### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON N ove m be r 29, 200 6 S es sio n
MOODY REALT Y COMPANY, INC. v. RONALD L. HUES TI S, ET AL 

### .

Direc t Appeal from the Chancer y Court for Weakley County No. 18,992 William B. Ac ree , Chancellor

No. W2006-00905-C OA-R3-C V - F iled April 4, 2007

This is a brea ch of contrac t action for the recover y of a rea l estate brokera g e commis sion. The trial
c ourt fo un d th a t th e pa

rt ie s d id n ot e nter i nt o a bin din g buy e r’ s r e pr e se ntatio n a g re e me nt b e c a us e there was no mee ting of the minds. I nstead, the c ourt awa rded the plaintiff re al estate broker damag es i n quantum meruit. On appeal, we find that the parties mutually assented to the te rms of the buy e r’ s r e pr e se ntatio n a g re e me nt a nd that the br ok e r wa s e nti tle d to its c omm iss ion a s state d in the contra ct. We vacate t he award of damag es i n quantum meruit, aff irm in part, re verse in part, and
re mand fo r e ntr y of jud g me nt i n a c c or da

nc e wi th t he c on tr a c t. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Chancer y Court Affi rm ed in p art; Reve rsed in part; Vac ated in part; and Rem anded

D AVI D R. F ARMER , J ., delivere d the opinion of the cour t, in which A L AN E. H I G H ERS , J ., and H O LLY M. K I RBY , J ., joined.

Jef fe ry T. Was hb ur

n, Dr e sd e n, Te nn e sse e , for the a pp e lla nts , Ro na ld L . H ue sti s and L isa M. Hu e sti s.
Wil liam R. Neese, D resde n, Tenne ssee, f or the a ppellee, Moody

Realty Company , Inc.
OP IN ION

In this action to recove r a r eal e state broke rag e commission, Moody Realty Company , Inc. (M oo dy Re a lty ) al le g e d that Rona ld an d L isa Hu e sti s ( Mr . H ue sti s, Mr s. Hu e sti s, or the Hu e sti se s) br e a c he d th e buy e r r e pr e se ntatio n a g re e me nt whe n th e y re fu se d to pa

y the c om mi ss io n for

the ir purcha se of a dairy far

m specific ally listed in the agr eeme nt. After telling Moody Realty ag ents they
we re no t in te re ste d in the fa rm , the y pr oc e e de d to ne g oti a te dir e c tly wi th t he se lle r a nd to p ur c ha se it without M oody

Realty ’s involvement. The dispositive i ssue on appe al involves the question of contra ct formation. Specifically , the Huestises c ontend they wer e not bound b y t he buy er repr esentation ag ree ment beca use there was no meeting of the minds. To support this a rgument, they rely upon the abse nce of

Mrs. Huestis’s s i gn at ure, Moody Realty ’s alleg ed re fusal to sig n the contr a c t in M r

. H u e s ti s ’ s p r e s e n c e , th e a lt e r a ti o n o f th e c o n tr a c t te r mi n a ti o n d a te , an d

Moody-2-

Realty ’s alleg ed fa ilure to pr ovide the Huestises with a copy of the c ontrac t. The trial cour t found ther e was no mee ting of

the minds and there fore no contra ct, but it awar ded $20,000 in quantum
m e r u i tt o M o o dy R e a l ty. On appe al, the Hue stises raise the issue of whether the lower court e rre d in awa rd ing dama g e s in qu antu

m me ru it whe n n o p ro of

wa s o ff e re d at tr ia l r e g ard ingthe re a so na ble value of the ag ents’ ser

vices. Moody

Realty raises the additional issue of whether the lower court
err ed by finding an abse nce of

contra ct betwe en the pa

rties. We believe the evidenc e in the re cord preponde rate s ag ainst the trial cour t’s finding

. There was a meeting of t he mi nds, and thus a binding
c on tr a c t, b e tw e e n th e pa

rt ie s. We v a c a te the awa

rd of dama g e s in q

ua ntum me ru it, a ff

ir m in pa rt , re ve rs e in p art , a

nd re mand fo r e ntr y of jud g me nt i n a c c or da

nc e wi th t he c on tr a c t.

Fac ts a nd P

ro c e dural H

ist or y

In J uly of 2004, the Huestises soug ht the assistance of Moody Realty in locating a dair

y far m to p ur c ha se in T e nn e sse e . In late July of 20 04 , th e y

dr ov e to Par is, Te nn e sse e fr om the ir ho me in Ver mont and met with associate br oker William Fuc hs (Mr. F uchs) a nd broker J ames Oliver

(Mr. Oliver), both e mploy ees of Moody Realty , to view ava ilable fa rm proper ties. Mr. Fuc hs first showed Mr. Huestis one of

their listed proper

ties, the Arnold fa

rm. Then, Mr. F uchs and Mr . Oliver (the
a g e nts ) d ro ve the Hu e sti se s b y the Ar no ld fa rm a g a in and pr oc e e de d to sh ow the m tw o o the r f arm s, the L eac h far

m and the Ha zelton farm , t h at wer e not listed by Moody Realty . The Ha zelton farm
was not listed by

anyone at the time of

the Huestises’ visit, but the ag ents knew the owner s of the Hazelton far

m would enterta in offer s to purchase the prope rty

. On that day , the ag ents prese nted a standard, two- pag e Buye r’s Repre sentation Agreeme nt (“buyer’ s repr esentation ag ree ment” or “ ag ree ment”) pr ovided by the Tenne ssee Assoc iation of Realtors to the Hue stises. The first pag e identifies “Ron Huestis and wife ” as the client employing Mo od y Re a lty a s a n on -ex c lus ive a g e nt t o lo c a te pr op e rt y fo r p ur c ha se and

to a dv oc a te on

the ir behalf duringany

neg otiations. The ag ree ment also p ro v i d es t h at it is effec tive from the date of execution until “1-1-06" or until the closing if it occurs be fore that date. Moody Realty ag ents had written the ter

mination date of “1-1- 06” in the bl ank supplied. Unde r the sec tion lis ting the c lient’s obligations, parag raph two ( 2) states that the c lient

a uth or ize [s] B ro ke r t o n e g oti a te fo r a fe e pa id by the Se lle r an d/o r the Se lle r’ s a g e nt, the pa y me nt o f whic h w ill be fu lly dis c los e d to Clie nt. I f a fe e is no t of fe re d o r p a id to Broke r, as could occ ur, for example, in the purcha se of a n unlisted property , Client ag ree s to pay

Br oker a total of . . . 8% compe nsation based on the total sales price

.

. . . B ro ke r’ s f

e e is e arn e d at th e signin g by bo th p art ie s o f a

n a g re e me nt t o p ur c ha se any proper ty (ies) a s descr ibed above throug h the eff orts of Br oker and is due at the closing of any

such transa ction.

On t h e first pa g e, the a g ree ment specific ally exempts t he “Wilford Dunc an” pr operty and, on the sec ond pag e, spec ifically includes the Ha zelton and L eac h fa rm s in the space provided for oth e r t e rm s and

c on dit ion s. Th is s e c tio n, a lso pe nn e d by Mo od y Re a lty a g e nts , pro vid e s as f oll ow s:W h e n the H u e stise s w e re c o n sid e r in g M r

. H a z e lto n ’s p ro p o sa l i n late 2 0 0 4 , t h e y c o n ta c te d M r. S p e igh t t o 1 det er mi ne whe t her t he buy er ’ s r epre s ent at i on ag r eement was b i ndi ng o n t hem. T hey t r ans mi t t ed a c op y of an un s i gn ed

c o n tra c t t o M r. S p e igh t b y fac sim ile a n d re q u e ste d tha t he re n d e r a n o p inio n a s to it s e ff ic a c y. -3- “This ag ree ment valid on Ron Huestis and is valid for David L eac h and R ichar d Hazleton [si c] dairy far ms.”

I t is undisput ed that Mr. Huestis signe d the agr eeme nt and that Mrs. Huestis did not. Moody Real t y offe red the orig inal pag e two (2) into evidence , bear ing the signatures of Mr . Huestis, Mr. Fuc hs, and Mr. Oliver

. At the time it filed suit, Moody Realty could not loc ate the first pag e of the ag ree ment but obtained it from attorne y Max Speight (Mr. Speight) , who had e arlier obtained it from the Hu e sti se s. Ex cluding Mr. S peig ht’s notations in the m arg in (which a re irr eleva

nt to this case ), 1 both parties authe nticated the c opy of the fir st pag e. All appe ar to ag ree that the ag ents discussed the buy er r epre sentation ag ree ment while t hey wer e en r oute from the Arnold proper ty to the L eac h far m. And, with the exception of the termination date dispute, the Huestises testified to knowing and understandingthe terms of the ag ree ment, which included a n eig ht perc ent (8%) commission on the sales pric e of the Hazelton or L eac h far m if purcha sed. The pa rties vig orously

dispute when the ag ents signe d the agr eeme nt and what they provided to Mr. Huestis to evidence the contra ct. Ther e is no dispute that Mr. Huestis rec eived a copy of the written contra ct, i n cl u ding the terms penne d by Moody Realty , but litt le in the re cord c larifies whether M r. Hu es tis rece ived a pa rtially or fully executed copy

in addition to a completely blank one. F irst, Mr. Fuc hs and Mr. Oliver testified that they both signe d the ag ree ment in the prese nce of Mr. Huestis and that Mr. Fuchs c opied the agree ment for the H uestises in the Moody Realty office
a t the e nd of that da

y . Y e t, t he ir te sti mony

fa ils to a c c ount f

or the Hu e sti se s’ po sse ssi on of pa rt ia lly
e xec ute d a

nd /or bla nk c op ie s o f t

he a g re e me nt i nc lud ingthe ha nd wr itt e n te rm s.
Unf o rt un at el y , th e H u es t i s es ’ t es t i m o n y b ro u gh tn o cl ar i ty

t o th e m at t er

. M r. Hue stis testi fied that the ag ents did not sign the ag ree ment in his presenc e. Along side these a ssertions, howeve r, Mr. Hu e sti s ma de ambi g uo us state me nts that clo ud e d his v e rs ion of e ve nts . Wh e n r e c ounti nghis tr ip t o the Mo od y Re alt y off

ice a t th e e nd

of the da y , M r. Hu e sti s st a te d th a t he e nte re d th e of fi c e , g ot a
c op y of a c on tr a c t w ith out a

signatur e , a

nd a sk e d f or Mr . F uc hs ’ s ig natur e on

it. He c on tin

ue d: “ so Ifig ured it would be valid with his signature on it, I put my signature on it a fter beca use I assumed my wife ha d alre ady

signe d it.” This statement seems to sug g est t h at M r. Hu es tis and Mr. Fuc hs executed an a g ree ment at that time, but then Mr. Huestis testified that he ha d signe d the first contra ct
ear lier that day

but never saw them sign it. He returne d to the office for a second copy and “a ll Ig ot
was a blank copy

with no signat u re s o n it, not even mine.” Intere stingly , Mr. Huestis’s attorne y could not sort these fa cts out for the c ourt when a sked.

Mrs. Huestis stated that she ne ver sa w the ag ents sign t h e agreement. The n she g ave conflictingtestimony

about the copie s Mr. Huestis rec eived at the end of the day . In her de position, she stated that he returne d from the Moody Realty office with two copies: one blank and one bear ing his signatur e. Then at trial, she stated that she vie wed the c ontrac t when her husband re turned to theT he p art i es di sput e whet her t he agent s eve n p rovided t he M LS s heet t o t he H uest i ses

. M r. Fuchs and M r. 2
O l i ver contend t hey never pro vi d ed one , and t he H uest i ses co nt end M r. O l i ver hand ed i t t o t hem whi l e t ravel i ng t o t he f ar ms

. T h e H u es t i ses o f f ered a no t her M LS s h ee t a t t r i al t h at s h owe d t h e mos t r ec en t a s k i n g pr i ce f or t h e f ar m t o be $ 3 2 5 , 0 0 0 rat her t han $ 4 6 8 , 0 0 0

. T he M LS s heet ref l ect ed t hat t he H azelt o n f arm was of

f ered at t hi s l o wer pri ce as r ecent
a s fo u rte e n m o n ths b e fo re the y vie w e d the p ro p e rty.
-4- car and that it lacke d signatures. She rec alled her husband say ing that he did not have a copy of the
c on tr a c t, t

hat Mo od y wo uld n’ t sig n it, but that he wo uld lik e a signe d c op y . Wh e n p re se nte d w ith her c onflicting deposition testimony , Mrs. Huestis stated that she ha d been mistake n beca use she actua lly relied on what Mr. Hue stis said to her rathe r than view ing the document itself.

We find simil ar patterns with respe ct to the termination date dispute. The Huestises conte nd that the ag ents cha

ng ed the te rm i n at i o n d at e twice in the course of the da y . Acc ordingto the Huestises, the a g ents first chang ed the date from a si x month term t o a ter mination date of January 1, 20 05 , a nd dis c us se d th e c ha

ng e wi th b oth

Mr . a nd Mrs. Hue st is. Th e y

c on te nd that th e a g e nts the n c ha ng e d th e date to Janu ary

1, 20 06 , w hil e Mr . H ue sti s wa s n ot p re se nt. F ro m mo st a c c ounts , it a pp e ars that th e te rm inatio n d a te of “ 1- 1- 06 " wa s on the a g re e me nt whe n M r. Hu e sti s si g ne d it

. Although Mr . Huestis stated at trial that he wa s n o t ce rt ai n if it was there , Mrs. Huestis and Mr. F uc hs te sti fi e d to its pr e se nc e a t th e tim e of e xec uti on

. Th e Hu e sti se s a lso c on te nd that at th e tim e Mr. Huestis sig ned the a g ree ment, he thoug ht the contra ct terminated in 2005. Mrs. Huestis stated attri al th ats h e wa s p re s en t i nth e c ar wh en th e a gen t s ch an gedth e d at e t o 2 0 0 6 an d th at , al th o u gh they handed he r the doc ument and told he r of the chang e, she place d it on the seat and ne ver sig ned it. Yet, Mrs. Huestis testified diffe rently at her deposition and stated that whe n her husba nd returne d t o th e c ar , M r. Fu ch s t o l d

h i mab o u tth e c o n tra ct , th e t erm i n at i o nd at e o f 20 0 6 , an d as k edh i mt o s i gn it. Mr. Huestis then signe d it.

I mmediately

afte r the showingand at a ll tim es there afte r, the couple told the ag ents that they ha d n o inte re st i n th e Ha zel ton fa rm. At tr ial, Mr . H ue sti s te sti fi e d th a t th e fa rm wa s o ut o f t

he ir price rang e, as the Multipl e L isting S ervic e (ML S) information s heet reve aled a purcha se price of 2 $468,000. Mr. Huestis also stated t hat he questioned how old the ML S lis ting infor mation was, but that the ag ents did not respond to him. Although assuming the sheet to be more than a year old, he appar ently

never pursued the issue of current pricing or eng ag ed in discussions with the age nts about how flexible Mr. Hazelton might be in neg otiating the price

. The a g ents, on the other ha nd, testified that they told Mr. Huestis that Mr. Hazelton would take no less th an $400,000 for the f arm. Mr. Hu e sti s c on te nd e d th a t he le arn e d o f t his pr ic e on ly fr om Mr . Ha zel ton in De c e mbe r of 20 04 , ju st prior to their ora l purcha se agree ment.

Mr. Fuc hs called the Huestises no l ess than thre e (3) times after their visit to determine if they wanted to pur sue any

of the thre e farms further

. Eac h time, the Huestises unequivoca lly stated they
wer e not intere sted. Acc ord i n g t o Mr. Huestis, ar ound Thanksg iving of 2004, Mr. Hazelton contac ted him to inquire into his interest in seeing the farm ag ain. Mr. Huestis agr eed to take another look beca use he planned to be in the are a for other rea sons. Mr. Huestis appar ently never contac ted Moody Realty or notified them that he would be returning to the are a and visiti ng the Hazelton Fa rm ag ain. Duringthe visit, Mr. Hazelton quoted a $475,000 asking price

. They later c ommunicated byM r

. H u es t i s t es t i f i ed t h at , a l t h ou g h t h ey h ad r ea ch ed an a g r ee men t regar di n g h i s pu r ch as e of t h e f ar m f or 3 $400, 000, t h ei r n eg ot i at i on s r eg ar di n g t h e s al e of e qu i pmen t c on t i n u ed.

E xh i bi t 2 r eve al s t hat t he H ues t i s es provi ded t o M r. S p eigh t a copy of t he agr eement wi t h n o s i gn at ur es 4

w h a t s oe v e r , bu t t h e r e c or d i s u n c l e a r a s t o w h e t h e r h e u n de r s t oo d t h a t M r

. Hu e s t i s h a d s i g n e d t h e f or m.

W e no te tha t M o o d y R e a lty n e v e r in c lud e d the re m e d y o f q u a n tum m e ru it in its c o m p la int. 5

T hi s f i gu r e i s t he equi val ent of an ei gh t per cen t ( 8% ) comm i s s i o n o n a f o ur hu ndr ed t hous and dol l ar 6 ( $4 00 , 00 0) s al es pri ce.
-5- telephone in the f

irst week of

Dec ember , and Mr. Hue stis tol d Mr. Hazelton they wer e not intere sted in the far m beca us e o f t h e p ri ci n g . Mr. Hazelton then lower ed the pr ice to $400,000, and Mr

. Huestis acc epted the of

fer . They rea ched a

n ag ree ment that day

for the H uest i s es t o p urcha se the far m f or that amount, and they

consummated the tra

nsaction in J anuar

y of 2005. Mr. Ha zelton and 3 his co-owne r executed a

war ranty deed on January

20, 2005, and recorde d the t ransf er of title to Mr. and Mrs. Hue stis four day s later.

As we no te d pr e vio us ly , pr ior to e nte ri ng thi s a g re e me nt and c on summatin g it, Mr . H ue sti s contac ted attorne y

Max S peig ht to determine if the buyer r epre sentation ag ree ment was bindi ng . He the n tr ans mitte d c op ie s o f a n uns ig ne d c on tr a c t by

fa c sim ile to M r. Spe ig ht and und e rs too d h is

4 op ini on to b e that th e re wa s n o c on tr a c t be c a us e no bo dy

signe d th e a g re e me nt.

Mr. Fuc hs learne d of t he pending transaction fr om Mr. Hazelton and conta cted the H uestises in the first wee k of De cembe r 2004. He testified to c alling the Huestises seve ral times and insisting on the eig ht perc ent (8%) commiss i o n s t at ed i n the contra ct. Mr. Hue stis refused to pa y Moody Re a lty the c omm iss ion

and c on te nd e d th a t th e re wa s n o b ind ingc on tr a c t be tw e e n th e m. Moody Realty filed a c omplaint ag ainst the Huestises on Mar ch 10, 2005, and alleg ed bre ach of c on tr a c t and

vio latio n o f t

he Te nn e sse e Con sume r P ro te c tio n A c t ( TCP A)

. I t de mand e d th ir ty 5 two thousand dollars ($32,000) , pre- judgme nt and post-judg ment interest, tre ble damag es, and 6 attorney ’s fe es. The H uestises filed an a nswer a nd later a mended i t wi t h the cour

t’s permission. They denied the e x istence of

a binding contra ct and, as a n alternative aff

irmative def

ense, c ontended th e i r p e r f o r m an c e w a s e x c u s e d

b e c a u s e o f M o o dy R e a l ty’ s b r e a c h o f c o n tr a c t an d o f f i d u c i ar y d u ty. The Hue stises alleged t h at t he ag ents failed to infor m them of all ava ilable information on the proper ty , including the most rece nt asking price of $3 2 5,000, and that this failure constituted a brea ch of fiduciar

y duty

. These omissi ons also constituted a breac h of contract, thus excusing the Hu e sti s e s ’ o bli g a tio n to pe rf or m and pa y the c omm iss ion . M or e ov e r, the y a sse rt e d th a t be c a

us e Mr s. Hu e sti s n e ve r e xec ute d th e a g re e me nt, sh e wa s n ot b ound in a ny even t. Th ey mo ve d th e c ourt to dismiss the complaint in its entirety for these rea sons. T he Hue stises also filed a c ounter-c omplaint with their ame n d ed an s wer . In it, they identified var ious undisclosed fac ts and information and
asser ted claims for brea ch of contra ct, brea ch of fiduciar y duty , and violation of t h e T C P A. T he counter -complaint did not list the m oney damag es soug ht but inst ead r equeste d “judg ment . . . for such sum that the cour

t finds just and appropriate under the circ umstances a long w ith pre-judg ment-6-

and post-judg ment interest,” tr eble damag es, attorne y ’s fe es and e x penses, a nd the dismissal of Mo od y Re a lty ’s c omp la int

. After Moody Realty filed its answer

to the counter -complaint, the Huestises filed a motion to d ism iss the TCP A c la im f or fa ilure to s tate a

c la im u po n w hic h r e lie f m ay

be g ra nte d, a lon g wi th
a memora ndum of law a

nd with excerpts from Mr. Fuchs’ de position. The parties appe are d befor e th e c h an ce l l o r, wh o d ec i d edn o t t o ru l e o nth e m o t i o n

. T h en , o nM ar ch 1 0 , 2 0 0 6 , C i rc u i tJ u d ge Wil liam Acre e, sittingby

intercha ng e, ef fec tively dismiss ed the Hue stises’ motion and then presided over the two-day

trial.

At the concl u s i o n o f the proof , J udg e Ac ree discussed the issue of c ontrac t formation as fo llo ws

. The que stion of whether or not there was a contra ct betwe en the pa

rties, the Court fi nd s th a t th e re wa s n ot a

me e tin g of

the min ds in thi s ca se fo r s e ve ra l r e a so ns

. First of a ll the contrac t was sign ed b y - - i n a haphazard manne r. I t was signe d - - the re [we re ] ch ang e s ma de . It w a s si g ne d in a c ar r a the r t

ha n a bu sin e ss office as one w ould expect. There wer e kids, small children involved pre sent.

Th e pa rt ie s nev e r did sit do wn

and sa y , lo ok , h e re ’s wh a t w e ’r e a g re e ingto
and e xpla in a ll that. It w a s n ot p re se nte d in that ma nn e r a s you

wo uld no rm a lly expect a contr act to be sig ned.

Mr s. Hu e sti s d id n ot s ig n th e c on tr a c t. It w a s h and e d to he r, and sh e jus t la id it down and didn’t sign it, and I don’t understa nd why if the par ties did ag ree upon th e c o n tra ctwh y

s h e wa s n ’t qu es t i o n ed ab o ut th i s , M rs

. Hu es t i s , y o u ’r e go i n g t o s i gn this or y ou’re not goingto sign it or what is the situation.
And, finally , there was no complete copy of the contra ct kept. I k n o w t hat
wa s n ot - - I un ders tan d th a t c op ie s c an b e a c c e pta ble in e vid e nc e , b ut t akin g thi s c ir c ums tanc e in wi th the oth e rs ; that is, that no bo dy bo the re d to ke ep a co mpl e te copy of the c ontrac t leads t h e C o u rt to conclude that there was no mee ting of the minds and no contrac t.

In a dec ree enter ed on Mar ch 29, 2006, Judge A cree d i s missed both Tennessee Consumer Pr ote c tio n A c t c la ims and ru le d, in p e rt ine nt p art , a s f oll ow s:
3

. D e f

e n d an t s ’ c o un t e r c l a i mi s d e n i e d an d d i s m i s s e d

w i thp r e j u d i c e i ni t s e n t i r e ty.
4. Pla int if

f’ s c a us e of a c tio n f or br e a c h o f c on tr a c t is de nie d a nd dis mis se d w ith prejudice

.W e n ot e a s an i ni t i al mat t er t hat on appeal , t he H ues t i s es do not r ai s e t he i s s ue of t he t r i al cour t ’ s di s mi s s al 7

o f th e ir c o u n te r-c o m p la int fo r b re a c h o f co n tra c t, the su b sta n c e o f wh ic h the y utilize d a s a n a ff irm a tive d e fen se to
e sta b lish th a t M o o d y R e a lty’ s b re a c h e x c u se d the m fro m p e rfo rm ing

. -7- 5. Plaintiff is g rante d judgme nt ag ainst Defe ndants, jointly and seve rally , in the
amo un t o f

tw e n ty th o u s an d

d o ll ar s ( $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 ) f

o r s e r v ic e s p r o v ide d Def endants, qu an tum me ru it

. Th e Hu e sti se s th e n ti me ly fi le d th e ir

no tic e of a pp e a l.

Issues Presented and St

andard of Review The pa rties collec tively

prese n t t wo i s sues, re stated below, f or this Court to address. The Huestises ra ise the followingissue:

(1 ) Whe the r t

he Cha nc e ry Cou rt of Wea kle y Cou nty , T e nn e sse e , e rr e d in
awa rdingthe plaintiff $20,000 for service s, quantum meruit, afte r rulingthat a re al
e state age nc y ’s B uy e r’ s Re pr e se ntatio n A g re e me nt w a s n ot a va lid c on tr a c t and

in view of t h e fa ct that the plaintiff fa iled to present a ny evidenc e duringthe trial
re lativ e to t

he re a so na

ble va lue of

the g oo ds or

se rv ic e s p ro vid e d to the de fe nd ants

. Moody Realty , on the other ha

nd, prese nts the following issue: ( 2 ) Whet

h e r th e tr ia l c o urt e r

r e d in d e n yin gan d

d is mi s s in g M oody Re a lty ’s c la im f

or br e a c h o f c on tr a c t. 7

Our a naly sis beg i n s and ends w ith the issue of contra ct formation. Our holding that the pa rt ie s d id ente r int o a bind ing c on tr a c t thus ob viate s the ne e d to a dd re ss t he re me dy

of dama g e s in quantum meruit.

In a no nju ry tr ial , o ur

sta nd ard of re vie w i s de novo on the re cord. W right v. City of Kno x v ill e , 8 9 8 S

. W

. 2 d

1 7 7 , 1 8 1 (T en n

. 1 9 9 5 ). W e ap p l y a p re s u mp t i o nth atth e t ri al co urt ’s fi n d i n gs of fa c t are c or

re c t and wi ll r e ve rs e th e cou rt bel ow on ly if the pr e po nd e ra

nc e of the e vid e nc e is otherwise. T enn. R. App. P. 13(d). We do not apply that presumption, howeve r, to the trial cour t’s conclusions of law

. Bo wde n v . W ar d , 27 S.W .3d 913, 916 (Tenn. 2000)

. Anal y sis

In light of the trial court’s finding that there was no meeting of the minds a nd there fore no contra ct, we be g in with Huestises’ arg uments conce rningthis iss ue. In essenc e, they insist t hat they
ar e n o tb o un d

b y th e bu y er ’s re p re s en t at i o n agr ee m en t b ec au s e t h e M o o dy R ea l ty age n t s d i d

n o ts i gn the contra ct in the prese nce of Mr. Huestis; be cause the ag ents altere d the termination date without-8-

Mr . H ue sti s’ s k

no wl e dg e ; be c a

us e the y did no t re c e ive a c op y of the c on tr a c t sig ne d by bo th p art ie s; and be c a us e Mr s. Hu e sti s d id n ot s ig n th e c on tr a c t.
The Huestises appea

r to attack a ssent on both sides of the contra ct. They first sug g est that the a g e nts did

no t a ss ent b e c a

us e the y did no t si g n th e a g re e me nt i n th e pr e se nc e of Mr . H ue sti s. They next contend that, even thoug h Mr. Huestis sig ned the a g ree m en t, his signature did not constitute eff

ective a ssent beca

use he w as ig norant of the chang e in the contr act ter mination date. Although w e perc eive these arguments to be disinge nuous, we ne verthe less addre ss them below and fi nd that th e re c or d r e ve a ls mutu a l ass e nt ev e n if we a ssume the Hu e sti se s hav e pr e se nte d a n a c c ur a te
ve rs ion of e ve nts

. Th e Hu e sti se s a lso a sse rt

tha t th e tr ia l c ou

rt ha d a ba sis to vo id the c on tr a c t a s a g a ins t pu bli c policy under Te nnessee Code Annotated Sec tion 62-13-312(b)( 8). They contend that this provision require s rea l estate a g ents and broke rs to provide a written copy of t he ag ency contra ct, executed by both parties, to the client f or the c ontrac t to b e v al i d

. Yet, the statutory authority cited by the Huestises applies only to a dis ciplinary action, and we are unconvinced that Moody Realty violated it i n a ny e ve nt. Th is a

uth or ity thu s c ann ot s e rv e a s a state me nt of po lic y up on wh ic h th is C ourt wi ll
vo id a c on tr a c t. F ina lly , th e re c or d c on ta ins ins uf fi c ie nt e vid e nce to c on c lud e tha t Mr s. Hu e sti s a sse nte d to be bo un d b y

the c on tr a c t. E ve n th ou g h s he fa ile d to sign it , th a t f a ilure do e s n ot v iti a te the contra ct betwe en Mr. Hue stis and Moody Realty

. Mutual Assent to be Bound

The Huestises first contend that the ag ents’ ref usal to sign the ag ree ment in the prese nce of Mr. Huestis pre vented the f ormation of a bindingcontra ct. A contr act “ must result from a me eting of the minds of t h e p ar t i es in mutual assent to the terms, must be based upon a sufficie nt
c on sid e ratio n, fr e e fr om f

ra ud or un du e inf lue nc e , not a g a ins t pu

bli c po lic y

and su ff ic ie ntl y de fi nit e to be enf orce d.” Staubach Retail Servs.- Southeast, L.L.C

. v. H.G. Hill Realty Co. , 160 S.W .3d 521, 5 2 4 (T en n

. 2 0 0 4 )( qu o t i n g Doe v . HCA Health Serv s. o f T en n ., Inc. , 46 S.W .3d 191, 196 (Tenn. 20 01 )( c itatio ns omi tte d) ). Court s d ete rm in e mut ua lity of a sse nt b y

a sse ssi ngthe pa

rt ie s’ manifestations ac cordingto an objective sta ndard. Id. In other wor ds, we must deter mine whether
a re asonable onlooker, ba sed upon the pa rties’ outwa

rd manife stat ions, would conclude that the Huestises and the ag ents ag ree d to be bound by the terms of the written contra ct.
We f ir st n ote that th e signatur e s o f p art ie s to a wr itt e n a g re e me nt a re no t a lw ay s e sse nti a l to establish a binding contra ct. Id. ; T

. R

. Mills Cont ractors, Inc. v . W RH Enters., L.L.C., 93 S.W .3d 861, 866 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). One function of the signature is to show the signor’ s intent to be bound by the terms stated, but other manifestations of as s en t can se rve the same purpose in the absenc e of sig nature

. See Burton v

. W arren Farmers Coop. , 129 S.W .3d 513, 521 (Tenn. Ct. App. 20 02 ). Th e pa

rt ie s’ a c tio ns or

ina c tio ns, a s w e ll a s sp ok e n w or ds , c an e sta bli shmut ua l a sse nt. Id. ( c it ing Co l e-M

cInty re-Norfleet Co. v. Holloway , 214 S.W . 817, 818 (Tenn. 1919) ). “[T]he exis tence of a c ontract, the meetingof the minds, the intention to assume an oblig ation, and the understandingare to be deter mined ... not alone fr om the words used, but a lso the situation, a cts, andT he l ega l mechan i s m by whi ch part i es s how t hei r as s ent t o be bo un d i s t hr ough off er a nd accept anc e. 8
G e n e ra lly, w h e n the p a rtie s u se a fo rm c o n tra c t p ro v id ing sp a c e s fo r b o th sign a tur e s, the p a rty first sig n ing the fo rm is

c o n sid e re d th e o ff

e ro r, a n d th e p a rty sig n ing se c o n d the o ff e re e

. See C .J .S

. C o n tra c ts § 7 5

. T h o u g h a n a rg u m e n t ex ists fo r c a sting M o o d y R e a lty a s the o ff e ro r, w e inste a d w ill a d h e re to this g e n e ra l a p p ro a c h a n d d e te rm ine w h e the r th e a g e n ts suf f i ci ent l y accep t ed M r. H uest i s’ s o f f er.

W e se e no re a so n to a d d re ss M r. H u e stis’s as se n t, a s h e sign e d the a g re e m e n t an d , b y sign ing , m a n ifeste d his

a sse n t t o b e b o u n d b y its te rm s. M r. H u e stis’s re q u e st fo r c o p ie s o f t h e c o n tra c t at the e n d o f t h e d a y furth e r su p p o rts this c o n c lus io n

.

-9- the conduc t of the par

ties, and the at tendant cir cumstance s.” Scandlyn v . McD ill Columbus Corp., 8 9 5 S

. W

. 2 d

342, 345 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 4 )( qu o t i n g AP COAm us e me nt C o. v . W ilk ins Fa mi ly Rests. of America, 673 S.W .2d 523, 527 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984)( citations omitt ed))

.
In th is c a se , th e tr ia l c ourt mad e no fi nd ing s r e g ard ingwh e n o r b e fo re wh om t he a g e nts signe d the contra ct, and the pro o f at t rial cla rified ve ry

littl e. Ne verthe less, we be lieve the r ecor d supports a findingof mutual assent to be bound e ven assumingthe ag ents did not sig n the ag ree ment in front of Mr. H uestis. When only one par ty signs a written contra ct that co n t em p l at es the signatures of both pa

rties (but does not expressly require it), the l aw c onsiders it to bind both parties when the non-sig ning party acc epts it. See B uddy Lee A ttractions, Inc. v. W illiam Morris Agency, Inc. , 13 S.W .3d 343, 350 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). T here is no question that t h e age n ts signed the ag ree ment at some p o i n t , b u t assuming the a g ents did not sign the a g ree ment in Mr. Huestis’s pr e se nc e , th e piv ota l qu e sti on the n b e c ome s w he the r t he Mo od y Re a lty a gen ts s uf

fi c ie ntl y manif e ste d th e ir

a sse nt to be bo un d a t that ti me . O r, in o the r w or ds , w e c on sid e r whe the r t he a g e nts
acc epted Mr. H uestis’s offe r. We believe the e vidence is clear that they did. 8

F ir st, Mr . H ue sti s tes tif

ie d that, wh e n ask e d if the y we re g oin g to sig n the c on tr a c t, t he a g e nts tol d him that the y did no t ne e d to do so

. We vie w thi s state me nt, if a c c ur a te , a s c on fi rm a tio n o f t he ir int e nt t o b e bo un d r a the r t ha n a s a re je c tio n o f M r. Hu e sti s’ s o ff e r. Al tho ug h M r. Hu e sti s st a te d to his wife that he didn’t think they had a contrac t without the ag ents’ sig nature s, he does not asse rt that he communicated this understandingto the ag ents themselves. Thus, M r. Huestis’s subjective understandingof this statement, if uncommunicate d to the ag ents and in c onflict with an objec tive interpre tation, has no eff

ect on our analy sis. In our estimation, the re asonable onlooker would view this statement as a manife station of the intent to be bound. Even more, it e vinces a belief that the contra ct alre ady had bindi ng eff ect. Sec ond, Moody

Realty ag ents not only

prepa red a nd worde d the a g re e me nt, but th e y

a lso se le c te d th e te rm s w ri tte n in the bla nk sp a c e s. Th e fa c t th a t th e a g e nts dr a ft e d th e ve ry

a g re e me nt s ig ne d b y

Mr. Hue st is , c ou

ple d w iththe state me nt a bo ve , s tr on g ly sug g ests their asse nt to be bound.

Th ir d, the a g e nts pr oc e e de d to sh owthe Huest is e s th e Ha zel ton fa rm a ft e r M r. Hu e sti s undisputedly

executed the a g ree ment. The Hazelton far m was unlisted at that time and would not have be en ea sily

identifiable by

non-loca l buy ers. The rea sonable person would thus presume that the ag ents would identify and show the unlisted pr operty only afte r enter ing a binding c ontrac t that-10-

would secur e a commission on i ts sale. The a g ents beg an to per form under the contra ct when the y sh ow e d th e Hu e sti se s th e Ha zel ton fa rm

.
F ina lly , M r. F uc hs ’ s ub se qu e nt t e lep ho ne c a lls to t he Hu e sti se s r e fl e c te d th e a g e nts ’ understanding that the repr esentation a g ree ment was indeed valid. Had he no t i n t en d ed or understood himself to be bound by the contra ct, Mr. Fuchs would not have taken the tim e to follow up no less than three times w ith Mr. Huestis. In sum, e ven if Mr. Huestis subjectively believed the ag ents had not a cce pted the offe r or assented to be bound by the contra ct, the object i v e o n l o o k er wo uld vie w the a g e nts ’ s tate me nts and c on du c t as cle ar manif

e statio ns of a sse nt. Ev e n if the a g e nts signe d the ag ree ment wee ks later, they eff ectively acc epted Mr. H uestis’s offe r o n the day they ide nti fi e d a

nd sh ow e d h im the Ha zel ton fa rm

. Mutual Assent to the Terms of the W ritten Contr act

Th e fo rm a tio n o f a

c on tr a c t a lso de pe nd s u

po n mutua l a sse nt t o s uf

fi c ie ntl y de fi nit e te rm s. Sta ub ac h R e tai l Se rv

s. , 160 S.W .3d at 524. The H uestises contend that Mr. Huestis could not have assented to the te rms of the c ontrac t if he was unawa re of the chang ed ter

mination date. Tenne ssee Cod e Anno tate d Se c tio n 4 7- 50 -1 12 (a ) p ro vid e s th a t:

[a]ll c on tr a c ts .

. . in wr iti ng and signe d by the pa rt y to b e bo un d .

. . sh a ll b e pr ima fac ie evidenc e that the c ontrac t contains the t rue intention of t he parties, and shall be
e nf or c e d a s w ri tte n; pr ov ide d, that no thi nghe re in s ha ll l imi t th e ri g ht o f a ny pa rt y to contest the a g ree ment on the basis it wa s procur ed by fra ud or limit t he rig ht of any party to a ssert any other rig hts or defe nse provided by common law or statutory law in reg ard to c ontrac ts.

Tenn. Code Ann. § 47- 50-11 2 (a) (2001). Mr. H uestis, the party to be bound, sig ned a written ag ree ment, and we beg in with the presumption that it contained his intentions and that he asse nted to be bound by

those terms. Our review of the record revea ls that the “1- 1-06" termination date w as on the ag ree ment at the time he signe d it. The fac tual dispute hinge s mostly on the extent of Mr. Huestis’s awa

rene ss of t hat date; y et, t here is no need to deter mine what Mr. Hue stis knew and whe n he knew it. Mr. Huestis’s aw ar en es s o f t he ter m is irreleva

nt in this analy sis because he had a n ob lig a tio n to re a d th e a g re e me nt be fo re signin g it, is thu s c ha rg e d w iththe kn ow le dg e of the te rm s there in, and, in any

event, r atified the a g ree ment by seekingadditional copies of the contra ct and by f a i l i n g t o o b

j e c tt o th e t e r

ma f t e r h e l e ar n e d o f i tth a tv e r

y d ay.

One who sig ns a contra ct ca nnot later plea d ignor ance of its contents if t h er e was an opportunity to r ead it bef

ore sig ning. See Solomon v . First American Nat’l Bank, 774 S.W .2d 935, 94 3 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 98 9) . T he law w ill no t a llo w a pa rt y to e nte r a co ntr a c t and the n see k to avo id perf ormanc e bec ause he did not rea d the ag ree ment or know its contents. Giles v. Allstate Ins. Co. ,T h e p r o v is io n a ll o w s the re a l es ta te c o m m issio n to tak e d isc ip lina ry a c tio n in the e v e n t a lic e n se e fails “to 9 fur n ish a c o p y o f an y . . . co n tra c t re le v a n t to a re a l e sta te tra n sa c tio n to a ll sig n a to rie s the re o f at the ti m e o f ex e c u tio n .” T enn. C o d e A nn. § 6 2

- 1 3

- 3 1 2 (b)(8) (19 9 7 ).
-11- 8 7 1 S

. W

. 2 d 1 5 4 , 1 5 7 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 3 ) ( ci t i n g Beasley v. Me tro. Li fe Ins. Co. , 229 S.W .2d 146 (Tenn. 1950) ). Other

wise, written c ontrac ts would be worthless. Id. I n gen er al , the law holds parties r esponsible for what they sign. See id. But see Teague Bros. v. Martin & Bayley , Inc. , 750 S.W .2d 152, 158 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1987) ( excluding fr o m this gene ral rule situations in which the neg lect to re ad wa s induced throug h artifice or trick by the par ty seekingto enforc e the c ontrac t). In this case, Mr. H uestis signe d a two-pa g e contr act with only a handf ul of writt en terms. The te rm inatio n d a te wa s the se c on d ha nd wr itt e n te rm , loc a te d on the fi rs t pa g e of the a g re e me nt, jus t under his handwritten name identifying him as t he “Cli ent.” Not only was the te rm conspicuous, but the ag ree ment was c oncise. I f Mr. Hue stis si g ned this ag ree ment without readingit first, which
a pp e ars to b e the c a se , th e n h e did so a t hi s o wn

pe ri l.

The Hue stises sugg est in their re ply b ri ef t h e possi bility of mistake, fr aud, or mis re pr e se ntatio n. F or

e xamp le , the y argue that the re c ou ld be no mut ua l a sse nt whe n M r. Hu e sti s was mistaken a s to the expi ration date . They also imply

that the ag ents surre ptitious ly altere d the termination date w ithout Mr. Huestis’s knowledg e and tricked him into signingthe ag ree ment. They have done nothing mor e than sug g est these f ormation defe cts on appe al and have cited nothing beyond a passing ref

ere nce to the m from a Corpus Juris Secundum volume. Even if the H uestises had prove n fra

ud with respec t to the termination date, Mr. H uestis ratified the ag ree ment by acquie scenc e. I f, af

ter discove ringfra

ud, a party implies his acquie scenc e in the act or rema ins silent in situations s ug g esting his acquiesc ence , he ca nnot then maintain a claim in fraud. Brandon v. W right , 8 3 8 S

. W

. 2 d

5 3 2 , 5 3 4 (T en n

. C t

. Ap p

. 1 9 9 2 ) ( ci t i n g Gi lber t v . H un ne we ll , 59 Tenn. 289 (1 87 3) ). Ind e e d, a vo ida

ble c on tr a c t c an be ra

tif ie d b y a c ts o r s tate me nts , a

nd on e wh o h a s f

a ile d to
o b je c t ti me ly to th e c ir c u ms ta n c e w h il e aw ar e o f it h a s c o n f ir me d it s v a lidity

. Id. ( c i t i n g Fi de lit y Bank &Trust Co. v. Cain Partnership, Lt d. , 7 38 S.W. 2d 63 8 ( Te nn . Ct . App . 1 98 7) ; Russell v. Zanone , 404 S.W .2d 539 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1966)) . Mr. Huestis testified t hat he knew a bout the term by the end of

the day , y et he ne verthe less soug ht another copy of t he contract, fa iled to object to the term, and took Mr. F uchs’ subseque nt c alls without mentioning any thing about the validity of the contra ct or the a lleg ed surr eptitious alteration of the te rmination date.

Voidness and Public Policy

The Hue stises also asser

t that the trial court c ould have voided the contra ct as violative of public policy

under Tennessee Code Annotated Sec tion 62-13-312(b)( 8). The H uestises argue that thi s pro vis ion re qu ir e s re a l est a te a g e nts and br ok e rs to pr ov ide a wr itt e n co py of the a g e nc y

c on tr a c t,
e xec ute d b y

bo th p art ie s, to t

he c lie nt f or the c on tr a c t to be va lid

. Th a t se c tio n, ho we ve r, e xists on ly 9 to “ pr ov ide g uid e lin e s f

or dis c ipl ina

ry a c tio ns take n by the Te nn e sse e re a l e state c omm iss ion a g a ins t licensee s found g uilty of the [l isted] violations.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 62- 13-312(e ) (1997) . Indeed,-12-

this Court has found that this particular se ction does not prohibit even oral listi ng ag ree ments. See, e.g., Pa rk s v . M orris , 914 S.W .2d 545 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). And, althoug h the Tenne ssee Code’ s provisions addressing repr esentation by rea l estate ag ents requir e a “ written bilatera l ag ree ment that establishes the [ag ree d-upon] terms and conditions” for an ag ency

relationship t o arise, they do not expressly require both parties’ sig nature s on the written agree ment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 62- 13- 40 1 ( 19 97 ) ( pr ov idi ngals o that an a g e nc y re latio ns hip is n ot n e c e ssa ry fo r a re a l e state a g e nt t o pr ov ide se rv ic e s to a

pa rt y in a pr os pe c tiv e tr ans a c tio n) . N or did the L e g isl a tur e inc lud e re a l e state br ok e ra g e c on tr a c ts pe r sein the statute of fr auds. SeeTenn. Code Ann. § 29-2-101 (2000 & Supp. 2006). I f it had, thoug h, this a g ree ment would satisfy the statute, as the “par ty to be cha

rg ed,” Mr

. Huestis, signe d it. I ndeed, onc e a written contra ct has been signe d by one party and acce pted by the other, it is a binding written contra ct in the contemplation of the l aw. Se e T.R . M ill s Co ntrac tor

s, 93 S.W .3d at 866 ; Buddy Lee At t r actions , 13 S.W .3d at 350. Ironica lly , the par ty providing the missing first pag e of the contra ct is the very one see king to avoid the obligations li sted there in.

Ab se nc e of M

rs. Hu esti s’ s S ign atu re

The rec ord contains very littl e evidenc e reg arding Mrs. Huestis’s dealing s with the Moody Re a lty a g e nts . It r e ve a ls l itt le mor e tha n M rs . H ue sti s’ s p re se nc e duri ng mos t of the int e ra c tio ns wi th the ag ents, her inquiry

about t he contract before its completion and presentation t o the couple, and her me re placeme nt of it on the car seat whe n asked to sig n it. Even thoug h Mrs. Huestis admitted that she mig ht have sig ned the contra ct if she had disc ussed it further with her husband that day , we find no outward manifestations of assent on her part. We there fore conclude that Mrs. Huestis was not a par ty to the contract wit h Moody Realty . We also conclude that the abse nce of her sig nature on the ag ree ment does not undermine the formation of the contra ct betwe en her husban d an d the ag ency . There is no ex press language requiringher sig nature for the c ontrac t to be valid, and the handwr itten term on the sec ond pag e re cites th at the contra ct is binding on “ Ron Huestis” for the identified proper

ties. Thus, the absenc e of he r sig nature , the wordingof the doc ument itself, and the surrounding circ umstances bring us to the conclusion that Mrs. Huestis was not a party to the contra ct but that, notwithstanding this fac t, the contra ct re mained binding upon her husba nd.

Performance

, Breach, and D amage

I f the a g ents dischar g ed their oblig ations under the contrac t and the Huestises refused to pay the commission following their purcha se of the fa rm, then there is breac h of contra ct and e ntitlement to money damag es. Althoug h t h e t ri al co urt neve r re ache d the issue of whe ther the H uestises brea ched the contra ct, the re cord a mply supports such a f

inding: they ref

used to pay

the commission. As for Moody

Realty ’s per formanc e, the a g ents tender ed valuable servic es to Mr. Hue stis when they identified a da iry

far m the Huestises we re unlikely to loc ate without a n ag ent’s assistance and g ained
a c c e ss t o th e pr op e rt

y fo r t he ir c on sid e ra

tio n. An d, a lth ou g h th e c on tr a c t st a te s th a t Mo od y Re a lty
ear ns the commission when the buy er a nd seller e nter a

contra ct for pur chase throug h the ef forts of-13-

the ag ency , Moody Realty discharg ed it s obligations under the contra ct and e arne d its commiss ion.
Where pa rties to a bilater al contra ct ar e oblig ated to carry out cer tain tasks that are nece ssary for the r ealization of bene fits under the agr ee m ent, ea ch par ty has the rig ht “to proce ed fr ee of hindranc e by

the other pa

rty . [I ]f such other par ty interef ere [s] , hinder[s] , o r p re v ent[s] the perf ormanc e to such a

n extent as to rende r the perf ormanc e difficult and diminish the benefits to be
rec eived, the f

irst party [can] treat the con t ra ct as broken and [is] not bound to procee d under the added burdens.” W

il-Helm Age ncy v . Lynn , 618 S.W .2d 748, 751–52 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1981). Mr

. Hu e sti s h ind e re d the a g e nts fr om pr ov idi ng the ir fu ll rang e of se rv ic e s whe n h e un e qu ivo c a lly tol d Mr. Fuc hs by

telephone that he was not inter ested in the Ha zelton farm and whe n he fa iled to contact Moody Realty to inf

orm the ag ents of his ne wfound interest in late Novembe r or e arly Dec ember

.
“[W ]here the obligation of a party depends upon a

cer tain condition being perf

ormed a nd the fulfillment of that condition is preve nted by the ac t of t he other

party , the condition is considere d fulfilled.” ACG, Inc. v . Southeast Elevator, Inc

. , 912 S.W .2d 163, 167-168 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995) (quoting from an opinion of the Tex as C ourt of Appeals and equating the T exas rule to its Tennessee counter part). A lthough the c ontrac t betwee n Moody Realty and Mr. Hu es t i s contemplated the perf ormanc e of more extensive service s, we consider t he age nts to have fully perf ormed unde r the contra ct wher e the Hue stises never told them of their interest in the proper ty and thus ne ver a llowed them to perfor

m the service s they

wer e pre pare d to deliver.

Finally , the Huestises attempted to set up the defense of excused perf ormanc e by virtue of the ag ents’ brea ch of fiduciar y duty , but most of their alleg ations on the subject lac ked mer it in li g ht of their immediate disavowa l of interest in the prope rty . For example, the Huestises complaine d of
re c e ivi ngan old ML S sh e e t with an inf late d pri c e , but Mr . Hue sti s nev e r te sti fi e d to inq uir ingint o the purc hase pr ice of

the fa rm beyon d wh at wa s s hown on the ML S sheet or to askingabout the ag ents’ opinion of how flexibl e Mr. Hazelton might have been in neg otiating a lower pr ice. In any event, the H uestises failed to pr esent a ny argument in their reply

brief c oncer

nin g t h i s i s s u e and failed to ra ise the issue of the trial court’s dismi ssal of t heir breac h of contract claim. We theref ore c on c lud e tha

t th e a g e nts pe rf

or me d und e r the c on tr a c t, Mr . Hue sti s b re a c he d it , a nd Mo od y Re a lty is entitled to it s eig ht perc ent (8%) commission.

Conclu sion

We believe the e vidence preponde rate s ag ainst the trial cour t’s finding that there w as no me e tin g of

the min ds and

thu s n o c on tr a c t. O n th e c on tr ary , we fi nd the re c or d ampl y su pp or ts mut ua l a sse nt t o th e te rm s of the c on tr a c t. M r. Hu e sti s si g ne d th e c on tr a c t, a nd the a g e nts manifested the ir assent by their statements, conduct, and signatures on the document. We a lso find that the re cord r evea ls that the “1-1- 06 " t er m i n ation date wa s on the document at the time Mr. Huestis signe d it. The buy er’ s repr esentation ag ree ment was a concise , two-pag e docume nt, and the-14-

terminat i o n d ate was conspicuous. As pa rties to a contr act a

re unde r a duty

to rea d written
a g re e me nts and are thu s re sp on sib le fo r what th e y sign, we a c c or din g ly

ho ld M r. Hu e sti s to the te rm s of the buy er’ s repr esentation ag ree ment. Even if he was una war e of the termination date whe n he signe d th e a g re e me nt, he le arn e d o f i t th a t da y y e t f a ile d to take a c tio n a

nd ob je c t to the te rm

.

We acc ording ly

vaca te the trial c ourt’s aw ard of damag es in quantum meruit and re verse the trial court’ s finding of

no contra ct as to Mr. Hue stis. We otherwise a ffirm the tria l court’s judg ment and re mand this case f

or entry of judg ment in acc ordanc e with the contr act. Costs of this appea l are ta xed to R on a ld L . H ue sti s, L isa M. Hu e sti s, and

the ir sure ty , f or whi ch ex ecut ion

sh a ll i ssu e if
n e c e s s ar y.

___________________________________ DAVI D R. FARMER, J UDGE