# IN THE SUPREME COURT O F TEX AS

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 

## N O


## . 15-0591

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 

# I N R E 

# N A T IO N A L 

# L L O Y D S 

# I N S U R A N C E 

# C O M P A N Y 

# , W A R D L A W 

# C L A IM S 

# S E R V IC E 

# , I N C


# . , A N D 

# I D E A L 

# A D J U S T IN G 

# , I N C


# . , R E L A T O R S

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## O N 

## P E T I T I O N F O R 

## W R I T O F 

## M A N D A M U S



### 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4



## Argued F ebruary 7, 2017

J U S T I C E 

## G U Z M A N 

## delivere d the opinion of the Court, in which C H I E F 

## J U S T I C E 

## H E C H T 

## , J U S T I C E 

## G R E E N 

## , J U S T I C E 

## W I L L E T T 

## , J U S T I C E 

## D E V I N E 

## , and J U S T I C E 

## B R O W N 

## joined.
J U S T I C E 

## J O H N S O N 

## f

il e d a d is s e n ti n g o p in io n , in which J U S T I C E 

## L E H R M A N N 

## and J U S T I C E 

## B O Y D 

## joined.

The discovery dispute in this mandamu s p roceeding arises in the context of multidi strict litigation involving a lleg ations of under paid homeowner insurance claims. The issue is w hether a party ’s attorne y -billing information is discove rable when the pa rty challeng es an opposing party ’s attorney -fe e re q u es t as u n rea sonable or unnece ssary but neither uses its own attorney fee s as a
compar ator nor seeks to rec over any portion of its own attorn ey fee s. We hold that, under such
circ umstances, (1) compelling en masse production of a party ’s billing rec ords invades the attorney work-pr oduct privileg e; (2) the privileg e is not waived mere ly beca use the party resisting discovery

## h as challeng ed the opponent’s attorney -fe e reque st; and (3) such information is ordinarily n o t

discovera ble. 1


## To the extent fac tual information about hourly rate s and ag g reg ate at t o rn ey fee s is not privileg ed, that information is g ener ally irrele vant and nondiscovera ble beca use it does not establish

or tend to establish the rea sonablene ss or nece ssity of the attorney fe es an o p p osing party has
incurre d. A party ’s litigation expenditures ref lect only the value that party has assig ned to litigating 2


## the matter, which may be influence d by my riad party -spec ific interests. Absent a fee -shifting claim,

a party ’s attorney -fe e expenditures need not b e re as o n ab l e or nece ssary for the particula r case
. Ba rring unusual circ umstances, allowing discovery of such information would spawn unnece ssary

case -within-a- case litigation devoted to deter mining the rea sonablene ss and nece ssit y o f a tt o r n e y - f e e expenditures that are not at issue in the litigation. This is not a proper discovery objective. We there fore conditionally g rant mandamus relief and direc t the trial court to vacate its discovery order

. I. F actual and Proc edural Backgroun d Following two hail storms that struck Hidalg o County in 2012, insured hom eowners sued
various insurer s and cla ims a djustors, a lleg ing underpa y ment of insured pr operty -dama g e cla ims.
The lawsuits wer e consolidated into a single multidi strict l i t i gati on (MDL ) court for pretria l
proce eding s, including discove ry
. 3

S e e T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 2

. 5 ( b )

. 1

S e e T E X
. R

. E V ID
. 4 0 1 ( d e f i n i n g r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e a s h a v i n g “ a n y t e n d e n c y t o m a k e a f a c t m o r e o r l e s s 2 p r o b a b l e t h a n i t w o u l d b e w i t h o u t t h e e v i d e n c e ” ) ; T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 2

. 3 ( e x t e n d i n g t h e s c o p e o f d i s c o v e r y t o r e l e v a n t n o n p r i v i l e g e d i n f

o r m a t i o n , i n c l u d i n g r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e t h a t i s i n a d m i s s i b l e b u t “ r e a s o n a b l y c a l c u l a t e d t o l e a d t o t h e d i s c o v e r y o f a d m i s s i b l e e v i d e n c e ” )

.

S e e T E X
. R

. J U D
. A D M IN
. 1 3 , r e p r i n t e d i n T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E , t i t

. 2 , s u b t i t

. F a p p
. 3 

## 2

## The discovery dispute in this mandamus p ro ce eding involves four MDL case s in which

individual h o m eo wn ers sued National L loy ds I nsuranc e Co., Wardlaw Claims Service , I nc., and
I deal Adjusting, I nc. (collec tively , th e in s u r e r ) , a s s e r

ti n g s ta tu to r y , c o n trac tual, and extra-contra ctual 4


## claims. Among other damag es, the homeowner s seek attorney fee s incurred i n p ro secuting their statutory and contra ctual claims. I n addition to assailing the m er i t s o f the homeowner s’ liability claims, the insurer asser ts the homeowner s’ at t orney -fe e claims are excessive for a case of
compar able c omplex ity

in the rele vant locality

. A mere two months befor e trial, and near ly a y ear afte r the parties serve d MDL master discovery reque sts, the homeowner s reque sted a trial continuance and soug ht leave to serve additional discovery reg arding the insurer’ s attorney -billing information. Thoug h the insurer is not making a claim for at t o rney fee s, the homeowner s submitt ed (1) three interrog atories reque sting 5 

## hourly ra t es , t o t al amount billed, and total reimbursa ble expenses; and (2) four reque sts for production seeking all billing invoices; pay ment logs, ledg ers, and pay ment summaries; audits; and
any documents perta ining to f lat-ra te billing. The homeowner s asser ted additional discovery was 6

T h e h o m e o w n e r s a l s o s u e d i n d i v i d u a l a d j u s t e r s w h o a r e n o t p a r t i e s t o t h i s p r o c e e d i n g
. 4

T h e i n s u r e r a c k n o w l e d g e s i t m a d e a n o f f e r o f s e t t l e m e n t , w h i c h c o u l d r e s u l t i n t h e i n s u r e r r e c o v e r i n g a t t o r n e y 5 f e e s i n t h e f

u t u r e
. S e e T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 6 7

. I f t h a t e v e n t o c c u r s , h o w e v e r , t h e c i v i l

- p r o c e d u r e r u l e s p e r m i t t h e “ p a r t y a g a i n s t w h o m l i t i g a t i o n c o s t s a r e t o b e a w a r d e d ” t o s e e k l e a v e t o c o n d u c t d i s c o v e r y c o n c e r n i n g t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f t h e c o s t s t o b e r e c o v e r e d

. T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 6 7

. 5 ( b )

.

T h e s p e c i f

i c d i s c o v e r y r e q u e s t s a t i s s u e a r e a s f o l l o w s : 6

I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s :

( 1 ) S t a t e t h e h o u r l y r a t e o f a n y a n d a l l a t t o r n e y s w h o h a v e p r o v i d e d l e g a l s e r v i c e s t o t h i s D e f e n d a n t i n t h i s c a s e ; ( 2 ) S t a t e t h e t o t a l a m o u n t b i l l e d b y e a c h l a w f i r m p r o v i d i n g l e g a l s e r v i c e s t o t h i s D e f e n d a n t i n t h i s c a s e u p t o a n d i n c l u d i n g t h e t i m e o f t r i a l ; a n d

( 3 ) S t a t e t h e t o t a l a m o u n t o f r e i m b u r s a b l e e x p e n s e s i n c u r r e d b y a n y l a w f i r m p r o v i d i n g l e g a l 

## 3

## war

rante d “in light of” expert testimony in Amaro v. National Lloyds Insurance Co. , the first MDL 7


## hailstorm case to proce ed to a jury verdic t. Acc ording to the homeowner s, the insurer’ s attorney fe es and billing information are dis co v er able in the prese nt case s beca use the insurer’ s counsel, Scot Doy en, testified as an attorney -fe e expert in Amaro and admitted on cross-e x amination—albeit over objection—that an opposing party ’s fees could be considered as “a fac tor” in dete rmining a rea sonable fe e re cover

y
. Doy en also used his law firm’s billing prac tices as an example of a proper way to a llocate attorney fee s to avoid an artificia lly inflated fee claim in MDL case s. Prior to Doy en’s testimony in Amaro , 8

s e r v i c e s t o t h i s D e f

e n d a n t i n t h i s c a s e u p t o a n d i n c l u d i n g t h e t i m e o f t r i a l

. R e q u e s t s f

o r P r o d u c t i o n : ( 1 ) P r o d u c e a l l b i l l i n g i n v o i c e s r e c e i v e d b y D e f e n d a n t a n d / o r a n y o f t h e f i r m s t h e n a m e d a t t o r n e y s a r e a f

f i l i a t e d w i t h o r e m p l o y e d b y , i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h i s c a s e ; ( 2 ) P r o d u c e a l l p a y m e n t l o g s , l e d g e r s , o r p a y m e n t s u m m a r i e s s h o w i n g a l l p a y m e n t s p a i d t o D e f e n d a n t s ’ a t t o r n e y s a n d / o r a n y o f t h e f i r m s t h a t t h e n a m e d a t t o r n e y s a r e a f f i l i a t e d w i t h o r e m p l o y e d b y , i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h i s c a s e ;

( 3 ) [ w i t h d r a w n d i s c o v e r y r e q u e s t n o t a t i s s u e i n t h i s a p p e a l ] ; ( 4 ) P l e a s e p r o d u c e a l l d o c u m e n t s t h a t s h o w t h e f l a t r a t e , i f a n y , b e i n g p a i d t o D e f e n s e C o u n s e l a n d / o r a n y o f t h e f i r m s t h a t t h e n a m e d a t t o r n e y s a r e a f f i l i a t e d w i t h o r e m p l o y e d b y , i n c o n n e c t i o n w i t h t h e i r s e r v i c e s o n t h i s c a s e ; a n d

( 5 ) P l e a s e p r o d u c e a l l d o c u m e n t s r e l a t e d t o a u d i t s o f t h e b i l l i n g a n d / o r i n v o i c e s o f D e f e n s e C o u n s e l a n d / o r a n y o f t h e f i r m s t h a t t h e n a m e d a t t o r n e y s a r e a f f i l i a t e d w i t h o r e m p l o y e d b y , w h i c h
w e r e p e r f

o r m e d o n b e h a l f o f D e f e n d a n t i n r e g a r d s t o t h e a t t o r n e y s e r v i c e s r e c e i v e d b y D e f e n d a n t

. T h i s r e q u e s t i s l i m i t e d t o t h e l a s t f i v e ( 5 ) y e a r s
. [ T h e t r i a l c o u r t f u r t h e r l i m i t e d t h i s r e q u e s t t o

“ d o c u m e n t s r e g a r d i n g t h e s p e c i f i c c a s e i n w h i c h t h e r e q u e s t i s p r o p o u n d e d ” ]

. C a u s e N o
. C

- 0 3 0 4

- 1 3

- H ( 2 0 6 t h D i s t

. C t

. , H i d a l g o C o u n t y , T e x . F e b

. 2 7 , 2 0 1 5 )

. 7

D o y e n i n i t i a l l y t e s t i f

i e d : 8

W e l l , I t h i n k t h a t w e h a v e t o l o o k a t t h e t i m e c o m p o n e n t s t h a t a r e i n s o m e o f t h e s e d i f

f e r e n t e n t r i e s
. A n d I w i l l t e l l y o u t h a t

. . . I d o n ’ t [ n e c e s s a r i l y ] t a k e e x c e p t i o n w i t h

. . . t h e a m o u n t o f t i m e t h a t i s i n a g i v e n e n t r y a s m u c h a s I d o a c o u p l e o f t h e m t h a t I t h i n k t h e t i m e s p e n t s h o u l d h a v e b e e n a l l o c a t e d a c r o s s m o r e t h a n j u s t t h e A m a r o f i l e
.

. . . . T h e M o t i o n t o R e m a n d w a s f i l e d i n t h e A m a r o c a s e
. I t w a s a l s o f i l e d i n a b o u t a h u n d r e d o t h e r c a s e s
. 

## 4

## he had been desig nated in the underly ing MDL case as a testify ing expert in opposition to the
homeowner s’ attorne y -fe e re quests.
Ba sed on the rec ord in Amaro , the homeowner s contend Doy en’s expert testimony in these

case s will ne cessa

rily be based on his e x perie nce as the insurer’ s attorney in the same proce eding s and, more to the point, he has admitted that an opposing party ’s fee s are rele vant to the disputed attorney -fe e is s u es
. According ly , the homeowner s arg ue that information about the insurer’ s attorney -fe e expenditures is discover able a nd rele vant to the attorne y -fe e dispute.
The insurer objects on the basis that the reque sted discovery is overly broad and seeks
information that is both irrele vant and protec ted by the attorney -client and work-pr oduct privileg es. Wit h reg ard to rele vancy , the insurer principally relies on its stipulation that it “will not use its own billing invoices rec eived from its attorney s; pay ment logs, ledg ers, or pay ment summaries showing
pay ments t o i t s attorney s; or the hourly fee s or flat rate s being paid to its attorney s; audits of the

W h e n t h e l a w y e r s h o w s u p t o a t t e n d t h a t h e a r i n g , a n d w h a t h a v e t o d o i n o u r f e e b i l l s [ s i c ] , f

o r i n s t a n c e , t h e f

o u r h o u r s f

o r a t t e n d i n g t h e h e a r i n g , I d o n ’ t h a v e a p r o b l e m w i t h

. T h a t ’ s
. . . a r e a s o n a b l e e x p e n d i t u r e o f

t i m e
. B u t , f

o r i n s t a n c e , [ o n ] m y s i d e , t h e l a w y e r t h a t I h a v e t h e r e h a s t o t a k e t h a t a n d t h e n p r o r a t e t h a t o u t o v e r a n u m b e r o f f i l e s
. B e c a u s e y o u c a n ’ t b i l l t h a t f o u r h o u r s t o e v e r y f

i l e , i t w o u l d b e a s t h o u g h y o u w o r k e d f o u r h u n d r e d h o u r s f

o r t h a t h e a r i n g a n d

. . . t h a t w o u l d n e v e r b e r e a s o n a b l e
. S o y o u h a v e t o t a k e t h a t t i m e a n d p r o r a t e i t o u t

. W e d o i t o n o u r s i d e
. . . . A s a p o i n t o f c l a r i f

i c a t i o n , D o y e n l a t e r a d d e d :
O n t h e m o t i o n t o r e m a n d , I t h i n k i t w a s a f o u r - h o u r h e a r i n g t h a t I w a s t a l k i n g a b o u t e a r l i e r , w h a t s t r u c k m e a b o u t t h i s w h e n I r e v i e w e d i t w a s w e p r o r a t e d o u r t i m e a c r o s s e v e r y c a s e o n t h e a p p e n d i x t o w h i c h t h a t

— t h o s e m o t i o n s a p p l y . A n d I c a n n o t s a y t h a t t h e [ p l a i n t i f f s ’ a t t o r n e y s ] d i d t h a t t h e s a m e w a y . I f , i n f a c t , t h e y d i d n o t a n d o n l y b i l l e d i t t o t h e f i l e t h a t w a s f

o r t h a t h e a r i n g , t h e n t h e f o u r h o u r s w o u l d b e a p p r o p r i a t e b e c a u s e t h e y d i d h a v e s o m e b o d y t h e r e f o r t h a t p e r i o d o f t i m e
. A n d I d o n ’ t k n o w h o w i t w a s b i l l e d i n s i d e t h e i r s y s t e m , i f

— a n d t h e y ’ v e p u t i t o n h e r e w i t h r e g a r d t o i t b e i n g t h i s f i l e a n d t h i s f i l e a l o n e
. I f

i t w a s b i l l e d t h e r e , t h e n I t h i n k t h a t ’ s c o m p l e t e l y a p p r o p r i a t e t o d o
. A n d

. . . I d o n ’ t h a v e a n y i n d i c a t i o n [ t h a t ] t h e y d i d o v e r b i l l i t

. A n d i f I c r e a t e d t h a t i m p r e s s i o n , t h e n I a p o l o g i z e f o r t h a t

. B u t w h a t s t r u c k m e w a s t h e w a y w e d i d i t

. W e p r o r a t e d i t o u t a c r o s s e v e r y o n e , b u t i t h a s o c c u r r e d t o m e t h a t t h e y m a y n o t h a v e d o n e i t t h a t w a y . T h e y m a y h a v e g o n e a n d b i l l e d i t t o j u s t t h a t o n e
. I f t h a t ’ s t h e c a s e , t h e n i t ’ s c e r t a i n l y a p p r o p r i a t e t o d o s o
. 

## 5

## billing and invoice s of its attorney s to contest the reasonablene ss of [ the homeowne rs’] attorney ’s

fee s.” After two non-evide ntiary hear ings, a discovery specia l master rec ommended that (1) an opponent’s attorney -billing information is, as a g ener al proposition, rele vant to the rea sonablene ss of an attorney -fe e reque st in the same case ; (2) to the extent the discovery reque sts in this case seek
materia l from an expert witness on the attorney -fe e issue, the information falls within the scope of permissible discovery under Texas R u le of Civil Procedur e 192.3(e) ; (3) some of the discovery
reque sts should be more narr owly tailored, but the insurer’ s objections to the discovery reque sts as modified should be overr

uled; and (4) “[s] pecif

ic rec ords may be reda cted for content protec ted by

an appropr iate privileg e.” Adopting these rec ommendat i ons, the MDL pretria l court order ed the
insurer to re spond to the discovery reque sts. The court o f ap p eals denied the insurer’ s petition for mandamus relief

. Whil e the court 9


## acknow ledg ed that an opposing party ’s attorney -billing in fo rmation may be irrele vant in a g iven

case , the court conclude d the discovery order was not an abuse of discretion in the underly ing case s 1 0


## beca use (1) an opposing party ’s attorney fee s are ger m an e to at least two fac tors that inform the
“re aso n ab l e an d n ece ssary ” attorney -fe e inquiry , as set forth in Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry

2 0 1 5 W L 4 3 8 0 9 2 9 , a t * 6 ,

_ _ _ S

. W

. 3 d

_ _ _ ( T e x . A p p
. — C o r p u s C h r i s t i 2 0 1 5 )

. 9

I d

. a t * 4 ( c i t i n g M C

I T e l e c o m m s
. C o r

p
. v
. C r o w l e

y , 8 9 9 S

. W

. 2 d 3 9 9 , 4 0 3

- 0 4 ( T e x . A p p
. — F o r t W o r t h 1 9 9 5 , 10
o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) )

. 

## 6

## Equipment Corp. ; (2) the Arthur Andersen fac tors are expli citly nonexclusive; (3) the insurer’ s 1 1 1 2 

## desig nated expert witness previously testified he based his opinion on his own persona l experience
in de fending the same case in which he was testify ing as an expert; (4) the reque sted information 1 3


## i s wi t h i n the permissible scope of expert-witness discovery , as provided by Rule 192.3(e) ; and 1 4 

## (5) the insurer produce d no evidenc e that reda ction would be insufficient to protec t its privileg es. 1 5


## I n this orig inal proce eding , the insurer primarily relies on sever al lower- court case s decla ring
information about a party ’s attorney -fe e expenditures is “pate ntly irrele vant” to an opposing party ’s attorney -fe e claim. The insurer maintains that the Arthur Andersen fac tors d o not contemplate 1 6 

## discovery of an opposing party ’s attorney -billing inf o rm at i o n , arg uing those fac tors are text ually
direc ted only to evidenc e about the claimant’s attorney fee s. The insurer also rea sserts its privileg e objections and d i s p u t es t h at its attorney fee s are at issue in this litigation by virtue of the Amaro litigation.

I d

. a t * 5 ( c i t i n g 9 4 5 S

. W

. 2 d 8 1 2 , 8 1 9 ( T e x . 1 9 9 7 ) a n d T E X
. D IS C IP L IN A R Y R

. P R O F ’ L C O N D U C T 1

. 0 4 ( a ) , 11
r e p r i n t e d i n T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E t i t

. 2 , s u b t i t

. G , a p p
. A )

.

I d

. a t * 4 ( c i t i n g E l A p

p l e I , L t d

. v
. O l i v a s , 3 7 0 S

. W

. 3 d 7 5 7 , 7 6 1 ( T e x . 2 0 1 2 ) )

. 12

I d

. a t * 4

- 5

. 13

I d

. a t * 5

. 14

I d

. 15

S e e I n r e T e x
. M u t

. I

n s
. C o
. , 3 5 8 S

. W

. 3 d 8 6 9 , 8 7 2 n
. 3 ( T e x . A p p
. — D a l l a s 2 0 1 2 , o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ; I n r e A I G 16 A v i a t i o n (

T e x
. ) , I n c
. , N o
. 0 4

- 0 4

- 0 0 2 9 1

- C V , 2 0 0 4 W L 1 1 6 6 5 6 0 , a t * 1 ( T e x . A p p
. — S a n A n t o n i o M a y 2 6 , 2 0 0 4 , o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ( m e m
. o p
. ) ; M C I T e l e c o m m s
. C o r

p
. v
. C r o w l e

y , 8 9 9 S

. W

. 2 d 3 9 9 , 4 0 3

- 0 4 ( T e x . A p p
. — F o r t W o r t h 1 9 9 5 , o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ; s e e a l s o D u i n i n c k B r o s
. , I n c
. v
. H o w e P r e c a s t

, I n c
. , N o
. 4 : 0 6

- C V 4 4 1 , 2 0 0 8 W L 4 4 1 1 6 4 1 , a t * 2 ( E

. D

. T e x . S e p t

. 2 3 , 2 0 0 8 )

. 

## 7

## Rely ing on authority from other jurisdictions, the homeowner s argue trial courts have

discretion to order disclosure of an opposing party ’s attorney -fe e information and could permissibly compel production in this case
. I n addition to citing counsel’s role as a testify ing expert in this case and Amaro as supporting the trial cour t’s discovery order , the hom eowne rs rely on the conc urring opinion in El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas , which descr ibes an opposing party ’s attorney fee s as a “sure r 1 7 

## indicator[] ” of the rea sonablene ss of a fee reque st. Wit h reg ard to privileg e, the homeowner s point
to a dear th of evidenc e that reda ction would be ineffe ctive to protec t any applicable privileg es and
arg ue, in the alterna tive, that attorney -billing information is not privileg ed as a matter of law or on the re cord be fore the Court.
Ger mania Fa rm Mutual I nsuranc e Association filed an amicus brief supporting the insurer.
Ge rm an i a i s a defe ndant in other case s pending befor e the MDL pretria l court and asser ts th e plaintiffs in those case s are seeking near ly identical discovery from Ger mania even though
“Ge rmania’ s counsel has not testified about attorney ’s fe es in any MDL case or otherwise done
any thing to put Ger

mania’s a ttorney ’s fe es at issue.”

II. Discussion
A. Standard of

Review
A trial court g ener ally

has discre tion to determine the scope of discovery

. Howeve r, “[a] 1 8 

## discovery order that compels production bey ond the rules of proce dure is an abuse of discretion for

3 7 0 S

. W

. 3 d a t 7 6 6 ( H E C H T , J

. , c o n c u r r i n g )

. 17

I n r e C S X C o r p
. , 1 2 4 S

. W

. 3 d 1 4 9 , 1 5 2 ( T e x . 2 0 0 3 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g )

. 18 

## 8

## which mandamus is the proper reme dy .” Under o ur proce dural rules, the scope of discovery 1 9


## extends to “any matter that is not privileg ed and is rele vant to th e s ubject matter of the pending
action.” Mandamus relief is appropr iate when, as in this case , a trial court compels production of

2 0


## irrele vant information or information that is rele v ant but privileg ed. Be cause either condition 2 1


## suffice s to war

rant mandamus relief

, we first consider whether the reque sted inform at i o n i s privileg ed.
B. Pr ivilege The insurer asser

ted two privileg es in response to the discovery reque sts: the attorney -client privileg e and attorney work-pr oduct privileg e. Analog izi ng to our analy sis in National Union Fire
Insurance Co. v. Valdez , we hold that a reque st to produce all billing rec ords invades a party ’s 2 2 

## work-pr oduct privileg e beca use, cumulatively , billing rec ords constitute a mecha nical compilation
of informa tion that, at least incidentally , reve als an a ttorney ’s strateg y and thoug ht proce sses. 1. Legal-Repre sentation P rivileges The a ttorney -client privileg e protec ts c ommunications be tween attorney and client that are (1 ) n o t intended to be disclosed to third parties and (2) made for the purpose of fac ilitating th e

I n r e N a t ’ l L l o y d s I

n s
. C o
. , 5 0 7 S

. W

. 3 d 2 1 9 , 2 2 4 ( T e x . 2 0 1 6 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ( q u o t i n g I n r e N a t ’ l L l o y d s 19 I n s
. C o
. , 4 4 9 S

. W

. 3 d 4 8 6 , 4 8 8 ( T e x . 2 0 1 4 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) )

.

T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 2

. 3 ( a ) ; s e e a l s o I n r e C S X C o r p
. , 1 2 4 S

. W

. 3 d a t 1 5 2

. 20

S e e , e
. g
. , I

n r e N a t ’ l L l o y d s I

n s
. C o
. , 5 0 7 S

. W

. 3 d a t 2 2 4

- 2 5 ( g r a n t i n g m a n d a m u s r e l i e f w h e n t r i a l c o u r t 21
o r d e r e d d i s c o v e r y o f i r r e l e v a n t i n f o r m a t i o n ) ; I

n r e L i v i n g C t r s
. o

f T e x
. , I n c
. , 1 7 5 S

. W

. 3 d 2 5 3 , 2 5 6 ( T e x . 2 0 0 5 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ( g r a n t i n g m a n d a m u s r e l i e f w h e n t r i a l c o u r t o r d e r e d d i s c o v e r y o f p r i v i l e g e d i n f o r m a t i o n )

. 8 6 3 S

. W

. 2 d 4 5 8 , 4 6 0

- 6 1 ( T e x . 1 9 9 3 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g )

. 22 

## 9

## rendition of prof essional leg al servic es. The privileg e promotes f ree discourse betwee n attorney 2 3 

## and client, ther eby

advanc ing the eff

ective a dminist ration of justice. 2 4


## “The work product privileg e is broade r than the attorney -client privileg e.” The discovery 2 5


## rules def ine “wor k product” as: (1) materia l prepa

red or mental impressions develo ped in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for a par ty or a pa rty ’s re prese ntatives . . . ; or (2) a communication made in anticipation of litigation or for trial betwee n a party and the party ’s repr esenta tives or among a party ’s repr esenta tives, including the party ’s attorney s [and] consultants. 2 6


## Certain matters are expressly excluded from the definition of “wor k product,” howeve r, and are not
p ro t ec t ed fr om discovery even if made or prepa red in anticipation of litigation or for trial. The 2 7



## car ve-outs include “informa tion discovera ble under Rule 192.3 conce rning experts, trial witnesses, witness statements, and c ontentions.” 2 8


## “The primary purpose of the work product rule is to shelter the mental proce sses, conclusions, and leg al theories of the attorney , providing a privileg ed are a within which the lawy er

can analy ze and prepa

re his or her case .” Core work product—wor k product that co n t ai n s “the 2 9

T E X
. R

. E V ID
. 5 0 3 ( a ) ( 5 ) , ( b ) ( 1 )

. 23

P a x t o n v
. C i t

y o f D a l l

. , 5 0 9 S

. W

. 3 d 2 4 7 , 2 5 0 ( T e x . 2 0 1 7 )

. 24

I n r e B e x a r C t

y
. C r i m
. D i s t

. A t t o r n e

y ’ s O f f i c e , 2 2 4 S

. W

. 3 d 1 8 2 , 1 8 6 ( T e x . 2 0 0 7 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g )

. 25

T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 2

. 5 ( a )

. 26

T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 2

. 5 ( c ) ( 1 )

- ( 5 )

. 27

T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 2

. 5 ( c ) ( 1 )

. 28

O w e n s - C o r n i n g F i b e r g l a s C o r p
. v
. C a l d w e l l , 8 1 8 S

. W

. 2 d 7 4 9 , 7 5 0 ( T e x . 1 9 9 1 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g )

. 29 

## 10

## mental impress i o n s , o pinions, conclusions, or leg al theories” of an attorney or an attorney ’s

repr esenta tive—is not discovera ble. A trial court may order disclosure of noncore work 3 0 

## product—d e f

in e d a s “[a]ny other work product” that is not core work product—only if the reque sting party shows substantial need and undue hardship. I n such a case , the t ri al court may order 3 1


## disclosure even if doing so “incidenta lly discloses by infere nce attorney mental proce sses otherwise protec ted [as core work product],” but “the court must—insofar as possible— p rot ect ag ainst
disclosure of the mental impressions, opinions, conclusions, or legal theories not otherwise
discovera ble.” 3 2


## The party asser

ting a privileg e in opposition to a discovery reque st “must establish by testimony or aff

idavit a prima fac ie case for the privileg e,” althoug h “[t] he party need produce ‘only
the m inimum quantum o f ev i dence nece ssary to support a rational infere nce that the allega tion of
fac t is true.’” I n limit ed circ umstances, “the documents themselves may , standing alone, constitute

3 3

T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 2

. 5 ( b ) ( 1 )

. 30

T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 2

. 5 ( b ) ( 2 )

. 31

T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 2

. 5 ( b ) ( 3 ) , ( 4 )

. 32

I n r e M e m ’ l H e r m a n n H o s p
. S y s
. , 4 6 4 S

. W

. 3 d 6 8 6 , 6 9 8 ( T e x . 2 0 1 5 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ( i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n s 33
r e m o v e d ) ( q u o t i n g I

n r e E

. I

. D u P o n t d e N e m o u r s & C o
. , 1 3 6 S

. W

. 3 d 2 1 8 , 2 2 3 ( T e x . 2 0 0 4 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ) ; s e e T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 3

. 4

. 

## 11

## sufficie nt proof” to establish a claimed privileg e. Additionally , we have held that “evide nce may 3 4 

## not alway s be nec essar

y to support a claim of pr otection from discove ry .” 3 5 

## 2. The Requested Docum ents, Collect ively, Are Work P roduct
We have describe d the work-product privil ege as encompa ssing “two rela ted but differ ent

conce pts”: First, the privileg e protects the attorney ’s t houg ht pro ce ss, which includes strateg y decisions and issue f

ormulation. . . . Second, the privileg e prote cts the mec hanica l compilation of information to t he extent such compilation reve als the attorney ’s thought pr ocesse s. 3 6 

## Billing rec ords constitute “communica tion[ s] made in anticipation of litigation or for trial betwee n

a party and the party ’s repr esenta tives or among a party ’s repr esenta tives.” Moreove r, as a whole,

3 7


## b i l l ing rec ords repr esent the mecha nical compilation of information that reve als counsel’s lega l strateg y and thoug ht proce sses, at lea st incidentally

. Conceptually , the matter is simil ar to the issue we consider ed in National Union Fire
Insurance Co. v. Valdez , which involved a discovery reque st for an attorney ’s entire litigation file. 3 8


## We observed tha t “[t] he org anization of the file, as w ell as the decision as to what to include in it,

nece ssarily reve als the attorney ’s thought proce sses conce rning the pro s ecution or defe nse of the

case ” and that, if such information wer e discovera ble, an attorney would “be restric t ed in the

S t a t e v
. L o w r

y , 8 0 2 S

. W

. 2 d 6 6 9 , 6 7 1 ( T e x . 1 9 9 1 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g )

. 34

I n r e U n i o n P a c
. R e s
. C o
. , 2 2 S

. W

. 3 d 3 3 8 , 3 4 1 ( T e x . 1 9 9 9 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g )

. 35

O c c i d e n t a l C h e m
. C o r p
. v
. B a n a l e s , 9 0 7 S

. W

. 2 d 4 8 8 , 4 9 0 ( T e x . 1 9 9 5 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g )

. 36

T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 2

. 5 ( a ) ( 2 )

. 37

8 6 3 S

. W

. 2 d 4 5 8 , 4 6 0

- 6 1 ( T e x . 1 9 9 3 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g )

. 38 

## 12

## org anization and maintenanc e of his or her files by the prospec t that they might have to be reve aled

in their entirety .” We thus held (1) an attorney ’s litigation file g oes to the hear t of the work-pr oduct 3 9 

## privileg e, (2) “an attorney ’s selec tion and order ing of documents in anticipation of litigation is protec ted work product even wher e the individual documents are not privileg ed,” and (3) a party is
there fore preve nted “fr om reque sting the entire file, which is almost cer tain to encompa ss numerous irrele vant and immater ial documents . . . as we ll as privileg ed informa tion.” 4 0


## A reque st for all billing invoices, p ay ment logs, pay

ment ledg ers, pay

ment summaries,
documents showing flat rate s, and audits is analog ous to the reque st in Valdez for an attorney ’s entire litigation file. These billing rec ords—which are g ener ated in anticipation of litigation and trial—are
“almost cer

tain to encompa ss numerous irrele vant and immaterial documents.” W h en a party 4 1


## neither seeks to rec over its own att o rney fee s nor attempts to use its attorney -billing rec ords to challeng e the opposing party ’s attorney fee s, the party ’s attorney should n o t b e restric ted in the
prepa ration or prese ntment of hi s or her billing records by the prospect that they might have t o be

reve aled in their entirety

. Fur ther, these billing rec ords, which are useful to the reque sting party only
if t hey descr ibe what the attorney has done in the case , reve al the attorney ’s thought proce sses

conce rning the prosec ution or defe nse of the c ase. For example, billing rec ords reve al when and wher e attorney s strateg ically deploy a client’s

resour ces; which issues were ad d ressed by experience d lawy ers as compar ed to less experience d

I d

. a t 4 6 0

. 39

I d

. a t 4 6 0

- 6 1 ; s e e a l s o B a n a l e s , 9 0 7 S

. W

. 2 d a t 4 9 0

. 40

V a l d e z , 8 6 3 S

. W

. 2 d a t 4 6 1

. 41 

## 13

## counsel; the subject-matter expertise of an attorney working on a particula r aspec t of the case ; a

nd
who was hired as consultants—including consulting experts and jury consultants—and when. This
information provides detailed information reg arding a party ’s litigation decisions and also
illumi nates the rela tive signific ance of or conce rn about particula r matters. Especia lly when a party is a repe at litigant, as the insurer is here , decisions reve aled throug h billing rec ords re p re s en t strateg ic choice s and are piece s of “an overa ll leg al strateg y for all the case s in which it is involved,”
which a party must be allowed to develop without intrusion. Discover y of billing rec ords in their 4 2 

## entirety would provide a roadma p of how the insurer plans to litigate not only this particula r case but
also other MDL

case s. The homeowners arg ue that reda ction of privileg ed mater ial, which the tria l court allowed
in this case , should be sufficie nt to protec t any privileg ed information. Howeve r, in Valdez , we held
the attorney ’s entire litigation file is privileg ed per s e, re g ardle ss of whether unprivileg ed
information i s included in the file. We conclude tha t Valdez ’s core analy sis applies here as well 4 3 

## and log ically

applies eve n if privileg ed informa tion within t he re quested re cords is re dacte d.
We also conclude that reda cting privileg ed information—such as t h e specific topics

rese arc hed or the descr iptions of the subject of phone calls—would be insufficient as a matter of law
to mask the attorney ’s thought proce sses and strateg ies. The chronolog ical nature of billing rec ords

O w e n s - C o r n i n g F i b e r

g l a s C o r p
. v
. C a l d w e l l , 8 1 8 S

. W

. 2 d 7 4 9 , 7 5 1 ( T e x . 1 9 9 1 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g )

. 42

S e e 8 6 3 S

. W

. 2 d a t 4 6 0 ( “ [ E ] v e n i f s o m e o f t h e d o c u m e n t s i n t h e l a w f i r m f i l e s w o u l d n o t o t h e r w i s e b e 43 p r i v i l e g e d , p r o d u c t i o n o f a n a t t o r n e y ’ s e n t i r e f

i l e n e c e s s a r i l y r e v e a l s t h e a t t o r n e y ’ s m e n t a l p r o c e s s e s
. ” ) ; s e e a l s o L e w i s v
. W i t t i g , 8 7 7 S

. W

. 2 d 5 2 , 5 7 ( T e x . A p p
. — H o u s t o n [ 1 4 t h D i s t

. ] 1 9 9 4 , o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ( “ A n a t t o r n e y ’ s ‘ e n t i r e f i l e ’ i s w o r k

- p r o d u c t p r i v i l e g e d p e r s e , s u b j e c t t o w a i v e r t h r o u g h o f f e n s i v e u s e
. T h i s , w e b e l i e v e , i s t h e c e n t r a l h o l d i n g o f V a l d e z . ” )

. 

## 14

## re v ea l s when, how, and what resour ces were deploy ed. Wit h this knowledg e, a party in the s am e

proce eding could deduc e litiga tion strateg y

as to specif

ic or g lobal matters. Ag g reg ate fee summaries also reve al strateg ic choice s. When litiga tion is pending , the discovery rules impose a duty to amend or supplement discovery throug hout litigation. A drama tic 4 4


## incre ase in mid-lit i gat i on spending could imply an upcoming filing or signific ant rese arc h expenditures rela ted to eleva ted conce rns over rec ent litigation events. For these rea sons, reda ction 4 5


## would be inade quate to prote ct the wor k-produc t nature of

the total billing information.
Fur ther, objections and disputes reg arding what should be reda cted based on privileg e would
lead to collater al l i t i gat i on over attorney -fe e claims, with the i ssues likely to rec ur t hroug hout the litigation as discovery is amende d or supplemented. As the United S tates Supreme Court admonished i n Hensley v. Eckerhart , “[ a] reque st for attorney ’s fees s hould not result i n a second major litiga tion.” 4 6


## We there fore hold that reque sts for production of all billing invoices, pay ment logs, pay

ment ledg ers, pay

ment summaries, documents showing flat ra t es , and audits invade the zone of work-pr oduct protec tion. Our holding does not preve nt a more narr owly tailo re d re q u est for

T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 3

. 5

. 44

S e e L

. A

. C t

y
. B d

. o f S u p e r v i s o r s v
. S u

p e r
. C t

. , 3 8 6 P

. 3 d 7 7 3 , 7 8 1 ( C a l

. 2 0 1 6 ) ( “ W h e n a l e g a l m a t t e r r e m a i n s 45 p e n d i n g a n d a c t i v e , t h e p r i v i l e g e e n c o m p a s s e s e v e r y t h i n g i n a n i n v o i c e , i n c l u d i n g t h e a m o u n t o f a g g r e g a t e f e e s
. T h i s i s b e c a u s e , e v e n t h o u g h t h e a m o u n t o f m o n e y p a i d f o r l e g a l s e r v i c e s i s g e n e r a l l y n o t p r i v i l e g e d , a n i n v o i c e t h a t s h o w s a s u d d e n u p t i c k i n s p e n d i n g ‘ m i g h t v e r y w e l l r e v e a l m u c h o f [ a g o v e r n m e n t a g e n c y ] ’ s i n v e s t i g a t i v e e f f o r t s a n d t r i a l s t r a t e g y . ’ M i d l i t i g a t i o n s w i n g s i n s p e n d i n g , f o r e x a m p l e , c o u l d r e v e a l a n i m p e n d i n g f i l i n g o r o u t s i z e d c o n c e r n a b o u t a r e c e n t e v e n t

. ” ( q u o t i n g M i t c h e l l v
. S u p e r
. C t

. , 6 9 1 P

. 2 d 6 4 2 , 6 4 6 ( C a l

. 1 9 8 4 ) ) )

. 4 6 1 U

. S

. 4 2 4 , 4 3 7 ( 1 9 8 3 ) ; s e e a l s o C o s t a v
. S e a r s H o m e I m p r o v e m e n t P r o d s
. , I

n c
. , 1 7 8 F

. S u p p
. 3 d 1 0 8 , 1 1 4 46 ( W

. D

. N

. Y

. 2 0 1 6 ) ( c o n c l u d i n g t h a t r e q u i r i n g p r o d u c t i o n o f d e f e n d a n t s ’ b i l l i n g r e c o r d s t o s u p p o r t t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f p l a i n t i f f ’ s a t t o r n e y - f

e e r e q u e s t w o u l d i n c r e a s e e x p e n s e s , l e a d t o v a r i o u s p r i v i l e g e o b j e c t i o n s , a n d r e s u l t i n a s e c o n d m a j o r l i t i g a t i o n t h a t c o u r t s s h o u l d e n d e a v o r t o a v o i d )

. 

## 15

## information rele vant to an issue in a pending case that does n o t i n v ad e the attorney ’s strateg ic

decisions or thought proce sses. Nor does our holding prec lude a party from seeking noncore work 4 7 

## product “upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materia ls in the
prepa ration of the party ’s case and that the party is unable without und u e h ardship to obtain the
substantial equivalent of the materia l by other means.” But, here , the rec ord bear s no evidenc e of 4 8


## either.
We acknow ledg e that an opposing party may waive its work-pro d u ct p rivileg e throug h
offe nsive use—per

haps by rely ing on its billing re cords to conte st the reasonablene ss of opposi ng counsel’s attorney fee s or to rec over its own attorney fee s. But in this case , the in s u rer has 4 9 

## stipulated it will not use its own billing rec ords to contest the homeowner s’ attorney fee s. Nor is the
insurer seeking to rec over its own attorney fee s from the homeowner s. Although the court of appea ls
indicated the insurer could seek attorney fee s in the future based on a R ule 167 s ettlement offer, 5 0


## the offe r-of

-settlement rule provides a proce ss for reope ning discovery to enable a party to asce rtain
the re asonable ness of the r equeste d costs. 5 1

C f

. V a l d e z , 8 6 3 S

. W

. 2 d a t 4 6 1 ( “ O u r d e c i s i o n t o d a y d o e s n o t p r e v e n t a p a r t y f r o m r e q u e s t i n g s p e c i f

i c 47 d o c u m e n t s o r c a t e g o r i e s o f d o c u m e n t s r e l e v a n t t o i s s u e s i n a p e n d i n g c a s e , e v e n t h o u g h s o m e o r a l l o f t h e d o c u m e n t s m a y b e c o n t a i n e d i n a n a t t o r n e y ’ s f i l e s
. I t d o e s , h o w e v e r , p r e v e n t a p a r t y f r o m r e q u e s t i n g t h e e n t i r e f i l e
. ” )

. T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 2

. 5 ( b ) ( 2 )

. 48

S e e V a l d e z , 8 6 3 S

. W

. 2 d a t 4 6 1

- 6 2 ; s e e a l s o R e p u b l i c I n s
. C o
. v
. D a v i s , 8 5 6 S

. W

. 2 d 1 5 8 , 1 6 4 ( T e x . 1 9 9 3 ) 49 ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ( h o l d i n g a p a r t y m a y w a i v e t h e a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t p r i v i l e g e t h r o u g h o f f e n s i v e u s e ) ; O w e n s - C o r n i n g F i b e r g l a s C o r p
. v
. C a l d w e l l , 8 1 8 S

. W

. 2 d 7 4 9 , 7 5 2 ( T e x . 1 9 9 1 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ( o b s e r v i n g a p a r t y m a y w a i v e t h e w o r k

- p r o d u c t p r i v i l e g e t h r o u g h o f f e n s i v e u s e )

. 2 0 1 5 W L 4 3 8 0 9 2 9 , a t * 3 ,

_ _ _ S

. W

. 3 d

_ _ _ ,

_ _ _ ( T e x . A p p
. — C o r p u s C h r i s t i 2 0 1 5 )

. 50

T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 6 7

. 5 ( b )

. 51 

## 16

## I n descr ibing billing rec ords as work product when reque sted en masse, we do not fore close

the possibili ty that some or all of the information may also be protec ted from compelled disclosure by the attorney -client priv i l ege
. But to be protec ted by the attorney -client privileg e, the insurer 5 2



## m u s t es t ablish that the communications wer e confide ntial and made to fac ilitate the rendition o f profe ssional leg al service s to the client. The insurer failed, howeve r, to “esta blish [a prima fac ie case for the privileg e] by testimony or aff idavit” or ev en b y “o n l y the minimum quantum of evidenc e

nece ssary to support a ra tional infere nce tha t the alleg ation of fa ct is true.” 5 3


## C. Rele vance Although we conclude the reque sted documents are protec ted by the work-pr oduct privileg e, fac tual information is not exempt from discovery by mere inclusion within protec ted documents. 5 4


## Acc ording ly , we must a lso c onsider whether interrog atories that reque st hourly rate s, total amount billed, and total reimbursa ble expenses seek discovera ble information. Thoug h the parties disag ree about whether the reque sted fac tual information is privileg ed, even unprivileg ed information is not discovera ble unless the informa tion is relevant.

S e e , e
. g
. , L

. A

. C t

y
. B d

. o f S u p e r v i s o r s v
. S u

p e r
. C t

. , 3 8 6 P

. 3 d 7 7 3 , 7 8 1 ( C a l

. 2 0 1 6 ) ( h o l d i n g t h a t “ [ w ] h e n a 52 l e g a l m a t t e r r e m a i n s p e n d i n g a n d a c t i v e , t h e [ a t t o r n e y - c l i e n t ] p r i v i l e g e e n c o m p a s s e s e v e r y t h i n g i n a n [ a t t o r n e y ’ s ] i n v o i c e , i n c l u d i n g t h e a m o u n t o f a g g r e g a t e f e e s ” )

. B u t s e e P a t o n v
. G E I C O G e n
. I n s
. C o
. , 1 9 0 S o
. 3 d 1 0 4 7 , 1 0 5 2 ( F l a
. 2 0 1 6 ) ( h o l d i n g t h a t “ t h e e n t i r e t y o f t h e b i l l i n g r e c o r d s a r e n o t p r i v i l e g e d , a n d w h e r e t h e t r i a l c o u r t s p e c i f i c a l l y s t a t e s t h a t a n y p r i v i l e g e d i n f

o r m a t i o n m a y b e r e d a c t e d , t h e p l a i n t i f f s h o u l d n o t b e r e q u i r e d t o m a k e a n a d d i t i o n a l s p e c i a l s h o w i n g t o o b t a i n t h e r e m a i n i n g r e l e v a n t , n o n - p r i v i l e g e d i n f o r m a t i o n ” )

. I n r e M e m ’ l H e r m a n n H o s p
. S y s
. , 4 6 4 S

. W

. 3 d 6 8 6 , 6 9 8 ( T e x . 2 0 1 5 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ( c i t i n g I n r e L i v i n g 53 C t r s
. o f T e x
. , 1 7 5 S

. W

. 3 d 2 5 3 , 2 6 1 ( T e x . 2 0 0 5 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) , a n d S t a t e v
. L o w r y , 8 0 2 S

. W

. 2 d 6 6 9 , 6 7 1 ( T e x . 1 9 9 1 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) , a n d q u o t i n g I n r e E

. I

. D u P o n t d e N

e m o u r s & C o
. , 1 3 6 S

. W

. 3 d 2 1 8 , 2 2 3 ( T e x . 2 0 0 4 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ) ; s e e a l s o T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 3

. 4

.

C f

. V a l d e z , 8 6 3 S

. W

. 2 d a t 4 6 0 ( n o t i n g a d o c u m e n t i s n o t p r i v i l e g e d s i m p l y b e c a u s e i t i s c o n t a i n e d i n a n 54
a t t o r n e y ’ s f

i l e s ) ; O w e n s - C o r n i n g , 8 1 8 S

. W

. 2 d a t 7 5 0 n
. 2 ( “ W h i l e a n a t t o r n e y m u s t b e a l l o w e d t o w o r k w i t h a d e g r e e o f p r i v a c y , t h e p r o t e c t i o n g r a n t e d u n d e r t h e w o r k p r o d u c t d o c t r i n e d o e s n o t e x t e n d t o f a c t s t h e a t t o r n e y m a y a c q u i r e
. ” )

. 

## 17

## We hold the reque sted information is g ener ally not r eleva nt beca use (1) the opposing party
may fre ely choose to spe nd more or less time or money than would be “re asonable ” in compar ison
to the reque sting party ; (2) compar isons betwee n the hourly rate s and fee expenditures of opposing parties are inapt, as differ ing motivations of pl ai n t i ff s and defe ndants impact the time and labor spent, hourly

rate char g ed, and skill requir ed; (3) “ the tasks and roles of counsel on opposite sides

o f a case vary fundame ntally ,” so even in the same case , the leg al service s rende red to o p p o s i n g parties are not fairly char acte rized as “simi lar” ; an d (4 ) a si ng le l aw firm’s fee s and hourly rate s 5 5


## do not deter

m ine t he “customary” rang e of fee s in a given locality for sim ilar services. Howeve r, when a party uses i ts “own hours and rates as y ardsticks by which to assess the rea sonabl en es s of
those soug ht by [t h e reque sting party ]” or seeks to shift responsibility for those expenditures, the party place s its own attorney -billing infor mation at issue, making the information discove rable

. 5 6 

## 1. Scope of Discovery
T h e scope of discovery extends to any unprivileg ed information that is “re leva n t t o t h e subject matter” of the pending action, even if inadmissible at trial, so long as the information soug ht “appe ars rea sonably calc ulated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidenc e.” We broadly 5 7


## construe the phrase “re levant to th e s u b ject matter” t o provide li tiga nts the opportuni ty “to obt ain

M c C l a i n v
. L u

f k i n I n d u s
. , I n c
. , 6 4 9 F

. 3 d 3 7 4 , 3 8 4 ( 5 t h C i r
. 2 0 1 1 )

. 55

M e n d e z v
. R a d e c C o r p
. , 8 1 8 F

. S u p p
. 2 d 6 6 7 , 6 6 9 ( W

. D

. N

. Y

. 2 0 1 1 )

. 56

T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 2

. 3 ( a )

. 57 

## 18

## the fullest knowledg e of the fac ts a nd issues prior to tr ial.” Evidence is r eleva nt if “(a ) it has any 5 8


## tendenc y to make a fac t more or less probable than it would be without the evidenc e; and (b) the fac t is of conseque nce in deter mining the action.” Although the scope of discovery is broad, a reque st 5 9


## for information “must show a rea sonable expectat i o n o f obtaining information that will aid the dispute’s resolution.” 6 0


## The discovery g uidepos t s ca n be summarized as follows: only rele vant evidenc e is
discovera ble; rele vant evidenc e that is privileg ed is not discovera ble; rele vant evidenc e that is not privileg ed is discovera

ble when (i) it is admissible or (ii) it is inadmissible but rea sonably calc ulated
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidenc e; and failing either of those admissibili ty criter ia, the
reque st for discovery may be denied even if the reque sted information is rele vant and unprivileg ed.
We turn now to the pertinent inquiry : whether information about opposing counsel’s hourly
rate s, total fee s, and total reimbursa ble expenses is rele vant and rea sonably calc ulated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidenc e even when those expenditures are not independe ntly at issue in the litigation, as is the ca se her e.

F o r d M o t o r C o
. v
. C a s t i l l o , 2 7 9 S

. W

. 3 d 6 5 6 , 6 6 4 ( T e x . 2 0 0 9 ) ( q u o t i n g A x e l s o n , I n c
. v
. M c I l h a n y , 7 9 8 5 8 S

. W

. 2 d 5 5 0 , 5 5 3 ( T e x . 1 9 9 0 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ) ; s e e a l s o I n r e N a t ’ l L l o y d s I

n s
. C o
. , 4 4 9 S

. W

. 3 d 4 8 6 , 4 8 8 ( T e x . 2 0 1 4 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g )

.

T E X
. R

. E V ID
. 4 0 1

. 59

I n r e C S X C o r p
. , 1 2 4 S

. W

. 3 d 1 4 9 , 1 5 2 ( T e x . 2 0 0 3 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g )

. 60 

## 19

## 2. Establi shin g Reasonable and Nec essary At torney F ees

We beg in by considering the issue to which the reque sted information is purportedly
rele vant—the homeowne rs’ c laim for re imbursement of re asonable and nec essar y attorney fee s. “Te x as follows the Americ an rule on attorney ’s fee s, which provides that, g ener ally , ‘a party
may not rec over attorney ’s fee s unless authorized by statute or co n t ra ct

. ’” When fee -shifting is 6 1 

## authorized, the party seeking to rec over those fee s bear s t h e b u rd en of establishing the fee s are

reas o n ab le and nece ssary
. This inquiry require s consideration of eig ht nonexclusive fac tors 6 2


## articula ted in Arthur Andersen & Co. v. Perry E quipment Corp. : 1. the time and labor require d, the novelty and difficu l t y of the questions involved, and the skill require d to perfor m the leg al servic e prope rly ; 2. the likelih o o d

. . . acc eptanc e of the particula r employ ment will prec lude other e mploy

ment by the lawy er; 3. the fe e customar ily char g ed in the loca lity

for similar leg al servic es; 4. the amount involved and the r esults obtained;
5. the time limit ations imposed by the client or by

the circ umstances; 6. the nature and leng th of the prof essional re lationship with t he client;
7. the experience , r e putation, and ability of the lawy er or lawy ers perf orming the service s; and

W h e e l a b r a t o r A i r P o l l u t i o n C o n t r o l , I n c
. v
. C i t

y o f S a n A n t o n i o , 4 8 9 S

. W

. 3 d 4 4 8 , 4 5 3 n
. 4 ( T e x . 2 0 1 6 ) 61 ( q u o t i n g W

e l l s F a r g o B a n k N

A v
. M u r p h y , 4 5 8 S

. W

. 3 d 9 1 2 , 9 1 5 ( T e x . 2 0 1 5 ) )

. S e e I n r e B e n t , 4 8 7 S

. W

. 3 d 1 7 0 , 1 8 4 ( T e x . 2 0 1 6 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ; S t e w a r t T i t l e G u a r
. C o
. v
. S t e r l i n g , 8 2 2 62 S

. W

. 2 d 1 , 1 0 ( T e x . 1 9 9 1 )

. 

## 20

## 8. whether the fee is fix ed or conting ent on results obtai n ed or uncer tainty of collection bef

ore the leg al servic es have been r ender ed. 6 3


## The homeowner s cite the first and third Arthur Andersen fac tors as establishing the trial
court’s discretion to authoriz e discovery conce rning the insurer’ s attorney -fe e expenditures. The
hom eo wner s neither addre ss the other enumer ated fac tors nor identify any nonenumer ated fac tor aff ecting the analy sis in this case
. But rely ing on the concur

ring opinion in El Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas , the homeowner s asser

t that a compar ison of their own fee s to the insurer’ s fee s is rele vant to discharg ing the ir burden of proof a nd is, in fact, a “ surer

indicator[] ” of a

rea sonable fe e. 6 4


## The insurer arg ues no Arthur Andersen fac tor is text ually o r p rac tically direc ted to an opposing party ’s attorney fee s beca use the fee -re cover

y analy sis f

o c u s e s s o le ly o n the rea sonablene ss and nece ssity of the claimant’s attorney fee s. The insurer char acte rizes the El Apple concur renc e as involving a party ’s elec tion to use its own fee s as a compar ator and not a s insinuating an opposing party ’s attorne y -billing infor mation is inherently

rele vant. 3. The Requested Inf

orm ation Is Not Relevant Considering wher e the evidentiar y burden lies with respe ct to a fee -shifting reque st and the
focus of the materia l inquiry , we hold that an opposing party ’s hourly rate s, total amount billed, and
total reimbursa

ble expenses do no t , i n and of themselves, make it any more probable that a
reque sting party ’s attorney fee s are rea sonab l e an d nece ssary , or not, which are the only fac ts “of

9 4 5 S

. W

. 2 d 8 1 2 , 8 1 8 ( T e x . 1 9 9 7 ) ( c i t i n g T E X
. D IS C IP L IN A R Y R U L E S P R O F ’ L C O N D U C T 1

. 0 4 ( b ) , r e p r i n t e d i n 63 T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E t i t

. 2 , s u b t i t

. G , a p p
. A ) ; s e e E l A p p l e I , L t d

. v
. O l i v a s , 3 7 0 S

. W

. 3 d 7 5 7 , 7 6 1 ( T e x . 2 0 1 2 ) ( t h e A r t h u r A n d e r s e n f

a c t o r s a r e n o t e x c l u s i v e ) ( c i t i n g T E X
. D IS C IP L IN A R Y R U L E S P R O F ’ L C O N D U C T 1

. 0 4 ( b ) , r e p r i n t e d i n T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E t i t

. 2 , s u b t i t

. G , a p p
. A )

.

S e e E l A p

p l e I , 3 7 0 S

. W

. 3 d a t 7 6 6 ( H E C H T , J

. , c o n c u r r i n g )

. 64 

## 21

## conseque nce.” This is so b ec au s e an opposing party ’s litigation expenditures are not ipso facto 6 5



## rea sonable or nece ssary ; indeed parties who are not seeking to shift responsibility for their fee s may fre ely choose to spend more or less time or m oney than would be “rea sonable” or “nece ssary ” for parties who a

re. 6 6 

## Despite super ficial a

ppeal, suc h “an a

pples-to-ora

ng es compa

rison” is ana ly

tically faulty : The most obvious flaw

. . . is that making such a compar ison—where the benchma rk for the awa

rd of plaintiff’s attorney fee s is “re asonable ness”—would require the trial court to first deter

mine whether the defe ndant’s counsel billed a rea sonable amount. Such a sche me does not make sense. 6 7


## I n order for an opposing party ’s fe es t o serve as a rele vant measure to any leg itimate deg ree , the
claimant wou ld first have to establish those fee s are themselves reasonable and necessar y . Doing

so nece ssitates consideration of other data points bey ond the instant parties’ expenditures. Be cause

o t h er evidence would be require d to make an opposing party ’s fee s rele vant in the first instance, discovery conce rning an opposing party ’s attorney -fe e expenditures serve s no purpose besides

unnece ssarily complicating the litigation in pursuit of a collater al matter. Evidence of an opposing party ’s fee s lacks g enuine probative value as a compar ator for a reque sting party ’s fee s and, at best,
would be mer ely

cumulative or duplicative of other e vidence direc ted to that inquiry

. Concisely 6 8

S e e T E X
. R

. E V ID
. 4 0 1

. 65

H o w e v e r , a l a w y e r i s c o n s t r a i n e d f r o m e n t e r i n g i n t o a n a r r a n g e m e n t f o r “ a n i l l e g a l f

e e o r u n c o n s c i o n a b l e f

e e , ” 66
w h i c h i s d e f

i n e d a s “ i f a c o m p e t e n t l a w y e r c o u l d n o t f o r m a r e a s o n a b l e b e l i e f t h a t t h e f e e i s r e a s o n a b l e
. ” T E X
. D IS C IP L IN A R Y R U L E S P R O F ’ L C O N D U C T 1

. 0 4 ( a ) , r e p r i n t e d i n T E X
. G O V ’ T C O D E t i t

. 2 , s u b t i t

. G , a p p
. A

. B u r k s v
. S i e m e n s E n e r

g y & A u t o m a t i o n , I

n c
. , 2 1 5 F

. 3 d 8 8 0 , 8 8 4 ( 8 t h C i r
. 2 0 0 0 )

. 67

S e e T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 2

. 4 ( a )

. 68 

## 22

## stated, two wrong s don’t make a rig ht, and proving two rig hts is unnece ssary when the only fac t of

conseque nce is whe ther one is right.
This conclusion acc ords with both a literal and prac tical rea ding of the first and third Arthur
Andersen fac tors, which the homeowner s cite as supporting the trial court’s discovery order

. Wit h
reg ard to the first fac tor—which considers the time, labor, and skill require d and the no v elty and difficulty of the qu es t ions involved—there can be littl e dispute that differ ent motivations and
differ ent demands drive the time a nd labor spent, hour ly

rate char g ed, and skill re quired to de fend litigation as comp are d to prosec uting a suit. As to the third Arthur Andersen fac tor—the fee 6 9 

## customarily char g ed in the locality for simil ar leg al service s—opposing parties are not p ro v i d ing
“similar leg al service s” even in the same case , and the term “customar ily ” connotes a composite of
fee information for the area rather than a single data p o i n t

. Fu n d am entally , the t asks and roles of
counsel on opposite s i d es o f a case and the interests of opposing parties are so distinct that no “log ical compa

rability ” exists wit h respe ct to their attorne y fee s and billing ra

tes. 7 0


## For example, a

party subject to repe at litigation, such a s an insurer or cor porate defe ndant,
may view the prec edential value of a case more signific antly than an opposing party who might not anticipate ever being involved in simil ar litigation ag ain. L ikewise, one side may have more at risk

S e e , e
. g
. , M i r a b a l v
. G e n
. M o t o r s A c c e p t a n c e C o r

p
. , 5 7 6 F

. 2 d 7 2 9 , 7 3 1 ( 7 t h C i r
. 1 9 7 8 )

. 69

M c C l a i n v
. L u

f k i n I n d u s
. , I n c
. , 6 4 9 F

. 3 d 3 7 4 , 3 8 4 ( 5 t h C i r
. 2 0 1 1 ) ( c r i t i c i z i n g d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r a l l o w i n g 70 d i s c o v e r y o f d e f

e n s e c o u n s e l ’ s f

e e s b e c a u s e “ [ n ] o p r i o r F i f t h C i r c u i t a u t h o r i t y r e q u i r e s t h i s c o m p a r i s o n , n o r d o e s c o m m o n e x p e r i e n c e ” g i v e n t h e f u n d a m e n t a l l y d i f

f e r e n t r o l e s o f o p p o s i n g c o u n s e l , a n d t h a t i f “ t h e r e w e r e l o g i c a l c o m p a r a b i l i t y , t h i s c o u r t ’ s d e c i s i o n s w o u l d h a v e r e c o g n i z e d i t i n t h e J o h n s o n f a c t o r s [ w h i c h a r e s i m i l a r t o T e x a s ’ s A r t h u r A n d e r s e n f

a c t o r s ] o r i n p a s t l o d e s t a r d e c i s i o n s ” )

. 

## 23

## in a case
. S u ch considera tions could rea sonably justify g rea ter expenditures in time, labor, and 7 1


## money than might be considere d “re asonable ” from th e o t h er party ’s perspe ctive. As the 7 2 

## expression goe s, one side of the litigation may have mor e skin in the g ame than the other.
Simi larly , the nature of the attorney -client rela tionship may differ in way s that aff ect the rate s char g ed and the demands on counsel’s time. I n that vein, ong oing attorney -client rela tionships often
exis t betwee n corpor ate and g overnme ntal parties and their counsel and fre quently involve
neg otiated rates that take into consideration future liti g ation work. And “[ l] ar ger o rganizations, 7 3


## often arme d with more resour ces to expend on litigation than individuals, are fre quent l y more demanding on their counsel in reque sting constant updates on the litigation and detailed summaries

on rec ent ruli n gs , t h ereby requiring more time by their attorney s.” These considerations are 7 4


## espec ially pertinent in multi-party

litigation, like the MDL

proce eding s here

. Even when workin g on the same tasks, attorney s litigating the same case do not approa ch
those tasks in a sufficie ntly compar able manner to be g enuinely probative of the deg ree of eff ort or skill require d by one another

. I ndeed, while counsel for both sides may attend the same deposition,

C f

. O h i o - S e a l

y M a t t r e s s M

f g
. C o
. v
. S e a l

y I n c
. , 7 7 6 F

. 2 d 6 4 6 , 6 5 9 ( 7 t h C i r
. 1 9 8 5 ) ( “ W e w o u l d n o r m a l l y 71
e x p e c t a d e f

e n d a n t t o i n v e s t m o r e i n d e f e n d i n g a n a n t i t r u s t s u i t t h a n a p l a i n t i f f w o u l d i n v e s t i n p r o s e c u t i n g i t

. A f t e r a l l , i f a d e f e n d a n t l o s e s , i t m u s t p a y t r e b l e d a m a g e s , t h e c o s t o f d e f e n d i n g , a n d t h e p l a i n t i f f ’ s r e a s o n a b l e c o s t s o f b r i n g i n g t h e s u i t ; i f t h e p l a i n t i f

f l o s e s , i t i s o u t o n l y c o s t s a n d w h a t e v e r f e e s i t p a i d i t s a t t o r n e y s
. ” )

. S e e J o h n s o n v
. U

n i v
. C o l l

. o

f t h e U n i v
. o f A l a
. i n B i r m i n g h a m , 7 0 6 F

. 2 d 1 2 0 5 , 1 2 0 8 ( 1 1 t h C i r
. 1 9 8 3 ) ( h o u r s 72
n e e d e d b y o n e s i d e t o p r e p a r e m a y d i f f e r s u b s t a n t i a l l y f

r o m t h a t o f

o p p o s i n g c o u n s e l , s i n c e t h e n a t u r e o f t h e w o r k m a y v a r y d r a m a t i c a l l y a n d t h e c a s e m a y h a v e f a r g r e a t e r p r e c e d e n t i a l v a l u e t o o n e s i d e t h a n t h e o t h e r )

. S o u r y a v o n g v
. L a c k a w a n n a C t y
. , 1 5 9 F

. S u p p
. 3 d 5 1 4 , 5 4 4 ( M

. D

. P a
. 2 0 1 6 ) ( n o t i n g a d e f e n s e c o u n s e l ’ s t i m e 73
a n d b i l l i n g r e c o r d s a r e n o t h e l p f u l i n a s s e s s i n g r e a s o n a b l e n e s s a n d t h a t t h i s i s “ p a r t i c u l a r l y t r u e h e r e w h e r e d e f e n s e c o u n s e l r e p r e s e n t s a l a r g e g o v e r n m e n t a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d P l a i n t i f f s ’ c o u n s e l r e p r e s e n t s t h r e e ( 3 ) n o n - c o r p o r a t e i n d i v i d u a l s ” )

.

I d

. ( c i t i n g S a m u e l v
. U n i v
. o f P i t t s b u r

g h , 8 0 F

. R

. D

. 2 9 3 , 2 9 5 ( W

. D

. P e n n
. 1 9 7 8 ) )

. 74 

## 24

## the attorney taking the deposition would rea sonably be expected to expend more time and expense

in prepa ring for the deposition than the attorney defe nding the deponent. I n like manner , the contra st betwee n responding to discover y r e q u e s ts a n d r e v ie w ing and analy

zing information produce d cre ates signific ant varia tions in time and money spent. Suffice it to say that counsel in the same case are not
actua lly or eve n eff

ectively perf orming “similar leg al servic es” f or the litiga tion. Even if they

wer e per forming roug hly the same le g al servic es, a sing le law f irm’s fee s and hourly rate s in a particula

r ca se do not equa te to a “c ustomar[y ]” fee f or similar leg al servic es: [W ]hat a s i n gl e l aw firm char g es for a particula r set of service s and its choice of tactics in repr esenting a g iven client are issues decide dly distinct from deciding what constitutes a customary fee

. The [cust o m ar y -fe e] fac tor is plainly aimed at a composite of leg al fee s char g ed for a g iven service

. Thus, focusing on one law firm’s billing prac tices is unhelpful in deter mining what is “customar y .” The thrust of this lawsuit is whether [pl aintiff’s] fee s, not those ge nera ted by [defendant], fall within the ra ng e of r eason. 7 5


## Ex plai n i n g the distinction, one court observe d: “The particula r rate s char g ed by defe ndants’ attorney s in this action reflec t only the rates char g ed in one specific case by one s p ec ific l aw firm
but do not have a bear ing on the g ener al hourly rate normally char g ed for simil ar leg al work in the

are a.” 7 6

D u i n i n c k B r o s
. v
. H o w e P r e c a s t , I n c
. , N o
. 4 : 0 6

- C V

- 4 4 1 , 2 0 0 8 W L 4 4 1 1 6 4 1 , a t * 3 ( E

. D

. T e x . S e p t

. 2 3 , 2 0 0 8 ) 75 ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d )

.

B l o w e r s v
. L a w

y e r s C o o p
. P u b l ’ g C o
. , 5 2 6 F

. S u p p
. 1 3 2 4 , 1 3 2 8 ( W

. D

. N

. Y

. 1 9 8 1 ) ( “ T h e h o u r l y r a t e s c h a r g e d 76 t o d e f e n d a n t s b y t h e i r a t t o r n e y s i n t h i s p a r t i c u l a r c a s e i s s i m p l y n o t r e l e v a n t i n d e t e r m i n i n g t h e p r e v a i l i n g h o u r l y r a t e i n t h e a r e a
. P l a i n t i f

f h a s n o t r e q u e s t e d g e n e r a l i n f o r m a t i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e n o r m a l r a t e s c h a r g e d b y d e f e n d a n t s ’ a t t o r n e y s i n s i m i l a r c a s e s , b u t h a s p a r t i c u l a r i z e d h e r I n t e r r o g a t o r i e s
. ” )

. 

## 25

## The fac t that the insurer challeng es the homeowner s’ attorney fee s as excessive does not, in

and of itself, alter the analy sis. A party ca n challenge another party ’s fee reque st as not 7 7


## “customar

y ” even though that party also paid a fee that was not “c u s tomary ,” as long as the challeng er doe s not rely

on its own fees to prove the point. 7 8


## The homeowner s cite sever al state and fede ral decisions for the proposition that an opposing party ’s attorney -billing information is at least m i n i m al ly rele vant and there fore the trial court has complete discretion to order discovery of s u ch i n formation or not. Whil e there is authority that 7 9


## may be construed as supporting the homeowner s’ discovery eff orts, the jurisprudenc e ref

lects a wide
varie ty of approa ches to this issue among state and fede ral courts. For the rea sons explained above, 8 0



## we ag ree with t h o se case s concluding such information is g ener ally not discovera ble and, in the ordinary case , “pate ntly

irrele vant.” 8 1

I n a r g u i n g t h e c o n t r a r y , t h e h o m e o w n e r s c i t e , a m o n g o t h e r c a s e s , M e n d e z v
. R a d e c C o r p
. , 8 1 8 F

. S u p p
. 2 d 77 6 6 7 , 6 6 8

- 6 9 ( W

. D

. N

. Y

. 2 0 1 1 ) ( “ W h e r e t h e o p p o s i n g p a r t y c h a l l e n g e s t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f t h e r a t e o r h o u r s c h a r g e d b y t h e m o v i n g p a r t y ’ s c o u n s e l , c o u r t s a r e m o r e l i k e l y t o f i n d t h a t e v i d e n c e o f

t h e n o n m o v i n g p a r t y ’ s c o u n s e l ’ s f e e s a r e r e l e v a n t a n d d i s c o v e r a b l e
. ” )

.

S e e i d

. a t 6 6 9 ( f

i n d i n g d e f

e n s e c o u n s e l ’ s b i l l i n g r e c o r d s r e l e v a n t a n d d i s c o v e r a b l e b e c a u s e d e f e n s e c o u n s e l 78
o b j e c t e d t o t h e f

e e r e q u e s t a s e x c e s s i v e a n d “ u s e d t h e i r o w n h o u r s a n d r a t e s a s y a r d s t i c k s b y w h i c h t o a s s e s s t h e r e a s o n a b l e n e s s o f t h o s e s o u g h t b y p l a i n t i f f s ” )

. S e e , e
. g
. , P a t o n v
. G E I C O G e n
. I n s
. C o
. , 1 9 0 S o
. 3 d 1 0 4 7 , 1 0 5 2 ( F l a
. 2 0 1 6 ) ; E x p a r t e V u l c a n M a t e r i a l s C o
. , 79 9 9 2 S o
. 2 d 1 2 5 2 , 1 2 6 8 ( A l a
. 2 0 0 8 ) ; s e e a l s o N a i s m i t h v
. P r o

f ’ l G o l f e r s A s s ’ n , 8 5 F

. R

. D

. 5 5 2 , 5 6 2

- 6 4 ( N

. D

. G a
. 1 9 7 9 )

. S e e , e
. g
. , M o n t

g o m e r y v
. K r a f t F o o d s G l o b

. , I

n c
. , N o
. 1 : 1 2

- C V

- 0 0 1 4 9 , 2 0 1 5 W L 8 8 1 5 8 5 , a t * 2

- 3 ( W

. D

. 80 M i c h

. M a r
. 2 , 2 0 1 5 ) ( c o l l e c t i n g c o n t r a s t i n g a u t h o r i t i e s ) ; M a r k s C o n s t r
. C o
. v
. H u n t i n g t o n N a t ’ l B a n k , C i v i l A c t i o n N o
. 1 : 0 5 C V 7 3 , 2 0 1 0 W L 1 8 3 6 7 8 5 , a t * 2

- 5 ( N

. D

. W

. V a
. M a y 5 , 2 0 1 0 ) ( s a m e ) ; C o h e n v
. B r o w n U n i v
. , C A 9 2

- 1 9 7 L , 1 9 9 9 W L 6 9 5 2 3 5 , a t * 2 ( D

. R

. I

. M a y 1 9 , 1 9 9 9 ) ( s a m e )

.

S e e , e
. g
. , I

n r e T e x
. M u t

. I

n s
. C o
. , 3 5 8 S

. W

. 3 d 8 6 9 , 8 7 2 ( T e x . A p p
. — D a l l a s 2 0 1 2 , o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ; I n r e 81 A I G A v i a t i o n (

T e x
. ) , I n c
. , N o
. 0 4

- 0 4

- 0 0 2 9 1

- C V , 2 0 0 4 W L 1 1 6 6 5 6 0 , a t * 1 ( T e x . A p p
. — S a n A n t o n i o M a y 2 6 , 2 0 0 4 , o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ( m e m
. o p
. ) ; M C I T e l e c o m m s
. C o r

p
. v
. C r o w l e

y , 8 9 9 S

. W

. 2 d 3 9 9 , 4 0 3 ( T e x . A p p
. — F o r t W o r t h 1 9 9 5 , o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g )

. 

## 26

## E v e n if a party ’s attorney -billing information wer e marg inally rele vant to an opposing part y ’ s fee claim, discovery of such information should ordinarily be denie d beca

use the “proba tive value
is substantially outweig hed by the dang er of

. . . unfair prejudice , confusion of the issues, misleading
the jury , undue delay , or needle ssly prese nting cumulative evidenc e.” When reque sted information 8 2


## woul d manifestly foment these conce rns and the probative value of the reque sted information is minimal, the discovery reque st is not “re asonably calc ulated to le ad to the discovery of admissible
evidenc e.” 8 3


## What’s more, barring unusual circ umstances, evidence about an opposing party ’s attorney fee s is not nece ssary for the reque sting party to meet its burden of proof, but there is a g enuine threa t that allowing such discovery would g ive rise to abusive discovery prac tices. “Discove ry is often the
most signific ant cost of litigation” and a potential “we apon capa ble of imposing large an d unjustifi ab l e co s ts on one’s adversa ry .” Especia lly in the contex t of m ulti-party litigation, costs 8 4



## are mag nified by expanding the scope of discovery , and “the costs of multi-party litigation can drive
defe ndants to settle reg ardle ss of the merits.” Whil e litigants should have the opportunity “to 8 5

T E X
. R

. E V ID
. 4 0 3

. 82

T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 2

. 3 ( a )

. 83

I n r e A l f o r d C h e v r o l e t

- G e o , 9 9 7 S

. W

. 2 d 1 7 3 , 1 8 0 ( T e x . 1 9 9 9 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ( c i t i n g W a y n e D

. B r a z i l , 84 Vi e w s F r o m t h e F r o n t L i n e s : O b s e r v a t i o n s b y C h i c a g o L a w y e r s A b o u t t h e S

y s t e m o f C i v i l D i s c o v e r

y , 1 9 8 0 A M
. B

. F O U N D
. R E S
. J

. 2 1 9 , 2 2 9 , a n d F r a n k H

. E a s t e r b r o o k , D i s c o v e r y a s A b u s e , 6 9 B

. U

. L

. R E V
. 6 3 5 , 6 3 6 ( 1 9 8 9 ) )

. I d

. ( c i t i n g C S

R , L t d

. v
. L i n k , 9 2 5 S

. W

. 2 d 5 9 1 , 5 9 8 ( T e x . 1 9 9 6 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ( G O N Z A L E Z , J

. , 85
c o n c u r r i n g ) )

. 

## 27

## obtain the fullest knowledg e of the fac ts and issues prior to tri al , ” our rules also protec t ag ainst 8 6



## unnece ssary

burg eoning of litiga tion costs.
I n sum, barr ing unusual circ umstances, an opposing party ’s attorney -fe e information is not rele vant beca

use there i s n o re as o nable expectation that the information will aid the dispute’s
resolution. Moreove r, whateve r marg inal rele vance might theore tically exis t would not come close
to surpassing co m p et i n g conce rns about undue prejudice , confusion of the issues, and abusive discovery prac tices, among others. Aside from lacking g enuine prob at ive value, discovery of an opposing party ’s attorney -billing information should g ener ally not be permitted for these additional

rea sons. D. Expert Disc overy A tt o r n e y - b illing information may be discovera ble by virtue of the opposing party desig natin g its counsel as a testify ing expert. Per Rule 192. 3 , a p ar t y i s entitled to expert discovery of fac ts known by the testify ing expert rela ting to the expert’s mental impressions and opinions formed, any bias of the e x pert witness, a nd documents provided to or r eviewe d by the expert in anticipation of testimony

. Additionally , the work-pr oduct privileg e does not apply to “informa tion discovera ble 8 7


## under Rule 192.3 conce rning experts, trial witnesses, witness statements, and contentions.” Thus, 8 8


## the tactica l decision to desig nate counsel as a testify ing witness provides the opposing party with the

F o r d M o t o r C o
. v
. C a s t i l l o , 2 7 9 S

. W

. 3 d 6 5 6 , 6 6 4 ( T e x . 2 0 0 9 ) ( q u o t i n g A x e l s o n , I n c
. v
. M c I l h a n y , 7 9 8 8 6 S

. W

. 2 d 5 5 0 , 5 5 3 ( T e x . 1 9 9 0 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) )

.

T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 2

. 3 ( e ) ( 3 )

- ( 6 )

. 87

T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 2

. 5 ( c ) ( 1 )

. 88 

## 28

## means to acc ess i nformation and attorney work product not otherwise availabl e u n d er the gene ral

scope of discovery

. 8 9


## I n those circ umstances, howe v er, the reque sting party must follow the discovery rules applicable to testify ing experts. I mportantly , a party is limit ed in the tools av ai l ab l e t o d iscover
information conce rning expert witnesses, even though the information may otherwise be within the
scope of testify ing- expert discovery

. “Rule 192.3(e) sets forth the scope of information that parties
may discover about a testify ing expert

. . . . Rule 195 addre sses the methods for obtaining such information, limit ing testify ing- expert discovery to th a t a c q u ired throug h disclosures, expert repor ts, and oral depositions of expert witnesses.” To minimi ze undue expense and curb discovery abuse, 9 0 9 1


## Rule 195 does not provide for interrog atories or reque sts for production like the discovery reque sts
at issue here

. Fur

ther, beca use the disputed discovery reque sts are not permissible methods of 9 2

I f a p a r t y i s c o n c e r n e d a b o u t t h e d i s c o v e r y o f i t s p r i v i l e g e d i n f

o r m a t i o n t h r o u g h e x p e r t d i s c o v e r y , t h e p a r t y 89
m a y d e s i g n a t e a n o t h e r e x p e r t i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e o r , p r e s u m a b l y , w i t h d r a w a c u r r e n t l y d e s i g n a t e d e x p e r t a n d n a m e a n o t h e r
. S e e I n r e C h r i s t u s S

p o h n H o s

p
. K l e b e r

g , 2 2 2 S

. W

. 3 d 4 3 4 , 4 4 5 ( T e x . 2 0 0 7 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g )

. I n r e F o r d M o t o r C o
. , 4 2 7 S

. W

. 3 d 3 9 6 , 3 9 7 ( T e x . 2 0 1 4 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ( e m p h a s e s a d d e d )

. 90

W e o b s e r v e d i n I

n r e F o r d M o t o r C o
. t h a t : 91

T h e o f f i c i a l c o m m e n t s t o R u l e 1 9 5 a r t i c u l a t e a g o a l o f m i n i m i z i n g “ u n d u e e x p e n s e ” i n c o n d u c t i n g e x p e r t d i s c o v e r y . T h i s g o a l c o m p o r t s w i t h e f f o r t s b y t h i s C o u r t a n d o t h e r s t o c u r b d i s c o v e r y a b u s e t h r o u g h t h e i m p l e m e n t a t i o n o f c a r e f u l l y c r a f t e d p r i n c i p l e s a n d p r o c e d u r e s
. W e h a v e e x p r e s s e d c o n c e r n s a b o u t a l l o w i n g o v e r l y e x p a n s i v e d i s c o v e r y a b o u t t e s t i f y i n g e x p e r t s t h a t c a n p e r m i t w i t n e s s e s t o b e s u b j e c t e d t o h a r a s s m e n t a n d m i g h t w e l l d i s c o u r a g e r e p u t a b l e e x p e r t s f r o m p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n t h e l i t i g a t i o n p r o c e s s
. I d

. ( c i t a t i o n s a n d i n t e r n a l q u o t a t i o n s o m i t t e d )

.

S e e T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 5

. 1 ( “ A p a r t y m a y r e q u e s t a n o t h e r p a r t y t o d e s i g n a t e a n d d i s c l o s e i n f o r m a t i o n 92
c o n c e r n i n g t e s t i f

y i n g e x p e r t w i t n e s s e s o n l y t h r o u g h a r e q u e s t f

o r d i s c l o s u r e u n d e r R u l e 1 9 4 a n d t h r o u g h d e p o s i t i o n s a n d
r e p o r t s a s p e r m i t t e d b y t h i s r u l e
. ” ( e m p h a s i s a d d e d ) )

. V i a r e q u e s t s f o r d i s c l o s u r e , a s a u t h o r i z e d b y R u l e 1 9 5

. 1 , a p a r t y i s e n t i t l e d t o l i m i t e d e x p e r t

- w i t n e s s d o c u m e n t d i s c o v e r y , i n c l u d i n g “ a l l d o c u m e n t s , t a n g i b l e t h i n g s , r e p o r t s , m o d e l s , o r d a t a c o m p i l a t i o n s t h a t h a v e b e e n p r o v i d e d t o , r e v i e w e d b y , o r p r e p a r e d b y o r f o r t h e e x p e r t i n a n t i c i p a t i o n o f t h e e x p e r t ’ s 

## 29

## obtaining in formation discovera ble under Rule 192.3(e) , the exception to the work-pr oduct privileg e in Rule 192.5(c)( 1) does not apply

. 9 3


## Whil e the distinctions may seem like a techn i ca l i t y , the limit ations on expert discovery

ensure discovery is narr owly tailored to permiss i b l e p u rposes. I n this case , for example, the
reque sted discovery seeks all billing information without any showing that those rec ords “have been provided to, revie wed by , or prepa red by or for the expert in anticipation of the expert’s testimony .” 9 4 

## By asser ting the reque sted discovery is proper based on counsel’s desig nation as an expert witness,
the hom eowne rs circumvent the requirement that there b e at least som e nex us betwee n the ex pert and the reque sted information. Whil e counse l s u re l y has revie wed his own bills and is knowledg eable about his own b i l ling prac tices, he has not nece ssarily revie wed the billing
information of other

attorney s repr esenting the insurer in the MDLcase s. 9 5


## Be cause the homeowner s chose not to use R ule 195’s permissible discovery methods to
reque st insurer’ s expert in fo rm at i o n , t h e trial court err ed insofar as it relied on Rule 192.3(e) in
deter mining th e s c o p e of discovery

. Additionally , the Rule 192.5(c) (1) work-pr oduct exception does

t e s t i m o n y . ” T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 4

. 2 ( f ) ( 4 ) ; s e e a l s o T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 2

. 3 ( e ) ( d e l i n e a t i n g t h e s c o p e o f e x p e r t d i s c o v e r y ) , 1 9 5

. 5 ( “ I n a d d i t i o n t o d i s c l o s u r e u n d e r R u l e 1 9 4 , a p a r t y m a y o b t a i n d i s c o v e r y c o n c e r n i n g t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o n w h i c h t h e e x p e r t i s e x p e c t e d t o t e s t i f y . . . a n d o t h e r d i s c o v e r a b l e m a t t e r s , i n c l u d i n g d o c u m e n t s n o t p r o d u c e d i n d i s c l o s u r e , o n l y b y o r a l d e p o s i t i o n o f t h e e x p e r t a n d b y a r e p o r t p r e p a r e d b y t h e e x p e r t u n d e r t h i s r u l e
. ” )

.

T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 2

. 5 ( c ) ( 1 ) ( e x c e p t i n g f r o m w o r k

- p r o d u c t p r o t e c t i o n “ i n f o r m a t i o n d i s c o v e r a b l e u n d e r R u l e 93 1 9 2

. 3 c o n c e r n i n g e x p e r t s , t r i a l w i t n e s s e s , w i t n e s s s t a t e m e n t s , a n d c o n t e n t i o n s ” )

.

T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 4

. 2 ( f ) ( 4 )

. 94

T h e r e c o r d i l l u s t r a t e s t h e p o i n t w i t h c o u n s e l ’ s t e s t i m o n y i n t h e A m a r o c a s e , w h i c h t h e h o m e o w n e r s r e l y o n 95
a s t h e i m p e t u s f

o r t h e d i s p u t e d d i s c o v e r y : “ I c a n g i v e y o u t h e r a n g e o f w h a t m y f i r m h a s b i l l e d

. W h a t I c a n n o t g i v e y o u t o d a y a r e t h e f

e e s i n c u r r e d a n d t h e a m o u n t t h a t [ c o - c o u n s e l ] h a s b i l l e d o n i t

. ” 

## 30

## not apply to reque sted information under these particula r discovery methods and thus the trial court’s discovery order improperly

compels discover

y of work- product privileg ed informa tion. E. Response to Dissent “The line betwee n who is a Rule 702 expert witness and who is a Rule 701 [fact] witness is
not alway s brig ht.” But when a witness is proper ly disclosed and desig nated as an expert and the 9 6


## main substance of th e wi tness’s testimony is based on specia liz ed knowledg e, skill, experience , training , and educa

tion, “the testimony will g ener ally be expert testimony within the scope of Rule
702.” Her e, the insurer (1) challeng ed the rea sonablene ss and nece ssity of the hom eowne rs’ 9 7 

## attorney fee s, b u t has not reque sted its own fee s; (2) stipulated that it will not use its own billing
information to contest the homeowner s’ attorney fee s; (3) desig nated one of its attorney s as an expert based upon his experience , education, and skill; and (4) stated that counsel “is expected to testify as
to rea sonable and nece ssary attorney fee s for a case of such com p l exit y as this case , pending in Hidalg o County , Texas.” The dissent’s analy sis confla tes the role of an expert with the role of a fa ct wi tness and
i gn ores the distinction betwee n the di scover y rules associated with those respe ctive roles. We d o not disa g ree with the dissent tha t the insurer’ s counsel can be cross-e x amined at trial in his role as

an expert witness; conseque ntly , discovery as to his cre dibilit y , biases, and fa ct s re l at i n g to or forming the basis of his mental impressions and opinions is permitted under the expert-discover y

R e i d R d

. M u n
. U t i l

. D i s t

. N o
. 2 v
. S p e e d y S t o p F o o d S t o r e s , L t d

. , 3 3 7 S

. W

. 3 d 8 4 6 , 8 5 0

- 5 2 ( T e x . 2 0 1 1 )

. 96

I d

. a t 8 5 1

. 97 

## 31

## rules. But the homeowner s did not use permissible methods for obtaining expert discovery

. The 9 8 9 9 

## discovery methods matter; we require —as our rules of civil proce dure require —that parties utiliz e permissible tools for re questing expert discovery

. The dissent also misunderstands our holding reg arding the attorney work-pr oduct privileg e. The dissent ag ree s that compelling en masse production of a party ’s billing rec ords invades the work-pr oduct privileg e but, somewhat confusing ly , asser ts the privileg e is not impinged beca use the
order to produce billing rec ords was limit ed to the billing rec ords in this case and reda ction would
be sufficient to protec t the privi leg e. We co n fronted a s imilar situation in National Union Fire 1 0 0


## Insur ance Co. v. Valdez and square ly held that production of an attorney ’s entire case fi l e wo u l d

reve al an attorney ’s thought proce sses and strateg ies, even if some of the documents in the file would
not otherwise be privileg ed. We did not provide for reda ction then, nor do we conclude reda ction 1 0 1


## would be adequa

te in this context. Redac tion is simply not sufficie nt to protec t the privileg e or mask

an attorney ’s thought proces s es and strateg ies whether production of an entire litigation file is at issue o r en masse production of attorney billing rec ords is involved. Thus conce rns analog ous to those in Valdez compel the sa me conc lusion in t his case.

S e e T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 2

. 3 ( e ) ( 3 )

- ( 6 )

. 98

T E X
. R

. C IV
. P

. 1 9 5

. 1 ( l i m i t i n g a p a r t y ’ s e x p e r t d i s c o v e r y t o o l s t o o n l y a r e q u e s t f o r d i s c l o s u r e a n d t h r o u g h 99 d e p o s i t i o n s a n d r e p o r t s )

.

P o s t a t

_ _ _ . 100

8 6 3 S

. W

. 2 d 4 5 8 , 4 6 0

- 6 1 ( T e x . 1 9 9 3 ) ( o r i g
. p r o c e e d i n g ) ; s e e a l s o s u p r a n o t e s 3 8

- 4 6 a n d a c c o m p a n y i n g t e x t

. 101 

## 32

## Finally , the dissent’s prese rvation arg ument misses the mark. The insurer’ s opposition to 1 0 2 

## discovery is two-prong ed: (1 ) the reque sted information is privileg ed and irrele vant under the
g ener al scope of discovery , and (2) the insurer’ s desig nation of its attorney as an expert witness does
not chang e this fac t. Whether desig nation of counsel as an expert alters the discovery analy sis—as
the homeowne rs and dissent maintain—is well within the issue prese nted.
III. Conclusi on Making a claim for attorney fee s or using attorney fee s as a compar ator in ch alleng ing an opponent’s fee reque st puts a party ’s attorney fee s at issue in the litigation. I n addition, desig nating
counsel as an expert opens the door to expert-witness discovery as provided and limit ed by the Texas Rules of Civil Procedur e. Outside of these scena rios and absent unusual circ umstances, information
about an opposing party ’s attorney fee s and expenses is, in the ordinary case , privileg ed or irrele vant and, thus, not discovera

ble. Given the circ umstances in this case and the n at ure of the discovery
reque sts at issue, we conditionally g rant mandamus relief and direc t the trial court to vaca te its order compelling National L loy ds I nsuranc e Company , Wardlaw Claims Service , and I deal Adjusting to

answe r reque sts for production 1, 2, 4, and 5, and interrog atories 1, 2, and 3. The writ will issue only
if the trial cour

t fails to do so.

___________________________ Eva M. Guzman J ustice
OP INION DELIVERED : J une 9, 2017

P o s t a t

_ _ _ . 102 

## 33