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State of Nebraska, appellee, v. 

Ryan M. Barbeau, appellant.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed October 12, 2018. No. S-17-1158.

1. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Motions to Suppress: 

Appeal and Error. When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion 

to suppress based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment, an 

appellate court applies a two-part standard of review. Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial court’s findings for clear 

error, but whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment 

protections is a question of law that an appellate court reviews independently of the trial court’s determination.

2. Investigative Stops: Appeal and Error. The ultimate determinations 

of reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop are reviewed 

de novo, and findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, giving due 

weight to the inferences drawn from those facts by the trial judge.

3. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure. Both the Fourth Amendment 

to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution 

guarantee the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures.

4. Constitutional Law: Search and Seizure: Investigative Stops: Motor 

Vehicles. A traffic stop is a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, and 

therefore is accorded Fourth Amendment protections.

5. Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Police Officers and Sheriffs: 

Probable Cause. As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a 

traffic violation has occurred. A traffic violation, no matter how minor, 

creates probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle.

6. Constitutional Law: Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Police 

Officers and Sheriffs: Probable Cause. Probable cause is not the only 

standard applied by courts to determine whether a traffic stop is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth Amendment also permits 

brief investigative stops of vehicles based on reasonable suspicion when 

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

11/02/2018 01:11 AM CDT
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a law enforcement officer has a particularized and objective basis for 

suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.

7. Probable Cause. Like the probable cause standard, the reasonable suspicion standard takes into account the totality of the circumstances.

8. Constitutional Law: Investigative Stops: Police Officers and 

Sheriffs: Probable Cause. Police can constitutionally stop and briefly 

detain a person for investigative purposes if the police have a reasonable 

suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity exists, 

even if probable cause is lacking under the Fourth Amendment.

9. Probable Cause: Words and Phrases. Reasonable suspicion entails 

some minimal level of objective justification for detention, something 

more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch, but less 

than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.

10. Judgments: Records: Appeal and Error. Where the record adequately 

demonstrates that the decision of a trial court is correct—although such 

correctness is based on a ground or reason different from that assigned 

by the trial court—an appellate court will affirm.

11. Constitutional Law: Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Police 

Officers and Sheriffs: Statutes. Reasonable suspicion, as a prerequisite for a constitutional investigatory stop, cannot be based only on a 

police officer’s desire to verify compliance with motor vehicle registration statutes.

12. Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Police Officers and Sheriffs: 

Statutes. When an officer observes a vehicle without license plates 

or in-transit tags, a particularized and objective basis exists to justify 

a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver may be criminally 

avoiding the motor vehicle registration statutes. The State’s interest 

in enforcing its registration laws supports a brief investigatory stop to 

ascertain whether the driver possesses the necessary documentation to 

show compliance with the motor vehicle registration statutes.

13. Probable Cause: Police Officers and Sheriffs. Reasonable suspicion 

can be premised on an officer’s mistake of fact or mistake of law, so 

long as the mistake was reasonable.

14. ____: ____. A determination that reasonable suspicion exists need not 

rule out the possibility of innocent conduct. The inquiry is not whether 

some circumstances may be susceptible of innocent explanation, but 

whether, taken together, they suffice to form a particularized and objective basis for the officer to suspect a crime is, or is about to, occur.

15. Police Officers and Sheriffs: Motor Vehicles: Probable Cause. 

Exiting a highway after passing a sign indicating there is a police 

checkpoint ahead does not, without more, give rise to reasonable suspicion. But it is one factor which can be considered in the totality of the 

circumstances.
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16. Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Time. A lawful traffic stop can 

become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required 

to complete the mission of the stop.

17. Investigative Stops: Motor Vehicles: Police Officers and Sheriffs. 

Once a vehicle is lawfully stopped, a law enforcement officer may conduct an investigation reasonably related in scope to the circumstances 

that justified the traffic stop. This investigation may include asking 

the driver for an operator’s license and registration, requesting that 

the driver sit in the patrol car, and asking the driver about the purpose 

and destination of his or her travel. Also, the officer may run a computer check to determine whether the vehicle involved in the stop has 

been stolen and whether there are any outstanding warrants for any of 

its occupants.

Appeal from the District Court for Hamilton County: Rachel

A. Daugherty, Judge. Affirmed.

Mark Porto, of Porto Law Office, for appellant.

Douglas J. Peterson, Attorney General, and Joe Meyer for 

appellee.

Heavican, C.J., Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, 

Papik, and Freudenberg, JJ.

Stacy, J.

Ryan M. Barbeau appeals his convictions for drug-related 

felonies, arguing the evidence was obtained as the result of an 

unconstitutional traffic stop and should have been suppressed. 

The district court overruled his motion to suppress, finding the 

traffic stop was supported by probable cause. We do not reach 

the question of probable cause, because we conclude this was 

an investigatory traffic stop supported by reasonable suspicion. 

Therefore, although our reasoning differs from that of the district court, we agree the motion to suppress was properly overruled, and we therefore affirm.

BACKGROUND

On December 11, 2015, Nebraska State Patrol Trooper 

Gregory Goltz was conducting a “ruse checkpoint” operation 
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at the Giltner interchange on Interstate 80 in Hamilton County, 

Nebraska. As part of that operation, signs were placed along 

the Interstate advising drivers there was a State Patrol checkpoint ahead and a drug dog in use. No such Interstate checkpoint actually existed, but troopers monitored vehicles that left 

the Interstate immediately after passing the sign.

At approximately 2:52 p.m., Goltz saw a Lincoln Town Car 

leave the Interstate after passing the checkpoint sign. The car 

stopped at the end of the off ramp, signaled, and turned north 

onto the Giltner spur. Goltz followed the car, eventually catching up to it and traveling several car lengths behind it. The car 

was not speeding.

Goltz could see the car had no license plates, but had what 

appeared to be an in-transit tag mounted inside a black license 

plate holder on the rear of the car. Portions of the in-transit 

tag were covered by the top and bottom of the frame, preventing Goltz from reading the state of issuance and some of the 

numbers and handwriting on the tag. Goltz also noticed some 

of the handwritten numbers on the in-transit tag were written in 

red ink; he considered that unusual because he had never seen 

a Nebraska in-transit tag with red ink before. Goltz initiated a 

traffic stop.

After the car was stopped, Goltz approached it on foot and 

was able to read “North Carolina” on the in-transit tag. There 

were two individuals in the car. Goltz made contact with the 

driver and explained he had been stopped because his car did 

not have plates and the trooper could not read the in-transit 

tag. Goltz asked to see an operator’s license and identified the 

driver as Barbeau.

Goltz asked to see the car’s paperwork to determine whether 

the in-transit tag was “real.” Barbeau told Goltz he had recently 

purchased the car in North Carolina and was driving it back to 

his home in Oregon. But Barbeau was not able to produce any 

paperwork or insurance information on the car.

When Barbeau was unable to produce any paperwork for 

the car, Goltz had him step out of the car and walk to the 
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front of Goltz’ patrol car. Goltz’ plan was to “investigate the 

vehicle” and obtain additional information from Barbeau about 

“where the vehicle came from” and Barbeau’s travel plans. 

Goltz then got into his patrol car to run Barbeau’s operator’s 

license and wait for backup. Goltz had called for backup, and 

a canine unit, almost immediately after the stop. According to 

Goltz, he planned to return to Barbeau’s car to take a closer 

look at the in-transit tag once backup arrived.

Within a few minutes of the initial stop, another trooper 

arrived on the scene and obtained the passenger’s identification 

information. When Goltz ran the passenger’s information, he 

learned there was an active warrant for his arrest. The passenger was then arrested and handcuffed.

After the passenger was arrested, the dog alerted to drugs 

in the trunk of Barbeau’s car. A subsequent search of the car 

yielded an AR-15 semiautomatic rifle with ammunition and 

a 30-round clip; two marijuana pipes; 40 tramadol pills; 60 

hydrocodone pills; and $39,575, which was determined to have 

been used in a controlled substance transaction.

Barbeau was then arrested and charged with (1) possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver while in 

possession of a firearm, (2) possession of a deadly weapon 

during the commission of a felony, (3) possession of drug 

money, and (4) possession of a controlled substance. Goltz 

did not issue Barbeau a ticket or a warning related to the 

in-transit tag.

Before trial, Barbeau moved to suppress the evidence 

obtained from the search of his car. Barbeau argued Goltz did 

not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to initiate the 

traffic stop. Alternatively, he argued the stop should have been 

terminated as soon as Goltz could read the information on the 

in-transit tag.

The State countered that Goltz had probable cause for the 

traffic stop based on the partially obscured in-transit tag. 

The State claimed this was a violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. 

§ 60-399(2) (Reissue 2010), which requires that “[a]ll letters, 
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numbers, printing, writing, and other identification marks” on 

plates “shall be kept clear . . . so that they shall be plainly 

visible at all times during daylight and under artificial light in 

the nighttime.”

At the evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, Goltz 

testified to the facts summarized above and a video recording of the stop was received into evidence. The court found 

that some of the information on the in-transit tag was covered 

by the license plate frame, and because the printing was not 

“plainly visible,” the court concluded that Goltz had probable 

cause to suspect a violation of § 60-399(2). The court rejected 

Barbeau’s claim that the traffic stop should have ended once 

Goltz approached the car and could read the in-transit tag was 

from North Carolina. The court reasoned that once the car was 

lawfully stopped, Nebraska law permitted Goltz to conduct an 

investigation reasonably related in scope to the circumstance 

that justified the traffic stop, including asking the driver for 

an operator’s license and registration, requesting the driver to 

sit in the patrol car, asking the driver about the purpose and 

destination of his or her travel, and running a computer check 

to determine whether the vehicle involved in the stop had been 

stolen and whether there were outstanding warrants for any 

of its occupants.1 The trial court reasoned that while troopers 

were conducting such an investigation, they discovered the 

passenger had an active warrant. They then arrested the passenger and conducted a postarrest search, during which the 

drugs, gun, and money were discovered. The trial court overruled the motion to suppress.

The State and Barbeau subsequently entered into an agreement whereby the State would drop the charge of possession of a deadly weapon during the commission of a felony 

in exchange for a bench trial on stipulated facts. At the 

bench trial, Barbeau renewed his motion to suppress evidence 

obtained from the stop.

1 See State v. Nelson, 282 Neb. 767, 807 N.W.2d 769 (2011).
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The trial court found Barbeau guilty of possession of a 

controlled substance with intent to deliver, possession of drug 

money, and possession of a controlled substance. Barbeau was 

sentenced to concurrent terms of imprisonment, the longest 

of which was 18 to 36 months. He timely appealed, and we 

moved the case to our docket on our own motion.2

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

Barbeau assigns, restated, that the district court erred in 

(1) denying his motion to suppress and (2) finding him guilty 

based on evidence that should have been suppressed.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] When reviewing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress based on a claimed violation of the Fourth Amendment, 

an appellate court applies a two-part standard of review.3

Regarding historical facts, an appellate court reviews the trial 

court’s findings for clear error, but whether those facts trigger or violate Fourth Amendment protections is a question of 

law that an appellate court reviews independently of the trial 

court’s determination.4

[2] The ultimate determinations of reasonable suspicion to 

conduct an investigatory stop are reviewed de novo, and findings of fact are reviewed for clear error, giving due weight to 

the inferences drawn from those facts by the trial judge.5

ANALYSIS

Barbeau contends the traffic stop in this case violated the 

Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, § 7, 

of the Nebraska Constitution, both of which protect individuals 

against unreasonable searches and seizures by the government. 

He argues the traffic stop was not supported by either probable 

2 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 24-1106(3) (Supp. 2017).

3 State v. Thalken, 299 Neb. 857, 911 N.W.2d 562 (2018).

4 Id.

5 State v. Woldt, 293 Neb. 265, 876 N.W.2d 891 (2016).
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cause or reasonable suspicion, and he also challenges the duration of the investigation, arguing that once Goltz approached 

the car and was able to read the in-transit tag, no further investigation was justified.

Because Barbeau’s motion to suppress focused only on 

the lawfulness and duration of the traffic stop, and did not 

challenge whether the search of his car was supported by 

probable cause, we confine our analysis accordingly. We 

begin by setting out the constitutional principles governing 

traffic stops.

Traffic Stops Must Be Supported by

Either Probable Cause or

Reasonable Suspicion

[3,4] The Fourth Amendment guarantees “[t]he right of 

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 

effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures . . . ,” as 

does article I, § 7, of the Nebraska Constitution. A traffic stop 

is a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, and therefore is 

accorded Fourth Amendment protections.6

[5] As a general matter, the decision to stop an automobile is 

reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that 

a traffic violation has occurred.7 We have long recognized that 

a traffic violation, no matter how minor, creates probable cause 

to stop the driver of a vehicle.8

[6,7] But probable cause is not the only standard applied 

by courts to determine whether a traffic stop is reasonable 

under the Fourth Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court has 

6 Heien v. North Carolina, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 530, 190 L. Ed. 2d 475 

(2014). See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889 

(1968).

7 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 116 S. Ct. 1769, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89 

(1996).

8 See, e.g., Thalken, supra note 3; State v. Hill, 298 Neb. 675, 905 N.W.2d 

668 (2018); State v. Jasa, 297 Neb. 822, 901 N.W.2d 315 (2017); State v. 

Au, 285 Neb. 797, 829 N.W.2d 695 (2013).
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recognized the Fourth Amendment permits brief investigative stops of vehicles based on reasonable suspicion when a 

law enforcement officer has a “‘particularized and objective 

basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity.’”9

 The reasonable suspicion needed to justify an 

investigatory traffic stop “‘is dependent upon both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of 

reliability.’”10 Like the probable cause standard, the reasonable 

suspicion standard “takes into account ‘the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.’”11 A mere hunch does not create reasonable suspicion, but the level of suspicion required to 

meet the standard is “‘considerably less than proof of wrongdoing by a preponderance of the evidence,’ and ‘obviously less’ 

than is necessary for probable cause.”12

[8,9] Nebraska courts have also applied the reasonable suspicion standard when considering the lawfulness of a traffic 

stop.13 In doing so, this court has recognized that “‘[p]olice can 

constitutionally stop and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes if the police have a reasonable suspicion, supported by articulable facts, that criminal activity exists, even if 

probable cause is lacking under the [F]ourth [A]mendment.’”14

9 Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 188 L. Ed. 2d 

680 (2014), quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 101 S. Ct. 690, 

66 L. Ed. 2d 621 (1981). See, also, Terry, supra note 6.

10 Navarette, supra note 9, 572 U.S. at 397, quoting Alabama v. White, 496 

U.S. 325, 110 S. Ct. 2412, 110 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1990).

11 Id., quoting Cortez, supra note 9.

12 Id., quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 109 S. Ct. 1581, 104 L. 

Ed. 2d 1 (1989).

13 See, e.g., Jasa, supra note 8; State v. Arizola, 295 Neb. 477, 890 N.W.2d 

770 (2017); State v. Rodriguez, 288 Neb. 878, 852 N.W.2d 705 (2014); 

State v. Bol, 288 Neb. 144, 846 N.W.2d 241 (2014); Au, supra note 8; 

State v. Lamb, 280 Neb. 738, 789 N.W.2d 918 (2010); State v. Wollam, 280 

Neb. 43, 783 N.W.2d 612 (2010).

14 State v. Childs, 242 Neb. 426, 433, 495 N.W.2d 475, 479 (1993), quoting 

State v. Staten, 238 Neb. 13, 469 N.W.2d 112 (1991).
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We have explained that “‘[r]easonable suspicion entails some 

minimal level of objective justification for detention, something more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or 

“hunch,” but less than the level of suspicion required for probable cause.’”15 When determining whether there is reasonable 

suspicion for a police officer to make an investigatory stop, the 

totality of the circumstances must be taken into account.16

Traffic Stop Was Supported

by Reasonable Suspicion

[10] Before analyzing whether there was reasonable suspicion to support this traffic stop, we pause briefly to address 

Barbeau’s arguments focused on the district court’s finding 

of probable cause. The district court found the initial traffic 

stop was supported by probable cause to believe a violation 

of § 60-399(2) had occurred, because some of the printing on 

the in-transit tag was not “plainly visible.” Barbeau argues, 

on appeal, that he was not a resident of Nebraska and thus 

was only required to comply with the registration requirements of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-367 (Cum. Supp. 2016). Section 

60-367 provides that nonresident vehicles must comply with 

the registration requirements of the owner’s state of residence 

and “conspicuously” display registration numbers as required 

thereby. Barbeau argues that because he was not required to 

comply with the “plainly visible” requirement of § 60-399(2), 

there could be no probable cause to suspect a violation of 

that statute. Because we find the stop was investigatory in 

nature and was supported by reasonable suspicion, we do not 

address the district court’s probable cause finding, and we 

express no opinion on whether the “plainly visible” requirement of § 60-399(2) applies to nonresidents. Where the record 

adequately demonstrates that the decision of a trial court is correct—although such correctness is based on a ground or reason 

15 Id. at 433, 495 N.W.2d at 479-80.

16 Rodriguez, supra note 13.
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different from that assigned by the trial court—an appellate 

court will affirm.17

When considering whether there was reasonable suspicion to 

support the traffic stop in this case, our prior decisions in State 

v. Childs18 and State v. Bowers19 are instructive. Both cases 

involved investigatory traffic stops based on suspected vehicle 

registration violations.

[11] In Childs, police observed a car driving with in-transit 

tags and stopped the car to check whether the tags were still 

within the valid timeframe for use. On those facts, we concluded there was no reasonable suspicion for the stop, and we 

rejected the State’s contention that whenever police see a vehicle operating on the street with an in-transit tag, they should 

suspect a violation of the motor vehicle registration laws. We 

found it significant that before stopping the vehicle, police 

noticed “nothing suspicious or out of the ordinary” about the 

operation of the vehicle, the appearance of the vehicle, or the 

appearance of the in-transit tag.20 We held that “[r]easonable 

suspicion, as a prerequisite for a constitutional investigatory 

stop, cannot be based only on a police officer’s desire to verify 

compliance with motor vehicle registration statutes.”21 Because 

police had no articulable facts upon which to suspect the driver 

“had been engaged in, was presently engaged in, or was about 

to engage in any criminal activity,”22 we found the traffic stop 

was unconstitutional.

[12] Three years after Childs, we decided Bowers. In that 

case, we found police had reasonable suspicion to conduct 

an investigatory traffic stop of a car being operated without 

17 Jasa, supra note 8.

18 Childs, supra note 14.

19 State v. Bowers, 250 Neb. 151, 548 N.W.2d 725 (1996).

20 Childs, supra note 14, 242 Neb. at 427, 495 N.W.2d at 477.

21 Id. at 433, 495 N.W.2d at 480.

22 Id. at 435, 495 N.W.2d at 481.
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license plates or in-transit tags. The driver in Bowers argued 

the absence of plates or in-transit tags did not provide reasonable suspicion to believe he was operating the car unlawfully. 

He reasoned that under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-320.01 (Reissue 

1993), he could lawfully operate the car without plates or an 

in-transit tag for 30 days after purchase from a nonlicensed 

seller, provided he could produce the proper documentation of 

ownership upon demand. We agreed that the driver was in “full 

compliance with the motor vehicle licensing laws,” but we 

observed that “[s]ome people who operate motor vehicles without license plates or in-transit tags clearly do so in an unlawful 

attempt to escape the requirements of the motor vehicle registration statutes.”23 We reasoned:

When an officer observes a vehicle without license 

plates or in-transit tags, a particularized and objective 

basis exists to justify a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the driver may be criminally avoiding the 

motor vehicle registration statutes. The State’s interest in enforcing its registration laws supports a brief 

investigatory stop to ascertain whether the driver possesses the necessary documentation to establish that he 

or she is within the 30-day grace period to register the 

vehicle.24

The Nebraska Court of Appeals applied similar reasoning 

in State v. Kling25 and found police had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop of a vehicle displaying 

handwritten in-transit tags. The driver in Kling argued that 

handwritten in-transit tags did not violate state law, and he 

relied on Childs for the proposition that an officer’s desire 

to merely verify compliance with registration laws does not, 

without more, amount to reasonable suspicion. The State 

countered that handwritten in-transit tags should have the 

23 Bowers, supra note 19, 250 Neb. at 159, 548 N.W.2d at 730.

24 Id. at 161, 548 N.W.2d at 731.

25 State v. Kling, 8 Neb. App. 631, 599 N.W.2d 240 (1999).
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same legal effect as no in-transit tags, and thus relied on 

Bowers for the proposition that when a car is being operated 

without displaying plates or in-transit tags, police have a particularized and objective basis to suspect the vehicle registration laws are being violated.

The Court of Appeals reviewed our holdings in Childs and 

Bowers and concluded the facts presented in Kling were more 

akin to Bowers. That court observed that although Nebraska 

law did not prohibit handwritten in-transit tags, neither did it 

authorize them. Thus, the court held that when police saw the 

car being operated without plates or dealer-issued in-transit 

tags, that observation provided reasonable suspicion the driver 

was violating the motor vehicle registration laws and justified 

the investigatory stop.

[13,14] These cases illustrate that the determination of reasonable suspicion is fact specific and requires police to have 

a particularized and objective basis for suspecting a driver is 

violating the vehicle registration law. Childs teaches that an 

officer’s desire to verify whether an in-transit tag is valid will 

not, without more, be sufficient to provide reasonable suspicion the vehicle is being operated in violation of the vehicle 

registration laws. But Bowers and Kling illustrate that when 

police have reliable information that provides a particularized 

and objective basis for suspecting the vehicle is being operated 

in violation of the vehicle registration laws, there is reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory traffic stop. This 

is so even if the reasonable suspicion is premised on an officer’s mistake of fact or mistake of law, so long as the mistake 

was reasonable.26 Moreover, a determination that reasonable 

suspicion exists need not rule out the possibility of innocent 

conduct.27 The inquiry is not whether some circumstances may 

be susceptible of innocent explanation, but whether, taken 

26 Heien, supra note 6.

27 United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 122 S. Ct. 744, 151 L. Ed. 2d 740 

(2002).
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together, they suffice to form a particularized and objective 

basis for the officer to suspect a crime is occurring, or is about 

to occur.28

The question of reasonable suspicion in this case, then, turns 

on whether, considering the totality of the circumstances, Goltz 

had reliable information that provided a particularized and 

objective basis for suspecting Barbeau was operating his car in 

violation of the motor vehicle registration laws.

Barbeau does not challenge the district court’s factual findings concerning Goltz’ information and observations, and we 

find no clear error in those findings. Applying the constitutional principles discussed above to those factual findings, 

we conclude Goltz had an objective basis, based on firsthand 

observation, for reasonably suspecting Barbeau was operating 

his car in violation of the registration laws.

First, as in Bowers, there were objective signs of possible noncompliance with Nebraska’s registration laws. Under 

Nebraska law, a dealer-issued in-transit “sticker shall [have] 

plainly printed in black letters the words In Transit” and 

must be displayed either on the front and rear windows or on 

the rear side windows of the vehicle.29 The in-transit tag on 

Barbeau’s car was located on the rear bumper and included red 

handwriting. Goltz had never seen a Nebraska in-transit tag 

with red handwriting. Moreover, the tag was affixed inside a 

license plate frame that partially obstructed the information on 

the top and bottom of the tag, preventing Goltz from being able 

to read the state of issuance.

Unlike the police in Childs, Goltz did not initiate a traffic 

stop merely to check the validity of the tags without any reasonable suspicion they were noncompliant. Nor does the record 

support the conclusion that Goltz initiated the traffic stop based 

on nothing more than his inability to read the in-transit tag 

28 See id.

29 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-376 (Cum. Supp. 2016).
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while pursuing the car.30 Rather, in addition to the inability of 

Goltz to read some of the information on the tag, the tag itself 

appeared suspect due to its location on the car, the red ink, 

and the fact that some information was covered by the license 

plate frame.

[15] Moreover, when considering the totality of the circumstances, we also consider that Goltz had seen Barbeau exit the 

Interstate immediately after passing a sign advising drivers 

there was a State Patrol checkpoint ahead. Exiting a highway 

after passing a sign indicating there is a police checkpoint 

ahead does not, without more, give rise to reasonable suspicion.31 It is, however, “one factor which can be considered in 

the totality of the circumstances.”32 And here, Goltz’ knowledge that Barbeau pulled off the Interstate immediately after 

passing a sign notifying drivers of an upcoming State Patrol 

checkpoint, when combined with the irregular appearance of 

the temporary tag and the fact that some information on the 

tag was covered by the frame, creates a particularized and 

objectively reasonable suspicion that the vehicle is not in compliance with the registration laws and that the driver wants to 

evade detection.

We therefore determine the investigatory stop of Barbeau’s 

car was supported by reasonable suspicion and comported with 

the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and article I, 

§ 7, of the Nebraska Constitution.

Investigation

Barbeau contends that even if the initial stop was lawful, 

Goltz should have ended the stop as soon as he approached 

30 Compare U.S. v. McLemore, 887 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 2018) (officer’s 

inability to read temporary registration card in vehicle’s rear window while 

following in police cruiser does not, without more, give rise to reasonable 

suspicion vehicle is being operated in violation of registration laws).

31 See U.S. v. Yousif, 308 F.3d 820 (8th Cir. 2002). See, also, State v. 

Hedgcock, 277 Neb. 805, 765 N.W.2d 469 (2009).

32 Hedgcock, supra note 31, 277 Neb. at 816-17, 765 N.W.2d at 480.
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the car and was able to see the in-transit tag was from North 

Carolina. According to Barbeau, any continued investigation 

beyond that point was unreasonable, and thus unlawful.

[16] In Rodriguez v. U.S.,

33 the U.S. Supreme Court cautioned that a lawful traffic stop “‘can become unlawful if it 

is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to complete th[e] mission’” of the stop. When the mission of an 

investigative stop is addressing a suspected traffic violation, 

the stop may “‘last no longer than is necessary to effectuate th[at] purpose’” and authority for the seizure “thus ends 

when tasks tied to the traffic infraction are—or reasonably 

should have been—completed.”34 However, the U.S. Supreme 

Court has recognized that beyond just determining whether 

to issue a traffic citation or warning, an officer’s mission in a 

traffic stop “includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop.’”35 Typically, “such inquiries involve checking the 

driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding 

warrants against the driver, and inspecting the automobile’s 

registration and proof of insurance.”36

[17] Similarly, this court has long held that once a vehicle 

is lawfully stopped, a law enforcement officer may conduct 

an investigation reasonably related in scope to the circumstances that justified the traffic stop.37 This investigation may 

include asking the driver for an operator’s license and registration, requesting that the driver sit in the patrol car, and 

asking the driver about the purpose and destination of his or 

her travel.38 Also, the officer may run a computer check to 

determine whether the vehicle involved in the stop has been 

33 Rodriguez v. U.S., ___ U.S. ___, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614-15, 191 L. Ed. 2d 

492 (2015).

34 Id., 135 S. Ct. at 1614.

35 Id., 135 S. Ct. at 1615.

36 Id.

37 Nelson, supra note 1.

38 Id.
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stolen and whether there are any outstanding warrants for any 

of its occupants.39

Having concluded the investigatory stop of Barbeau’s car 

was lawful, we agree with the trial court that Goltz was justified in conducting an investigation related to the circumstances 

that justified the stop and gave rise to Goltz’ reasonable suspicion that the car was being operated in violation of the motor 

vehicle registration laws. The record shows that after initiating the stop, Goltz approached the car, briefly inspected the 

in-transit tag, and then proceeded to contact the driver and 

ask many of the routine questions that this court, and the U.S. 

Supreme Court, have recognized as appropriate incidental to a 

traffic stop.

On appeal, Barbeau does not claim the scope of Goltz’ 

investigation was too broad under the circumstances, nor does 

he argue the few minutes it took for backup and the canine unit 

to arrive unnecessarily extended the stop. Instead, he argues 

the entire investigation should have ended before Goltz made 

contact with the driver.

Barbeau’s argument in this regard is premised on the flawed 

assumption that the only justification for the stop was Goltz’ 

inability to read the state of issuance on the in-transit tag. 

Summarized, Barbeau argues that he was stopped because 

Goltz could not see the state of issuance on the in-transit tag, 

so he argues that once Goltz approached the car and was able 

to read “North Carolina,” the purpose of the traffic stop was 

accomplished and no further investigation was warranted.

But as discussed above, the circumstances justifying the 

investigatory stop here included more than just Goltz’ inability 

to read the state of issuance on the in-transit tag. In addition 

to being unable to read some of the information on the tag, 

the tag itself appeared suspect due to its location, the red ink, 

and the fact that it was partially covered by the license plate 

frame. The additional fact that Barbeau was seen exiting the 

39 Id.
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Interstate immediately after passing a sign notifying drivers 

of an upcoming State Patrol checkpoint, combined with the 

irregular appearance of the temporary tag, gave Goltz a particularized and objectively reasonable suspicion that the car was 

not in compliance with the registration laws and that the driver 

wanted to evade detection. Having lawfully stopped the car, 

Goltz was authorized to conduct an investigation reasonably 

related in scope to the circumstances that justified the traffic 

stop,40 and the record supports that he did just that.

There is no merit to Barbeau’s claim that the investigatory 

stop should have ended before Goltz contacted the driver to 

begin his investigation.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons discussed above, the district court did not 

err in overruling the motion to suppress. Barbeau’s assignments of error have no merit, and we therefore affirm the judgment of the district court.

Affirmed.

40 See id.