Filed 10/15/21 P. v. Paguada CA2/8

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE,

 Plaintiff and Respondent,

 v.

MARVIN NAHUN PAGUADA,

 Defendant and Appellant.

B305782

(Los Angeles County

Super. Ct. No. YA019025)

 APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 

Angeles County, Laura C. Ellison, Judge. Reversed.

 Lise M. Breakey, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief 

Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior 

Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy 

Attorney General, and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorney General, 

for Plaintiff and Respondent.

____________________
2

Marvin Nahun Paguada appeals the trial court’s denial of 

his postjudgment request for a Franklin proceeding. The 

prosecution agrees this proceeding was due. We reverse and 

remand for the requested proceeding. Statutory references are to 

the Penal Code.

In 1994, Paguada pleaded guilty to two kidnapping counts 

(§ 209, subds. (a) & (b)) and admitted two firearm enhancements 

(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The trial court sentenced Paguada to two 

terms of life with the possibility of parole, plus consecutive fouryear terms for the enhancements. 

Paguada was 21 years old when he committed the crimes. 

He claimed he “drank an unusual amount of alcohol” and was on 

drugs at the time. He had been using cocaine and speed daily. 

The probation report shows Paguada had no criminal 

history. It characterizes Paguada and his cohorts as “very 

unsophisticated and immature.” A detective described them as 

“the dumbest criminals he has ever faced” and opined the crimes 

were “a reaction against overly strict and sheltered upbringings.” 

Another officer said, “their boldness and stupidity [were] almost 

unbelievable.” 

In January 2020, Paguada, representing himself, moved for 

a limited remand under section 1203.01. Paguada sought to 

make a record of youth-related evidence for an eventual youth 

offender parole hearing. His motion invoked In re Cook (2019) 7 

Cal.5th 439 (Cook) and People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261 

(Franklin). 

In Franklin, supra, 63 Cal.4th at pages 269 and 284, the 

Supreme Court recognized the right of youth offenders described 

by section 3051 to make a record of mitigating evidence tied to 

youth for later use in a youth offender parole hearing. Section 
3

3051 provides for such hearings, as well as parole eligibility, for 

youth offenders serving life terms or other lengthy sentences 

(with exceptions not applicable here) during their 15th, 20th, or 

25th year of incarceration, depending on the sentence. 

In Cook, supra, 7 Cal.5th at pages 451–459, the Court 

determined section 1203.01 provides the means for conducting an 

evidence preservation proceeding under Franklin for offenders 

with final convictions. 

The trial court denied Paguada’s motion the day he filed it, 

finding Paguada failed to state a prima facie case and had the 

opportunity to present evidence of his youth at his sentencing 

hearing. The basis for the latter finding is unknown, as there is 

no hearing transcript and nothing in the 1994 minute orders 

supports the finding. 

Denying Paguada’s motion was error. 

The prosecution concedes the error. According to the 

prosecution, nothing indicates Paguada has had a parole hearing 

or “sufficient opportunity to present relevant youth offender 

information at a postconviction proceeding with the benefit of 

appointed counsel.” 

Following the Supreme Court’s guidance in Cook, supra, 7 

Cal.5th at pages 458–460, the self-represented Paguada filed a 

motion in the superior court under the original case number, 

citing section 1203.01 and Cook. Paguada represented he was 21 

years old at the time of his crimes—well under the statutory age 

limit of 25 (see § 3051, subd. (b)(1)–(3))—yet no prior hearing 

addressed his youthfulness. Paguada’s motion maintained he 

was entitled to make a record of information relevant to an 

eventual youth offender parole hearing and explicitly requested a 

“Franklin Hearing.”
4

The 1994 sentencing hearing was no substitute for the 

requested Franklin proceeding. (See People v. Rodriguez (2018) 4 

Cal.5th 1123, 1131.) Paguada is entitled to this proceeding. (See 

People v. Lipptrapp (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 886, 892 & 896 

(Lipptrapp).) 

As Paguada has spent more than 25 years in prison, the 

trial court should conduct the Franklin proceeding as soon as 

possible. (See Lipptrapp, supra, 59 Cal.App.5th at p. 897.)

DISPOSITION

We reverse the trial court’s order and remand for a 

Franklin evidence preservation proceeding, with counsel 

appointed for Paguada. 

WILEY, J.

We concur: 

 STRATTON, Acting P. J. 

OHTA, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the 

Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California 

Constitution.