Art of War Papers

Perceptions of Airpower and 

Implications for the Leavenworth Schools: 

Interwar Student Papers

David R. Jones, Major, US Army

US Army Command and General Staff College Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
The cover photo of the Command and General Staff Class of 1927-1928 is courtesy of the US Army Frontier Army Museum.
Perceptions of Airpower and

Implications for the Leavenworth Schools:

Interwar Student Papers

David R. Jones, Major, US Army

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

2014

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student 

author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army 

Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. 

(References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

The US Army Command and General Staff College Press

US Army Combined Arms Center

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
ii

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Jones, David R., 1981-

 Perceptions of airpower and implications for the Leavenworth schools : 

Interwar student papers / David R. Jones, Major, US Army.

 pages cm

 Includes bibliographical references and index.

 ISBN 978-1-940804-17-0 (alk. paper)

 1. Air power--History--20th century. 2. Air power--United States--

Evaluation. 3. Military education--United States--Evaluation. 4. United 

States. Army--Officers--Training of--History--20th century. 5. Command 

and General Staff School (U.S.)--History--20th century. 6. Fort 

Leavenworth (Kan.)--History--20th century. I. Title. II. Title: Perceptions 

of airpower and implications regarding effectiveness of the Leavenworth 

schools. 

 UG633.J66 2015

 358.4’0309042--dc23

 

2014045046

2015

Editor

Jennifer B. Fike

US Army Command and General Staff College Press 

publications cover a wide variety of military topics. The 

views expressed in this publication are those of the author(s) 

and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army or 

the Department of Defense. 

The seal of the US Army Command and General Staff 

College authenticates this document as an official publication of the US 

Army Command and General Staff College Press. It is prohibited to use this 

official seal on any republication without the express written permission of 

the US Army Command and General Staff College Press.
iii

Abstract

This thesis evaluates interwar period US Army officer perceptions of 

aviation as expressed in student papers written as part of the Command and 

General Staff School during the 1930s. The evaluation compares student 

perceptions to period airpower theory and doctrine and applies that study to 

weigh-in on the broader debate over the effectiveness of Fort Leavenworth 

during the interwar period. 

America’s School for War and Command Culture by Dr. Peter Schifferle 

and Dr. Jörg Muth, respectively, highlight the competing sides of that debate. Schifferle argues Leavenworth was a key component to the US victory 

in World War II while Muth argues the US victory occurred in spite of Leavenworth teaching faulty doctrine and stifling critical thinking.

This study concludes that the students generally agreed with period 

doctrine while also rejecting many of the ideas of airpower theorists. However, application of the study to the question of Leavenworth effectiveness 

yields mixed results. The papers indicate the doctrine, which formed the basis of Leavenworth instruction, was appropriate for the time. Nonetheless, 

they also suggest Leavenworth’s willingness to part with critical thinking 

development (in the form of writing) in favor of more classroom instruction 

- instruction of debatable effectiveness.

v

Acknowledgments

I would like to extend my gratitude to my chair, Dr. Scott Stephenson, 

and my readers, Dr. Richard Faulkner and Dr. John Curatola. They provided a great deal of assistance selecting a topic and their recommendations 

and feedback throughout the research and writing process was invaluable. 

Additionally, I greatly appreciate the support from my peers within the Art 

of War Scholars Program. Your feedback and questions helped improve my 

paper. Of course, any mention of the Art of War Program would be remiss 

without also thanking Dr. Nowowiejski. His dedication to the program and 

encouragement of the research and writing process deserves many thanks. 

Finally, I would like to thank my wife Crystal for her patience and assistance throughout this process.

vii

Contents

Abstract............................................................................................... iii

Acknowledgments.................................................................................v

Acronyms.............................................................................................ix

Chapter 1 Introduction ..........................................................................1

Chapter 2 Airpower in the First World War, Interwar 

Airpower Theory, and Interwar US Army Doctrine ...........................17

Chapter 3 CGSS Student Opinions on Airpower................................53

Chapter 4 Student Papers and Leavenworth Effectiveness.................89

Appendix A.......................................................................................103

Appendix B.......................................................................................107

Appendix C.......................................................................................109

Appendix D.......................................................................................113

Appendix E .......................................................................................115

Appendix F........................................................................................117

Appendix G.......................................................................................119

Appendix H.......................................................................................121

Appendix I ........................................................................................123

Bibliography .....................................................................................125

ix

Acronyms

AC Air Corps

ACTS Air Corps Tactical School

AEF American Expeditionary Forces

CAC Coast Artillery Corps

CGSS Command and General Staff School

FSR Field Service Regulations

TR Training Regulation

1

Chapter 1

Introduction

As the United States Army slowly ramps down from more than 

a decade of continuous combat operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and 

elsewhere, there are significant ongoing debates over the future of the 

Army. In an environment characterized by increasingly constrained resources, topics such as the size of the Army, the balance of capabilities 

between the active and reserve components, equipment procurement, 

and personnel costs predictably appear to dominate the discussion. That 

the Army must reduce in size because of these as other factors is, at this 

point, a foregone conclusion. However, the challenge is ensuring that 

those Army activities that remain through a post-war drawdown provide the best return on investment possible. In light of this challenge, it 

should not be a surprise that the topic of the best way to conduct Professional Military Education (PME) is a point of debate within the broader 

subject of the future of the US Army.

Given that the education and training of its personnel heavily influence the Army’s ability to perform in future conflicts, the effectiveness 

of a portion of that system, the Command and General Staff School 

(CGSS) at Fort Leavenworth, has recently been the subject of increasing debate. In a blog at Foreign Policy online, Dr. Nicholas Murray 

leveled significant criticism against the conduct of the resident course at 

the CGSS.1 He noted that an emphasis on time spent in class, rather than 

quality of instruction and time for reflection, has become a focus of the 

CGSS curriculum. An earlier article by the same author stated the problem more bluntly, that “the current focus of PME does not adequately 

prepare our officers to think critically.”2 Along similar lines, Jörg Muth 

argued that the current PME structure, including Leavenworth, fails to 

adequately educate Army officers to be effective staff officers.3 A recent 

article written by the former commander of the US Army Training and 

Doctrine Command, GEN Cone, who stated Leavenworth is not what 

it should be - an intellectual “Harvard on the Missouri,” supports these 

assessments.4 However, what is particularly interesting in the debate 

over the effectiveness of Leavenworth in the Army’s officer education 

system is not that it is happening, but that such debate is not new. Indeed, a number of works exist which explore the effectiveness of the 

instruction at Fort Leavenworth during the interwar period, points of 

which may be applicable to the current debate. 
2

Evolution of the Command and General Staff School

Prior to a review of the available works covering effectiveness of 

the CGSS during the interwar period, it is first necessary to provide 

a degree of background on the school. Formal military instruction at 

the former frontier post began with the establishment of the School of 

Application for Cavalry and Infantry in 1881.5 However, it was not until 

after the conclusion of the Spanish-American War that Leavenworth 

began its evolution from a basic branch school to a form of intermediate 

level education for mid-grade officers with emphasis on command and 

staff functions.6

As the school evolved, its importance grew within the Army. 

Even prior to the US entry into World War I, the Leavenworth school 

(renamed the School of the Line in 1907) was increasingly viewed as 

the “intellectual center of the Army.”7 While manpower requirements 

forced the school to close in May of 1916, General Pershing placed 

such importance on the Leavenworth instruction that he opened a school 

for officers of the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in Langres, 

France built around the model of instruction used at Leavenworth.8

Additionally, Pershing gave great praise to the role Leavenworth 

graduates played in solving many of the significant challenges faced by 

the AEF.9 By the time the Army schools at Fort Leavenworth reopened 

in 1919, Leavenworth attendance was unquestionably a key milestone 

in the career of a professional officer.

When the school reopened for the 1919-1920 academic year, it did 

so with a two-year course format. During the first year, students attended the School of the Line with a general focus on division operations. 

Upon completion of the first year of instruction, the Army selected the 

best students to attend a second year of instruction at the General Staff 

School with emphasis on corps and army operations.10 Commenting on 

both the 1919-1923 courses and the perceived importance of the school, 

in 1929 the Commandant of the CGSS wrote, “those who were not 

fortunate enough to stay for the second year felt that they were ruined 

professionally.”11 This issue, the need to maximize the number of graduates, and a large “hump” of officers requiring education prompted consolidation of the two schools into a one-year course titled the Command 

and General Staff School, a name that remains to the present.12

However, the shift to a one-year course was short-lived. Beginning 

in 1928, the CGSS returned to a two-year model, this time with all 

students attending both years. This format was believed to address 
3

possible shortcomings in the curriculum caused by the shortened course 

while, at the same time, eliminating the morale problems present in 

the 1919-1923 two-year format associated with non-selection for a 

second year of instruction.13 These two-year courses began in 1928 and 

graduated from 1930 through 1936. In 1935, as the last students of the 

two-year course completed their second year of instruction, the Army 

again instituted a one-year CGSS course for new students. This change 

occurred to provide the Army as many Leavenworth trained officers as 

possible.14

Throughout these shifts in course structure, Leavenworth retained 

its important position as a key developmental institution for mid-grade 

officers of the US Army during the interwar period. Indeed, for many 

officers of the period, Leavenworth was likely the only formal schooling they received on the operations of divisions, corps, and armies. Due 

to both the fact that many of the leaders of the US Army in World War 

II attended Leavenworth during the interwar period and the ultimate 

success of the Army in the war, significant debate exists over the effectiveness of the interwar CGSS and its role in the American victory.

Effectiveness of the Command and General Staff School

in the Interwar Period

The debate over the effectiveness of the instruction at the CGSS 

during the interwar period falls largely into one of two camps. On one 

side, scholars argued favorably for Leavenworth in that the school’s 

interwar instruction of division, corps, and army operations was an essential component in the later success of the US Army. On the other 

side of the debate, the argument is that despite the Army’s desire to 

use Leavenworth to develop skilled commanders and staff officers, the 

method of instruction and other factors worked against the intent. Thus, 

any successes of the US Army in World War II occurred not because 

of the instruction at Leavenworth, but in spite of Leavenworth. What 

follows in this section is a brief examination of each side of the debate 

as well as the introduction of another possible method to examine Leavenworth effectiveness beyond the methods used in the current literature.

Beginning with the proponents of the interwar CGSS, two historians stand out - Dr. Timothy Nenninger and Dr. Peter Schifferle. Although the first of these historians, Dr. Nenninger, focused much of his 

work on Leavenworth prior to the First World War, he wrote two articles directly addressing Leavenworth during the period of 1920-1940.15

In the earliest of these articles, “Creating Officers, The Leavenworth 
4

Experience: 1920-1940,” he wrote that Leavenworth was essential to 

the preparation of US Army officers for their duties during World War 

II.16 From his perspective, not only did the school adequately groom 

students in the basics of division and larger unit operations, it also successfully served as “an opportunity to practice the mental, intellectual, 

judgmental and decision-making aspects of higher levels of the military 

art.”17 As evidence, he pointed out the largely positive perceptions of 

the school by its students, the method and content of instruction, and 

the fact that the overwhelming majority of the US Army’s corps, army, 

and army group commanders or principal staff officers of World War II 

attended Leavenworth during the interwar period.18 Since Leavenworth 

was likely the only formal education many of these officers received on 

large-unit operations, the success of those leaders managing such units, 

in his opinion, stands as validation of the value of Leavenworth.

Only a few years after the publication of “Creating Officers,” 

Nenninger wrote another article to address criticisms of the interwar 

CGSS.19 In “Leavenworth and its Critics,” Nenninger acknowledged a 

number of arguments that the interwar Leavenworth did not perform as 

well as it could or should have, the main criticism being the school’s 

reliance upon school solutions (doctrinally correct solutions to tactical 

problems). Nenninger stated that critics of the school viewed these 

school solutions as having “inculcated narrow, uniform thinking among 

its graduates.”20 Additional criticism of the school, he points out, existed 

over the limited instruction on emerging technologies such as aviation 

and mechanization as well as a belief that the German Kriegsakademie

conducted better instruction during the same period.21 To counter the 

primary criticism of the school solution, Nenninger wrote that school 

solutions were not the only solution, rather a starting point from which 

instructors could evaluate student works. Those students who produced 

well-reasoned solutions to tactical problems were to receive full credit 

for their solutions.22 To counter other criticisms of the school Nenninger 

noted that instruction changed as technology advanced.23 Additionally, 

regardless of the instruction at the Kriegsakademie, he stated that 

Leavenworth ensured a common understanding of the capabilities and 

limitations of the separate arms as part of large-scale combat operations.24

This, in his opinion, was sufficient for the school as it increased the 

general abilities and knowledge of the interwar officer corps and trained 

them to solve problems.25 Yet Nenninger readily acknowledged that his 

own short article was not sufficient coverage of the performance of the 

CGSS in the interwar period. 
5

To address his acknowledged insufficient coverage of the topic, 

Nenninger called for a comprehensive examination of Leavenworth 

during the 1920s and 1930s with a focus on student and faculty selection, the curriculum, and post-schooling graduate utilization.26 Dr. Peter 

Schifferle’s America’s School for War (as well as his earlier dissertation 

on the same topic) largely answered that call.27 Although Schifferle’s 

work mirrors Nenninger’s argument that the instruction at Leavenworth 

during the interwar period “was essential to the success of the United 

States Army in World War II,” Schifferle provided significant detail to 

support the conclusion and attempt to address critics of the school.28

To those who proposed American manufacturing rather than military 

leadership was the basis of US victory, Schifferle noted that victory still 

required leaders with the ability to coordinate the activities of a massive 

army.29 He stated that Leavenworth was the only place officers could 

train for command and staff roles in operations of large units due to 

the limited size and budget of the interwar US Army.30 Regarding criticisms of Leavenworth teaching faulty doctrinal principals, Schifferle 

countered that there were few notable changes to US Army doctrine 

from 1923 through 1940 and that the school was not wrong to teach the 

existing (and accepted) doctrine as the fundamentals.31

Perhaps the greatest criticism Schifferle attempted to counter is that 

of an overreliance on an approved solution and the belief that such reliance stifled critical and creative thinking by the students. To this, he 

wrote that the much criticized school solutions originated from consideration of multiple solutions to tactical problems. Additionally, the approved solutions were not the only accepted solution but rather a starting point to facilitate the grading process. Students could still arrive at 

unique and acceptable solutions to problems provided those solutions 

did not place them at odds with the intent of the school to teach the fundamental doctrinal principles.32 It is that last caveat, acknowledgement 

that the school may not have been receptive to students who disagreed 

with the doctrine, which ultimately prevented Schifferle’s work from 

fully addressing the criticism behind the school solutions. After all, if 

the interwar doctrine failed to account for changing conditions or if 

students who arrived at innovative but doctrinally incorrect solutions to 

problems were viewed unfavorably, then there may exist a reasonable 

argument that Leavenworth focused on conformity at the expense of 

critical and creative thinking.

It is this idea that Dr. Jörg Muth explored in his recent work, 

Command Culture, as part of a larger examination of what he believed 
6

were failures of officer selection, education, and training in the US 

Army.33 On the subject of Leavenworth, Muth argued, “the presence of 

Leavenworth graduates in positions of command coupled with the US 

victory does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the Leavenworth 

experience taught these men superior military expertise.”34 To argue 

against the linkage he addressed both instruction at Leavenworth as 

well as the idea of Leavenworth graduate performance in World War 

II. Regarding the first, he wrote that the instruction at Leavenworth was 

poor because of both poor faculty selection and doctrine too focused on 

the last war.35 Additionally, he pointed out that not only was the doctrine 

faulty, the instruction and grading at the school focused on students 

performing exactly in accordance with that doctrine - the basis of the 

school solutions.36 To that end, he described Leavenworth students as 

“factory products” who were to leave the school with an understanding 

of the common professional language and doctrine rather than depart 

as creative and innovative thinkers able to address challenging 

problems.37 On the very idea of graduate performance during World 

War II, Muth wrote that although graduates did occupy positions of 

significance during World War II, the evidence shows widely uneven 

performance by Leavenworth graduates. As a result, there can be no 

clear link between Leavenworth education and officer performance.38

Thus, if Leavenworth taught the wrong information and attendance at 

the institution did not result in better performance in combat, was it an 

effective institution? Muth clearly answered in the negative.

Although these works stand very clearly for or against the quality 

of instruction at Leavenworth during the interwar period, each of these 

works stands in agreement that the school excelled at teaching students 

the doctrine. Thus, the debate over effectiveness in the existing literature comes down to whether or not the doctrine was correct and whether 

or not the coursework at Leavenworth developed and encouraged critical and creative thinking by its students. To arrive at conclusions on 

these topics the existing works largely explored different perceptions 

of similar material. Specifically, the authors relied heavily upon institutional processes of the CGSS including curriculum (with an emphasis 

on tactical map problems), faculty selection, and student selection. Yet, 

it may be possible to arrive at conclusions regarding the school’s effectiveness through examination of some of the work students completed 

while in attendance rather than through review of institutional processes. It is this approach to analyzing effectiveness that serves as the basis 

for this paper.
7

The Interwar Student Papers

Fortunately, for this examination, the Fort Leavenworth Combined 

Arms Research Library (CARL) maintains a digitized collection of 

some 930 research papers authored by students at the CGSS during 

the interwar period. Although an extensive number of papers exist, the 

collection does not comprise student research papers from every CGSS 

class during the interwar period. Rather, the collection is only of those 

student papers written as a portion of the two-year courses, which started from 1928-1934 and graduated from 1930-1936. Although review 

of Leavenworth academic schedules indicates the second-year class 

of 1920-1921 completed monographs as part of their coursework, the 

research staff at the CARL was unable to locate any copies of their 

work in the library archives. Additionally, the academic schedules do 

not show and the library archives do not contain monographs from of 

any of the courses during the interwar period other than those already 

mentioned.39

Of the existing papers, approximately two-thirds are historical research with the remainder written as opinion pieces to derive answers 

to then contemporary questions about employment of military forces. 

Although the topics of the opinion papers vary greatly, in general the 

papers used past battles, results of maneuvers or tests, theory, doctrine, 

and aspects of emerging technology in an attempt to draw conclusions 

applicable to the Army of the time. Since a thorough examination of over 

300 opinion papers exceeds the time available for this study, this study 

only examines the 69 student papers written on the topic of airpower. 

This topic limitation not only serves to maximize the use of available 

time, it also holds the potential to address whether or not the interwar 

doctrine was indeed faulty. If comparison of student opinions to period 

doctrine suggests the students largely held the established doctrine as 

true and valid based on references and experiences of the time, then the 

papers stand as an argument that doctrine was appropriate. Likewise, 

if the comparison shows students largely rejected doctrine, the papers 

may add weight to Muth’s arguments.

Still, whether or not doctrine was faulty is only one aspect of the debate over Leavenworth effectiveness. Perhaps the more important question is if instruction at Leavenworth developed or stifled critical and 

creative thinking amongst its students. The manner in which students 

wrote their papers and the very presence or absence of writing requirements as part of the Leavenworth curriculum may provide answers to 

that question. Assuming the students applied critical thinking to arrive 
8

at the solutions in their papers, the presence of writing requirements 

may indicate that Leavenworth, by requiring writing, demonstrated at 

least some focus on developing its students’ critical thinking abilities. 

Conversely, the absence of writing requirements from the curriculum 

could indicate a school unconcerned with critical thinking development, 

depending on the reasons for removal of writing requirements and the 

quality and focus of the coursework replacing the writing requirements. 

Thus, using these papers, this thesis seeks answers two primary 

questions. First, how did student perceptions of the role of airpower 

expressed within their papers compare to period theory and doctrine? 

Second, what do the student papers suggest about the effectiveness of 

the CGSS during the interwar period? 

Thesis

Examination of the papers written on airpower topics suggests that 

the interwar CGSS students held relatively conservative views of the 

role of aviation in warfare. The papers displayed near universal rejection of the views of Giulio Douhet and William “Billy” Mitchell that 

airpower, and strategic bombing in particular, was the key to quick and 

decisive victory in wars. Instead, the students presented a balanced 

view of aviation by acknowledging its strengths without downplaying 

its weaknesses. Rather than viewing aviation as the dominant force in 

war, they perceived it as part of a combined arms effort to defeat an enemy’s military forces and will to fight. In this respect, the student papers 

largely mirrored interwar US Army doctrine with one major exception. 

Unlike doctrine, the students appeared very open to targeting cities and 

civilians in future conflicts.

Of potentially greater significance, it is possible to conclude that 

the student papers serve as an argument that interwar US Army airpower doctrine was appropriate for its time. Despite the wide range of 

materials the students used to write their papers, their conclusions on 

the proper employment of airpower differed little from period doctrine. 

This lack of difference between doctrine and student conclusions suggests that the students believed the doctrine to be appropriate. To arrive 

at this conclusion, readers must assume as true that the student papers 

demonstrated application of critical thinking to arrive at conclusions 

on aviation topics - conclusions supported by a wide-range of research 

materials. Although it is possible for readers to validate this assumption 

independently, doing so requires either reading a large number of those 
9

student papers to gain a detailed understanding of their methodology or 

inclusion of a large sample of student writing in this thesis. 

Regarding Leavenworth effectiveness, the student papers provided 

mixed reviews. Arguing positively for the school, if the period doctrine 

was appropriate, the school’s reliance upon that doctrine is an indicator of effectiveness rather than ineffectiveness. Additionally, operating 

on the perception that the students demonstrated good critical thinking 

skills in their papers, assignment of student papers as part of the curriculum is a positive mark for the school. However, the potential reasons 

why the school eliminated writing requirements - graduate production, 

faculty shortages, and institutional preference for classroom instruction - may overshadow that positive mark. Even though elimination of 

writing requirements potentially indicates a lower priority toward critical thinking development at Leavenworth, whether or not that was the 

case must return to the debate over the quality of classroom instruction 

and the impact of approved solutions. Ultimately, this is a debate with 

sharply divided lines between Muth and Schifferle and a debate that 

examination of the student papers cannot answer.

Research Scope and Methodology

In order to arrive at the conclusions stated above, this paper consists of three additional chapters. Chapter 2 consists of three sections 

designed to provide a summary of those works of history, theory, and 

doctrine that the students used as references. The examination of these 

works provides a basis of comparison between student opinions and 

period thought explored in chapter 3. It is of note that since student 

papers are only available from the two-year courses that began in 1928 

and graduated from 1930 through 1936, this chapter does not consider 

works of doctrine or theory produced after 1936. 

In the period history section, chapter two explores the role that aviation played in the First World War as described in the historical works 

available to and used by CGSS students in the 1930s. These works include the “Final Report of the Chief of Air Service, AEF,” Sir Alfred 

Rawlinson’s The Defence of London, Charles Turner’s The Struggle in 

the Air, Liman von Sanders’ Five Years in Turkey, Ernest von Hoeppner’s Germany’s War in the Air, and William Massey’s Allenby’s Final 

Triumph.

40 The intent within this section of the chapter is not to focus 

on the specific content of the works, but rather on the common themes 

about the role of airpower during the Great War which exist between 
10

the works - themes which can be said to the be the lessons learned about 

airpower. 

In addition to the history of airpower in the Great War, chapter two 

also examines the theories on airpower that emerged during the interwar period. Again, as with the histories discussed in chapter two, the 

discussion of interwar period airpower theory focuses on those theorists 

whose works were available to, and used by the CGSS students. This 

scope limits the theoretical works discussed in chapter two to that of 

five different authors - Giulio Douhet, William Mitchell, B.H. Liddell 

Hart, William Sherman, and the pseudonym “Squadron Leader.”41 The 

analysis of these works focuses on placing them on a spectrum regarding their take on the decisiveness of airpower in armed conflict. 

The final section of chapter two examines US Army doctrine from 

the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s. As will be discussed in chapter two, 

despite a clear picture of which doctrinal references the students used, 

the combination of likely low initial circulation and elapsed time mean 

that a number of those doctrinal references are not available for analysis 

in this study. Nevertheless, chapter seeks to characterize the prevailing US Army doctrine regarding airpower with those sources that are 

still available. Namely, these include the US Army Field Service Regulations of 1923, US Army Training Regulations, and select Air Corps 

Tactical School (ACTS) Manuals.42

Chapter 3 presents descriptions of the role of air power presented 

by the students in their papers. This chapter consolidates the positions 

presented by the students into nine different topic areas - bombardment, 

pursuit, antiaircraft defense, attack, observation, troop movements, 

coastal defense, air superiority, and aviation in small wars and other 

outlying ideas. Each of these topic areas describes both the overall student perceptions on the topic and notable disagreements between student papers, if any. The end of each topic area compares the student 

perceptions to the interwar period theory and doctrine explored in chapter two. Through this comparison, points of agreement (or lack thereof) 

potentially indicate to what extent those students supported or refuted 

the ideas contained in theory and doctrine. In doing so, this chapter 

ultimately arrives at the answer to the first question of this paper, how 

did student perceptions of the role of airpower expressed within their 

papers compare to period theory and doctrine?

Chapter 4 applies the examination of student papers to the broader 

question of Leavenworth effectiveness during the interwar period. To 
11

do so, the two key points of the effectiveness debate - doctrine and 

critical thinking - are the focus of the chapter. On doctrine, the chapter 

briefly explores the nature of doctrine. Building on this exploration, 

the chapter applies the chapter 3 comparison of student opinions, period doctrine, and theory to conclude whether or not the interwar period 

doctrine was appropriate. On critical thinking, chapter 4 examines the 

presence or absence of writing requirements at Leavenworth during the 

interwar period. The chapter then applies the examination to the debate 

over whether or not Leavenworth valued and developed the critical and 

creative thinking of its students. Chapter 4 concludes with implications 

of the interwar study to the modern CGSS as well as recommendations 

for further study. 
12

Notes

1. Nicholas Murray, “Best Defense Department of Remedial PME,” 

Foreign Policy, 10 September 2013, http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/

posts/2013/09/10/guess_what_cgsc_is_even_more_broken_than_we_

thought_and_it_is_getting_worse (accessed 10 March 2014).

2. Nicholas Murray, “Officer Education: What Lessons Does the French 

Defeat in 1871 Have for the US Army Today?” Small Wars Journal, 14 January 2013, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/officer-education-what-lessons-does-thefrench-defeat-in-1871-have-for-the-us-army-today (accessed 10 

March 2014).

3. Jörg Muth, “A Crisis in Command and the Roots of the Problem,” 

The Barefoot Strategist in The Bridge, 9 February 2014, https://medium.com/

the-bridge/80dfcfd7fd49 (accessed 10 March 2014).

4. Robert W. Cone, “The Future Army: Preparation and Readiness,” 

Military Review 93, no. 4 (July 2013), 5. http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/ English/MilitaryReview_20130831_art001.pdf (accessed 5 May 2014). 

5. Elvid Hunt, History of Fort Leavenworth 1827-1937, 2nd ed. (1937; 

repr., The Fort Leavenworth Historical Society, 1981), 133-137. http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/utils/ getdownloaditem/collection/p4013coll4/id/39/filename/40.

pdf/mapsto/pdf (accessed 15 March 2014). General William Sherman’s General Order No. 42 dated 7 May 1881 directed the establishment of the school.

6. Hunt, 151-153.

7. Timothy K. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army

(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 129.

8. Nenninger, The Leavenworth Schools and the Old Army, 138.

9. Hunt, 154-155.

10. The General Service Schools, Annual Report of the Commandant 

(Fort Leavenworth, KS: The General Service Schools Press, 1920), 13-16 

and 17-20, http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/reports/rep1920.

pdf (accessed 26 September 2013). Hereafter all Leavenworth Annual Reports 

cited as Annual Report, [year], [page]. The bibliography contains full citation 

information for all Annual Reports. 

11. Annual Report, 1929, 8.
13

12. Annual Report, 1923, 7; Annual Report, 1929, 8. 

13. Annual Report, 1929, 8. 

14. Annual Report, 1936, 13.

15. Nenninger, Leavenworth Schools; Timothy Nenninger, “Creating 

Officers,” Military Review 69, no. 11 (November 1989); Timothy Nenninger, 

“Leavenworth and its Critics: The U.S. Army Command and General Staff 

School, 1920-1940,” The Journal of Military History 58, no. 2 (April 1994), 

ProQuest Online (accessed March 6, 2014).

16. Nenninger, “Creating Officers,” 68. 

17. Nenninger, “Creating Officers,” 67. 

18. Nenninger, “Creating Officers,” 64-65 and 67. 

19. Nenninger, “Leavenworth and its Critics.”

20. Nenninger, “Leavenworth and its Critics.”

21. Nenninger, “Leavenworth and its Critics.”

22. Nenninger, “Leavenworth and its Critics.”

23. Nenninger, “Leavenworth and its Critics.”

24. Nenninger, “Leavenworth and its Critics,” 9. 

25. Nenninger, “Leavenworth and its Critics.” 

26. Nenninger, “Leavenworth and its Critics,” 1. 

27. Peter J. Schifferle, America’s School for War (Lawrence, KS: The 

University of Kansas Press, 2010); Peter J. Schifferle, “Anticipating Armageddon: The Leavenworth Schools and U.S. Army Military Effectiveness 1919 to 

1945” (PhD diss., University of Kansas, 2002).

28. Schifferle, America’s School for War, 61. 

29. Schifferle, America’s School for War, 188. 

30. Schifferle, America’s School for War, 7, 19-22, 28, 31, 63-64, and 93. 
14

31. Schifferle, America’s School for War, 98-99 and 192-193. 

32. Schifferle, America’s School for War, 111 and 142-145. 

33. Jörg Muth, Command Culture (Denton, TX: University of North Texas Press, 2011). 

34. Muth, 7. 

35. Muth, 126-127. 

36. Muth, 185-186. 

37. Muth, 185-186 and 189-190. 

38. Muth, 190. 

39. Based on review of academic schedules for the schools at Fort Leavenworth (The School of the Line, the General Staff School and the Command 

and General Staff School) during the interwar period. Digital copies of the 

schedules are available through the reference desk at the Combined Arms Research Library, Ft. Leavenworth, KS. 

40. Air Service, A.E.F., “Final Report of Chief of Air Service,” in The 

U.S. Air Service in World War 1, ed. Maurer Maurer, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978); Alfred Rawlinson, The Defence of 

London 1915-1918 (London: Andrew Melrose, 1924); Charles C. Turner, The 

Struggle in the Air, 1914-1918 (London: Edward Arnold, 1919); Liman von 

Sanders, Five Years in Turkey, trans. Carl Reichman (Annapolis, MD: The 

United States Naval Institute, 1927); Ernest von Hoeppner, Germany’s War in 

the Air, trans. J. Hawley Larned (1921; repr., Nashville, TN: The Battery Press, 

Inc., 1994); William T. Massey, Allenby’s Final Triumph (London: Constable 

and Company, 1920). https://archive.org/details/allenbysfinaltri00massrich 

(accessed 15 November 2013).

41. Giulio Douhet, The Command of The Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (1942; 

repr., Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998); William Mitchell, Winged Defense (New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1925); 

Basil H. Liddell Hart, Paris: Or, The Future of War (London: Kegan Paul, 

Trench, Trubner and Co., 1925); William C. Sherman, Air Warfare (2002; repr., 

Honolulu: University Press of the Pacific, 2004); Squadron Leader [pseud.], 

Basic Principles of Air Warfare (London: Gale and Polden, 1927).
15

42. War Department, Field Service Regulations (1923) (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1924); War Department, Training Regulation 

440-15, Fundamental Principles for the Employment of the Air Service (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1926), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/

awcgate/documents/tr440-15.htm (accessed 1 January 2014); Air Corps Tactical School, Bombardment (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 

1933); Air Service Tactical School, Bombardment (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1926); Air Service Tactical School, Pursuit (Washington, 

DC: Government Printing Office, 1926).

17

Chapter 2

Airpower in the First World War, Interwar Airpower 

Theory, and Interwar US Army Doctrine

By the time the CGSS students wrote their papers in the 1930s, a 

relatively large number of references existed which described employment of aviation in military operations. Because those works represent 

the available body of knowledge from which the students could develop 

their own thoughts, this chapter explores those references. Specifically, 

this chapter focuses on three categories of interwar airpower materials. 

The first of these categories is available histories of the First World 

War. Although aviation played a role in a number of small conflicts in 

the interwar period, the employment of aviation forces in those conflicts paled in comparison to that of the First World War. The scale of 

that conflict also meant that the history of the Great War contained the 

greatest amount of information from which to base aviation theory and 

doctrine during the interwar period. The second category - works of influential airpower theorists - is included as such review not only serves 

as a point of comparison with student papers, but also has potential to 

indicate which theories and theorists actually held influence within the 

Air Corps. Since critics of Leavenworth raised the prospect of school 

reliance upon faulty doctrine, a review of interwar US Army doctrine 

serves as the final category of references examined in this chapter. This 

examination allows for comparison between the positions advocated in 

the student papers and those positions approved by at least the leadership of the Air Corps, if not that of the Army as a whole. 

Within each of the three categories, only certain works are included 

for summary in this chapter. The primary basis for selection of those 

works was whether they were available to and used by the interwar 

students as indicated by the bibliographies of the student papers. The 

frequency with which multiple students citied a particular work also 

served to limit the number of interwar references contained in this 

chapter. These two source limitations ensure proper comparison of the 

period-specific ideas of the students to period-specific history, theory, 

and doctrine. A final undesired but ultimately unavoidable source 

limitation at play is the present-day availability of certain publications 

from the 1920s and 1930s. A number of student references are simply 

unavailable or were inaccessible in the course of this study.
18

Airpower in the First World War

Turning first to works of history, this section explores those official 

and unofficial histories of the First World War used by the interwar 

period CGSS students as references in their papers. This exploration 

is not a summary of those histories, but rather a discussion of the common themes that existed between the works. These common themes 

ultimately represent lessons learned on the subject of airpower from the 

experiences of the First World War and, as such, are likely areas of influence on period theory and doctrine. However, prior to presenting the 

common lessons learned as detailed in the historical references, the following paragraphs provide overviews of the sources by nation of origin. 

Of the American histories of the war cited by students, the “Final 

Report” of the Chief of the Air Service, AEF is the most commonly 

referenced.1 Prepared under the direction of Major General Mason M. 

Patrick, the “Final Report” is a complete historical record of the conduct of the Air Service created for submission to General Pershing.2

This report was significant enough that those officers were required to 

complete their own reports on lessons learned in order to redeploy to 

the United States.3 As published, the “Final Report” provided significant detail into nearly all aspects of the US Air Service role in the First 

World War to include not only conduct in battle, but also details on the 

logistical, training, and mobilization efforts which supported combat 

operations of the Air Service.4

For the German perspective, two works stand out. The first is Germany’s War in the Air by General Ernest von Hoeppner, the Commanding General of the German Air Force during World War I, who endeavored to describe the development and operations of German aviation 

from pre-war through demobilization.5 Also frequently referenced by 

the GCSS students is General Liman von Sanders’ Five Years in Turkey.

6

 Although not focused solely on airpower, von Sanders’ work does 

provided perspectives on the influence of airpower in broader operations, as will be discussed during the examination of the lessons learned.

From the British side, several works stand out as frequent student 

references. One such work, The Defence of London by Alfred Rawlinson, chronicled the efforts to defend London from air attack.7

 Another 

common reference is Charles Turner’s The Struggle in the Air, 1914-

1918.

8

 Approximately the first third of his book documented the nature 

of aerial combat using stories and award citations covering the actions 

of individual airmen.9 However, it is the remainder of the work that 
19

presented the most lessons learned material in its discussion of topics 

such as the air defense, bombing, reconnaissance and coordination with 

the infantry.10 The final British history considered in this paper based 

on frequent citations in student papers is Allenby’s Final Triumph by 

William Massey.11 As with Five Years in Turkey, the focus of Allenby’s 

Final Triumph was not the air war, but the British campaign in Palestine in which aviation played a part. As a final note of British sources, 

a number of students cited The War in the Air, a multivolume official 

British history.12 Although the CARL maintains a copy of this work, the 

sheer size of each of the six volumes of The War in the Air precluded 

review and analysis of the series in this study.

However, what is important is not the content or structure of any 

one of the above works, but the themes that exist between the works as 

these represent the lessons of the war. Of these themes, there are five 

that merit discussion here: generation of aircraft and crews, aircraft reconnaissance, bombardment aviation, attack aviation, and air defense. 

The remainder of this section details the lessons the various histories 

provide on these themes.

On the subject of generation of aircraft and crews, there is a general 

consensus in the histories reviewed that, from the outset of the First 

World War, considerable time was needed to establish the necessary 

production and training facilities to create the required aircraft and aircrew members, respectively. The “Final Report” stated one of the major 

problems facing the Air Service as lack of properly trained personnel, 

including not just pilots, but also the skilled mechanics necessary to 

maintain and repair aircraft.13 Not only did personnel shortages pose a 

problem for the United States, a lack of combat capable aircraft and an 

insufficient industry to produce aircraft was a significant issue. Indeed, 

at the outset of the war, the US Air Service had zero combat capable 

planes in its inventory and would not produce more than 100 combat 

ready planes per month until July of 1918.14 However, these issues were 

not unique to the United States as a late arrival to the war. From the 

outset of the conflict, Germany also experienced significant difficulty expanding training and production of aircrews and aircraft. General 

von Hoeppner noted that Germany suffered a shortage of aircraft, parts, 

pilots, and workmen at the start of the war due to pre-war failure to 

anticipate their need.15 Given these realties, the lesson drawn from the 

available references is that because of the time required to develop aviation capabilities, significant peacetime investment is required to ensure 

adequacy of a nation’s aviation force at the outset of the next war.
20

A second theme with relative consensus between the interwar reference materials is that of the impact of air reconnaissance. To that end, 

there is general agreement that the presence of aircraft in a reconnaissance role significantly influences unit movements and operations. Although the value of aircraft at the start of the Great War was, to the 

Germans, unproven and considered of little value in some circles, the 

impact of aircraft in the reconnaissance role would prove significant.16

General von Hoeppner noted that the opening days of the war proved the 

value of air reconnaissance when the information supplied by French 

pilots indicated the position and movements of the German First Army 

as it turned east of Paris. In turn, this information identified to Marshal 

Joffre the vulnerability of German forces to a counterattack.17

By the last year of the war, commanders, having learned the value 

of information gained by aerial reconnaissance, went to great lengths 

to avoid aerial observation of their forces. On the Western Front, the 

British often employed artists to apply paint schemes on key facilities 

to camouflage them from aerial observation.18 At Cambrai, the British 

were able to mask the assembly of their forces prior to the start of the 

offensive by conducting movements only under cover of darkness.19 In 

the east, General Allenby went as far as to set up fake encampments and 

only conducted daylight movements when under the cover of the British Air Force.20 Even the Americans did not overlook the importance 

of air reconnaissance. The “Final Report” stated that, “the work of the 

observer and observation pilot is the most important and far-reaching 

which an Air Service operating with an Army is called upon to perform.”21 Based on this information, the consensus opinion reflected 

in the reference material is that while aviation can provide vital information on the disposition of the enemy, strong control measures could 

minimize detection of friendly forces by enemy air reconnaissance. 

A third point of consensus found in the references used by the 

interwar CGSS students relates to aircraft in the bombardment role. 

Specifically, that during large-scale conflicts, cities, as not only 

centers of population but also centers of industry, would be attacked 

by opposing forces in an attempt to destroy the will and the ability to 

continue fighting. Although Germany’s War in the Air claimed that 

France was the first to attack cities in a departure from accepted norms 

regarding protection of civilians, von Hoeppner acknowledged that 

Germany quickly followed suit.22 Although the actual material effect 

of such bombardment aviation attacks against cities is not entirely clear 
21

from the histories, what is clear in the selected works is the perception 

that such attacks did affect morale.

Von Hoeppner also stated that, to the Germans, the early attacks 

immediately sparked a desire to provide both defense against attack 

and some means of early warning to provide civilians a chance to avoid 

the bombs.23 On the British side, Rawlinson, adopting the stereotypical 

British stiff upper lip, stated, “the dropping of these extremely inefficient bombs, however, did infinitely more good than harm to the country at large and vastly increased our chances of emerging victorious 

from the great struggle in which we had engaged.”24 Of course, reading 

between the lines of his statement, there can be little doubt that he acknowledged that the German bombing raids affected the morale of the 

populace. Although the AEF fielded only a handful of bombardment 

squadrons prior to the Armistice, the potential of bombardment was not 

lost on the Americans.25 The “Final Report,” referencing bombardment, 

stated that although actual damage of bombing raids was questionable, 

“there is absolutely no doubt that the moral effect of these operations is 

most considerable.”26

Regarding bombardment aviation, another theme exists within 

the selected references, although in this case the theme is not one of 

agreement between sources, but rather a theme of disagreement. This 

theme of disagreement is over the capability of pursuit aircraft to stop a 

bomber attack and the associated necessity (or lack thereof) for friendly 

pursuit to escort bombers. Both The Struggle in the Air and the “Final 

Report” stated that by 1918, presence of defending German pursuit aircraft opposing bombing raids necessitated the use of escorts to defend 

the bomber formations and increase the likelihood of success.27 The 

“Final Report” also stated tight formation flying by the bombardment 

pilots ensured the safety of the bombardment group.28 In contrast, in 

Germany’s War in the Air, von Hoeppner cited a late-war example of a 

flight of 17 German bombers that successfully attacked London with no 

losses despite the presence of not only British antiaircraft defenses, but 

also approximately 30 British pursuit planes that attempted intercept.29

The differing views on the effectiveness of pursuit and the necessity for 

escort demonstrate a lack of a clear lesson learned on the subject. Thus, 

while there exists consensus in the sources that use of bombardment 

aviation against cities is likely in future war and that such attacks affect 

morale; there exists debate on whether or not such attacks can succeed 

without pursuit escort in the face of defending pursuit aircraft. 
22

The fourth common theme found in the references is the impact of 

aircraft employed in tactical roles. Summarized, this theme is that air 

attacks can have significant effects on both the supply and morale of 

enemy forces; however, establishment of air superiority is necessary 

to maximize the impact. Although The Struggle in the Air stated that 

during the first two years of the war air attacks on ground troops were 

largely unplanned and not done in coordination with friendly ground 

forces, such was not the case by the summer of 1916 and after.30 General 

von Hoeppner remarked that, encouraged by a relatively weak presence 

of the German Air Forces, French and British pilots at the Battle of 

the Somme in 1916 frequently strafed German positions. These strafing 

runs imparted little real damage, but served as a significant blow to 

the morale of the German soldiers.31 As the war on the western front 

developed, the British and French took steps to not only develop better 

means of cooperation between aircraft and infantry, by 1918 they also 

developed attack aircraft armed and armored specifically to best conduct 

the mission of attacking ground troops.32 Although the developments 

and employment of attack aviation are discussed at length in a number 

of the histories, the most striking lesson learned of what could be 

accomplished with attack aviation operating with air superiority are 

provided from the British campaign in Palestine.

While dispute exists within the sources over when the British in 

Palestine achieved air superiority, General von Sanders concedes in 

Five Years in Turkey that, by the summer of 1918, the British had air 

superiority in the region.33 This air superiority, combined with measures to disguise troop movements, allowed General Allenby to mass 

his forces for his September 1918 offensive while remaining undetected by German observation aircraft.34 At the start of the offensive on 

19 September, General Allenby employed his aircraft to bomb Turkish 

communication nodes linking front-line forces to the Turkish General 

Headquarters.35 Additionally, Allenby used one British air squadron to 

attack a German aerodrome at Jenin in order to prevent employment of 

their few remaining German aircraft against the British ground forces 

on the offensive.36 The greatest example of the power of attack aviation in the campaign came on 21 September 1918 when British aircraft 

maintained a continuous attack for more than four hours against a five 

to eight mile long column of Turkish troops.37 This attack resulted in the 

near-complete destruction of the right wing of the Turkish 8th Army.38

The lesson thus derived from the experience appears to be that, when 

operating with air superiority, air attacks against ground troops can 
23

have significant effects. This lesson was included in the “Final Report” 

in that the leadership of the Air Service felt there was a demonstrated 

need to organize attack squadrons to provide for direct attacks against 

enemy tactical formations.39

The final theme considered from the references is that of defense 

against air attack. The common theme of those references is that antiaircraft defenses (artillery, machine guns, and passive means) were able 

to modify the manner in which pilots employed their aircraft. However, 

such means were not only largely ineffective at shooting down enemy 

planes, they also prevented a significant number of men and materiel 

from employment elsewhere. Speaking to the first portion of the lesson 

learned, both British and German sources indicated that antiaircraft defense measures did modify aircraft employment. Specifically, British 

employment of barrage balloons, while ineffective at actually downing German aircraft, are noted to have altered the altitudes and routes 

used by German pilots during bombing raids.40 Due to the effectiveness 

of such passive measures at routing enemy aircraft, the Germans also 

made extensive use of the balloons to limit the area requiring antiaircraft artillery coverage.41 Considering active defensive measures, von 

Hoeppner noted the use of machine guns in an antiaircraft role forced 

enemy aircraft to higher altitudes and Rawlinson stated that antiaircraft 

artillery was able to disrupt or disperse German bombing raids on London.42

Turning to the actual effectiveness against aircraft, there is a consensus in the histories that antiaircraft artillery and machine guns employed for antiaircraft defense were extremely ineffective. In The Defense of London, Rawlinson described a number of German zeppelin 

and airplane raids that resulted in no enemy aircraft shot down except 

by defending pursuit aircraft, despite large numbers of antiaircraft artillery pieces positioned around London.43 The American experience 

against the Germans also supports the ineffectiveness of antiaircraft 

artillery. The “Final Report” noted that, despite large concentrations 

of German antiaircraft artillery in 1918, the defensive measures could 

not prevent completion of air reconnaissance in the well-defended sectors.44 Such was the limited effectiveness of antiaircraft artillery that 

Rawlinson ultimately argued antiaircraft artillery could not properly 

defend a city, stating, “neither London nor any other district can be 

successfully defended against air attacks except by means of adequate 

forces IN THE AIR.”45
24

Finally, with regard to men and materiel, there is little question in 

the histories that establishment of an antiaircraft defensive network represented a significant commitment in both. Von Hoeppner noted multiple times that the German air attacks against England tied-up a large 

amount of British resources at the home, thus preventing employment 

of those resources along the front.46 Rawlinson also discussed the resource cost of maintaining an aircraft defense network. He identified a 

constant internal struggle over manpower for the antiaircraft guns defending London and the manpower available for the front. This struggle, according to Rawlinson, resulted in too few men available for antiaircraft defense, and a general lack of physical fitness amongst the men 

assigned.47

Although there are other lessons learned which may be able to be 

derived from the historical references used by the Leavenworth students 

during the interwar period, those of a generation of aircraft and crews, 

aircraft reconnaissance, bombardment aviation, attack aviation, and air 

defense stand out. This is due not only to the frequency with which such 

discussions appear in multiple works, but as will be explored in chapter 

3 of this work, they are the topics which are among the most discussed 

within the student papers.

Interwar Airpower Theory

Just as the previous section on the role of airpower in the Great War 

was limited in scope, so too is this section limited in its discussion of 

interwar airpower theory. The limitation is necessary here as nearly any 

document from the interwar period arguing for a particular manner of 

employment of aircraft or antiaircraft defense can fit into a broad definition of theory. Therefore, the summaries that follow are also limited 

to those that were available to the interwar CGSS students and actually used by those students. This limitation on the inclusion of theorists 

limits the following discussion to the work presented by five different 

authors - Giulio Douhet, William Mitchell, B. H. Liddell Hart, William 

Sherman, and the pseudonym “Squadron Leader.” A brief overview of 

Air Defence by Edward Ashmore is also included as it focuses heavily 

on the means by which a nation might defend against air attack.48

While the immediate post-war histories provide a fair amount of 

consensus on observations from the war and the lessons derived from 

those observations, the post-war theories available to the interwar CGSS 

students represent varying degrees along a spectrum of their perception 

of the ability of airpower to force a quick and decisive end to a conflict. 
25

An attempt was made to arrange the overviews of the works of the selected airpower theorists that follow in sequence from that which advocates for airpower as the most decisive to that which advances airpower 

as simply another element of modern warfare which, while important, 

is not alone the decisive factor. 

The Command of the Air - Douhet

Before moving into the summary of Douhet’s work, it is worth mentioning that the interwar students did not cite a translation of The Command of the Air, but rather a publication titled Air Warfare.

49 That publication was a translated extract of Douhet’s writings distributed within 

the Air Corps by the early 1930s.50 As a copy of that publication could 

not be obtained for this study, the following description of Douhet’s 

positions is from on a translation of The Command of the Air.

51

Of the theoretical works discussed in this section, Giulio Douhet’s 

The Command of the Air is both arguably the best known work of the 

period, and the one which presents the strongest position that aviation 

alone can result in a rapid and decisive end to a future war.52 Discussing 

the nature of modern warfare, Douhet argued that wars had become and 

would remain a struggle between the entire population and resources of 

belligerent nations. The way to win such wars, he stated, is to defeat an 

opponent’s means to resist, both physical and moral.53 Yet, overcoming that resistance during the First World War required “a long, painful 

process of attrition.”54 Douhet stated that the air arm, with its ability to 

attack anywhere, changes everything for the future - effectively acting 

as a means to avoid a repeat of the bloody stalemate of the past war and 

its high cost in lives and resources.55

After discussing how the opening of a third dimension of warfare 

holds great possibilities for the future, Douhet devoted much of his 

work to discussing the means to achieve the best results from the air 

arm. He held that success or failure of a nation in war is dependent upon 

the speed at which the nation can mobilize and deploy its air arm.56

Once mobilized, the air arm must deploy in mass to establish command of the air, a condition in which a nation maintains its own ability 

to fly while preventing enemy air operations (effectively complete air 

supremacy).57 Once a nation achieves command of the air, it should 

relentlessly attack enemy industry, infrastructure, and civilians until it 

crushes enemy resistance.58 Douhet stated that, “to conquer command 

of the air means victory; to be beaten in the air means defeat and acceptance of whatever terms the enemy may be pleased to impose.”59
26

Yet, in his argument for massed offensive air action, Douhet also 

argued defensive actions against enemy air attack are pointless and that 

the air arm should seek to inflict a “frightful cataclysm” against enemy 

civilians.60 To the first point, Douhet pointed out that during the First 

World War, antiaircraft defensive measures (including antiaircraft artillery and defending pursuit aircraft) were not only ineffective at downing enemy bombers, but that such defensive efforts only weakened the 

resources available for offensive action.61 Thus, he felt that at the start 

of a war, a nation must resign itself to attacks by an enemy air force 

while attempting to inflict greater damage on the enemy.62 Regarding 

attacks against civilian populations, Douhet made it clear that civilians 

are valid targets and that attacks against civilians should be as violent as 

possible to force a quick victory. He wrote that nations should use explosive, incendiary, and chemical bombs to inflict the greatest damage 

and that such use is valid because, despite international conventions, 

any means that harm the enemy as much as possible are valid in war.63

He provided further justification for such attacks in his statements that 

while civilian casualties would be horrible, the duration would be short 

and thus reduce the overall number of casualties in a war.64

Winged Defense - Mitchell

Of the theories discussed in this chapter, William Mitchell’s 

1925 work, Winged Defense, most closely resembles the positions of 

Douhet.65 Specifically, Mitchell made a number of arguments that fit 

into several categories explored in the following paragraphs - the decisive nature of air warfare, the ineffectiveness of defensive measures, the 

reduced importance of naval forces in an age of flight, and ultimately 

the necessity of a separate air force.

Early in his work, Mitchell made it clear that he foresaw a future in 

which airpower could bring about quick decisions in war for far less cost 

in money and lives that traditional land warfare.66 To that end, Mitchell 

considered it feasible for air attacks to cause the complete destruction 

of the enemy industries and cities required to sustain a war.67 Not only 

did he feel that aircraft were capable of achieving such effects, he stated that victory in war would go to that country which, at the outset of 

conflict, is able to attack its enemy with the greatest concentration of 

aircraft (oriented first on destruction of an enemy’s air force).68 Once a 

country loses the initial air battles, he recommended it capitulate rather 

than continue fighting due to both the inability to achieve air superiority 

once lost and the ineffectiveness of ground based defenses.69
27

On the topic of defense against air attack, Mitchell clearly viewed 

ground based defenses as a poor substitute for sufficient air forces capable of defeating an enemy air force. He argued that offensive air action, 

preferably over the enemy’s territory, represents the proper way to defend against air attack as it seizes the initiative and forces the enemy to 

defend on unfavorable terms.70 Attempting to further his point, he stated 

that not only are ground-based defenses incapable of any significant impact on enemy airplanes, but that establishing a defensive posture cedes 

the initiative and invites defeat.71

While arguing for the decisive abilities of airpower and the need for 

a strong offensive air arm, Mitchell also emphasized that the dominance 

of airpower over sea power rendered the latter a poor investment for the 

security of a nation. Citing trials testing the effectiveness of aircraft attacks against warships, Mitchell stated that, by the end of 1921, the Air 

Service had fully demonstrated that airpower dominates sea power.72

Given the vulnerability of naval vessels to air attack, Mitchell pointed 

out that some four thousand airplanes could be built for the cost of only 

one battleship (and the impact of that many aircraft would be far more 

than what could be accomplished with one ship).73

Given his perception of the decisive nature of the air arm, Mitchell 

pushed a position that a separate air force was necessary to ensure the 

security of the nation. He held this position because he felt that if the 

Army and Navy controlled development of the air arm, development of 

air capability would always be subordinate to other priorities of those 

services.74 If, as discussed previously, the air arm is indeed the decisive 

arm and land and naval forces are vulnerable to air attack, such subordination could have no outcome other than failure in a future war. 

In an attempt to point out that the United States was falling behind 

other nations in the matter, Mitchell cited the establishment of separate 

air forces in Britain, France, Germany, and Italy.75 While Mitchell, like 

Douhet, was relatively extreme in his perceptions of airpower, several 

works of theory cited by the students took a more moderate approach.

Paris: Or, The Future of War - B. H. Liddell Hart

One of these more moderate works is a relatively short book by B. 

H. Liddell Hart titled, Paris: Or, The Future of War. Although less committed to the absolute dominance of airpower than Douhet or Mitchell, Hart’s work acknowledged the possibility of airpower to serve as 

a means to change how a nation achieves victory in war. Hart stated 

that, prior to the Great War, European powers structured their doctrine 
28

on an interpretation of Clausewitz that emphasized the destruction of 

an enemy’s army as the way to achieve victory.76 Yet, to Hart, even 

though destruction of an enemy army could defeat the enemy’s will, it 

was perhaps of greater importance than destruction of an enemy’s will 

is almost certain to defeat its army.77 To that end, Hart viewed aircraft, 

with their ability to “jump over” an enemy army, as a means to attack 

an opponent’s will and force an end to conflict.78

However, Hart acknowledged that to truly attack an opponent’s will 

means attacks against enemy cities to which there existed both economic and ethical objections.79 On the subject of ethics, he noted that 

attacks against civilians, while inherently brutal, are likely to result in 

quick cessation of hostilities, thus resulting in far fewer casualties (and 

therefore being ethically acceptable from a strictly pragmatic view of 

ethics).80 To the economic, Hart pointed out that the use of poison gases 

rather than high explosives could preserve infrastructure and industry 

while still affecting the will of the enemy.81 Yet, Hart did point out that 

effectiveness of a strategy focused on attacking enemy cities and industrial centers is relative to the size of a nation and the dispersion of 

such targets within the nation’s boundaries.82 As a result, while he felt 

airpower could be decisive in Europe, such a strategy would not be effective against the United States.83

As a final note on Hart’s work, while he viewed airpower as eventually becoming the decisive arm, in the immediate future, the air arm 

had not rendered armies and navies obsolete. 84 Indeed, Hart spent the 

last third of his work discussing the future of those services in light of 

the evolution of aviation as well as the submarine, the tank, and motorization.85 Thus, while Douhet and Mitchell negate the value of other 

services relative to airpower, Hart did not see those visions as a reality 

for the immediate future at the time of his writing. Taking an even more 

limited view of the ability of airpower to achieve decisive results independent of other services was William Sherman.

Air Warfare - Sherman

Prior to discussing William Sherman’s positions stated in Air Warfare, it is likely of value to readers to provide a limited degree of background on his roles within the Air Service. Following the Armistice, 

then Lieutenant Colonel Sherman was responsible for the production 

of the “Tactical History” of the Air Service’s role in the Great War 

(produced along with the “Final Report”).86 Upon return to the United States, Sherman served as an instructor at the Air Service Tactical 
29

School from 1920 to 192387 and as an instructor at the CGSS from 1924 

until his death in 1927. During his time as an instructor, he contributed 

to both curriculum development and Army doctrine.89 For Air Warfare, 

Sherman stated that he wrote the work primarily from his notes collected while serving as an instructor.90

As with the other theorists discussed to this point, Sherman expressed a belief that the most important thing in war is to defeat the enemy’s will to fight.91 To target that will and push toward a political end 

to conflict, Sherman supported attacks against civilian populations as 

well as attacks against industrial and transportation targets.92 However, 

unlike other theorists Sherman did not support the idea that air superiority, once gained, would become absolute. Rather, on air superiority 

he stated, “it is generally restricted in scope and fleeting in duration.”93

In order to address both the desired ability to conduct strategic 

bombing centered on the enemy’s will and an anticipated inability to 

achieve absolute air supremacy, Sherman focused heavily on pursuit 

aviation as the key to success. Although Sherman acknowledged the 

defensive strength of bombers in tight formations, he argued that such 

formations increase the effectiveness of antiaircraft artillery.94 Additionally, when attacked by large numbers of enemy pursuit planes bombardment aviation would ultimately suffer “unnecessarily high losses 

and the consequent deterioration.”95 According to Sherman, the First 

World War firmly demonstrated that only friendly pursuit could effectively protect friendly bombers from enemy pursuit.96

Given his view that strategic bombing, while important, would be 

limited due to the back and forth nature of the struggle for air superiority, it should be no surprise that Sherman also argued for the air arm to 

maintain both observation and attack aviation roles to support ground 

forces.97 This position is the area in which Sherman is most at odds 

with the strategic role advocated by the previously discussed theories. 

Regarding observation, Sherman noted that the services provided by 

observation aviation during the Great War were of significant value to 

both intelligence gathering and artillery adjustment.98 For the future, 

he viewed the importance of observation only increasing as land war 

became less static and more mobile in character.99 On attack aviation, 

Sherman anticipated that armies in the future would limit their movements to hours of darkness in order to avoid enemy attack aviation.100

Additionally, Sherman saw incredible value in the moral effect that attack aviation had when employed against enemy troop formations.101
30

Sherman was not the only theorist who displayed a perception of air 

forces as part of a joint effort with armies and navies.

Basic Principles of Air Warfare - “Squadron Leader”102

It the opening of pages of Basic Principles of Air Warfare, the author stated that he “does not accept the belief that the forces of the air 

will supplant those of the sea and the land.”103 He argued that those 

theorists who conclude otherwise did so by emphasizing the offensive 

capabilities of aircraft while simultaneously shortchanging aircraft limitations and the potential strength of defense.104 As a result, he perceived 

that although bombardment might break an enemy’s will, such an argument loses value when it overstates the ability to achieve air superiority.105 Like William Sherman, “Squadron Leader” emphasized that air 

superiority is a prerequisite to other air action, but that air superiority, in 

practice, could never be absolute.106 If air superiority can never be absolute, then there is not an ability to conduct the continuous air offensives 

necessary to subvert an enemy’s will.107

Given the position that airpower cannot achieve decisive results 

independently, the author presented an overall argument that the proper 

role of the air arm is to serve in combined and complementary action 

with the army and the navy.108 In order to provide the best support to the 

army and navy, aviation assets required organization into an independent air force for failure to do so would weaken the air arm and violate 

the principle of concentration.109 The role of this independent air force 

is then first toward defeat of the enemy air force (both offensively and 

defensively), second toward targets of value to the army and navy, and 

finally against vital (strategic) enemy targets.110

Air Defence - E.B. Ashmore

Published in 1929, Ashmore’s Air Defence is primarily a history of 

the efforts to establish air defense measures around London during the 

First World War. 111 Although the history represents a valuable source 

given Ashmore’s role as Commander of the London Air Defense Area, 

the importance to this section is the last chapter of his book in which 

argued extensively against theories advocating strategic bombing.112

To that end, Ashmore argued that one of the key factors overlooked 

by bombing advocates is the idea of room - physical space between a 

bomber origin and target. Specifically, Ashmore stated that room provides time for air patrols to launch and reach the altitude to intercept 

bombers and for intelligence of approaching enemy aircraft to circu-
31

late.113 His writing clearly favored the thought that fighters, when operated in coordination with antiaircraft artillery, are more than capable of 

bringing down large numbers of enemy aircraft.114 At the same time, he 

anticipated that the mere presence of such defensive measures would 

force enemy bombers to operate at higher and higher altitudes, at which 

the difficulties of navigation, hypoxia, and cold operate in unison to 

make bombing less effective.115 In a clear counter to strategic bombing 

advocates, Ashmore stated that were Britain to accept their theories, 

“London would suffer terribly, perhaps intolerably, long before any 

counter-bombing could save her.”116

Summary of Interwar Airpower Theory

Although the preceding paragraphs are by no means a complete 

review of all interwar airpower theory, they cover those works of theory 

most frequently cited as sources for student papers.117 From the information provided it should be evident that the interwar theorists’ works 

reviewed here exist on a spectrum regarding their take on the decisiveness of airpower in future wars. Both Douhet and Mitchell advocated 

so strongly for the power of offensive aviation that they felt expenditures on land or naval forces (or aviation types designed specifically 

to support those forces) was foolish. The writings of Hart, Sherman, 

and “Squadron Leader” presented a far more balanced approach. Each 

author indicated limitations on the ability of an air force to achieve decisive results independent of other services. Speaking from the ground 

perspective, Ashmore openly questioned the idea that ground-based 

antiaircraft defenses were ineffective against attacking enemy aircraft. 

Despite the differences between the theorists’ opinions, there are 

apparent linkages to the lessons of the Great War presented in the 

previous section. Mitchell and Douhet seem to have interpreted the time 

required to generate aircraft and aircrews as justification for developing 

a strong, strategic bombardment focused, air force in peacetime. With 

such a force available at the onset of war, and assuming the lessons of 

the Great War about the relative inability of pursuit or attack to stop 

bombardment of city vital targets remained true, then they saw no reason 

why a strong air force would fail to achieve quick and decisive victory. 

However, the other theorists clearly interpreted the lessons of the war 

somewhat differently. They appear to have considered that development 

of an air force takes time and that pursuit, antiaircraft artillery, or a 

combination thereof, could be effective at preventing a decisive blow 

early in war. Thus, their writings indicated a back and forth struggle for 

air superiority as merely another aspect of modern warfare rather than 
32

offering aviation as the sole deciding factor in war. Of course, these 

theories on the employment of airpower were merely ideas they were 

not policy. Yet, examination of policy, in this case airpower doctrine, 

can indicate which ideas were most regarded in official circles.

Interwar US Army Doctrine

While histories attempt to capture what happened (or a least what 

authors want to argue happened) and theories propose what should happen, doctrine represents what an organization believes is the right way 

to do things. To quote period material, “doctrine of war is the theory 

of use of the Nation’s force under particular conditions and is based 

upon national characteristics and resources.”118 Thus, to complete a full 

picture of the environment in which the interwar CGSS students wrote 

their papers, a discussion of the official beliefs and policies of the interwar Army - the interwar US Army doctrine - follows. To do so, this 

section discusses the types of doctrine used by the students, the present-day availability of those materials, and finally the content of the 

available documents. 

Based on the resources referenced within the student papers, it is 

possible to break down the interwar US Army doctrine into two broad 

categories - official regulations and ACTS publications.119 Regarding 

official regulations, the interwar students referenced both the US Army 

Field Service Regulations of 1923 and a number of US Army Training 

Regulations. 120 What sets these regulations apart from documents in the 

other categories is that they exist by order of the Secretary of War.121

Thus, if any documents from the period state the official position of the 

army of the time, these regulations are those documents. 

The second category of doctrinal publications are works produced 

by the Air Corps Tactical School for use as textbooks and course material during instruction at the school.122 These works include publications 

on each aircraft type (pursuit, attack, bombardment, and observation) as 

well as Air Corps history and logistics.123 Although lacking official War 

Department approval, the works outline the Air Corps position of how 

to employ aviation assets in combat operations. Also important to note 

is that since every Air Corps officer who attended a two-year CGSS 

course between 1928 and 1936 first attended the ASTC/ACTS, they 

would have trained at the ACTS using these texts (excepting a small 

number who attended courses in the early 1920s).124

Although the preceding discussion should make it clear that there 

were a number of doctrinal publications referenced by the CGSS 
33

students, understanding the students’ positions relative to that doctrine 

requires access to the material. Unfortunately, of the 18 ASTS/ACTS 

publications cited in more than one student paper, the author was unable 

to locate 12. For the six which are known to still exist, one was obtained 

digitally, two were requested (with one rejection), and three have only 

one copy available at the Smithsonian.125 The problem is similar with 

the other categories of doctrinal materials from the interwar period. As 

a result, the discussion of interwar US Army doctrine will be limited 

to less than desired. Specifically, review of official doctrine is limited 

to the 1923 Field Service Regulations and Training Regulation 440-

15, Fundamental Principles for the Employment of the Air Service.

126

Review of the ASTS/ACTS publications used by students is limited to 

Bombardment for 1926 and 1933, Pursuit for 1926, Attack for 1930, 

and Antiaircraft Defense for 1927.127 Unavailability of references means 

that no summary is possible of the other publications referenced by the 

students in their papers.

US Army Field Service Regulations, 1923

The earliest of the doctrinal works considered in this section is the 

1923 Field Service Regulations (hereafter FSR). The Army published 

the FSR to serve as a basis for the principles of combined arms operations of the United States Army when engaged in war with a comparable modern power.128 As such, the FSR covered a significant number of 

topics to include roles of the command and staff, each of the combined 

arms, reconnaissance, security, movement, logistics, and administration.129 For the purpose of this paper, the following paragraphs discuss 

only those portions of the FSR that directly related to the role and impact of aviation upon the battlefield.

In a brief section describing the role of the Air Service, the FSR 

identified three missions for the Air Service - combat, observation, and 

information transmission.130 The FSR noted that, to carry out these missions, the Air Service divided itself into units of pursuit, attack, bombardment, and observation.131 Of these classes of units, the FSR stated 

that pursuit, with its mission of air supremacy, “constitutes the most 

vital element of the air service” in that “its success creates the conditions which enable the other elements to operate with the greatest 

degree of effectiveness.”132 The role of attack aviation, per the FSR, 

was to conduct aerial attack against enemy ground troops and columns, 

preferably against those objectives that were decisive.133 Bombardment 

existed for attacking those ground objectives that were vital to the enemy supply or lines of communication but were beyond the range of 
34

friendly artillery.134 The final category, observation, operated to provide 

information to commanders and the air service, coordinate artillery, and 

relay messages.135

While these unit types and responsibilities very much conform to 

the types and responsibilities contained in the previously described histories and theories, two items are of note regarding the FSR position on 

the four classes of aviation. First, the FSR omitted mention of employment of bombardment against strategic targets or enemy will. Instead, 

the types of targets described as suitable for bombardment were operational level of war targets - supply depots, bridges, railroad stations, 

and airdromes.136 Second, the FSR also stated to what level of command 

to assign the various aircraft types. To that end, the FSR indicated allocation of observation to division and larger units, pursuit and attack 

to armies and the general headquarters (GHQ), and bombardment and 

airships to the GHQ.137

Regarding the impact of aviation on the battlefield, the FSR clearly 

acknowledged the potential damage that enemy aircraft could inflict on 

friendly forces through instructions to avoid and mitigate such damage. Specifically, the FSR advocated that commands defend themselves 

against air attack using friendly pursuit aircraft and antiaircraft artillery.138 The expectation presented in the FSR was that use of antiaircraft 

artillery would force enemy aircraft to higher altitudes that, in turn, reduced the effectiveness of bombardment and observation.139 To reduce 

detection and mitigate damage if attacked, the FSR argued for distribution of forces, night marches, cross country movement, concealment, 

and camouflage.140

Ultimately, the FSR outlined a number of general concepts regarding the role of aviation as part of US Army combined arms operations. 

However, the level of detail in the FSR on actual conduct of aviation 

operations was relatively light. For detailed information, the FSR stated 

that the Training Regulations detailed the true tactical principles of each 

of the combined arms.141

Training Regulation 440-15

Published in 1926 under the direction of the Chief of the Air Service, Training Regulation (TR) 440-15, Fundamental Principles for the 

Employment of the Air Service, detailed the mission, employment, administration, and training of the Air Service.142 Although this regulation 

in many ways mirrored the information presented in the FSR it did so 

in detail and included some notable differences.
35

Beginning with the similarities, TR 440-15 acknowledged that the 

Air Service was a component part of the Army whose role was to conduct attacks, observation, and communication missions in cooperation 

with and in support of ground units.143 The TR also stated the same four 

classes of aircraft - bombardment, observation, pursuit, and attack - that 

comprised the combat units of the Air Service.144 The assignment of 

these classes, per the TR, mirrored the information in the FSR - that 

observation existed at division and above, attack and pursuit under control of armies, and bombardment reserved to the GHQ.145 Additionally, 

as with the FSR, the TR stated that unit marches and other movements 

should be under cover of darkness in order to avoid detection and attack 

by aircraft.146

As to the missions of the various classes of aircraft, most of the TR 

was in agreement with the FSR. Specifically, there existed no notable 

difference in the missions described for observation, pursuit, or attack 

with two exceptions.147 The first is that the TR stated that attack aviation 

might have a role in suppressing local disturbances in colonial possessions where the deployment of troops was either impossible or impractical.148 The second is that the TR advocated the use of aircraft for 

observation and attack of enemy shipping in conjunction with efforts 

by the Coast Artillery Corps.149 The absence of these positions from the 

FSR is unsurprising given that the FSR, unlike the TR, focused solely 

on land combat with a comparable developed nation.150

Despite the similarities, on the subject of bombardment aviation, 

the TR presented a more expanded role than did the FSR. Whereas the 

FSR focused bombardment on operational targets outside the range of 

friendly artillery, the TR stated that bombardment filled either a tactical 

or a strategic role.151 To the former, the TR stated an expanded tactical role for bombardment. According to the TR, bombardment was not 

only for those targets beyond artillery range, but available in place of 

artillery or to supplement artillery.152 To the latter, the TR argued for 

employment of bombardment in a strategic role against vital targets 

in the enemy interior (including industry, transportation, power plants, 

etc) to “weaken him by causing discontent and alarm.”153

Bombardment, ACTS, 1926 and 1933

Given the year of publication, it is reasonable to assume existence 

of a great deal of similarity between TR 440-15 and the 1926 Bombardment manual with the latter simply greatly expanding on the positions 
36

expressed in the former. Indeed, largely this holds true; however, some 

of the detail was particularly important. 

As with TR 440-15, the 1926 Bombardment manual described 

bombardment as having a tactical and strategic role, but elaborated that 

there is an inherent trade-off between the two and the decision over 

manner of employment should be up to the high command’s assessment 

of which would have the greatest impact.154 However, the manual ultimately concluded that employment in the strategic role “must not take 

precedence over the support of ground operations by proper tactical 

employment.”155

Also important to note is the manual’s emphasis on will of the bombardment crew. Page 20 stated, “most important of all in the training of 

the bombing crew is the inculcation of the will to reach and destroy the 

objective.”156 This statement served to both acknowledge the potential 

strength of enemy defenses and supported the idea that, when manned 

with proper crews, bombers would always get through to the objective.157

While all of the points of the 1926 manual are too numerous to cover, a final subject from the manual deserving mention is that of attacks 

on cities. The manual made it clear that such action was restricted under 

the laws of warfare; however, targeting of “political centers” could be 

important should the enemy attack such targets first.158

What then of the changes in the manual from the 1926 printing to 

the 1933 printing? The greatest difference between the manuals exists 

primarily over two subjects. The first is the shift completely away from 

tactical bombardment. The 1933 manual stated that the entire purpose 

of bombardment was to strike those enemy targets “which will contribute most to the overcoming of his will to resist.”159 The specific mention 

of targeting economic and industrial centers makes it clear that the authors of the later manual envisioned attacks on enemy cities and populations, even if it was not clearly stated as such.160 The manual even stated 

that if attack aviation could reach a target, that target was not suitable 

for bombardment aviation.161

Another notable difference from the 1926 to 1933 manuals was the 

strong push for independent air force operations in the 1933 manual. 

The manual argued that bombardment aviation had the greatest effect 

when it was concentrated and employed only against vital enemy targets.162 According to the manual, this concentration existed only by 

having all bombardment fall under the command of an air force that 
37

reports directly to the theater commander-in-chief designated by the 

president.163

Despite the difference, much of the subject matter argues the same 

points, just in an expanded fashion. The 1933 manual pushed heavily 

on the need for “offensive spirit” amongst bomber crews to ensure they 

reached their objectives and could “carry-on in spite of opposition.”164

The manual also said there was universal acceptance that once launched, 

an air attack would almost certainly reach its target.165

Pursuit, ASTS, 1926

Just as great similarity existed between TR 440-15 and the 1926 

Bombardment manual, a great deal of similarity existed between TR 

440-15 and the 1926 Pursuit manual. The Pursuit manual stressed that 

the true mission of pursuit as a class of aviation was to establish and 

maintain air supremacy through offensive actions designed to defeat 

enemy aircraft in flight.166 This closely matched the position stated in 

the pursuit section of the TR.167

However, where the Pursuit manual differed from the TR is not 

in the overall concept of employment of pursuit, but in its arguments 

against use of pursuit in defensive roles (an idea alluded to, but not 

clearly stated in the TR). Referencing defense of political centers (taken to imply cities), Pursuit stated that the only reason pursuit aircraft 

would be assigned to such a role is for the sake of political expediency. 

It is this expediency, the manual argued, which violated sound principles of combat and would not accomplish decisive results.168 Considering aerial defense of friendly aircraft, the manual made it clear that to 

tie pursuit aircraft to “close protection” of other aircraft was an unsound 

practice which “sacrifices both initiative and aggressiveness in combat.”169 The correct defense of friendly air units would be either through 

completely independent action of pursuit units or through rendezvous 

with friendly aircraft over key points along the defended unit’s route of 

flight.170 

Attack, ACTS, 1930

While the 1926 Pursuit manual contained little change from the 

FSR or the TR, the 1930 Attack manual included a number of notable shifts from the doctrinal publications of the 1920s. The first such 

change was a shift in the type of targets the doctrine assigned to attack 

aviation. Whereas the 1923 FSR and TR 440-15 described proper attack targets as troop concentrations and movements, the 1930 Attack 
38

manual focused attack aviation on those targets previously considered 

bombardment targets. These targets included enemy airfields, enemy 

reserves and reinforcements, key transportation nodes, and vulnerable 

points of enemy lines of communication.171 This change was likely due 

to the need to ensure that the shift in mission of bombardment from 

operational to strategic targets did not leave the operational targets uncovered. The second change listed in the 1930 Attack manual, and perhaps the most significant change, dealt with which class of aviation was 

most important in the Air Corps. The 1923 FSR unequivocally placed 

the greatest significance on pursuit due to the importance of pursuit to 

air superiority.172 The Attack manual stated, “In air force operations the 

interests of bombardment aviation are paramount.”173 Also of note, the 

Attack manual did not include any discussion of the possible role of 

attack aviation in suppression of local disturbances, as did TR 440-15.

The 1930 Attack manual also included a number of details that, 

while not indicative of a shift from earlier doctrinal publications, clarified the development of attack aviation and highlighted risks posed by 

ground-based antiaircraft fires. Regarding attack aviation development, 

the manual described the rise of attack aviation as a unique class out 

of necessity during the First World War. The manual detailed how the 

initial use of pursuit, observation, or bombardment for ground attack 

proved unsuitable either due to vulnerability to ground fire or design 

characteristics of those types limiting their effectiveness when employed against ground targets.174 With respect to the impact of antiaircraft fires, the manual discussed two important points. First, that it was 

desirable for attack aircraft to have armor to protect the crew and vital 

aircraft systems from ground fire.175 Second, that attack aviation had 

an important role in support of friendly bombardment - suppression or 

destruction of enemy antiaircraft artillery.176 Both of these points indicate official acknowledgement of the potentially significant impact of 

ground-based antiaircraft defenses on the ability of aviation to accomplish its mission.

Antiaircraft Defense, ACTS, 1927

While the ACTS manuals covered to this point of the study focused 

on offensive capabilities of different aircraft mission types, Antiaircraft 

Defense focused on defensive measures. According to this manual, because pursuit could only guarantee adequate local defense against enemy aircraft through gaining air superiority, antiaircraft artillery was 

required to provide local defense until the Air Corps secured command 

of the air.177 However, given that Antiaircraft Defense was an Air Corps 
39

manual, it is perhaps unsurprising that it largely downplayed the effectiveness of those ground-based local defensive measures. 

In terms of the general effectiveness of antiaircraft defenses, the 

manual was quick to point out that machine guns and antiaircraft guns 

were unlikely to have significant impact on individual, maneuverable 

aircraft.178 Against formations, the manual stated that effectiveness 

would decline significantly during poor visibility due to either cloud 

cover or hours of darkness.179 During such periods of limited visibility, 

the text made it clear that locating devices were too rudimentary to 

ensure effective fires.180 Overall, the manual suggested that the presence of coordinated and accurate antiaircraft fires would force aircraft 

to maneuver or seek protection at very high or very low altitudes. It 

did not indicate that such fires were likely to bring down observation 

or bombardment aircraft.181 However, with respect to attack aviation, 

Antiaircraft Defense argued that the antiaircraft defenses organic to a 

division were more than capable of providing adequate defense against 

attack aviation.182 Interestingly, there was no data provided to back up 

this statement, making it appear as though the statement had more to do 

with a trend toward bombardment taking a position of greater importance than other classes of aviation.

Anticipated effectiveness of antiaircraft defenses represented only a 

portion of the manual. The majority of Antiaircraft Defense detailed the 

various unit types and overall organization of ground-based defensive 

systems. Although many of these details focused on the organization of 

batteries, battalions, and regiments, a more important portion discussed 

establishment of a system of antiaircraft guns around key locations. On 

that topic, Antiaircraft Defense directed analysis of likely flight routes 

of enemy bombers and placement of guns in a position to best engage 

along those routes of flight.183 As part of this defensive network, the 

manual also discussed the importance of intelligence gathering and reporting services to coordinate defensive measures.184

Summary of Interwar US Army Doctrine

As with the section on interwar theory, the intent of this section on 

interwar doctrine was to provide a review of doctrinal manuals cited 

by the CGSS students. Although limitations on availability of publications and desired chapter length meant some manuals did not receive a 

review, those evaluated presented a picture of the official positions of 

the Army or Army Air Corps on employment of aviation. Both the Field 

Service Regulations and Training Regulation 440-15 described the roles 
40

of the four aviation mission types as part of combined arms operations. 

Within those regulations, there was a clear emphasis on the offensive 

nature of the air arm. The 1926 Pursuit and Bombardment manuals did 

not alter the roles described in FSR or the TR but did expand upon those 

roles. Pursuit argued extensively against the use of pursuit aviation in 

defensive roles while Bombardment discussed the idea of will as a key 

determining factor on whether or not bombers would reach their targets. 

However, post-1926, the Air Corps publications began to shift in 

favor of bombardment, but that shift was only incremental. The 1930 

Attack and 1933 Bombardment manuals represented a shift in targets 

for each aircraft mission type. The focus for bombardment shifted to 

strategic targets while the focus for attack moved to targets formerly described as best suited for bombardment. The 1927 Antiaircraft Defense

manual also emphasized bombardment rather than pursuit as the most 

important aircraft type in the Air Corps. That manual also downplayed 

effectiveness of antiaircraft defenses against bombers while suggesting 

attack was vulnerable to ground fire. Even with these shifts, the publications did not fundamentally alter the idea that all aircraft types must 

work together to meet the objectives dictated by the theater commander. 

Chapter Conclusion

The preceding discussions of the lessons of the Great War, interwar 

period airpower theory, and US Army doctrine frame the intellectual 

environment during which the CGSS students completed their papers. 

Although the students relied on a number of histories of the Great War, 

common themes on the role of airpower during the war existed within 

those works. As evidenced by the various theories on airpower employment that emerged in the 1920s and 1930s, the CGSS students wrote 

in a time of significant debate over the role of aviation in war and the 

relationship between air, land, and naval forces. Doctrine of the period 

also experienced incremental changes as technologies advanced and 

reflected much of the theoretical debate over the proper role of the air 

arm. Given this discussion on history, theory, and doctrine, this paper 

now turns to the views of some of those who served in the US military 

during the interwar period - the CGSS students.
41

Notes

1. Air Service, A.E.F., “Final Report of Chief of Air Service,” in The 

U.S. Air Service in World War 1, ed. Maurer Maurer, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: 

U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978). For detail see Appendix C. The Final 

Report was cited in a total of six of the student papers. Hereafter cited as “Final 

Report.”

2. The U.S. Air Service in World War 1, ed. Maurer Maurer, vol. 1 

(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), 6.

3. The U.S. Air Service in World War 1.

4. The U.S. Air Service in World War 1, ix.

5. Ernest von Hoeppner, Germany’s War in the Air, trans. J. Hawley 

Larned (1921; repr., Nashville, TN: The Battery Press, 1994). This work was 

referenced in seven student papers (See Appendix C)

6. Liman von Sanders, Five Years in Turkey, trans. Carl Reichman (Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval Institute, 1927). Referenced in five of 

the student papers (See Appendix C).

7. Alfred Rawlinson, The Defence of London 1915-1918 (London: Andrew Melrose, 1924), xi-x.

8. Charles C. Turner, The Struggle in the Air, 1914-1918 (London: Edward Arnold, 1919). Referenced in five student papers (See Appendix C).

9. Turner, 34-124.

10. Turner, vii.

11. William T. Massey, Allenby’s Final Triumph (London: Constable and 

Company, 1920), https://archive.org/details/allenbysfinaltri00massrich (accessed 15 November 2013). Cited in seven student papers (See Appendix C).

12. Walter A. Raleigh and H. A. Jones, The War in the Air, 6 vols. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1922-1937).

13. “Final Report,” 82 and 99.

14. “Final Report,” 51 and 66.

15. Von Hoeppner, 17.
42

16. Von Hoeppner, 8.

17. Von Hoeppner, 14-15.

18. Turner, 206.

19. Von Hoeppner, 117.

20. Massey, 97-98.

21. “Final Report,” 104.

22. Von Hoeppner, 21 and 54. Hoeppner cites the French attack against 

Freiburg on 4 December 1914 as the first example of an air attack oriented 

against a civilian population. While decrying the French action, he argues that 

Germany’s attacks against the cities was only oriented against legitimate military targets contained within.

23. Von Hoeppner, 31-32.

24. Rawlinson, 4.

25. “Final Report,” 18. The Final Report indicates that the Air Service 

fielded only 7 total bombing squadrons of all types, day and night, by the end 

of the war.

26. “Final Report,” 48-49.

27. Turner, 185; “Final Report,” 44.

28. “Final Report,” 43.

29. Von Hoeppner, 105-106.

30. Turner, 224-225.

31. Von Hoeppner, 67-69.

32. Turner, 226.

33. Von Sanders, 250. On page 321 of Allenby’s Final Triumph, the author states that the British air supremacy was unchallenged following the Battle of Beersheba in 1917, however this assertion is not clearly supported by 

General von Sanders in Five Years in Turkey.
43

34. Massey, 97-98.

35. Massey, 142.

36. Massey, 142-143.

37. Massey, 183-185.

38. Von Sanders, 280.

39. “Final Report,” 49.

40. Turner, 156-157.

41. Von Hoeppner, 129.

42. Von Hoeppner, 129; Rawlinson, 207-208.

43. Rawlinson, 98-102, 178-179, and 232-234. A 2-3 September 1916 

zeppelin raid is described on pages 98-102. Pages 178-179 describe a daylight 

German bombing raid on 7 July 1917. Pages 232-234 discuss a massive multiple wave German bomber attack on 18 December 1917 which lasted more than 

2 hours yet did not result in downing of aircraft by antiaircraft artillery.

44. “Final Report,” 41

45. Rawlinson, 244.

46. Von Hoeppner, 57 and 107.

47. Rawlinson, 205.

48. Edward Ashmore, Air Defence (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 

1929), 144-155.

49. See Appendix C.

50. Giulio Douhet, The Command of The Air, trans. Dino Ferrari (1942; 

repr., Washington, DC: Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998), vi.
44

51. The translation used as source material for this paper is that contained 

in the 1998 imprint of a 1983 reprint of the 1942 edition of The Command of 

the Air.

52. Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air 

Arm 1917-1941 (1955; repr., Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1985), 48-49.

53. Douhet, 5-6 and 22.

54. Douhet, 174.

55. Douhet, 179.

56. Douhet, 136.

57. Douhet, 24 and 128-129.

58. Douhet, 20, 57, and 128-129.

59. Douhet, 28.

60. Douhet, 61.

61. Douhet, 17-18 and 112.

62. Douhet, 55.

63. Douhet, 19-20 and 181.

64. Douhet, 61.

65. Greer, 49-50. Thomas Greer identifies similarities between the two 

works, even stating that some of Mitchell’s later work was more extreme than 

any position advanced by Douhet. However, those later works are not considered in this study as only Winged Defense was cited by interwar students and 

then only once (see Appendix C).

66. William Mitchell, Winged Defense (New York: The Knickerbocker 

Press, 1925), 14.

67. Mitchell, 5.

68. Mitchell, 10.
45

69. Mitchell, 122 and 198. On 122, Mitchell says that after the loss of 

air superiority, capitulation is preferable to being subject to continued attacks 

from enemy aircraft. On 198 he argues that those continued attacks would 

prevent industry from producing the aircraft necessary to reestablish air superiority. 

70. Mitchell, 199.

71. Mitchell, 199 and 204.

72. Mitchell, 76. For further discussion see Chapter 3, “Aircraft Dominate Seacraft” which provides significant details of the testing which used 

German warships as targets for air attack.

73. Mitchell, 110.

74. Mitchell, 112-113.

75. Mitchell, 114-116.

76. Basil H. Liddell Hart, Paris: Or, The Future of War (London: Kegan 

Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co., 1925), 14-17.

77. Hart, 17.

78. Hart, 43.

79. Hart, 49-50.

80. Hart

81. Hart, 51.

82. Hart, 60-61.

83. Hart

84. Hart, 59-60.

85. Hart, 62-89. In pages 62-67 Hart details his view of how both the 

airplane and the submarine have altered the nature of naval warfare; Pages 

68-89 discuss the need to increase mobility of land forces due to the impact of 

airpower and the advent of the tank and the manner in which to do so. 
46

86. The U.S. Air Service in World War 1, vii.

87. Robert T. Finney, History of the Air Corps Tactical School 1920-1940

(1955; repr., Washington, DC: Center for Air Force History, 1992), 99-100. 

Annual Report, 1925, 7-9. Also reference the annual reports for the years 

1925-1926 and 1926-1927.

88. William C. Sherman, Air Warfare (2002; repr., Honolulu: University 

Press of the Pacific, 2004), x-xiii. Background information provided in an introduction written by Wray R. Johnson.

89. William C. Sherman, Air Warfare (New York: The Ronald Press Co., 

1926), v.

90. Sherman, Air Warfare, 7-8.

91. Sherman, Air Warfare, 210-211 and 218.

92. Sherman, Air Warfare, 129.

93. Sherman, Air Warfare, 237-238.

94. Sherman, Air Warfare, 227.

95. Sherman, Air Warfare, 208.

96. Sherman, Air Warfare, See Chapter 4, “The Service of Observation” 

and Chapter 6, “Attack Aviation”

97. Sherman, Air Warfare, 2004, 92-93.

98. Sherman, Air Warfare, 93-94.

99. Sherman, Air Warfare, 1926, 184.

100. Sherman Air Warfare, 2004, 162.

101. Squadron Leader, Basic Principles of Air Warfare (London: Gale and 

Polden, 1927). No sources appear to indicate the actual identity of “Squadron Leader.” From the book, it is clear the author is a British aviator almost 

certainly with combat experience during the First World War. That the work 

advocates the strength of defense against bombers by pursuit suggests that he 

was probably a pursuit pilot.

102. Squadron Leader, 2.
47

103. Squadron Leader, 115.

104. Squadron Leader, 7-8.

105. Squadron Leader, 12-13

106. Squadron Leader, 56-60.

107. Squadron Leader, 2 and 115.

108. Squadron Leader, 41-42.

109. Squadron Leader, 48.

110. Ashmore, vii.

111. Ashmore, vii.

112. Ashmore, 147-148

113. Ashmore, 146.

114. Ashmore, 144.

115. Ashmore, 149.

116. See Appendix C. This is true of all works except Mitchell’s which is 

cited only once; it is included here due to his prominence in the development 

of aviation in the U.S. 

117. War Department, Training Regulation 440-15, Fundamental Principles for the Employment of the Air Service (Washington, DC: Government 

Printing Office, 1926), paragraph 1, http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/

documents/ tr440-15.htm (accessed 1 January 2014). Quotation comes from 

Training Regulation 10-5. 

118. See Appendix D for a list of interwar period U.S. Army doctrinal references which were cited by the CGSS students. This list includes the source, 

the date of publication (if known), and the number of papers that reference the 

source.

119. War Department, Field Service Regulations (1923) (Washington, 

DC: Government Printing Office, 1924).
48

120. War Department, Field Service Regulations, 3; War Department, TR 

440-15.

121. Air Corps Tactical School, Bombardment (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1933), Letter from the Assistant Commandant.

122. See Appendix D for a listing of ASTS/ACTS interwar publications.

123. See Appendix A for a list of Air Corps officers who attended the 

CGSS during a two-year course from 1928 to 1936.

124. See Appendix H.

125. War Department, Field Service Regulations; War Department, TR 

440-15.

126. Air Service Tactical School, Bombardment (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1926); Air Corps Tactical School, Bombardment, 

1933; Air Service Tactical School, Pursuit (Washington, DC: Government 

Printing Office, 1926); Air Corps Tactical School, Attack (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1930); Air Corps Tactical School, Antiaircraft 

Defense (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1927).

127. War Department, Field Service Regulations, Acting Army Chief of 

Staff Introduction Letter.

128. War Department, Field Service Regulations, v-vii.

129. War Department, Field Service Regulations, 21.

130. War Department, Field Service Regulations, 22.

131. War Department, Field Service Regulations, 22.

132. War Department, Field Service Regulations, 22-23.

133. War Department, Field Service Regulations, 23

134. War Department, Field Service Regulations, 22.

135. War Department, Field Service Regulations, 23.

136. War Department, Field Service Regulations, 23.

137. War Department, Field Service Regulations, 41.
49

138. War Department, Field Service Regulations, 17 and 35.

139. War Department, Field Service Regulations, 36, 41, and 48.

140. War Department, Field Service Regulations, Acting Army Chief of 

Staff Introduction Letter.

141. War Department, TR 440-15, paragraphs 1-5.

142. War Department, TR 440-15, paragraphs 3-4.

143. War Department, TR 440-15, paragraph 8.

144. War Department, TR 440-15, paragraph 11.

145. War Department, TR 440-15, paragraph 17d.

146. War Department, TR 440-15, paragraphs 13c, 15c, 17a, and 18a.

147. War Department, TR 440-15, paragraph 17i.

148. War Department, TR 440-15, paragraph 14d(4).

149. War Department, Field Service Regulations, Acting Army Chief of 

Staff Introduction Letter.

150. War Department, TR 440-15, paragraph 16g.

151. War Department, TR 440-15, paragraph 16e.

152. War Department, TR 440-15, paragraph 16g.

153. Air Service Tactical School, Bombardment, 1926, 2 and 5.

154. Air Corps Tactical School, Bombardment, 72.

155. Air Corps Tactical School, Bombardment, 20.

156. Air Corps Tactical School, Bombardment, 20 and 73.

157. Air Corps Tactical School, Bombardment, 64. The manual does not 

say cities, civilians, or people, rather it advocates potential reprisal attacks 

on enemy “political centers.” While the manual even states that such attacks 

should not target residential districts, that it discusses it reference attacks on 
50

Paris and London as well as possible attacks on New York would clearly indicate civilian casualties would be expected based on historical experience.

158. Air Corps Tactical School, Bombardment, 1933, 23-24.

159. Air Corps Tactical School, Bombardment, 81.

160. Air Corps Tactical School, Bombardment, 82.

161. Air Corps Tactical School, Bombardment, 81.

162. Air Corps Tactical School, Bombardment, 81.

163. Air Corps Tactical School, Bombardment, 21-22.

164. Air Corps Tactical School, Bombardment, 118-119.

165. Air Service Tactical School, Pursuit, 1, 42 and 45.

166. War Department, TR 440-15, paragraph 15.

167. Air Service Tactical School, Pursuit, 43.

168. Air Service Tactical School, Pursuit, 19.

169. Air Service Tactical School, Pursuit, 43 and 90.

170. Air Corps Tactical School, Attack, 47. 

171. War Department, Field Service Regulations, 22.

172. Air Corps Tactical School, Attack, 32.

173. Air Corps Tactical School, Attack, 1-10.

174. Air Corps Tactical School, Attack, 27-28.

175. Air Corps Tactical School, Attack, 32.

176. Air Corps Tactical School, Antiaircraft Defense, 4.

177. Air Corps Tactical School, Antiaircraft Defense, 6.

178. Air Corps Tactical School, Antiaircraft Defense, 6.
51

179. Air Corps Tactical School, Antiaircraft Defense, 6.

180. Air Corps Tactical School, Antiaircraft Defense, 8.

181. Air Corps Tactical School, Antiaircraft Defense, 13.

182. Air Corps Tactical School, Antiaircraft Defense, 41-45.

183. Air Corps Tactical School, Antiaircraft Defense, 49-52.

53

Chapter 3

CGSS Student Opinions on Airpower

Turning to the Leavenworth student papers, the collection represents only a small sampling of opinions of interwar military officers. 

Of that relatively small sample, only 69 papers by 68 different authors 

cover air power topics. However, it would be premature to dismiss the 

opinions presented in the papers on the basis that the authors were only 

a fraction of the overall interwar US Army officer population. Despite 

the relatively small number of papers, those written by Air Corps officers still account for more than 60% of the total number of Air Corps 

graduates of the 1928-1936 two-year courses. In addition, those officers 

selected to attend the two-year course were, at least in theory, among 

the best officers for their branch at the time of selection.1 Therefore, the 

papers by Air Corps authors represent a relatively large sample of supposedly the best mid-grade Air Corps officers of the time. Even though 

a far smaller percentage of graduates from other branches wrote papers 

on airpower topics, their papers still provide a snapshot of how those 

outside of the Air Corps viewed aviation. As a result, the data and opinions found in the papers hold tremendous potential to provide insight 

into how US Army officers perceived airpower during the interwar period.

Even though the papers hold great potential, they still represent 69 

different papers by different authors who sought answers to different 

questions under the broad topic of aviation. Drawing out the similarities 

and differences between the papers required a detailed reading of each 

paper focusing on key facts, ideas, and conclusions. Once complete, this 

information served as data points for organization into like topic areas. 

For this study, those topic areas came from the divisions found within 

the previously discussed World War I histories as well as the interwar 

theories and doctrine. In the pages that follow, nine different topic areas 

serve as organization for the student opinions - bombardment, pursuit, 

antiaircraft defense, attack, observation, troop movements, coastal 

defense, air superiority, and aviation in small wars and other outlying 

ideas. Through consolidation of student opinions from multiple papers 

into these topic areas, it is then possible to identify both overall student 

perceptions on the capabilities and limitations of airpower within that 

topic and the areas in which students displayed notable disagreement, 

if any. Additionally, these topic areas allow relatively easy comparison 

of student opinions to those positions expressed in the previously 
54

examined interwar period theory and doctrine. Points of agreement 

or disagreement, between the students, the theory, and the doctrine, in 

turn, suggest to what extent those students, taken as a whole, supported 

or refuted ideas contained in theory and doctrine.

As explored in the chapter that follows, the information contained 

in the student papers appears to show a student body that perceived 

an incredibly complicated interrelationship between aviation mission 

types, defenses against aircraft, and the impact of aviation on the conduct of military operations. When compared to theory, their papers suggest that the students, taken as a whole, perceived greater limitations 

on the potential of aviation to achieve decisive results in war than did 

Douhet, Mitchell, or Liddell Hart. This places their viewpoints more in 

line with those expressed by Sherman, Ashmore, or “Squadron Leader.” 

Relative to doctrine, students displayed general agreement with period 

Air Corps doctrinal publications as well as the 1923 FSR. However, 

the student papers showed some disagreement with doctrine on topics 

including the use of defensive pursuit, the ability to achieve air superiority, and, perhaps most strikingly, targeting of civilians.

Bombardment Aviation

Given the heavy emphasis that several of the interwar theorists 

placed on the power of strategic bombing to achieve victory in war, 

bombardment aviation is perhaps the best starting point of this examination into student opinions. Within this category, there was a great 

deal of agreement between students that the role of bombardment 

was to strike at the vital targets of a nation. Interestingly, the students 

viewed not only transportation and industrial centers as vital targets, but 

also foresaw cities as vital targets (even if not openly supporting such 

attacks, they agreed that such attacks would be likely). Nonetheless, 

the students presented a number of arguments questioning the ability of 

such attacks to bring about the desired results, particularly in the presence of enemy pursuit and antiaircraft defenses. 

Although some early papers focused on the impact of bombardment against enemy troop concentrations and lines of communication, 

most focused on the anticipated use of bombardment aviation against 

industrial and population centers.2 In his 1934 paper, Captain St. Clair 

Streett, Air Corps (AC), stated, “air raids on industrial centers and munitions centers seriously affected production in the past and can be expected to accomplish the same result to an even greater degree in the 

future.”3 The same paper argued that while nations may initially restrain 
55

themselves from attacks on cities, attacks on cities, along with attacks 

on industry and government, were merely a means to an end of defeating the enemy’s will to resist.4

 A 1935 paper by Captain Sam Ellis, 

AC, argued that the use of bombardment against cities, capitols, and 

industry would occur and would be comparable to William Sherman’s 

“March to the Sea” in that the intent is the “destruction of the economic 

forces and the people themselves.”5

Within the student papers that discussed employment of bombardment aviation, there was acknowledgement that even though attacks 

against cities violate the accepted rules of war, such attacks would take 

place. In his 1932 paper, then Major John Hood, Coast Artillery Corps 

(CAC), argued that cities, particularly those of political or industrial 

importance, would be subject to air attack even though such attacks 

violate the rules governing land warfare.6 Captain Rolla Ladd, CAC, 

expanded upon this opinion in 1933, stating, “on account of taking 

over large industrial plants and putting them to manufacturing of war 

supplies, certain cities and localities become seats of production for 

such supplies and will invariably have large populations near.”7 He concluded that under those conditions, cities represented proper military 

targets. Another student, Major Vincent Dixon, AC, while not openly 

advocating for attacks on cities, cited available literature to argue that 

it was reasonable to expect attacks against cities during the next war 

with the intent of inflicting the maximum number of casualties on civilians.8

 Yet another student, Captain Vernon Hall, CAC, cited period 

journals to argue that in the next war, the lines between combatants and 

non-combatants would blur and attacks on cities were a way to impact 

enemy morale and industrial production.9 Summarizing, the consensus 

was that the role of bombardment was attacks on vital targets, which 

included not only industrial centers, but also cities. Regarding the latter, 

there is near universal agreement that attacks on cities were contrary to 

international law, but that such attacks would occur regardless of such 

law.

Given the relative clarity in the papers on the role of bombardment, 

there was a rather large amount of disagreement on the perceived effectiveness of such use. These disagreements centered upon three areas: 

the ability to achieve desired target effects, the impact of defending 

pursuit aircraft, and the impact of antiaircraft artillery. Regarding target 

effects, Major Lawrence Stone, AC, pointed out that given the rising 

threat of air attack, nations would disperse their industries in such a 

manner as to prevent paralysis following a concentrated air attack.10 A 
56

counterargument to this point existed in another paper. Captain Streett 

argued that dispersion does not necessarily prevent destruction. Rather, the number of available bombardment units dictated the degree of 

destruction.11 Students also did not overlook the fact that target effects 

depended upon accuracy of bombs and bombers. To ensure target hits, 

Captain Francis Brady, AC, pointed out the need to operate bombers in 

mass to increase the number of bombs dropped and thereby increase 

the number of hits and the associated target damage.12 Captain Brady 

and Major Harrison Richards, AC, also acknowledged the reduction in 

accuracy imposed by night bombardment.13 Of course, the ability to hit 

a target is dependent upon reaching the target - another potential weakness highlighted by students.

While a number of factors including weather, maintenance, and 

navigation play a role determining whether a mass of bombers could 

reach their target, those are not the means by which a military can defend against bombing. The available defensive measures of the time 

were pursuit aircraft and antiaircraft artillery. Bombardment success 

would require bombers to overcome those defenses - a task which not 

all students viewed as carrying the same risk. Some students expressed 

little concern over defensive measures. Of these students, Captain Asa 

Duncan and Major Delos Emmons, both of the Air Corps, believed that 

massing bombers would ensure adequate defense against enemy pursuit 

planes, particularly because a defender would likely disperse pursuit 

aircraft to defend a large area.14 However, some students argued that it 

was possible to stop or at least inflict heavy damage against attacking 

bomber formations. As noted by Major Willis Hale, AC, the ability to 

defend against a bombardment attack depended upon early warning to 

provide sufficient time for friendly pursuit to launch and climb to altitude (suggesting that pursuit could be effective against bombers).15

Major Charles Finley, CAC, and Major Harrison Richards, AC, made it 

clear that antiaircraft artillery, while not able to completely stop attacks, 

would inflict significant damage to bombardment formations.16 Combining these areas of disagreement with those areas of consensus presents a relatively clear picture of student perceptions of bombardment 

aviation. Bombardment was a force which existed to strike vital targets 

(e.g., industry, cities, capitals) in order to attack the enemy’s will and 

ability to fight. However, whether or not bombardment would be able to 

achieve the desired results in the face of enemy defenses was unclear - a 

lack of clarity which is expanded upon in the subsequent sections of this 

chapter covering pursuit aviation and antiaircraft defense.
57

With the preceding review of student opinions on bombardment 

aviation, it becomes possible to compare those perceptions to interwar theory and doctrine. Concerning theory, the emphasis the students 

placed on the use of bombardment aviation to attack an enemy’s will 

and means to resist resembles the viewpoints expressed by both Douhet 

and Mitchell. However, Douhet and Mitchell left little doubt of their 

support for strategic bombing as a means to achieve relatively quick 

and decisive victory; the papers indicate the students were not completely convinced. As such, the consensus opinion of the students on 

bombardment was more restrained than Douhet, Mitchell, and Hart 

while also more optimistic about the abilities of bombardment than 

Sherman, Ashmore, and “Squadron Leader.”

On doctrine, the student opinions generally adhered to the period 

doctrine produced by the Air Corps with the notable exception of their 

acknowledgement that cities would be targets for strategic bombing - 

targets that some students argued would be legitimate in spite of the 

law (in spite of which specific laws they did not state). Although the Air 

Corps manuals imply such use in their discussion of strategic roles, they 

did not directly mention of cities or civilians as targets. Of course, it 

likely would not have been acceptable for the doctrine, as official publications of the War Department or subordinate agencies, to support the 

use of bombardment in ways contrary to accepted international law and 

norms. This notable difference from doctrine expressed in the papers 

might be indicative of a larger acceptance of targeting civilians in war 

within the Air Corps and the greater Army of the early to middle 1930s. 

As mentioned, students expressed considerable differences of opinion regarding the effectiveness of bombardment aviation, with a large 

part of that debate resting on capabilities of available defensive measures - pursuit aviation and antiaircraft defense. The greater the capabilities of the defensive means, the less effective bombardment aviation 

becomes; the less capable the defense, the greater the impact expected 

of bombardment.

Pursuit Aviation

Turning to the first of those defensive means, pursuit aviation, 

this section will show that the student papers demonstrated significant 

agreement that pursuit represented the best available means of defense 

against enemy aircraft even though that effectiveness declined at night. 

Additionally, most students agreed pursuit would be an effective means 

of stopping enemy aircraft, provided pursuit units were properly located 
58

and received sufficient early warning. However, disagreement existed 

over whether or not such positioning and warning was possible given 

the technology available at the time (students did not mention radar).

To the first point of defense against enemy aircraft, several papers 

expressed agreement that the best means of stopping enemy aircraft 

was with pursuit aviation. In his 1930 paper, Major William Foote, stated this idea simply in that, “the first line of antiaircraft defense is the 

airplane.”17 Major C. R. Finley, Major John Hood, and Captain Benjamin Harmon repeated this idea, stating the best defense against enemy 

aircraft was friendly pursuit.18 What is notable about the statements of 

these officers is that all four were members of the Coast Artillery Corps, 

and their statements point out their own branch’s secondary importance 

in air defense.19 Air Corps officers also shared the opinion that pursuit 

was key to defense against enemy aircraft. In his 1932 paper, Major 

Benjamin Weir, AC, wrote that pursuit exists to support the operations 

of the other types of aviation through destruction of enemy aircraft in 

flight.20 Although Douhet and Mitchell’s works stated that attack or 

bombardment could achieve defeat of the enemy air force through attacks on enemy airfields, Captain Lawrence Hickey, AC, saw things 

differently. He pointed out that damage to aircraft on the ground was 

typically easy to repair whereas damage to aircraft in flight was usually 

fatal. He viewed pursuit as the best means of causing such fatal damage 

to enemy aircraft in flight.21 However, agreement that pursuit was the 

best available means to destroy enemy aircraft was not the same as saying that pursuit was actually effective at stopping enemy aircraft.

To that end, the students consistently argued that the deciding 

factor of pursuit effectiveness was the amount of reaction time afforded 

to friendly pursuit aircraft to get into position to attack approaching 

flights of enemy aircraft. Several students argued that if friendly pursuit 

received enough notice, it could inflict significant damage upon enemy 

aircraft (including bomber formations), particularly given improvements 

in technology such as large aircraft-mounted cannons with exploding 

shells.22 Yet, even within the agreement over the importance of early 

warning, there was disagreement on whether or not sufficient early 

warning was possible. Arguing that such notice is unlikely, one student 

pointed out that initiative in air warfare goes to the attacker. Since an 

enemy selects when and where to bomb as well as the routes to and 

from the target, detection of enemy bombardment formations would 

be difficult, particularly under the cover of darkness.23 However, those 

who argued that early warning was possible (and that pursuit would 
59

therefore be successful at interception) based their opinions on in-depth 

analysis prior to the start of a conflict. To that end, Captain Hickey, 

AC, believed careful analysis by a defending force could identify those 

targets that the enemy was likely to attack. Further analysis would 

determine the routes enemy aircraft could use to reach those targets.24

Knowing targets and routes, Major Clarence Cotter, CAC, stated a 

defending force could place defensive pursuit aircraft in a position to 

allow them to react in force to the approach of enemy bombers.25 Thus, 

upon receipt of intelligence of approaching aircraft (which neither of 

these students anticipated would be lacking), the prior analysis and 

proper placement of pursuit aircraft would ensure adequate time and 

space to launch, climb, and attack the inbound bombers. 

Additionally, papers displayed agreement on the difficulty of pursuit operations during hours of darkness. One student pointed out that 

the defense of London during the Great War showed that night pursuit 

was nearly worthless against German bombers.26 Another, Major Harrison Richards, AC, focused on accidental risks as a significant problem 

in night pursuit operations. He stated that the mass of pursuit planes 

required to have the desired effect on enemy aircraft formations is not 

possible due to risk of collision. Additionally, he argued that landings 

and departures of pursuit under low-light conditions greatly increase 

the risks to the defenders.27 Richards also recommended use of lateral 

and vertical patrol sectors as well as radios to improve the performance 

of night pursuit operations although he did not go so far as to argue such 

techniques would ensure effects against attacking aircraft.28

These opinions demonstrate, once again, that the predominant view 

of the students did not support the position advocated by Douhet and 

largely shied away from Mitchell’s viewpoints. As previously discussed, 

both theorists largely viewed defense against air attack as pointless - a 

position which the students clearly found incorrect. Only in the idea 

that adopting a defensive approach cedes the initiative to the enemy do 

the opinions of the student papers resemble some of Mitchell’s ideas. 

It is actually Sherman’s ideas that most closely match those expressed 

by the interwar students; specifically, that pursuit, when properly employed, would inflict significant losses to enemy aircraft.

Considering the differences between student opinions and doctrine 

on the role of pursuit, the students tended to emphasize the defensive 

power of pursuit while the doctrine focused on offensive pursuit. As 

mentioned in the preceding chapter, the 1923 FSR and TR 440-15 did 

not provide sufficient clarity on employment of pursuit aviation; the 
60

regulations simply emphasized the importance of pursuit to gaining and 

maintaining air superiority. In the Pursuit manual, the doctrinal position 

designated pursuit aviation for offensive roles. The manual indicated 

that defense of political centers or cities would be a waste of resources 

done for purely political reasons.29 Since the students clearly supported 

defensive uses of pursuit aviation, their positions rest somewhat at odds 

with period doctrine.

Antiaircraft Defense

Turning to the second component of defense against aircraft, 

students wrote extensively on their perceptions on effectiveness of 

ground-based antiaircraft defensive measures. Such measures included 

antiaircraft guns, searchlights, intelligence networks, organization, and 

use of machine guns and small arms against aircraft. The individual 

student perceptions, when taken as a whole, indicated near universal 

agreement that demand for protection would exceed supply, thereby 

requiring tough choices on where and how to employ ground-based 

defenses. Students also expressed near unanimous agreement that, to 

be effective, those limited resources must be properly organized and 

deployed. Surprisingly, a majority of the students covering the subject 

also agreed, though not unanimously, that properly prepared and organized ground-based antiaircraft defenses could stop or significantly 

impact enemy bombardment attacks against strategic targets. However, 

students presented mixed reviews of the ability of antiaircraft defenses 

to stop attacks against tactical and operational targets. 

The first point of universal consensus amongst the student papers 

on the topic related to the limited availability of antiaircraft defensive 

measures and the trade-offs necessary to either increase availability or 

manage the limited resources. Succinctly stated by Captain Vernon Hall, 

CAC, in 1932, “the only thing certain is that the demand [for defenses 

against hostile aviation] will always far exceed the supply.”30 Students 

identified the cause of this problem as a combination of limited national 

resources (men and materiel) as well as an incredibly large number of 

targets vulnerable to air attack if left unguarded. Referencing manpower 

and resources, Major Clarence Cotter, CAC, wrote that the challenge in 

antiaircraft defense is determining the correct balance of forces. Where 

defenses were too strong, men and materiel were lost from the decisive 

points on the battlefield; where defenses were too weak an enemy 

could exploit bombing to cause vital damage to the friendly ability 

to wage war.31 Regarding vulnerabilities, Captain Francis Brady, AC, 

argued that the scale of anticipated future conflicts combined with the 
61

range of modern aircraft meant that a vast number of targets present 

themselves to an enemy air force.32 Given this problem of targets to 

defend exceeding means of defense, several students wrote that tradeoffs would have to be made.

Regarding trade-offs, Major Alva Englehart, CAC, wrote that because it is not possible to protect every vulnerable point commanders 

must determine the most important points requiring protection and concentrate available defenses around those points.33 Expressing a similar 

viewpoint, Captain Clarence Cotter, CAC, stated that the first priority 

of antiaircraft defense must be to those “points which are vital to the 

program of industrial mobilization and to mobilization of manpower.”34

Yet as part of these priorities for antiaircraft defense, Captain St. Clair 

Street, AC, cautioned that political pressure would not simply play a 

significant part determining what was vital and worthy of defense. Political pressure would also demand greater resources allocated toward 

antiaircraft defense, thereby limiting those resources available in theaters of operation.35

The second point of universal consensus amongst the students on 

the topic of antiaircraft defense was that to succeed, a nation had to 

organize its limited resources into a closely coordinated system linking intelligence to both antiaircraft units and defensive pursuit units. 

To establish such a system, students argued that there should be an 

overall commander with authority over the means of antiaircraft defense.36 Subordinate to this overall force or antiaircraft defense command, the antiaircraft artillery commander and air force commander 

should have authority over their own forces.37 In such an arrangement, 

the overall command served as the central node of the system, receiving intelligence reports and distributing those reports to pursuit units or 

ground-based defense units as required to mass friendly effects against 

approaching enemy aircraft.38 To support this idea of a coordinated antiaircraft defensive network, students largely referenced the defense of 

London during World War I as described in Ashmore’s Air Defence. Of 

course, as described, such systems would consist of several components 

- intelligence, command structure, pursuit, and antiaircraft artillery.

Of the components of an integrated air defense system, students 

agreed that proper organization and command structure made the best 

use of limited resources, but the key to making the system function was 

a large and responsive intelligence section. The pursuit aviation section 

of this chapter discussed the students’ perceived need for such an early warning system as the determining factor on pursuit effectiveness. 
62

Students viewed such early warning as no less important for the antiaircraft artillery units. Just as pursuit required time to launch and establish 

altitude in order to engage enemy aircraft, so too was time required to 

man and prepare guns to fire upon aircraft from the ground.39 Major 

Ward Duval, CAC, wrote in 1932 that, in rear areas, the responsibility 

for the intelligence gathering was not merely a military function, but a 

responsibility of all citizens and businesses. He argued that the organization of civilian observers and the civilian telephone system under the 

air defense command(s) would prove a key part of early warning of enemy air attack.40 In forward areas, the responsibility for intelligence of 

approaching enemy aircraft would fall to forward observers equipped 

with radios.41

However, just because the students identified the need to decide how 

to organize and deploy those limited resources to maximize the chance 

of success, this does not necessarily mean the students thought groundbased defenses could successfully defend against enemy aircraft. Yet, 

the majority opinion in the student papers show that ground-based antiaircraft defensive measures were viewed as very capable of inflicting 

significant damage to bombardment aircraft attacking strategic targets. 

However, the ability of antiaircraft defenses to protect troops and targets at the tactical and operational level was a point of contention. 

Those students who maintained a positive view of the ability of antiaircraft defenses to protect strategic targets based their opinions on a 

number of references. These references included World War I statistics, 

World War I history, and a report of a board of officers convened by 

the Hawaiian Department to examine the capabilities and limitations of 

the Coast Artillery and Air Corps.42 From history and statistics, Captain 

Vernon Hall, CAC, noted fewer than 10% of the German aircraft sent 

against Paris in 1918 reached the objective, a fact that he attributed to 

the strength of the antiaircraft gun defenses in and around the city.43

Another student, Major Christian Foltz, CAC, attempted to argue positively for antiaircraft gun effectiveness by comparing the average number of antiaircraft rounds expended per plane shot down to the average 

number of rounds (small arms, artillery, grenades, and small mortars) 

expended by the Allies per Central Powers soldier killed on the ground 

in the war. He estimated that every 1,100 rounds expended resulted in 

one casualty whereas the AEF averaged one plane shot down for every 

604 antiaircraft rounds fired.44 Also using this idea of measuring effectiveness in rounds per shoot-down, Captain Edward Rehman, Infantry 

(IN), explained that in the years following the world war, there was 
63

a continuous improvement in antiaircraft accuracy. He also anticipated that improved technologies, including better fire control directors, 

would only serve to further increase accuracy.45 On the same topic, Major C. R. Finley, CAC, frequently referred to findings of the McNair 

Board. Those findings determined that properly positioned antiaircraft 

artillery was to bombers what properly positioned coast artillery was to 

warships.46 Although neither defensive measure was likely to stop all 

bombers or warships, respectively, from attacking their target, attacks 

against those defenses would prove costly. Finley’s own conclusions 

mirrored the board’s findings: that antiaircraft artillery “can make an air 

attack on a city sufficiently hazardous to deter an enemy lacking great 

air superiority and ample replacements.”47 Another student expressed a 

similar belief that the presence of antiaircraft defenses, while not sufficient to prevent a large number of bombers from reaching their target, 

could inflict significant damage on the bomber flight and force enemy 

aircraft to operate at higher altitudes where they would be far less accurate.48

Turning to ground-based antiaircraft defenses used to protect tactical and operational targets, students held mixed views on the capabilities of defensive measures. Students were quick to point out that the 

problem of greater demand for defense than available resources was 

even more dramatic at the tactical level than the strategic level. Students argued that just as antiaircraft defenses of strategic targets required prioritization, so too did the distribution of antiaircraft defenses 

of friendly forces.49 This prioritization, to the students, likely meant 

that infantry units would have to conduct active defensive measures 

against enemy aircraft through employment of rifle, automatic rifle, 

and machine gun fire.50 However, the students debated whether such 

measures were effective. Major Paul Baker, IN, citing the French experience against Rif forces, noted that the Rifs were able to inflict a 

relatively high rate of hits and casualties against French aircraft and 

pilots, respectively.51 Nevertheless, Major John Hood, CAC, clearly felt 

that the stopping power of organic infantry weapons was unreliable for 

antiaircraft defense of ground units.52 The subsequent chapter of this 

section on attack aviation explores the other side of this argument, the 

perceived effectiveness of attack aviation against those targets - a perception likely influenced by debate over whether or not defensive measures were effective countermeasures. 

Comparison of the student perceptions of antiaircraft defense to the 

theorists once again indicates that students largely rejected the opinions 
64

of Douhet and Mitchell. Those two theorists found antiaircraft defenses 

not simply ineffective, but also counterproductive in that the manpower 

and resources expended to create an antiaircraft defense network would 

shortchange efforts to create a strong air force. As a result, the student 

opinions on antiaircraft defense closely resembled the more moderate 

positions presented by both Sherman and Ashmore.

While a full comparison of the student perceptions on antiaircraft 

defense to period doctrine is possible through analysis of the antiaircraft manuals produced by the Coast Artillery Corps in the 1920s and 

1930s, such analysis exceeds the intended scope of this study. As a result, for this study, the student perceptions on antiaircraft defense are 

best considered in respect to how they influenced students’ views on 

the ability of the different aviation mission types to accomplish their 

missions - a factor discussed with each of those topics in this chapter. That said, when compared to the doctrine analyzed in chapter two, 

the students provided significantly greater fidelity on the role of antiaircraft defense. The FSR gave little guidance on the effectiveness or 

employment of antiaircraft defenses except to state that commanders 

must defend themselves from air attack and those guns would to force 

enemy aircraft to higher altitudes where they would be less effective. 

Compared to the Air Corps doctrinal manuals, specifically the positions 

stated in Antiaircraft Defense, it should be clear that the students held 

a far more favorable view of antiaircraft effectiveness than the ACTS 

publication presented. Of course, this is not surprising since the ACTS 

publication was a product of the Air Corps that had a stake in arguing 

that ground-based defenses were ineffective. The student opinions, on 

the other hand, included a number of CAC officers whose branch was 

responsible for those ground-based defenses.

Attack Aviation

Closely related to the abilities of antiaircraft defenses to protect 

tactical and operational targets were the student perceptions regarding 

the role and effectiveness of attack aviation. Among the students who 

wrote on the topic of attack aviation, there was little disagreement that 

the proper role of attack aviation was for attacks against enemy ground 

targets beyond the range of friendly artillery, except in cases of emergency.53 Major Charles Banfill and Captain Asa Duncan, both of the 

Air Corps, argued these attacks should focus first on enemy aircraft on 

the ground and air force ground facilities as part of greater Air Corps 

efforts to establish and maintain air superiority.54 Secondary to attacks 

on enemy air force targets were attacks on sensitive logistical points, 
65

antiaircraft defenses, or concentrations of troops in rear areas.55 Their 

omission of the use of attack aviation against troops in forward positions except as an emergency measure likely owed to debate over the 

actual effectiveness of attack aviation in such a role - a debate captured 

in the student papers.

Those students who argued positively for the impact of attack aviation against troops deployed at the front did so on the basis of both 

World War I events and interwar period Air Corps testing on the subject. Captain Frederick Eglin, AC, pointed out that as part of the German spring offensive in March 1918, the Germans organized over 300 

attack aircraft into flights and squadrons. He argued that these aircraft, 

operating in coordination with German ground forces, played a significant role in the collapse of the British Fifth Army and caused great 

disruption to inbound British reserves.56 He also described the French 

Army’s use of aircraft employed in the attack role to destroy the bridges 

and bridging equipment of the German Seventh Army along the Marne 

in July of 1918, thereby playing a major part in stopping the German 

advance.57

Regarding interwar period Air Corps testing, student descriptions 

of the tests conducted make it clear that the Air Corps sought to determine the true impact of attack aviation against troops. In one such 

test during 1931, described in a 1935 paper by Major Howard Davidson, AC, an infantry battalion marching on a road had four seconds to 

disperse to simulate their reaction to approaching aircraft. The positions 

of the soldiers at the end of the four seconds were marked and the soldiers replaced with man-sized targets. When subsequently engaged by 

attack aircraft, the targets showed 72% hits from guns and 83% hits by 

guns and bombs.58 If accurate, such tests, combined with the historical 

vignettes, make a clear argument for the value of attack aircraft against 

troops in forward areas.

However, many students rejected these arguments as overly optimistic. One student, Major Paul Baker, IN, based on his own analysis 

of various tests, pointed out that the manner of execution of different 

tests of attack aviation against simulated infantry battalions resulted in 

a range of hits by machine guns between 0% to 70%.59 He also noted 

that when a test made use of fragmentation bombs, pilots often dropped 

more bombs over a smaller area than prescribed by service manuals.60

One test cited in a paper by Captain Edward Rehman, IN, supports this 

belief of overestimation of the power of attack aviation, noting that 

testing conducted at the Infantry School suggested properly deployed 
66

infantry columns would only suffer 10-15% casualties.61 Of course, it 

may not be a surprise that a pair of infantry officers would downplay 

the effectiveness of attack aviation. However, criticism of attack effectiveness did not only come from infantry officers. In further criticism 

of the interwar period testing, Captain Dayton Watson, AC, identified 

that many of the tests occurred during daylight hours.62 Since there was 

near universal agreement that threat of air attack would force units to 

move under cover of darkness (student perceptions on aviation and 

troop movements discussed later in this chapter), daylight testing did 

not fit perceived reality of the time. Another student, Captain Carl Russell, IN, argued against the effectiveness of attack aviation on the basis 

that without local air superiority, the best attack aviation could hope to 

achieve was confusion among or limited delay to ground troops.63 Two 

students presented less specific arguments opposed to employment of 

attack aviation against forward-deployed troops. Captain Francis Brady, 

AC, wrote that aviation showed only marginal effectiveness against 

troops which were deployed for battle, and those marginal results were 

not worth the effort expended to carry out such attacks.64 Major Benjamin Weir, AC, argued that direct employment of attack aviation against 

troop formations was likely of limited value owing to both dispersion 

of troops and that attack aviation could get better results against other 

targets.65 From these statements, it is apparent that many students were 

unconvinced of the benefit of attacking troops at the front, even if they 

supported the other missions of attack aviation.

Another area of student dissension on attack aviation, and a subset 

of the debate on attack effectiveness against troops, was a debate on the 

employment of poison gas. Three students writing on the topic noted 

that the use of gas delivered by attack aircraft, or even the potential 

thereof, could cause considerable negative impact on troop movements. 

For units operating under the threat of gas attack, the characteristics 

of period protective equipment were such to significantly slow or stop 

movement.66 For units actually hit with mustard or similar gases, Majors Howard Davidson, AC, Paul Baker, IN, and Leonard Boyd, IN, 

anticipated the same slowed or stopped movement as well as significant casualties that would reduce combat effectiveness.67 Even though 

there was agreement between student papers on the impact of gas if 

employed against troops, two authors debated whether troops on the 

move could or would be suitable targets for gas deployed from attack 

aircraft. In 1931, Captain Carl Russell, IN, stated that the use of poison 

gas was not contemplated except when used for retaliatory measures in 
67

defense.68 Even if this position was overly optimistic (as suggested by 

students spending significant time debating the impact of gas attacks), 

a student pointed out that the flight profile required to release gas spray 

or drop gas bombs would subject attack aviation to significant ground 

fire and correspondingly high casualties.69

This concern over the ability of ground fire to prevent or limit the 

effectiveness of attack aviation was a point of debate. In addition to the 

comment on ground fire influencing release of gas, one student speculated that concentrated .50 caliber machine guns or light antiaircraft 

guns in coordination with small arms could prevent attack aviation 

from achieving the desired results in most circumstances. 70 However, 

the majority felt otherwise provided attack aviation existed as distinctly 

different from other types of aviation. For attack aviation, a student 

pointed out that aircraft could defend themselves against ground fire 

through placement of armor designed to absorb small arms and machine gun rounds.71 Naturally, for other aircraft types operating at altitudes or speeds beyond the range or capability of small arms, machine 

guns, and light antiaircraft guns, such armor would serve little purpose. 

Therefore, the threat and the armor needed to counter the threat lead 

to the idea that attack must be distinct from other types of aviation. 

In 1932, Captain Frederick Eglin, AC, wrote that the difficulty and 

complexity of the attack mission necessitates specialized training for 

pilots.72 He also pointed out that the physics of flight meant aircraft optimized to perform the attack mission would perform marginally in other missions.73 Conversely, his argument also meant that those aircraft 

designed for pursuit, bombardment, or observation were less effective 

at the attack role. Eglin supported his argument by noting that use of 

pursuit aircraft in the attack role rather than employing specialized attack aircraft resulted in significant French aircraft losses during ground 

attack missions.74 In the same year, Captain Lloyd Harvey, AC, took an 

identical position with respect to aircraft design and employment. He 

noted that even though any aircraft mission type was capable of attack 

against tactical ground targets, the best results occurred when aircraft 

were employed on the mission for which they were designed.75

Given the trend thus far, it should come as no surprise that the student perceptions again did not support the theories of Mitchell, Douhet, 

or Hart. Those theorists argued in favor of quick decisions through massive strikes of bombardment aircraft against strategic targets to destroy 

an enemy’s will and means to resist. From their perspective, since an 

enemy could be defeated through bombardment, there was little value 
68

in a mission type designed specifically to attack lines of communication 

and troop concentrations. In fact, of the theorists discussed in chapter 

two, only Sherman placed value on the mission of attack aviation - a 

mission he viewed largely along the same lines as the students.

With respect to period doctrine, the student opinions of attack aviation somewhat blurred the doctrinal lines between attack aviation and 

bombardment aviation. Stated in the previous chapter, the FSR and the 

TR both described the mission of attack aviation as conduct of attacks 

against ground troops and columns while the mission of bombardment 

was against enemy lines of communication, preferably beyond the 

range of friendly artillery. The student perception then pushed attack 

aviation up one level. To the students, attack aviation was ideal for use 

against enemy lines of communication and use against ground troops 

was less suitable for the mission type because of factor such as dispersion and self-defense abilities of front-line units. Of note, this student 

perception, while different from the FSR and the TR, lined up with the 

information in the later ACTS Bombardment and Attack manuals. As 

bomber range improved, those aircraft became more capable of reaching strategic targets well inside an enemy’s borders. A shift of bombardment targets from lines of communication to strategic targets would 

have left the former uncovered. Thus, while the student perceptions of 

suitable attack targets differed notably from some of the earlier doctrinal publications, they were in line with later publications.

Observation Aviation

Another component of the debate over the effectiveness of aviation 

evident in the student papers was the ability of aviation assets to detect 

the movements of an opposing army. No students argued against the 

usefulness of observation aviation for detection of enemy movements - 

on either land or sea. This section is limited to the student perceptions 

over observation aviation’s role over land, as a later section discusses student perceptions of aviation in coastal defense. On the topic of 

observation aviation and land forces, the student opinions of observation were unanimously positive about its place on a modern battlefield. 

Students gave only limited consideration to potential vulnerabilities of 

observation to both pursuit aviation and ground-based antiaircraft defenses.

On the value of observation aviation, seven of the students unequivocally emphasized the importance it played on a modern battlefield. In 

his 1931 paper, Captain Francis Brady, AC, argued that by the end of 
69

the World War, “aerial observation proved to be indispensible to a commander if he were to keep informed of the location and actions of his 

own and enemy units, and consequently, be enabled to make correct decisions.”76 The same year, Major Lawrence Stone, AC, stated that field 

commanders must not fail to use adequate observation aviation to remain advised of the enemy situation.77 Major Robert Bathurst, Field Artillery (FA), expressed his opinion that observation aviation represented 

the fastest, most capable means available to commanders to lift the fog 

of war.78 These perceptions repeated in several other student papers.79

One such paper, written by First Lieutenant Kenneth Walker, AC, went 

as far as to state that not only did observation play a significant role, the 

service schools also overstated the limitations and understated the benefits of reliance upon the information provided by observation aviation.80

Related to the perceived role of observation aviation’s influence 

upon the ground commander’s understanding of the situation was the 

interaction students expected between observation and cavalry, the traditional “eyes” of the commander. Although only a small number of 

students focused significant effort on that relationship, those who did 

saw the two, operating in unison, as essential to reconnaissance efforts. 

Two students, Captain George Barnes, Quartermaster (QM), and Captain Charles Robinson, AC, wrote nearly identical statements that observation aviation would provide the cavalry the information necessary 

to operate with greater precision.81 Another student, Captain William 

Irvin, Cavalry, summarized the relationship by simply stating, “close 

continuous liaison between the cavalry and aviation engaged in combined reconnaissance operations is essential to success.”82

Although the students placed significant value on observation aviation, they devoted little in their papers to the risks posed to observation by enemy pursuit or ground-based antiaircraft defenses. One paper 

suggested the conduct of observation missions at night to minimize the 

risk of interception by enemy pursuit aircraft.83 That author acknowledged that night observation crews were limited in what they could see; 

however, the anticipated increase in night movements (discussed in the 

next section of this chapter) meant that those crews required training to 

identify key items of interest during periods of darkness; proper training would thereby limit the disadvantages posed by darkness.84 For protection of observation against ground-based antiaircraft defenses, the 

papers offered little. One student merely took the approach that while 

those defenses could cause the loss of some observation aircraft, they 

would be unable to stop air reconnaissance from taking place.85 While 
70

this approach was not dissimilar to the student perspective on effectiveness of ground-based antiaircraft defenses, it did leave open the 

question of whether or not those defenses could inflict enough losses 

to make aerial observation prohibitive (as was the student viewpoint on 

bombardment versus antiaircraft defenses).

Although the previous topics showed significant disagreement between student opinion and the beliefs of Douhet, Mitchell, and Hart, 

such is not as clearly the case regarding observation. Students’ faith in 

observation to determine enemy dispositions was not necessarily contradictory to Douhet, Mitchell, and Hart, provided use of observation 

focused on identification or assessment of targets of strategic value. 

It was the use of observation as a reconnaissance arm of the army that 

was contradictory to the theoretical views. Since Douhet, Mitchell, and 

Hart viewed bomber attacks on strategic targets as the way to win wars, 

employing limited observation assets to other targets was, to them, a 

waste of the resource.

Turning to doctrine, the emphasis that the students placed on the 

value of observation aviation to ground commanders closely mirrored 

the emphasis contained within the 1923 FSR and TR 440-15. The FSR 

stated that observation existed to provide information to ground commanders. To support this role, the FSR clearly indicated that observation assets required assignment to division or higher-level units. Therefore, on this topic there is little difference between the opinion of the 

students, taken as a whole, and the position of doctrine. 

Impact on Troop Movements

Closely related to student perceptions of observation and attack 

aviation were their views over the impact of those aviation types on 

troop movements. A number of students used their papers to discuss 

how ground forces should adjust their movements to avoid detection 

or, if detected, what measures could minimize soldier casualties and 

equipment damage in the event of engagement by enemy aircraft. 

Summarized, due to the presence of aircraft on the battlefield, 

the students felt ground forces must conduct the majority of their 

movements under cover of darkness, during poor weather, or when 

operating under the protection of friendly local air superiority. Students 

also justified the need to motorize ground forces based on the impact of 

aircraft on the battlefield. To that end, students stated that motorization 

of ground forces both maximized rates of movement during periods of 
71

decreased aircraft performance (night, weather, etc.) and eliminated the 

vulnerability of animal-drawn transport.

On the first point, student papers on the topic showed unanimous 

agreement over the need to conduct troop movements while protected 

from enemy aircraft by darkness, weather, or friendly aircraft. Captain 

Francis Brady, AC, stated in his 1931 paper that the World War conclusively showed that to have any chance of secrecy of major troop movements, those movements must occur during periods when observation 

is “hindered or prohibited by weather conditions as at night or during 

foggy weather.”86 To confirm that this lesson from the war remained 

applicable, Major Lawrence Stone, AC, reached out to Major Courtney 

Hodges, IN, (then an instructor at the Infantry School) for information 

on how that school addressed aviation’s impact on troop movements. 

Hodges stated that the school placed “an added emphasis on the importance of using darkness to cover all movements when the situation 

permits.”87 Two students, Captain Carl Russell, IN, in 1931 and Captain Idwal Edwards, AC, in 1935 further argued that night movements 

alone, while necessary to conceal strength and composition of forces 

and essential for protection of those forces were insufficient to ensure 

complete secrecy of troop movements.88 Students, based on World War 

I experience, also argued that this necessary emphasis on night movements significantly complicated troop deployment. They pointed out 

that this added complexity would likely strain command and control 

of ground forces and result in reduced movement speeds, even if an air 

attack never occurred.89

According to several students, motorization of ground forces represented a possible solution to the complexity and slow speed of night 

movements caused by the threat of hostile aviation. Since the duration 

of darkness, poor weather, or friendly air cover was limited, students 

felt that success of ground movements required maximizing the rate of 

movement during those limited hours. To do so, students recommended 

the replacement of slow and vulnerable animal-drawn transports with 

motor transports.90 Not only did students feel that increases in speed 

would maximize limited time for movement, they also argued that the 

speed and cross-country mobility of motorized transport would make 

detection by enemy aircraft more difficult.91

Moving to the theory and doctrine comparison, the student opinions once again showed similarity with William Sherman’s work. Just 

as Sherman was the only theorist who placed value on attack aviation, 

he was also the only theorist discussed who described the impact of 
72

aviation upon troop movements. His belief that the presence of aviation 

would force armies to limit their movements to hours of darkness is exactly in line with the students’ position. The only difference between the 

two is on the student focus on elimination of animal-drawn transport. 

Regarding doctrine, as both the FSR and the TR placed emphasis on the 

need to conduct movements under cover of darkness to avoid detection 

and attack by enemy aircraft, the doctrine and the student perceptions 

were also nearly identical. 

Coast Defense

Just as some of the students discussed the impact of aviation on 

military movements on land, so too did some discuss the role they felt 

Army aviation would play in movements at sea, specifically in vicinity 

of the coastlines. Although only a few students addressed coast defense, 

those who did were quick to identify both the risks posed by hostile aviation actions against the United States or its overseas possessions and 

the key role of friendly aviation in opposing any attempted invasion of 

the same. Regarding the risks, Major Ira Hill, CAC, and Captain Robert 

Olds, AC, stated that in any future operation undertaken by a foreign 

power against the United States, carrier-based aviation represented a 

significant risk to established defenses.92 To counter these risks, the 

students stressed the necessity of aerial reconnaissance to locate approaching enemy vessels. Captain Olds and Captain Edmund Hill, AC, 

wrote that airships, particularly due to their range and station time, were 

ideal for the conduct of such reconnaissance.93 Students anticipated that 

heavier-than-air observation aviation might become suitable for the 

role given increased range through technological developments.94 Students also wrote that once observation detected an enemy naval force, 

it became the role of bombardment to destroy the enemy ships, pursuit 

to defeat enemy aircraft in flight, and attack to destroy enemy landing 

forces either ashore or in their transports.95 Additionally, Majors Richard Gibson and Ira Hill, both of CAC, argued for a sufficient number 

of land-based antiaircraft defenses organized under the Coast Artillery 

to defend against enemy aircraft.96 Of course, it is not surprising that 

two CAC officers argued that Air Corps assets fall subordinate to their 

branch rather than CAC assets subordinate to the Air Corps. Ultimately, 

the effectiveness of such antiaircraft defenses employed for coast defense was subject to the same student debates on pursuit and antiaircraft 

artillery effectiveness. 

While most of the student positions on aviation and coastal defense are relatively generic, some of the students made very specific 
73

observations and conclusions over the link between aviation and coastal 

defense. The last topic of this chapter explores some of those observations and conclusions due to the degree to which they foreshadowed 

the events to come at Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941. However, the 

broad opinion of the students of the risks from and defensive power of 

aviation in coastal defense remained fixed.

With respect to coastal defense, only Mitchell and TR 440-15 made 

any significant mention of the part which aviation plays. Citing the tests 

of aircraft against ships he led in the early 1920s, Mitchell concluded in 

his work that airpower dominates sea power. Based on Mitchell’s statements on the topic in Winged Defense, it is clear that student perceptions 

on the integration of aviation - at least attack and bombardment - into 

coastal defense largely matched Mitchell’s with the probable exception 

of the role of antiaircraft defenses. As to the doctrine, the TR also emphasized the value of aviation to detect and engage enemy shipping in 

conjunction with the Coast Artillery Corps.

Air Superiority

One of the significant areas discussed in both theory and doctrine 

of the period was that of air superiority - the ability to operate friendly 

aircraft free of effective enemy interference. On the subject, although 

a few students pressed the necessity to establish complete air superiority, most argued that complete air superiority was not possible in war 

between like powers. Rather, the predominant view expressed by the 

students was that only local air superiority is possible and even that 

only for a limited duration. 

Arguing that complete air superiority was possible, Major Vincent 

Dixon, AC, wrote, “all air force operations should be conducted against 

the hostile air force, in the air and on the ground, its bases and sources 

of supply; until ‘air superiority’ has been attained and its retention assured.”97 Only once this was complete, he argued, should the air force 

shift to attacks against other targets.98 Captain Asa Duncan, AC, and 

Major Charles Oldfield, AC, expressed a similar viewpoint. Each argued that the first mission for an air force at the start of a conflict had to 

be the enemy’s air force.99 Yet, both Duncan and Oldfield, despite advocating that air superiority was the most important mission, acknowledged that actually achieving such superiority would prove difficult.100

The majority of students argued that the difficulty of establishing 

air superiority restricted air superiority to limited areas and for limited 

periods within those areas. On this point, Captain St. Clair Streett, AC, 
74

wrote that, “no matter how overwhelming the air force of a belligerent 

may be, it cannot wholly prevent hostile air mobility, unless the enemy’s air force is completely destroyed.”101 Yet, students largely did not 

believe that the complete destruction of an enemy’s air force was likely, 

at least not until a significant amount of time after the start of hostilities. 

Because students expected air forces to target each other early in hostilities, they argued in favor of dispersion of air force assets well to the 

rear of the front lines to prevent significant losses from any one enemy 

attack.102 The dispersion of the air forces of both sides in positions well 

behind the front, while necessary for protection, also limited the depth 

those air forces could reach over enemy territory.103 This, the students 

argued, forced the fight for air supremacy to the skies between those 

bases, a fight in which control of the skies would frequently change 

hands since neither side could force a decisive commitment from the 

other.104

Even though students expressed beliefs that absolute air supremacy 

was not realistic, they firmly believed that local supremacy was possible. Major Henry Miller, AC, argued that establishing local air supremacy merely required application of the age-old principles of mass and 

economy of force.105 From his perspective, a friendly air force could establish air supremacy over a certain area by massing its pursuit aircraft 

there, while ceding supremacy in other areas through economy of force 

operations.106 According to another student, massing of air power to establish local air superiority was comparable to how a navy temporarily 

controls a portion of the seas without first destroying the entire enemy 

fleet.107 Ultimately, the back and forth struggle for air supremacy was, 

according to Streett, determined by the nation which could produce 

more aircraft and conduct better pilot training - a process which would 

not come into play until the late stages of a war.108

On the subject of air superiority, the theorists appear to fit into one 

of two categories - those who felt total air superiority was possible and 

those who believed superiority was limited in both time and space. 

Douhet, Mitchell, and Hart clearly believed in the former, while Sherman, “Squadron Leader,” and, to a limited extent, Ashmore agreed with 

the latter. Based on this, the majority of the interwar students aligned 

themselves with the theorists advocating limitations on the ability to air 

superiority. On doctrine, the FSR and the TR both stated that air superiority was an essential role of the Air Corps, in that it affected the ability 

of other arms to perform effectively. While the value of air superiority 

written in doctrine is similar to the students’ position, the absence of a 
75

statement in doctrine on the ability to achieve and maintain that superiority was a notable difference when compared to the student papers.

Aviation in Small Wars and Outlying Ideas

Up to this point, each of the topics discussed in this chapter closely 

match topics that existed within the period doctrine and theory. These 

common links between the papers, the doctrine, and the theories allow 

for comparison between student ideas and the intellectual environment 

of the period in which they wrote. Yet some of the ideas expressed in 

the student papers do not lend themselves to such comparison. Several 

papers, either in whole or in part, included either new ideas or discussed 

post-World War I application of airpower in ways that do not fit with the 

employment of airpower described in theory or doctrine. These ideas 

are included in this chapter not because they provide a means to compare student opinions to theory and doctrine, but rather because those 

ideas are demonstrations of a student population that considered and 

analyzed a wide range of ideas. What follows is a brief exploration of 

these ideas, focusing on student perceptions of aviation in small wars 

as well as outlying ideas that were forward thinking, fanciful, or foreshadowing. 

Starting with the subject of small wars, even though there was not 

major conflict between world powers in the years between the world 

wars, there were a number of small wars in places such as Iraq, Nicaragua, and North Africa. While most of the interwar CGSS students did 

not consider the role of aviation in those wars, three students devoted 

either all of their paper or a large portion of their paper to the topic. The 

papers by Captain William Evans, USMC, and Captain Earl DeFord, 

AC, focused solely on aviation in small wars while a third by Major 

William Lynd, AC, referenced events of the small wars in a broader 

discussion of air transportation.109 Between these papers, the consensus 

was that aviation played an indispensible role in successful conduct 

of counter-guerilla operations particularly through supply, evacuation, 

observation, and attack.

Regarding supply and evacuation in small wars, Evans pointed out 

that transportation aviation proved particularly useful, as it often was 

the only reliable link between geographically separated units. When 

friendly forces dispersed over large areas as was common during counter-guerrilla operations, he argued that aviation not only allowed resupply of those forces, but it also allowed reinforcement or evacuation of 

personnel as required.110 To support this viewpoint, he highlighted the 
76

significant role which aviation played in the supply of Marine forces 

deployed to Nicaragua. In that operation several Marine detachments 

in the northern portions of the country were entirely or primarily supplied by aviation, and the Marines used aircraft to evacuate troops from 

those outposts.111 DeFord supported this viewpoint through acknowledgement that during their campaign in Morocco, the French made 

extensive (and successful) use of transport aircraft to deliver supplies 

and evacuate their wounded. By doing so, the French increased their 

capabilities and decreased the number of soldier deaths.112 Lynd wrote 

extensively of British experiences with aviation in small wars. He noted 

that in response to a crisis in the summer of 1932, the British flew an 

entire battalion from Egypt to Baghdad and returned the battalion to 

Egypt by air once the crisis abated.113 Regarding the value of aviation 

to support troops on the move, Lynd also described the British use of 

transports and parachute loads to resupply a column of 1000 British 

Soldiers on a march of some 150 miles in vicinity of Peshawar.114

On observation and attack, both DeFord and Evans made it clear 

that both aviation mission types had incredible value in the conduct 

of small wars. To make the argument, DeFord focused on the actions 

of those mission types in Morocco, Libya, and Nicaragua. Regarding 

Morocco, he pointed out that the French were able to use attack aircraft 

to locate concentrations of Rif forces and subsequently inflicted significant casualties. These casualties ultimately forced the Rifs to switch to 

night movements and disperse during the day, thereby reducing their effectiveness.115 DeFord presented a similar take on Italian actions in Libya in that Italian observation aircraft scouted for enemy concentrations 

and, when located, radioed for attack or bombardment aircraft to execute an attack on the enemy.116 Additionally, he noted the Italian use of 

aircraft in what was, essentially, a screen for ground movements. Italian 

pilots observed the route of march of friendly ground forces through the 

desert and informed those forces of impending hazards.117 Evans mirrored this emphasis on the value of observation. He noted that the difficult terrain in Nicaragua significantly limited ground observation, making aerial observation the best means of detecting enemy forces.118 Such 

was the effectiveness and value of aviation that, according to Evans, 

Marine patrols frequently requested aerial escort during movements.119

Both Evans and DeFord also advocated for aviation’s ability to conduct 

independent missions during counter-guerilla operations when the risks 

of employing ground forces were simply too high. Each student cited a 

situation where approximately 1,000 Sandino forces concentrated in a 
77

fortified position on Chipote Mountain in Nicaragua - a position ground 

forces could not successfully attack. The Marines attacked the fortified 

position with four aircraft and caused the defenses to collapse.120

Taken as a whole, the opinions of Evans, DeFord, and Lynd presented a view that aviation could significantly alter the course of counter-guerilla operations. The value of aviation in such campaigns was 

well-summarized by DeFord who concluded the speed and economy of 

aviation forces relative to ground forces combined with the ability of 

aviation to allow a smaller ground force to defeat a larger ground force 

meant that, “there is no substitute for aviation in guerilla warfare.”121

Turning now to those ideas that were forward thinking in nature, 

the papers contained a number of indications that students paid attention to technological developments and were interested not merely in 

what was, but also what could be. One such student, Captain George 

Johnson, AC, wrote his entire 1935 paper on the military uses of radio aided navigation - at the time a technology still in its infancy. He 

pointed out that the Air Corps was experimenting with the use of radio signals to provide aircraft with approach and departure procedures 

during periods of poor weather.122 He subsequently concluded that the 

demands of the Air Corps to operate under adverse weather meant that 

radio aided navigation would be essential to the Air Corps in the future, and all military aircraft should be equipped with radio navigation 

equipment.123 Another paper authored by Major Louis Bourne, USMC, 

in 1932 emphasized the potential value of radio-controlled airplanes as 

flying torpedos able to strike enemy fleets using radio direction finders.124 This idea rests somewhere as a precursor to modern precision 

anti-ship munitions and resembles ideas attempted in World War II to 

strike targets with explosive-laden remote controlled planes. A final, 

rather forward-looking paper from 1936 focused on the role of modern 

communications in cavalry raids. In his paper, Captain George Palmer, 

AC, contemplated the potential value of television in reconnaissance. 

He cited General Harbord’s statement that, “There still will be nothing 

new in the principle of using every possible means of communication 

if the day comes when the perfected television flashes to our armies the 

exact appearance of enemy territory or ‘no mans land’ as seen by an 

‘electric eye’ from an unmanned airplane guided by remote control.”125

On the fanciful front, only one paper really stands out. Writing in 

1931, Captain Edmund Hill, an Air Corps airship pilot, focused extensively on his perceptions of the important place airships should play in 

the future of the Air Corps.126 Were such perceptions limited to the use 
78

of airships for coastal observation or of balloons for battlefield observation, his writing would not stand out. However, he went notably further, 

arguing that technological advances would allow for airships capable 

of lifting over 400 tons of cargo, making them extremely valuable as 

both transports and as flying aircraft carriers.127 While the idea of using 

airships to launch and recover aircraft or transport supplies was not new 

(he discussed experiments from the 1920s), Hill’s take on airship aircraft carriers was fanciful in its scale.128 The visions of massive airships 

were based on his assumptions of what technology would allow rather than source materials indicating feasibility to engineer airships with 

significantly greater lifting capacity than those in service at the time. 

Hill also stated that the increased range of artillery was limiting the effectiveness of ground observation and necessitated significant roles for 

observation balloons on the battlefield.129 Overall, his paper represents 

one blatantly focused on self-interest given his background as an airship pilot and largely disconnected from the realities of his time.

The final outlying ideas are those that foreshadowed events to come 

- in this case, foreshadowing the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. Writing in 1933, Captain Fenton Epling, CAC, predicted that a relatively 

small force from a “sufficiently centralized, autocratic, and Machiavellian government” or an “Asiatic Power” could cause significant damage to Manila, Oahu, and other Pacific bases through surprise attack.130

Again foreshadowing the events of 1941, Captain Robert Olds, AC, 

argued extensively for aircraft or airship reconnaissance of those areas 

some 500-600 miles from shore.131 He calculated that it was essential 

to detect enemy aircraft carriers by dusk 500 miles out. Failure to do 

so would mean a carrier force could transit undetected some 300-400 

miles under cover of darkness and be in position to launch a surprise 

attack at dawn with minimum risk to the carrier force.132 However, Olds 

was not the only one concerned with surprise attack. Captain Charles 

Banfill, AC, discussed joint maneuvers in which a carrier aviation force 

launched a surprise attack against Hawaii on the morning of Sunday, 7 

February 1932 resulting in the (notional) destruction of the entire defending Army Air Corps force as well as significant (notional) damage 

to ammunition depots, hangars, barracks, and rail centers.133 While the 

actual events prior to and on 7 December 1941 are well studied, these 

papers demonstrate that at least some of the interwar Leavenworth students were aware of and concerned about the risks of a surprise attack 

against the United States.
79

Summary of Student Perceptions and Conclusions

To summarize the positions of the interwar CGSS students, their 

works, taken as a whole, stated the following:

1. Bombardment was the best striking arm to achieve results against 

the enemy’s means and will to resist; however, bombers often lacked 

accuracy and enemy pursuit and antiaircraft defenses posed risks to 

bomber formations. 

2. Pursuit, when properly deployed and with sufficient warning, 

was a capable means of defense against bombers and other aircraft although to a more limited degree at night. Students disagreed on whether 

or not such warning could in fact occur.

3. Ground-based antiaircraft defenses, while less effective at downing aircraft than pursuit, still posed a significant risk to enemy aircraft. 

This risk was present, but reduced when defending tactical and operational level targets. In addition, demand for antiaircraft protection 

would always exceed available means, requiring tough choices on what 

to protect. In order to maximize the effectiveness of limited resources, 

students argued the military should establish a centralized command 

with authority over the guns, in control of intelligence, and closely tied 

in with pursuit aviation.

4. The proper use of attack aviation was to target enemy air force 

ground facilities, lines of communication, and other areas of concentration. Use of attack aviation against troops in forward areas was of 

debatable effectiveness.

5. There was universal acceptance that observation aviation represented an indispensible tool for commanders to determine the strength 

and disposition of enemy forces.

6. Ground forces should conduct the majority of movement under cover of darkness, during poor weather, or when operating with 

friendly local air superiority. Additionally, the army should replace 

animal-drawn transport with motorized transport to maximize rate of 

march during the limited periods of reduced enemy air capability.

7. Enemy aviation posed the greatest threat to coastal defense and 

friendly aviation played an essential role in countering that threat.

8. Air superiority, while an important function of an air force, was 

unlikely to be total in conflicts between like powers. Rather, belligerent 

parties in war would exchange control of the air in a back and forth 
80

struggle, with each side able to establish local air supremacy over limited areas for limited periods. 

9. In small wars, aviation was vital for supply and evacuation of 

troops while observation and attack aircraft could locate and engage 

enemy concentrations more effectively, faster, and with less risk than 

ground engagements. 

From this chapter, it should be clear that the students were keenly 

aware that strengths in one area represented weaknesses in another, and 

conversely that weaknesses in one were strengths of another. Although 

they made it clear that aviation had changed aspects of the conduct of 

warfare, their views suggest that the balance between aviation forces 

would make the much-desired objective of air supremacy elusive. Given a perceived inability to achieve complete air superiority combined 

with limitations on the capabilities of bombardment and attack in the 

face of air and ground defenses, the student opinions, taken together, 

point to aviation as simply another element of modern warfare. This element was incapable of decisive results on its own in a conflict between 

like powers. This position, the uncertainty whether or not airpower 

could be decisive, largely stands in contradiction to the expressed views 

of Douhet, Mitchell, and Hart while mostly adhering to the ideas of 

Sherman, Ashmore, and “Squadron Leader.” 

Compared to doctrine, the students, in most cases, did not depart 

far from the accepted positions of the Army. One such departure from 

doctrine was student perceptions that pursuit was not just an offensive 

arm, but also could play a key role in defense. Regarding air superiority, 

the difference between doctrine and the students centered on the ability 

to achieve that superiority. The FSR and the TR emphasized the importance of air superiority but did not describe how to reach it; the ACTS 

manuals viewed air superiority as gained through successful offensive 

action. The students perceived superiority as difficult to obtain and generally fleeting in duration. The final difference, and almost certainly the 

most important, was that students were far more open about the use of 

bombardment against cities and civilians. 
81

Notes

1. Annual Report, 1929, 8; Annual Report, 1930, 6; Annual Report, 

1936, 13.

2. Francis M. Brady, “Study of the effect of aviation on the strategical 

and tactical movement of troops” (1931): 9. CGSS Student Papers, 1930-1936, 

Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS. 

Hereafter collection and library information omitted from citations of student 

papers; Harrison H.C. Richards, “ Effect on aerial operation of the greater use 

of night movements by ground troops as a result of development of aircraft,” 

(1930): 27. In his paper, Brady focuses on the impact of bombardment against 

enemy lines of communication, specifically bridges and railroads. Richards 

discusses the use of bombardment against areas of troop concentrations.

3. St. Clair Streett, “What Principles Should Govern the Strategical Employment of the Air Force, With Particular Consideration to the Most Suitable 

Objectives?” (23 March 1934): 70. 

4. Streett, 70-72. 

5. Sam L. Ellis, “The Air Force as the Maneuvering Force in War” 

(1935): 8-9. 

6. John H. Hood, “To what extent should antiaircraft artillery be relied 

upon for the defense of ground troops, cities and fortifications against aircraft” 

(31 May 1932): 6. 

7. Rolla V. Ladd, “Organization of Antiaircraft Artillery in All Echelons” (12 May 1933): 14. 

8. Vincent B. Dixon, “Principles governing the selection of the proper 

air force objectives” (1932): 8-9. 

9. Vernon W. Hall, “Antiaircraft defense of cities and measures that 

should be taken in time of peace in preparation therefor” (1932): 10. 

10. Lawrence F. Stone, “A study of the effect of aircraft on the present 

system of the development and approach march of ground units and the effect 

of aircraft on the present system of supply and transportation” (1931): 3. 

11. Streett, 61. 

12. Brady, 8. 
82

13. Richards, 22; Brady, 10. 

14. Asa N. Duncan, “Operations of the British Aviation, 25 October to 15 

November, 1917” (1931): 5; Delos C. Emmons, “Location of Airdromes with 

Respect to the Front Lines” (23 March 1934): 12. Duncan focuses on using 

masses of bombers to overcome the weakness of limited speed and maneuverability and Emmons expresses his belief that concentration of bombers is likely 

to overcome dispersed pursuit. 

15. Willis H. Hale, “The Role of Air Force in Frontier Defense” (1934): 

8. 

16. C.R. Finley, “To What Extent Should Anti-aircraft Artillery be Relied 

Upon for Defense Against Aircraft of: (a) Cities, (b) Fortifications, (c) Ground 

Troops” (1931): 15; Richards, 33. 

17. William C. Foote, “Antiaircraft Defense of Infantry and Cavalry Divisions” (1 June 1930): 2. 

18. Finley, 5 and 10; Hood, 3; Benjamin F. Harmon, “A Comparison of 

Current American Doctrines as to Antiaircraft Defense with those of the British Army” (1934): 34. 

19. See Appendix B.

20. Benjamin G. Weir, “The Effect of Aerial Operations on the Development and Approach March of Ground Units, and on the location of Supply 

Installations” (31 May 1932): 2.

21. Lawrence P. Hickey, “A Study of the Effect of Increased Speed and 

Armament Developments on the Tactical Employment of Pursuit Aviation” 

(23 March 1934): 19.

22. Emmons, 10-11; Hickey, 1-2 and 17-18.

23. Emmons, 12-13.

24. Hickey, 11.

25. Clarence E. Cotter, “Antiaircraft Defense of the Zone of the Interior” 

(17 June 1930): 11-12.

26. Finley, 2.
83

27. Richards, 23 and 28. Darkness alone was not a major risk factor. Rather the risk came from the combination of limited visibility and poor low-speed 

flight handling characteristics of pursuit aircraft (designed for high-speed maneuver).

28. Richards, 29.

29. Air Service Tactical School, Pursuit (Washington, DC: Government 

Printing Office, 1926), 43.

30. Hall, 15.

31. Cotter, 6.

32. Brady, 10-11.

33. Alva F. Englehart, “To what extent should antiaircraft artillery be relied upon for the defense of ground troops, cities and fortifications against 

aircraft” (3 April 1933): 30-31.

34. Cotter, 8.

35. Streett, 70.

36. Ladd, Rolla, 20; Harmon, 65.

37. Alexander H. Campbell, “The Coordination of Anti-Aircraft Defense 

in the Combat Zone” (1936): 36.

38. Campbell, 37; Hall, 14-15; Foote, 23; Hood, 7.

39. Paul T. Baker, “Infantry Defense Against Aircraft, with Particular Attention to the Receipt and Transmittal to Troops of Warnings of the Approach 

of Hostile Aviation and Including a Comparison of United States and Foreign 

Developments” (1936): 51. Baker argues for the need of ground forces to receive as much notice as possible of inbound enemy aircraft in order to prepare 

defense.

40. Ward E. Duvall, “Antiaircraft defense of cities and measures that 

should be taken in time of peace in preparation therefor” (1932): 8.

41. Baker, 51.

42. Finley, bibliography.
84

43. Hall, 7-8.

44. Christian G. Foltz, “The Positions and Dispositions of Anti-aircraft 

Artillery in Defense of Front-line Troops in the Attack and Defense” (1935): 

5-6.

45. Edward J. Rehmann, “A Study of the Effect of the Development of 

Aircraft on Troop movements and operations, with particular reference to night 

movements” (2 June 1930): 14-15.

46. Finley, 1 and 14.

47. Finley, 21.

48. Cotter,10-11.

49. Foltz, 24.

50. Baker, 49-51.

51. Baker, 18.

52. Hood, 5-6.

53. Henry J.F. Miller, “The Effect of the Development of Aircraft upon 

Troop Movements” (31 May 1932): 5; Stone, 15.

54. Charles Y. Banfill, “The Use of Attack Aviation in Support of Decisive Ground Attack” (March 1936): 10 and 19; Asa N. Duncan, “Defensive 

Power of Unsupported Attack Aviation (Against Pursuit Aviation)” (1931): 1.

55. Banfill, 19; Duncan, “Unsupported Attack Aviation,” 1.

56. Frederick I. Eglin, “A Study: Is attack aviation necessary as a distinct 

type of aviation?” (1932): 4.

57. Eglin, 6-7.

58. Howard C. Davidson, “How Much Delay and Loss can an Attack 

Squadron Inflict on an Infantry Division under varying Conditions” (1935): 6.

59. Baker, 3-5.

60. Baker, 3-5.
85

61. Rehmann, 15.

62. Dayton D. Watson, “The Active Antiaircraft Defense of Troop Movements at Night” (1936): 2.

63. Carl A. Russell, “A study of the effect of the development of aircraft 

upon troop movements, with particular reference to night movements and operations” (1931): 10.

64. Brady, 5.

65. Weir, 8.

66. Baker, 49.

67. Davidson, 20; Baker, 49; Leonard R. Boyd, “Infantry defense against 

aircraft with particular attention to the effect of low-flying attack-aviation on 

foot and motor columns” (1935): 38.

68. Russell, 7.

69. Boyd, 37.

70. Finley, 21.

71. Boyd, 38.

72. Eglin, 12.

73. Eglin, 11.

74. Eglin, 7.

75. Lloyd L. Harvey, “Attack Aviation” (1932): 8.

76. Brady, 4.

77. Stone, 15.

78. Robert M. Bathurst, “Study of the methods of training Air Observers” 

(1932): 1-2.

79. Weir, 6; Miller, 7; Idwal H. Edwards, “Is the Wide Envelopment 

Practicable with Present Day Aviation and Communication Facilities Available 
86

for Intelligence Agencies?” (1935): 11-12; Kenneth H. Walker, “What the 

Ground Forces may Expect of Observation Aviation” (1935): 2-3.

80. Walker, 2-3.

81. George T. Barnes, “The Necessity for Coordination of Reconnaissance Activities of a Cavalry Division--Aviation--Armored Car” (1936): 15; 

Charles M. Robinson, “The Supply of Airplane Bombs in the Theater of Operations” (March 1936): 30.

82. William R. Irvin, “Combined Reconnaissance Operations by Cavalry 

and Aviation” (1934): 23.

83. Richards, 25.

84. Richards, 36.

85. Edwards, 9-10.

86. Brady, 4.

87. Stone, 14.

88. Russell, 11; Edwards, 15-16.

89. Stone, 9; Miller, 5-6.

90. Stone, 14-15; Boyd, 41; Baker, 52.

91. Baker, 50-51; Edwards, 13.

92. Robert Olds, “A Critical Analysis of Air Force Action in Coastal Defense, By Phases” (1935): 3; Ira B. Hill, “The Best Method of Cooperation 

Between the Navy, the Air Corps, and the Coast Artillery in Harbor Defense” 

(1931): 4.

93. Olds, 11-12; Edmund W. Hill, “The Use of Lighter-Than-Air in Future Wars and its Recommended Peace Time Organization” (1931):8.

94. Olds, 34.

95. Olds, 16-17; Richmond T. Gibson, “A study of the best method of 

cooperation between the Navy, the Air Corps, and the Coast Artillery in harbor 

defense” (1930): 5.
87

96. Hill, Ira, 7; Gibson, 3.

97. Dixon, 13.

98. Dixon, 13-14.

99. Duncan, “Operations of the British Aviation,” 5; Charles B. Oldfield, 

“A Study of the Effect of Increased Radius of Action on Air Force Operations” 

(1933): 10.

100. Duncan, “Operations of the British Aviation,” 5; Oldfield, 4.

101. Streett, 70-71.

102. Ellis, 12; Howard A. Craig, “The Supply of Airplane Bombs in the 

Theater of Operations,” (1936): 15.

103. Craig, 11; Streett, 16.

104. Streett, 16.

105. Miller, 8.

106. Miller, 9.

107. Ellis, 11.

108. Streett, 25.

109. William T. Evans, “Task Force and Use of Aviation in Minor Wars” 

(1934); Earl H. DeFord, “A Critical Analysis of Air Operations Since the World 

War” (25 March 1935); William E. Lynd, “Military Air Transport,” (12 May 

1933).

110. Evans, 15.

111. Evans, 15-16.

112. DeFord, 9.

113. Lynd, 4.

114. Lynd, 6.

115. DeFord, 7.
88

116. DeFord, 10-11.

117. DeFord, 10.

118. Evans, 11.

119. Evans, 12-13.

120. Evans, 14; DeFord, 13.

121.DeFord, 14-15.

122. George P. Johnson, “Radio Aids to Air Navigation as it applies to 

Military Operations both Day and Night” (26 March 1935): 14.

123. Johnson, 30-32.

124. Louis M. Bourne, Jr., “Aviation in Coast Defense” (31 May 1932): 1.

125. George M. Palmer, “The Effects of Modern Communications (Radio, 

Airplane etc.) on a Cavalry Raid” (1936): 11.

126. Hill, Edmund, 11.

127. Hill, 8-9.

128. Hill, 5.

129. Hill, 6.

130. Fenton G. Epling, “A Study of Cooperation between Naval, Air, and 

Ground Forces in Coast Defense” (12 May 1933): 16-17. Of note, Epling was 

primarily concerned about raids conducted by actual landing parties, possibly 

supported by carrier-based aviation rather than an air raid alone.

131. Olds, 19.

132. Olds, 19.

133. Banfill, 15-16.
89

Chapter 4

Student Papers and Leavenworth Effectiveness

The previous chapter explored student opinions in relation to period theory and doctrine and concluded that the students’ work, taken as 

a whole, suggests a student body which largely agreed with published 

Army doctrine on the employment of airpower. However, examination 

of student perceptions of airpower relative to theory and doctrine is 

only one aspect of this paper. More important than interwar student 

perceptions is what their papers offer to the ongoing debate over Leavenworth effectiveness during the interwar period. 

Regarding effectiveness of the CGSS during the interwar period, 

chapter 1 reviewed the works of Nenninger, Schifferle, and Muth. Although Nenninger and Schifferle ultimately argued in favor of Leavenworth during the 1920s and 1930s, they acknowledged the existence 

of two major criticisms of the school - criticisms that Muth used to 

argue against the school in his work, Command Culture. The first of 

these criticisms is that the CGSS was ineffective due to a reliance on 

faulty doctrinal principles. This doctrine, the argument goes, was too 

focused on the last war and failed to adequately account for the rapid pace of technological advance following World War I. Additionally, 

Muth argued that the faculty’s rigid adherence to this faulty doctrine 

limited students to solutions in line with doctrine and punished those 

who deviated. It is this supposed rejection of student solutions outside 

of established doctrine that represents the second major criticism of the 

CGSS - that the school’s focus on approved solutions stifled critical and 

creative thinking. 

This chapter applies the study of the student papers to both of these 

criticisms - doctrine and critical thinking. The application ultimately 

determines that the student papers provide mixed evidence regarding 

Leavenworth effectiveness. On one hand, the papers indicate the doctrine was likely appropriate for the time. Given appropriate doctrine 

and general agreement that Leavenworth ensured students knew that 

doctrine, this paper concludes the interwar CGSS was effective at ensuring its graduates entered the Army with a solid basis of doctrinal 

knowledge. On the other hand, a student departing Leavenworth with 

solid knowledge of doctrine is not the same as that student departing 

Leavenworth with improved critical thinking skills. 
90

When viewed in conjunction with annual reports and academic 

schedules, the papers provide indications that the school was willing 

to part with critical thinking development, in the form of writing, in favor of increased classroom instruction. Whether or not this institutional 

preference for classroom instruction reduced the school’s effectiveness 

at developing critical thinking comes down to the quality of that instruction. Unfortunately, examination of the papers does not provide 

sufficient clarity on critical thinking during classroom instruction to 

make a clear determination for or against the school’s effectiveness at 

developing critical and creative thinking during the interwar period.

Interwar Doctrine

The first criticism addressed is the notion that a key shortcoming of 

the instruction at Leavenworth during the 1920s and 1930s was heavy 

reliance upon faulty doctrine. No evidence from the study of student papers on airpower topics indicates anything to contradict assertions that 

the school relied heavily upon doctrine. However, the impression from 

the papers is that the students showed the critical thinking skills necessary to arrive at supportable conclusions on the proper employment 

of airpower. As a result, the papers suggest that the airpower doctrine 

was appropriate for the period. Additionally, this section argues that 

even though the doctrine as taught failed to match “the necessities of 

modern war at it was to come” 1 (according to Muth), such failure does 

not make the school’s instruction of that doctrine wrong. To support this 

assertion, this section begins with a review of present understanding of 

the nature of military doctrine with a focus on those factors that influence doctrine development. Following this review, this paper argues 

that because the students’ conclusions closely matched period airpower 

doctrine and they based findings on available history, theory, doctrine, 

technology, and personal experience - the very items that serve as building blocks of doctrine - their conclusions indicate the appropriateness 

of period airpower doctrine. Further, since no events of sufficient significance occurred until the late 1930s to fundamentally alter beliefs 

over existing best practices, this conclusion may well apply to period 

doctrine covering other subjects.

Turning to the nature of doctrine, the current edition of Joint Publication 1-02, The Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines doctrine as: “Fundamental principles by which 

the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support 

of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.”2

 Although this definition highlights that doctrine represents 
91

fundamentals and serves as a guide for action, several notable sources 

argued doctrine is much more than a list of principles or a checklist for 

action. They perceived doctrine as a tangible representation of a system 

of beliefs.3 This system includes what a military force believes about its 

roles and responsibilities, what lessons it believes history demonstrates, 

beliefs about fundamentals derived from the experiences of the institution and its members, and beliefs about present or future capabilities. 

These beliefs all contribute to make doctrine, in the words of Dennis 

Drew and Donald Snow, “what we believe about the best way to do 

things.”4

Because beliefs represent firmly held ideals, the interpretation of 

doctrine as a system of beliefs suggests that once established doctrine 

is not likely to change without something significant occurring to alter perceived best practices. To this point, a recent briefing by the US 

Army Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate stated, “the need to change 

[doctrine] only occurs when we find a better way to do something based 

on experience.”5 While this statement begins to suggest how doctrine 

evolves, the description of doctrine in the British Air and Space Power 

Doctrine manual does an excellent job describing the basis for doctrine and how doctrine changes. That manual highlights doctrine as a 

process in which inputs (national interest, military objectives, threats, 

politics, theory, history, and capabilities) lead to doctrine. This doctrine 

results in certain outputs (notably force structure and training), which 

in turn cause feedback (experiences, current combat, and training requirements). As feedback either validates or refutes doctrinal inputs, 

doctrine adjusts accordingly.6 With each of these sources, occurrence of 

an experience of sufficient significance to alter perceptions is a necessary component to cause changes to doctrine.

The emergence of a vast number of doctrinal manuals in the years 

immediately following the First World War suggest that the war was a 

driving force behind doctrinal revision within the Army. As reference 

material for post-World War I doctrine, Army doctrine writers would 

have undoubtedly had access to all manner of official and unofficial 

histories from World War I and prior, wartime lessons learned, a wide 

range of personal experiences, previous doctrine, foreign source material, and theories from a range of writers including Jomini and Clausewitz. Evidence of such inputs are easily found in the 1923 Field Service 

Regulations, TR 440-15, or any of the other interwar doctrinal manuals 

referenced in chapter 2.7 Yet, according to Schifferle, the doctrine developed by the US Army in the wake of World War I changed little from 
92

1923 through 1940.8 This is in spite of the interwar period involving a 

rapid pace of incremental technological development and the occurrence of a number of small wars, in locations such as Iraq, Nicaragua, 

and Afghanistan. To Muth, this lack of doctrinal advance in the face of 

evidence indicating potential shifts in the conduct of war likely represents a failure to prepare for the next war. However, according to the 

nature of doctrine explored in the preceding paragraphs, the lack of 

doctrinal change could be simply because the events that occurred were 

insufficiently compelling to challenge doctrinal beliefs. If a compelling cause for doctrinal change did not occur, then Muth’s position that 

the doctrine was insufficient for the next war may be irrelevant to the 

debate over CGSS effectiveness. With respect to doctrine used at the 

CGSS, what mattered is not that the doctrine proved correct at a then 

unknown point in the future, rather that it was believed to be appropriate at the time it was taught.

The student papers reviewed for the study support the idea that 

the beliefs contained in interwar Army airpower doctrine were correct 

based on the information available at the time. In order to arrive at the 

conclusions presented in their papers, the students relied on a number 

of sources. Among these was a wide variety of World War I histories 

by American, British, French, and German authors.9 However, the students did not confine their research to history. Much of their research 

relied upon the works of interwar airpower theorists, official reports 

of military operations and tests, board proceedings, military journals, 

aspects of emerging technology, and doctrinal publications.10 This very 

process leaves the impression that the vast majority of the students were 

more than capable of arriving at reasonable and well-supported solutions. Based on that perception of their work, had their analysis of these 

sources resulted in beliefs divergent from period airpower doctrine, 

their research might indicate fault with the doctrine. However, despite 

the wide range of materials the students used to write their papers, their 

conclusions on the proper employment of airpower differed little from 

period doctrine.11 This lack of difference between doctrine and student 

conclusions suggests that they believed the doctrine to be appropriate 

at the time.

While this study confines the comparison of papers to doctrine and 

theory to the subject of airpower, there is strong reason to believe that 

study of student papers on other topic areas would suggest the same 

conclusion of the appropriateness of period doctrine. The absence of 

large-scale combat operations or significantly large peacetime maneuvers 
93

by the US Army through the mid-1930s serves to limit the experience 

base, which could challenge established beliefs over the best way to 

conduct operations. The lack of major military conflict between large 

powers in the interwar period meant there was likely little compelling 

evidence to present a serious challenge to the established beliefs within 

the US Army. While small-scale exercises, advancing technology, or 

influential theories may have hinted that period doctrine would prove 

insufficient in the next war, such events, items, or ideas likely were just 

not enough to put established US Army doctrine to the test and find it 

wanting. This apparent combination of belief in established doctrine 

and absence of convincing evidence contradictory to doctrine suggests 

Leavenworth was correct to rely upon available doctrine for its courses 

of instruction. After all, given a mission to provide graduates capable 

of conducting themselves as key members of division and larger units, 

it was reasonable for Leavenworth to teach its students the established 

doctrinal beliefs of how such units and their associated arms operate.

Critical Thinking at the Leavenworth Schools

Although the student papers suggest that the period doctrine was 

appropriate, criticism of the interwar CGSS also argues that rigid application of that doctrine served to limit the thinking of its students. To 

that end, Muth stated, “to constantly emphasize uniformity in judgment 

in a military school - as was done at Leavenworth - sooner or later 

stifles original and creative thinking.”12 Unfortunately, the content of 

the interwar student papers alone provided little evidence regarding the 

degree of doctrinal rigidity applied within the school. As a result, the 

papers do not directly answer to the broader debate of whether Leavenworth sought “factory products” or students who could find creative 

solutions to problems. Nevertheless, examination of the student papers 

in conjunction with Leavenworth’s annual reports and academic schedules provide indicators of Leavenworth’s priorities regarding critical 

thinking.

For the purposes of this examination, critical thinking shall be considered the process of questioning with a purpose in mind, gathering 

information pertinent to the question, applying interpretation and reasoning to that information, and drawing conclusions which have implications and consequences on the subject examined.13 This examination 

also presumes that there is little dispute over the value of an officer 

corps capable of quality critical thinking or the need to develop and 

practice those skills. 
94

While the student papers indicated varying degrees of proficiency at this reasoning process, the question at hand is not how well the 

students thought through the questions they asked, but whether or not 

Leavenworth encouraged the process. To that end, it is possible to state 

that the CGSS’s requirement that students complete independent research during the second year of the two-year courses demonstrates 

that the school valued time spent practicing and developing critical 

thinking skills. After all, time blocked off for independent research is 

time that could have been dedicated to other courses of study. However, 

this statement may oversimplify the issue. The information gathered for 

this study actually indicates Leavenworth may have sacrificed writing 

- and in such, a form of critical thinking development - for the sake of 

increased graduate production and limited faculty size. To arrive at this 

conclusion the starting point is not the student papers themselves, but 

rather the information contained in the CGSS academic schedules and 

annual reports from the interwar period. 

As discussed in Chapter 1, the CGSS annual reports described a 

number of changes to the Leavenworth curriculum during the interwar 

period. When the course reopened following the end of the First World 

War, it resumed the two-year model that was in place prior to the war. 

This two-year model was really two one-year courses. In the first year, 

officers attended the School of the Line, which focused on division 

operations. Selection for subsequent attendance at the General Staff 

School was, in theory, based on which officers performed best at the 

School of the Line. To address both the need for education of a large 

“hump” of Army officers and to allay concerns over non-selection for 

the General Staff School, the Army consolidated the courses into a oneyear Command and General Staff School.14 As the Army moved past 

the “hump” and sought to improve the quality of officer education, it 

returned the course to a two-year program beginning with students who 

entered the school in 1928. Unlike the previous two-year program, in 

the new format all students attended both years unless they failed to 

meet course standards. 15 When students entered the CGSS in fall of 

1935, the course once again returned to a one-year format in order to 

maximize the number of graduates.16 What is important to the debate 

on critical thinking at Leavenworth is not that the course format 

changed, rather two key factors identifiable within that change. The 

first of these factors, and the one already discussed, is that the need 

for officer production was the primary driving force behind changes 

to course duration. The second factor, and the point of consideration 
95

for the remainder of this section, is the aspects of the curriculum that 

differed as the format changed.

Given that the primary focus of this study is the interwar student 

papers, the writing requirements of the various iterations of the interwar CGSS are a natural starting point for examination of the changes 

in curriculum. Other than two-year courses from 1928-1936, a review 

of available academic schedules and annual reports from 1919 through 

1936 indicates that only one additional course mandated individual research and writing of any significance.17 The academic schedule for the 

1920-1921 General Staff School shows that students were required to 

complete three monographs.18 The first was to be an independent work 

of between 3,000 and 10,000 words covering a topic of importance to 

the student. The second, 6,000 to 15,000 words analyzing a US division or corps action in 1918 or the Battle of Verdun in 1916. The final 

monograph was a group paper on United States military geography.19

Interestingly, while the post-World War I General Staff School operated from 1919 through 1923, only those students in attendance for the 

1920-1921 were subject to the monograph requirement.20

No clear statements describe why the school dropped the monographs for subsequent iterations of the General Staff School, but indications suggest it may have been the result of insufficient faculty. 

To this point, Leavenworth began the 1920-1921 academic year with 

31 instructors for 150 students (94 in the School of the Line and 56 in 

the General Staff School).21 The following year’s courses hosted a total 

of 272 students with 197 in the first year course and 75 in the second 

year course. This near doubling of the student population took place 

with only a 50 percent increase in instructors.22 This ratio of students 

to instructors at Leavenworth remained in excess of 5:1 for the 1922-

1923 academic year.23 By comparison, from 1920 to 1939 the student 

to instructor ratio at ACTS, which all interwar Army Air Corps officers 

attended prior to CGSS, never exceeded 2.5:1.24 Since evaluation of papers covering a wide range of different topics with different conclusions 

potentially represents a more difficult task than evaluation of works on 

the same topic for which there is a doctrinal solution, the shifting student to instructor ratio was a possible factor in the decision to eliminate 

the monograph requirements.25

Regarding other changes to curriculum, the academic schedules 

of the General Staff School show that when the school eliminated 

student monographs - exercises in critical thinking - it maintained 

approximately the same number of map problems while also reducing 
96

non-classroom instruction. The 1920-1921 class included a total of 

46 map problems and 36 blocks of non-classroom instruction (terrain 

exercises or tactical rides).26 For 1921-1922, the schedule had 48 map 

problems with only 24 terrain exercises or tactical rides.27 The 1922-

1923 General Staff School instruction included 43 map problems and 

17 terrain exercises or tactical rides.28 This shift away from writing and 

non-classroom instruction without a notable change in the number of 

map problems provides indications about the priorities for instruction 

at the school. If map problems and classroom instruction were indeed 

the creativity stifling experiences Muth argues, prioritization of those 

problems over other forms of instruction would show an institution 

less suited to developing and practicing critical thinking in its students. 

Conversely, if Schifferle is correct that the problems challenged students 

to arrive at independent, well-reasoned solutions to map problems, then 

the preference given to classroom instruction may not indicate lack of 

focus on critical thinking development. 

Returning to the overall focus for this section, whether or not the interwar courses at Leavenworth encouraged critical thinking, the available information returns a mixed verdict. Since the school included individual research in the curriculum for eight of its interwar courses, this 

suggests school leadership placed value on the critical thinking process. 

However, the fact that school leadership allocated the available time 

to other methods of instruction during the other 21 courses from 1919 

through 1936 might overshadow that positive mark. Also potentially 

speaking against the school, there is a notable correlation between the 

Army’s desire for increased graduate production and the presence or 

absence of writing requirements.29 While these factors point toward 

the school placing less value on writing requirements than doctrinal 

instruction, they do not touch on the conduct of the doctrinal instruction 

(most notably the map problems). As a result, examination of the student papers cannot counter criticisms that the school was more interested in student adherence to doctrine than critical thinking, particularly in 

graded map problems. Adequately addressing that criticism requires examination of the doctrinal instruction. Of course, such examinations by 

Nenninger, Schifferle, and Muth have intensified rather than resolved 

debate.

Conclusions on Interwar CGSS Effectiveness

This chapter focused on two key criticisms of the instruction at 

Leavenworth during the interwar period. First, that the school was ineffective due to a reliance on faulty doctrinal principles. Second, that 
97

by rejecting student solutions that contradicted established doctrine, 

Leavenworth stifled rather than developed critical thinking amongst its 

students. On doctrine, the close match between interwar US Army doctrine and the solutions contained within the student papers suggests the 

doctrine was not wrong, even if the doctrine proved inappropriate at the 

outbreak of World War II. If the interwar doctrine was appropriate for 

the time, then Leavenworth, as a key component of officer education 

would have been wrong if it did not teach that doctrine. There is, of 

course, no suggestion in available literature that the school failed to 

instruct students on period doctrine. Indeed the criticism of the school 

is the opposite - that it overemphasized doctrine. As a result, this study 

concludes that Leavenworth was effective at ensuring its graduates 

understood US Army doctrine - doctrine that was appropriate for the 

time. 

Unfortunately, effectiveness at doctrinal instruction may have come 

at the expense of critical thinking development. Even though the papers 

examined in this study displayed critical thinking, the requirement to 

produce papers during the interwar courses was the exception rather 

than the norm. Although Leavenworth’s apparent preference for doctrinal instruction over writing suggests the school may not have given 

priority to critical thinking development, it is not reasonable to label 

Leavenworth as ineffective at critical thinking development on that basis alone. Ultimately, the Leavenworth’s effectiveness at critical thinking development comes down to the ongoing debate over classroom 

instruction and the rigidity of doctrinal application through school solutions.

Application to the Modern CGSS

Even though this study returned mixed results on the effectiveness 

of the Leavenworth schools during the interwar period, the information 

still has applicability to the debate over the present-day CGSS. The 

interwar CGSS existed at a time during which circumstances served to 

pressure the CGSS to increase graduate production. When pressured 

for increased production, when faced with limited resources (faculty 

in particular), or both, the school dropped writing requirements from 

the curriculum in favor of increased classroom instruction. Although 

those actions do not mean that the school was unconcerned with critical 

thinking development, dropping exercises that supported critical thinking development in favor of classroom instruction of questionable value 

at the same indicates a potential weakness of the interwar institution.
98

From that, the lesson for the modern CGSS is not that it should 

focus on writing or that time spent in the classroom does not promote 

critical thinking development. Rather, the takeaway from the interwar 

experience is that the school must ensure that whatever the driver of 

changes to curriculum, those courses which remain should not sacrifice 

critical thinking. Given the combination of Army downsizing, limitations on resources, and reductions in the number of attendees at the 

resident CGSS, now may be the ideal time for the school to ensure its 

curriculum promotes critical and creative thinking rather than graduates 

who are factory products.

Recommendations for Further Study

This study originated from a recommendation to seek out information residing in the hundreds of research papers authored by Leavenworth students during the 1930s. From that recommendation, research 

focused on an examination of the differences between student perceptions of airpower and interwar airpower doctrine and theory. As more 

information was uncovered during the course of that research, the scope 

of the study expanded to the debate over effectiveness of the Command 

and General Staff School. Yet, this expansion also brought to light a 

number of related items worthy of additional research that, unfortunately, did not fit within the constraints of available time and intended 

scope of this study. What follows are recommended areas for additional 

research. 

1. A number of student research papers cover motorization, mechanization, tanks, and other topics related to technologies emerging 

during the interwar period. Research into student opinions on those 

topics could provide valuable information or insights. This includes 

whether or not those students appeared to agree with period doctrine as 

this paper speculates they would. 

2. Whether or not clear linkages exist between opinions expressed 

by a student in his paper and later actions held by that student, particularly during World War II. 

3. Examination into the historical ratios of students to instructors 

at Leavenworth and the apparent effect of those ratios on the quality of 

instruction, if any. Such study could also extend to other Army schools.
99

Notes

1. Jörg Muth, Command Culture (Denton, Texas: University of North 

Texas Press, 2011), 126.

2. US Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of 

Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, (15 Mar 2014), 95, 

http://www.dtic.mil/ doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf (accessed 7 April 2014).

3. Aaron P. Jackson, The Roots of Military Doctrine (Fort Leavenworth, 

KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2013), 6, http://usacac.army.mil/Cac2/

cgsc/carl/ download/csipubs/RootsOfMilitaryDoctrine.pdf (accessed 8 April 

2014); U.K. Ministry of Defense, Army Doctrine Primer, AC 71954 (May 

2011), iii and Part I Title Page, https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/33693/20110519ADP_Army_Doctrine_

Primer pdf.pdf (accessed 7 April 2014); U.S. Department of Defense, Joint 

Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (25 Mar 

2013), I-1, http://www.dtic.mil/ doctrine/new_pubs/jp1.pdf (accessed 7 April 

2014).

4. Dennis M. Drew and Donald M. Snow, Making Strategy: An Introduction to National Security Processes and Problems (Maxwell Air Force 

Base, Alabama: 1988), 163. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA422016 (accessed 9 April 2014).

5. US Army Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, “Doctrine Development Philosophy and Practice,” August 2008 (Slides used as part of a presentation to the CGSS Class 14-01 Art of War Scholars Program in 2014), Slide 21.

6. UK Ministry of Defense, The Air Staff, British Air and Space Power Doctrine, AP 3000, 4th ed., 3.11.4. http://www.raf.mod.uk/rafcms/mediafiles/9E435312_ 5056_A318_A88F14CF6F4FC6CE.pdf (accessed 07 April 

2014).

7. War Department, Field Service Regulations (1923) (Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1924); War Department, Training Regulation 

440-15, Fundamental Principles for the Employment of the Air Service (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1926), http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/

awcgate/ documents/tr440-15.htm (accessed 1 January 2014).

8. Peter J. Schifferle, America’s School for War, (Lawrence, KS: The 

University of Kansas Press, 2010), 98-99 and 192-193.

9. See Appendix E.
100

10. See Appendices E, F, G, and H.

11. See Chapter 3.

12. Muth, Command Culture, 190.

13. Richard Paul and Linda Elder, The Miniature Guide to Critical Thinking, 4th ed. (The Foundation for Critical Thinking, 2006), 4-7.

14. Annual Report, 1923, 7.

15. Annual Report, 1929, 8.

16. Annual Report, 1936, 13. The commandant stated that the Army 

needed to make clear the true intent of the school. If the point was to produce 

the largest number of graduates he stated that the one-year format could do 

so. However his words clearly indicate that he was in favor of more selective 

instruction of the best officers through a return to a two-year format.

17. Statement based upon a full review of all available Annual Reports, 

1920 through 1936, Leavenworth Course Schedules, 1919 through 1937, and 

available student papers. Refer to the bibliography for complete citations of 

all Annual Reports and Course Schedules consulted in this study. Complete 

schedules were not located for the following courses: School of the Line, 1919-

1920 and 1920-1921; One-year CGSS, 1926-1927, 1935-1936; Two-year 

CGSS, 1931-1932 (both courses), 1934-1935 (both courses), and 1935-1936 

(second year).

18. The US Army, the General Service Schools, Course for the General 

Staff School, 1920-1921 (26 June 1920), 16 and 19, Adobe pdf provided by 

the Combined Arms Research Library. Hereafter, references to Leavenworth 

academic course schedules cited as abbreviated course title, Schedule, year, 

and page(s) if applicable. In this format, this citation reads: GSS Schedule, 

1920-1921, 16 and 19.

19. Annual Report, 1921, 20. It must be noted that no evidence was located to prove whether or not these monographs required in the academic schedule were actually written. The Combined Arms Research Library did not locate 

any student monographs on file other than those written from 1930-1936. Additionally, the 1921 Annual Report (written after the 1920-1921 classes ended) 

suggests some students did not complete all requirements due to the need for 

extra instructors at the School of the Line. The report does not state which 

requirements were dropped for those students. On page 20 the report states, 

“The Staff School course for the year 1920-1921 was brought to a successful 
101

conclusion practically as originally planned, those officers who were not called 

on for instruction work taking the entire course in all its details, those required 

to perform instruction work omitting only such portions as were absolutely 

necessary and as interfered with their instruction duties.”

20. GSS Schedule, 1919-20; GSS Schedule 1921-22; GSS Schedule 

1922-23.

21. Annual Report, 1921, 3-5.

22. Annual Report, 1922, 19-22.

23. Annual Report, 1923, 3-5.

24. Robert T. Finney, History of the Air Corps Tactical School 1920-1940

(Washington, DC: Center for Air Force History, 1992), 99-132.

25. On note, when individual research requirements returned to the school 

for the second-year courses which graduated from 1930-1936, the student to 

instructor ratios at Leavenworth were 3.8:1 or less. Ratios for the 1920-1921, 

1921-1922, and 1922-1923 academic years were 4.8:1, 5.8:1, and 5.4:1, respectively. Refer to Appendix I for additional information.

26. GSS schedule, 1920-1921, 3-4.

27. GSS Schedule, 1921-1922, 65-79.

28. GSS Schedule, 1922-1923, 70-84.

29. See table in Appendix I.

103

Appendix A

Air Corps Graduates of the Command and 

General Staff School Two-Year Courses, 1930-1936

CGSS 

Attendance

Name ASTS/ACTS 

Attendance1

Highest 

WWII Rank2

Paper Used in Study

1928-19303 Brett, George H.

Hanley, Thomas J.

Richards, Harrison H.C.

1927-1928

1920-1921

1927-1929

LTG

COL

COL

Yes

No - Paper on unrelated topic

Yes

1929-19314 Ballard, Richard H.

Brady, Francis M.

Connell, Carl W.

Duncan, Asa N.

Hill, Edmund W.

Lackland, Frank D.

Peabody, Hume

Rudolph, Jacob H.

Stone, Laurence F.

1927-1928

1922-1923

1928-1929

1928-1929

1922-1923

1928-1929

1928-1929

1928-1929

1927-1928

COL

BG

BG

BG

MG

BG

BG

BG

Died in 1940

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No - Paper on unrelated topic

No - Paper on unrelated topic

Yes

Yes

1930-19325 Dixon, Vincent B.

Eglin, Frederick I.

Harvey, Lloyd L.

Ladd, Arthur K.

Miller, Henry J.F.

Moore, John I.

Phillips, Charles T.

Stratemeyer, George E.

Weir, Benjamin G.

1928-1929

1929-1930

1925-1926

1929-1930

1929-1930

1929-1930

1921-1922

1929-1930

1929-1930

COL

Died in 1937

Died in 1935

Died in 1935

MG

COL

COL

LTG

BG

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No - Paper on unrelated topic

Yes

No - Paper not on file

Yes

1931-19336 Beam, Rosenham

Bissell, Clayton L.

Cousins, Ralph P.

Duncan, Early E.W.

Lynd, William E.

Oldfield, Charles B.

1922-1923

1920-1921

1930-1931

1925-1926

1923-1924

1930-1931

BG

MG

MG

BG

MG

COL

Yes

No - Paper on unrelated topic

No - Paper on unrelated topic

Yes

Yes

Yes

1932-19347 Adler, Elmer e.

Burwell, Harvey S.

Echols, Oliver P.

Emmons, Delos C.

Ford, Christopher W.

Hale, Willis H.

Hickey, Lawrence P.

Miller, Lester T.

Streett, St. Clair

1931-1932

1931-1932

1931-1932

1931-1932

1922-1923

1927-1928

1931-1932

1930-1931

1925-1926

MG

BG

MG

LTG

LTC

MG

COL

MG

MG

Yes

Yes

No - Paper on unrelated topic

Yes

No - Paper not on file

Yes

Yes

No - Paper not on file

Yes
104

1933-19358 Butler, William O.

Davidson, Howard C.

DeFord, Earl H.

Edwards, Idwal H.

Ellis, Sam L.

Harmon, Hubert R.

Hopkins, Hubert V.

Johnson, George P.

McDonnell, John C.

Morgan, John R.

Olds, Robert

Paul, Frank M.

Smith, Lowell H.

Walker, Kenneth N.

Wooten, Ralph H.

1931-1932

1932-1933

1928-1929

1930-1931

1932-1933

1932-1933

1922-1923

1922-1923

1932-1933

1932-1933

1927-1928

1923-1933

1923-1933

1928-1929

1923-1924

MG

MG

BG

MG

COL

MG

COL

COL

BG

COL

MG

COL

COL

BG

MG

 No - Paper not on file

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No - Paper not on file

No - Paper not on file

Yes

No - Paper not on file

No - Paper not on file

Yes

Yes

Yes

Yes

No - Paper not on file

1934-19369 Banfill, Charles Y.

Barker, John DeF.

Birnn, Roland

Breene, Robert G.

Burt, Byron T.

Craig, Howard A.

Curry, James T.

Hodges, James P.

Johnson, Harry A.

McDaniel, Arthur B.

Meloy, Vincent J.

Palmer, George M.

Ramey, Howard K.

Robinson, Charles McK.

Wash, Carlyle H.

Watson, Dayton D.

1933-1934

1929-1930

1933-1934

1930-1931

1933-1934

1931-1932

1929-1930

1929-1930

1932-1933

1933-1934

1933-1934

1933-1934

1933-1934

1929-1930

1931-1932

1933-1934

BG

BG

COL

MG

COL

MG

LTC

MG

BG

BG

BG

COL

BG

LTC

BG

Died in 1939

Yes

No - Paper not on file

No - Paper not on file

No - Paper not on file

No - Paper not on file

Yes

No - Paper on unrelated topic

No - Paper not on file

No - Paper not on file

No - Paper not on file

Yes

Yes

No - Paper not on file

Yes

No - Paper not on file

Yes

1. Robert T. Finney, History of the Air Corps Tactical School 1920-

1940 (1955; repr., Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998), Appendix.

2. The Adjutant General’s Office, Official Army Register (Washington, 

DC: Government Printing Office, 1946), https://archive.org/ details/

officialarmyregi1946unit (accessed 7 November 2013). Note: The 1946 

Register was the primary source for information on the highest rank attained by 

each officer during World War II. All registers from 1935-1946 were consulted 

to determine those officers who retired or died prior to the end of the war. 

Access to the additional army lists consulted is through the same url as shown 

for the 1946 Register with a different year in place of 1946.

3. Annual Report, 1930, 3-5.

4. Annual Report, 1931, 3-5.

5. Annual Report, 1932, 4-6.

6. Annual Report, 1933, 4-6.

7. Annual Report, 1934, 4-6.

8. Annual Report, 1935, 4-6.
105

9. Annual Report, 1936, 3-5.

107

Appendix B

Non-Air Corps Graduates of the Command and 

General Staff School for Two-Year Courses, 

1930-139, With Papers Used in this Study

CGSS 

Attendance

Name Army Branch or 

Military Service

Highest WWII Rank1

1928-19302 Cotter, Clarence E.

Foote, William C.

Gibson, Richmond T.

Rehmann, Edward J.

Wallington, Edward C.

Coastal Artillery

Coastal Artillery

Coastal Artillery

Infantry

Chemical

COL

COL

COL

COL

COL

1929-19313 Burr, William E.

Finley, C.R.

Hill, Ira B.

Russell, Carl A.

Field Artillery

Coastal Artillery

Coastal Artillery

Infantry

COL

COL

COL

BG

1930-19324 Bathurst, Robert M.

Bourne, Louis M.

Duvall, Ward E.

Hall, Vernon W.

Hood, John H.

Field Artillery

USMC

Coastal Artillery

Coastal Artillery

Coastal Artillery

BG

Unknown

COL

COL

COL

1931-19335 Englehart, Alva F.

Epling, Fenton G.

Ladd, Rolla V.

Coastal Artillery

Coastal Artillery

Coastal Artillery

COL

COL

COL

1932-19346 Evans, William T.

Ford, Elbert L.

Harmon, Benjamin F.

Irvin, William R.

USMC

Ordinance

Coastal Artillery

Cavalry

Unknown

BG

Died in 1936

COL

1933-19357 Boyd, Leonard R.

Foltz, Christian

Infantry

Coastal Artillery

BG

COL

1934-19368 Baker, Paul T.

Barnes, George T.

Campbell, Alexander H.

Shea, George D.

Infantry

Quartermaster

Coastal Artillery

Field Artillery

COL

COL

COL

COL

1. The Adjutant General’s Office, Official Army Register (Washington, 

DC: Government Printing Office, 1946), https://archive.org/details/

officialarmyregi1946unit (accessed 7 November 2013). Note: The 1946 

Register was the primary source for information on the highest rank attained by 

each officer during World War II. All registers from 1935-1946 were consulted 

to determine those officers who retired or died prior to the end of the war. 
108

Access to the additional army lists consulted is through the same url as shown 

for the 1946 Register with a different year in place of 1946.

2. Annual Report, 1930, 3-5.

3. Annual Report, 1931, 3-5.

4. Annual Report, 1932, 4-6.

5. Annual Report, 1933, 4-6.

6. Annual Report, 1934, 4-6.

7. Annual Report, 1935, 4-6.

8. Annual Report, 1936, 3-5.
109

Appendix C

Select List of References Used in the Student 

Papers Consulted for this Study1

Theory

Source Number of Student 

Papers Citing the Source

Air Defence, E.B. Ashmore 11

Air Power and the Cities, J.M. Spaight 2

Air Power and War Rights, J. M. Spaight 1

Air Warfare, William C. Sherman 7

Air Warfare,

2

 Guilio Douhet 3

Basic Principles of Air Warfare, “Squadron Leader” 5

Paris: Or, the Future of War, B.H. Liddell Hart 3

Winged Defense, William Mitchell 1

History

Source Number of Student 

Papers Citing the Source

Allenby’s Final Triumph, W.T. Massey 7

Allenby of Armageddon, Raymond Savage 5

The Defence of London, A. Rawlinson 9

“Final Report of Chief of Air Service, AEF” 6

Five Years in Turkey, Limon von Sanders 5

The German Air Force in the Great War, Georg P. 

Neumann

5

German Air Raids on Great Britain, Joseph Morris 5
110

Germany’s War in the Air, Ernest W. von Hoeppner 7

Der Grosse Krieg, Max Schwarte 6

Ludendorff’s Own Story, Erick Ludendorff 8

The Struggle in the Air, 1914-1918, Charles C. Turner 5

The War in the Air, W. Raleigh (Vol. 1) and H.A. 

Jones (II-VI)

9

Doctrine, Reports, Military Journals, and Official Publication3

Source Number of Student 

Papers Citing the Source

The Air Force, ACTS Manual 8

Attack Aviation, ACTS Manual 12

Bombardment Aviation, ACTS Manual 6

Coast Artillery Journal4 8

Field Service Regulations, US Army Publication 17

“Marching Organization and Air Effectiveness,” 

German Report

5

Observation Aviation, ACTS Manual 5

Tactics and Techniques of the Air Corps, CGSS 

Publication

10

Training Regulation 435-50: Tactical Employment of 

Anti-Aircraft Artillery, US Army Publication

8

1. Data compiled from the bibliographic information listed in each of 

the 69 student papers consulted for this study. References are included on this 

list either due to appearance in at least five student papers or on the basis of the 

prominence of the author from a modern perspective (i.e. Mitchell, Douhet, 

Spaight).
111

2. Students reference a publication produced by the Office of the Chief 

of the Air Corps titled “Air Warfare” by Douhet. This was a translated selection 

of Douhet’s writings most probably from The Command of the Air.

3. Student bibliographies are not always clear as to the date of 

publication when citing various manuals. The total reflects the total number of 

papers that reference the manuals listed, regardless of publication year.

4. Although no single article from the Coast Artillery Journal is 

referenced in more than two papers, a total of 23 articles are cited in eight 

separate papers.

113

Appendix D

Doctrinal References Cited in

Multiple Interwar Student Papers1

Numbers appearing in parentheses indicate the number of papers that 

cite the source.

US Army Regulations

Field Service Regulations, 1923 (17)

Training Regulation (TR) 300-5: Anitaircraft Combat, 1928 (4)

TR 420-130: Infantry, Combat Principles, The Machine Gun 

Platoon

(2)

TR 435-30: Tactical Employment of Anti-aircraft Artillery (8)

TR 440-15: Fundamental Principles for the Employment of the Air 

Service

(2)

ASTS/ACTS Publications

The Air Force Bombardment Aviation

1930 (2) 1927-1928 (1)

1931 (3) 1929-1930 (1)

1934 (1) 1931 (4)

Unknown Year (2) Observation Aviation

Attack Aviation 1930 (3)

1928 (2) 1934 (2)

1929 (1) Pursuit Aviation

1930 (3) 1926 (1)

1933 (1) 1927-1928 (1)

1934 (1) History of the Air Corps

1935 (1) 1927 (4)

Unknown Year (3) Air Logistics, 1935 (2)

Other Publications

Tactics and Techniques of the Air Corps, CGSS Publication

1929 (8)

1935 (3)

Army Extension Course, Air Force, Special Text No. 189 (3)

Training Manual Number 1, The Advanced Flying School, 1926 (2)

Training Manual Number 2, The Advanced Flying School, 1927 (2)
114

1. Data compiled from examination of the bibliographies of the 69 

student papers consulted for this thesis.
115

Appendix E

Historical References Cited in Multiple 

Interwar Student Papers1

Numbers appearing in parentheses indicate the number of papers that 

cite the source.

Air Defence, E.B. Ashmore2 (11)

Allenby’s Final Triumph, W.T. Massey (7)

Allenby of Armageddon, Raymond Savage (5)

L’aviation militaire et la guerre aérienne, Marcel Jauneaud (2)

The Defence of London, A. Rawlinson (9)

“Final Report of Chief of Air Service, AEF” (6)

Five Years in Turkey, Limon von Sanders (5)

The German Air Force in the Great War, Georg P. Neumann (5)

German Air Raids on Great Britain, Joseph Morris (5)

The German General Staff and its Decisions, Erich von 

Falkenhayn

(2)

Germany’s War in the Air, Ernest W. von Hoeppner (7)

Der Grosse Krieg, Max Schwarte (6)

Ludendorff’s Own Story, Erich Ludendorff (8)

The March on Paris, Alexander von Kluck (3)

Mémoires du Général Gallieni, Joseph-Simon Gallieni (3)

Military Operations, France and Belgium, 1914, James E. 

Edmonds

(2)

The Official History of Australia in the War of 1914-1918 (3)

“Organization of the German Air Service,” A.E.F. G.H.Q. (4)

The Palestine Campaigns, Archibald Percival Wavell (4)

The Real War, 1914-1918, B.H. Liddell Hart (4)

The Struggle in the Air, 1914-1918, Charles C. Turner (5)

The War in the Air, W. Raleigh (Vol. 1) and H.A. Jones (II-VI) (9)

1. Data compiled from examination of the bibliographies of the 69 

student papers consulted for this thesis.

2. Based on the organization of the book as both a history of air defense 

efforts in London during World War I and recommendations for the proper 

conduct of air defense, this book is included in this appendix and the theory 

appendix.
116
117

Appendix F

Airpower Theory References Cited in 

Multiple Interwar Student Papers1

Numbers appearing in parentheses indicate the number of papers that 

cite the source.

Aircraft in Warfare, F.W. Lanchester (2)

Air Defence, E.B. Ashmore (11)

Air Power and the Cities, J.M. Spaight (2)

Air Warfare2, Guilio Douhet (3)

Air Warfare, William C. Sherman (7)

Aviation in Peace and War, F.H. Sykes (3)

Basic Principles of Air Warfare, “Squadron 

Leader”

(5)

Paris: Or, the Future of War, B.H. Liddell Hart (3)

The Role of Defensive Pursuit, Claire Chennault (2)

The Strategy and Tactics of Air Fighting, Oliver 

Stewart

(2)

Winged Defense, William Mitchell (1)3

1. Data compiled from examination of the bibliographies of the 69 

student papers consulted for this thesis.

2. Students reference a publication produced by the Office of the Chief 

of the Air Corps titled “Air Warfare” by Douhet. This was a translated selection 

of Douhet’s writings most probably from The Command of the Air. Of note, no 

student references to Douhet occur until the 1934 papers.

3. Although not cited in multiple student papers, Mitchell’s work is 

included on this list due to his prominence within American aviation history.

119

Appendix G

Official Reports and Other Miscellaneous References Cited in 

Multiple Interwar Student Papers1

Numbers appearing in parentheses indicate the number of papers that 

cite the source.

The Air Annual of the British Empire (10)

1929 (2)

1930 (2)

1931-1932 (2)

1933-1934 (3)

1934-1935 (1)

The Air Corps Newsletter (3)

Antiaircraft Defense, The Kirtland Board, 1925 (2)

Coast Artillery Journal (8)

Conference on Antiaircraft Defense, French War Department, 

1923

(5)

Foreign Field Service Regulations (11)

British (3)

French (4)

German (4)

Infantry Defense Against Airplanes (Conference), 1929 (2)

Joint Action of the Army and Navy, The Joint Board, 1927 (4)

Marching Organization and Air Effectiveness, Waldemar Pfeifer (5)

Preparation of Antiaircraft Defense Plans, War Department, Office 

of the Chief of Coast Artillery, July 15, 1928

(2)

Report of Air-Ground Maneuvers, San Antonio, 1927 (4)

Report of Antiaircraft Exercises, Aberdeen Proving Ground (8)

1927 (2)

1928 (3)

1929 (2)

1930 (1)

Report of the President’s Aircraft Board, 1925 (4)
120

1. Data compiled from examination of the bibliographies of the 69 

student papers consulted for this thesis.
121

Appendix H

Air Corps Tactical School Publications and Availability

Items followed with a were cited in interwar student publications.

Items followed with b are known to still exist based on various online 

catalogs.

Items followed with c were able to be accessed for this study.

Bombardment Aviation Attack Aviation

1925b (1 at USAFA) 1925b (1 copy at USAFA)

1926b, c 1928a

1927-1928a 1929a

1929-1930a 1930a, b (1 at USAFA, 1 at Marshall Lib., 1 at UW)

1930b (1 at Arkansas State) 1933a

1931a 1934a

1933b, c 1935a, b (1 copy at the Smithsonian)

1935b, c

Pursuit Aviation Observation Aviation

1925b (1 copy at USAFA) 1930a, b (1 at Sill, 1 at UW)

1926a, b, c 1934a

1927-1928a, b (1 copy at the Smithsonian)

1933b (1 at AHEC, 1 at the Smithsonian) Antiaircraft Defense

1927b, c

The Air Force

1930a Balloons and Airships

1931a, b (1 copy at the Smithsonian) 1932b (1 at CARL closed stacks)

1934a

A Brief history of the Air Corps

1927a Antiaircraft Artillery

1924b (1 at USAFA)

Air Logistics

1935a

123

Appendix I

Interwar Leavenworth Student, Instructor, and 

Graduate Numbers by Academic Year and Course

1919-

1920

1920-

1921

1921-

1922

1922-

1923

1923-

1924

1924-

1925

1925-

1926

1926-

1927

1927-

1928

Students Per Class

School of the Line 99 94 197

General Staff School 49 56 75 111

CGSS (1 year) 154 251 263 248 204 212

CGSS (1st Year)

CGSS (2nd Year)

Annual Student Total 148 150 272 265 251 263 248 204 212

Number of Instructors1 32 31 47 49 72 76 78 59 57

Student:Instructor Ratio 4.6:1 4.8:1 5.8:1 5.4:1 3.5:1 3.5:1 3.2:1 3.5:1 3.7:1

Annual Graduate Production2 82 80 154 261 249 259 245 200 200

1928-

1929

1929-

1930

1930-

1931

1931-

1932

1932-

1933

1933-

1934

1934-

1935

1935-

1936

Students Per Class

School of the Line

General Staff School

CGSS (1 year) 89 122

CGSS (1st Year) 117 126 118 133 121 120 122

CGSS (2nd Year) 112 126 118 125 118 118 122

Annual Student Total 206 238 244 251 246 238 240 244

Number of Instructors1 60 62 69 69 64 63 64 69

Student:Instructor Ratio 3.4:1 3.8:1 3.5:1 3.6:1 3.8:1 3.8:1 3.8:1 3.5:1

Annual Graduate 

Production2

86 109 124 116 125 118 118 242

1. Instructor total does not include positions such as commandant, assistant 

commandant, school directors, secretary, librarian, adjutant, publications, or 

correspondence course leads.

2. Total number of graduates for all courses less those students selected to 

remain at Leavenworth for another year of instruction; for the two-year courses 

of 1928-1936 only graduates of the second year are included.

All data for this appendix was taken from the Command and General Staff 

School Annual Reports from 1920 to 1936. Those reports are accessible 

through the Combined Arms Research Library website. Links to each year’s 

report are listed in the bibliography.

125

Bibliography

Leavenworth Student Papers

1930

Brett, George H. “Should the air corps of the Army and Navy be combined into 

a separate independent department or bureau, or should they continue 

to operate as component parts to the Army and Navy?” 9 June 1930, 

CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library 

Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Cotter, Clarence E. “Antiaircraft Defense of the Zone of the Interior,” 17 June 

1930, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research 

Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Foote, William C. “Antiaircraft Defense of Infantry and Cavalry Divisions,” 1 

June 1930, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Gibson, Richmond T. “A study of the best method of cooperation between the 

Navy, the Air Corps, and the Coast Artillery in harbor defense,” 1930, 

CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library 

Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Rehmann, Edward J. “A Study of the Effect of the Development of Aircraft on 

Troop movements and operations, with particular reference to night 

movements,” 2 June 1930, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Richards, Harrison H.C. “Effect on aerial operation of the greater use of night 

movements by ground troops as a result of development of aircraft,” 

5 June 1930, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms 

Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Wallington, Edward C. “A study of the tactical uses of smoke,” 1930, CGSC 

Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

1931

Ballard, Richard H. “A Study of Commercial Aviation and its Growth,” 25 May 

1931, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research 

Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Brady, Francis M. “Study of the effect of aviation on the strategical and tactical 

movement of troops,” 1931, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
126

Burr, William E. “A Discussion of the All-Purpose gun from a tactical point of 

view,” 12 June 1931, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined 

Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Connell, Carl W. “ Air operations connected with the action of the French 

Tenth Army, 18-23 July, 1918,” 1931, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-

1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Duncan, Asa N. “Defensive Power of Unsupported Attack Aviation (Against 

Pursuit Aviation),” 1931, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

———. “Operations of the British Aviation, 25 October to 15 November, 

1917,” 1931,CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms 

Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Finley, C.R. “To What Extent Should Anti-aircraft Artillery be Relied Upon for 

Defense Against Aircraft of: (a) Cities, (b) Fortifications, (c) Ground 

Troops,” 1931, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined 

Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Hill, Edmund W. “The Use of Lighter-Than-Air in Future Wars and its 

Recommended Peace Time Organization,” 1931, CGSC Student 

Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital 

Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Hill, Ira B. “The Best Method of Cooperation Between the Navy, the Air 

Corps, and the Coast Artillery in Harbor Defense,” 1931, CGSC 

Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library 

Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Rudolph, Jacob H. “A study of the probabilities of developing air transport 

during the next ten years to such an extent as to justify dependence 

upon it as a practical and sole means for use in reinforcing the Canal 

Zone and the Hawaiian garrisons during war,” 1 June 1931, CGSC 

Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library 

Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Russell, Carl A. “A study of the effect of the development of aircraft upon 

troop movements, with particular reference to night movements and 

operations,” 1931, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined 

Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Stone, Laurence F. “A study of the effect of aircraft on the present system of 

the development and approach march of ground units and the effect 

of aircraft on the present system of supply and transportation,” 1931, 

CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library 
127

Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

1932

Bathurst, Robert M. “Study of the methods of training Air Observers,” 1932, 

CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library 

Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Bourne, Louis M. Jr. “Aviation in Coast Defense,” 31 May 1932, CGSC 

Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library 

Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Dixon, Vincent B. “Principles governing the selection of the proper air force 

objectives,” 1932, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined 

Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Duvall, Ward E. “Antiaircraft defense of cities and measures that should be 

taken in time of peace in preparation therefor,” 1932, CGSC Student 

Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital 

Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Eglin, Frederick I. “A Study: Is attack aviation necessary as a distinct type of 

aviation?” 1932, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms 

Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Hall, Vernon W. “Antiaircraft defense of cities and measures that should be 

taken in time of peace in preparation therefor,” 1932, CGSC Student 

Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital 

Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Harvey, Lloyd L. “Attack Aviation,” 1932, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, 

Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS.

Hood, John H. “To what extent should antiaircraft artillery be relied upon for 

the defense of ground troops, cities and fortifications against aircraft,” 

31 May 1932, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms 

Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Ladd, Arthur K. “An estimate of the powers and limitations of commercial 

aviation, in relation to National Defense,” 1932, CGSC Student 

Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital 

Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Miller, Henry J.F. “The Effect of the Development of Aircraft upon Troop 

Movements,” 31 May 1932, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, 

Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS.
128

Phillips, Charles T. “A Study of the Possible Military Uses of Commercial 

Aviation during the Next War,” 20 May 1932, CGSC Student Papers, 

1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS.

Weir, Benjamin G. “The Effect of Aerial Operations on the Development and 

Approach March of Ground Units, and on the location of Supply 

Installations,” 31 May 1932, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, 

Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS.

1933

Beam, Rosenham. “Air Operation in the Palestine Campaign Particularly after the 3rd Battle of Gaza,” 15 May 1933, CGSC Student Papers, 

1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS.

Duncan, Early E.W. “The Duties of a Corps Area Air Officer with Special Reference to the Training of Regular Army and Civilian Components,” 

1933, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research 

Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Englehart, Alva F. “To what extent should antiaircraft artillery be relied upon 

for the defense of ground troops, cities and fortifications against 

aircraft,” 3 April 1933, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined 

Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Epling, Fenton G. “A Study of Cooperation between Naval, Air, and Ground 

Forces in Coast Defense,” 12 May 1933, CGSC Student Papers, 

1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS.

Ladd, Rolla V. “Organization of Antiaircraft Artillery in All Echelons,” 12 May 

1933, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research 

Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Lynd, William E. “Military Air Transport,” 12 May 1933, CGSC Student 

Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital 

Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Oldfield, Charles B. “A Study of the Effect of Increased Radius of Action on 

Air Force Operations,” 1933, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, 

Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS.
129

1934

Adler, Elmer E. “The Influence of Air Forces on River Operations,” March 

1934, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research 

Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Burwell, Harvey S. “The Effect of Coastal Aviation on Strategy,” 1934, CGSC 

Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Emmons, Delos C. “Location of Airdromes with Respect to the Front Lines,” 

23 March 23, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms 

Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Evans, William T. “Task Force and Use of Aviation in Minor Wars,” 1934, 

CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library 

Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Ford, Elbert L., Jr. “The Employment of Antiaircraft Weapons against Ground 

Targets, with Particular Reference to the Defense against Mechanized 

Forces,” 1934, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms 

Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Hale, Willis H. “The Role of Air Force in Frontier Defense,” 1934, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital 

Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Harmon, Benjamin F. “A Comparison of Current American Doctrines as to 

Antiaircraft Defense with those of the British Army,” 1934, CGSC 

Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library 

Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Hickey, Lawrence P. “A Study of the Effect of Increased Speed and Armament 

Developments on the Tactical Employment of Pursuit Aviation,” 23 

March 1934, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Irvin, William R. “Combined Reconnaissance Operations by Cavalry and Aviation,” 1934, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Streett, St. Clair. “What Principles Should Govern the Strategical Employment 

of the Air Force, With Particular Consideration to the Most Suitable 

Objectives?” 23 March 1934, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, 

Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS.

1935
130

Boyd, Leonard R. “Infantry defense against aircraft with particular attention to 

the effect of low-flying attack-aviation on foot and motor columns,” 

1935, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research 

Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Davidson, Howard C. “How Much Delay and Loss can an Attack Squadron 

Inflict on an Infantry Division under varying Conditions,” 1935, 

CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library 

Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

DeFord, Earl H. “A Critical Analysis of Air Operations Since the World War,” 

25 March 1935, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms 

Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Edwards, Idwal H. “Is the Wide Envelopment Practicable with Present Day 

Aviation and Communication Facilities Available for Intelligence 

Agencies?” 1935, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined 

Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Ellis, Sam L. “The Air Force as the Maneuvering Force in War,” 1935, CGSC 

Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital 

Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Foltz, Christian G. “The Positions and Dispositions of Anti-aircraft Artillery 

in Defense of Front-line Troops in the Attack and Defense,” 1935, 

CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library 

Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Johnson, George P. “Radio Aids to Air Navigation as it applies to Military Operations both Day and Night,” 26 March 1935, CGSC Student Papers, 

1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS.

Olds, Robert. “A Critical Analysis of Air Force Action in Coastal Defense, By 

Phases,” 1935, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms 

Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Paul, Frank M. “The Use of Air Transport, Military and Commercial, for the 

Transportation of Ground Troops,” 1 March 1935, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Smith, Lowell H. “How Much Delay and Loss can Attack Aviation Inflict upon 

an Infantry Division under varying Circumstances? The Study to be 

Based on Recorded Firing Tests,” 20 March 1935, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, 

Fort Leavenworth, KS.
131

Walker, Kenneth H. “What the Ground Forces may Expect of Observation Aviation,” 31 March 1935, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined 

Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

1936

Baker, Paul T. “Infantry Defense Against Aircraft, with Particular Attention to 

the Receipt and Transmittal to Troops of Warnings of the Approach 

of Hostile Aviation and Including a Comparison of United States and 

Foreign Developments,” 1936, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, 

Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS.

Banfill, Charles Y. “The Use of Attack Aviation in Support of Decisive Ground 

Attack,” March 1936, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined 

Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Barnes, George T. “The Necessity for Coordination of Reconnaissance 

Activities of a Cavalry Division--Aviation--Armored Car,” 1936, 

CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library 

Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Campbell, Alexander H. “The Coordination of Anti-Aircraft Defense in the 

Combat Zone,” 1936, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined 

Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Craig, Howard A. “The Supply of Airplane Bombs in the Theater of Operations,” 

1936, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research 

Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Meloy, Vincent J. “Class I, II, III and IV Supplies for an Air Force in the Theater 

of Operations,” 26 March 1936, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, 

Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, 

KS.

Palmer, George M. “The Effects of Modern Communications (Radio, Airplane 

etc.) on a Cavalry Raid,” March 1936, CGSC Student Papers, 

1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort 

Leavenworth, KS.

Robinson, Charles M. “Combined Reconnaissance Operations by Cavalry and 

Aviation,” March 1936, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

Shea, George D. “An Investigation of the Advisability of Further Development 

of the ‘All Purpose Gun,’ with a view to its Employment against 

Mechanized Forces, Aircraft, and the usual Ground Targets,” 1936, 

CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms Research Library 

Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.
132

Watson, Dayton D. “The Active Antiaircraft Defense of Troop Movements at 

Night,” 1936, CGSC Student Papers, 1930-1936, Combined Arms 

Research Library Digital Library, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

World War I History

Air Service, A.E.F. “Final Report of Chief of Air Service.” In The U.S. Air 

Service in World War 1, edited by Maurer Maurer, 15-164. Washington, 

DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978.

Hoeppner, Ernest Von. Germany’s War in the Air. Translated by J. Hawley 

Larned. 1921. Reprint, Nashville, TN: The Battery Press, 1994.

Massey, William T. Allenby’s Final Triumph. London: Constable and Company, 

1920.

Raleigh, Walter A. and Henry A. Jones. The War in the Air. 6 vols. Oxford: 

Clarendon Press, 1922-1937.

Rawlinson, Alfred. The Defence of London 1915-1918. London: Andrew 

Melrose, 1924.

Sanders, Limon Von. Five Years in Turkey. Translated by Carl Reichmann. 

Annapolis, MD: The United States Naval Institute, 1927.

Turner, Charles C. The Struggle in the Air, 1914-1918. London: Edward 

Arnold, 1919.

Air Power Development and Theory

Ashmore, Edward. Air Defence. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1929.

Douhet, Giulio. The Command of the Air. Translated by Dino Ferrari. New 

York: Coward-McCann, 1942.

Finney, Robert T. History of the Air Corps Tactical School 1920-1940. 1955. 

Reprint, Air Force History and Museums Program, 1998.

Greer, Thomas H. The Development of Air Doctrine in the Army Air Arm 1917-

1941. 1955. Reprint, Washington, DC, 1985.

Hart, Basil H. Liddell. Paris: Or, The Future of War. London: Kegan Paul, 

Trench, Trubner and Co., 1925.

Holley, Irving B. Ideas and Weapons. 1953. Reprint, Air Force History and 

Museums Program, 1997.

Mitchell, William. Winged Defense. New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 

1925.
133

Sherman, William C. Air Warfare. New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1926.

Squadron Leader [pseud.]. Basic Principles of Air Warfare. London: Gale and 

Polden, 1927.

Interwar Doctrinal Publications

Air Corps Advanced Flying School. Observation. Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1928.

Air Corps Tactical School. Antiaircraft Defense. Washington, DC: Government 

Printing Office, 1927. http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/

collection/p15040coll1/id/ 575 (accessed 9 October 2013).

———. Bombardment. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1933.

———. Bombardment. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1935.

Air Service Tactical School. Bombardment. Washington, DC: Government 

Printing Office, 1926. http://www.idaillinois.org/cdm/

compoundobject/collection/isl8/ id/2326/rec/2 (accessed 7 October 

2013).

———. Pursuit. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1926. http://

www.idaillinois.org/cdm/ref/collection/ isl8/id/2221 (accessed 7 October 2013).

The Command and General Staff School. Tactics and Techniques of the Air 

Corps (tentative). Leavenworth, KS: The Command and General 

Staff School Press, 1935.

War Department. Field Service Regulations (1923). Washington, DC: 

Government Printing Office, 1924.

———. Training Regulation 440-15. Fundamental Principles for the Employment of the Air Service. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1926. http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ documents/tr440-

15.htm (accessed 1 January 2014).

Fort Leavenworth Annual Reports (Arranged by Year)

The General Service Schools. Annual Report of the Commandant. Fort Leavenworth, KS: The General Service Schools Press, 1920. http://usacac.

army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/ download/reports/rep1920.pdf (accessed 26 

September 2013).

———. Annual Report of the Commandant. Fort Leavenworth, KS: The 

General Service Schools Press, 1921. http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/
134

cgsc/carl/download/reports/ rep1921.pdf (accessed 26 September 

2013).

———. Annual Report of the Commandant. Fort Leavenworth, KS: The 

General Service Schools Press, 1922. http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/

cgsc/carl/download/reports/ rep1922.pdf (accessed 26 September 

2013).

———. Annual Report of the Commandant. Fort Leavenworth, KS: The 

General Service Schools Press, 1923. http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/

cgsc/carl/download/reports/ rep1923.pdf (accessed 26 September 

2013).

———. Annual Report of the Commandant. Fort Leavenworth, KS: The 

General Service Schools Press, 1924. http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/

cgsc/carl/download/reports/ rep1924.pdf (accessed 26 September 

2013).

———. Annual Report of the Commandant. Fort Leavenworth, KS: The 

General Service Schools Press, 1925. http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/

cgsc/carl/download/reports/ rep1925.pdf (accessed 26 September 

2013).

———. Annual Report of the Commandant. Fort Leavenworth, KS: The 

General Service Schools Press, 1926. http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/

cgsc/carl/download/reports/ rep1926.pdf (accessed 26 September 

2013).

———. Annual Report of the Commandant. Fort Leavenworth, KS: The 

General Service Schools Press, 1927. http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/

cgsc/carl/download/reports/ rep1927.pdf (accessed 26 September 

2013).

———. Annual Report of the Commandant. Fort Leavenworth, KS: The 

General Service Schools Press, 1928. http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/

cgsc/carl/download/reports/ rep1928.pdf (accessed 26 September 

2013).

The Command and General Staff School. Annual Report of the Commandant. 

Fort Leavenworth, KS: The Command and General Staff School 

Press, 1929. http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/ reports/

rep1929.pdf (accessed 26 September 2013).

———. Annual Report of the Command and General Staff School, Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, 1929-1930. Fort Leavenworth, KS: The 

Command and General Staff School Press, 1930. http://usacac.army.

mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/reports/ rep1930.pdf (accessed 26 

September 2013).
135

———. Annual Report of the Command and General Staff School, Fort 

Leavenworth, Kansas, 1930-1931. Fort Leavenworth, KS: The 

Command and General Staff School Press, 1931. http://usacac.army.

mil/cac2/cgsc/carl/download/reports/ rep1931.pdf (accessed 26 

September 2013).

———. Annual Report of the Command and General Staff School, Fort 

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