[Cite as State ex rel. Craftsmen Basement Finishing Sys., Inc. v. Ryan, 121 Ohio St.3d 492, 

2009-Ohio-1676.]

THE STATE EX REL. CRAFTSMEN BASEMENT FINISHING SYSTEM, INC.,

APPELLEE, v. RYAN, ADMR., APPELLANT. 

[Cite as State ex rel. Craftsmen Basement Finishing Sys., Inc. v. Ryan, 

 121 Ohio St.3d 492, 2009-Ohio-1676.]

Workers’ compensation — Occupational classification — Home-remodeling 

salespersons — “Construction estimator” and “salesperson” 

classifications reviewed — Reconsideration by bureau ordered. 

(No. 2007-2377 — Submitted March 10, 2009 — Decided April 15, 2009.) 

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, 

No. 06AP-1201, 2007-Ohio-5919. 

__________________

Per Curiam. 

{¶ 1} At issue is the Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Compensation’s 

occupational reclassification of certain employees of Craftsmen Basement 

Finishing System, Inc., appellee, for purposes of workers’ compensation 

premiums. Craftsmen is in the home-renovation business, and it employs 

salespersons who schedule in-home appointments with prospective customers to 

discuss their remodeling needs. During the visits, sales personnel take 

measurements and gather other information to prepare estimates. After that, any 

further contact between the customer and salesperson takes place in Craftsmen’s 

showroom, not at the home. 

{¶ 2} Initially, these employees were classified according to the bureau’s 

State Insurance Fund Manual under former classification code No. 8747 – 

“traveling salesperson – no handling or delivery of products.” That classification 

was later changed to code 8742, “outside salespersons,” after the bureau adopted 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

2 

the National Council of Compensation Insurance (“NCCI”) classification scheme 

as required by R.C. 4123.29(A)(1). 

{¶ 3} The bureau periodically reviewed its classifications and, in 2005, 

reclassified Craftsmen’s sales employees into code 5605, “construction 

estimators.” This reclassification significantly increased Craftsmen’s premiums. 

Craftsmen objected to the reassignment, and the matter was heard by the bureau’s 

Adjudicating Committee. 

{¶ 4} Craftsmen argued that nothing had changed in its employees’ job 

description to warrant the reclassification. It asserted that its employees did not 

satisfy the criteria for code 5605 because its sales staff was not exposed to 

construction but instead went into existing client homes. 

{¶ 5} The bureau pointed out that code 5605 defined a construction site 

as follows: “A space of ground occupied or to be occupied by a building. The 

location can have an existing building (commercial or residential) or building 

under construction.” The bureau maintained that employees were thus on a 

“construction site” preparing estimates, which made code 5605 the appropriate 

classification. 

{¶ 6} The committee upheld the classification. It made no findings of 

fact and merely summarized the parties’ positions. It closed with these 

observations and this holding: 

{¶ 7} “The BWC representative noted that this employer is on the low 

end of the bell curve of what may be considered a construction site. 

{¶ 8} “While the Committee is not unsympathetic to the employer’s 

situation, the Adjudicating Committee finds that the reclassification was proper 

under the NCCI classification system. Therefore, the employer’s protest shall be 

DENIED and the audit findings affirmed.” 
January Term, 2009 

3 

{¶ 9} That decision was affirmed on appeal to the designee of the 

predecessor of appellant, Marsha Ryan, the administrator of workers’ 

compensation. 

{¶ 10} Craftsmen filed a complaint in mandamus against the administrator 

in the Court of Appeals for Franklin County, alleging that the bureau’s order was 

contrary to law and did not adequately explain its reasoning as required by State 

ex rel. Noll v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 57 Ohio St.3d 203, 567 N.E.2d 245. The 

court agreed. It held that, contrary to the bureau’s representation, the order was 

not self-explanatory. The court cited code 5605’s scope provision, which limited 

the classification’s applicability to employees who “sell or estimate the costs of 

construction, erection or rigging activities outside of an office environment with 

exposure to construction, erection or rigging hazards at the job/construction 

site.” (Emphasis added.) The provision also referred to “exposure to field 

hazards” and further stated that “[e]stimators who go to the job/construction site 

to determine the cost of a job have an increase in job hazards compared to the 

typical outside salesperson.” These comments prompted the court of appeals to 

conclude: 

{¶ 11} “One of the key criteria for determining the applicability of manual 

5605 is whether the salespersons are exposed to construction, erection, or rigging 

hazards and whether the salespersons are subjected to an increase in job hazards 

compared to the typical outside salesperson. The bureau’s order fails to address 

this criteri[ion]. This failure is particularly significant because the bureau’s order 

acknowledges that the reclassification was a close call.” 2007-Ohio-5919 at ¶ 4. 

{¶ 12} The court granted a writ that ordered the bureau to vacate its order 

and issue an amended order. 

{¶ 13} The administrator now appeals to this court as of right. 

{¶ 14} The administrator contends that the traditional deference that is 

accorded to the bureau’s expertise in rate-making matters exempts it from having 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

4 

to explain its reclassification decision. Alternatively, she claims that the bureau 

has adequately explained its reclassification of Craftsmen’s sales staff from code 

8742 to code 5605. The court of appeals disagreed with both propositions, and 

we affirm that judgment. 

{¶ 15} We have long recognized the bureau’s considerable expertise and 

experience in premium-related matters. State ex rel. Reaugh Constr. Co. v. Indus. 

Comm. (1928), 119 Ohio St. 205, 209, 162 N.E. 800; State ex rel. Minutemen, Inc. 

v. Indus. Comm. (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 158, 161, 580 N.E.2d 777. That expertise, 

however, does not supersede the duty this court has imposed upon the Industrial 

Commission and the bureau to adequately explain their decisions. In State ex rel. 

Mitchell v. Robbins & Myers, Inc. (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 481, 6 OBR 531, 453 

N.E.2d 721, we held that the Industrial Commission of Ohio must properly 

explain its decisions, and in State ex rel. Ochs v. Indus. Comm. (1999), 85 Ohio 

St.3d 674, 710 N.E.2d 1126, we imposed that same duty on the bureau. 

{¶ 16} The administrator summarizes her second proposition in this 

passage: 

{¶ 17} “Craftsmen fits within this occupational description [code 5605] 

and the BWC need not describe in any more detail why it was making a change. * 

* * The order rendered by the Adjudicating Committee found ‘that the 

reclassification was proper under NCCI classification system.’ Though concise, 

this is sufficient.” 

{¶ 18} The administrator’s position seems to imply that in premiumrelated matters, if the bureau says something is so, it is so, and that is explanation 

enough. Ochs, however, reiterated that “[t]he purpose of an explanation 

requirement is ‘to inform the parties and potentially a reviewing court of the basis 

for the [agency’s] decision.’ ” 85 Ohio St.3d at 675, 710 N.E.2d 1126, quoting 

State ex rel. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc. v. Indus. Comm. (1994), 71 Ohio St.3d 139, 

142, 642 N.E.2d 378. The sufficiency of the bureau’s order must, therefore, be 
January Term, 2009 

5 

measured against a larger audience than just that agency, and what may be selfexplanatory to the bureau may not be self-explanatory to others. 

{¶ 19} The court of appeals found that the contested order was not selfexplanatory. The administrator suggests that even if the Craftsmen employees at 

issue could fall under either “8742–outside salespersons” or “5605–construction 

estimators,” it was within the bureau’s prerogative to select one over the other. 

But as the court of appeals stressed, these are not equivalent categories. One, by 

definition, entails a greater occupational risk than the other. According to the 

NCCI’s scope provision for code 5605, one of the distinguishing features between 

the two is the “increase in job hazards.” The construction-estimator classification 

“is available only to employees who sell or estimate the costs of construction, 

erection or rigging activities outside of an office environment with exposure to 

construction, erection or rigging hazards at the job/construction site.” (Emphasis 

added.) 

{¶ 20} It is not enough that the bureau consider a prospective customer’s 

home to be a job or construction site. There also must be an increased 

construction hazard to the Craftsmen employee. The bureau’s order did not 

discuss that requirement. 

{¶ 21} The bureau argues that State ex rel. RMS of Ohio, Inc. v. Ohio Bur. 

of Workers’ Comp., 113 Ohio St.3d 154, 2007-Ohio-1252, 863 N.E.2d 160, is 

precedent for upholding classification orders that, while cursory, are selfexplanatory. RMS, however, differs because the two classifications there were 

immediately distinguishable. One classification applied to charitable 

organizations and one did not. Consequently, when the bureau made the lone 

finding that RMS was not a charitable endeavor, the reason for the chosen 

classification was self-evident. No comparable distinction exists here. 

{¶ 22} The bureau’s order, as the court of appeals noted, characterized the 

classification into code 5605 as “a close call” for an employer that “is on the low 
SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

6 

end of the bell curve of what may be considered a construction site.” There was 

no discussion of the increased site hazard that the NCCI clearly anticipated with 

the classification. The court of appeals correctly ordered the bureau to issue an 

amended order. 

{¶ 23} The judgment of the court of appeals is affirmed. 

Judgment affirmed. 

 MOYER, C.J., and PFEIFER, LUNDBERG STRATTON, O’CONNOR,

O’DONNELL, LANZINGER, and CUPP, JJ., concur. 

__________________ 

Sebaly, Shillito & Dyer, L.P.A., and Danyelle S.T. Wright, for appellee. 

Richard Cordray, Attorney General, and Gerald H. Waterman, Assistant 

Attorney General, for appellant. 

______________________