alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
### §2735. Use of probabilistic risk assessment to ensure nuclear safety of facilities of the Administration and the Office of Environmental Management

#### (a) Nuclear safety at NNSA and DOE facilities

The Administrator and the Secretary of Energy shall ensure that the methods for assessing, certifying, and overseeing nuclear safety at the facilities specified in subsection (c) use national and international standards and nuclear industry best practices, including probabilistic or quantitative risk assessment if sufficient data exist.

#### (b) Adequate protection

The use of probabilistic or quantitative risk assessment under subsection (a) shall be to support, rather than replace, the requirement under section 2232 of title 42 that the utilization or production of special nuclear material will be in accordance with the common defense and security and will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public.

#### (c) Facilities specified

Subsection (a) shall apply—

(1) to the Administrator with respect to the national security laboratories and the nuclear weapons production facilities; and

(2) to the Secretary of Energy with respect to defense nuclear facilities of the Office of Environmental Management of the Department of Energy.

(Pub. L. 107–314, div. D, title XLVI, §4645, as added Pub. L. 112–239, div. C, title XXXI, §3161(a), Jan. 2, 2013, 126 Stat. 2203.)
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. David Spiegelman, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the former Court of Special Sessions of the City of New York, County of Kings, rendered June 21, 1961, convicting him of a violation of section 600 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law (leaving the scene of an accident without reporting); sentencing him to pay a fine of $100 or, in the alternative, to serve 30 days in the City Prison; and revoking his license to operate a motor vehicle. The fine was paid. Judgment reversed on the law and the facts; information dismissed; fine remitted; and the revocation of defendant’s license vacated. Upon the facts in this record, it does not appear that the defendant knew that an injury had been caused or that he had left the place of the accident without stopping. Beldock, P. J., Kleinfeld, Hill, Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Lawrence Debe, Appellant.

Order of County Court, Bronx County, entered November 15, 1960, denying, without a hearing, defendant’s application for a writ of error *coram nobis*to vacate a judgment of said court rendered December 9, 1953, convicting defendant on his plea of guilty of robbery, first degree, unanimously reversed, on the law and on the facts, and the cause remanded for a hearing. Appellant in his affidavit alleges that at the time of his arrest he was promised by police officers and an Assistant District Attorney that he would receive a reformatory sentence of not more than five years if he would admit his participation in certain crimes, plead guilty thereto and persuade his codefendant to plead guilty. It is further alleged that defendant performed all of these conditions but in violation of the promise he was sentenced to 10 to 20 years in a State prison. An answering affidavit was filed made by an Assistant District Attorney which made part thereof certain records of the court, including a transcript of the stenographer’s minutes taken at the time of the plea of guilty by defendant and his sentencing. None of appellant’s allegations were denied. A hearing is required. *{People*v. *Picciotti,*4 N Y 2d 340; *People*v. *Doceti,*9 A D 2d 740; *People*v. *Hughes,*8 A D 2d 302.) *“*It is only when the record conclusively demonstrates the falsity of the allegations and there is no reasonable probability at all that defendant’s averments are true that a hearing will be denied”. *{People*v. *Gua/riglia,*303 N. Y. 338, 343.) Concur — Rabin, J. P., Stevens, Eager, Bergan and Bastow, JJ.
Exhibit 32.1


                              CERTIFICATION OF THE
                        JOINT CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF
                         Pursuant to Section 906 of the
                           Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002

      In connection with the Quarterly Report of Trident Rowan Group, Inc. (the
"Company") on Form 10-Q for the quarter ending September 30, 2002 as filed with
the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I,
Mark S. Hauser, Joint Chief Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. ss. 1350, as adopted pursuant to ss. 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002, that:

      (1)   The Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or
            15(d) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934; and

      (2)   The information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all
            material respects, the financial condition and results of operations
            of the Company.


                                          /s/ Mark S. Hauser
                                          ---------------------------------
                                          Mark S. Hauser
                                          Joint Chief Executive Officer
                                          May 25, 2004
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS   SCHEDULE  CONTAINS  SUMMARY  FINANCIAL  INFORMATION  EXTRACTED  FROM
DIONICS,  INC.'S  QUARTERLY REPORT FOR THE QUARTER ENDED SEPTEMBER 30, 1996
AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                      9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                  DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                       SEP-30-1996
<CASH>                             208,000
<SECURITIES>                       0
<RECEIVABLES>                      214,600
<ALLOWANCES>                       0
<INVENTORY>                        380,400
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                   823,400
<PP&E>                             1,686,400
<DEPRECIATION>                     1,616,300
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                     918,700
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>              153,400
<BONDS>                            1,419,300
<COMMON>                           36,400
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>              0
<PREFERRED>                        0
<OTHER-SE>                         1,522,800
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>       918,700
<SALES>                            1,104,600
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                   1,104,600
<CGS>                              784,200
<TOTAL-COSTS>                      1,027,100
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                   0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                   0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                 54,400
<INCOME-PRETAX>                    26,700
<INCOME-TAX>                       0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                26,700
<DISCONTINUED>                     0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                    0
<CHANGES>                          0
<NET-INCOME>                       26,700
<EPS-PRIMARY>                      .008
<EPS-DILUTED>                      .008


</TABLE>
### §3616. Transportation of remains of certain employees

(a) The Secretary of Defense may pay the expenses referred to in section 5742(b) of title 5 in the case of any employee of the National Security Agency who dies while on a rotational tour of duty within the United States or while in transit to or from such tour of duty.

(b) For the purposes of this section, the term "rotational tour of duty", with respect to an employee, means a permanent change of station involving the transfer of the employee from the National Security Agency headquarters to another post of duty for a fixed period established by regulation to be followed at the end of such period by a permanent change of station involving a transfer of the employee back to such headquarters.

(Pub. L. 86–36, §18, formerly §17, as added Pub. L. 102–183, title IV, §405, Dec. 4, 1991, 105 Stat. 1267; renumbered §18, Pub. L. 102–496, title III, §304(a), Oct. 24, 1992, 106 Stat. 3183.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Codification

Section was formerly classified in a note under section 402 of this title prior to editorial reclassification as this section.
(No. 92-CC-1122

#### Consolidated Steel & Supply Co., Claimant, *v.*The State of Illinois, Respondent.

*Order filed December 18, 1992.*

Consolidated Steel & Supply Co., *pro se,*for Claimant.

Roland W. Burris, Attorney General (Cynthia Wood, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel), for Respondent.

ORDER

JANN, J.

Claimant Consolidated Steel & Supply Company filed this claim seeking payment in the amount of *428$4,415.70 for steel plates sold to the Respondents Department of Transportation (IDOT). In its standard lapsed appropriation form complaint, Claimant alleged that it made demand for payment to IDOT but the demand was refused on the grounds that the funds appropriated for such payments had lapsed. The Respondent filed a stipulation agreeing to the Court entering an award in the full amount claimed. The case is now before the Court for approval of the stipulation.

The Court of Claims is not bound by such stipulations and it cannot approve the one at bar for the following reason.

The Respondents stipulation was based on a report compiled by IDOT which report was offered as *prima facie*evidence of the facts contained therein pursuant to section 790.140 of the Court of Claims Regulations (74 Ill. Adm. Code 790.140.) The report indicates that the reason this claim was not paid previously was not because of the lapsing of the appropriation as claimant alleged but because of a violation of the bidding and contract requirements in the Illinois Purchasing Act. (Ill. Rev. Stat. (1991), ch. 127, par. 132.1 *et seq.)*Several purchases were made which, when strung together, exceeded the no-bid purchase limits. Pursuant to §10 of the State Purchasing Act, the transaction is void. Therefore we are constrained by operation of law to deny the claim.

However, for the purpose of possible consideration of this matter by the General Assembly and in fulfillment of our duties as an advisory body to the General Assembly we will make additional findings.

The IDOT report explains that during the winter and spring of 1991 IDOT had a shortage of steel, plates such as those which are the subject of this claim. Workers *429on the Stevenson Expressway had to borrow steel plates to cover holes appearing on bridge decks. Lanes of Interstate 290 had to be closed during rush hour because full-depth hot patch would not cool and stabilize and no plates were available to “bridge” the patches overnight. In order to rectify the situation and have plates available for future needs, a series of purchases were made.

The purchases were apparently made in good faith; the violation of the Illinois Purchase Act appears to have been inadvertent. The report adds that those responsible for the purchases have been chastised. The steel plates have presumably been used and are not a commodity that can be returned, *i.e.*the transaction cannot be “undone.” The Claimant has suffered a loss. The IDOT report is in agreement with Claimant that the amount of the loss is $4,415.70.

Wherefore, it is hereby ordered that this claim be, and hereby is denied.
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#### Richard R. Regis et al. *v.*Connecticut Real Estate Investors Balanced Fund, Inc., et al.

*David*A. *Ball,*in support of the petition.

*Ernest J. Cotnoir,*in opposition.

Decided October 22, 1992

The named defendant’s petition for certification for appeal from the Appellate Court, 28 Conn. App. 760, is denied.
N O T FO R PUB L ICAT IO N UNITED STATES C OUR T OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH C IR C UIT JOHN F. FRIEDLANDER , Pe titione r, v. UNITED STATES OF AM ER IC A, R

e sponde n t . No. 13-70918

ORDER *

Applic ation to File

Se c ond or Suc c e ssive Pe tition Under 28 U.S.C . § 2255 Subm itte d Oc tobe r 8, 2013 ** Se attle , W a s hington B e fore : TASHIM A , GR AB ER , a nd M UR GUIA, C irc uit Judge s. John Frie dla

nde r wa s c ha

rge d a s a n a dult in fe de ra l distric t c ourt for a m urde r c o m

m itte d whe n he wa s sixte e n. On Ja nua ry 20, 1988, heple a d e d guilty to Se c ond De gre e M urde r in viola tion of 18 U.S.C . § 1111(a ), and Assa ult with Intent 

# FIL E D OCT 15 2013 M OLLY C. DW Y ER, CLERK U. S. CO URT O F APPEALS

* This disposition is not a ppropria te for public at ion a

nd is not pre c e de nt e xc e pt a s provide d

by 9th C ir. R . 36-3.

** The pa

ne l una nim ously finds this motion suita

ble for de c ision without ora l argum e nt. S

e e Fe d. R . App. P. 34(a )(2)(C ).

-1-to C om

m it M urde r in viola

t ion of 18 U.S.C . § 113(a ). He wa s se nte nc e d to life in prison for them

urde r c ha rge , a nd a c onc urre n t te rm

of twe n ty

y e ars for the a ssa

ult c ha rge . In 1992, the distric t c ourt de nie d his first pro se m otion unde r 28 U.S.C . § 2255. Frie dla

n de r ha s now file d a

n a pplic ation for le ave to file a se c o nd or suc c e ssive m otion unde r § 2255. W e have jurisdic t ion unde r 28 U.S.C . § 2255(h). W e m a y a uthoriz e the filing of a

se c ond or suc c e ssive m otion unde r § 2255 if, am ong othe r things, the a pplic a tion m a

ke s a prim a fa c ie showing tha

t the m otion would “ c onta in . . . a ne w rule of c o nstitutiona l la w, m a de re t

roa c tive to c a se s on c olla

te ra l re vie w by the Supre m e C ourt, tha t wa s pre viously

una va ila ble .” 28 U.S.C . § 2255; 28 U.S.C . § 2244(b)(C ). Frie d la nde r c onte nds tha

t his se nte nc e is c ontra ry to Mille r v . Alabama , 132 S. C t. 2455 (2012), which he ld tha t a m andatory

se nte nc e of life without the possibility

of pa role for a juve nile hom ic ide offe nde r viola

te s the Eighth Am e ndm e nt. W e ne e d not de c ide whe the r Mille r announc e d a

ne w, re troa c t ive rule of c onstitutiona l la w be c a use , e ve n if it did, Frie dla nde r’ s a pplic ation would fail. Mille r is ina p plic a ble be c a use Frie dla

nde r wa s not se nte nc e d to life without pa role . Frie dla

nde r a dm its tha

t he “ ha s se e n the pa

role boa rd a pproxim ate ly

8 tim e [s] . . . a

nd [ha s] a forth c om ing [sic ] he aring in Fe brua ry of 2014.” The a pplic ation to file

a se c o nd or suc c e ssive m o tion unde r § 2255 is

-2-DE NIE D .

-3-
### §145. Printing and distribution

(a) The Director of the Government Publishing Office shall print and bind each volume of the official papers relating to the Territories of the United States as provided for in this chapter, of which—

(1) four hundred and twenty copies shall be delivered to the Superintendent of Documents, Government Publishing Office, for distribution, on the basis of one copy each, and as directed by the Archivist, to those historical associations, commissions, museums, or libraries and other nondepository libraries, not to exceed eight in number within each State, Territory, or Possession, which have been or may be designated by the Governor thereof to receive such copies;

(2) one hundred copies shall be delivered to the National Archives and Records Administration for the use of that Administration; and

(3) one hundred copies shall be delivered to the Superintendent of Documents for distribution in such manner and number as may be authorized and directed by the Joint Committee on Printing.

(b) The historical associations, commissions, museums, or libraries and other nondepository libraries within each State, Territory, or Possession which have been or may be designated by the Governor thereof to receive the publications referred to in subsection (a) of this section, shall, during their existence, receive the succeeding volumes, the distribution of which shall be made by the Superintendent of Documents in accordance with lists of designations transmitted to him by the Archivist. A new designation may be made to the Archivist by the Governor only when a designated association, commission, museum, or library shall cease to exist, or when authorized by law.

(Added Oct. 31, 1951, ch. 655, §12, 65 Stat. 714; amended Pub. L. 98–497, title I, §107(f), Oct. 19, 1984, 98 Stat. 2292; Pub. L. 113–235, div. H, title I, §1301(b), (d), Dec. 16, 2014, 128 Stat. 2537.)

#### **Editorial Notes**

#### Amendments

1984—Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 98–497 substituted "Archivist" for "Administrator".

Subsec. (a)(2). Pub. L. 98–497 substituted "National Archives and Records Administration" for "General Services Administration".

Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 98–497 substituted "Archivist" for "Administrator" in two places.

#### **Statutory Notes and Related Subsidiaries**

#### Change of Name

"Director of the Government Publishing Office" substituted for "Public Printer" in subsec. (a) on authority of section 1301(d) of Pub. L. 113–235, set out as a note under section 301 of Title 44, Public Printing and Documents.

"Government Publishing Office" substituted for "Government Printing Office" in subsec. (a)(1) on authority of section 1301(b) of Pub. L. 113–235, set out as a note preceding section 301 of Title 44, Public Printing and Documents.

#### Effective Date of 1984 Amendment

Amendment by Pub. L. 98–497 effective Apr. 1, 1985, see section 301 of Pub. L. 98–497, set out as a note under section 2102 of Title 44, Public Printing and Documents.

#### Similar Provisions; Repeal; Saving Clause; Delegation of Functions; Transfer of Property and Personnel

See note preceding section 141 of this title.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT KNOXVILLE

LENDEL L. CONLEY v. JO ANN CONLEY

Appeal from the General Sessions Court for Bledsoe County

No. 1082 Howard L. Upchurch, Judge

No. E2004-01309-COA-R3-CV - FILED MAY 9, 2005

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., concurring.

I write separately to further address the trial court’s judgment with respect to the

jurisdictional issue raised by Wife. 

I agree with the majority’s observation that, when the parties filed competing affidavits which

were later considered by the trial court, Wife’s motion was converted into one for summary

judgment. See Tenn. R. Civ. P. 12.03. It is arguable, as the majority found, that the trial court chose

to hold an “evidentiary hearing on the matter.” The trial court appears to have accepted all of the

affidavits as true, even though they contain competing facts and assertions as to where Husband was

domiciled (1) when he filed his complaint for divorce, and (2) during the period of time preceding

that filing. It should be noted that the parties entered into a stipulation, which the trial court also

considered.

I agree with the majority that the evidence does not preponderate against the trial court’s

decision to deny Wife’s motion to dismiss. However, I suppose the trial court’s disposition of

Wife’s motion could be construed as a judgment made on the issue of whether Wife was entitled to

summary judgment on her defense of lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Even if we view the trial

court’s decision as one denying summary judgment on the jurisdictional defense because of the

existence of genuine issues of material fact, such an interpretation is of no particular benefit to Wife.

This is because the record does not reflect that Wife aggressively sought to pursue this defense by

putting on evidence to support it at the divorce hearing. Thus, regardless of whether the trial court’s

pre-divorce hearing was, as found by the majority, an evidentiary hearing, or simply a decision to

deny summary judgment because of conflicting factual assertions, the record before us does not show

that Wife is entitled to relief from us with respect to her lack of jurisdiction defense.
-2-

_______________________________

CHARLES D. SUSANO, JR., JUDGE