UN PUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 17 - 4173
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA , Plaintiff

- Appellee , v. CHRISTIAN GEOVANY GUARDADO

- DIAZ, a/k/a Christian Diaz , Defendant

- Appellant
.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland , at Greenbelt
. George Jarrod Hazel , District Judge. ( 8:16

- cr - 00214

- GJH

- 1 )
Submitted : May 21, 2018 Decided: June 5, 2018
Before MOTZ, KING, and WYNN , Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by un published per curiam opinion
. James Wyda, Baltimore, Maryland, Joanna Silver, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenbelt, Maryland; Christopher B. Leach, Monica L. Haymond, GIBSON, DUNN & CRUTCHER LLP, Washington, D.C., for Appellant
. Stephen M. Schenning, Acting United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland , David I. Salem, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbe lt, Maryland; Kenneth A. Blanco, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Trevor N. McFadd en, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, John M. Pellettieri, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee.2 Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.3 PER CURIAM: A jury convicted Christian Geovany Guardado

- Diaz of unlawful reentry after removal following a felony conviction , in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(1) (2012). The district court sentenced Guardado

- Diaz to a sentence of time served , followed by three years’ supervised release. On appeal, he raise s various challenges to his conviction. Finding no error, we affirm. Guardado

- Diaz first challenges the district court’s denial of his 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) (2012) motion to dismiss the indictmen t on the basis that Guardado

- Diaz failed to show that the entry of his underlying 1997 remova l order was fundamentally unfair
. See 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) (3). He contends that during his deportation hearing, the immigration judge (IJ) omitted certain key benef its of voluntary departure

— a form of discretionary relief

— and misstated that in order to qualify for such relief, Guardado

- Diaz was required to secure funds in a short period of time to leave the country. Guardado

- Diaz claims that , rather than being depor ted, he would have sought voluntary departure had he been sufficiently informed of the attendant benefits and eligibility requirements. In considering the district court’s ruling on a § 1326(d) motion to dismiss an indictment, “we review the court ’ s le gal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error .” United States v. Lopez

- Collazo , 82 4 F.3d 453, 460 (4th Cir. 2016) , cert. denied , 137 S. Ct. 628 (2017). In a prosecution for illegal reentry following an order of removal, a defendant may col laterally attack the removal order that constitutes an element of the offense if he can show , in part, that “ the entry of the order was fun damentally unfair.” 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) (3) ; see Lopez

- Collazo , 82 4 F.3d at 458. “ To4 demo nstrate fundamental unfairne ss in the entry of the removal o rder, a defendant must show that (1) his due process rights were violated by defects in his underlying deportation proceeding, and (2) he suffered prejudice as a result of the defects. ” Lopez

- Collazo , 82 4 F.3d at 460 (inter nal quotation marks omitted). Even if we were to assume that the failure to sufficiently inform a defendant of discretionary relief at his deportation hearing constitutes a due process violation, the IJ did not violate this right with his announcement of the short period of time requirement because he correctly stated the law at the time
. See Ramsay v. INS , 14 F.3d 206 , 211 (4 th Cir. 1994)
. And regardless , the district court did not clearly err in finding that Guardado

Diaz failed to show prejudice, as n either Guardado

- Diaz’s nor his godfather’s conclusory affidavits explain ed why Guardado

- Diaz needed additional time to secure funds or how having knowledge of additional benefits of voluntary departure would have changed Guardado

- Diaz’s decision not to see k it. Guardado

- Diaz next contends that the district court’s admission of testimony from Rita Crawley

— a United States Citizenship a nd Immigration Services (USCIS) Records S ection C hief

— regarding a database search, in the absence at trial of the supervisee w ho conducted the search, viol ated his rights under the Confrontation Clause . He claims that the screenshots of the search results did not constitute raw data and that Crawley ’s testimony relayed the supervisee’s implied testimonial assertion that the supe rvisee
e ntered the correct search terms
. The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment pr ovides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses5 against him. ” U.S. Const. amend. VI
. “ Evidence implicates the Confrontation Clause only if it constitutes a testimonial statement

— that is, a statement made with a primary purpose of creating an out

- of

- court substitute for trial tes timony.” United States v. Reed , 780 F.3d 260, 269 (4th Cir. 20 15 ) (int e rnal quotation marks omitted). The Confrontation Clause bars “ admission of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for
cross - examination.” Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 53

- 54 (2004). Raw data generated by machines is non

- testimonial and does not implicate the Confrontation Clause. United States v. Summers , 666 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 2011)
. “[W]e review an alleged Confrontat ion Clause violation de novo. . . .” Reed , 780 F.3d at 269
. However, “ a violation may be found harmless on appeal if the beneficiary of the constitutional error can prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the ve rdict obtained. ” Id. (int ernal quotation marks omitted). To the extent that the admission of database search results through the supervisor of the individual who conducted the search raises Confrontation Clause concerns , any such e rror in this case was ha rmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Reed , 780 F.3d at 269. Crawley testified that she personally reviewed Guardado

- Diaz’s A

- file, which did not contain any documents showing that he had applied for or received permissio n to reenter the United States an d that such documents would be i n his A

- file if he had applied. See United States v. Blanco

- Gallegos , 188 F.3d 1072 , 1075 (9 th Cir. 19 99)
. Further, another witness confirmed that important documents, such as those concerning6 permission to reenter, were a lways kept in A

- files. Thus, Guardado

- Diaz fails to show that the district court’s admission of the contested testimony constituted reversible error. Finally, Guardado

- Diaz argues that the district court erred in admitting a warrant of deportation (“the warrant”) as a record of a regularly conducted activity or a public record, pu rsuant to Fed. R. Evid. 803(6), (8), because the document was untrustworthy. He claims that the immigration officials who attached a fingerprint to the warrant had little or no memory at trial of doing so, that the document that served as the source of the fingerprint taped onto the warrant was not in his A

- file, and that none of the witnesses could verify the fingerprint’s source. “We review a district court ’ s evidentiary ruling s for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Garcia , 855 F.3d 615, 621 (4th Cir. 2017). “ Erroneous evidentiary r ulings are harmless so long as we are assured that they did not substantially sway the judgment. ” Id. Records of a regularly conducted activ ity and public records are admissible if, amongst other requirements, “the opponent does not show the source of information or other circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness.” Fed. R. Evid. 803(6)(E), (8)(B).

“ The party opposing admission has the bu rden to establish unreliability , ” and public records and records of a regularly conducted activity are presumptively admissible

“ unless there are sufficient negative factors to indicate a lack of trustworthiness .” Zeus Enters
. , Inc. v. Alphin Aircraft, Inc. , 190 F.3d 238 , 241 (4 th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted); s ee Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, London v. Sinkovich , 232 F.3d 200 , 205 (4 th Cir. 2000). The motive of a record’s creator is highly relevant to the record’s7 trustworthiness. See Certain Underwriters , 232 F.3d at 205; Ellis v. Int’ l Playtex, Inc. , 745 F.2d 292 , 300

- 01 (4 th Cir. 1984). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the warrant. Immigration officials explained the procedures i nvolved in creating the warrant, described their contributions to the document, and confirmed that they relied on safeg uards other than fingerprints for confirmation of deportation. An expert matched the fingerprint on the wa rrant to that of Guardado

- Diaz . An Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent stated that he was responsible for taping the fingerprint on the warrant, while another ICE agent identified a specific form as the likely source of the fingerprint. The fact that most of the testifyin g officials did not specifically remember Guardado

- Diaz or the warrant does not undermine the warrant’s trustworthiness. See Ellis , 745 F.2d at 300. Further, Guardado

- Diaz failed to identify any motivation on the part of the immigration officials to fals ify the warrant. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process. AF FIRMED