avoid the labor-intensive activity of looting.23

The case that has yielded some of the most comprehensive evidence 

on an antiquities trafficking network is the Giacomo Medici case of the 

1990s and early 2000s. The story about how Medici and his accomplices 

acted as the middlemen between bands of Italian tombaroli (tomb raiders) 

and major international antiquities dealers such as Robert Hecht, Robin 

Symes, and the Aboutaam brothers, among others (along with their wealthy 

clients), is detailed in the seminal book, Chasing Aphrodite: The Hunt for 

Looted Antiquities at the World’s Richest Museum, written by Jason Felch 

and Ralph Frammolino.24 The work of these two authors, and of others who 
7

Howard/Elliott/Prohov: IS and Cultural Genocide

have researched this case, shows how just one diffuse trafficking network 

can span continents and incorporate many different accomplices, including 

looters, smugglers, dealers, wealthy collectors, and even some of the world’s 

most famous museums.25

In 1995, Italian police uncovered a sheet of paper “with a diagram of key 

players in [the] antiquities trade out of Italy.”26 This evidence, along with the 

later raid of Medici’s warehouse in the Geneva Free Ports (which contained 

many artifacts and his own archive about the artifacts’ sources and market 

destinations), revealed the international scope of his network. Medici’s artifacts were sold to collectors and museums “in Germany, Switzerland, France, 

Spain, Japan, [and] the Netherlands,” with the majority going to institutions 

in the United States, such as the J. Paul Getty Museum in Los Angeles, the 

Metropolitan Museum of Art “in New York City, Boston’s Museum of Fine 

Arts, and smaller but significant museums in Cleveland, Tampa, Minneapolis, Princeton, San Antonio, and Fort Worth.”27 Exploiting Switzerland’s lax 

trade laws and unwillingness to recognize the crime of looted and trafficked 

antiquities, Medici sold artifacts to dealers and major auction houses such 

as Sotheby’s. Over a span of 25 years, Medici sold some of the world’s most 

valuable and controversial antiquities—such as the Euphronios krater—to 

dealers, including Hecht, and museums such as the Met via an illicit transnational supply chain.28 However, it is important to stress that Medici was 

only one important node in a much larger and decentralized network of 

many conspirators, all of whom were integral to the illicit antiquities trade 

in Italian and Greek antiquities.29 The Medici case alone is revealing, but 

it is not the only example or the archetype of the global antiquities trade. 

Recent scholarship on the illicit antiquities trade, which takes into 

account the Medici case and others from different regions, suggests that a 

four-stage network supply chain model broadly applies to the global trafficking of antiquities (five- and six-stage models have also been suggested).30

Campbell asserts that this supply chain has an “underlying internal structure” that varies according to local factors such as economics, geography, 

laws, and cultural views on antiquities.31 In light of these complex factors, 

no fixed formula can explain every case, but the theoretical supply-chain 

model helps to explain some common characteristics of the trade. Campbell 

uses three case studies, in addition to the Medici case, to explain that the 

structures for trafficking antiquities in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Bulgaria are 

indicative of the larger global trade in illicit cultural property. The cases 
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JSOU Report 16-11

also suggest both direct and indirect connections to organized crime and 

terrorism.32

The first stage is the looting itself, which most often occurs in “politically conflicted and economically depressed regions” that have a significant archeological heritage.33 Looters are often ‘subsistence diggers’ who 

earn very low wages (less than 1 percent of the profit from the eventual 

sale) and sell looted artifacts to middlemen.34 The high unemployment rate 

in these areas (above 8 percent) is thought to create an economic climate 

that induces the poor residents to loot.35 The second stage consists of earlystage middlemen or intermediaries, such as regional metropolitan dealers 

who specialize in the procurement and transit of illicit antiquities. These 

middlemen work with organized criminal networks to traffic the artifacts 

from source to transit countries.36 The second stage offers the best opportunity to explore the involvement of traditional organized crime networks, 

according to Campbell.37 The third stage is the facilitation, where a latestage intermediary launders artifacts after transit and provides the export 

licenses and false provenance that bring the looted items to the legitimate 

global market.38 The fourth stage is where artifacts enter the legal market 

via international antiquities brokers in the country of transit or arrive at 

their ultimate destination—in the hands of the collector.39 Campbell also 

notes that the illicit antiquities trade has a networked structure, rather than 

the hierarchical character mistakenly suggested by incorrect reading of the 

evidence in the Medici case and further spurious application of that belief 

to the trade itself.40 Moreover, Efrat and Campbell agree that profit margins 

and specialized knowledge increase at each stage, and that the later-stage 

network actors, such as traffickers and facilitators, earn the highest profits.41 

UNESCO estimated in 2011 that “98 percent of the final market price of an 

[illicit artifact] remains in the pocket of middlemen.”42

In their groundbreaking study on antiquities trafficking in Cambodia, 

Simon Mackenzie, a researcher of global trafficking in looted cultural objects 

at the University of Glasgow, and Tess Davis, executive director of the Antiquities Coalition, use unique ethnographies of antiquities traffickers to present a different four-stage model. Mackenzie and Davis favor a model that 

is more formal and hierarchical than Campbell’s.43 In stage one of their 

model, a regional broker organizes looting at the source and delivers the 

artifacts to a regional trade hub. In stage two, organized criminal groups 

purchase artifacts from the broker at the trade hub and deliver them to a 
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Thai border city. In the third stage, a receiver takes delivery of the artifacts 

at the border and transports them to a major city. Finally, in stage four, an 

“internationally connected dealer” acts as the “Janus figure”—the culpable 

“interface between the licit and illicit trade.”44 The authors argue that there 

are “surprisingly few” stages between the initial looting and final integration of the artifacts into the international market.45 This model emphasizes a 

more institutionalized and hierarchical approach to antiquities trafficking by 

transnational criminal organizations, which may be applicable to trafficking 

cases well beyond Cambodia.

In Middle Eastern countries, “there are well-established networks” that 

specialize in looting and trading illicit antiquities, according to Amr Al 

Azm, a Syrian archeologist at Shawnee State University. For example, Al 

Azm describes certain small villages in Syria “near well-known archeological sites like Mari where clans and families specialize in the looting of 

archeological artifacts, and they have been doing this for generations.”46 The 

historical nature of antiquities trafficking in Syria has provided the IS with 

abundant opportunities to exploit existing looting structures and distribution networks in the region. Generally speaking, scholars have described 

various ways the looting and trafficking of antiquities occurs in the Middle 

East, especially following the 2003 invasion of Iraq and since the outbreak of 

the Syrian conflict in 2011. There appears to be a basic trafficking structure 

in both Syria and Iraq, and both countries are examined in this monograph 

in subsequent case studies. 

Al Azm explains the Syrian model, based on information gathered from 

his network of confidential informants.47 In Syria, local buyers he describes 

as “small fish” buy antiquities directly from looters and, more recently, from 

extremist groups like the IS. Prospective buyers assess the items offered, 

which include bulk items from the Iron Age and items of higher value that 

date from the Roman and Hellenistic periods. Buyers then offer “spot prices” 

for the desired items, based on their perceived market value. According to 

Al Azm, local dealers and extremist groups have a thorough understanding 

of the value of different kinds of antiquities being offered throughout Syria. 

Once a price is agreed to, the buyer pays for the items in U.S. dollars and 

leaves with the artifacts. The first buyer then sells the artifacts to another 

dealer, who sells to another—the freshly looted items gradually rise in value 

as they change hands among local buyers. 
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The next phase occurs when valuable items are acquired by what Al Azm 

calls the “big fish”—antiquities dealers, primarily in Syria, who can afford to 

buy valuable artifacts and “sit on them” for a period of five to 20 years. These 

dealers wait patiently for the value of the artifacts to increase, and for a time 

when they can sell the items to transnational antiquities brokers without 

raising suspicion that they were looted. This means of avoiding suspicion is 

also not unique to the Syrian case and has been suggested in other contexts.48

Before reaching “the markets in Europe or America where the real money 

is to be made,” the artifacts are sold repeatedly among complicit dealers to 

establish a paper trail that suggests a legitimate origin. However, says Al 

Azm, “the vast majority of goods, and in particular the valuable artifacts, 

you will never see them on the market,” as they are often sold on the black 

market to unscrupulous private collectors. While most of this activity takes 

place within Syria, Al Azm says that countries such as Lebanon and Turkey 

are important conduits for the trade because of their long, porous borders 

and their connections to the international antiquities markets in Europe 

and the United States. 

According to Abdulamir al-Hamdani, director of the Antiquities Office 

in Iraq’s southern province of Dhi Qar from 2003 to 2010, the situation 

in Iraq suggests a general structure that closely resembles the four-stage 

models suggested earlier.49 In the first stage, poor looters excavate archeological sites to earn survival money, as they lack other means of support. 

These subsistence diggers are motivated to loot because local collectors from 

nearby towns act as their benefactors, providing them transportation to 

and from sites, food and water, and daily pay for the unearthed artifacts. In 

the second stage, the local collectors acquire valuable antiquities from the 

excavators and sell them to traffickers in cities such as Baghdad and Najaf. 

In the third stage, traffickers smuggle the goods into neighboring countries 

such as Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Turkey. In the fourth stage, transnational 

antiquities traffickers purchase valuable artifacts in these transit countries 

and smuggle them through transshipment points in Greece, Bulgaria, and 

Italy, for example. The goods eventually reach destination markets in such 

cities as London and New York. Alternate routes could pass through Dubai 

or other Gulf countries to markets in the West and East Asia. 

Al-Hamdani believes that potential buyers maintain contact with Middle 

Eastern dealers and traffickers via the Internet. This was suggested in a recent 

undercover investigation conducted by UK media outlet The Independent, 
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which describes how Syrian and Turkish dealers of Syrian and Iraqi antiquities minimize the risk of being caught with illicit artifacts by showing digital 

pictures to potential buyers. This aspect of the trade is run “‘like a business,’ 

[according to the dealers interviewed by The Independent], albeit one that’s 

replete with a network of diggers, smugglers and dealers. ‘Anything you 

want, we can get for you. Just look at the pictures and tell us what you like.’”50

In fact, Dubai appears to be a key transshipment point for all types of 

illicit Middle Eastern antiquities.51 One well-connected antiquities dealer 

was caught in 2008 selling looted Iraqi antiquities, among others, “to dealers 

around the world.”52 In Operation Lost Treasure, special agents from the U.S. 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement Homeland Security Investigations, 

in cooperation with U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the Southern 

District of New York U.S. Attorney’s Office:

seized the limestone ... [head of Assyrian King Sargon II] on Aug. 13, 

2008, after it was shipped to New York by a Dubai-based antiquities 

trading company owned by the antiques dealer. This investigation 

identified a broad transnational criminal organization dealing in 

illicit cultural property. Some of the network’s shipments were 

directly linked to major museums, galleries and art houses in New 

York. The investigation has resulted in one arrest, multiple seizures 

of antiquities ranging from Libya, Egypt, and Afghanistan, and the 

return of many of artifacts. A repatriation ceremony with Afghanistan was held two years ago and future repatriations are anticipated.53

In a civil forfeiture case, the Dubai-based company was identified as 

the Hassan Fazeli Trading Company.54 Prosecutors in the case alleged that 

Hassan Fazeli intentionally misstated on its customs import form that the 

statue was Turkish in origin and worth only $6,500, not its assessed value 

of $1.2 million. In fact, falsely declaring and invoicing artifacts is a common 

way smugglers traffic artifacts into market countries and avoid the suspicion 

of customs officials. Rick St. Hilaire, an attorney specializing in cultural heritage issues, notes that a notice of forfeiture was sent to Hassan Fazeli as the 

“potential civil claimant,” but no reply was filed by “June 17, 2014, [and thus] 

the federal district court entered a default judgment, awarding the Assyrian 

sculpture to U.S. authorities with instructions that the head must be repatriated within 90 days ‘or as soon thereafter as conditions in Iraq permit.’”55
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The Fazeli case, as just one example, demonstrates that Dubai, well known 

for being a conduit for both licit and illicit trade, is also well integrated into 

a sophisticated trade in illicit antiquities.56 The complexity mentioned in 

this case, coupled with the connections to cultural heritage institutions, 

further demonstrates the problematic nexus between the licit and illicit trade. 

Unfortunately, most illicit trafficking networks in the Middle East are not 

uncovered in elaborate and well-publicized busts like Operation Lost Treasure. This means that most significant artifacts presumably slip through the 

cracks and continue to provide funds for transnational organized crime and 

even terrorism.

Moreover, researchers such as Al Azm and Campbell note that the ongoing conflict in Syria, as well as the rise of the IS in Syria and Iraq, has dramatically altered the age-old Middle Eastern antiquities trade to fit the new 

social order brought about by recent events: “While looting and trafficking 

have been around for many years in the region, it has never really been as it is 

in the present moment. The strength of loosely formed trafficking networks is 

that they alter themselves to fit the current political landscape; thus, as governments, the economy, and law enforcement change, so do the networks.”57 

The Problem of Provenance in the Antiquities Trade

The issue of provenance is one of the greatest challenges facing archeologists, 

legitimate antiquities collectors, law enforcement, and policymakers as they 

confront the problem of illicit trade in antiquities. How does one know if the 

artifact they want to acquire was looted and trafficked? The ideal industry 

standard is to establish an item’s provenance—an official record that should 

include the item’s archeological origin, detailed documentation of ownership, how that ownership has been transferred (i.e., through private sales, 

brokers/auction houses, or inheritance/bequest), and where items have been 

collected and stored after changing ownership.58 However, there are major 

problems with the system of provenance documentation. For example, there 

is no standardized procedure to verify or conduct due diligence, thus gaps in 

the chain of custody frequently make it difficult to get an accurate account 

of an item’s history.59 According to Tom Keatinge, director of the Centre for 

Financial Crime and Security Studies at the Royal United Services Institute 

in London, “the standards of due diligence and checking the provenance 

of antiquities clearly varies wildly.”60 In some cases, even the most trivial 
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evidence indicating origin or ownership such as photos, holiday cards, wills, 

and insurance records is better than nothing, because without any kind of 

substantive documentation it is safe to assume that an item has a shady or 

illicit origin.61 British archeologist Sam Hardy, author of the Conflict Antiquities blog, describes the procedural difficulties in tracing the provenance 

of historical artifacts:

It is very time-consuming to trace and check all of the sources for 

transactions that may have been conducted privately and long ago, 

which can make it very difficult for interested parties to do that 

on spec, let alone systematically. But that assumes that all of the 

paperwork has been preserved along with the object and presented 

to researchers. Even for objects that would have required licenses 

to be owned, sold, and exported, the possessors can simply say that 

the paperwork has been lost, and it can become extremely difficult 

to prove otherwise.62

Traffickers and dealers of illicit antiquities intentionally exploit these 

gaps. They often lie about the history of a looted or stolen item to disguise its 

unlawful origin, usually by creating a false provenance. In countries across 

the Middle East, many items with historic value originated in polities and 

empires that long predate modern states with defined borders, and thus 

could easily come from a neighboring nation. An example of this is a type 

of coin commonly found in Syria, which, according to one veteran Syrian 

coin dealer, also can be found in “cities that minted coins in antiquity—Lyon, 

Antakya, Athens, Rome. ‘There is no proof it is coming from Syria.’”63

Al Azm explains there are two basic steps in creating false provenance 

for a looted item.64 First, dealers remove physical evidence “that an item has 

been looted out of the ground,” such as the presence of soil, which would cast 

doubt on the claim that an item “has been in a [private] collection for 60 or 

70 years.”65 Surprisingly, unscrupulous dealers selling goods looted in conflict 

zones have ignored even this crucial step. For instance, in the documentary 

Blood Antiques, Belgian dealers are seen offering customers freshly looted 

artifacts from Afghanistan that still have dirt on them.66 When confronted 

about this by the undercover filmmakers, the dealers find it hard to justify 

the dirty artifacts. The second most common way to falsify provenance is 

for dealers to establish a false paper trail for looted or stolen items, which 

can be done in a variety of ways. For example, a dealer can state that an 
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item comes from a family collection that existed before 1970 (the cutoff date 

established by the 1970 UNESCO Convention for artifacts acquired without 

provenance).67 This is done to avoid additional scrutiny, as there is no easy 

way to verify the true origin of items held by a family for generations.

Establishing false provenance also can involve “straight forgery,” where 

a paper trail is invented and documents are crafted to “pass the eye test” 

with customs officials, who only want to see that a dossier or export license 

exists for an artifact. Customs agents are usually unwilling to conduct due 

diligence on an item’s provenance or documentation because they are more 

concerned with finding drugs or other prohibited imports.68 Illicit antiquities brokers also sell goods back and forth to each other to establish a 

track record of “private contractual sales” as a way to obscure an item’s 

illegal origins.69 This “circuitous route” of acquisition establishes a carefully 

manipulated chain of transactions, which reduces the buyer’s fears; antiquities collectors often know that an artifact has no legal origin but can claim 

plausible deniability if under scrutiny because of the seemingly legitimate 

sales records.70 The international frameworks established to deal with the 

issue of provenance clearly need increased market transparency in order to 

streamline the process for stakeholders attempting to verify the legitimacy 

of historical artifacts.

The Nexus Between Antiquities Trafficking and Terrorism in 

the Middle East

Scholarly debate is ongoing about the convergence of activity between antiquities trafficking, organized crime, and terrorism.71 Like the rest of the illicit 

antiquities trade, it is difficult to analyze any evidential aspect of the convergence with terrorism because most open-source data is speculative. While 

comprehensive literature exists on the theft of cultural heritage in general, 

and also of subsistence diggers, the documentation that associates antiquities 

traffickers with terrorist groups is lacking—mostly due to the absence of hard 

evidence.72 U.S. Marine Colonel Matthew Bogdanos—the leading expert on 

the looting of the National Museum in Baghdad in 2003—believes that terrorists’ use of antiquities trafficking to fund their operations is “too recent 

a phenomenon” to be widely documented and well understood; moreover, 

“some of the investigations remain classified because of the connection to 

terrorists.”73
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In her 2014 book, Dirty Entanglements, Louise Shelley, founder and director of the Terrorism, Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, takes a 

broad view of terrorist involvement in the illicit antiquities trade, describing it as only one component in a “convergence of illicit actors.”74 Terrorists 

and criminal traffickers of all kinds of goods use antiquities as one among 

many streams of illicit revenue, including drug and commodity smuggling, 

counterfeiting, and the weapons trade. The illicit antiquities trade consists 

of “organized rings of professional criminals who hire poor rural people to 

dig for antiquities,” which are then smuggled out of countries like Iraq and 

Afghanistan along ancient trade routes, in exchange for cash or weaponry 

that directly supports terrorism and insurgencies.75 Shelley emphasizes that 

corruption within governments, businesses, and cultural institutions such 

as museums and art galleries is an enabling factor that “integrates actors of 

both the legitimate and the illegitimate economy along with corrupt officials 

into a single network.”76 The U.S. National Central Bureau of Interpol takes 

a position similar to Shelly’s, stating that “the criminal networks trafficking 

in the illicit sale of works of art and cultural property are often times the 

same circles that deal in illegal drugs, arms, and other transactions ... [and 

that] insurgent and terrorist groups fund their operations through the sale 

and trade of stolen works of art and cultural property.”77 Former FBI Director Robert Mueller and other counterterrorism officials also have alluded to 

the connection between these antiquities trafficking groups and their ties to 

terrorists and insurgents.78

The evidence suggests that terrorists have recently exploited the profitable 

nature of valuable antiquities in war-torn countries such as Syria, Iraq, and 

Afghanistan.79 As government officials have become more efficient at targeting conventional methods of terrorist financing and following the trail of 

illicit transactions in general, terrorists have turned to alternative methods 

of financing that are more commonly associated with criminal activity.80

This paradigm shift occurred because traditional revenue sources, such as 

state sponsorship, front charities, and legal (albeit terrorist-owned) investments, have declined under government pressure, in addition to the fact 

that terrorist organizations have become more decentralized and thus more 

responsible for funding their respective operations.81 By interacting with a 

wide array of actors—looters, dealers, collectors, and traffickers—terrorists 

and other armed groups exploit antiquities as one among many sources of 

illicit revenue to fund operations that contribute to further strife.82 While 
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antiquities trafficking is certainly not the main source of revenue for terrorist 

groups, it has become increasingly important for counterterrorism finance 

efforts to target these sources to deny terrorists the ability to exploit a diverse 

portfolio that further damages rich cultural heritage sites around the world. 

The illicit antiquities trade clearly provides opportunities for organized 

criminal groups and terrorist organizations to exploit an existing and profitable revenue source. The supply-chain structures mentioned in this chapter 

show how members of mostly decentralized networks source and sell illicit 

artifacts throughout the world, both on the legitimate market and under 

the table in the black market, where artifacts can be stored for decades and 

laundered before surfacing in the legitimate market. Convenience explains 

how organizations such as the IS and other parties in the current Syrian and 

Iraqi conflicts can exploit antiquities and other resources. Moreover, countries such as Egypt have seen significant looting and trafficking of antiquities 

since the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 and the chaos that ensued.83 

All of this paints a problematic picture of this grey market as facilitating 

the theft of some of the world’s most unique cultural heritage items just 

to fill the collections of unscrupulous collectors and the coffers of greedy 

traffickers and Janus figures. To provide a further context for the networks 

and markets the IS has exploited, the next two chapters detail the modern 

history of antiquities trafficking in Syria and Iraq. 
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2. Case Study: Antiquities Looting in Iraq 

up to 2010

A History of Looting in Iraq

Like other parts of the Middle East, the looting of historic relics, and 

of antiquities in general, is nothing new in the Fertile Crescent, particularly in times of conflict. Iraq’s many civilizations left behind a trove of 

artifacts buried beneath the sand, which looters can easily exploit. In fact, 

there is a saying in Iraq that “if you dig one meter, you will find antiquities—if you dig more, you will find oil.”84 Antiquities looting as we know it 

today began in Iraq in the 19th century, and the practice has continued to 

expand as a result of growing Western interest in the archeology of ancient 

Mesopotamia.85 After the 1958 revolution in Iraq, antiquities looting became 

a crime punishable by fine or imprisonment.86 Following the 1968 Ba’athist 

coup, Iraq’s rich archeological heritage—derived from an area often referred 

to as the cradle of civilization—was integrated into the nationalist narrative to reinforce a unified Iraqi identity. After 1979, when Saddam Hussein 

assumed power, archeological sites were protected by the regime and looters 

were punished severely.87

Until the first Gulf War in 1990, active state protection prevented largescale looting.88 However, the chaos after 1990 allowed the pillaging of 13 

regional museums and significant looting of archeological sites in southern Iraq.89 Lebanese archaeologist and journalist Joanne Farchakh-Bajjaly 

has extensively studied looting in southern Iraq. She argues that the sanctions imposed on Iraq by the UN and Western nations caused impoverishment among the tribes in the region, as they prevented farmers from 

selling their agricultural products to the government.90 After the war, to 

compensate for the lack of income, these farmers turned to looting and 

began the “plundering of archaeological sites [as] a sort of revenge against 

the system.”91 Farchakh-Bajjaly’s 2007 analysis of looting in the context of 

Iraqi tribal dynamics offers insights into who the looters were and what 

motivated them. According to Farchakh-Bajjaly, the social institutions of 

a poor tribe in southern Iraq often are stronger than local government and 

law enforcement.92 These tribes also view Iraq’s cultural heritage differently 
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than Westerners do: “We see in archaeological sites the heritage of mankind. 

Many Iraqi peasants see in them ‘fields full of pottery that you can dig up 

whenever you’re broke.’”93

In the 1990s, the sanctions imposed on Iraq also created a widespread 

black market for buying and selling goods that ranged from basic commodities to antiquities. Many of these markets were controlled by the regime and 

its loyal Sunni proxy tribes, which often facilitated the illicit trade on behalf 

of the regime.94 Former Iraqi Vice President Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri directed 

this statewide organized crime network, as he was an “expert smuggler” who 

knew how to operate “vertically integrated rackets.”95 Al-Douri was also well 

known for organizing various aspects of the insurgency against the U.S. and 

is “believed to be the leader of the Baathist militant group the Naqshbandi 

Army, one of several groups said to have supported the Islamic State.”96

Al-Douri’s aptitude for smuggling, intelligence gathering, and organizing 

an insurgency appears to have aided the rise of the IS organization and 

may have influenced the ways it benefits from the looting and trafficking 

of illicit antiquities.97 A strong case can thus be made that the antiquities 

smuggling networks currently operating under the IS are similar to those 

of the 1990s, which similarly exploited cultural heritage for both profit and 

ideology. The difference between the exploitation by the IS and by Saddam 

Hussein’s regime is that the concept of preserving and venerating some of 

Iraq’s history was used to justify Hussein’s despotic rule when relevant, even 

if he benefited from his proxies’ sales of antiquities on the side. In the case 

of the IS, however, that history can either be looted to fund the group or 

destroyed in line with its extremist ideology. 

It is thought that during the 1990s entire tribes specialized in the illicit 

trade of historical artifacts because it was a “good alternative” to smuggling 

black market oil, and because antiquities trafficking became more professional and systematized over time at the hands of “mafia-like gangs.”98 International antiquities trafficking organizations are thought to have moved into 

the archeologically rich southern province of Dhi Qar in 1994, where they 

exploited both the province’s archeological sites and a large labor force of 

poor looters who lacked adequate social support from the Iraqi government.99

Another factor that drove poor tribesmen to looting, particularly the 

Shia, was Saddam’s farcical effort to drain the country’s southern marshes 

after the first Gulf War, which desiccated the agricultural potential of the 

south. Looting thus became one of these tribes’ few other sources of income, 
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particularly once the looters discovered that the much-hated regime had a 

hypocritical attitude toward antiquities and was exploiting the history of the 

Fertile Crescent for its own nationalist ambitions.100 Despite the state’s active 

protection and endorsement of Iraqi cultural heritage, Saddam’s regime 

showed little regard for archeology when it embarked on extravagant construction projects that served its interests throughout the country.101 The 

regime’s association with Iraq’s past helped looters justify their actions and 

“overcome the shame that would otherwise have been meted out to those 

involved in such an illegal activity.”102

From 1990 through 2003, Iraqi state funding for protecting archaeological sites dried up as a result of the UN-imposed sanctions, leaving many 

formerly protected sites under the authority of local tribal sheikhs who often 

were themselves involved in the illicit antiquities trade.103 Saddam attempted 

a rapprochement with the tribes in the late 1990s by offering them autonomy 

and hiring local peasants to work with Iraqi archaeologists. Farchakh-Bajjaly 

claims that this “stopped” looting in the late 1990s but that employing local 

peasants backfired after the 2003 invasion, when well-trained diggers became 

professional looters who “were ... paid extra money for digging the sites 

because they knew how to excavate without breaking the objects.”104

Post-2003 Disorder

Iraq descended into chaos following the American-led Coalition’s invasion 

in March 2003. During the battle for Baghdad, which took place from 8 to 16 

April, professional looters capitalized on the breakdown of central authority 

and pillaged the National Museum.105 Three types of looters were involved 

in pillaging approximately 15,000 artifacts: professional thieves, random 

citizens, and museum employees.106 While much has been written on the 

museum looting in both academia and in the press, Colonel Bogdanos’ academic articles and 2005 book, Thieves of Baghdad, are the most authoritative accounts and analyses of the museum looting and subsequent efforts to 

recover the stolen artifacts.107 Of the 15,000 stolen artifacts, more than 5,000 

items have since been recovered. However, many priceless artifacts, including 

some of the most historically significant, have never been found.108 Colonel 

Bogdanos emphasizes the level of expertise displayed by the looters, alleging that “professionals had come in just before the war—possibly through 

Jordan—waiting for the fog of war and the opportunity of a lifetime.”109
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The potential for profit was a tempting motivation, says Colonel Bogdanos, 

who estimates that many small cuneiform cylinder seals are worth around 

$250,000 each and thus “enable an insurgent to smuggle millions of dollars 

in his pocket.”110

The looters’ level of organization and their connection to organized crime 

are the most important takeaways from the looting of the National Museum 

and later pillaging of thousands of archeological sites. Phil Williams of the 

University of Pittsburgh, an expert on terrorist networks, distinguishes 

between the museum theft “and the [general] looting, theft, and trafficking 

of antiquities” that took place throughout Iraq after the initial invasion. 

He says that attention to the latter activity “has been largely neglected.”111

Lawrence Rothfield, cofounder and former director of the Cultural Policy 

Center at the University of Chicago, argues that the U.S. military should have 

paid more attention to the looting and smuggling of antiquities because of 

the precedent of terrorists using stolen art and antiquities to finance their 

operations and arms acquisitions. He cites similar cases in Northern Ireland 

during “the troubles” and in Lebanon during that country’s civil war.112

However, according to Rothfield, illicit Iraqi antiquities networks are 

“not terribly well understood.” It appears that middlemen approach the diggers to purchase goods and then transfer them to smugglers and dealers, 

who traffic them abroad.113 Other sources describe a similar but unspecified 

criminal trafficking supply chain in Iraqi antiquities, in which poor peasants 

loot objects for low returns and professional smugglers use age-old smuggling routes to move the goods into Jordan, Syria, and likely Turkey, where 

they are sold for higher sums.114 Colonel Bogdanos named Beirut, Dubai, 

and Geneva as known destinations for the looted goods, where they are 

given false provenance and make their way onto the legitimate market.115

The Archaeological Institute of America has estimated that the trade in 

illegal Iraqi antiquities generated $10 million to $20 million annually in the 

years following the 2003 invasion.116 Rothfield believes this figure to be on 

the “low side,” given that the 5,000-year-old Guennol Lioness statue legally 

sold for $57.2 million in 2007—“the highest price ever paid for a scripture 

or an antiquity [at that time].”117
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Using Antiquities to Finance Terrorism During the Insurgency

Colonel Bogdanos asserts that antiquities trafficking is a significant element 

of terrorist financing, ranking only below kidnapping for ransom and extorting protection money from local Iraqis.118 Moreover, the ties between terrorism, insurgencies, and organized crime in trafficking antiquities appear to 

have increased after 2003, once insurgents discovered the lucrative potential 

in Iraq’s antiquities. “In 2003, when pursuing leads to recover antiquities, we 

usually came across weapons and links to violent groups. Now, as security 

forces pursue leads for weapons and insurgents, they find antiquities.”119

Colonel Bogdanos notes that terrorists’ antiquities trafficking was “not that 

sophisticated” early in the war, but after 2004, the U.S. military “saw the use 

of antiquities in funding initially the [Sunni insurgents] and al-Qaida in Iraq, 

and [later] the Shiite militias.”120 Phil Williams concurs that antiquities, like 

drugs, are a convenient source of revenue and that “insurgents and terrorists 

[in need of] funding ... will use whatever source is available.”121

Abdulamir al-Hamdani, director of the Antiquities Office in Iraq’s southern province of Dhi Qar from 2003 to 2010, described the nexus between 

terrorism and antiquities trafficking in an interview with the authors.122 AlHamdani says that Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s Sunni insurgent group, known 

as Jamaat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad before becoming the al-Qaeda in Iraq franchise, was involved in antiquities trafficking in areas controlled by the group 

in southwestern Iraq in 2003. Al-Hamdani describes how, in 2004, Italian 

forces captured traffickers in Al Fajr with 80 stolen artifacts, which were 

placed in a police vehicle for transport to the National Museum. The vehicle 

never made it to Baghdad; it was attacked by terrorists in the Triangle of 

Death—a volatile area south of Baghdad with a mixed Sunni-Shia population 

that was, and still is, an active hub of insurgent activity. (A senior officer at 

the U.S. military headquarters in Baghdad described the Triangle in 2004 as 

“an area with a real mix of bad guys—thugs and criminals as well as terrorists ... The terrorists move in and out along ... lines that stretch in all directions”).123 The policemen transporting the stolen antiquities were murdered, 

and the artifacts seized by the terrorists. The antiquities looters and traffickers in southern Iraq were described by al-Hamdani as highly-organized and 

dangerous, as they were well-equipped with weapons and vehicles, and had 

a working relationship with the terrorist groups active in that area. 
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In the Shia areas of southern Iraq, some Shia radicals sanctioned looting on religious grounds, as long as funding could be generated directly for 

the Shia militias or indirectly in the form of taxes.124 Fundamentalist Shia 

cleric Muqtada al-Sadr issued the al-Hawasim fatwa that permitted the general looting and retention of stolen property, provided that the 20 percent 

khums tax was paid to the “local Sadrist office.”125 Broadly interpreted, the 

al-Hawasim fatwa justified the trafficking and sale of antiquities to generate 

revenue for al-Sadr’s Shia militia, the Mahdi Army. 

Donny George Youkhanna, the late Iraqi archeologist and former director of the National Museum, stated that, in “Najaf, al-Sadr’s party was heard 

to tell worshippers that looting artifacts is ethical so long as the money 

goes for guns or building mosques.”126 However, it is worth noting that the 

moderate and well-respected Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani said in 

his own fatwa that “the looting of archeological sites was not permitted and 

that all artifacts should be returned to the State Board of Antiquities and 

Heritage.”127 Considering these statements from Shia extremists and the 

prolific looting that occurred in Shia-dominant southern Iraq after the 1991 

and 2003 wars, it would not be surprising if antiquities looting was a profitable source of revenue for the violent Shia militias that frequently targeted 

Coalition forces. 

In 2010, the independent Iraqi news agency Aswat al-Iraq reported the 

recovery of “seven antiquities and documents belong[ing] to what is called 

the Islamic State of Iraq armed group in Mosul,” which were discovered when 

Iraqi security forces raided a goldsmith’s store “after receiving information 

on financing armed groups.”128 The Ninewa Operations Command unit of 

the Iraqi army arrested two wanted men and seized documents belonging to 

the Sunni terrorist group Islamic State of Iraq (ISI)—the predecessor of the 

IS. The same agency reported in 2011 that “the dagger of the Mongol Ruler, 

Hulagu, was found with a gang, smuggling archaeological antiquities, trying 

to smuggle it outside Iraq.”129

These statements made by counterterrorism officials, archaeologists, and 

journalists suggest that trafficking in Iraqi antiquities is done by a sophisticated network of organized criminal organizations that collude with various 

Iraqi terrorist groups. More worrisome, from a counterterrorism perspective, 

is that it is highly likely that antiquities trafficking supported terrorists and 

insurgents during the 2003–2011 campaigns against U.S. and Coalition forces 

in Iraq. Unfortunately, this illicit activity has not ceased and it continues 
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to support the IS, which loots antiquities to fund its caliphate ambitions in 

Syria and Iraq.130

In terms of lessons learned from this period, had intelligence professionals and SOF operatives been more aware of the intricacies of antiquities 

trafficking in the region, terrorists and criminals perhaps would have been 

unable to get an early foothold in Iraq and profit from plundering historic 

artifacts. Moreover, Coalition forces and their intelligence partners should 

have recognized the influx and organization of sophisticated antiquities traffickers both before and after the conflict started, as this possibly would have 

prepared Coalition forces to prevent the degree of destructive and systematic 

looting that occurred.

Writing in 2008, Rothfield speculated that “the future of Iraq’s past 

looks bleak indeed ... Out on the sites, prospects are even more dire [than 

for the National Museum]. Most will be ruined within the next decade, 

absent some effort by those with the wherewithal to stop the looting.”131 In 

an eerie statement of foreshadowing, Rothfield noted that future wars in the 

region—in Syria or Iran (where he presumed wars would be undertaken by 

the U.S.)—would put archaeological heritage at risk “once again—whatever 

the scenario.”132 Rothfield erred in predicting U.S. action against Iran, but he 

unfortunately was right about Syria, where the civil war continues to rage. 

Iraq joined the fray for the second time following the conquest of northern 

Iraq by the IS in the summer of 2014. 

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3. Case Study: Looting and Trafficking in 

Syria Since 2011

As Syria descended into civil war in 2011, the breakdown of civil society 

and the rampant lawlessness in most parts of the country had several 

unforeseen consequences. One of those consequences was the looting of 

Syria’s 25 cultural museums and some of its estimated 10,000 archaeological 

sites. Although the antiquities looting was predicted early in the conflict, 

little was done to stop it.133 As mentioned previously in this monograph, 

antiquities looting goes back centuries in Syria, with some clans and families specializing in the illicit trade for generations. According to Al Azm, 

“looting is much older than the immediate conflict. What the conflict does 

is create an environment, a vacuum, in which illicit activity can flourish and 

spin out of control.”134

A History of Antiquities Looting in Syria Pre-2011

Looting and trafficking occurred in Syria under the Assad family’s rule, 

despite harsh laws that in extreme cases included execution.135 During the 

1980s and 1990s, some senior members of the Syrian military were involved 

in this illicit trade, according to Abdalrazzaq Moaz, Syria’s former deputy 

minister of culture and former head of Syria’s Directorate-General for Antiquities and Museums.136 In fact, former Syrian president Hafez al-Assad, father 

of current president Bashar al-Assad, was himself an avid collector of ancient 

coins, although collecting these coins was illegal. Hafez’s brother, Rifaat, 

was also known for looting archaeological sites and, given his documented 

involvement in the illicit trafficking of other goods, he may well have trafficked antiquities.137

Looting increased in Syria toward the end of the 1990s, perhaps because 

of global antiquities buyers’ growing interest in the Middle East.138 Bashar 

was personally strongly opposed to the looting and trafficking of Syria’s 

cultural heritage and he tried to crack down on this trade when he assumed 

the presidency following his father’s death in 2000.139 It was already illegal 

to own or sell antiquities in Syria before Bashar took power, but he appeared 

determined to enforce these laws more than his father had. Bashar signaled 
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this early in his presidency when he publicly had a smuggled Syrian mosaic 

repatriated from Canada, despite having to spend more money on legal fees 

than the mosaic was worth monetarily.140 Bashar also quietly transferred his 

father’s coin collection to a Syrian museum, and when Lebanese president 

Emile Lahoud gave him a Phoenician artifact dating to the first century BCE 

as a gift, it too was given to a museum.141

Nonetheless, looting by senior officials continued. According to Syrian 

archaeologist Cheikhmous Ali, president of the Association for the Protection of Syrian Archeology, this occurred due to the fact that “in most cases 

these laws were never implemented because of bribes the looters give and the 

influence that some of them have ... There are principals in the government 

[who] are very powerful and highly influential and really so good at smuggling that they can never be convicted.”142 One such individual was Ghazi 

Kanaan, Syria’s interior minister from 2004 to 2005, and the head of Syria’s 

security apparatus in Lebanon from 1982 until his death in 2005.143 While 

in Beirut in the mid-2000s, Al Azm was introduced to a local businessman 

and antiquities collector. The man told Al Azm that he knew from personal 

experience that Kanaan was very involved in looting, selling, and buying 

antiquities. One day, the businessman reported, Kanaan called him and said, 

“We have three [army] trucks on the street filled with antiquities that were 

looted from Syria and were being smuggled through Lebanon. I’ve taken 

what I want for myself already. Get on the truck and help yourself. What’s 

left we’ll return to Syria.”144 Antiquities trafficking was a profitable venture 

not only for Syrian officials but also for Syrians who were not part of the 

Ba’ath Party’s exclusive ranks prior to the current civil war; the activity gave 

“ambitious young men” the opportunity to make a “better living under a 

dictatorship.”145

Networks in Lebanon have “a long history of being a conduit for looted 

antiquities and artifacts because of its civil war [1975–1990] and because of its 

lax regulations. In fact Lebanon has been a major conduit for the smuggling 

of antiquities out of the region.”146 According to Abdalrazzaq Moaz, “sometimes the Lebanese arrest people with objects and send them back, but unlike 

in Syria, owning antiquities is not illegal in Lebanon.”147 Lebanese sources 

told Colonel Bogdanos, lead investigator of the 2003 looting of the National 

Museum of Iraq, that Hezbollah is involved in this illicit trade and even 

levies taxes on antiquities trafficked in Lebanon.148 Lebanon continues to 

serve as a smuggling conduit today and its antiquities markets are flush with 
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freshly looted artifacts, which usually make their way from Syria to these 

markets through Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley.149 Since the Syrian crisis began, 

Lebanese police have seized more than 1,000 objects being smuggled across 

the border. Lieutenant Colonel Nicholas Saad, head of Lebanon’s Bureau of 

International Theft, reports that “much more objects are probably being successfully smuggled, as we only have 5 to 10 percent chance to intercept them, 

relying mainly on customs’ searches and tips from our own informers.”150

Looting after 2011

On 11 July 2011, then Syrian Prime Minister Adel Safar wrote to government 

officials warning that “the country is threatened by armed criminal groups 

with hi-tech tools and specialized in the theft of manuscripts and antiquities, as well as the pillaging of museums.”151 Safar recommended installing 

increased security measures, such as more secure doors, alarm systems, and 

surveillance cameras.152 At the time, archaeologists from the Syrian Heritage 

in Danger initiative found these suggestions rather odd, as no looting related 

to these armed criminal groups had yet occurred.153 Safar’s directive nonetheless fits the narrative the Assad regime promoted almost immediately after 

the uprising began: that foreign conspirators and terrorists were behind the 

protests against his regime, despite no evidence of this at the outset of the 

revolution.154 Thus, some archaeologists speculated that officials in Bashar’s 

regime would engage in the theft and sale of the country’s cherished relics, 

just as they had during Hafez al-Assad’s reign, as any such theft would be 

blamed only on anti-government conspirators.155 In the same month the letter 

was sent, an Aramaic statuette was stolen from the Archaeological Museum 

of Hama and, with no sign of a break-in, it appeared to be an inside job; the 

whereabouts of the statuette are still unknown.156

However, the current Assad government was spurred into action by the 

letter from Safar, and Assad initiated a number of efforts to protect Syria’s 

cultural heritage. In 2011, the Assad regime launched a media campaign 

called “Syria My Homeland,” which, among other measures, encouraged 

the local population to protect archaeological sites.157 In 2012, Maamoun 

Abdulkarim, current head of Syria’s Directorate-General for Antiquities and 

Museums, launched a more targeted campaign called the National Campaign 

to Rescue Syrian Antiquities, which uses phone messages and billboards to 

raise awareness about the need to protect antiquities.158 Syria also launched 
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Save Syria’s History, a more proactive national campaign that relies on volunteers to provide additional security for antiquities. It also is creating a digital 

archive of known cultural properties and their locations.159 Unfortunately, 

these measures have had little effect in areas that are beyond the control of 

the Assad regime. Additionally, the Syrian regime has exploited cultural 

heritage much like Saddam Hussein’s did. Much damage to Syria’s cultural 

heritage, including looting and site destruction, has occurred as a result 

of regime military activity, such as defensive construction and destructive 

offenses. This will be covered in greater detail in chapter 5. 

By 2012, Syrian opposition groups desperately needed money and arms, 

and they too turned to looting their own heritage to finance their campaign 

against the regime.160 Soon thereafter, fighters supporting the Free Syrian 

Army developed an “association of diggers dedicated to finding antiquities 

in order to fund the revolution.”161 A known smuggler by the name of Abu 

Khaled said that even “the regime is dealing with antiquities, because they 

are collapsing economically. They need cash money to pay the shabiha [hired 

thugs].”162 Indeed, “if you ask people from Syria, they would simply answer 

[that] everyone is trafficking antiquities. And, by the way, they have been 

doing this for decades, it just increased now dramatically, because of the 

political chaos.”163 Archeological sites were looted by all sides early in the 

conflict, particularly rich archeological sites such as Apamea. According to 

Al Azm, “the site was being looted by the regime and the opposition, and 

locals, all simultaneously as they were shooting at each other.”164

After more than four years of intense fighting and looting, Syria’s rich cultural heritage “is being sold off en masse” to fund most of the armed groups 

actively vying for domination in the war-torn country.165 At archeological 

sites throughout Syria, poor looters excavate daily with the permission of 

armed groups, unearthing ancient burial sites or buildings in the hope of 

finding valuable artifacts. However, these looters “can go for weeks without 

a payday, sweating ‘for nothing,’ in the sun,” according to one man interviewed in a recent investigation of antiquities trafficking in Syria by Mike 

Giglio and Munzer al-Awad, correspondents for the media outlet BuzzFeed 

News. Looters told the correspondents that they sell what they discover at 

a low price to middlemen, who in turn sell them for higher prices: “We feel 

bad because we are stealing our history and selling it for a cheap price ... 

but we have become homeless and jobless, so we don’t care.” 
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The correspondents also spoke with Mark Altaweel, an archeologist at 

the University College London who has experience in Syria. Altaweel “was 

shocked by the professionalism” of the looters in Syria, describing their 

methodology as the kind used in a “proper excavation.” 

The conflict also has had a negative impact on wealthy Syrian families in 

major cities. The Arabic daily newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat reported in July 

2015 that the breakdown of Syrian society, as a result of the war, has caused 

many “noble and deep-rooted” Syrian families from Damascus and Aleppo 

to sell valuable heirlooms such as antique furniture, ancient manuscripts, 

and historic documents in order to meet their material needs. These items 

are reportedly being sold in large quantities at public auctions in Beirut.166

It was reported recently from Lebanon that meat trucks from Syria were 

secretly carrying artifacts to stores in Lebanon that were acting as fronts 

on behalf of IS.167

In addition to those in Lebanon, there are centuries-old smuggling routes 

across Turkey that also have facilitated antiquities trafficking.168 British and 

German reporters have come across people in both southern Turkey and 

Lebanon who are eagerly trying to sell millions of dollars’ worth of Syrian 

artifacts, which they obtained from trafficking networks with ties to armed 

groups in Syria.169 Many buyers are Syrian collectors who stockpile valuable 

antiquities within the country, while collectors from other Gulf States travel 

to Syria via southern Turkey to buy directly from dealers.170 The Turkish 

cities of Antakya, Gaziantep, Mardin, and Urfa have been identified as hubs 

for selling antiquities looted from Syria’s numerous archaeological sites, 

including Apamea and Dura-Europos, where heavy looting has been confirmed.171 Some buyers allegedly come to Turkey from Western countries to 

purchase artifacts ranging from “$100 for ... a Roman-era coin, and ... as high 

as $100,000 for statues and rare manuscripts.”172 Some buyers from Western 

countries allegedly have forged direct relationships with antiquities dealers 

in southern Turkey and make frequent trips to the region, including one 

American “man of about 50 who visited a few times a year with a translator 

... and ... pays a lot of money” for trafficked antiquities.173

Cheikhmous Ali, who is documenting the looting and destruction of 

Syria’s cultural heritage, explains that those involved in archaeological looting throughout Syria have different specialties at four basic levels of sophistication:174 (1) indiscriminate and random digging; (2) digging by thieves and 

specialists who focus on specific locations using sophisticated technology, 
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such as metal detectors; (3) systematic digging using archaeologists’ methods; and (4) excavation with bulldozers and heavy machinery, which causes 

extensive damage and has destroyed dozens of sites.175 The IS has engaged 

at all four levels and has been active at an even higher level—the purposeful 

destruction of the world’s ancient cultural heritage for ideological and propagandist purposes. While numerous groups of Syrian ‘Monuments Men’ 

are courageously risking their lives to protect all kinds of cultural heritage 

and document the ongoing destruction of archaeological sites, no measures, 

no matter how well intentioned, will be entirely effective at preventing this 

kind of looting until the fighting stops and groups like the IS are defeated.176
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4. Digging In and Trafficking Out: 

Plundering the Fertile Crescent for Profit 

and Ideology177

Islamic State Background

Despite policymakers’ apparent surprise at the dramatic conquest of 

Mosul by the IS in June 2014, the IS did not emerge as abruptly as it 

appeared to in the initial media coverage.In fact, U.S. policymakers had 

been familiar with the organization for over a decade.178 The IS is just the 

latest, albeit the most powerful, incarnation of al-Qaeda in Iraq, and while 

the group’s name and leadership have changed over the past 15 years, its 

ideology and aspirations remain those of its Jordanian founder, Abu Musab 

al-Zarqawi.

In 1999, Zarqawi founded an organization called Jamaat al-Tawhid walJihad, but the organization did not gather any significant followers until 

the U.S.-led Coalition invaded Iraq in 2003. After the invasion, like-minded 

individuals and disenfranchised Sunnis gathered around Zarqawi in a savage 

insurgency against Coalition forces.179 Eighteen months into the war, Zarqawi 

pledged his bayah (allegiance) to Osama bin Laden, but this new affiliation 

was more a “marriage of convenience” than submission to al-Qaeda’s authority.180 In fact, two letters were sent to Zarqawi from senior al-Qaeda leaders 

in 2005 telling him to “tone down the violence” because he “was alienating 

Sunnis and hurting the long-term goals of the global jihadist project.” But 

even as they admonished him, al-Qaeda asked Zarqawi to send them money, 

as “many [of their financial] lines [had] been cut off.”181

Zarqawi’s brutal tactics and attacks on Coalition forces quickly made 

him enemy number one for the U.S.-led Coalition in Iraq. On 7 June 2006, 

Zarqawi was finally tracked down and killed by an airstrike.182 However, in 

October 2006, Zarqawi’s followers swore bayah to yet another organization, 

the ISI, and its new leader, Abu Omar al-Baghdadi. According to al-Qaeda 

and IS expert Aaron Zelin, “the creation of ISI pushed the group to focus on 

taking territory and governing in Iraq’s Anbar province. The attempt ... was 

disastrous: in 2010, the leaders of ISI were killed in a joint raid conducted 
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by Iraqi forces with U.S. support, and it appeared that ISI was in its death 

throes.”183

In March 2011, protests against the Assad regime broke out in Syria, 

creating a fortuitous power vacuum for ISI. In the late summer of 2011, alBaghdadi dispatched operatives to Syria to set up a new jihadist organization, 

and by April 2013, al-Baghdadi had relocated to Syria to more accurately 

reflect his organization’s aspirations. Now operating in Syria as well as Iraq, 

al-Baghdadi changed the name of his organization to the Islamic State of 

Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). By June 2014, ISIS had conquered Mosul and large 

swaths of land in northern Iraq. Then, on the first day of Ramadan, the group 

declared the establishment of the Caliphate and renamed itself simply the 

Islamic State.184

Financing the Islamic State

The IS has worked to become financially independent by “engaging in tremendously successful criminal activity enterprises.”185 This has contributed to the group’s increased wealth, and to the difficulty of cutting off its 

sources of revenue. The IS is not simply a name; the organization is truly 

attempting to govern conquered territory in accordance with its extreme 

ideology.186 Governing, however, is expensive, and to fund this endeavor the 

IS has exploited the illicit antiquities market at an unprecedented level and 

established several other revenue streams.

By the time the IS conquered Mosul in June 2014, the terrorist organization was already involved in antiquities trafficking throughout Syria and 

Iraq.187 Indeed, just about every faction in the Syrian conflict is actively looting and trafficking antiquities to help fund their activities, just as terrorists 

and insurgents have done previously in Iraq and Afghanistan.188 Shortly after 

conquering Mosul, the IS robbed the city’s central bank and took almost all 

of its cash; as a result it was declared the “world’s richest terrorist group.”189

The IS had already gained access to oil wells in Syria, and oil was its primary 

source of revenue for several months, bringing in as much as US$1 million 

per day, according to the U.S. Department of the Treasury.190 However, the 

group’s main source of revenue is its many criminal enterprises. The IS “steals 

livestock, sells foreign fighters’ passports, taxes minorities and farmers and 

truckers, runs sophisticated extortion rackets, kidnaps civilians for ransom 

payments and much more.”191 There is a great deal of numerical speculation 
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about the income the IS has brought in from antiquities trafficking, but 

whereas terrorists are happy to pontificate on their goals and aspirations, 

they are not so forthcoming about their finances, much to the chagrin of 

cultural heritage researchers and policymakers.192

Many of the goods looted by IS operatives never reach the legal market, 

due to the black market trade in illicit antiquities, and no one on the ground 

in Syria and Iraq has verifiable intelligence to say accurately how much the 

IS makes from looted antiquities.193 Nevertheless, the organization’s involvement in antiquities looting and trafficking is clear, based on the trove of 

antiquities seized during the May 2015 SOF raid on Abu Sayyaf (see Introduction) and on information from a leading IS finance official, as well as 

anecdotal evidence, documentation by citizen journalists and concerned 

activists, satellite imagery, and the similar involvement of IS predecessors 

al-Qaeda in Iraq and ISI.194 Terrorists and traffickers are known to be opportunists and, given that the IS derives much of its income from various illicit 

activities, it would be surprising if the group were not involved in what is 

believed to be the world’s third-largest illicit market, particularly in a region 

that is home to some of the world’s oldest and most valuable antiquities.195

IS Looting and Trafficking in Syria

As noted in the Syria and Iraq case studies, antiquities looting and trafficking 

is not a new phenomenon in either country. That said, the scale of looting 

in Syria since 2011 and in Iraq since the summer of 2014 is unprecedented 

because the current conflicts have created the chaotic conditions that allow 

for looting and trafficking to continue unabated.196 Despite the paucity of 

hard evidence, an increase in looting appears to have occurred when the 

IS consolidated control in northern Syria and expanded into Iraq. In fact, 

while the majority of looting activity is thought to occur outside of IS control 

(because it occurs collectively in territory controlled by the other factions):

[IS] areas show a much higher rate of moderate and severe looting 

as a total percentage of looted sites than other parts of Syria. A staggering 42% of looted sites in ISIS-held areas is classified as severe or 

moderate looting, compared to 23% in Syrian regime areas, 14% in 

opposition-held areas, and only 9% in Kurdish areas.197
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In the Turkish province of Hatay, a smuggler known as Ugur told reporters from The Wall Street Journal that Islamist militants from groups like 

the IS now “understand how lucrative this stuff is so they exploit it with 

sophisticated networks.”198 When television station France 24 investigated 

antiquities trafficking and interviewed Syrian traffickers in Gaziantep, 

Turkey, one trafficker asserted that the IS is “pulling the strings” on all of 

the antiquities-related activity under its control, and that no one can excavate 

without obtaining the proper licensing from IS officials.199 In some cases, the 

IS appears to be “taking advantage of the pre-existing looting situation and 

institutionalizing the way they manage the illicit antiquities trade,” according to Al Azm.200 Based on information from his Syrian contacts, Al Azm 

explains that this shift toward institutionalization occurred in parts of Syria 

once the IS realized the potential profit in antiquities: 

IS found local inhabitants looting and initially began to tax them. 

By the end of summer 2014, however, they were employing their 

own people, conducting their own excavations, and were bringing 

in their own equipment and resources—they would not be doing 

this unless there is a lot of profit at stake.201

In some areas, rather than controlling the whole process, the IS instead 

appears to have put a formal tax on antiquities looting.202 Eyewitnesses in 

Manbij, a Syrian town near Aleppo, note that the way the IS treats antiquities in areas under its control depends on the local emir, who determines 

whether specific antiquities are destroyed, sold, or protected.203 The emir 

offers local looters 700 Syrian pounds (US$3.71) per day, thus fulfilling his 

role as a “responsible” governing agent and providing ample employment 

opportunities.204 After the looted antiquities are sold, the IS taxes them at 

rates estimated to range from 12.5 percent to the 20 percent Islamic khums 

tax, and as high as 50 percent for looted Islamic items.205 The Association for 

the Protection of Syrian Archeology posted on its website what appears to 

be an original IS digging license, which was obtained by the media department of a Syrian rebel group calling itself the Revolutionary Forces of Syria 

(RFS).206 The picture of the license is accompanied by the explanation that 

the IS stipulates different tax rates for looters based on their relationship 

with IS officials: 
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RFS Media Office correspondent got an [IS] license that is granted 

to excavators, and it is issued by what is called al-Rikaz Department which is involved in collecting antiquities and buried money. 

Young man (M.S.) from the town of al-Sayal, located near the [Mari] 

archaeological site in the eastern countryside of Deir ez-Zor, said “I 

got the license for free without having to share any of my excavation 

findings with [IS] since the man responsible for al-Rikaz is a relative 

of mine”. However, another man called (M.N.) said “I could not 

obtain the license until I stated that I would pay 60% of the money 

I gain from excavation works to the Rikaz Department.”207

A similar anecdote from Syrian smugglers in Turkey appeared in The 

Independent: “If we find jewelry or gold, [IS will] charge us 20 percent of 

the value and it’s official. Once you get permission you can tell everyone 

you’re going to the land and dig. You apply to [IS] to get permission to 

dig.”208 Taking this a step further, the IS reportedly opened a special office in 

Manbij to monitor looting activities, and it sometimes confiscates antiquities 

unearthed by locals and sells them to smugglers, one example being a Roman 

mosaic that the IS confiscated and sold to Turkish traffickers.209 In the eastern 

Syrian province of Deir ez-Zor, the archaeological sites of Mari and DuraEuropos have faced extensive looting, both before and after coming under IS 

control, according to recently analyzed geospatial imagery.210 Willy Bruggeman, former deputy director of Europol, believes that pillaged Greco-Roman 

frescoes and masonry are among the most common antiquities stolen from 

the estimated 1,000 historical sites in Syria now controlled by the IS.211 The 

Wall Street Journal reports that it “reviewed cell phone photos of a Bronze 

Age votive bust, possibly 5,000 years old, looted from Islamic State-controlled 

[Syrian] territory, being touted for sale to private clients and potentially sold 

for around $30,000.”212

Neighboring countries also are serving as important transit hubs for 

antiquities trafficked from IS-held regions of Syria. As mentioned in the Syria 

case study, cities in southern Turkey, such as Antakya, Gaziantep, Mardin, 

and Urfa, are major hubs for illicit antiquities that enter the country via its 

porous borders.213 Looted antiquities are also trafficked through Lebanon’s 

Bekaa Valley into the capital Beirut, which serves as an important epicenter 

for artifacts looted near Syrian cities such as Aleppo, as well as the IS capital 

city Raqqa.214 One Syrian smuggler told a reporter from the BBC that the 
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IS sells some artifacts for as much as US$1 million and that many of these 

artifacts are being trafficked to eager buyers in European countries such 

as Switzerland, Germany, and the UK, in addition to Arab Gulf countries 

Dubai and Qatar. Demand for illicit antiquities from Syria and Iraq also 

may be increasing in “places with booming luxury markets like China [and] 

Russia.”215 Al Azm claims that “repeatable antiquities buyers” from Turkey 

and the Gulf countries frequently enter Syria through southern Turkey, and 

that the IS gives them safe passage to designated meeting locations and even 

to archeological sites where the IS either oversees or is directly involved in 

looting operations. From there, buyers offer ‘spot prices’ for goods presented 

to them, as mentioned in chapter 1. After completing these transactions, 

buyers return to Turkey to sell the artifacts to other dealers or directly to 

European buyers at a considerable profit. 

IS Looting and Trafficking in Iraq

After conquering Mosul in June 2014, the IS seized tens of millions of dollars 

from local banks and also conveniently found itself controlling a few thousand of Iraq’s estimated 12,000 archaeological sites.216 By mid-July, reports 

began to emerge of the IS looting such Iraqi cultural heritage sites as “the 

grand palace of the Assyrian king Ashurnasirpal II at ... Nimrud,” where a 

“bas-relief that weighed more than 3 to 4 tons” was cut up and sold.217 The 

director of the Iraqi Institute for the Conservation of Antiquities and Heritage, which is located in Erbil, states that international antiquities “mafias” 

are advising the IS which artifacts can be sold, in a method akin to the 

“antiques wanted” section found on Craigslist.218

Since the U.S.-led Coalition attacked oil refineries under IS control—

in Iraq on 8 August 2014, and in Syria on 23 September 2014—the IS has 

increased its antiquities trafficking to make up for the loss of oil revenues.219

The IS “clearly is involved and profiting at every level, from extraction to 

final sale and exit from [its] territory.”220 According to Bruggeman, the IS is 

now seeking even greater control over its trafficking activities by establishing a direct, one-on-one relationship with buyers in the West.221 While little 

information about the Iraqi trafficking networks is available, it is possible 

that some of the same Turkish cities are hubs for Iraqi artifacts as for those 

smuggled from Syria. The IS also could be tapping into Jordan’s illicit antiquities market via a southwestern route into that country.222 According to 
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James McAndrew, a former senior special agent responsible for the Cultural 

Property, Art, and Antiquities Program of the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security, intelligence sources suggest that significant pieces leaving Iraq will 

go to buyers in the UAE, Iran, Syria, and other Gulf States.223

The Problem With Value Speculation

The ongoing chaos of war and the nature of the illicit antiquities trade make 

it impossible to calculate the amount the IS has earned from pillaging cultural heritage sites. The evidence thus far suggests that the IS treats each case 

of looting individually, and that it has procedures in place to ensure that it 

either controls or benefits from any looting and trafficking that occur in 

places under its control. Estimates of how much the IS earns from antiquities 

trafficking runs the gamut from a superficial amount to billions of dollars.224

The only official evidence to date that includes hard numbers came from the 

Abu Sayyaf raid in spring 2015 (see Introduction), which included antiquities sales tax receipts showing that the IS generated US$265,000. The only 

other potential revenue figure for its antiquities dealing came from alleged IS 

accounting records that were seized by Iraqi intelligence near Mosul in June 

2014, two weeks before the IS conquered the city.225 According to intelligence 

officials who analyzed the data, the IS derived US$36 million from antiquities 

smuggling in the al-Nabuk region of Syria alone. British archeologist Sam 

Hardy, however, has seriously questioned the reliability of this claim.226 Al 

Azm also does not find the claim credible, arguing that the records reflect 

the looting of a “small provincial museum that I know, which contains copies 

of more valuable artifacts, tourist trinkets, and Bedouin rugs—there is no 

such thing as $36 million dollars’ worth of antiquities there.”227

There is some skepticism as to whether the IS does in fact earn a significant amount from looted antiquities. A team of German journalists concluded an in-depth investigation of the organization’s financial records in 

December 2014, and one of them noted that, while looting is clearly going 

on in areas of Syria and Iraq under IS control, they did not uncover any hard 

evidence to suggest that antiquities are a significant revenue source for the 

IS.228 Abdalrazzaq Moaz, former head of Syria’s Directorate-General for 

Antiquities and Museums, argues that “archeology cannot be a significant 

source of revenue for IS and other parties because they rely on more substantial sources such as oil.”229 Moaz also says that many trafficked artifacts 
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in Syria are fakes, and that numerous archaeological sites assumed to have 

been excavated since the current conflict began had already been looted as 

far back as 2000.

In contrast, Michael Danti, an archaeologist working with the American 

Schools of Oriental Research’s Syrian Heritage Initiative, speculates that 

antiquities trafficking is highly profitable for the IS and could be its second 

highest source of revenue in some regions.230 Iraqi archeologist Abdulamir 

al-Hamdani also believes it is possible that antiquities trafficking could be 

the second highest source of IS revenue in certain regions of Iraq, after oil.231

Al-Hamdani reasons that looting and trafficking provide an easy revenue 

boon for groups such as the IS, considering the abundance of valuable antiquities lying beneath the sands at the numerous archeological sites under IS 

control. The types of antiquities that can be looted in Nineveh, Saladin, and 

Anbar provinces include desirable statues, coins, cuneiform tablets, cylinder 

seals, jewelry, and glassware. 

Diplomatic sources have offered even more extreme speculation. Rajendra 

Abhyankar, the former Indian ambassador to Syria, Turkey, and the European Union, stated in the fall of 2014 that the IS derives 30 to 50 percent of 

an estimated US$2 billion revenue from antiquities looting overall—some 

US$600 million to US$1 billion!232 In spring 2015, Iraqi UN ambassador 

Mohammed Ali Al Hakim told media outlet the Middle East Eye that “Interpol gave [Iraq a revenue] number of $100 million a year” for antiquities looted 

from archaeological sites and stolen from museums in both Syria and Iraq; 

however, Interpol does not appear to have made this claim and has not provided any data on IS antiquities revenue.233

Despite the range of speculation, the IS clearly profits from looting and 

trafficking antiquities; there is just no way of knowing exactly how much. 

Neil Brodie of the University of Glasgow calls any value statement attributed 

to illicit antiquities “absurd” because there is no way to verify the claims, 

especially if they come from parties with politicized agendas.234 Al Azm 

argues that, while the IS is clearly exploiting the illicit antiquities trade 

because of this profitability, no precise values can be placed on illicit antiquities looted or stolen under IS control unless they are “known pieces with 

a history of transactions”; this is especially true for previously undiscovered 

artifacts plundered from beneath the sand.235 Moreover, the possible value of 

different kinds of Iraqi and Syrian antiquities varies extensively:
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from area to area, depending on the materials. If you are dealing 

with Roman-Hellenistic sites, they will produce higher values. If 

you are dealing with Bronze Age sites, it is much different because 

of the nature of the materials, such as pottery and cylinder seals 

scattered about here and there. That is why looters and traffickers 

go for bulk quantity over quality with Bronze Age sites, and why 

looters under IS control are, in many cases, bringing in bulldozers 

and heavy excavating equipment in order to excavate and sell lesser 

valued items in bulk.236

Concluding Remarks: The IS View of Antiquities

As the conflict wears on in Syria and Iraq, the people who live under IS rule 

will bear the worst of it. Like many other armies with imperial ambitions 

throughout history, the IS does not just attempt to establish control and 

impose its ideology; its financial model depends on controlling territory and 

people. Therefore, from a moral perspective, the need to free the Syrian and 

Iraqi people from this terrorist organization’s oppressive rule is abundantly 

clear.

Although no evidence presented to date suggests that the IS has one 

overarching policy on looting and selling antiquities, the practice likely 

will continue to be an important revenue stream for the organization.237 An 

indication of the systemic nature of its involvement in this illicit activity is 

the “department of precious resources [al-Rikaz],” which grants licenses for 

digging; the need for such a department indicates that the income derived 

from this source is significant.238 Moreover, ancient cultural sites are prohibited under international law from being targeted by military forces, and 

thus as a source of revenue they are seemingly inexhaustible.

The IS is pillaging and destroying cultural heritage sites to support its 

mission for two main reasons: first, to bankroll a violent and totalitarian 

caliphate through a profitable illicit activity; and second, to erase the cultural identity of minority groups and ideologies that do not comply with 

its radical interpretation of Islam.239 Peter Campbell argues that the “IS is 

not only looting and selling culture to make a profit, they are also actively 

destroying culture in order to rewrite the historical narrative in Syria and 

Iraq—they are as happy to blow up a statue as they are to sell it, as long as 

it no longer remains in their presence.”240 In fact, it is possible that there is 
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ideological tension and disagreement between IS operatives over whether 

artifacts should be destroyed in the first place, defaced (literally) to remove 

anthropomorphic representations, or just sold as is for maximum profit. If 

true, this could indicate a greater ideological divergence within the organization than that regarding antiquities. 

The IS clearly has destroyed some precious archeological sites, such as 

Nimrud in Iraq, and it has assumed control over ongoing looting operations 

at others. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the IS demolishes ‘idolatrous’ 

sites after systematically looting the goods inside, thus allowing the group 

to both profit from selling the valuable artifacts and advance their brand 

through the media coverage of these cultural atrocities.241 This model is no 

different from the way the IS loots the property of the minorities they evict 

or massacre, or how its militants rob the banks, businesses, and institutions 

they conquer.242 In fact, one of the many reasons the IS is so dangerous is 

that it has been cut off from the formal financial system and thus must fill 

its coffers by any means necessary, including engaging in criminal activity. 

The first definitive proof of IS involvement in antiquities trafficking was 

revealed after the SOF raid in May 2015 that killed Abu Sayyaf, the IS finance 

official known as the emir of oil and gas (see page 1).243 USA Today quoted 

an anonymous U.S. official who said that the IS “planned to sell” the 500 

valuable antiquities uncovered in the raid, “rather than destroy them.” More 

importantly from an SOF perspective, this operation indicates not only that 

antiquities are an integral part of IS financial operations at its highest administrative levels but also that kinetic SOF counterterrorism operations can 

be used to weaken the organization’s financial strength. By eliminating or 

apprehending high-profile IS financial officials like Abu Sayyaf, SOF operations disrupt the IS’s ability to exploit the region’s cultural heritage.

However, antiquities are just one component of the organization’s diverse 

criminal financial portfolio. While the Fertile Crescent has faced severe 

looting and destruction throughout its history, it has never been threatened 

to the extent it is under IS control. With no end to this conflict in sight, 

the IS will continue to exploit this region’s endangered cultural heritage 

through its criminal rackets and violent rule. Moreover, as the IS continues 

to gain territory throughout the Middle East, it poses an immediate threat 

to the cultural heritage of countries outside Syria and Iraq, such as Libya, 

Yemen, and even Egypt.244 The IS is not the first terrorist organization to 

use antiquities to fund its operations and, sadly, it will not be the last. This 
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disturbing situation will continue until the IS can be severely weakened 

and eventually defeated—or until it has expropriated and destroyed all that 

remains of some of the world’s most ancient and valuable historical treasures. 

Until then, the international community must be vigilant in doing what it 

can to reduce demand for the illicit antiquities that fund all kinds of vile 

actors, from terrorist organizations like the IS to profit-driven transnational 

criminal groups.

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5. Cultural Heritage as a Target and 

Victim of War

The looting and trafficking of antiquities poses a significant threat to 

the cultural heritage of Syria and Iraq, and, by funding terrorism, it 

contributes to the breakdown of security and civil society. The undisturbed 

treasures of sites yet to be unearthed in these historically rich countries are 

being obliterated by looting, causing irreplaceable losses in these archeological contexts. Trafficking of the looted treasures is funding nefarious terrorist 

groups and other organized criminal enterprises. Furthermore, no discussion of looting and trafficking in Syria and Iraq would be complete without 

describing the extensive and often willful destruction of historic artifacts, 

symbols, and architecture currently taking place in these two war-torn countries. This destruction, whether caused by the artillery shells and bullets of 

competing factions or the hammers and explosives of Islamist extremists, 

poses an overwhelming threat to Syria’s and Iraq’s cultural heritage.245

The destruction of cultural heritage is an age-old consequence of war 

and conflict. Recent examples include the targeting of cultural heritage sites 

during the Balkan wars of the 1990s; the demolition of the Bamiyan Buddhas by the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001; the 2006 bombing of the Shia 

al-Askari Mosque in Samarra, Iraq; the Islamist rebels’ destruction of tombs 

and shrines in Mali in 2012; and, since 2012, the devastation of Syria’s rich 

archeological history caught in the crossfire of civil war. Perhaps most abhorrent is the IS’s current targeting of historic and cultural sites belonging to 

cultures and ideologies they oppose, as the IS often documents its destructive 

acts for the world to see in skillfully edited propaganda videos.246

The ongoing conflicts in Syria and Iraq have brought renewed attention 

to the debate over how to deal with the destruction of cultural heritage in 

times of war and conflict.247 As thousands of Syrians and Iraqis continue to 

lose their lives, the violence is also taking a considerable toll on cities and 

historic buildings that have existed for millennia and are an integral part 

of these communities’ identity and urban fabric. Moreover, the targeted 

archeological sites are a testament to the diverse history and civilizations of 

the Middle East.248
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This cultural heritage—the monumental architecture, archeological 

ruins, and priceless artifacts of exquisite artistry and craftsmanship—is 

immeasurably valuable. Richard Kurin, undersecretary for history, art, and 

culture at the Smithsonian Institution, explains that the value of cultural 

heritage lies in the fact that it:

embodies knowledge of particular times about architecture, engineering, design, social structure, economy, craftsmanship and 

religious beliefs ... But heritage is not only about the past ... It 

symbolizes how people think of themselves and others, including 

their predecessors and neighbors today. In that sense, cultural heritage teaches us about tolerance and respect for a diverse humanity. 

Saving heritage saves us from the foibles of arrogance, intolerance, 

prejudice toward and persecution of our fellow human beings.249

Therefore, it is imperative to understand and act to mitigate the current 

threat to the cultural heritage of Syria and Iraq to prevent further destruction 

and the risk that the world will lose the artifacts and other remains of this 

invaluable history forever. The international community must find ways to 

protect cultural heritage sites in the Middle East and throughout the world 

that are being threatened by armed conflict and criminal exploitation. Some 

possible solutions to protect cultural heritage in general and to deal with the 

IS phenomenon specifically were proposed by the Antiquities Coalition, Asia 

Society, and Middle East Institute in their 2016 report “#CultureUnderThreat 

Task Force: Recommendations for the U.S. Government.” The report’s proposals to protect cultural heritage sites include “executive action to ‘prioritize 

the protection of cultural property in military operations,’” Department 

of Defense (DOD) support for “‘no strike lists’ of cultural heritage sites ... 

during armed conflict,” the reconstitution of the “Monuments Men,” and 

additional training on “cultural property protection (CPP)” for military 

personnel, such as civil affairs and SOF.250 This chapter argues further that 

U.S. policymakers and SOF should go beyond the traditional strategy of ‘following the money’—in other words, the often effective strategy used to track 

financing sources and methods (including antiquities) in order to uncover 

terrorist networks’ means of support and how they execute operations. With 

regard to antiquities and cultural heritage, counterterrorism operations 

should not only undermine the terrorist groups’ financial exploitation of 

cultural heritage but also do more to challenge the ideology organizations 
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such as the IS who justify their eradication of history for profit and propaganda. Undermining this ideology will not only benefit the endangered cultural heritage of Syria and Iraq, it also will be a key component of efforts to 

counter the violent extremism that is costing so much in lives and property. 

Under the Bombs and the Fog of War: The Destruction of 

Syrian Cultural Heritage 

Syria’s archeological sites and historic structures began to suffer almost 

immediately after the anti-government demonstrations in 2011 and the 

outbreak of large-scale armed conflict in 2012. The proliferation of looting 

activities began in early 2012, as the government lost control of historic 

sites throughout northern Syria. Meanwhile, in regime strongholds, Syrian 

forces sought shelter and built “trenches and hideouts, all while digging in 

areas that are considered historic and should be protected, such as Apamea 

and Tadmur [Palmyra].”251 Regime forces built a road at the historic site of 

Qal’at al-Madiq and defensive fences and trenches “in many hills such as Tal 

Uthman, Tal Qarqoor, Qal’at Hums, [and] Qal’at Hamat.”252

Since 2012, regime and opposition forces have been fighting throughout Syria, including intense battles at archaeological sites such as Bosra, 

Palmyra, Apamea, and other ancient settlements.253 Stephan Savage, an 

archeologist and geospatial analyst at Arizona State University, conducted 

a study that found the Syrian regime in particular, but also opposition forces, 

exploit these archeological sites because of their inherent tactical value.254 

For instance, the hilltop citadel of Qal‘at al-Madiq offered regime tanks the 

“vantage point ... to call down indirect fire on the lower town,” which was 

held by the opposition. Other examples include the Syrian regime’s use of 

the high ground at numerous other archeological sites to situate artillery 

formations and surface-to-air missile batteries.255 The intense fighting also 

has damaged historic sites such as the heavily fortified Crusader castle Krak 

de Chevaliers, which opposition forces occupied for two years before the 

regime forced their retreat in March 2014.256 Strategic archeological locations, 

valued since antiquity, remain militarily important today and are often the 

setting for gruesome battles.

Unfortunately, countless other sites throughout Syria have been severely 

damaged by repeated shelling from all parties in the conflict, ongoing regime 

airstrikes, and the construction of defensive positions.257 To date, five of six 
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Syrian UNESCO World Heritage sites have sustained heavy damage, with 

only the ancient city of Damascus, which is under regime control, escaping 

destruction.258 This grueling civil war has also been fought on the streets of 

Syria’s ancient cities. Many shocking before-and-after images reveal the nearapocalyptic conditions in heavily-populated urban areas that contain many 

historic sites.259 For example, intense fighting between regime and opposition 

forces has killed scores of people in Aleppo and destroyed some of the city’s 

most valuable historic buildings and quarters, such as the Umayyad Mosque, 

the Aleppo Souk, and the 13th-century Citadel.260 Similar destruction has 

occurred in Bosra, the old city of Homs, and Krak de Chevaliers, the result of 

“the systematic bombing and shelling committed by the Syrian military.”261

The Ideology of Destruction

The deliberate destruction of Syrian and Iraqi history by armed extremists 

such as the IS and Syrian al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) exacerbates the devastation wrought during more than three years of war, thus 

creating a crisis of epic proportion in an area that has long been known as 

historic artifacts or monuments because they liken it to shirk (idolatry), the 

principal sin in orthodox Islam.262 The IS and JN believe that by destroying cultural heritage sites they are emulating the actions of the prophets 

Ibrahim (Abraham) and Muhammad, who destroyed the “false idols” their 

peoples worshipped so they would worship only God. Hadiths, or sayings 

of the Prophet Muhammad, and passages from the Qur’an are cited in the 

IS online publication Dabiq as justification for this destruction. Archeological sites are described as the remains of civilizations that became “ruined 

nations” after being destroyed by God for violating the principles of tawhid

(monotheism):263

Allah humiliated [the ruined nations] and left their dwellings on 

display to be seen by the generations that would come after them, 

not to gaze upon them with admiration, but to look at them with 

disgust and hatred, coupled with the fear of falling into shirk and 

being afflicted with the same punishment they had tasted.

The IS believes that kuffar (nonbelievers) from the West “unearthed these 

statues and ruins in recent generations ... [in order] to portray them as part 

of a cultural heritage and identity that the Muslims of Iraq should embrace 
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and be proud of.”264 The IS believes that, by venerating the past, Muslims 

serve “a nationalist agenda that severely dilutes” their loyalty to God.265 IS 

extremists feel compelled to purge the perceived symbols of sin that stain 

their lands and tempt believers into what they consider shirk, just as other 

Islamic extremists have done in Mali and Afghanistan. Extremists like the IS 

and JN destroy not only the symbols of ruined nations but also any Islamic 

shrines, tombs of saints, or mosques that teach or symbolize what they consider the wrong interpretation of Islam.266 In fact, “most ... acts of destruction [by IS] have targeted Shia and Sufi religious sites” in order “to erase the 

physical evidence of ideas and history whose existence stands in opposition 

to their own ideology,” according to Christopher Jones, a doctoral candidate 

at Columbia University who specializes in ancient Near Eastern history.267

Despite IS claims of extreme piety, a sinister propaganda element also 

appears to be at play in its ideology. Eckart Frahm, a renowned scholar of 

Assyriology, argues that much of the destruction by the IS is politically 

motivated.268 Frahm elaborates on how cultural heritage has been “used 

by previous political leaders in Iraq [see chapter 3] to build some kind of 

national identity across religions, sects, and ethnic groups—something to 

which [IS] is strongly opposed.” The IS also “seeks to inflict pain on the West, 

which considers the civilizations of ancient Mesopotamia, for good reasons, 

as one of the roots of its own culture ... Many [IS] supporters operating in 

Iraq are foreigners from the West who are well aware of this.”269 A quick 

Google search for the destruction of cultural heritage by the IS, ISIL, or ISIS 

shows the topic has been widely covered by media outlets throughout the 

world, which may be fueling the organization’s motivation to destroy cultural heritage sites.270 The IS produces these highly-edited videos for shock 

value—they know they often will be front-page news and “boost the web 

traffic to their pornography of violence.”271 As Frahm notes, the IS is very 

aware how much of the world values its cultural heritage, and the organization exploits this appreciation for history to gain media exposure. While 

Frahm may be downplaying the role of ideology in this destruction, it is clear 

that these propaganda videos both inflame the world’s anger against the IS 

and give the organization more opportunities to pontificate on its violent, 

intolerant ideology.

Their contempt for cultural heritage has led the IS and JN to demolish numerous shrines and historic sites throughout Syria and Iraq. This 

destruction is also part of their effort to conquer significant swaths of these 
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two countries and dominate the local inhabitants both physically and ideologically. In January 2015, JN published a communiqué stating its intention 

to impose Sharia (Islamic law) in Druze-Muslim areas of Aleppo, which 

included an order to demolish Druze maqams (shrines).272 The announcement came after the 16 January demolition of the “Sufi Tomb of Sheikh 

Mohammed Nabhan and his family near the al-Keltawia Mosque (Madrasa 

al-Atabakiya) in the Bab al-Hadid area of the Old City of Aleppo” by JN 

and two other extremist groups, which acted in accordance with a “signed 

decree from the Head of the Aleppo Sharia Court and other offices dated 

January 15, 2015.”273

Social media posts and documentation by concerned citizens indicate 

that the IS also has destroyed numerous historic sites in Syria, including Sufi 

shrines, cemeteries, and ancient statues.274 The IS is thought to have bombed 

St. Mary’s Church in Tel Nasri in al-Hasakah province on Easter Sunday 

while fighting Assyrian and Kurdish militants.275 This bombing on one of 

Christianity’s holiest days demonstrates further that the IS is undertaking 

both a strategic military attack on its enemies and an ideological attack on 

the ancient Christian communities of the Middle East. Syria’s rich cultural 

heritage, which consists of ancient structures, countless archeological sites, 

and diverse religious communities, has suffered tremendously during the 

present conflict. This became especially acute when Islamist extremists like 

the IS and JN gained and held territory and began a systematic campaign 

to destroy ancient sites they deemed idolatrous.

Iraq: The Cradle of Civilizations in the Crosshairs

Iraq, the epicenter of the cradle of civilizations, has a storied millennia-long 

history as the crossroads of many different cultures, religions, and political 

entities. Because of Iraq’s geographic, political, and cultural prominence, it 

has endured extreme violence and the destruction of its cultural heritage 

throughout its history. Most notably, the Mongol invasion in the 13th century 

decimated Baghdad. The massive libraries of the knowledge-hungry Abbasid 

Caliphate were tossed into the Tigris, which ran black from the dissolving 

ink as Hulagu Khan’s forces sacked the rest of the city and looted its wealth.276 

As noted in the Iraq case study (see chapter 2), Iraq’s cultural heritage has 

suffered from extensive looting of museums and archaeological sites, which 

occurred after both the 1991 and 2003 wars. Unfortunately, Iraq’s cultural 
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heritage once again faces the threat of destruction at the hand of vicious 

aggressors. Since the IS conquered northern Iraq in June 2014, it has waged 

a concerted campaign in the diverse ethno-religious mosaic that is northern 

Iraq against the heritage of any culture or belief it deems un-Islamic. 

Once the IS took Mosul and began expanding throughout Nineveh Province, it did not waste any time before initiating this campaign against Iraq’s 

cultural heritage.277 Human Rights Watch alleges that the IS displaced the 

Iraqi minority Shia Turkmen group from two villages outside of Mosul at the 

end of June 2014, and then methodically demolished their shrines and places 

of worship.278 According to Al-Arabiya News, the IS had demolished four Sufi 

shrines and six Shia mosques in Nineveh Province by the beginning of July 

2014, in addition to vandalizing Christian churches in Mosul.279 By the end 

of July, that figure grew to 30 shrines and 15 Shia mosques, and culminated 

in the massive demolition of the mosque containing the tomb of the biblical and Qur’anic Prophet Jonah (Yunis). Other mosques containing tombs 

were destroyed around that time, including those of the prophets Daniel, 

George, and Seth.280 The IS continued its consolidation of northern Iraq 

throughout the fall of 2014, and its pillaging of cultural heritage sites. This 

included various Yazidi temples; the Shia mausoleum for the Uqaylid amir, 

Sharaf ad-Dawla Muslim in Samarra, which featured unique architectural 

characteristics; and the Christian Victory Convent of the Chaldean Sisters 

of the Sacred Heart in Mosul.281

In the first half of 2015, the IS stepped up its rampage as it came under 

increased pressure from Coalition bombings and the Iraqi military, with 

its Shia militia allies.282 Reports in January 2015 alleged that the IS sacked 

Mosul’s central library and burned 100,000 books and manuscripts.283 Then 

came the 26 February publication of a video showing the group’s shocking 

destruction of many authentic (and reproduction) sculptures from Roman 

and Assyrian periods in the Mosul Museum; the same video featured the 

ritualistic wrecking of the Akkadian winged bull statues flanking the Nergal 

Gate in old Nineveh.284 Other historic sites were targeted by the IS or sustained damage around the time the Mosul Museum video was published. The 

al-Khidr Sufi Mosque in Mosul was wholly demolished; the ninth-century 

Palace of Ashnas, near Samarra, may have sustained damage as the IS fought 

the Shia militia Kata’ib Hezbollah; and the St. George Catholic Monastery 

near Mosul was vandalized by IS militants as part of its ideological attack 

on Iraqi Christians.285
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Sometime in March 2015, the IS ransacked the ancient Parthian city and 

UNESCO heritage site of Hatra. It published a video of the destruction in 

early April, which showed “Islamic State militants usi[ng] sledgehammers 

and assault rifles to destroy ancient artifacts.”286 While the whole site was not 

destroyed, as was initially speculated, many priceless statues were crushed 

in carefully choreographed and symbolic propaganda scenes. Unfortunately, 

the ancient Assyrian city of Nimrud south of Mosul did not escape wholesale 

destruction. At some point between mid-March and early April, IS militants 

filmed their ceremonial destruction of statues and stone reliefs at Nimrud, 

which they did using sledgehammers, bulldozers, and power tools. The IS 

then rigged the site with improvised explosive devices and leveled the former 

Palace of Assyrian King Ashurnasirpal II in a massive explosion.287

The Significance of Destruction

The recent destruction of cultural heritage sites, artifacts, and other antiquities in the Middle East shows that the irreplaceable landmarks of the Fertile 

Crescent and other of mankind’s earliest civilizations are at stake, due to the 

current climate of extreme violence and increasing sectarianism. While the 

cultural heritage crises in Syria and Iraq are dwarfed by the human suffering and wholesale destruction of society and its institutions, it is important 

that the world community take notice of what is occurring and do what it 

can to prevent this wanton obliteration of human history and culture.288 The 

destruction of cultural heritage sites in Syria and Iraq is just one aspect of the 

widespread humanitarian and security crises that need to be addressed both 

locally and internationally.289 The power vacuum brought about by civil strife 

in these countries has created a terrible humanitarian catastrophe—starvation, disease, and the breakdown of civil society and critical infrastructure. 

The unfortunate destruction of cultural heritage cannot be fully addressed 

until the humanitarian and security situations improve. Moreover, cultural 

heritage cannot be a unifying factor between disparate factions if the underlying political, social, and economic tensions that are driving these factions 

to wage war against each other are not resolved. 

Through both military and ideological campaigns, Islamist extremist 

organizations such as the IS and JN are attempting to rewrite the historical narrative of Syria and Iraq. Extremists can literally create their purified 

world on a tangible level by conquering territory and erasing the remains 
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of cultures that recall past glories. Although most of the world is seemingly 

desensitized to the killing of hundreds of thousands of innocent civilians 

in these regions and unwilling to intervene to stop the carnage, the IS’s 

destruction of the region’s rich cultural heritage has caused outrage and 

drummed up renewed calls for action against the organization.290 While it 

is unfortunate that more was not done to prevent the rise of the IS and the 

consequent atrocities, the group’s call for all-out war against different peoples 

and cultures should convince the world of its true threat and thus motivate 

more actors to move to defeat it. 

The symbolic violence displayed in the destruction of cultural heritage 

sites enables extremists such as the IS to advance the ultimate goal of terrorist 

organizations, which is to influence the perceptions and behaviors of a wide 

target audience.291 By destroying these historic sites and releasing footage of 

the sacrilege in carefully choreographed videos, the IS is able to conduct an 

offensive in the information domain that extends far beyond the physical 

domains in which it operates, thereby triggering visceral and emotional 

responses throughout the world by those who fear for the safety of the Fertile 

Crescent’s antiquities.292 Radical Islamist ideology is the driving force behind 

the atrocities being carried out against people and cultural heritage, but some 

outsiders apparently do not believe that this ideology explains IS actions, 

despite the fact that it has repeatedly and explicitly justified atrocities by 

invoking this very belief.293 The attempt the IS is making to re-create history 

starting at ‘year zero’ by erasing archeological sites and ancient structures 

should convince any observer skeptical about the organization’s true ideological motivation, and that it is deadly serious about what it says.294

At the time of this writing, following a year of IS occupation, hordes of IS 

militants who hoisted the black flags of jihad over the ancient and immensely 

valuable Syrian city of Palmyra have been driven out by the Syrian regime 

and its Russian and Iranian allies. In August 2015, satellite images confirmed 

that the IS had destroyed the highly-treasured Baal Shamin temple, an act 

UNESCO described as “a war crime.”295 Other irreversible damage to Palmyra inflicted by the IS has been extensively documented by the American 

Schools of Oriental Research Syrian Heritage Initiative using geospatial tools 

and by analyzing reports on the ground.296 While no longer under IS control, 

Palmyra—already looted and damaged during years of fighting (including 

looting by regime forces)—is still in a vulnerable position. There has been 

ongoing fighting and damage to the site by Russian airstrikes, coupled with 
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renewed fears that the regime and its proxies, as well as local looters, could 

return and continue to inflict more damage on the site.

The unprecedented damage the IS has done to Palmyra and Syrian heritage was not the only act of violence against the ancient city. On 18 August 

2015, in an even more gruesome demonstration of the IS’s scorn for what 

the ancient city represents to humanity, the IS beheaded Khalid al-Asaad, 

the celebrated former Directorate-General of Antiquities and Museums at 

Palmyra.297 The militants “hung his mutilated body on a column in a main 

square of the historic site because he apparently refused to reveal where valuable artifacts had been moved for safekeeping.”298 The 83-year-old al-Asaad 

was a living symbol of what the IS seeks to obliterate—knowledge and respect 

for the region’s history and its irreplaceable artifacts. 

The international community has been correct in its concern for Palmyra 

and other valuable heritage sites and should do what it can to save what 

remains, but the rest of the world cannot convey to the people of Syria and 

Iraq that it cares more about historic stones than saving the lives of those 

the IS seeks to exploit and subjugate.299 Moreover, U.S. policymakers and 

military planners considering using SOF against the IS must recognize the 

importance of cultural heritage as part of a larger effort to restore peace and 

stability in both countries. Until and unless these goals are achieved, the 

international community will find it difficult to address the spread of this 

Dark Age ideology and save both the present generation and what remains 

of the past, or to prove to those vulnerable to extremist manipulation that 

there are far better alternatives to the destructive creed that drives the IS. 

Despite the multitude of repugnant reports emerging from Syria and 

Iraq, there is some good news. First, the international community is appalled 

by the antiquities trafficking and destruction of historic sites by the IS and 

is beginning to view this as a palpable security threat that constitutes one 

front among many in the campaign against the terrorist organization.300

In an unprecedented international call to action, many experts attended a 

regional conference organized and hosted by the Antiquities Coalition and 

10 Arab states, which was held in Cairo in May 2015. Their stated goal was 

“unifying regional and international efforts to combat the phenomena of 

looting and destroying antiquities by terrorist organizations.”301 The conference concluded by issuing the “Cairo Declaration, the first communiqué 

of its kind in historic preservation,” which makes six concrete recommendations for action and commits the 10 states to initiate immediate “joint 
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efforts” against the ongoing assaults on cultural heritage.302 While in Cairo, 

UNESCO Director-General Irina Bokova called for labeling the destruction 

of cultural heritage as a war crime because it is a “tactic of war to terrify 

populations, to finance criminal activities and to spread hatred.”303 While 

too much irreplaceable history has already been lost in Syria and Iraq, the 

conference shows a strengthened resolve to take action against the ongoing 

destruction, and to protect the increasingly threatened cultural heritage of 

countries such as Libya, Yemen, and Egypt. 

Second, innovative initiatives continue to be undertaken to preserve 

cultural heritage sites in conflict zones. Threatened archeological sites 

throughout the Middle East and North Africa are being digitally mapped 

and recorded using the latest 3D technologies in order to coordinate efforts 

to protect them against future threats, or, as a last resort, to ‘preserve’ sites 

and large artifacts digitally so that, if their physical destruction cannot be 

prevented, as recent IS demolitions have demonstrated, a record will exist 

to guide reconstruction efforts.304 Among the people who have been risking 

their lives to protect cultural heritage under fire in Syria is a secretive group 

called the Committee for Shared Culture, which was formed to “track and 

restore looted artifacts” that the IS is selling to fund its operations.305

From both a practical and moral perspective, while designing and executing kinetic operations against the IS, SOF and civil affairs in particular 

should consider ways to counter and undermine extremist ideologies that 

call for both mass murder and the destruction of cultural heritage. SOF 

could take a leading role in these efforts by partnering with civil affairs in 

a modern re-creation of WWII’s Monuments Men (officially the Monuments, Fine Arts, and Archives Section), a special U.S. Army civil affairs unit 

that worked with cultural heritage experts to recover and protect treasures 

looted by the Nazis. The Monuments Men also helped to limit the destruction of historic areas by informing military planners of places to avoid when 

bombing Germany and Japan.306 Unfortunately, in spite of the success of the 

Monuments Men during WWII and the U.S. military’s large investment in 

these efforts, “the U.S. military allowed the capability [of the Monuments, 

Fine Arts, and Archives Section] to dissipate in the years after the war ... and 

never revived [it] or any other cultural property program.”307 Following the 

end of WWII, “responsibility for cultural heritage protection was assigned 

to the Arts, Monuments, and Archives (AMA), now organized under the 

Army Reserve Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command.”308 
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The #CultureUnderThreat Task Force report rightly recommends that, as a 

first step, the DOD should “review” and “rejuvenate” the AMA to make it 

“relevant in today’s cultural crises in the Middle East.”309

If the Monuments Men program can be revived and used in the current 

Syrian and Iraqi conflicts, one follow-up option could be to insert a team 

of “Monuments Men into the field, perhaps protected by ... [SOF units], 

where they can secure key sites or ... bring relief to shattered towns.”310 By 

using military support operations to win the hearts and minds of the local 

inhabitants who have suffered severely under IS control and witnessed the 

annihilation of their own property as well as their cultural heritage, such 

an effort would be one important part of a broader operation to degrade 

and defeat the IS. 

Furthermore, according to Ronald T.P. Alcala, a major in the Judge Advocate General’s Corps of the U.S. Army and Military Personnel Law Attorney, the U.S. military, in general, should avoid some of the mistakes made 

during the 2003 Iraq War with regard to cultural heritage. Alcala notes three 

counterproductive military activities. First, there was a “general absence of 

cultural property specialists on the battlefield” during the conflict. Second, 

the occupation of ancient Iraqi heritage sites, such as Ur and Babylon, by 

U.S.-led Coalition forces were destructive. Finally, a total disregard for the 

sites’ archeological value did not win friends among the indigenous population.311 This stands in stark contrast to the efforts of the Monuments Men 

during WWII, and it contributes to the negative perception of U.S. forces 

while also setting an example that suggests cultural heritage is not valuable. As an alternative, Alcala argues, “the creation of a corps of specialized 

cultural property officers ... could help ... [establish] a greater appreciation 

for works of artistic and cultural significance,” and these “cultural property 

officers could have a profound impact on U.S. forces before they ever set foot 

in a combat zone.”

Indeed, before SOF forces and their civil affairs partners can begin to protect cultural heritage through programs called for by Alcala and others, they 

must gain a basic knowledge of the region’s antiquities and of the ideologies 

that drive the destruction of cultural heritage.312 Having this knowledge will 

enable the U.S. to challenge the destructive extremist ideological ‘narrative’ 

more effectively and to create their own narrative by communicating with 

the local population about the value of their cultural heritage, including the 

artifacts some of them are looting.313 Establishing an alternative narrative of 
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why and how U.S. forces are countering the IS—in general and against its 

exploitation of cultural heritage—could also allow SOF to glean intelligence 

about antiquities trafficking and attempts to vandalize and destroy cultural 

heritage sites the locals might be aware of.

Other recent conflicts have already shown that, when valuable cultural 

heritage is threatened, members of vulnerable communities are galvanized 

and even willing to risk their lives to protect and preserve their cherished 

legacies. During the 2012 war in Mali, Timbuktu residents personally funded 

and conducted complex operations to smuggle endangered ancient scholarly 

manuscripts to safety and out of the reach of puritanical Islamist militants. 

In Afghanistan, key personnel of the national museum secretly hid 22,000 of 

the nation’s most valuable objects and did not reveal the location even when 

threatened at gunpoint. During the Balkan Wars, inhabitants of Sarajevo 

risked their lives under shell and sniper fire to save books from the National 

Library, while others smuggled and preserved thousands of rare books and 

documents from other locations that would otherwise have been intentionally destroyed.314 When inhabitants already suffering the effects of war incur 

further risks to protect their cultural heritage, it highlights the importance 

of their culture and history to their own modern identities.

The need to protect cultural property is beginning to receive the level of 

attention long called for by such documents as the 1954 Hague Convention 

and the 1970 UNESCO Convention.315 Between summer 2014 and spring 2015, 

draft operational guidelines (yet to be adopted) were released by UNESCO 

in an initial effort to find language that will minimize disputes surrounding 

the interpretation of the 1970 UNESCO Convention and build international 

consensus on how finally to facilitate its implementation.316 The framework 

of the recent Cairo Declaration, if realized, could encourage the Arab states 

to become far more proactive in taking action against this growing problem, 

both within their own countries and by mutual cooperation throughout the 

region. The recent attention and call to action against these cultural atrocities is a good start, but more concrete measures will need to build on this 

increased awareness of the plight of the world’s cultural heritage in order to 

prevent or at least limit further destruction. Potential policy solutions are 

examined in the next and final chapter. 

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6. Conclusion and Policy 

Recommendations

Countries and organizations around the world are beginning to implement a variety of measures in response to trafficking in illicit antiquities and the destruction of ancient historical sites in Syria and Iraq. Most 

recently, in the spring of 2016, the U.S. Congress passed the Protect and 

Preserve International Cultural Property Act, which restricts the import of 

Syrian cultural property. This bill, which was signed by President Obama 

on 9 May, calls on the executive branch to establish an “interagency coordinating committee to coordinate the efforts ... to protect and preserve international cultural property at risk from political instability, armed conflict, 

or natural or other disasters.”317 In 2015, the UN Security Council (UNSC) 

passed Resolution 2199, a unanimous counter-IS financing resolution that 

bans all trade in antiquities from Syria and reaffirms the ban on trading Iraqi 

antiquities.318 Importantly, once signed, the Protect and Preserve Act will 

“fulfill the United States’ obligations under U.N. Security Council Resolution 

2199 of February 2015 to cut off terrorist financing to [IS], the Al-Nusrah 

Front, and al-Qaeda from antiquities, hostages, and oil.”319 The European 

Union, which includes several important “market countries” where looted 

items are known to be purchased, has reacted similarly to the U.S. by putting 

stronger trade controls on all Syrian cultural property.320

After the 2003 invasion of Iraq, the FBI created an Art Crime Team to 

help other countries recover stolen art and antiquities, and has since collaborated with foreign police forces in numerous undercover sting operations 

that have helped recover artifacts worth millions of dollars.321 The Homeland 

Security Investigations component of the U.S. Department of Homeland 

Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and the Customs 

and Border Protection agency (CBP), have taken active roles in investigating 

antiquities trafficking networks that benefit terrorists.322 The U.S. government, often through ICE, has also been active in repatriating looted and 

stolen artifacts to their source countries.323 During two recent operations, 

Lost Treasure and Mummy’s Curse, ICE seized and repatriated antiquities from Iraq and Egypt that were being trafficked by organized criminal 

elements to prominent buyers in the U.S.324 The State Department is also 
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assisting the International Council of Museums with its “Emergency Red List 

of Syrian Cultural Objects at Risk,” which identifies cultural artifacts that 

might come from Syria and provides phone numbers and email addresses 

of people to contact if a suspected object turns up.325

In February 2013, UNESCO held a four-day regional conference in 

Amman, Jordan, to develop an action plan to protect Syrian cultural property and build neighboring countries’ capacity to crack down on the smuggling of illicit antiquities.326 Indeed, Jordan, Lebanon, and Turkey have all 

recovered antiquities that were trafficked into their territory from Syria.327 

However, most encouraging for the Arab world and the diplomatic community was the May 2015 Cairo Declaration, signed thus far by 10 Middle 

Eastern and North African countries that have agreed “to launch immediate 

joint efforts” to take on the looting and illicit trafficking of antiquities.328

The 2015 Cairo Conference that resulted in the Cairo Declaration will be 

followed up in the summer of 2016 with a ministerial-level conference in 

Jordan hosted by the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) Task Force 

that was created by the Cairo Declaration.329

At the policymaking level, recent recommendations and conferences, 

both academic and diplomatic, have helped to strengthen the political will 

needed to address the trafficking and destruction of cultural heritage. Much 

collaboration and discussion among cultural heritage researchers and security policy specialists followed the 2015 Cairo Declaration and culminated in 

the aforementioned report “#CultureUnderThreat Task Force: Recommendations for the U.S. Government,” which was convened by the Antiquities 

Coalition, the Asia Society, and the Middle East Institute to build consensus 

on policy recommendations among various experts.330 The authors of this 

monograph, acting as members of and contributors to the Task Force, agree 

that the first-of-their-kind recommendations listed in the report are a crucial 

first step in proposing and implementing tangible solutions. 

True to its title, the report focuses primarily on the United States and its 

various departments and agencies, but it also makes recommendations to the 

United Nations and the legal antiquities market. Numerous recommendations have been made to these different entities, but those most relevant for 

this monograph, which its authors consider feasible and necessary, are the 

following made to the U.S. Armed Forces and DOD, agencies and departments, and the executive branch, as well as the antiquities market:331
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• Implement training for active and reserve duty civil affairs in the 

general background in CPP, and for SOF about antiquities trafficking 

and the ideologies driving the exploitation of cultural heritage. 

• Conduct a DOD review of the status of the Arts, Monuments, and 

Archives section with the hope of rejuvenating a Monuments Men–

type effort. 

• “The armed forces, through the Manpower and Personnel Directorate (J-1), should maintain a roster of active duty personnel with a 

demonstrated expertise in heritage-related fields, who can be quickly 

identified, tasked, and deployed to protect cultural property.” 

• The DOD should review the “1954 Hague Convention’s Second Protocol” with the ultimate goal of ratification.

• Call on the U.S. president to “use his powers as Commander in Chief 

to instruct the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to 

prioritize the protection of cultural property in military operations.” 

• “U.S. law enforcement should shift its focus from seizure and repatriation of antiquities to the dismantling of criminal networks through 

criminal prosecution.”

• “The Department of Justice (DOJ) should appoint designated prosecutors to bring criminal cases against individuals and organizations 

involved in the illicit antiquities trade.”

• “The Internal Revenue Service should require proof of legal title and 

known ownership history before granting tax deductions for art and 

antiquities.”

• “U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) should work with the 

World Customs Organization (WCO) to join and further develop 

ARCHEO, a web based application that allows real time communication between government authorities and international experts to 

prevent antiquities trafficking.”

• “Art market players should pledge to be fully transparent in their 

dealings, making publicly available documentation of legal title and 

known ownership history for all antiquities.”

• “Museums that receive public funding should adopt a disclosure 

policy that follows the intent of the Freedom of Information Act.”

• “A relevant professional organization should establish a registry of 

antiquities dealers who are verified to abide by prescribed ethical 

codes and industry best practices.”
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Other initiatives have brought other experts together with the hope of 

finding better methods for researching and collecting data on the antiquities 

trade. For instance, the authors of this monograph, working as researchers for the Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program, hosted 

a professional conference attended by some of the world’s leading experts 

on this issue to discuss ways to more accurately portray the global scale 

of the illicit antiquities trade and propose tangible policy solutions for the 

public and private sectors to address these phenomena. The conference, 

“Culture in the Crossfire: the Security and Policy Implications of the Trafficking and Destruction of Antiquities,” took place on 4 March 2016, at the 

Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, California.332 One 

primary outcome of the conference was consensus that, while some innovative research methodologies and technologies are already being employed 

effectively, more work needs to be done in both the public and private sectors to uncover additional data that will help researchers and policymakers 

fully understand the supply and demand sides of the illicit antiquities trade. 

As noted in chapter 1, while the illicit antiquities trade has been studied 

extensively from a qualitative perspective, solid empirical evidence is lacking from both the supply and demand sides, which unfortunately affects the 

way policy solutions are conceived and implemented. 

The authors of this monograph believe that some crucial progress has 

been made in raising awareness of this issue, particularly with regard to the 

cultural crimes committed by the IS, and in the effort to gather more information about the illicit antiquities trade as a whole. However, many proposed 

solutions to the upsurge in looting and trafficking in the Middle East have 

been regionally focused. Indeed, tackling the issue of trafficked antiquities at 

the regional level is a positive and necessary step in the broader international 

effort to counter the IS and resolve the Syrian and Iraqi crises. However, 

a country- or region-specific effort to stop this practice is not enough. To 

be truly effective, this international effort will have to combat antiquities 

looting and trafficking across the globe, and it must address both supply 

and demand. Also noted in chapter 1 of this monograph is the fact that the 

illicit antiquities market is truly global, with source and market countries 

on nearly every continent. While recent efforts are so far encouraging, they 

fall well short of producing a global solution. Neil Brodie of the University 

of Glasgow describes the current efforts as a “fire brigade approach,” meaning that the international community rushes to hotspots and conflict zones 
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such as Syria and Iraq only when there is a massive spike in looting and 

high-profile media coverage, and then puts countermeasures in place only 

in the immediate area of concern.333 For example, as the media and international community have been fixated on looting in Syria and Iraq, there has 

been a devastating increase in the looting of archaeological sites just across 

the border in Jordan.334 However, because the recent UNSC resolution and 

U.S. act apply only to Syria and Iraq, Jordanian antiquities are not given the 

same protection. 

A global policy approach to combating antiquities trafficking has long 

been called for in such acts as the 1954 Hague Convention and the 1970 

UNESCO Convention.335 However, these international legal frameworks have 

been criticized because they lack the strong enforcement mechanisms needed 

to protect cultural heritage effectively. The recent draft of the UNESCO 

Operational Guidelines to strengthen the 1970 UNESCO Convention provide a strong response to the recent cultural atrocities, and if the guidelines 

are adopted as hoped, they will build a more effective international legal 

framework—one that also can be enforced.336

These enforcement mechanisms must be implemented at all levels. Of 

the four stages of antiquities trafficking discussed earlier (see chapter 1), 

the third and fourth stages—the facilitating/laundering of a stolen artifact 

and its integration into the legitimate market—offer the best opportunity 

to curb the demand that currently is fueling the trade in looted antiquities 

and spurring the destruction of priceless cultural heritage sites. Ideally, SOF 

operations and other policy decisions would target the first and second stages 

of the illicit supply chain—the looting and initial trafficking—to curb the 

flow of stolen antiquities out of the source countries. However, SOF, and 

indeed the greater international community, will not be able to halt the trafficking of illicit antiquities without a much larger, legitimate, and effective 

law enforcement presence in these war-torn countries. Unfortunately, as of 

this writing, the struggle to stabilize the chaos in Syria and Iraq continues, 

with no apparent end in sight, which makes such an ideal approach simply 

unviable, beyond the effective but limited SOF operations that have used 

kinetic force to eliminate key IS financiers, like Abu Sayyaf. These operations 

certainly have been instrumental in degrading IS revenue sources, but they 

will not resolve the phenomenon that has its roots in the much larger illicit 

industry devoted to looting and trafficking in the region. 
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However, one advantage security practitioners such as SOF and intelligence analysts have in studying the IS’s involvement in the illicit antiquities 

trade is that it could give them a better idea of how the organization operates 

overall. Yaya Fanusie—a former economic and counterterrorism analyst for 

the CIA—notes that:

 law enforcement and intelligence officials should pay close attention to the antiquities trade emanating from Syria and Iraq, but not 

because they need to know precisely how much money [IS] brings 

in. What is important is that the trade itself reveals something about 

the Islamic State’s operational infrastructure, its links with partners 

and middlemen, and how the group is exploiting the local civilian 

population. All of this is critical to understanding how the U.S. and its 

allies may defeat the group militarily, financially, and ideologically.337

Fanusie also notes that uncovering the illicit networks working with the 

IS, such as those involved with its “mini-bureaucracy” dedicated to controlling the antiquities trade (see Introduction), may in fact lead to the uncovering of other intelligence vital to U.S. interests. In this sense, studying the 

antiquities trade could lead to additional knowledge about how the organization supports itself, such as where and how IS affiliates launder money 

worldwide and traffic other resources in and out of its territory.

In addition to the unprecedented threat the IS poses to cultural heritage, 

the international community must also deal with the persistent illicit trade 

in cultural property that gives organizations such as the IS the incentive to 

supply freshly looted artifacts. The international community must begin targeting the two-faced “Janus figures”—the internationally connected antiquities dealers—who are the links “between the licit and illicit trade.”338 Specific 

“choke points” in the supply chain also need to be targeted, possibly by SOF 

in denied areas under the control of the IS or other terrorist organizations 

(as was the case with the Abu Sayyaf raid), and by relevant law enforcement 

authorities in transit countries and cities that are known hubs for the illicit 

antiquities trade. Just as countries in the Middle East regions have been 

called on to take a greater role in the anti-IS military coalition, they also 

must be more proactive in countering antiquities trafficking—particularly in 

the Gulf States. Those who facilitate and benefit from this illicit trade, such 

as the Janus figures and transnational traffickers, must also be targeted. Law 

enforcement agencies worldwide must also coordinate their efforts to deal 
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with this transnational threat more effectively. This should include targeting 

the large number of artifacts sold by illicit actors into private collections, 

as these objects can be laundered through artificial private sales for several 

years, if not decades, before they are integrated into the open market with 

obscured provenance. 

Finally, given the ubiquity of looted antiquities currently on the market, 

willful blindness must no longer be tolerated in the acquisition of suspect 

artifacts by dealers, museums, auction houses, and private buyers. Halting 

this can only be achieved through a public-private initiative involving governments, museums, collectors, archaeologists, cultural heritage scholars, 

and any other parties that deal with antiquities.339 Improved compliance 

and enhanced due diligence measures to counter the current and unacceptable “optical due diligence” standard can reduce the availability of illicit 

antiquities in the public domain.340 If an individual or entity is found to 

have procured an illicit artifact without taking proper measures to ensure 

that it was acquired legally, they should be fined accordingly. This policy 

would be akin to the penalties banks are subject to for violating sanctions or 

money laundering. Buyers of antiquities who do not take measures to ensure 

that they are acquiring legal artifacts with authentic provenance are almost 

assuredly facilitating criminal activity, which may even include funding terrorism. If there is sufficient evidence that the purchase of an artifact funded 

terrorism or a violent organized crime group, the penalty should include the 

possibility of criminal charges.

Problems With Provenance

Confirming the provenance of objects sold on the legitimate market remains 

one of the thorniest aspects of the problem of looting and trafficking illicit 

antiquities. Even cultural heritage experts find it difficult to distinguish 

between legitimate and illegitimate provenance documentation. Middlemen 

are often experts in establishing believable false provenance, such as claiming 

that an object was recently discovered in an old family collection. This is a 

convenient decoy, as a family collection is likely to date back to a time before 

a country passed laws to protect its antiquities, or before the 1970 UNESCO 

Convention cutoff date. In Syria, this means buyers and sellers of illicit antiquities will conveniently deal in artifacts that were collected just before the 2011 

deadline set in the recent UNSC resolution and U.S. congressional bill. The 
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Berlin Museum has sought to overcome this by adopting a policy of “guilty 

until proven innocent.”341 As a standardized provenance policy with enhanced 

due diligence is developed as part of a global enforcement framework, the 

Berlin Museum’s extraordinary provenance policy will be an important test 

case that should be closely monitored. Such a policy may be instrumental in 

minimizing the number of illicit antiquities sold in the antiquities market. 

The Repatriation Debate

The longstanding debate over the repatriation of antiquities and the right 

of ownership of cultural objects has recently been reignited in the face of 

widespread conflict and destruction in the Middle East. Some with a direct 

interest in the subject, such as James Cuno, president and CEO of the J. Paul 

Getty Trust; Gary Vikan, former director of the Walters Art Museum in 

Baltimore; and the Committee for Cultural Policy lobby group, are arguing 

that cultural heritage artifacts belong to all of humanity and that the lesser 

evil is to remove as many cultural artifacts from the conflict zone as possible. They also argue that the objects are safer outside the conflict zone and 

that there is a moral obligation to rescue them by any means necessary. This 

includes knowingly buying illicit objects on the black market.342

While this argument has strong appeal, its logic is hollow. Under international law, each state has a right to sovereignty, meaning that each country 

has a right to decide its own laws. Any cultural objects that are removed from 

a country illegally are subject to that country’s laws, as well as international 

law. Furthermore, international law expects looted or stolen antiquities to 

be repatriated to their source country following the emergence of evidence 

that they were illicitly acquired. Law enforcement agencies, particularly ICE 

and CBP in the U.S., have been effective in seizing and repatriating artifacts 

to their source countries, but this does not go far enough to stop the trade 

from source to market. Entities that knowingly purchase illicit artifacts are 

deliberately violating laws, even if they simply remain unaware of the artifact’s origin by turning a blind eye. There are seldom any criminal charges 

when objects are seized by law enforcement from museums, galleries, auction 

houses, or even private collections prior to repatriation. For the “antiquities 

industry,” these seizures could be seen as the cost of doing business. 

Furthermore, as archaeologists and museum curators are well aware, 

once an artifact has been looted, it loses the valuable archaeological context 
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scholars rely on to understand the society and culture from which it came. 

Therefore, far from being “saved for humanity,” much of the archeological 

value of objects with dubious provenance is already lost, especially those 

being purchased on the black market. As an increasingly finite amount of 

antiquities are looted worldwide, all of humanity is losing the opportunity 

to learn about both our shared origins and distinct cultural histories because 

the pace of looting is far outrunning that of rigorous scientific inquiry and 

archeological documentation of cultural heritage sites. 

By purchasing cultural objects that have been robbed of their cultural 

value, unscrupulous buyers are giving such objects artificial value that actually increases the incentive for looters and traffickers to continue their illegal 

acts, just as paying ransom to terrorists for kidnapping victims encourages 

them to take more hostages. The looters may be the ones physically stealing 

the objects, but those purchasing them are in effect robbing the world of its 

cultural history and fueling this illicit market. If antiquities buyers, museums 

in particular, are driven by a mission to educate and preserve these historic 

treasures, then engaging in such behavior is misguided at best. Nevertheless, 

the idea advanced by some—that knowingly buying antiquities on the black 

market to “save them” is a valid act—is in fact a criminal one that suggests 

these buyers may be driven by other motives.343

Final Remarks: Sustained Political Will

Efforts to curb the demand side of the illicit antiquities market will help 

crack down on this lucrative activity. However, until legitimate governments 

can tackle this issue from both the supply and demand sides, the surge of 

antiquities looting and trafficking taking place today in Syria, Iraq, and the 

rest of the world will not stop. 

The authors have identified some key areas where new policies could be 

implemented or existing ones modified to help alleviate some of the demand 

side issues. As the need to address the illicit antiquities trade continues to 

gain political momentum, pressure on politicians to establish and maintain 

a global enforcement system must be maintained. The IS’s sale of antiquities 

to fund its operations and its campaign to destroy cultural heritage sites has 

pushed these issues into the public spotlight, but this window of public interest will not stay open indefinitely. As the conflicts in the Middle East wear 

on, interest may evaporate. However, unlike the public, antiquities collectors 
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are very patient when handling illicit artifacts; for example, objects looted 

during the 2003 invasion of Iraq are only now beginning to appear on the 

market, and still only in very small numbers.344 The fact that the current 

conflicts have no apparent end in sight means that establishing a system to 

protect cultural heritage sites and stop the illicit trade in antiquities is all 

the more urgent. 

It is important to remember that, once new enforcement mechanisms are 

put in place, it will take time for them to become effective. For example, new 

and strict standards for compliance in banking were implemented shortly 

after the 9/11 attacks with the emergence of evidence implicating certain 

banks in criminal activity such as money laundering and sanctions evasion. 

However, the financial services industry has only implemented these measures in the past few years. Changing the culture of the antiquities trade will 

also take time, as implementing major changes and dealing with complex 

issues such as establishing provenance involves a learning curve. Therefore, 

it is critical that the leaders of key countries and institutions embrace these 

changes, as they will set the tone moving forward. With the growing awareness of the illicit antiquities trade, including among those entering and rising 

in careers in the cultural heritage field, it may well be that a generational shift 

will help to establish a standard of legitimacy that is considered not only a 

legal, but also an ethical imperative.

Finally, while comprehensive solutions are discussed and implemented 

in the effort to resolve this global problem, there is little doubt that SOF will 

be relied on increasingly to conduct dangerous missions intended to degrade 

and defeat terrorist organizations such as the IS. Because antiquities trafficking and the ideological destruction of cultural heritage has proven to be part 

of the IS’s modus operandi, the authors of this monograph strongly encourage SOF and civil affairs operators to acquire a practical knowledge of the 

trafficking and destruction phenomena, which will enhance their efforts to 

prevent the IS and others from filling their coffers by selling illicit antiquities 

and from spreading their intolerant ideology by destroying cultural heritage. 

SOF can play a key role in saving the lives of thousands of innocent civilians 

by degrading the IS through kinetic counterterrorism operations, and it can 

also make a lasting contribution to the region’s history by helping to preserve 

the treasured heritage of the cradle of civilization in Syria and Iraq. Where 

it is feasible to do so, SOF and civil affairs should deny the IS one of its key 

sources of revenue and most prominent means of spreading its ideology.
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Appendix A: Acronym List

AMA Arts, Monuments, and Archives

CBP Customs and Border Protection

CPP cultural property protection

DOD Department of Defense

DOJ Department of Justice

ICE Immigration and Customs Enforcement

IS Islamic State

ISI Islamic State of Iraq

ISIL The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham

JN Jabhat al-Nusra

RFS Revolutionary Forces of Syria

SOF Special Operations Forces

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural 

 Organization

UNSC UN Security Council

WCO World Customs Organization

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Endnotes 

1. The Antiquities Coalition, “#CultureUnderThreat: Recommendations for the 

U.S. Government,” Task Force Report, April 2016, 5, available at http://taskforce.

theantiquitiescoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/Culture-Under-ThreatTask-Force-Report-Complete-Document-.pdf.

2. “Iraq Receives Artifacts Found by US Special Forces in Syria,” Associated Press, 15 

July 2015, available at: https://www.yahoo.com/news/iraq-gets-back-antiquitiesrecovered-us-forces-syria-105706847.html; and Eric Schmitt, “A Raid on ISIS 

Yields a Trove of Intelligence,” New York Times, 8 June 2015, available at: http://

www.nytimes.com/2015/06/09/world/middleeast/us-raid-in-syria-uncoversdetails-on-isis-leadership-and-finances.html. 

3. Vasudevan Sridharan, “Unesco Terms Isis’s Destruction of Heritage Sites 

‘Cultural Cleansing,’” International Business Times, 3 July 2014, available 

at: http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/unesco-terms-isiss-destruction-heritage-sitescultural-cleansing-1509109.

4. Kareem Shaheen, “Isis Attacks on Ancient Sites Erasing History of Humanity, 

Says Iraq,” The Guardian, 9 March 2015, available at: http://www.theguardian.

com/world/2015/mar/09/iraq-condemns-isis-destruction-ancient-sites.

5. Rajendra Abhyankar, “Syrian ‘Blood Antiquities’ Proliferate Urgent Need for an 

International Agreement,” The Huffington Post, 3 November 2014, available at: 

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/rajendra-abhyankar/syrian-blood-antiquities-

_b_6095248.html.

6. For a quantitative analysis using geographic information systems that shows how 

most major actors involved in the conflict in Syria have been involved in antiquities looting, see: Jesse Casana, “Satellite Imagery-Based Analysis of Archaeological 

Looting in Syria,” Near Eastern Archaeology 78, no. 3 (September 2015), 142–152, 

available at: http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.5615/neareastarch.78.3.0142.pdf.

7. Andrew Keller, “Documenting ISIL’s Antiquities Trafficking: The Looting and Destruction of Iraqi and Syrian Cultural Heritage: What We Know 

and What Can Be Done,” U.S. Department of State, transcription of presentation at Conflict Antiquities: Forging a Public/Private Response to Save 

Iraq and Syria’s Endangered Cultural Heritage, Metropolitan Museum of 

Art, New York, 29 September 2015, available at: http://www.state.gov/e/eb/

rls/rm/2015/247610.htm. For leaked IS documents, see: Aymenn Jawad AlTamimi, “Unseen Documents from the Islamic State’s Diwan al-Rikaz,” Jihadology blog, 12 October 2015, available at: http://jihadology.net/2015/10/12/

the-archivist-unseen-documents-from-the-islamic-states-diwan-al-rikaz/.

8. Andrew Keller, “Documenting ISIL’s Antiquities Trafficking: Corresponding 

Visuals to the Remarks,” U.S. Department of State, 29 September 2015, available 

at: http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/rm/2015/247739.htm#Letter1.

9. Al-Tamimi, “Unseen Documents.” 
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10. Keller, “Documenting ISIL’s Antiquities Trafficking.”

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid. 

13. Sam Hardy, “The ‘First Material Proof’ That Islamic State Is Trafficking Antiquities,” Conflict Antiquities blog, 15 July 2015, available at: https://conflictantiquities.

wordpress.com/2015/07/15/syria-iraq-islamic-state-conflict-antiquities-trafficking-forensic-evidence-mosul-museum/.

14. UNESCO, “The Fight against the Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Objects. The 1970 

Convention: Past and Future. Information Kit.” Convention for the Fight Against 

the Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Property, Paris, 15–16 March 2011, available at: 

http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0019/001916/191606E.pdf. (The official name 

of the 1970 meeting is Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing 

the Illicit Import, Export, and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.)

15. Jessica Dietzler, “On ‘Organized Crime’ in the Illicit Antiquities Trade: Moving 

Beyond the Definitional Debate,” Trends in Organized Crime 16, no. 3 (2013), 4, 

available at: http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs12117-012-9182-0. 

16. Ibid. 

17. Asif Efrat, Governing Guns, Preventing Plunder: International Cooperation against 

Illicit Trade (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 117; and Dietzler, “On 

‘Organized Crime,’” 5–6. 

18. Peter B. Campbell (archaeologist), in an interview with the authors, 12 February 2015. Syrian archeologist Amr Al Azm also stated in an interview with the 

authors, on 13 February 2015, that it is impossible to quantify values on the trade 

because of the constantly changing market values of different kinds of goods and 

the fluctuating availability of artifacts.

19. On the lack of empirical evidence hampering researchers’ ability to make more 

policy recommendations, as well as a discussion of “grey markets,” see: Siobhán 

Ní Chonaill, Anaïs Reding, and Lorenzo Valeri, “Assessing the Illegal Trade in 

Cultural Property from a Public Policy Perspective,” Santa Monica, CA: RAND 

Corporation, 2011, 11–18. On the “grey” nature of the antiquities trade, Phil Williams discussed this in “Antiquities Trafficking: Myths, Markets and Networks,” 

a paper presented at the Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program 

Spring 2016 Conference, “Culture in the Crossfire: The Security and Policy 

Implications of the Trafficking and Destruction of Antiquities,” 4 March 2016, 

available at: http://www.miis.edu/academics/researchcenters/terrorism/events/

montrepantiquitiesconference2016.

20. Campbell interview.

21. Peter B. Campbell, “The Illicit Antiquities Trade as a Transnational Criminal 

Network: Characterizing and Anticipating Trafficking of Cultural Heritage,” 

International Journal of Cultural Property 20 (2013), 116; Dietzler, “On ‘Organized Crime,’” 12; A. J. G. Tijhuis, “Transnational Crime and the Interface 

between Legal and Illegal Actors: The Case of the Illicit Art and Antiquities 
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Howard/Elliott/Prohov: IS and Cultural Genocide

Trade” (doctoral thesis, Leiden University, 2006), available at: https://openaccess.

leidenuniv.nl/handle/1887/4551; Sam Hardy and Sasan Aghlani, “Tomb Raiders 

and the Profits of Doom,” The World Today, February 2015, available at: http://

www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_publication_docs/

WT0115HardyAghlani.pdf; and Sam Hardy, “Heritage Crime and Threats to 

Cultural Heritage in the Cyprus Conflict,” Conflict Antiquities blog, 16 December 2014, available at: https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2014/12/16/

cyprus-cultural-heritage-conflict-crime/.

22. Campbell, “The Illicit Antiquities Trade,” 138. See also, Peter B. Campbell, 

“Structure,” Illicit Antiquities blog, available at: http://www.illicitantiquities.

com/structure/.

23. The looting of the National Museum of Iraq in 2003 is the prime example of a 

valuable and consolidated collection becoming a sought after prize by antiquities 

traffickers; for a firsthand account from the former museum research director about the looting of the museum and its implications, see Donny George 

Youkhanna, “The Looting of the Iraq National Museum,” in Antiquities under 

Siege: Cultural Heritage Protection after the Iraq War, ed. Lawrence Rothfield 

(New York: Altamira Press, 2008), 10: 97–107. For a detailed breakdown of the 

number of objects stolen and their classifications, see Matthew Bogdanos, “The 

Casualties of War: The Truth about the Iraq Museum,” American Journal of 

Archaeology 109, no. 3 (July 2005), 515. In an interview with the authors on 24 

February 2015, Iraqi archeologist Abdulamir al-Hamdani described instances of 

looting museums in times of lawlessness since the first Gulf War; for more on the 

case of looting of the Mosaic Museum in Syria’s Idlib province, see Joe Parkinson, 

Ayla Albayrak, and Duncan Mavin, “Syrian ‘Monuments Men’ Race to Protect 

Antiquities as Looting Bankrolls Terror,” Wall Street Journal, 10 February 2015, 

available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/syrian-monuments-men-race-to-protectantiquities-as-looting-bankrolls-terror-1423615241. See also, Jane O’Brian, “The 

International Team Trying to Save Syrian Antiquities,” BBC News, 21 July 2014, 

available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-28380674. 

24. Jason Felch and Ralph Frammolino, Chasing Aphrodite: The Hunt for Looted 

Antiquities at the World’s Richest Museum (New York: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2011).

25. See also, Chonaill et al., “Assessing the Illegal Trade,” 19–22.

26. Felch and Frammolino, Chasing Aphrodite, 151–153; Michelle D’Ippolito, “New 

Methods of Mapping: The Application of Social Network Analysis to the Study 

of the Illegal Trade in Antiquities,” in W. G. Kennedy, N. Agarwal, and S. J. Yang 

(eds.), Social Computing, Behavioral-Cultural Modeling and Prediction, volume 

8393 of the series, Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Springer, 2014), 253–260.

27. Felch and Frammolino, Chasing Aphrodite, 176.

28. The Euphronios krater is an ancient Greek terra cotta calyx-krater, a bowl used 

for mixing wine with water.
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29. D’Ippolito, “New Methods of Mapping,” 259. See also, Chonaill et al., “Assessing 

the Illegal Trade,” 19.

30. Campbell, “Structure” and “The Illicit Antiquities Trade.” For a slightly different 

description of this “four-stage progression model,” see Dietzler, “On ‘Organized 

Crime.’” A similar model is described in Efrat, Governing Guns, 119. While the 

four-stage network structure has received scholarly support in the past few years, 

it is also important to note that other sources note that this structure can have 

upwards of five or six stages; see Chonaill et al., “Assessing the Illegal Trade,” 

11–18. 

31. Campbell, “The Illicit Antiquities Trade,” 116. 

32. Ibid., 118, 120–125, 127–130, 132–134.

33. Dietzler, “On ‘Organized Crime,’” 6. 

34. Campbell, “The Illicit Antiquities Trade,” 117; Efrat, Governing Guns, 119; and 

Dietzler, “On ‘Organized Crime,’” 4–5. For more on poor subsistence looters, see: 

Reuters “Stealing Undiscovered History in Iraq,” Al Jazeera English, 14 April 2004, 

available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/archive/2004/04/2008410141833634744.

html. For the assertion that looters make very little while middlemen make “substantial profits,” see Christopher Hoh, “Practical and Policy Considerations in 

Protecting Cultural Heritage and Preventing Looting During International Peace 

and Stability Operations,” in Rothfield, Antiquities Under Siege, 17: 195–206.

35. Campbell interview.

36. Campbell, “The Illicit Antiquities Trade,” 116; and Efrat, Governing Guns, 119.

37. Campbell, “The Illicit Antiquities Trade,” 139.

38. Dietzler, “On ‘Organized Crime,’” 12; Campbell, “The Illicit Antiquities Trade,” 

116; and Efrat, Governing Guns, 119.

39. Dietzler, “On ‘Organized Crime,’” 12; Campbell, “The Illicit Antiquities Trade,” 

116; and Efrat, Governing Guns, 119.

40. Campbell, “The Illicit Antiquities Trade,” 114, 118-119, 125, 138.

41. In contrast, Chonaill et al., argue that the “source dealer receives the greatest 

mark-up on the object’s final value,” in “Assessing the Illegal Trade,” 14.

42. UNESCO, “The Fight against the Illicit Trafficking,” 4 (original emphasis). 

43. Simon Mackenzie and Tess Davis, “Temple Looting in Cambodia: Anatomy of 

a Statue Trafficking Network,” British Journal of Criminology 8 (13 June 2014): 

1-19.

44. Ibid., 8-15.

45. Ibid., 1. 

46. Al Azm interview.

47. For more information on Amr Al Azm and his model, see: Brian Schatz, “Meet 

the ‘Monuments Men’ Risking Everything to Save Syria’s Ancient Treasures from 

ISIS,” Mother Jones, 6 March 2015, available at http://www.motherjones.com/

politics/2015/02/how-isis-cashes-illegal-antiquities-trade. Regarding Al Azm’s 
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Howard/Elliott/Prohov: IS and Cultural Genocide

research and contacts, see Amr Al Azm, Salam al-Kuntar, and Brian Daniels, 

“ISIS’ Antiquities Sideline,” New York Times, 2 September 2014, available at: http://

www.nytimes.com/2014/09/03/opinion/isis-antiquities-sideline.html?_r=0. 

48. Williams, “Antiquities Trafficking: Myths, Markets and Networks.”

49. Al-Hamdani interview.

50. Isabel Hunter, “Syria Conflict: The Illicit Art Trade That Is a Major Source of 

Income for Today’s Terror Groups Is Nothing New,” The Independent, 26 April 

2015, available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/

syria-conflict-the-illicit-art-trade-that-is-a-major-source-of-income-for-todaysterror-groups-is-nothing-new-10204285.html. For more on the academic debate 

about “looting to order,” see Sam Hardy, “Does for-Order Looting Exist? Examining the Evidence and Testing a Hypothesis,” Conflict Antiquities blog, 16 

January 2014, available at: https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2014/06/16/

looting-to-order-evidence-hypothesis/.

51. Campbell, “The Illicit Antiquities Trade,” 121.

52. Rick St. Hilaire, “The Assyrian Head Repatriation: Filling in the Details of ICE’s 

Investigation,” Red Arch blog, 19 March 2015, available at: http://culturalheritagelawyer.blogspot.co.uk/2015/03/the-assyrian-head-repatriation-filling.html. 

53. “Ancient Antiquities and Saddam Hussein-Era Objects Returned to Iraq,” U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, 16 March 2015, available at: http://www.ice.gov/

news/releases/ancient-antiquities-and-saddam-hussein-era-objects-returned-iraq. 

54. St. Hilaire, “The Assyrian Head Repatriation.”

55. Ibid.

56. For a similar case, and the first major antiquities bust conducted by Homeland 

Security Investigations, see “Operation Mummy’s Curse” about the indictment 

of a network that smuggled antiquities from Egypt and used similar methods 

to skirt customs declaration rules. The U.S. Attorney’s Office Eastern District of 

New York, “Dealers and Collector Charged with Smuggling Egyptian Antiquities,” U.S. Department of Justice, 14 July 2011, available at: https://www.justice.

gov/archive/usao/nye/pr/2011/2011jul14.html . 

57. Email correspondence with Peter B. Campbell, 2 March 2015. 

58. International Foundation for Art Research, “Provenance Guide,” 2015, available 

at: https://www.ifar.org/provenance_guide.php. 

59. Interview with archeologist Sam Hardy, 12 February 2015. This lack of standardization also came up in the authors’ interview with Peter B. Campbell. 

60. Mike Giglio and Munzer al-Awad, “Inside the Underground Trade to Sell Off 

Syria’s History,” Buzzfeed News, 30 July 2015, available at: http://www.buzzfeed.

com/mikegiglio/the-trade-in-stolen-syrian-artifacts#.buZA0yxORN.

61. Matthew Bogdanos, discussion comment on roundtable discussion of Panel Two: 

“A Global Survey of Cultural Heritage Under Threat,” Culture in the Crossfire, 4 

March 2016.
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62. Hardy interview.

63. Giglio and al-Awad, “Inside the Underground Trade.”

64. Al Azm interview.

65. Ibid.

66. Blood Antiques, directed by Peter Brems and Wim Van den Eynde, New York 

Syndicad, 2009.

67. Campbell interview; and UNESCO, “The Fight against the Illicit Trafficking,” 9.

68. Campbell interview; and Amr Al Azm interview.

69. Al Azm interview.

70. Ibid.

71. This “nexus” concept is the greater debate about the relationships between traffickers and terrorists. For more general information, see Russell Howard, ed., 

The Nexus Between Traffickers and the Terrorists: The New Clear and Present 

Danger? (New York: McGraw-Hill Education, 2014). 

72. Russell Howard and Coleen Traughber, “The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking: Scourge of the World or So Much Hype?” in Howard, The Nexus Between, 

33.

73. Regarding antiquities as a recent phenomenon with much of the data tied to 

terrorists remaining classified, see Matthew Bogdanos, “Thieves of Baghdad,” 

in The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Iraq, ed. Peter Stone and Joanne 

Farchakh-Bajjaly (Woodbridge, England: The Boydell Press, 2008), 11:124. 

74. Louise Shelley, Dirty Entanglements: Corruption, Crime, and Terrorism (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 260–263.

75. Ibid., 264.

76. Ibid., 263–264. 

77. Quoted in Howard and Traughber, “The Nexus of Extremism and Trafficking,” 

33.

78. David Johnston, “Picking Up the Stolen Pieces of Iraq’s Cultural Heritage,” New 

York Times, 14 February 2005, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/14/

international/middleeast/14artifact.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. 

79. Sam Hardy, “Antiquities Looting under Regime, Rebels and Jihadists in Syria,” 

Conflict Antiquities blog, 18 December 2014, available at https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2014/12/18/syria-archaeological-site-looting-aaas-analysis/. 

On antiquities trafficking as a source of revenue for terrorists in Iraq, see Matthew Bogdanos, “Thieves of Baghdad,” 124–126. On antiquities trafficking as a 

source of revenue for the Taliban in Afghanistan, see Brems and Van den Eynde, 

Blood Antiques. On antiquities trafficking as a source of funding for terrorists 

and insurgents, see Pringle, “New Evidence Ties.” For more on antiquities trafficking as a means of supporting terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, see Shelley, 

Dirty Entanglements, 264. Finally, Campbell discusses this issue in detail with 

regard to Iraq and Afghanistan in “The Illicit Antiquities Trade,” 120–123.
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Howard/Elliott/Prohov: IS and Cultural Genocide

80. For how the U.S. government embarked on a concerted effort to target conventional terrorist financing networks, see Juan Zarate, Treasury’s War: The 

Unleashing of a New Era of Financial Warfare (New York: Public Affairs, 2013). 

For a detailed analysis of how terrorists have turned to more criminal methods 

for financing, see Shelley, Dirty Entanglements.

81. Michael Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” 

Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 34, no. 3 (2011). To understand the power of 

decentralized networks and the nature of decentralized terrorist organizations, 

see Ori Brafman and Rod A. Beckstrom, The Starfish and the Spider (New York: 

Penguin, 2007). For a case study of how terrorists have exploited criminal activity 

for huge profit, see the seminal work on how the Taliban uses the Afghan drug 

trade to fund itself in Gretchen Peters, Seeds of Terror (New York: St. Martin’s 

Press, 2009). 

82. Shelley, Dirty Entanglements, 260–263. For a general discussion of the variety of 

sources of terrorist financing, see Freeman, “The Sources of Terrorist Financing.” 

For a case study on how the terrorist organization IS utilizes a diverse array of 

revenue sources, including antiquities, see “Financing of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),” Financial Action Task Force, 

28 February 2015, available at: http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/

reports/Financing-of-the-terrorist-organisation-ISIL.pdf.

83. Katie A. Paul, “Unconventional Data Reveals Conventional Solutions: How 

Egypt’s Globalized Media Can Combat Looting,” (paper presented at “Culture 

in the Crossfire,” 4 March 2016). 

84. Iraqi archeologist Abdulamir al-Hamdani discussed this Iraqi saying and the 

culture of looting in Iraq in an interview with the authors, 24 February 2015. 

85. Lawrence Rothfield, The Rape of Mesopotamia: Behind the Looting of the Iraq 

Museum (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009), 4–7; Joanne FarchakhBajjaly, “Who Are the Looters at Archaeological Sites in Iraq?” in Antiquities 

under Siege: Cultural Heritage Protection after the Iraq War, ed. Lawrence Rothfield 

(New York: Altamira Press, 2008), 4:55–56.

86. Farchakh-Bajjaly, “Who Are the Looters?” 54.

87. Rothfield, The Rape of Mesopotamia, 12.

88. Ibid., 12–15.

89. Farchakh-Bajjaly, “Who Are the Looters?” 54; and Rothfield, The Rape of Mesopotamia, 15.

90. Farchakh-Bajjaly, “Who Are the Looters?” 54.

91. Ibid.

92. Farchakh-Bajjaly, “Who Are the Looters?” 52. See also: Rothfield, The Rape of 

Mesopotamia, 18.

93. Farchakh-Bajjaly, “Who Are the Looters?” 49–50.

94. Regarding the nature of organized crime in Iraq in both the post-1990 and 

post-2003 contexts, see Phil Williams, “The Rise of Organized Crime in Iraq,” 
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in Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents: Organized Crime in Iraq (Carlisle, PA: 

U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2009), 2:23–61, available at: 

http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub930.pdf. Williams 

also discusses the Sunni tribes as traffickers and black market entrepreneurs who 

often colluded with the Saddam Hussein regime under sanctions, see 2: 26–27. 

Williams addresses the nexus between antiquities trafficking and organized 

crime in “Extortion and Other Criminal Activities,” in Williams, Criminals, 

Militias, and Insurgents, 5:174–176.

95. Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan, ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror (New York: 

Regan Arts, 2015), 22.

96. Michael Georgy, Isabel Coles, and Giles Elgood, “Elusive Saddam Henchman 

Douri Feared Until Last Moment,” Reuters, 18 April 2015, available at: http://

in.reuters.com/article/iraq-douri-idINKBN0N81VQ20150417. 

97. Liz Sly, “The Hidden Hand behind the Islamic State Militants? Saddam Hussein’s,” Washington Post, 4 April 2015, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.

com/world/middle_east/the-hidden-hand-behind-the-islamic-state-militantssaddam-husseins/2015/04/04/aa97676c-cc32-11e4-8730-4f473416e759_story.

html. 

98. Regarding entire tribes specializing in antiquities looting, see Farchakh-Bajjaly, 

“Who Are the Looters?” 55. Regarding the organized crime dynamic in antiquities trafficking during this period, see Rothfield, The Rape of Mesopotamia, 16. 

99. Abdulamir al Hamdani, “Protecting and Recording our Archeological Heritage 

in Southern Iraq,” Near Eastern Archeology 71, no. 4 (December 2008): 221–223.

100. For the assertion that there is a causal relationship between the draining of 

the swamps and motivations to loot, see Rothfield, The Rape of Mesopotamia, 

16. In support of this assertion on the marsh draining and the involvement of 

the Shia populations in the context of looting, see Susan Breitkopf, “Lost: The 

Looting of Iraq’s Antiquities,” Museum News, January/February 2007, available 

at: http://web.archive.org/web/20100613025944/http://aam-us.org/pubs/mn/

MN_JF07_lost-iraq.cfm?renderforprint=1. 

101. Al Hamdani, “Protecting and Recording,” 223–224.

102. Ibid., 224.

103. On the impact of sanctions, see John Malcolm Russell, “Stolen Stones: The 

Modern Sack of Ninevah,” Archaeology Online, 30 December 1996, available at: 

http://archive.archaeology.org/online/features/nineveh/; Jim Long, “The Plunder 

of Iraq: John Malcolm Russell with Jim Long,” Brooklyn Rail, 1 June 2003; and 

Rothfield, The Rape of Mesopotamia, 12–18. Regarding tribal influence on the 

state’s ability to regulate historical sites, see Farchakh-Bajjaly, “Who Are the 

Looters?” 51.

104. Farchakh-Bajjaly, “Who Are the Looters?” 55. However, there is a discrepancy 

regarding the cessation of looting activities, as the former research director of the 

National Museum of Iraq, Donny George Youkhanna, claimed that the peak of 

looting activity was in the year 2000. George claims that the government hired 
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local villagers and armed archeologists, such as George himself, to protect the 

sites. The period of 2000 to 2003 is claimed to have been better for archaeology 

than the 1990s because of greater security, as reported in: Rothfield, The Rape of 

Mesopotamia, 18–20. Additionally, local peasants allegedly pillaged Nineveh in 

the mid-1990s. Many of the Assyrian artifacts at Nineveh had been documented 

before by archaeological teams, but were later found pieced up and for sale on 

the international market, according to: Russell, “Stolen Stones.” 

105. For a firsthand account of the museum looting from the former research director of the National Museum, see Donny George Youkhanna, “The Looting of 

the Iraq National Museum,” in The Destruction of Cultural Heritage in Iraq, ed. 

Stone and Farchakh-Bajjaly, 10:97–107.

106. For a detailed breakdown of the number of objects stolen and their classifications, 

see Bogdanos, “The Casualties of War,” 515.

107. Matthew Bogdanos and William Patrick, Thieves of Baghdad: One Marine’s Passion 

to Recover the World’s Greatest Stolen Treasures (New York: Bloomsbury, 2006). 

For a concise academic assessment of the 2003 museum looting, see Bogdanos, 

“Thieves of Baghdad,” 11:109–133. For another assessment on the looting of the 

National Museum of Iraq and of archeological site looting in general after 2003, 

see Rothfield, The Rape of Mesopotamia, 81–23. 

108. Bogdanos, “Thieves of Baghdad,” 11:121. 

109. Ibid., 11:124.

110. Ibid., 11:116.

111. Williams, “Extortion and Other Criminal Activities,” 5:174.

112. Rothfield, The Rape of Mesopotamia, 134.

113. Ibid., 139.

114. Regarding poor looters, see Reuters, “Stealing Undiscovered History in Iraq,” 

Al Jazeera English , 14 April 2004, available at: http://www.aljazeera.com/

archive/2004/04/2008410141833634744.html; and David Johnston, “Picking 

Up the Stolen Pieces of Iraq’s Cultural Heritage,” New York Times, 14 February 2005, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/14/international/

middleeast/14artifact.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0. For the assertion that looters 

make very little while middlemen make “substantial profits,” see Hoh, “Practical and Policy Considerations,” 17:195–206. Regarding the smuggling route, see 

Museum Security Network, “Investigator of Baghdad Museum.” Williams also 

concurs that a sophisticated smuggling network exists for antiquities in Iraq, 

“Extortion and Other Criminal Activities,” 5:176–177.

115. Museum Security Network, “Investigator of Baghdad Museum.”

116. Rothfield, The Rape of Mesopotamia, 137; and Johnston, “Picking Up the Stolen 

Pieces,” as John Malcolm Russell is quoted in supporting this figure. 

117. Rothfield, The Rape of Mesopotamia, 137.

118. Bogdanos, “Thieves of Baghdad,” 11:124. 
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119. Ibid., 11:124.

120. Museum Security Network, “Investigator of Baghdad Museum.”

121. Williams, “Extortion and Other Criminal Activities,” 5:177.

122. Al-Hamdani interview.

123. On the Triangle of Death, see Anthony Shadid, “Iraq’s Forbidding ‘Triangle of 

Death,’” Washington Post, 23 November 2004, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A5710-2004Nov22.html. On how the Islamic State 

organization may be active in the Triangle of Death today, see Michael Georgy and 

Ahmed Rasheed, “Tunneling through Triangle of Death, Islamic State Aims at 

Baghdad from South,” Reuters, 4 August 2014, available at: http://www.reuters.com/

article/2014/08/04/us-iraq-security-south-insight-idUSKBN0G41CO20140804. 

124. Brietkopf, “Lost.”

125. Penny Green and Tony Ward, “The Transformation of Violence in Iraq,” British Journal of Criminology 618, (2009): 7, available at: http://www.almosul.

com/library/articles/14e/ward2009a.pdf; and Sam Hardy, “Khums: An UnIslamic Tax for an Islamic Antiquities Market?” Conflict Antiquities blog, 17 

August 2014, available at: https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2014/08/17/

syria-iraq-islamic-antiquities-trafficking-tax/.

126. Andrew Lawler, “Discover Interview: Director of Iraq’s National Museum,” Discover Magazine, 3 August 2007, available at: http://discovermagazine.com/2007/

aug/discover-interview-director-iraqi-national-museum. 

127. Al Hamdani, “Protecting and Recording,” 224.

128. “Antiquities Found in Ninewa,” Aswat al-Iraq, 11 August 2010.

129. “Mongol Ruler Hulagu’s Dagger Found with Smuggling Gang in Kirkuk,” 

Aswat al-Iraq, 5 January 2011, available at: http://www.thefreelibrary.com/

Mongol+Ruler+Hulagu%27s+dagger+found+with+smuggling+gang+in+Kirku

k%3a.-a0245922087. 

130. For the original article that this monograph is based on, which argued that IS is 

involved in antiquities trafficking, see Russell Howard, Marc Elliott, and Jonathan Prohov, “Digging In and Trafficking Out: How the Destruction of Cultural 

Heritage Funds Terrorism,” CTC Sentinel 8 no. 2 (February 2015), 14, available at: 

https://www.ctc.usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/CTCSentinel-Vol8Issue27.pdf. This project began with an op-ed arguing that antiquities smuggling 

is one aspect of ISIS’ diverse revenue streams and is becoming more common 

in light of pressure on ISIS oil revenues and coalition military action against 

the group; see Russell Howard, Jonathan Prohov, and Marc Elliott, “Opinion: 

How ISIS Funds Terror Through Black Market Antiquities Trade,” U.S. Naval 

Institute News, 27 October 2014, available at: http://news.usni.org/2014/10/27/

isis-funds-terror-black-market-antiquities-trade. For other articles describing 

ISIS involvement in antiquities looting and trafficking, see David Kohn, “ISIS’s 

Looting Campaign,” The New Yorker, 14 October 2014, available at: http://www.

newyorker.com/tech/elements/isis-looting-campaign-iraq-syria; Al Azm et al., 
79

Howard/Elliott/Prohov: IS and Cultural Genocide

“ISIS’ Antiquities Sideline;” and Pringle, “New Evidence Ties.” For the original 

story that brought attention to ISIS involvement in looting antiquities, citing Iraqi 

evidence gathered from an arrest that revealed a suspected $36 million dollar 

revenue from looting in Syria, see Martin Chulov, “How an Arrest in Iraq Revealed 

ISIS’s $2bn Jihadist Network,” The Guardian, 15 June 2014, available at: http://

www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/15/iraq-isis-arrest-jihadists-wealth-power.

131. Rothfield, The Rape of Mesopotamia, 154.

132. Ibid., 154–155.

133. Robert Fisk, “Syria’s Ancient Treasures Pulverized,” The Independent, 5 August 

2012, available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/fisk/

robert-fisk-syrias-ancient-treasures-pulverised-8007768.html.

134. Al Azm interview.

135. Email correspondence with Cheikhmous Ali, 11 February 2015.

136. Interview with Abudulrazzaq Moaz, 17 February 2015.

137. Moaz interview; Asher Berman, “Criminalization of the Syrian Conflict,” Small 

Wars Journal, 16 May 2012, available at: http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/

criminalization-of-the-syrian-conflict. 

138. Moaz interview.

139. Ibid.

140. Ibid.

141. Ibid.

142. Ali correspondence.

143. “Syrian Minister ‘Commits Suicide,’” BBC, 12 October 2005, available at: http://

news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4334442.stm. 

144. Al Azm interview.

145. Giglio and al-Awad, “Inside the Underground Trade.”

146. Al Azm interview.

147. Moaz interview. 

148. Museum Security Network, “Investigator of Baghdad Museum;” and Shelley, 

Dirty Entanglements, 264.

149. Al Azm interview; interview with journalist, specialist on the MiddleEast, ARD, German Public Broadcaster; and Alice Fordham, “Smugglers 

Thrive on Syria’s Chaos, Looting Cultural Treasures,” Parallels, NPR blog, 

available at: http://www.npr.org/blogs/parallels/2014/05/27/316329859/

smugglers-thrive-on-syrias-chaos-looting-cultural-treasures. 

150. Samar Kadi, “Narrowing Markets for Illicit Trade of Syrian Antiquities,” Daily 

Star Lebanon, 14 March 2015, available at: http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/

Lebanon-News/2015/Mar-14/290754-narrowing-markets-for-illicit-trade-ofsyrian-antiquities.ashx. 
80

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151. Fisk, “Syria’s Ancient Treasures;” and Cheikhmous Ali, “Syrian Heritage under 

Threat,” Journal of Eastern Mediterranean Archeology & Heritage Studies 1 no. 

4 (2013), 351–366.

152. Ali, “Syrian Heritage under Threat.”

153. Fisk, “Syria’s Ancient Treasures.”

154. Jeffrey Fleishman, “President Bashar Assad Blames Conspiracies for Syria 

Unrest,” Los Angeles Times, 31 March 2011, available at: http://articles.latimes.

com/2011/mar/31/world/la-fg-syria-assad-20110331; and Karen DeYoung, “Iraq 

Militant Group’s Pipeline through Syria Revives after Long Gap,” Washington 

Post, 11 May 2009, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/

article/2009/05/10/AR2009051002242.html. 

155. Fisk, “Syria’s Ancient Treasures;” Al Azm interview; and Moaz interview.

156. Ali, “Syrian Heritage under Threat.”

157. Elizabeth Grenier, “Syria’s Cultural Casualties,” Deutsch Welle, 4 September 

2013, available at: http://www.dw.de/syrias-cultural-casualties/a-17066711. 

158. Anas Zarar and Wissam Kanann, “The Battle to Save Syria’s Antiquities,” AlAkhbar, 29 October 2012, available at: http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/13172. 

159. UNESCO, “Save Syria’s History,” Safeguarding Syrian Cultural Heritage 

Initiative, Paris, available at: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/safeguardingsyrian-cultural-heritage/national-initiatives/national-campaign/.

160. Aryn Baker and Majdel Anjar, “Syria’s Looted Past: How Ancient Artifacts Are Being 

Traded for Guns,” Time, 12 September 2012, available at: http://world.time.com/

2012/09/12/syrias-looted-past-how-ancient-artifacts-are-being-traded-for-guns/. 

161. Ibid.

162. Ibid. 

163. Interview with German public broadcaster.

164. Al Azm interview.

165. Giglio and al-Awad, “Inside the Underground Trade;” and Casana, “Satellite 

Imagery-Based Analysis.”

166. Boula Asteeh, “tahaf min boyout souriya tobaa’ bil-mazaad al-’alanee fi bayrout 

... wa mawaaqi’ al-tawaasal tarawwaj,” Asharq Al-Awsat, 26 July 2015, available 

at: http://goo.gl/dq5Aje. 

167. “Report: IS Smuggling Syrian Artifacts through Lebanon,” Naharnet Newsdesk, 22 December 2015, available at: http://www.naharnet.com/stories/

en/197773-report-is-smuggling-syrian-artifacts-through-lebanon.

168. “Liban Tentative de Contrebande D’antiquités Syriennes,” YouTube video depicting 

the confiscation of looted Syrian antiquities in Lebanon and detailing the arrest 

of antiquities smugglers, posted by APSA, 17 May 2013, available at: https://www.

youtube.com/watch?v=35rvzWFMAu4&index=1&list=FLZeQwmPndiENH6

W8J3EqhYQ; Gabriele Denecke, “Art Smuggling in Syria as Terrorists Loot the 

Cultural Heritage,” Das Erste, 9 January 2015, available at: http://www.daserste.
81

Howard/Elliott/Prohov: IS and Cultural Genocide

de/information/wissen-kultur/ttt/sendung/rbb/2014/31082014-kunstschmuggelsyrien-102.html; and Saad al-Masou’di, “Toraath al-’iraq yumowwel da’ish wa 

muqatiluhu yanhaboon al-aathar,” al-Arabia, 30 September 2014, available at: 

http://goo.gl/Ri+9-kExg.

169. Interview with German public broadcaster; “Liban Tentative,” APSA; Hala Jaber 

and George Arbuthnott, “Syrians Loot Roman Treasures to Buy Guns,” The 

Sunday Times, 5 May 2013, available at: http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/

news/world_news/Middle_East/article1255108.ece; and Denecke, “Art Smuggling 

in Syria.”

170. Al Azm interview.

171. James Harkin, “Stealing Syria’s Past,” Pulitzer Center on Crisis Reporting, 27 

August 2014, available at: http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/middle-east-syriawar-theft-archeology-assyria; Katrin Elger, “Monuments Men: The Quest to Save 

Syria’s History,” Der Spiegel, 4 August 2014, available at: http://www.spiegel.

de/international/world/how-archaelogists-are-trying-to-save-syrian-artifactsa-983818.html; “Apamée: Fouilles clandestines-partie 1,” YouTube video depicting 

heavy looting and excavations at Apamea, posted by APSA, 19 September 2014, 

available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DIcgRZaSB_A; and “Apamea: 

Illicit diggings-part 2,” YouTube video depicting heavy looting and excavations at 

Apamea, posted by APSA, 19 September 2014, available at: https://www.youtube.

com/watch?v=aJoiyOl_xo0. 

172. Harkin, “Stealing Syria’s Past;” and Janine Di Giovanni, Leah McGrath Goodman, 

and Damien Sharkov, “How Does ISIS Fund Its Reign of Terror?” Newsweek, 6 

November 2014, available at: http://www.newsweek.com/2014/11/14/how-doesisis-fund-its-reign-terror-282607.html.

173. Giglio and al-Awad, “Inside the Underground Tradey.”

174. Al Azm Interview.

175. Cheikhmous Ali and Salem Ali, “Archaeological Excavations during the Conflicts: When the Bulldozer Replaces the Trowel,” al-Gerbal, January 2015, 29–31, 

available at: http://www.mediafire.com/download/raaqw3t24zs7r7v/algherbal-23.

pdf; “Idlib: Illicit Diggings at Tell Hizareen P1,” YouTube video depicting the 

use of metal detectors, posted by APSA, 29 October 2014, available at: https://

www.youtube.com/watch?v=tH-V81EEmlw; and “Deir Ezzor: Illicit Diggings at 

Qal’at al Rahba,” YouTube video depicting the use of bulldozers for illicit diggings, posted by APSA, 30 November 2013, available at: https://www.youtube.

com/watch?v=ylfFX5L35zc&list=UUAIWkoCIJ4VlFP1A3fC3G5Q. 

176. Parkinson et al., “Syrian ‘Monuments Men;’” Deborah Amos, “In Syria, Archaeologists Risk Their Lives to Protect Ancient Heritage,” Parallels, NPR blog, 9 March 

2015, available at: http://www.npr.org/sections/parallels/2015/03/09/390691518/

in-syria-archaeologists-risk-their-lives-to-protect-ancient-heritage; and Schatz, 

“Meet the “Monuments Men.”

177. This section builds on an earlier article, Howard et al., “Digging In and Trafficking Out.”
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178. Sam Frizell, “Obama Admits U.S. Intelligence Didn’t See ISIS Coming,” Time, 

28 September 2014, available at: http://time.com/3442254/obama-u-s-intelligence-isis/; and David Remnick, “Going the Distance,” The New Yorker, 27 

January 2014, available at: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/01/27/

going-the-distance-2. 

179. Jessica Stern and J. M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror (New York: Harper Collins, 2015), 18.

180. Stern and Berger, ISIS, 18; and Zelin, “The War.”

181. Abu Muhammad (Ayman al-Zawahiri), “Zawahiri’s Letter to Zarqawi” (English translation), 8 July 2005, available at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/

zawahiris-letter-to-zarqawi-english-translation-2. 

182. Ellen Knickmeyer and Jonathan Finer, “Insurgent Leader Al-Zarqawi Killed in 

Iraq,” Washington Post, 8 June 2006, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.

com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/08/AR2006060800114.html. 

183. Zelin, “The War.”

184. Aaron Y. Zelin, “ISIS is Dead, Long Live the Islamic State,” Foreign Policy, 30 

June 2014, available at: http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/

isis-is-dead-long-live-the-islamic-state. 

185. “Terrorist Financing and the Islamic State,” Statement of Matthew Levitt at 

Hearing before the House Committee on Financial Services, 113th Cong., 2nd 

Sess., 13 November 2014. 

186. Aaron Y. Zelin, “The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria has a Consumer Protection 

Office,” The Atlantic, 13 June 2014, available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/

international/archive/2014/06/the-isis-guide-to-building-an-islamic-state/372769/. 

187. “Antiquities Found in Ninewa,” Aswat al-Iraq; “Hassaka-Tell Brak Region: 

Illicit Diggings at Tell al Hamidiya by ISIS,” Association for the Protection 

of Syrian Archaeology (APSA), available at: http://apsa2011.com/apsanew/

hassaka-tell-brak-region-illicit-diggings-at-tell-al-hamidiya-by-isis/.

188. Sam Hardy, “Antiquities Looting under Regime, Rebels and Jihadists in Syria,” 

Conflict Antiquities blog, 18 December 2014, available at: https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2014/12/18/syria-archaeological-site-looting-aaas-analysis/. 

In an interview with the authors, archeologist Amr Al Azm said that “all the 

groups involved in the Syrian conflict are also involved in the illicit on antiquities 

trade.” For trafficking as a source of revenue for terrorists in Iraq, see Bogdanos, 

“Thieves of Baghdad,” 11:124. On antiquities trafficking as a source of revenue 

for the Taliban in Afghanistan, see Brems and Van den Eynde, Blood Antiques. 

On antiquities trafficking as a source of funding for terrorists and insurgents, see 

Pringle, “New Evidence Ties.” For more information on how antiquities trafficking 

supports terrorism in Iraq and Afghanistan, see Shelley, Dirty Entanglements, 

264.

189. Terrence McCoy, “ISIS Just Stole $425 Million, Iraqi Governor Says, and 

Became the ‘World’s Richest Terrorist Group,’” Washington Post, 12 June 2014, 
83

Howard/Elliott/Prohov: IS and Cultural Genocide

available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/06/12/

isis-just-stole-425-million-and-became-the-worlds-richest-terrorist-group/. 

190. Ben Hubbard, Clifford Klaus, and Eric Schmitt, “Rebels and in Syria Claim 

Control of Resources,” New York Times, 28 January 2014, available at: http://

www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/world/middleeast/rebels-in-syria-claim-controlof-resources.html; “Iraq Crisis: Key Oil Refinery ‘Seized by Rebels,’” BBC, 24 June 

2014, available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-27990478; and 

“Attacking ISIL’s Financial Foundation,” Remarks of Undersecretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence David S. Cohen at The Carnegie Endowment for 

International Peace, U.S. Department of Treasury, 23 October 2014, available 

at: http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2672.aspx. 

191. Matthew Levitt, “Countering ISIL Financing: A Realistic Assessment,” (statement submitted for Taking the Fight to ISIL: Operationalizing CT Lines of Effort 

Against the Islamic State Group, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2 

February 2015).

192. Martin Chulov, “How an Arrest in Iraq Revealed Isis’s $2bn Jihadist Network,” The Guardian, 15 June 2014, available at: http://www.theguardian.

com/world/2014/jun/15/iraq-isis-arrest-jihadists-wealth-power; and Justine 

Drennan, “The Black-Market Battleground,” Foreign Policy, 17 October 2014, 

available at: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/10/17/the_black_

market_battleground_syria_iraq_isis. For a debate related to the claim that 

antiquities are IS’s “second highest” source of revenue, see Jason Felch, “Danti’s 

Inference: The Known Unknowns of ISIS and Antiquities Looting,” Chasing Aphrodite blog, 18 November 2014, available at: http://chasingaphrodite.

com/2014/11/18/dantis-inference-the-known-unknowns-of-isis-and-antiquities-looting/; and Sam Hardy, “Tax and Spend: Laissez-Faire Islamic State 

Capitalism for the Illicit Antiquities Trade?” Conflict Antiquities blog, 4 December 2014, available at: https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2014/12/05/

iraq-syria-islamic-state-capitalism-looting-smuggling-taxation/. 

193. Amr Al Azm works with a network of confidential informants on the ground 

in Syria, and in an interview with the authors on 13 February 2015, he was very 

skeptical of all attempts to quantify this trade. 

194. Kathy Wren, “AAAS Analysis Shows Widespread Looting and Damage to Historical Sites in Syria,” Washington, DC: American Association for the Advancement of Science, 17 December 2014, available at: http://www.aaas.org/news/

aaas-analysis-shows-widespread-looting-and-damage-historical-sites-syria; 

“Hassaka-Tell Brak Region: Illicit Diggings at Tell al Hamidiya by ISIS;” and Al 

Azm et al., “ISIS’ Antiquities Sideline”; Elena Becatoros, “Smuggled Antiquities 

Funding Iraq Extremists, U.S. Says,” National Geographic News, 19 March 2008, 

available at: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2008/03/080319-AP-iraqinsurg.html. 

195. Di Giovanni et al., “How Does ISIS Fund?;” UNESCO, “The Fight against the 

Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Objects;” and Cem Erciyes, “Islamic State Makes 

Millions from Stolen Antiquities,” Al-Monitor, 2 September 2014, available 
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at: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/security/2014/09/turkey-syria-iraq-isisartifacts-smuggling.html. 

196. Al Azm interview; and Campbell correspondence.

197. Casana, “Satellite Imagery-Based Analysis,” 150.

198. Parkinson et al., “Syrian ‘Monuments Men.’”

199. “Syria: On the Trail of Looted Antiquities,” France 24, 30 April 2015, available 

at: http://m.france24.com/en/20150501-reporters-syrian-antiquities-trafficking-turkey-smuggling; and Simon Cox, “The Men that Smuggle the Loot That 

Funds IS,” BBC News, 17 February 2015, available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/

magazine-31485439.

200. Al Azm interview.

201. Ibid. For more about this institutionalization model, see Al Azm et al., “ISIS’ 

Antiquities Sideline.”

202. Giglio and al-Awad, “Inside the Underground Trade.”

203. Interview with German public broadcaster.

204. Ibid.

205. Yochi Dreazen, “ISIS Uses Mafia Tactics to Fund Its Operations Without Help 

from Persian Gulf Donors,” Foreign Policy, 17 July 2014, available at: http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/06/17/isis-uses-mafia-tactics-to-fund-its-own-operationswithout-help-from-persian-gulf-donors/; Yassin Musharbash, “The ‘Islamic State’ 

and the Illegal Sale of Antiquities,” Abu Susu’s blog, 4 December 2014, available at 

http://abususu.blogspot.com/2014/12/the-islamic-state-and-illegal-sale-of.html; 

Onur Burcak Belli et al., “The Business of the Caliph,” Zeit Online, 4 December 

2014, available at: http://www.zeit.de/feature/islamic-state-is-caliphate; Sam 

Hardy, “The Antiquities Trade in the Islamic State: 12.5% Taxation of Private 

Looting-Smuggling Business,” Conflict Antiquities blog, 4 December 2014, 

available at: https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2014/12/04/iraq-syriaislamic-state-antiquities-trade-looting-smuggling-taxation/; and Al Azm et al., 

“ISIS’ Antiquities Sideline.” 

206. “Al-Rikaz Department of ISIS Licenses Excavation Works in Exchange for Monetary Percentage,” Association for the Protection of Syrian Archaeology (APSA), 

available at: http://apsa2011.com/apsanew/al-rikaz-department-of-isis-licensesexcavation-works-in-exchange-for-monetary-percentage/. 

207. “Al-Rikaz Department of ISIS Licenses.”

208. Hunter, “Syria Conflict.”

209. Parkinson et al., “Syrian ‘Monuments Men;’” and interview with German public 

broadcaster. 

210. The American Schools of Oriental Research, “Extensive Recent Looting 

Revealed,” ASOR blog, November 2014, available at: http://asorblog.org/

extensive-recent-looting-revealed/; and Kathy Wren, “AAAS Analysis.” On 

local emirs and the determination of tax rates, see Dalya Alberge and Jane 
85

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Arraf, “Loot, Sell, Bulldoze: Isis Grinds History to Dust,” The Sunday Times, 

13 July 2014, available at: http://www.thesundaytimes.co.uk/sto/news/world_

news/Middle_East/article1433622.ece; and Sam Hardy, “Was Most of the 

Looting at the Most Extensively Looted Site in Syria Conducted under the 

Islamic State or the Free Syrian Army?” Conflict Antiquities blog, 12 March 

2015, available at: https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2015/03/12/

syria-islamic-state-free-syrian-army-paramilitary-funding-dura-europos/. 

211. Oliver Moody, “Isis Fills War Chest by Selling Looted Antiquities to the West,” 

The Times, 17 December 2014, available at: http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/news/

world/middleeast/article4299572.ece.

212. Parkinson et al., “Syrian ‘Monuments Men.’” 

213. Harkin, “Stealing Syria’s Past;” and Elger, “Monuments Men.”

214. Cox, “The Men that Smuggle.” 

215. Giglio and al-Awad, “Inside the Underground Trade.”

216. “As-siyaaha tushakkel khaliyya azma limu’aalijat qadiyyat sariqat al-mawaaqi’ 

al-ithriyya fil-mowsul,” As-Sumaria News, 26 July 2014, available at: http://goo.

gl/jblaUL. For the claim of 1,800 sites, see Michael Janson, “A Common Heritage 

at Risk,” Assyrian International News Agency, 10 October 2014, available at: 

http://www.aina.org/news/20141010013704.htm. For the claim of 4,000 sites, see 

Abdulamir Al-Hamdani, “Iraq’s Heritage Is Facing a New Wave of Destruction.” 

For how ISIS taps into existing trafficking networks in both Iraq and Syria, see 

Al Azm et al., “ISIS’ Antiquities Sideline.” 

217. Di Giovanni et al., “How Does ISIS Fund?;” and Al-Hamdani, “Iraq’s Heritage 

Is Facing.”

218. “Da’ish tunaqqib ‘an al-aathaar wa tabee’ha lilmaafiaat,” Noon Post, 1 October 

2014, available at: http://www.noonpost.net/content/3877; and Sa’d al-Mas’oudi, 

“Toraath al-’iraq yumowwel da’ish wa muqatiluhu yanhaboon al-aathar,” alArabia, 30 September 2014, available at: goo.gl/RikExg; and Iraqi archaeologist 

Al-Hamdani agreed with this assessment in an interview with the authors.

219. David Kohn, “ISIS’s Looting Campaign.”

220. Alberge and Arraf, “Loot, Sell, Bulldoze.” 

221. Moody, “Isis Fills War Chest.” See also Parkinson et al., “Syrian ‘Monuments 

Men.’“

222. In interviews with the authors, archaeologist Neil Brodie, Abdulameer AlHamdani, and Amr Al Azm all mentioned a healthy and longstanding market 

for illicit antiquities in Jordan, 23 April 2015. 

223. James McAndrew, “Syria and Iraq’s Neighbours Can Help Contain the 

Looting,” The Art Newspaper, 18 December 2014, available at: http://old.

theartnewspaper.com/articles/Syria-and-Iraqs-neighbours-can-help-containthe-looting/36362http://www.theartnewspaper.com/articles/Syria+and+Iraq%

E2%80%99s+neighbours+can+help+contain+the+looting/36362.
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224. Duncan Mavin, “Calculating the Revenue from Antiquities to Islamic State,” 

Wall Street Journal, 11 February 2015, available at: http://www.wsj.com/articles/

calculating-the-revenue-from-antiquities-to-islamic-state-1423657578. 

225. Chulov, “How an Arrest in Iraq Revealed.”

226. Sam Hardy has questioned nearly every angle of this $36 million dollar claim: 

“German Media Corroborates $36M Islamic State Antiquities Trafficking,” 

Hyperallergic, 28 November 2014, available at: http://hyperallergic.com/165537/

german-media-corroborates-36m-islamic-state-antiquities-trafficking/; “The 

Making of the Making of an Urban Legend?” Conflict Antiquities blog, 29 

October 2014, available at: https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2014/10/29/

cultural-property-observer-urban-legend-iraq-syria-islamic-state-antiquitiesmarket/; “The Antiquities Trade in the Islamic State;” and “The Inexact Science 

of Exact Numbers: Does Anyone Know How Many Archaeological Sites Have 

Been Looted in Syria?,” 13 April 2015, available at: https://conflictantiquities.

wordpress.com/2015/04/13/syria-official-police-looting-statistics-lack-evidence/. 

227. Al Azm interview. 

228. Burcak Belli et al., “The Business of the Caliph.” On why antiquities were not 

included in the previous report, see Yassin Mursharbash, “The ‘Islamic State’ 

and the Illegal Sale of Antiquities.”

229. Moaz interview. Regarding fake antiquities, Lebanese law enforcement has allegedly identified fakes in addition to authentic pieces in some of their arrests, see 

Cox, “The Men that Smuggle.” See also, Hunter, “Syria Conflict.” 

230. Drennan, “The Black-Market Battleground.” 

231. Al-Hamdani interview.

232. Abhyankar, “Syrian ‘Blood Antiquities’ Proliferate.” 

233. James Reinl, “Islamic State Pockets $100 Million Yearly From Heritage Booty,” 

Middle East Eye, 28 April 2015, available at: http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/

exclusive-islamic-state-pockets-100-million-yearly-heritage-booty-933270924. 

Sam Hardy points out the problems with this claim and argues that it was 

falsely attributed to Interpol, see “Interpol Did Not Claim That Islamic State 

Made $100m-a-Year from Conflict Antiquities,” Conflict Antiquities blog, 5 

May 2015, available at: https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2015/05/05/

syria-iraq-islamic-state-antiquities-sales-estimate-false-interpol-attribution/.

234. Interview with Neil Brodie, 23 April 2015.

235. Al Azm interview. 

236. Ibid.

237. Interview with German public broadcaster.

238. Loveday Morris, “Islamic State Isn’t Just Destroying Artifacts—It’s Selling 

Them,” Washington Post, 8 June 2015, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.

com/world/middle_east/islamic-state-isnt-just-destroying-ancient-artifacts--itsselling-them/2015/06/08/ca5ea964-08a2-11e5-951e-8e15090d64ae_story.html.
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239. E. Nemeth, “Strategic Value of African Tribal Art: Auction Sales Trend as Cultural 

Intelligence,” Intelligence and National Security 27 no. 2 (April 2012), 302–316. 

On the damage looting causes to communities, see Asif Efrat, Governing Guns, 

Preventing Plunder: International Cooperation Against Illicit Trade (New York: 

Oxford University Press, 2012), 116–117; and Moody, “Isis Fills War Chest.”

240. Campbell interview. 

241. Hunter, “Syria Conflict;” and Martin Chulov, “A Sledgehammer to Civilisation: Islamic State’s War on Culture,” The Guardian, 7 April 2015, 

available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/07/islamic-stateisis-crimes-against-culture-iraq-syria.

242. Belli et al., “The Business of the Caliph.”

243. Vivian Salama, “Iraq Receives Artifacts Found By US Special Forces in Syria,” 

Military Times, 15 July 2015, available at: http://www.militarytimes.com/story/

military/2015/07/15/iraq-receives-artifacts-found-by-us-special-forces-insyria/30197457/; Tom Vanden Brook, “Palmyra May Be Off Limits to U.S. Airstrikes,” USA Today, 22 May 2015, available at: http://www.usatoday.com/story/

news/world/2015/05/22/isil-palmyra/27797491/; and Helene Cooper and Eric 

Schmitt, “ISIS Official Killed in U.S. Raid in Syria, Pentagon Says,” New York 

Times, 16 May 2015, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/17/world/

middleeast/abu-sayyaf-isis-commander-killed-by-us-forces-pentagon-says.

html?_r=0. 

244. Jack Moore, “The Ancient Sites Now Under Threat from ISIS in Libya,” 

Newsweek, 4 March 2015, available at: http://europe.newsweek.com/riseisis-threatens-libyas-classical-archaeology-sites-311038; and Laura C. Mallonee, “Yemeni War Leads to Massive Destruction of Cultural Heritage,” 

Hyperallergic, 27 May 2015, available at: http://hyperallergic.com/209933/

yemeni-war-leads-to-massive-destruction-of-cultural-heritage/. 

245. Iraqi archaeologist Abdulamir Al-Hamdani (24 February 2015) and Abdalrazzaq Moaz, former Syrian deputy minister of culture and former head of the 

Directorate-General of Antiquities and Museums, mentioned this in interviews 

with the authors, 17 February 2015.

246. Regarding cultural heritage as a victim of war throughout history, see Richard 

Kurin, “Why We Have a Civic Responsibility to Protect Cultural Treasures during 

Wartime,” Smithsonian, 10 April 2015, available at: http://www.smithsonianmag.

com/smithsonian-institution/why-we-have-civic-responsibility-protect-culturaltreasures-during-wartime-180954887/?no-ist. Regarding the Balkan Wars, see, 

Jacques Baumel, “The Destruction by War of the Cultural Heritage in Croatia 

and Bosnia-Herzegovina” (information report of the Council of Europe , Doc 

6756, 2 February 1993), available at: http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/X2HXref-ViewHTML.asp?FileID=6787&. Regarding the Taliban’s destruction of 

the Bamiyan Buddhas, see Nasir Behzad and Daud Qarizadah, “The Man Who 

Helped Blow Up the Bamiyan Buddhas,” BBC, 12 March 2015, available at: http://

www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-31813681; and W. L. Rathje, “Why the Taliban 
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Are Destroying Buddhas,” USA Today, 22 March 2001, available at: http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/science/archaeology/2001-03-22-afghan-buddhas.

htm. Regarding the 2006 attack on the Golden Mosque in Samarra, see Robert 

F. Worth, “Blast Destroys Shrine in Iraq, Setting Off Sectarian Fury,” New York 

Times, 22 February 2006, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/22/

international/middleeast/22cnd-iraq.html. Regarding Ansar Dine’s destruction in Mali, see Ishan Tharoor, “Timbuktu’s Destruction: Why Islamists Are 

Wrecking Mali’s Cultural Heritage,” Time, 2 July 2012, available at: http://world.

time.com/2012/07/02/timbuktus-destruction-why-islamists-are-wrecking-maliscultural-heritage/. Regarding some of the early destruction of Syrian heritage, see 

Anne Barnard and Hwaida Saad, “In Syria’s Largest City, Fire Ravages Ancient 

Market,” New York Times, 22 September 2012, available at: http://www.nytimes.

com/2012/09/30/world/middleeast/fire-sweeps-through-ancient-souk-of-aleppocitys-soul.html. 

247. The Opinion Pages: Room for Debate, “Protecting Syria’s Heritage,” New York 

Times, 8 October 2014, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/10/08/protecting-syrias-heritage. Regarding the debate over repatriation, see Tom Mashberg and Graham Bowley, “Islamic State Destruction 

Renews Debate Over Repatriation of Antiquities,” New York Times, 30 March 

2015, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/arts/design/islamicstate-destruction-renews-debate-over-repatriation-of-antiquities.html. For more 

discussion of Syria, see Stephen Heyman, “The Destruction of Syria’s Cultural 

Patrimony,” New York Times, 17 December 2014, available at: http://www.nytimes.

com/2014/12/18/arts/international/the-destruction-of-syrias-cultural-patrimony.

html?smid=tw-share&_r=0. Regarding Iraq, see Chulov, “A Sledgehammer to 

Civilisation.”

248. Jon Lee Anderson, “ISIS and the Destruction of History,” The New Yorker, 18 

March 2015, available at: http://www.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/

isis-and-the-destruction-of-history. 

249. Kurin, “Why We Have a Civic Responsibility.”

250. The Antiquities Coalition, “#CultureUnderThreat: Recommendations for the 

U.S. Government,” 14–15, 19–23.

251. Ali correspondence.

252. Ibid.

253. Stephen H. Savage, “Satellite Images Don’t Lie,” Slate, 2 April 2015, available at: 

http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2015/03/satellite_images_

show_isis_other_groups_destroying_archaeological_sites.html#return; “Homs 

anciennes Maisons Bombardee,” YouTube video depicting the destruction of 

historic homes by regime bombing in Homs, posted by APSA, 12 September 

2012, available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zyTC-G11CsE; “Bosra 

Destruction Temple romain,” a video demonstrating fighting taking place in the 

Roman Ruins in Bosra, posted by APSA, 28 October 2012, available at: https://

www.youtube.com/watch?feature=player_embedded&v=nZAb6mJxEjw; and 
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“Bosra-Combats à la citadelle occupée par des snipers,” a video from 2013 depicting battles occurring at archeological sites, posted by APSA, 25 September 2013, 

available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hTlJvAtwWAo. 

254. Savage, “Satellite Images Don’t Lie.”

255. In addition to Savage’s study, which shows military formations at different sites, 

Cheikhmous Ali, in correspondence with the authors, described numerous other 

sites used by the Syrian military.

256. “Syria Crusader Castle Krak des Chevaliers Has War Scars,” BBC, 22 March 

2014, available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26696113. 

257. For geospatial analysis of damage sustained by historical sites since the outbreak 

of the conflict, see “Ancient History, Modern Destruction: Assessing the Current 

Status of Syria’s World Heritage Sites Using High-Resolution Satellite Imagery,” 

American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1 May 2015, available 

at: http://www.aaas.org/page/ancient-history-modern-destruction-assessingcurrent-status-syria-s-world-heritage-sites-using. Regarding how battles are 

frequently fought on archeological sites due to their strategic value, see Savage, 

“Satellite Images Don’t Lie.” 

258. Elahe Izadi, “War Has Damaged All but One of Syria’s World Heritage Sites, 

Satellite Images Show,” Washington Post, 24 September 2014, available at: http://

www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2014/09/24/war-has-damagedall-but-one-of-syrias-world-heritage-sites-satellite-images-show/. 

259. For images of wholesale destruction in Aleppo, including damage to historical sites within the city, see Alan Taylor, “Destruction Comes to Aleppo,” The 

Atlantic, 4 October 2012, available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/photo/2012/10/

destruction-comes-to-aleppo/100381/; Martin Chulov, “Syria’s Heritage in Ruins: 

Before-and-After Pictures,” The Guardian, 26 January 2014, available at: http://

www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jan/26/syria-heritage-in-ruins-before-andafter-pictures; and Lizzie Porter, “Syria War: Drone Footage Shows Destruction 

of Aleppo’s Heritage Sites,” The Telegraph, 13 March 2015, available at: http://

www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/middleeast/syria/11468349/Syria-warAleppos-heritage-sites-destroyed.html.

260. Jonny Weeks, “Syria: Aleppo’s Umayyad Mosque Destroyed—In Pictures,” 

The Guardian, 24 April 2013, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/

gallery/2013/apr/25/syria-umayyad-mosque-destroyed-pictures; Matthew 

Weaver, “Syria Crisis: Aleppo’s Historic Souk Burns as Violence Continues,” 

The Guardian, 1 October 2012, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/

world/middle-east-live/2012/oct/01/syria-aleppo-souk-destroyed-live; and 

New York Times, “Watching Syria’s War: Footage Shows Damage to Aleppo 

Citadel,” 2014, available at: http://projects.nytimes.com/watching-syrias-war/

footage-shows-damage-to-aleppo-citadel. 

261. Ali correspondence.

262. Kristin Romey, “Why ISIS Hates Archaeology and Blew Up Ancient Iraqi Palace,” 

National Geographic, 14 April 2015, available at: http://news.nationalgeographic.
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com/2015/04/150414-why-islamic-state-destroyed-assyrian-palace-nimrud-iraqvideo-isis-isil-archaeology/.

263. “Erasing the Legacy of a Ruined Nation,” Dabiq, Jihadology Blog, Issue 8, March 

2015, 22–24, available at: https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/03/the-islamicstate-e2809cdc481biq-magazine-8e280b3.pdf. 

264. Ibid.

265. Ibid.

266. Romey, “Why ISIS Hates Archaeology.”

267. Christopher Jones, “Assessing the Damage at Hatra,” Gates of Nineveh blog, 

7 April 2015, available at: https://gatesofnineveh.wordpress.com/2015/04/07/

assessing-the-damage-at-hatra/. See also the comments of Lamia Al-Gailani 

Werr, an Iraqi archeologist in London, quoted within Eve Conant, “Q&A: Why 

Sunni Extremists Are Destroying Ancient Religious Sites in Mosul,” National 

Geographic, 1 August 2014, available at: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/

news/2014/08/140802-iraq-mosul-christian-muslim-islamic-state-syria-history/. 

268. Susan Gonzalez, “ISIS’ Destruction of Cultural Antiquities: Q&A with Eckart 

Frahm,” YaleNews, 16 March 2015, available at: http://news.yale.edu/2015/03/16/

isis-destruction-cultural-antiquities-qa-eckart-frahm. 

269. Gonzalez, “ISIS’ Destruction.” 

270. Jason Felch and Bastien Varoutsikos, “The Lessons of Palmyra: Islamic 

State and Iconoclasm in the Era of Clickbait,” The Art Newspaper, 7 April 

2016, available at: http://theartnewspaper.com/comment/comment/

lessons-from-palmyra-where-islamic-state-combined-iconoclasm-and-clickbait/.

271. Jones, “Assessing the Damage at Hatra;” and Sam Hardy, “Islamic State 

Has Toppled, Sledgehammered and Jackhammered (Drilled Out) Artefacts 

in Mosul Museum and at Nineveh,” Conflict Antiquities blog, 26 February 2015, available at: https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2015/02/26/

iraq-mosul-museum-nergal-gate-nineveh-destruction/. 

272. “Bayan saadr ‘an jabhat al-nusra bish’an al-qura wa al-muqamat al-dirziyya fi souriya,” AIWA, 25 January 2015, available at: http://www.aiwa.

co.il/?mod=articles&ID=4267. 

273. Michael D. Danti, Cheikhmous Ali, and Abdalrazzaq Moaz, “ASOR Cultural Heritage Initiatives (CHI): Planning for Safeguarding Heritage Sites in 

Syria and Iraq,” Weekly Report 24, American Schools of Oriental Research 

(ASOR), 20 January 2015, available at: http://www.asor-syrianheritage.org/

syrian-heritage-initiative-weekly-report-24-january-20-2015/. 

274. For the Association to Protect Syrian Archeology’s documentation of IS destruction of cultural heritage and looting, see APSA 2011 with the ISIS keyword search, 

available at: http://apsa2011.com/apsanew/?s=ISIS.

275. Johnlee Varhgese, “Syria: Isis Blows Up Ancient Al-Hasakah Church on Easter 

Sunday,” International Business Times, 6 April 2015, available at: http://www.
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ibtimes.co.in/syria-isis-booby-traps-ancient-al-hasakah-church-kill-assyrianfighters-easter-sunday-628245. 

276. For a brief and concise historical overview of the Mongol invasion of Baghdad, 

see Ian Frazier, “Invaders: Destroying Baghdad,” The New Yorker, 25 April 2005, 

available at: http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2005/04/25/invaders-3. 

277. Martin Chulov, “Isis insurgents Seize Control of Iraqi City of Mosul,” The Guardian, 10 June 2014, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/10/

iraq-sunni-insurgents-islamic-militants-seize-control-mosul. 

278. Human Rights Watch, “Iraq: ISIS Kidnaps Shia Turkmen, Destroys 

Shrines,” 28 June 2014, available at: http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/06/27/

iraq-isis-kidnaps-shia-turkmen-destroys-shrines.

279. Chulov, “Isis Insurgents;” and Yasmine Hafiz, “ISIS Destroys Shiite Mosques and 

Shrines in Iraq, Dangerously Fracturing Country,” Huffington Post, 7 July 2014, 

available at: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/07/isis-destroys-shiitemosque_n_5564373.html.

280. Sam Hardy, “Confirmed: The Shrine of Jonah/Mosque of Yunus (Nineveh, Mosul, 

Iraq) Has Been Destroyed,” Conflict Antiquities blog, 24 July 2014, available at: 

https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2014/07/24/iraq-mosul-nineveh-tombshrine-jonah-mosque-yunus-destruction-confirmed/; Al Arabiya News, “ISIS 

Destroys ‘Jonah’s Tomb’ in Mosul,” 24 July 2014, available at: http://english.

alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/07/25/ISIS-destroys-tombs-of-twoprophets-in-Mosul.html; Associated Press, “Islamic State Destroys Ancient Mosul 

Mosque, the Third in a Week,” The Guardian, 27 July 2014, available at: http://

www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/28/islamic-state-destroys-ancient-mosulmosque; and Sam Hardy, “Confirmed: The Shrine-Mosque of Prophet Seth/Nabi 

Sheet Has Been Destroyed,” 28 July 2014, available at: https://conflictantiquities.

wordpress.com/2014/07/28/iraq-mosul-islamic-state-destruction-shrine-seth/.

281. Sam Hardy, “Islamic State Has Destroyed Yet Another Yezidi Shrine (Sinjar, Iraq, 

by 29th October 2014),” Conflict Antiquities blog, 29 October 2014, available at: 

https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2014/10/29/iraq-sinjar-yezidi-shrineislamic-state-destruction-meme-reshan-shrine/; Sam Hardy, “Evidence Points to 

Fresh Destruction of Yazidi Temples by Islamic State,” Hyperallergic, 25 November 

2014, available at: http://hyperallergic.com/164868/evidence-points-to-freshdestruction-of-yazidi-temples-by-islamic-state/; Sam Hardy, “The First Shrine 

of Its Kind in Iraq Is Destroyed,” Hyperallergic, 31 October 2014, available at: 

http://hyperallergic.com/159952/the-first-shrine-of-its-kind-in-iraq-is-destroyed/; 

Sam Hardy, “Militants Destroy Iraqi Convent,” Hyperallergic, 9 December 2014, 

available at: http://hyperallergic.com/167562/militants-destroy-iraqi-convent/; 

and Christopher Jones, “ISIS Destroying Sites in Salah-ad-Din Province,” Gates of 

Nineveh blog, 27 November 2014, available at: https://gatesofnineveh.wordpress.

com/2014/11/27/november-isis-report/.

282. Anne Barnard, “A Balancing Act as Iraq Claims Gains in Tikrit,” New York 

Times, 12 March 2015, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/13/
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world/middleeast/tikrit-isis-iraq.html; and Patricia Zengerle, “Obama 

Asks Congress to Authorize U.S. War on Islamic State,” Reuters, 12 February 2015, available at: http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/12/

us-mideast-crisis-congress-authorization-idUSKBN0LF1KP20150212. 

283. Muna Fadhil, “Isis Destroys Thousands of Books and Manuscripts in Mosul 

Libraries,” The Guardian, 26 February 2015, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/feb/26/isis-destroys-thousands-books-libraries; and Associated Press, “ISIS Burning (and Looting?) Priceless Books,” 

CBS News, 24 February 2015, available at: http://www.cbsnews.com/news/

isis-reportedly-burning-books-looted-from-mosul-library-in-iraq/. 

284. Hardy, “Islamic State Has Toppled;” and Christopher Jones, “Assessing the Damage 

at the Mosul Museum, Part 1: The Assyrian Artifacts,” 27 February 2015, and “Part 

2: The Sculptures from Hatra,” Gates of Nineveh blog, 3 March 2015, available 

at: https://gatesofnineveh.wordpress.com/2015/02/27/assessing-the-damage-atthe-mosul-museum-part-1-the-assyrian-artifacts/, and https://gatesofnineveh.

wordpress.com/2015/03/03/assessing-the-damage-at-the-mosul-museum-part2-the-sculptures-from-hatra/. 

285. Christopher Jones, “Damage around Tikrit, Destruction in Mosul,” Gates of 

Nineveh blog, 17 March 2015, available at: https://gatesofnineveh.wordpress.

com/2015/03/17/damage-around-tikrit-destruction-in-mosul/. 

286. Kareem Shaheen, “Isis Video Confirms Destruction at Unesco World Heritage 

Site in Hatra,” The Guardian, 5 April 2015, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/05/isis-video-confirms-destruction-at-unesco-worldheritage-site-on-hatra; and Christopher Jones, “Assessing the Damage at Hatra.”

287. Romey, “Why ISIS Hates Archaeology;” and Simone Mühl, “Nimrud under Attack: 

A Short Analysis of Recent Destructions at Nimrud,” independent analysis for 

Endangered Heritage Sites in Iraq (Facebook group), Conflict Antiquities blog, 

15 April 2015, available at: https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2015/04/15/

iraq-nimrud-buildings-destruction-analysis/.

288. Editorial, “A War Zone’s Ancient Past at Stake,” New York Times, 5 April 2015, 

available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/06/opinion/a-war-zones-ancientpast-at-stake.html?_r=2.

289. Abdalrazzaq Moaz and Jesse Casana, “Only an End to the Civil War in Syria 

Will Solve the Problem,” New York Times, 9 October 2014, available at: http://

www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2014/10/08/protecting-syrias-heritage/

only-an-end-to-the-civil-war-in-syria-will-solve-the-problem.

290. Christopher Jones, “In Battle Against ISIS, Saving Lives or Ancient Artifacts,” 

Hyperallergic, 17 April 2015, available at: http://hyperallergic.com/200005/inbattle-against-isis-saving-lives-or-ancient-artifacts/; RT, “Global Intervention 

Required to Stop ISIS Destroying Ancient Sites—Boris Johnson,” 18 May 2015, 

available at: http://rt.com/uk/259553-johnson-isis-pyramids-artefacts/; and 

Kareem Shaheen, “Outcry over ISIS Destruction of Ancient Assyrian Site of 
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Nimrud,” The Guardian, 6 March 2015, available at: http://www.theguardian.

com/world/2015/mar/06/isis-destroys-ancient-assyrian-site-of-nimrud. 

291. Jeffery M. Bale, “What Is Terrorism?” (Monterey Terrorism Research and Education Program, Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey, 

Monterey, CA) available at: http://www.miis.edu/academics/researchcenters/

terrorism/about/Terrorism_Definition.

292. Sam Hardy, “Islamic State B-Movie of Attack on Nimrud,” Conflict Antiquities blog, 

12 April 2015, available at: https://conflictantiquities.wordpress.com/2015/04/12/

iraq-nimrud-buildings-destroyed-site-not-bulldozed-islamic-state/.

293. Max Fisher, “The Real Ideology Driving ISIS Isn’t Islam or Caliphate Revivalism: It’s Ultraviolence,” Vox, 6 October 2014, available at: http://www.vox.

com/2014/10/6/6905363/isis-truth-ideology-ultraviolence; Terrence McCoy, 

“The Disturbing Way the Islamic State Justifies Raping and Enslaving Women,” 

Washington Post, 13 October 2014, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.

com/news/morning-mix/wp/2014/10/13/the-disturbing-way-the-islamic-statejustifies-raping-and-enslaving-women/; and “The Revival of Slavery Before the 

Hour,” Dabiq, 14–17, available at: https://azelin.files.wordpress.com/2015/02/

the-islamic-state-e2809cdc481biq-magazine-422.pdf. 

294. Shaheen, “Isis Attacks on Ancient Sites;” and Graeme Wood, “What ISIS Really 

Wants,” The Atlantic, March 2015, available at: http://www.theatlantic.com/

features/archive/2015/02/what-isis-really-wants/384980/.

295. AFP, “Isis Reaches Gates of Ancient Syrian City Palmyra, Stoking Fears of Destruction,” The Guardian, 21 May 2015, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/

world/2015/may/14/isis-syria-palmyra-iraq; RT, “Global Intervention Required;” 

Greg Botelho and Khushbu Shah, “ISIS Is ‘Everywhere’ in Syria’s Ancient City of 

Palmyra,” CNN, 21 May 2015, available at: http://edition.cnn.com/2015/05/21/

middleeast/isis-syria-iraq/index.html; and Jonathan Amos, “Palmyra: Satellite 

Image of IS Destruction,” BBC, 29 August 2015, available at: http://www.bbc.

com/news/science-environment-34090536.

296. Allison Cuneo, Susan Penacho, Michael Danti, Marina Gabriel, and Jamie 

O’Connell, “SPECIAL REPORT: The Recapture of Palmyra,” ASOR, March 2016, 

available at: http://www.asor-syrianheritage.org/4290-2/.

297. Ben Hubbard, “Syrian Expert Who Shielded Palmyra Antiquities Meets a Grisly 

Death at ISIS’ Hands,” New York Times, 19 August 2015, available at: http://

www.nytimes.com/2015/08/20/world/middleeast/isis-palmyra-syria-antiquitiesscholar-beheaded.html?_r=0.

298. Kareem Shaheen and Ian Black, “Beheaded Syrian scholar refused to lead Isis to 

hidden Palmyra antiquities,” The Guardian, 19 August 2015, available at: http://

www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/18/isis-beheads-archaeologist-syria.

299. British archeologist Eleanor Robson recently said in regard to Iraqi cultural 

heritage, “The fact is that ancient stones can wait, as they have waited for millennia; they depend on the Iraqi people, and the Iraqi people need us more,” in 

“Modern War, Ancient Casualties,” The Times Literary Supplement (as quoted on 
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the Conflict Antiquities blog), 25 March 2015, available at: https://conflictantiquities.

wordpress.com/2015/03/26/iraq-cultural-heritage-political-violence-communityneed/. A Palmyra resident is reported to have said, “The world does not care about 

us ... all they are interested in is the stones of ancient Palmyra,” quoted in Botelho 

and Shah, “ISIS Is ‘Everywhere.’”

300. For legislation first introduced in the U.S. House and eventually passed by both the 

House and the Senate (amended), see “Protect and Preserve International Cultural 

Property Act,” HR 1493, 114th Cong., 1st Sess. 2015, available at: https://www.

congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1493. For the U.N. Security Council 

Resolution against IS’s crimes against cultural heritage, see “Unanimously Adopting 

Resolution 2199 (2015), Security Council Condemns Trade with Al-Qaida Associated Groups, Threatens Further Targeted Sanctions,” 7379th Meeting of the United 

Nations Security Council, 12 February 2015, available at: http://www.un.org/press/

en/2015/sc11775.doc.htm; and Michelle Nichols, “U.N. Security Council Ups Pressure on Islamic State Financing,” Reuters, 5 February 2015, available at: http://www.

reuters.com/article/2015/02/12/us-mideast-crisis-un-idUSKBN0LG1YN20150212. 

For antiquities as a typology of terrorism financing in the case of IS, see “Financing 

of the Terrorist Organisation Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL),” Financial Action Task Force (FATF). For UK MP Robert Jenrik’s initiative to tackle the 

IS trafficking and destruction of heritage, see Nigel Morris, “Call for UK to Take 

Tougher Action to Save Antiquities from Isis,” The Independent, 11 February 2015, 

available at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/science/archaeology/call-for-ukto-take-tougher-action-to-save-antiquities-from-isis-10039793.html.

301. Ahram Online, “Egypt to Host Conference to Combat Destruction of Antiquities by ‘Terrorists,’” 16 May 2015, available at: http://english.ahram.org.eg/

NewsContent/1/64/129536/Egypt/Politics-/Egypt-to-host-conference-to-combatdestruction-of-.aspx. For a summary of the conference and the key takeaways, see “2015 Cairo Conference: Cultural Property Under Threat,” Antiquities Coalition, May 2015, available at: https://theantiquitiescoalition.org/

home/2015-cairo-conference-cultural-property-under-threat/.

302. Governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, 

Lebanon, Libya, Sudan, and Sultanate of Oman, “The Cairo Declaration,” 14 May 

2015, available at: http://theantiquitiescoalition.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/

Cairo-Declaration-final-version-May-2015.pdf.

303. Associated Press, “UN Says Destruction of Mideast Historical Sites ‘War 

Crime,’” Boston Herald, 13 May 2015, available at: http://www.bostonherald.

com/news_opinion/international/middle_east/2015/05/un_says_destruction_

of_mideast_historical_sites_war.

304. Emma Cunliffe, “After ISIS Storms Palmyra, Race Is on to Log Global Heritage,” New 

Scientist, 26 May 2015, available at: http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn27590-

after-isis-storms-palmyra-race-is-on-to-log-global-heritage.html#.VWSQbed4i1n. 

305. Jonathan Gornall, “Mystery Men Hunt Cultural Past Stolen by ISIL,” The 

National, 28 May 2015, available at: http://www.thenational.ae/world/middle-east/

mystery-men-hunt-cultural-past-stolen-by-isil.
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306. Ronald Lee Fleming and Anthony Flint, “To Save World Heritage Sites from 

Destruction, the US Should Bring Back Monuments Men,” Global Post, 20 August 

2015, available at: http://www.globalpost.com/article/6632996/2015/08/20/

modern-day-monuments-men-can-help-save-world-heritage-sites-destruction.

307. Ronald T. P. Alcala, “Babylon Revisited: Reestablishing a Corps of Specialists 

for the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict,” Harvard National 

Security Journal, vol. 6, (2015), 209–210, available at: http://harvardnsj.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/02/Alcala-Vol6.pdf.

308. The Antiquities Coalition, “#CultureUnderThreat,” 23.

309. For more background on this issue, including additional support for the reconstitution of the Monuments Men, see Alcala, “Babylon Revisited,” 206–254.

310. Fleming and Flint, “To Save World Heritage Sites.”

311. Alcala, “Babylon Revisited,” 238–239.

312. The Antiquities Coalition, “#CultureUnderThreat,” 23–25.

313. John DeRosa, “Braiding New Narratives in Syria and Iraq: Methodology for 

the Project on Narrative Braiding,” Medium, 3 April 2016, available at: https://

medium.com/narrative-inquiry/braiding-new-narratives-in-syria-and-iraqb01bd214bf0d#.dbkalfxog.

314. Roland Hughes, “Rescuing Palmyra: History’s Lesson in How to Save Artefacts,” BBC, 21 May 2015, available at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middleeast-32824379.

315. The full names of the acts are: The Protection of Cultural Property in the Event 

of Armed Conflict, and Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export 

and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.

316. “Meeting of States Parties to the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property [draft],” Paris: UNESCO, 18–20 May 2015, available 

at: http://www.unesco.org/new/fileadmin/MULTIMEDIA/HQ/CLT/pdf/

Discussions_on_Draft_Operational_Guidelines_EN.pdf. 

317. As of this writing, the Senate passed an amended version of the bill, which 

was approved by the House and sent to President Obama for his signature on 

29 April 2016. See Protect and Preserve International Cultural Property Act, 

HR 1493, 114th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2016, available at: https://www.congress.gov/

bill/114th-congress/house-bill/1493. 

318. “Unanimously Adopting Resolution 2199 (2015), Security Council Condemns 

Trade with Al-Qaida Associated Groups, Threatens Further Targeted Sanctions,” 

United Nations Security Council 7379th Meeting, 12 February 2015, available at: 

http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/sc11775.doc.htm; and Michelle Nichols, “U.N. 

Security Council Ups Pressure.”

319. The Antiquities Coalition, “The Antiquities Coalition Applauds Congressional Action to Counter Illicit Trade in Blood Antiquities,” news release, 

27 April 2016, available at: https://theantiquitiescoalition.org/press-releases/
96

JSOU Report 16-11

the-antiquities-coalition-applauds-congressional-action-to-counter-illicit-tradein-blood-antiquities/.

320. Council Regulation (EU) No. 1332/2013 of 13 December 2013, Amending Regulation (EU) No. 36/2012 concerning restrictive measures in view of the situation in 

Syria, Official Journal of the European Union, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.

eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32013R1332&from=EN.

321. Noah Charney, Paul Denton, and John Kleberg, “Protecting Cultural Heritage 

from Art Theft,” FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, March 2012, available at: http://

leb.fbi.gov/2012/march/protecting-cultural-heritage-from-art-theft-internationalchallenge-local-opportunity.

322. “What We Do: Investigating Illegal Movement of People and Goods: Cultural 

Property, Art and Antiquities Investigations,” U.S. Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, available at: https://www.ice.gov/cultural-art-investigations.

323. “Fact Sheet: Cultural Property, Art and Antiquities Investigations,” U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, available at: https://www.ice.gov/factsheets/

cultural-artifacts.

324. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, “Ancient Antiquities and Saddam 

Hussein-Era Objects Returned to Iraq,” news release, 16 March 2015, available 

at: http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/ancient-antiquities-and-saddam-husseinera-objects-returned-iraq; and Danny Lewis, “How ‘Operation Mummy’s Curse’ 

Is Helping Fight Terrorism,” Smithsonian, 28 April 2015, available at: http://

www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/federal-agents-are-fighting-terrorismtracking-down-missing-mummies-180955113/?no-ist. 

325. International Council of Museums, “Emergency Red List of Syrian Cultural 

Objects at Risk,” 2013, available at: http://icom.museum/fileadmin/user_upload/

images/Redlists/Syria/ERL_SYRIE_EN.pdf.

326. UNESCO Office in Amman, “Illicit Traffic of Cultural Property,” Paris: UNESCO, 

10 February 2013, available at: http://www.unesco.org/new/en/amman/culture/

illicit-traffic-of-cultural-property/. 

327. Taylor Luck, “Police Seize Large Cache of Syrian Artefacts,” Jordan Times (via 

Culture in Development), 9 February 2013, available at: http://www.cultureindevelopment.nl/Culture_in_Development/News/Common_News/1755/

Police_seize_large_cache_of_Syrian_artefacts; and Husaam Zaydaan, “Maafia 

al-jawaar tunaqqib aathaar souriyya,” Al-Akhbar, 23 October 2014, available at: 

https://www.al-akhbar.com/node/218260. 

328. “2015 Cairo Conference,” The Antiquities Coalition.

329. The Antiquities Coalition, “#CultureUnderThreat,” 39.

330. For more information about the Task Force and its outputs, see The Antiquities 

Coalition, “#CultureUnderThreat.

331. The Antiquities Coalition, “#CultureUnderThreat,” 14–30.

332. Monterey Terrorism, Research, & Education Program, “MonTREP Antiquities 

Conference 2016: Culture in the Crossfire,” Middlebury Institute of International 
97

Howard/Elliott/Prohov: IS and Cultural Genocide

Studies at Monterey, available at: http://www.miis.edu/academics/researchcenters/

terrorism/events/montrepantiquitiesconference2016.

333. Brodie interview.

334. Author interview; and Associated Press, “At Jordan Site, Drone Offers Glimpse 

of Antiquities Looting,” Voice of America, 3 April 2015, available at: http://www.

voanews.com/content/ap-jordan-antiquities-looting-drone-looting-fifa/2705595.

html. 

335. Ali, “Syrian Heritage under Threat.” The full names of the acts are: The Protection 

of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, and Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property.

336. “Meeting of States Parties to the UNESCO Convention,” UNESCO.

337. Yaya J. Fanusie, “To Defeat ISIS, Study the Antiquity Trade,” CNBC, 1 January 

2015, available at: http://www.cnbc.com/2016/01/25/to-defeat-isis-study-theantiquity-trade-ex-cia-commentary.html.

338. Mackenzie and Davis, “Temple Looting in Cambodia.”

339. Mark Vlasic, “Islamic State Sells ‘Blood Antiquities’ from Iraq and Syria to Raise 

Money,” Washington Post, 14 September 2014, available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/islamic-state-sells-blood-antiquities-from-iraq-and-syriato-raise-money/2014/09/14/49663c98-3a7e-11e4-9c9f-ebb47272e40e_story.html. 

340. “Optical due diligence is a strategy of willful blindness that gives the appearance 

of being informed as to the provenance of an object in order to reduce legal risks 

of acquiring looted cultural items. The term was coined by Arthur Houghton III, 

former deputy curator of the Getty Museum, as a strategy of legal mitigation in 

order to justify acquiring antiquities that were almost assuredly looted. Effectively 

it amounts to a ‘don’t ask, don’t tell policy.’” See Jason and Frammolino, Chasing 

Aphrodite, 61–62, 68.

341. Jason Felch, tweeting as “Chasing Aphrodite,” Twitter, 8 May 2015, available at: 

https://twitter.com/chasingaphrodit/status/596772830139830272.

342. James Cuno, “Culture War: The Case Against Repatriating Museum Artifacts,” 

Foreign Affairs 93 (6): 119–129; James Cuno, “Deploring ISIS, Destroyer of a Civilization’s Art,” New York Times, Letter to the Editor, 11 March 2015, available 

at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/11/opinion/deploring-isis-destroyer-of-acivilizations-art.html?_r=0; and Tom Mashberg and Graham Bowley, “Islamic State 

Destruction Renews Debate over Repatriation of Antiquities,” New York Times, 30 

March 2015, available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/31/arts/design/islamicstate-destruction-renews-debate-over-repatriation-of-antiquities.html?emc=eta1.

343. Mashberg and Bowley, “Islamic State Destruction.”

344. Jackie Northam, “U.S. Returns Dozens of Looted Artifacts to Iraq,” NPR, 

17 March 2015, available at: http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/

03/17/393403937/u-s-returns-dozens-of-looted-artifacts-to-iraq.