U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

i 

20–063 2017

[H.A.S.C. No. 114–111] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2017 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

THE FISCAL YEAR 2017 NATIONAL 

DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FROM THE MILITARY 

DEPARTMENTS 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 16, 2016 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS

WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

CHRISTOPHER P. GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOSEPH J. HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida 

PAUL COOK, California 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

BRAD R. WENSTRUP, Ohio 

JACKIE WALORSKI, Indiana 

BRADLEY BYRNE, Alabama 

SAM GRAVES, Missouri 

RYAN K. ZINKE, Montana 

ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

THOMAS MACARTHUR, New Jersey 

STEVE RUSSELL, Oklahoma 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

JOHN GARAMENDI, California 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., Georgia 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas 

TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois 

SCOTT H. PETERS, California 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

TULSI GABBARD, Hawaii 

TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota 

BETO O’ROURKE, Texas 

DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey 

RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona 

MARK TAKAI, Hawaii 

GWEN GRAHAM, Florida 

BRAD ASHFORD, Nebraska 

SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts 

PETE AGUILAR, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

WILLIAM S. JOHNSON, Counsel 

BRITTON BURKETT, Clerk 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Committee on 

Armed Services ..................................................................................................... 2 

Thornberry, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac,’’ a Representative from Texas, Chairman, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

James, Hon. Deborah Lee, Secretary of the Air Force; accompanied by Gen 

Mark A. Welsh III, USAF, Chief of Staff of the Air Force ............................... 7 

Mabus, Hon. Ray, Secretary of the Navy; accompanied by ADM John M. 

Richardson, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, and Gen Robert B. Neller, 

USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps ........................................................ 5 

Murphy, Hon. Patrick J., Acting Secretary of the Army; accompanied by 

GEN Mark A. Milley, USA, Chief of Staff, United States Army ..................... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

James, Hon. Deborah Lee, joint with Gen Mark A. Welsh III ..................... 154 

Mabus, Hon. Ray .............................................................................................. 76 

Murphy, Hon. Patrick J., joint with GEN Mark A. Milley ........................... 59 

Richardson, ADM John M. ............................................................................... 124 

Neller, Gen Robert B. ....................................................................................... 138 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 171 

Mr. Rogers ......................................................................................................... 171 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bridenstine ................................................................................................. 189 

Mr. Brooks ......................................................................................................... 188 

Mr. Coffman ...................................................................................................... 184 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 180 

Dr. Fleming ....................................................................................................... 190 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 181 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 175 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 179 

Ms. Stefanik ...................................................................................................... 189 

(1) 

THE FISCAL YEAR 2017 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE MILITARY DEPARTMENTS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 16, 2016. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:06 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. William M. ‘‘Mac’’ 

Thornberry (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WILLIAM M. ‘‘MAC’’ THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. The committee 

meets today to hear from the service secretaries and the service 

chiefs, and we are grateful to each of you for being here today. 

The Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] testified 

earlier this month that the world is far more complicated, it is far 

more destabilized, it is far more complex than at any time we have 

seen. Just last month the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs testified before the Appropriations Defense Subcommittee, the joint force will 

be stressed to execute a major contingency operation to aggression 

by an adversary. 

We face a more dangerous world, and we face a stressed force 

and a high operational tempo, all major concerns for this committee. We talk a lot about readiness, but as one of our senior military leaders has said, the real—real bill payer for underfunded 

readiness is lost lives, and I think that helps bring it into context 

for all of us. 

Of course, the challenge in today’s complex world is we can’t just 

focus on one thing. We face everything from a serious nuclear 

threat from peer competitors to continuing threat of terrorism and 

aggression from a variety of actors. So we all face a number of 

challenges at the same time. I am sure that we will explore a number of those issues over the course of this hearing, as well as the 

administration’s budget request and how well it meets those challenges, both around the world and within our force. 

Finally, I would just note that yesterday I made some proposals 

to improve our acquisition system. I don’t expect that you all have 

had the time to look and react to those, but I do solicit your feedback on what you think is good and what you think could be better. 

And working with you as well as folks in OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] and obviously all of our colleagues and folks outside the building, we want to take further steps to improve the way 

that the Pentagon acquires goods and services. 
2 

Before introducing our witnesses, I will yield to the distinguished 

gentlelady from California, who is sitting in for the ranking member, Ms. Sanchez. 

STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for 

being before us today. I want to thank you for all of your service. 

Before I begin, I would like to insert for the record, ask unanimous 

consent to put Mr. Smith’s opening remarks in, please, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. So we live today in a world where the security environment is constantly changing, and so we have the responsibility to keep up with those changes. There are threats today that 

we are facing that we didn’t know about even last year, and the 

threats are vast. And so I understand that all the services today, 

that you face so many—you get pulled in so many different directions to defend and to protect our country and Americans, and so 

thank you for the service and the sacrifice. 

With the rise of ISIL [Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant] and 

extremism, it has become pretty apparent that we have to use all 

elements of power with those growing threats today. And I do completely agree with the Secretary in his written statement in terms 

of the different elements of power, and each element is necessary 

for combination with the others. However, each alone is insufficient 

to win a war or maintain a peace. And in the last couple of years 

it has become evident that military might alone is not enough to 

address the rising threats. 

The U.S. must take the necessary investments in diplomacy and 

economic stability and in collective security to be more effective 

against today’s threats. It is time for us to further engage our partners so that we can prevent terrorist attacks like the one in the 

Ivory Coast. The U.S. cannot combat ISIL and terrorism alone, and 

we have to be able to rely on our regional allies militarily and financially as we continue to fight against terrorism. And we have 

a budget problem, and we all know that, and we can’t fix this problem without addressing the defense budget. 

It is time not just for the services, but also for us in Congress 

to really sit down at the table and get down to the hard decisions, 

Mr. Chairman, to prioritize what we need and what is not a critical 

need. And we have to do that in the defense budget because it 

must be sustainable. As you said, a lack of resources is really a cost 

that none of us want to see. And I hope that you will speak to that, 

all of you. 

And I would also like to commend the Defense Department 

[DOD] and the services for all your efforts in opening up the military occupation and positions to women. As the services go forward 

in integrating women into these positions, I believe that leadership 

will be key. And I hope to hear from you the steps that each of the 

services is doing in order to ensure that we get that done. 

We are celebrating Women’s History Month right now, and for 

that reason in particular, I would like to recognize all those women 

who have served in our military and are currently serving. I be-
3 

lieve that the full integration of women into the military will not 

only open up the opportunities for these women, but they will enhance our readiness of our military. So I thank you, and I look forward to your testimony. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

Let me again welcome our witnesses. We have Mr. Patrick Murphy, Acting Secretary of the Army; General Mark Milley, Chief of 

Staff of the Army; Honorable Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy; 

Admiral John Richardson, Chief of Naval Operations [CNO]; General Robert Neller, Commandant of the Marine Corps; Honorable 

Deborah Lee James, Secretary of the Air Force; and General Mark 

Welsh, Chief of Staff of the Air Force. 

For some of you all, I think this may be your first opportunity 

to testify in this format. I do note Mr. Murphy was once on this 

side of the table, and now he is on that side. It will be interesting 

to see whether people go easy on him or not. For some of you all, 

this may be your last time to testify in this format. 

I just want to take a moment to acknowledge Mrs. Welsh, who 

is in the audience. One of the things that I have learned to appreciate is the full-time job which the spouses of our service chiefs occupy in supporting the force in their way, in the families. It is a 

tremendous asset for our country, and I appreciate all that you 

have done not only to support General Welsh over you all’s career, 

but what you have done to support all of the airmen who have 

served our country. And the same is true for all of your spouses. 

Without objection, your full written statements will be made part 

of the record, and we would be pleased to hear any introductory 

comments you would like to make. 

Secretary Murphy. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. MURPHY, ACTING SECRETARY OF THE ARMY; ACCOMPANIED BY GEN MARK A. 

MILLEY, USA, CHIEF OF STAFF, UNITED STATES ARMY 

Mr. MURPHY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of this 

committee. It is great to be back on this side of the dais, and I appreciate the opportunity to discuss our Army with you here today. 

This is my tenth week on the job as Acting Secretary of the Army, 

and it is truly an honor to be back with my Army family. 

Now, I have traveled to see our soldiers, our civilians, and their 

families to Fort Hood, to Fort Sam Houston, and most recently to 

Iraq and Afghanistan. And let me tell you, the selfless service and 

dedication of our team should inspire all of us. We are tasked with 

the solemn responsibility to fight and win our Nation’s wars and 

to keep our families safe here at home. 

Our Army must produce ready units today to deter and defeat 

our Nation’s enemies, defend our homeland, project power, and win 

decisively. By ready, we mean units that are fully manned, trained 

for combat, fully equipped according to their design structure, and 

led by competent leaders. We must also be ready for future fights 

by investing in modernization and research and development. We 

do not want our soldiers to have a fair fight. We want them to have 

a tactical and technical advantage over our enemies. 

With our $125.1 billion budget request, our Army will focus its 

efforts on rebuilding readiness for large-scale, high-end ground 
4 

combat today. We do so because we believe that ignoring readiness 

shortfalls puts our Nation at greatest risk for the following reasons: 

First, readiness wins wars. Our Army has never been the largest 

in the world. At times we have not even been the best equipped, 

but since World War II, we have recognized that ready soldiers, 

properly manned, trained, equipped, and led, can beat larger or 

more determined forces. So whether we are confronting the barbaric acts of ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria] or the desperation of North Korea, our Army must be prepared to execute and to 

win. We train like we fight, and our Army must be ready to fight 

tonight. 

Next, readiness deters our most dangerous threats and assures 

our allies. We are reminded with alarming frequency that great 

power conflicts are not dead. Today they often manifest themselves 

on a regional basis. Both Russia and China are challenging America’s willingness and ability to enforce international standards of 

conduct. A ready Army provides America the strength to deter such 

actions and reassure our partners throughout the world. 

Readiness also makes future training less costly. Continuing operations since 2001 have left our force proficient in stability operations and counterterrorism, but our future command sergeants 

major and brigade commanders have not had the critical combat 

training center experiences as junior leaders trained for high-end 

ground combat. Investing in readiness today builds a foundation 

necessary for long-term readiness. 

Finally, readiness prepares our force for potential future conflicts. We can’t keep fighting the last fight. Our Army must be prepared to face the high-end and advanced combat power of an aggressive Russia or more likely, Russian aggression employed by 

surrogate actors. 

This budget dedicates resources to develop solutions to allow our 

force the space to develop new concepts, and formed by the recommendations of the National Commission on the Future of the 

Army, our formations must first be ready to execute against current and emerging threats. The choice, though, to invest in nearterm readiness does come with risk. Smaller modernization investments risk our ability to fight and win in the future. We have no 

new major modernization programs this decade. Smaller investments in end strength risk our ability to conduct multiple operations for sustained periods of time. 

In short, we are mortgaging our future readiness because we 

have to ensure success in today’s battles against emerging threats. 

That is why initiatives that we asked for like BRAC [base realignment and closure] in 2019, are needed to be implemented now. Let 

us manage your investment, and this will result in $500 million a 

year in savings and a return on investment within 5 years. 

And lastly, while we thank Congress for the Bipartisan Budget 

Act [BBA] of 2015, which provides short-term relief and 2 years of 

predictable funding, we request your support for the enactment of 

our budget as proposed. We request your support, your continued 

funding levels calibrated to current threats and to our national security interests, and we request your support, your continued support, for our soldiers, civilians, and their families so that our Army 

remains the most capable fighting force possible to fight and win 
5 

our Nation’s wars and to keep our families safe here at home. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Murphy and General Milley 

can be found in the Appendix on page 59.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. My understanding is that only the 

service secretaries have introductory comments. Is that correct? 

Secretary Mabus. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RAY MABUS, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY; 

ACCOMPANIED BY ADM JOHN M. RICHARDSON, USN, CHIEF 

OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, AND GEN ROBERT B. NELLER, 

USMC, COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS 

Secretary MABUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congresswoman 

Sanchez on behalf of Ranking Member Smith, members of this 

committee. Thank you so much for the opportunity to talk about 

the Department of the Navy. 

As you pointed out, Mr. Chairman, this is the first budget testimony for our new Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Richardson, 

and for the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Neller. In 

the time since they took these positions, I have had the privilege 

of their frank, professional, and invaluable counsel. They are officers of the highest caliber who expertly lead our Navy and Marine 

Corps during ever tightening fiscal constraints and an increasingly 

dynamic threat environment. 

This is my eighth time, and my last, to appear before you. For 

me, leading the Department of the Navy is the greatest honor of 

my life. I couldn’t be more proud of our sailors, marines, civilians, 

their families. I am also proud of the many steps we have taken 

and changes we have made to ensure that the Navy and Marine 

Corps remain the greatest expeditionary fighting force the world 

has ever known. 

First and foremost, we continue to provide presence. That 

unrivaled advantage, on, above, beneath, and from the seas, gives 

our leaders options in times of crisis, reassures our allies, and deters adversaries. There is no next best thing to being there. Maintaining that presence requires gray hulls on the horizon. 

While there has been some discussion about posture versus presence, the simple fact is, for the Navy and Marine Corps, our posture is presence. In every case, from high-end combat to irregular 

warfare to disaster relief, our naval assets get on station faster, 

stay longer, bring whatever we need with us. And since we operate 

from our ships, which are sovereign American territory, we can act 

without having to ask any other nation’s permission. 

Resourcing that presence depends on four fundamentals, four Ps: 

people, our sailors and marines; platforms, our ships, our aircraft, 

our systems; power, how we use energy to make us better warfighters; and partnerships, our relationships with international allies, industry, and most importantly, with the American people. 

When I took this post almost 7 years ago, we had an incredibly 

committed and capable force, but each of these four Ps was under 

pressure. Our people had been stressed from high operational 

tempo and extended deployments. Our fleet was shrinking, and too 

many of our platforms were costing too much. Our use of power 

was a vulnerability. And our partners were seeking reassurance of 
6 

our sustained engagement. Now our people, platforms, power, and 

partnerships are stronger than they have been in many years, enabling us to provide that invaluable presence. 

In people, we have instituted sweeping changes. Personnel policy, 

promotions are based more on merit and less on tenure, and commanding officers are empowered to meritoriously promote more 

sailors and marines. We have made career paths more flexible. And 

one example, thanks to Congress, is the Career Intermission Program [CIP], which has been greatly expanded. 

We have also increased professional development and educational opportunities that bring America’s best ideas to the fleet 

by adding 30 graduate school slots through our Fleet Scholars Education Program and sending high-performing sailors on SECNAV 

[Secretary of the Navy] Industry Tours to great American companies like FedEx and Amazon, where they learn private sector best 

practices that can be applied when they return. 

We are absolutely committed, from leadership to the deck plates, 

on combating the crime of sexual assault and the tragedy of suicide. We have revamped our physical fitness assessments making 

them more realistically align with the jobs we do, and we have promoted healthier lifestyles through better nutrition and a culture of 

fitness. 

All billets in both services are now open to women. Standards 

will absolutely not be lowered, but anyone who can meet the standards will be able to do the job. This will make us a more combateffective force. We are trying to mitigate stress on sailors and marines and their families by making deployments more predictable, 

extending hours for child care, and creating colocation policies. To 

tap into the innovative culture inherent in the Navy and Marine 

Corps, we established Task Force Innovation, which takes good 

ideas from deck plate sailors and field marines, recognizes, funds, 

and rapidly moves these ideas fleetwide. 

On platforms, we have reversed the decline in ship count. And 

thanks to Congress, and in particular to this committee, our Navy 

will reach 300 ships by 2019, and we will get to our assessed need 

of 308 ships by 2021. In the 7 years before I took office, the Navy 

contracted for 41 ships. In my 7 years, we have contracted for 84, 

and we have done so while increasing aircraft purchases by 35 percent, all with a smaller top line. 

Practices like firm fixed price contracts, multiyear buys, stable 

requirements, have driven down costs on virtually every class of 

ship, and we are also in the process of recapitalizing nearly every 

naval aviation program. We have expanded unmanned systems, on, 

under, and above the sea, and put increased focus on them by establishing a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Unmanned and an Office of Unmanned Warfare System on the CNO staff, N99, designed 

specifically to coordinate all unmanned programs. We are also implementing advanced energy technologies like electromagnetic rail 

guns and laser weapons. 

In power, to increase our lethality and operational flexibility, I 

set goals of having 50 percent of sea and shore-based energy derived from alternative sources by 2020, competitive with the price 

of conventional power. We met that goal with shore at the end of 

last year. Energy efficiency has also been greatly increased on our 
7 

bases and at sea. Ultimately since 2009, both the Navy and Marine 

Corps have achieved large drops in oil consumption. 

In partnerships, during my tenure, I have traveled nearly 1.2 

million air miles to 144 different countries and territories, visiting 

with our sailors, marines, our allies, and our partners. Twelve of 

my trips have been to Afghanistan, where I visited every Marine 

Corps forward operating base in Helmand to be with our forwarddeployed men and women. And I have actively engaged with our 

allies and friends around the world to build and maintain a network of navies with whom we can train, operate, and trust. And 

we have worked in partnership with Congress to fulfill the constitutional mandate to provide for and maintain a Navy. 

As President George Washington once said: It follows then, as 

certain as night succeeds the day, that without a decisive naval 

force, we can do nothing definitive. With it, everything, honorable 

and glorious. Thank you. 

[The prepared statements of Secretary Mabus, Admiral Richardson, and General Neller can be found in the Appendix beginning 

on page 76.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Secretary James. 

STATEMENT OF HON. DEBORAH LEE JAMES, SECRETARY OF 

THE AIR FORCE; ACCOMPANIED BY GEN MARK A. WELSH III, 

USAF, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE AIR FORCE 

Secretary JAMES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and Congresswoman Sanchez and all the members of the committee. Good morning. My wingman, General Welsh, and I are very proud to come before you today to represent the nearly 660,000 Active Duty, National Guard, Reserve, and civilian airmen, plus all of our families, 

and we are certainly very honored to be here with our colleagues 

from the sister services as well. 

When we testified before all of you last year, we outlined our 

three priorities, which are taking care of people, balancing readiness with our need for modernization, and making every dollar 

count. These priorities have not changed over the last year, but 

what has changed, and you have already touched upon it, Mr. 

Chairman, is the threats that are facing our Nation. As we sit here 

today, our Air Force is working very, very hard to degrade, with 

the goal of ultimately destroying, Daesh in the Middle East as part 

of a whole of government and as part of a coalition approach. 

In the last year, our coalition forces upped the ante against 

Daesh, flying more than 55,000 sorties in support of Operation Inherent Resolve, which represents a threefold increase over the 

number of sorties in 2014. Moreover, a resurgent Russia continues 

to foment problems in the Ukraine and has announced its intent 

to modernize its nuclear forces, and of course, we are watching and 

we are waiting to see what happens next in Syria. 

In addition, we have observed North Korea conduct an illegal nuclear test and a rocket launch just within the last month or so, and 

we continue to see worrisome activity from China in the South 

China Sea. And, of course, there are also very important growing 

threats in both space and cyberspace. 
8 

The bottom line here is that our Air Force is playing an absolutely essential role in each of these areas. We are fully engaged 

in every region of the world, in every mission area, and across the 

full spectrum of operations. And to put it plainly, in my opinion, 

we have never been busier on such a sustained and global basis, 

and we are doing all of this with roughly 200,000 fewer people and 

79 fewer fighter squadrons than we had at the time of Operation 

Desert Storm, so we are a much, much smaller Air Force. 

Now, to continue confronting these challenges and in order to 

maintain an effective fighting force, our budget submission, which 

is now before you, tries to balance capacity, capability, and readiness appropriately. As has been mentioned, the Bipartisan Budget 

Act, we are very, very appreciative of the stability and the predictability that that gives us, but it does leave us somewhat short, $3.4 

billion short for the Air Force, as compared to what we originally 

requested for fiscal year 2017. So this means that once again we 

had some tough choices to make in this budget. And I will detail 

those budget choices as I discuss our top three priorities, and I 

want to begin with the most important one, and that is taking care 

of people. 

Airmen and their families are the Air Force’s most important resource, and our budget, I believe, reflects this truth. But with that 

said, as I just mentioned, we have been downsizing for years, and 

our people are very stressed, and this simply needs to stop. We now 

need to upsize our force modestly, and we want to do it in a total 

force way, to address a number of key areas, including critical career fields like intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, cyber, 

maintenance across the Air Force, and battlefield airmen. These 

are some of the areas that we need to plus-up. We thank this committee for your support of our Active Duty plus-up. You have also 

supported us, of course, in our Guard and Reserve as well. 

The Active Duty will go from roughly 311,000 to 317,000 airmen 

by the end of this fiscal year, but in reality, I think all of these mission demands I just spoke about will indicate that we need more 

growth in fiscal year 2017. So in order to meet that demand, I plan 

to take a judicious approach to incrementally increase our total 

force beyond the current level, provided, of course, that we can get 

the right talent. And we would be grateful to this committee to consider a reprogramming action at the appropriate time, should that 

be required. 

Speaking of total force, we are continuing to maximize our use 

of the Guard and Reserve by shifting additional missions and workload when it makes sense to do so. Some examples here include 

cyber, ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance], command and control, mobility and space, so we are continuing to shift 

workload and missions as it makes sense. We are also continuing 

to push the envelope when it comes to integration of our Guard and 

Reserve with our Active, and that goes from the staff level at the 

highest headquarters all the way down to the wing level and to the 

flight line. 

I also want to call to your attention, still on the subject of people, 

that we are expanding the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program. We are fully funding our child care operations, 

and we are making a big effort to fund the most important infra-
9 

structure projects to benefit our airmen, all as part of this budget. 

And, of course, we too are looking forward to welcoming qualified 

women into the previously closed career fields. 

The second priority I mentioned is getting the balance right between readiness and modernization, and we believe strongly that 

we need both. We can’t have either/or. It is not an either/or proposition for us. So as we have explained before, less than half of our 

combat forces are ready for what we call a high-end fight, less than 

half. And when I say high-end fight, I am speaking of a conflict 

that might take place in an anti-access/area denial environment, in 

other words, an environment where an adversary could shoot us 

down, interfere with us in some major way in space or cyberspace. 

In addition to all this, our aircraft inventory is the oldest that 

it has ever been, and of course as you know, the adversaries are 

closing the technological gap on us, so we must modernize. 

In terms of readiness, this budget funds flying hours to their 

maximum executable level, invests in weapon systems sustainment, and ensures combat exercises like Red and Green Flag remain strong. After consulting with our combatant commanders, 

General Welsh and I agreed that we needed to make some adjustments in this budget to address these real world changes that I 

mentioned. 

One of those adjustments is we are rephasing the A–10 and the 

Compass Call retirements. And the bottom line here is we are not 

proposing to retire any of these aircraft in fiscal year 2017. 

Furthermore, we will continue to look at the mix of aircraft each 

year and we will be prepared to modify, based on the global security situation. We also need to ensure the right number and mix 

of unmanned aircraft, so we are going to invest more in additional 

Reapers. And we also need to invest more in munitions. Again, this 

is contained in the budget request. 

Turning to modernization, this year’s budget will continue the 

ongoing investments to support our top priorities of nuclear deterrence, space, and cyberspace. We are also continuing with the F– 

35, the KC–46, Combat Rescue Helicopters. JSTARS [Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System] we are going to get started on, 

as well as T–X. We also are going to continue to move forward with 

the B–21, which was formerly known as the Long Range Strike 

Bomber. This fifth-generation global precision attack platform will 

give our country a networked sensor shooter capability and propel 

us into the next century of air power dominance. 

Now, unfortunately modernization is also where we had to make 

some of those tough choices because of the insufficient budgets. So, 

for example, with reluctance we are deferring the purchase of five 

F–35s in fiscal year 2017 and three C–130Js in fiscal year 2017. 

We will also have to delay some of our upgrades to the fourth-generation systems like the F–16, and many infrastructure projects 

will simply have to wait. So infrastructure is another tough choice 

for us. And I want to also support our department’s request for a 

BRAC in fiscal year 2019. 

The third priority reflects our commitment to give the taxpayers 

the best bang for the buck, which is why we call it Make Every 

Dollar Count, and we are working a number of initiatives here, including we too are working on streamlined energy usage, cost sav-
10 

ings ideas that come directly from airmen that we then put into 

practice, and we are continuing the march toward meeting the 

mandate to be audit ready by the end of fiscal year 2017. 

So, Mr. Chairman, as I begin to wrap, again I want to thank this 

committee and you for your leadership and support of the Bipartisan Budget Act. I want to associate myself with the remarks 

about the need to lift sequestration. I know many on this committee have tried very hard to do that. If we return to sequestration, and if we once again have to park jets and take some of those 

very dire effects that we did the last time around, there is just no 

question in my mind, this means that we will enter possibly a future conflict less prepared. And if you are a student of history—I 

like history, I try to be a student—history teaches us that the consequences of insufficient preparation are prolonged conflict and increased loss of life. So please keep up the fight to lift sequestration 

permanently. And with that, I thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The joint prepared statement of Secretary James and General 

Welsh can be found in the Appendix on page 154.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, ma’am. That is exactly what history 

teaches. I hope we have learned those lessons. 

Let me just ask about a couple of things right quick. General 

Neller, I have asked for the statistics for the Marine Corps on 

Class A mishap rates. And my understanding is the average over 

the last 10 years was 2.15 mishaps per 100,000 flying hours, but 

that went up in 2014 to 2.67; 2015, 2.88; 2016, 3.96. So the point 

is, over the last 3 years especially, the number of Class A mishaps 

per 100,000 flying hours has been increasing significantly. 

Given this readiness and safety issue and the budget constraints 

and all that the Marine Corps is being asked to do operationally, 

can the Marine Corps meet the demands of the National Military 

Strategy? 

General NELLER. Chairman, let me first comment on the aviation. We track this very closely, and the simple fact is that we don’t 

have enough airplanes to meet the training requirements for the 

entire force. The force that is deployed is trained and ready, and 

it is a little bit different for every model, type, and series. So we 

are working on this, and not all of it is related to aviation maintenance, some of these events. But it is a fact that our mishap rate 

has gone up. 

As far as our ability to meet the National Military Strategy, our 

ability to meet the day-to-day commitments and the requirements 

of the combatant commanders, we are doing that with trained and 

ready forces. Our ability to meet other regional requirements for 

major contingency plans, we would be able to do that, but we would 

probably not be able to do it within the timeframe that the current 

plans call for us to arrive to participate in that conflict. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. General Milley, the numbers for the Army 

are not quite as dramatic, but they are also on an upward trend, 

rising from 1.52 in fiscal year 2014, to 1.99—just about 2—in fiscal 

year 2016. Let me ask you the same question. Can the Army meet 

the demands of the National Military Strategy? 

General MILLEY. Thanks, Chairman. On the Class A’s, it has our 

attention. We have asked for the Deputy Commander of TRADOC 

[Training and Doctrine Command] to conduct a multifunctional, 
11 

very detailed study of Class A aviation accidents. And one of the 

things you will see in this budget is we are increasing flying hours 

for our rotary-wing aviators from 10 hours to 12 hours. Ideally, we 

want them 14 to 15 hours a month. We can’t get there with the 

budget to 14, 15, but we are going to increase it to 12. But we are 

going to have more data here in probably a month or so, and we 

will share that with you as soon as we get it. It does have our concern. Our aircraft accidents have increased, and we are very concerned about it. 

On the second question, it is my estimate that, similar to General Neller’s, is that on a day-to-day basis, the Army does about 46 

percent of all the combatant commander demand signal that comes 

in, and 64 percent of emergent demand from the combatant commander is done by the Army. We can handle that on a day-to-day 

basis, and we have also very good current capability and capacity 

to fight the counterterrorist, counterinsurgency fight that is ongoing against ISIS and other areas such as in Afghanistan. So we 

have got those skill sets. 

My concern going forward is at the higher end in the event of 

a contingency, and if that were to happen, then I have grave concerns in terms of the readiness of the Army forces to be able to deal 

with that in a timely manner. And I think the cost both in terms 

of time, casualties, and troops and the ability to accomplish military objectives, would be very significant, and we have all given 

our risk assessments associated with that in a classified session. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me turn to a different issue, and I want to 

ask first Admiral Richardson and then General Welsh about this. 

Deputy Secretary Work has testified before this committee that nuclear weapons remain the most important mission we have. This is 

absolutely critical. And Secretary Carter has said it is the foundation for everything we do. 

I was just engaged in a conversation yesterday with some British 

parliamentarians about their decision whether to replenish, update, their nuclear deterrent, which is submarine-based. Admiral, 

do you agree, I guess, first, with Secretary Carter and Deputy Secretary Work that our nuclear deterrent is foundational, and do you 

believe that all three legs of the triad plus the weapons themselves 

must be part of that modernization effort for us? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Chairman, yes, I do. I think that the triad, 

and our part of that, the Ohio Replacement Program, are absolutely critical to national survival, and that is why that program 

is our number one modernization program. We are also working, as 

you know, very closely with the British, our partners in the United 

Kingdom, to make sure that they reconstitute and modernize their 

continuous at-sea deterrents. And so I absolutely agree. 

And I agree that it is a triad approach that we have right now, 

and that includes not only the platforms but the weapons and the 

warheads. And so this moves over to not only the Defense Department, but the Department of Energy [DOE], to keep that whole 

system whole. 

The CHAIRMAN. General Welsh, a couple of those legs are in your 

bailiwick. Do you agree that we need all three legs of the triad to 

be modernized, as well as the weapons themselves? 
12 

General WELSH. Chairman, I do believe that. I believe the triad 

has been very effective over time. I think nuclear deterrence has 

been the security wallpaper, if you will, for this country since we 

stood up our nuclear capability, and I think it should continue. I 

believe without all three legs of the triad, you expose seams in that 

nuclear deterrence posture to certain enemies. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Sanchez. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I too am concerned 

about our nuclear capabilities and modernization. General Welsh, 

the funding bow wave for the nuclear modernization is really steep. 

Is there an effective 25-year plan to find and execute all these programs concurrently to modernize? 

General WELSH. Ma’am, I think the important thing that we 

have to face really as a nation is a decision on are we going to modernize; are we going to keep the triad, the question the chairman 

just asked. And if the answer to that is yes, there is no option but 

to fund it. But we have to prioritize the funding, and if we decide 

we are going to take pieces of this, we have to prioritize the pieces 

that we will invest in. 

This is a much larger discussion than any particular service. It 

has to be a Department of Defense. It is a congressional; it is a 

White House discussion, and I hope it is something that the next 

administration takes on early in their tenure because we need an 

answer pretty quickly, or we are going to spend money toward a 

lot of programs that we can’t complete if we don’t fund them down 

the road. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Well, thank you for that because, I mean, this has 

been my concern, is the funding of how do we modernize this. You 

know, I have sat I think of the 19 years, now 20 that I have been 

on this committee, all but 2 on the Strategic Forces Committee, 

being a ranking member for it at one point. And I hear Mr. Murphy and others say that our readiness is deteriorating or has deteriorated to some extent, and it is just really not something we 

should in detail discuss obviously, I believe, in a public forum. But, 

you know, being able to move forward our domestic programs, 

being able to have an Army at ready to go, having an Air Force 

that can do the air cover and air deterioration that we need before 

we send in our Marines or our special forces or our Army, and then 

doing a total modernization on our nuclear capabilities. It can’t all 

be funded at once. 

And so, Mr. Chairman, I hope that this committee will really sit 

and think about how we are going to get all of that done because 

it is coming to a head. I mean, we can’t fund everything. We just 

cannot fund everything. So I hope that, Mr. Chairman, that we 

might consider how we really take a look at that funding issue. 

I have another question. This one will be for Admiral Richardson 

and General Milley. When Admiral Greenert and General Odierno 

wrote us that letter in 2014, well, wrote to the Secretary of Defense, that regional missile defense capabilities were stretched and 

that the Department of Defense should look, among other approaches, to deterrence and left-of-launch capabilities to relieve the 

demands on missile defenders and the cost to the Navy and the 

Army, what are the effective alternatives that are being considered 

to that? 
13 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Ma’am, I will tell you that right now in 

terms of the Navy’s situation, the ballistic missile defense ships are 

our most stressed force right now, so in terms of deployment length 

and that sort of thing, they come—— 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Can you pull that up? I can’t hear you as well. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. I’m sorry. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Thank you. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. All right. Those ships are as stressed as 

any in the Navy, but we are considering sort of the ballistic missile 

defense across the entire kill chain, if you want, the left of launch 

starting with the systems that, you know, program and launch 

these missiles, all the way through towards terminal defense. You 

take that entire sequence, you break it down, and you take a look 

at the opportunities and vulnerabilities in that whole sequence, 

and that is our approach. 

But there is the terminal phase which relies on our Aegisequipped cruisers right now both at sea and at shore. And it is a 

costly system, as you point out, and that is why General Odierno 

and Admiral Greenert wrote that letter, so that we can make sure 

we are approaching this from a systems assist approach and not 

missing any opportunities. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Great. I think we have had such reliability and 

such capability in that area that we tend to want to use it everywhere, and I know that it is stretched. I have been with Mr. Turner to see some of the new systems coming up with respect to that. 

And I am just worried again how we are going to fund all of this. 

And then the last question I have, Mr. Chairman—I am sorry for 

taking up the time—but what is the Air Force’s plan to shift away 

from using the Russian RD–180 engine and have assured access to 

space as quickly as possible? 

Secretary JAMES. The plan that we have been pursuing, of course 

in conjunction with all of you and the last two NDAAs [National 

Defense Authorization Acts], is to fund rocket-propulsion systems 

to allow industry to get away from that Russian engine as quickly 

as possible. We are targeting 2019, per the law. We are doing it 

in a full and open, competitive way. We are working as hard as we 

can at it. The technical experts tell me that 2019 is an ambitious 

technical target, I will say, for a timeline, but we are working as 

hard as we can toward that goal. We absolutely share the goal. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I think I 

will have some follow-up questions, in particular on that issue. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And to each of you, I 

wish I had the time to go through and tell the American people all 

the great things you have done because you are all truly assets to 

our country, and we appreciate each and every one of you. 

My questions go more not to you personally, but to the substance 

of what we are asking today because it is important that we have 

the facts to make the decisions we need to make. And the first 

question I would ask each of you to do for me is to raise your hand 

if you had to submit, or you submitted, the written record of remarks that you have to anyone for approval that was not under 

your direct command before you came here today. 
14 

So, General Neller, you did not? You were the only one? 

General NELLER. Congressman, can you say that one more time? 

Mr. FORBES. Did you have to submit your written statement to 

anyone not under your direct command before you submitted it to 

us today? 

General NELLER. I approved the statement and sent it up, and 

I assume it went up here as written. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you all for doing that. So, Mr. Chairman, if 

we could just show the record that everyone had to submit their 

statement for approval. I think that is wrong. We just need to hear 

from you directly, and I know that is not your fault. 

Secretary Mabus, you know the personal high regard I have for 

you, and I appreciate your comment that the Navy, it is important 

that we have a presence. Also you have been a leader to say that 

ship count was a part of that presence, at least a component. You 

have testified that we need 308 ships in the Navy, and Admiral 

Richardson has told us before that he would bet his paycheck when 

the force structure comes back in, that that will go up higher, and 

I would also bet Admiral Richardson’s paycheck that it will go up 

higher. We currently have 272 ships in the Navy. We have had testimony before our committee if we get down to 260 ships, that we 

cease to be a superpower, and we become a regional power. 

Right now if we look at some of the ships we count, we count two 

hospital ships, two high-speed ferries that are in reserve status, 

and we are getting ready to count 11 cruisers that would be put 

up. It would take 18 months to get them back in the water. If we 

took those ships out, we would be down to 257 ships. But even if 

we didn’t look at that, we have had testimony from the CBO [Congressional Budget Office], and the Navy now says it is pretty close, 

that if we stay on track now, and we do everything the same way 

we are, and we don’t add about $4 billion to the accounts—maybe 

as much as $6 billion over the next several years—we will be down 

to 237 ships. 

Admiral Harris has testified before our committee that he only 

had 62 percent of the subs that he needed in the Pacific Command. 

We know that by 2029, we will have 41 subs, where our requirement is 48. The Chinese will have twice as many. We know the 

Marine Corps said they need 38 amphibious ships—some people 

say as many as 50—but we will have 30. We know in 2007, the 

Navy was able to meet approximately 90 percent of the validated 

needs of our combatant commanders. This year it will meet approximately 40. 

We know the administration is now trying to forego the refueling 

of an aircraft carrier. It is trying to disestablish a carrier air wing. 

It is going to cut the buy of small surface combatants from 52 to 

40, try to inactivate 1 of the 2 T–AOEs in the Pacific, deactivate 

half of our cruiser fleet, and deactivate 3 amphibious ships. We 

also know that we had before sequestration, cuts of between $487- 

to $780 billion. 

So my question is this, Mr. Secretary: Isn’t it true that unless 

another administration is able to do the heavy lifting and come up 

with that extra $4 billion to $6 billion a year, that the air will come 

out of this balloon, and we will come down to 237 ships? And the 

second thing is, can you point to where this administration has pre-
15 

sented any budget adding that $4 billion or making up that shortfall? It looks to me kind of like my wife coming to me when she 

is complaining about our house, and I say but, look, I got plans to 

buy the house on the Hill, and then she says, but where are you 

going to get the money? So maybe you can help us with that. 

Secretary MABUS. Thank you, Congressman, and every CNO that 

I have been privileged to serve with and I have talked about the 

Ohio-class replacement coming in 2021 and the need to fund that 

to keep it from having a huge and detrimental impact on Navy 

shipbuilding. I would say that what your comments point out is 

that shipbuilding takes a long time. It is not the job of one administration. It is not the job of one Congress. And this administration 

has reversed that precipitous decline that you pointed out. Now, it 

has also put us on the track to get to 308 ships, which is what you 

say we need, and I would bet the CNO’s paycheck too that the next 

one will come in higher. But what we are debating now, what you 

are discussing now, is not what happens to the fleet now. It is what 

happens to the fleet in the 2020s. 

Mr. FORBES. But if you don’t mind, I would love for you to give 

us the rest of that for the record. And I didn’t mean to cut you off. 

It is just that I am cut off. So, Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield 

back. 

Secretary MABUS. I would be happy to do that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 171.] 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I certainly want to 

welcome our former colleague, Acting Secretary Murphy, to the 

panel and to the committee this morning. I know through a series 

of opportunities that we have had to discuss the issues before us, 

one of the most critical really is readiness, and I think that you 

have all in one way or another said that, you know, readiness really has no constituency. And so we have to be able to make that 

case to our constituents that this is certainly something that has 

affected us a great deal. 

And I think what people have a harder time understanding is 

how the antiterrorism and anticounterinsurgency efforts have really impacted our overall readiness today of the forces throughout. 

Can you in as quick a way as possible speak to that, all the services, what is the most critical way in which that has made a difference and not allowed us to be at a place today that is of less risk 

than it would have been otherwise? 

General MILLEY. Thanks, Congresswoman. For the Army, just 

very briefly, you know, for 15 years we have been running back 

and forth to Iraq and Afghanistan. And during that time, we have 

been fighting one typology of war against counterinsurgents or terrorists or guerillas, and our higher-end training against conventional threats, hybrid threats, threats that involve enemy artillery, 

enemy air, enemy electronic warfare, et cetera, the higher-end, 

higher-intensity type battlefields have not been routinely practiced 

for 15 consecutive years. So our readiness against that type of 

threat has deteriorated over a decade and a half. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 
16 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Ma’am, I will tell you, the Navy, it has 

been very well known by this committee that this manifested itself 

in deployment lengths of 8 to 10 months during those times, which 

puts an incredible cost on the ship itself, but even more so on the 

people that man the ship, and so that part went under stress. The 

ability to do maintenance on those ships was severely affected by 

sequestration. It incurred a readiness debt that we have had difficulty pulling out or even making progress on, as the funding levels are what they are, and the security environment in the world 

continues to put demands on the force. 

General NELLER. I believe everybody is in a similar spot. The 

DEPTEMPO [deployment tempo] hasn’t reduced even though we 

are doing similar things, but we are back in the Far East as we 

have reset the force there, so the amount of deployment goes on. 

The fight in ISIL continues to put stress on equipment, particularly 

aviation. We are in the process of resetting our equipment, and 

then you are trying to maintain legacy gear and at the same time 

modernize. Every model/type/series aircraft in the Marine Corps is 

in the middle of a reset, either reset the legacy and/or buy new. 

And at the same time we recognize there is capabilities in training, 

as General Milley mentioned, that we have to get ready for what 

we think we are going to see in the future. So all those things together, they are putting stress on our readiness. 

General WELSH. Congresswoman, the Air Force never came home 

from the first Gulf war. We have had airmen flying and air tasking 

for 25 years in the Middle East. During that time, as Secretary 

James mentioned, we have cut 40 percent of our Active Duty force, 

so that lower force size combined with the increased deployment 

and operations tempo over the last 25 years has limited the 

amount of training we can do for the other missions that we are 

required to do in a different kind of conflict, as General Milley just 

stated. That is the biggest impact on us in attaining readiness over 

the long term. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. I appreciate all of you doing that very 

quickly. It was a little elevator speech, but that is important, I 

think, for us to be able to articulate as well. 

And if we could just go back to you, General Welsh, just the impact of the uncertainty on the budgets and what we have dealt 

with here. What impact does that have on the 2 million men and 

women who serve our country and sacrifice on our behalf? 

General WELSH. Ma’am, they are very proud of who they are. 

They are very proud of what they do, and they are very proud of 

the joint coalition team they stand beside doing it, and their families have been unbelievably dedicated to this. And this world of deployments I mentioned is what almost everybody in our services 

came into. It is the way it has been the entire time they have 

served. So they are willing to pay the price if they think it is important, if they think the Nation supports them, if they think they 

will have the resources and the equipment and the training to be 

the best in the world at what they do. That is all they ask. If they 

don’t believe that, they will think about voting with their feet. 

Mrs. DAVIS. General Neller. 

General NELLER. I think that is a very good review of where everybody is. You know, they don’t ask much. They always make it 
17 

happen. We want to keep them here. The thing that keeps them 

here is maybe not so much what you would call quality of life. It 

is having good gear. And the best quality of life I can offer to a marine family is I am going to bring their marine home alive. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank each of you 

for being here, and we are particularly grateful to see Secretary 

Murphy, our former colleague. There is life after office. And I know 

his military background, too. And so I thank all of you for your 

service. 

General Welsh, I appreciate being the son of a Flying Tiger. I am 

also very proud to be the uncle of a current airman. And as chairman of the Emerging Threats Subcommittee of the Armed Services 

Committee, I am concerned about the third offset strategy which 

may be providing for present-day tradeoffs for an overdue bet on 

the future when investments in both areas are desperately needed. 

In your opinion, what generation of weapons system is your priority to maintain American military technological superiority by 

2020? 

General WELSH. Chairman, the two best examples of technology 

that we need in the Air Force by 2020 are programs that are already in progress that the Congress has supported very well, and 

that is the KC–46 tanker and the F–35. The emerging threat over 

the next 5 to 10 years will mean that we have to have a capability 

to operate against an integrated air defense system, against aircraft that now have longer sensor ranges, longer weapons ranges, 

than anything we currently have on our legacy fleet. The F–35, 

working with the F–22, will give us that capability. It will also give 

us the capability to penetrate and integrate our defense systems. 

So 2020, those are the pacing technologies that we are already in 

the process of acquiring. 

Mr. WILSON. And I am grateful that you mentioned the F–35. I 

formerly represented Beaufort Marine Corps Air Station, and I am 

very grateful for the training there and what that means for our 

country. 

Admiral Richardson, I am also grateful to be a Navy dad. And 

you yesterday courageously testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee that Iran had knowingly violated international law 

earlier this year by boarding a U.S. Navy vessel, detaining 10 sailors against their will. In addition to this outrage, it was reported 

just this week that Iran has seized an estimated 13,000 pages of 

information extracted from government laptops, GPS [Global Positioning System] devices, and maps aboard the vessel. I am deeply 

concerned about this violation and would like to know what subsequent actions have been taken to rectify this brazen defiance of 

international law by Iran. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Sir, within the Navy—I will speak to that 

part—we have conducted an investigation. That investigation is 

being reviewed right now. That will detail all of the sequence of 

events that went on in detail as that event unfolded. And we have 

identified a number of areas in the Navy where we can tighten up 
18 

our act, improve, so that we can minimize the chance of something 

like this happening again. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, again, it is just an outrage to me to see our 

military personnel humiliated by what I consider to be an outlaw 

regime. 

And, General Milley, my wife and I appreciate that we have had 

three sons who have served under your command. Military officials 

have said that the Army’s fiscal year 2017 budget request for facilities is less than that of the prior year. So by far, this affects the 

military construction budget, which in recent years has been focused on family housing projects. Could you explain what military 

barracks and facilities have your focus, and in particular I am very 

interested in Fort Jackson, that I represent, and their barracks 

that are 50 years of age? 

General MILLEY. Thanks, Congressman. I must say that you 

have probably the most joint family I have ever heard in my life, 

and I do hope you got positive feedback from your sons. 

Mr. WILSON. I just can’t include the Coast Guard. 

General MILLEY. Coast Guard is next. But to answer your question, installation readiness is one of the foundational parts of overall readiness because that is where we get our housing, quality of 

life, education, et cetera, but that is also where you get your Rangers and all your training areas, et cetera. And that has taken a cut 

over several years, and frankly our installations have degraded significantly. 

And I agree with General Neller, the greatest quality of life that 

we can take care of a soldier is to bring him back with his dog tags 

in one piece, whole mind, whole body, and that requires good training, equipment, leadership, et cetera. But also when they are deployed, to ensure that their families have great quality of life so 

that they can focus on the task at hand, which is the military task. 

Specifically with respect to, you mentioned Fort Jackson in South 

Carolina, there are some areas there that have been deteriorated. 

So there are several projects that you will see in the 2017 budget 

that are targeted specifically to Fort Jackson because I am not satisfied with the quality of the barracks that are there, and we are 

going to upgrade some of those. And we are pulling forward a couple of additional items that we were looking to put in the FYDP 

[Future Years Defense Program] in 2018 or 2019. We are going to 

bring them forward because I think the condition of some of the facilities at Fort Jackson are unsatisfactory and don’t meet Army 

standards. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary James and 

General Welch, there has been recent criticism against the Air 

Force’s proposed use of the cost-plus during the early stages of the 

acquisition program for the new Long Range Strike Bomber, the B– 

21. Can you please explain the process for which the Air Force determined that a blended cost-plus fixed-price approach was ideal 

for that program, and what advantages it provides? 

Secretary JAMES. So Congresswoman, I will start, but then chief 

please jump in as well. When it comes to contracting, of course, I 

guess to state the obvious, one size does not fit all. It just depends 
19 

on the circumstances. And so in the case of a cost-plus when it 

comes to development programs, this is what we tend to do. When 

it is a larger program, when there are uncertainties, when there 

are risks involved, but in the case of the B–21, I do want to say 

that it is cost-plus incentives. 

So that is to say there are incentives for the contractor to be able 

to meet milestones for schedule and performance, and if they don’t 

meet those milestones according to the plan, they will lose their 

fee. And most of that, by the way, is backloaded in the development 

process which incentivizes them to move through development as 

quickly as feasible and not drag it out. 

So overall, cost-plus incentive for that development, for a never 

before done airframe and an integration job, the way it is seemed 

most appropriate and the incentives are key. When it comes to the 

firm-fixed-price in production, that seems to be a much more sensible way to do the production element. 

And as you know, Congresswoman, we awarded both at once. We 

awarded the EMD—engineering, manufacturing, and development—together with the initial tranche of the actual production in 

a firm-fixed-price environment. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you. I have very little time 

left. Mr. Welsh, do you wish to comment on that? 

General WELSH. Ma’am, I would just add that 70 percent of the 

cost of this program overall, is firm-fixed-price. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

Secretary Murphy, and General Milley, the Army has been working to replace the current force generation concept with the sustainable readiness concept. Is it still on track to replace the current 

model in fiscal year 2017? 

Additionally, how does the Army’s new model translate to the 

total force? Specifically, will National Guard and Reserve units be 

fully incorporated into this readiness model? 

General MILLEY. The short answer is yes. It is on track to be implemented and it does include Guard and Reserve in the readiness 

model. In general, what we want to do is increase the operational 

use of the National Guard and we want to increase their training, 

increase the CTCs [combat training centers], selectively increase 

the number of days of training per year, and then most importantly, increase National Guard deployment to Europe, Middle 

East, and Asia. 

Ms. BORDALLO. General Milley. 

General MILLEY. That was General Milley. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I am sorry. Secretary Murphy. 

Secretary MURPHY. I am only a Secretary, ma’am. But Congresswoman, General Milley is absolutely right. I mean, if you look at 

our 1 million soldiers in our Army, the majority of them are actually in the Reserve or National Guard Components. We are one 

team, one fight, one Army. And so when you look at Guam, for example, you know, we have the THAAD [Terminal High Altitude 

Area Defense] battery that is there and Active Duty, but we are 

working with the National Guard there as well. But as far as on 

schedule, we were absolutely on schedule, and we are committed to 

make sure that we have one team and one total force. 
20 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. All right. And I have a statement to 

make, not a question. Secretary Mabus and Admiral Richardson, I 

would like to make a brief comment regarding depot-level maintenance including dry-dock capabilities in the Western Pacific. I believe that these capabilities are sorely lacking and the Navy is not 

investing enough to support a forward-deployed fleet in the Western Pacific. We have these requirements and we must make the 

right investments as this is a key to readiness in our region. 

In particular, I have serious concerns about the Navy’s assessments, and will continue working to ensure that our forward-deployed assets have quality and secure maintenance that American 

workers and equipment provide without losing weeks of presence. 

And with that, Mr. Chairman, thank you and I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Rogers. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome to the panelists. I appreciate all of your service to our country. 

Secretary James, I really appreciate your leadership. You have 

been a great partner to work with on our endeavors in my subcommittee. I want to talk to you about helicopters. I know that is 

a subject you and I have talked about in the past. But for about 

12 years now we have had helicopters protecting our missile fields, 

our ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] fields that are not up 

to the mission. And as you know, recently, Admiral Haney has 

stated that this problem cannot go on. 

My question to you is, what is the status on that? What are your 

plans to remedy Admiral Haney’s concerns with making sure those 

helicopters are able to carry out their mission with protecting those 

ICBM fields? 

Secretary JAMES. I would expect within the next couple of weeks, 

our acquisition executive, in the Air Force, who is currently looking 

at acquisition strategies, will come to a conclusion and make a recommendation. So at the moment we are looking at sole-source opportunities. We need to have the proper documentation to support 

if that is the way to go. We are looking at competitive opportunities, and I also, you know, Congressman, but just in case there are 

others that aren’t following this day-to-day, there are those that actually protect the missile fields, and there is another part of the 

requirement as well. 

So maybe one is more urgent than the other. We are essentially 

working with Admiral Haney. We are working with Chairman 

Dunford and other members of the team of the Joint Staff to look 

at the case for how urgent we need to go. I think it is urgent. You 

think it is urgent. I think we are a couple of weeks away, at least 

within the Air Force, of having a way forward. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. I would like, if you would, by the first of 

April if you could provide me a detailed cost estimate on what you 

anticipate it would cost the Air Force if you have to call the Army 

National Guard in to provide gap fillers for these missile wings’ security. I would like to know what that would be with specificity if 

you could. 

Secretary JAMES. We will do that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 171.] 
21 

Mr. ROGERS. And then moving on to launch. As you know this 

is taking up a lot of your time and mine. And for those who aren’t 

familiar with how we evolved with the EELV [Evolved Expendable 

Launch Vehicle] program, it started in the 1990s with Boeing and 

Lockheed. Now, we tried to help both those two commercial enterprises be successful with launch capabilities and that just didn’t 

work out, so we helped them form United Launch Alliance [ULA] 

with a lot of expense to the government. But it is essential for national security and access to space. 

Could you certify Secretary James that there is a sufficient commercial market to support these companies over the next 10 years 

and sign firm-fixed-price contracts for the same? 

Secretary JAMES. I could not certify that, Chairman. I know the 

companies are trying to become competitive because they believe it, 

but I certainly could not certify such a thing. 

Mr. ROGERS. And do you concur then with the analysis by General Mitchell’s study which stated quote, ‘‘Launch capacity exceeds 

demand by a 3 to 1 ratio to service it in this fixed market.’’ 

Secretary JAMES. I would have to go back and read that to see 

the context. I am not sure he was talking about the total world 

market, including commercial launches, or whether he just meant 

NSS [national security space]. So please allow me to go back and 

reread that passage and get back to you for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 172.] 

Mr. ROGERS. Well, and you will find he was making reference to 

that global market, and it is just a practical term that we are going 

to have to acknowledge. I am not sure what the answer is going 

to be either. 

But you and I are going to have to navigate these waters and figure out how to make sure we have assured access to space. I don’t 

know what the answer is going to be ultimately, but I would look 

forward to having more dialogue with you offline about this. 

Secretary JAMES. And Mr. Chairman, I would also bet the CNO’s 

paycheck that we will be having more dialogue, you and me, but 

I thank you very much. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yeah. We are determined to make sure he never 

gets paid again, aren’t we? 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate it and I hope you all figure it out 

because it is a complex subject. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all of 

the witnesses. It is great to see our former colleague. It shows 

there is hope after Congress. And again, your testimony has been 

outstanding this morning. 

So Secretary Mabus, you know, again, we enjoyed your long service here, longest since World War I, and I just want to follow up 

again with some of the exchange earlier which I think we are all 

on the same team here, that shipbuilding is the long game, and 

that we did as a nation take a holiday. As you pointed out only 41 

ships under contract during the 8 years preceding your time in office. We doubled that to 84. I see it every day in southeastern Connecticut. 
22 

We have the Illinois christening, the South Dakota keel laying is 

coming up soon. In the yard we have the Colorado, and Vermont. 

There has not been four ships under construction in southeastern 

Connecticut at the same time since the 1980s, and, frankly, the 

biggest challenge we have is workforce. Secretary Perez is right 

down the hall. We just had a hearing on the Workforce Investment 

Act and the fact that Connecticut, like Maine, Vermont—excuse 

me, Virginia, Hawaii, California, they are all out there really now 

scouring the countryside for metal trades. And again, I think that 

speaks volumes about your record and I want to thank you publicly 

for the time that you have spent leading our Nation and really recovering our fleet. 

Admiral Richardson, we had a sequence of witnesses over the 

space of about 7 days a couple of weeks ago. Admiral Stavridis, Admiral Harris, and General Breedlove. And without any prompting, 

Admiral Stavridis talked about how Russian submarine activity 

now is about 70 or 80 percent of where it was during the Cold War. 

Admiral Harris again just said, you know, we need more submarines out in the Pacific. General Breedlove talked about the 

Greenland-Iceland-U.K. Gap, and that we are playing zone defense. 

We have a force structure that was developed back 10 years ago 

of 48 submarines in the fleet. We have 54 now that are under 

stress. Do we need to take another look at that force structure? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Sir, we do. And start of that look right 

now is part of our updated Force Structure Assessment and that 

will include a comprehensive look at attack submarine force levels. 

Mr. COURTNEY. So I mean, obviously, this budget this year, keeps 

the two-a-year build rate for Virginia and has all of the investment 

in Ohio replacement. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COURTNEY. But, again, even with that, we are looking at a 

41-sub fleet unless we again tweak or move—can you talk about 

that a little bit? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. This goes to one of the points that 

the Secretary makes so eloquently is that these are long-term decisions, as you highlighted. So at the end of their lives, these ships 

leave service at the rate that they entered service, and we are 

building ships, submarines in this case, at three or four a year, and 

that is the rate at which they leave service. And so we have to be 

very thoughtful in terms of a building plan that reaches and maintains those required force levels. 

Our two-per-year Virginia plan is part of that. We have done an 

intense look at the industrial base over the last year. We think we 

can mitigate that further, particularly in 2021 there might be 

room, industrial capability, capacity to build an additional Virginia-class submarine in that year so that would make it 10 over 

the 5-year plan. So we look forward to discussing that with you. 

That would mitigate that trough somewhat. We are building the 

Virginia Payload Module, so we get more capability out of each of 

those Virginia-class submarines starting in fiscal year 2019, but we 

do have to continually challenge ourselves, to make sure that we 

have got the right number in terms of requirements, and we are 

doing everything that we can to look at meeting that requirement. 
23 

And you know, that comes up with a resource or a cost that has 

been traditionally considered unacceptable. I think we still owe you 

that plan at the best cost point that we could appreciate, and then 

we will have a discussion. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Good. And as you know, the Seapower Subcommittee will work with you and I know I can speak for Mr. Forbes. 

I want to give you, Mr. Mabus, the floor for just—again, the question is, are we going to hit a 300-ship Navy with the contracts that 

are underway and the work that I described earlier that is happening right now? 

Secretary MABUS. We are going to get 300 by 2019 and 308 by 

2021 just with the ships this committee has authorized, that has 

been appropriated, and that are under contract today. 

And once again, these are long-term things. I mean, it took—the 

fleet size we are living with today, those decisions were made 8, 10, 

15 years ago. The fleet size that we will be living with in the mid2020s, late 2020s, those decisions are being made today. This administration has built all of the ships we are going to be able to 

build and have them under contract. 

Mr. COURTNEY. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ladies and gentlemen, 

thank you so much for joining us today and thank you for your 

service to our Nation. 

General Neller, I want to focus on Marine Corps aviation. As you 

know, Lieutenant General Davis I think has done a very good job 

in trying to bring back Marine Corps aviation readiness. Can you 

give us perspective? When General Paxton came and testified before our subcommittee he said that we don’t get back to restoring 

full-scale or full-spectrum readiness in Marine Corps aviation just 

by adding flying hours. Can you kind of give us a drill down of 

what we need to do to get you back to full-spectrum readiness on 

Marine Corps aviation? 

General NELLER. Well, Congressman, thank you for the question. 

It is different for every model/type/series, but in general, we have 

to repair our legacy aircraft that we have to keep online and we 

have to modernize by buying new airplanes. We are buying the F– 

35. The acquisition objective is 420 and we have got about 70. We 

are going to stand up our second squadron. 

At the same time, we have got F–18s that are going to fly for 

another 10-plus years. MV–22s, acquisition objective 360; we have 

got about 270, 280, so that is happening. So same thing with the 

Hueys and Cobras. CH–53 is probably in the hardest spot because 

we have two demonstrators that are flying. They are flying very 

well. We have got over 35 hours. I saw them last week, but that 

program is going to take some time to go through the test and evaluation. 

So it is a combination. Buy new, repair our old, and the accounts 

for fiscal year 2017, this budget fully funds the sustainment accounts for putting aircraft through depot level. And Admiral Richardson and I were out at the Fleet Readiness Center in San Diego. 

They have improved their output. We opened up other venues, got 

two contractors that have provided additional aircraft. So all of 

that is going to go on. 
24 

But the bottom line is, we’ve got to get more airplanes on the 

ramp. Pilots have to fly more. We have got to get our maintainers 

the parts they need to fix the airplanes. So all of these things are 

working. I think we have a plan. It is funded. But it is not going 

to happen overnight. It is going to take a couple of years of this 

combination of effects. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, General Neller, I appreciate that. I know we are all concerned about getting to the point 

that we project the Marine Corps needs to be at. So we want to 

make sure we keep up to date on that. 

Admiral Richardson, I know that you have been approached 

about a number of submarine issues, but I want to drill down a little bit on the Ohio-class replacement. The largest of the fiscal year 

2017 research and development programs are for Ohio-class replacement. And you have talked extensively about the design 

phase, making sure we are mature in designs, so when we go to 

build that boat we are ready to go. We understand, though, that 

if we take the cost of that boat wherever it ends up, and we put 

that in the middle of a shipbuilding budget, we know what happens. It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to figure that out. 

What we, I believe, need to be looking at is, what do we do to 

mitigate that? And what we have done, as a House, and trying to 

get the Senate to do, is a National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, 

which is how we funded Ohio-class submarines originally. 

Can you give us perspective, what kind of cost savings will we 

be able to accrue by funding Ohio-class replacement with the National Sea-Based Deterrence Fund, because there is still some resistance here. I think that that is the way to do it, and it doesn’t 

interfere with other long-term viability of other shipbuilding programs. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question. First 

of all, I like what the fund stands for, which is that this is a national program of absolutely top priority for national security, and 

so it elevates the discussion to a national level which is exactly 

where I think it should be. 

With the authorities that the fund may provide which would 

allow you to make very wise business decisions, the projections are 

that you could save on the order of 10 or more percent across the 

program, which is essentially getting one submarine for the cost of, 

you know, free, right. 

Mr. WITTMAN. For the total cost? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Yeah, so significant savings achievable by 

the use of a fund like that. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Got you. General Neller, from your perspective we 

look at all of the shipbuilding programs. Obviously, the ones we are 

addressing are Ohio-class replacement, but also amphibious lift. 

One of the elements is to look at, you know, what we are doing 

with the next generation amphibious ships, the LX(R), give us your 

perspective on the importance of the timeliness of getting that program locked in as far as building those ships. 

General NELLER. Congressman, similar to what the CNO said 

about submarines, we build these ships. They have a certain life 

expectancy, so if you don’t have a replacement vessel, they have to 
25 

have an extension program or their maintenance costs are increased, so you are spending money to keep something older online. 

So right now, due to the support of the Congress, and this committee, we are going to get LPD–28, give us 12 LPD–17 class ships. 

And the next class of ship is the LX(R) to replace the landing ship 

dock, the Whidbey Island/Harpers Ferry class. The first ship of 

that class is supposed to be built in 2020. There is some advance 

procurement of long-lead items like engineering, power, engines, 

and steel. 

But there is a gap, and anytime you have a gap, the workforce 

is not able to work. You forget what you have learned and your 

costs go up. So there was a discussion about it of LPD [landing 

platform/dock] repeat. Can’t make the price because we are all concerned with the cost, so there is a ship design, and talking with the 

CNO, and the Secretary, and Mr. Stackley. The plan is that we 

come up with a design. It is going to be bid between a couple of 

different shipyards and we will start to build that first ship in 

2020. 

If there were more money and we could come up with a design 

faster, that all could possibly be moved to the left. But then ideally, 

whenever we do start to build that ship we should build—there 

should be not build a ship, stop, build a ship, stop. It should be 

build a ship, start the next one so that workforce gets smarter. 

That we know will drive the cost down. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you lady 

and gentlemen for your service to the Nation. There can be no 

greater honor for me as a Congressman than to serve on the House 

Armed Services Committee that is charged with the responsibility 

of authorizing expenditures for the national security of this country. Which is guaranteed by our men and women who serve us in 

the military and you all lead that effort. And I thank you for that. 

I will say that since 2011 you have been operating under sequestration and each one of you have talked about how this has eroded 

your ability to ensure the continued superiority of the United 

States military, and we have heard a lot about the impact on ships 

and planes. We know that the Air Force, and the Navy, and the 

Marines, are very important elements of our superiority. But we 

should not forget about the foundational element of boots on the 

ground Army. 

And so I want to ask about how sequestration, which is not a 

program of President Obama. It is actually a statutory law passed 

here in Congress. I think members of the Armed Services Committee were not smitten with it at all because we knew what impact it would have, across-the-board 10 percent cuts without regard 

to need or jeopardy that we would place the Nation in. But I want 

to talk about that in terms of the Army and how the end strength 

of the Army has shrunk due to sequestration. 

Mr. Murphy, and General Milley, would you address that, 

please? 

Secretary MURPHY. Congressman, off the bat, budgets are moral 

documents. It shows what our country’s priorities are. You know, 

I left the Congress 5 years ago and the budget for the Army at that 
26 

time was $243 billion. You heard my opening testimony. We are 

asking for $125.1 billion. So we have downsized our Army. 

I would like to recognize, though, I was thankful also for the 

BBA of 2015, which helped relieve that sequestration. We are very 

thankful for that predictable and adequate funding. But if you are 

asking me as far as what this budget request is, it is minimal. It 

is minimally adequate. We are taking high risk, as an Army and 

as a Nation, when you fund our Army at this level, especially when 

you consider the OPTEMPO [operating tempo] and the world right 

now, when you talk about ISIS, a resurgent Russia, aggression 

with North Korea. 

So we ask you to support our budget request at that level. But 

I would like to, you know, when you look at brigade combat teams, 

you know, again, we are a total Army but as far as 5 years ago, 

when I left the Congress, we had 45 brigade combat teams on Active Duty, now we have 31. 

Mr. JOHNSON. In addition to the diminution on end strength, we 

also have issues of readiness and modernization. General Milley, 

could you comment on that? 

General MILLEY. Yeah, thanks, Congressman. As I mentioned 

earlier, the readiness issues are our number one priority as we go 

forward. Because we are uncertain, and I can’t tell you or anyone 

else that our Nation won’t be in other conflicts next week, next 

month, next year, or the year after that. None of us at this table 

can do that. So we have always got to maintain readiness, and 

readiness is a number one priority. 

Right now the readiness of the United States Army, all components of the United States Army, is not at a level that is appropriate for what the American people would expect to defend them. 

And I will be happy to give a classified briefing on the exact specifics of that. But it is not at the levels it can execute satisfactorily 

in terms of cost, in terms of time, cost in terms of casualties, or 

cost in terms of military objectives. 

As far as the impact, specifically, on the Army of the diminution 

of funding, et cetera, the Army is the largest force, largest military 

force among all of the joint forces. Right now, as I mentioned earlier, we do 46 percent of the annual demand of the combatant commanders, and 64 percent of everything they ask for on an emergent 

basis comes out of the Army. And we have suffered something like 

60 or 70 percent of all the casualties over the last 15 years. 

And we have been cut significantly, so you can imagine there is 

a significant amount of stress on the force as a result. And that 

also impacts readiness, so you have got the largest force, the largest demand, the largest stress, and the least budget. All of that is 

cumulative on the United States Army. We will drive on. The caissons will go rolling along. We will execute the tasks given to us on 

a day-to-day basis, but it does come with risk, and people have got 

to be clear-eyed and open-minded about what that risk is. And 

again, I will be happy to talk in a classified session in more detail 

on the risk if you desire. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Franks. 
27 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, as always, the generals 

and admirals, and all the service people there. We express a great 

gratitude to you all for everything that you do. 

General Milley, I have been especially impressed with the cogency and clarity of your comments in recent days and I appreciate 

you speaking so clearly to us. Because I believe your perspective 

is critically important. 

With that, I am going to direct my questions to the civilian command structure here. Secretary James and Secretary Mabus, during its 7-year tenure, the Obama administration, I understand, has 

reviewed and reassessed the need for the nuclear triad. Has the administration conducted detailed analysis of eliminating one or more 

legs of the triad or significantly altering the U.S. nuclear posture. 

And if so, what were the results of those efforts? 

And I will start with you Secretary Mabus. 

Secretary MABUS. Congressman, I am not aware of any detailed 

look at that. We have been, obviously, focused on our leg of the 

triad, the Ohio-class replacement, and have, obviously, done very 

detailed analysis on how that program comes into being in its own 

track for 2021. 

Mr. FRANKS. Let me kind of re-orient the question. Why does the 

administration continue to propose such strong support for and recapitalization of the nuclear triad from your perspective? 

Secretary MABUS. Well, to quote the CNO, it is a matter of our 

national existence. And from a Navy standpoint, it is our top modernization program. It is the top program that we have. It is on 

track to begin construction of the Ohio-class replacement in 2021. 

That is when we have to begin. 

But as this CNO, and the three that I have been privileged to 

serve with have said, and I have said, you are going to have to look 

at this program with a national lens because if you drop this into 

the middle of a Navy shipbuilding budget, it will just gut Navy 

shipbuilding for decades to come. And so the reason that we are focused on it is because it is an existential program, and the reason 

that we are focused on how to do it is to do it without damaging 

our conventional superiority as well. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, sir. Secretary James, I might ask 

if you share the same endorsement and support to the nuclear 

triad? 

Secretary JAMES. Yes, I absolutely support it and I believe that 

the administration supports it precisely because it has worked for 

us for decades. It has provided that deterrent and each leg of the 

triad adds a little bit different aspect to that. 

So the ICBMs are considered responsive. The sea launched are 

considered survivable, and the bombers, of course, are flexible and 

they also are survivable because of the dispersion. 

If I could just add one point. Obviously, it is a certain amount 

of money, and to the extent we fund one thing if we are under 

budget constraints, we can’t fund another. So I would just like to 

say I am not fully familiar with the strategic deterrence fund that 

you all have referenced here. But if that is a strategic deterrence 

fund which would help or benefit one leg of the triad, I would ask 

for consideration that all of the legs of the triad be included in such 

an approach. 
28 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Secretary Carter and Deputy Secretary Work 

have made clear that the nuclear deterrence is the Department of 

Defense’s highest priority mission. Certainly, I agree with that. But 

for the Navy and the Air Force, how are you prioritizing your portions of the nuclear deterrence mission within each service, and 

what nuclear deterrence programs are you pursuing, and where do 

they rank in your services’ priority list? You kind of have to take 

an overview, each of you, if you would, of those points. 

Secretary MABUS. It is our top priority. We have said that for 

several years now. The first boat is funded. We have funded all of 

the research and development, all of the design work, all of the engineering work going into this. As was said in answer to an earlier 

question, we have been working with our colleagues, the British, on 

a common launch, common missile launch tube so that we do save 

some money there. 

We have been driving down the cost of these boats and we are 

on track to begin construction of the first one in 2021, which will 

allow it to take its place in the fleet, and in the rotation at the correct time when the Ohio-class begins to retire. 

Secretary JAMES. And Mr. Franks, I would say there is three 

parts. There is the people who perform the nuclear mission, there 

is the readiness of those people, and then there is the modernization aspects. And over the last several years we have shifted billions of dollars in additional people to try to address all of these 

areas. 

So when it comes to modernization, of course, we have the B–21, 

we talked about that somewhat earlier. We have the ground-based 

strategic deterrent, which will be the future of the ICBM force, and 

then we, of course, have to also fund appropriately the weapons 

that would go with these. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all of you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. O’Rourke. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and I would like to 

thank each of you for your testimony today and your service to the 

country. 

And I would like to ask Secretary Murphy and General Milley a 

series of questions on readiness based on some of what we have 

heard so far today. 

Secretary Murphy, you defined readiness as the components 

being a fully manned and fully trained force that we send into 

harm’s way, and General Milley has been very eloquent about the 

consequences of a failure to do so. It really will end up costing this 

country the lives of the service members who are there fulfilling 

our missions. 

If the publicly stated goal for the Army is to be at 90 percent 

readiness, and if we are in this setting somewhere short of that, 

what does it cost to get us to our stated goal if it is not in this 

President’s budget? 

Secretary MURPHY. Well, Congressman, a couple of things. As far 

as when you look at the budget, as I mentioned, it is minimally 

adequate and we are taking on high risk. If you are talking about 

end strength that is also, we are at the minimal levels. We are in 

a glide path, as you know, to get down to 980,000 in the total force 

Army. 
29 

If you do give the Army money and extra money, it doesn’t mean 

that we are going to be at 90 percent the next day. Readiness takes 

time to build and that is why we are expanding CTCs, the combat 

training centers. And that is at total force. So next year we have 

planned that we are going to double the National Guard units, brigade combat teams going through the CTCs. So it is multilevel. 

So it is not just—the money is critically important. If you give 

us the money, we will be more ready. We will give the training. 

And as you know, we train like we fight. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. You really got my attention earlier when you said 

you put us at high risk when you fund the Army at this level, 

which leads me to this conclusion. I don’t want to be a passive witness to high risk. And so if more money is needed to improve readiness and reduce risk, especially for the service members whom we 

want to return safely, then I want to fund that. I want to be an 

advocate for that funding, and I want to be able to convince my colleagues that that funding is necessary because it comes at a cost 

in tax dollars, other opportunities, and other priorities. 

So I want to know what that number is. I don’t simply want to 

assume that we must move forward with a high-risk posture for 

the U.S. Army, so looking for a specific number that I can advocate 

for. 

Secretary MURPHY. Real quick. We have, obviously, our base 

budget request at $125.1 billion. We have an unfunded request 

which is not part of that. Please fund the base. Then we have unfunded. It is called UFRs [unfunded requirements], as you know, 

at $7.5 billion, which helps mitigate that risk. But again, that 

doesn’t mean that we are at 90 percent the next day. I mean, this 

is a process and, you know, I believe the chief wants to comment 

as well. 

General MILLEY. Congressman, the whole issue of readiness, the 

very first question any of us needs to ask is readiness for what? 

And as I mentioned earlier, the United States Army, you can take 

it to the bank right now, is ready to fight ISIS, Al Qaeda, alNusrah, and any other terrorist group, counterinsurgency type 

thing. That is not what we are talking about when we are saying 

risk. 

We are talking about great power war with one of, or two of, four 

countries. You are talking about China, Russia, Iran, and North 

Korea. That is the guidance we were given. That is how we are 

force sizing the budget, or that is how we are sizing the force and 

that is how we planned the budget, in accordance with the National Military Strategy, the Defense Planning Guidance, and a 

wide variety of other documents. To do those operations against 

those countries, if that day would ever come, that is what we are 

talking about in terms of the level of risk. 

Now, we collectively can roll the dice and say those days will 

never come. And that is a course of action. That is not a course of 

action I would advise, and I think that the guidance is correct. We 

need to size the force and train the force, all the forces, Army, 

Navy, Air Force, Marines—not just the Army—to be able to handle 

those contingencies. And I think there is a high level of risk associated with those contingencies right now. 
30 

Mr. O’ROURKE. So let me ask this. If others before us have said 

we are at the low ragged edge of what is safe or manageable risk, 

if you say we are at high risk, does $148 million total base in OCO 

[Overseas Contingency Operations] for the U.S. Army get you 

where you need to be, or do you need something more to mitigate 

that risk? 

I am accountable for this, so I want to make sure I am advocating for, and we are legislating for, the appropriate number to 

get you to where you need to be based on risk as you see it. 

I am out of time, so I hope that someone will follow up on this 

question because I want to know what that number is. 

Secretary MURPHY. Congressman, it is a minimal level. 

Mr. O’ROURKE. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Great questions. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I want to thank each and every one of 

you for the fact that you have, with clarity, assisted us in the debate on the issue of sequestration. Following on with a previous 

questioner, we appreciate an understanding that the base budget 

number that you need is $574, and we are certainly working and 

struggling to get it to that level. It is unfortunate that the administration did not follow the budget deal that had been agreed to with 

the House and the Senate, and did not send over a budget that was 

consistent with the 2-year predictable funding that Secretary Murphy had indicated was helpful. 

The base budget sent by the administration is lower, and I know 

you are all forced to present us budgets that were for that lower 

number. We are hoping to restore some of those to get back to what 

would give you some consistency in the funding that you expected 

from last year. 

General Milley, you had said that the issue of risk, and it being 

unacceptable with respect to readiness, equated to increased time 

and casualties. 

Secretary James, the general gave a great description for the 

Army. Are we currently at an unacceptable risk for the Air Force 

with respect to readiness, and does that risk also equate to increased time and casualties? 

General MILLEY. Congressman, could I just make a quick clarification? I did not use the word ‘‘unacceptable.’’ It is not my choice 

to say whether the risk is acceptable or not acceptable. My military 

professional advice tells the decision makers, Congress, the President, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, what I 

think the risk is. It is the decision maker’s choice to determine 

whether it is acceptable or unacceptable. 

Mr. TURNER. I appreciate that you said that. So let’s go to you 

then, General. Help me with how to characterize that risk because, 

obviously, as we attempt to advocate to put the base budget at 

$574, I believe and I think many believe it is unacceptable. How 

would you characterize the risk then currently? 

General MILLEY. The risk in terms of time, troops, and tasks, 

and that is how we categorize it, is a military risk, can you do the 

military tasks expected of you in the various contingency operations? Yes or no. And if you can’t do all of them, what ones can 

you do? And that translates into a level of risk. 
31 

Second is the effect on time. Can you do those tasks and can you 

get them done on time in accordance with what is determined by 

the decision makers of being an acceptable amount of time for the 

American people to accept in the course of a conflict. And 

troops—— 

Mr. TURNER. General, I understand that balance very good, but 

where are we in that balance? 

General MILLEY [continuing]. Is casualties. I have said that level 

of risk is high risk for the contingencies, that are the higher-end 

contingencies. Not for the day-to-day. 

Mr. TURNER. I understand. 

General MILLEY. But for the higher-end contingencies, we are, in 

my view, my professional view, at a high risk to execute the tasks 

that would be required. That is correct. 

Mr. TURNER. Excellent, perfect. So you are using the general 

terms for those high contingencies. Is the Air Force in the same 

place the Army is? 

Secretary JAMES. So half of our combat Air Forces are not sufficiently ready for that kind of a high-end fight that General Milley 

just described against one of those great powers. Ready to do what? 

That is an excellent question. We too are ready and we have been 

doing it for 25 years. To fly and operate in the kinds of environments that you are currently seeing in the Middle East, it takes 

a toll, but we are ready. We are doing it. 

I also want to agree with the point about time is a factor here. 

So money is helpful for readiness, but freeing up the time of our 

people to go and do this training is equally important. And right 

now, we are stretched so thin, and we are so small as an Air Force 

and we are so deployed we are having difficulty getting the time 

freed up. 

So yes, I am very worried about it. And yes, if you go into a highend conflict against a great power and you are not sufficiently 

ready, history teaches me you lose more lives and it is a prolonged 

conflict. And it is very worrisome. 

Mr. TURNER. General, to get back to you. You had talked about 

rolling the dice, and maybe the day will never come, and in looking 

at that calculus, don’t our adversaries know it too? So if we decide 

just to underfund assuming the day will never come, don’t we lessen our effects of deterrence and thereby perhaps even increase our 

risk? 

General MILLEY. I believe that is true historically, and I believe 

it is true in the present, and likely would be true in the future, 

that if you are strong that that aids or increases your probability 

of deterring an aggressor. 

Mr. TURNER. General, going back to Russia then. You know, considering that it very well could be our number one threat, are we 

ready currently for direct military conflict if Russia continues its 

adventuresomeness in Ukraine and the extreme exercises that they 

have had in both scale and scope with respect to the Baltics, are 

we ready? 

General MILLEY. I think you have to look at that at three levels, 

Congressman, tactically, operationally, and strategically. At the 

strategic level, there is no doubt in my mind that the United States 

would prevail. And it would be catastrophic for an awful lot of peo-
32 

ple, but the United States would prevail. Tactically, however, you 

are talking about a different ball game here. 

Mr. TURNER. And strategic being nuclear? 

General MILLEY. Well, I am talking subnuclear. No, I’m not talking about a nuclear exchange. That would be, to me, that is beyond 

the beyond. But my point is, I don’t think we ever want to get that 

question asked or answered. What we want to do, I believe, is to 

deter further Russian aggression in Europe. And they have been 

aggressive since at least 2008 or so. So I think the key is to deter 

Russian aggression and assure allies. And you do that with strong 

capabilities, some of which are military, some of which are diplomatic, or informational, or economic. There is a whole suite of a 

toolbox that we can use. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you for your clarification on strategic, because many people would translate that—— 

General MILLEY. No, that is not what I was talking about. No, 

not at all. 

Mr. TURNER. I appreciate that you walked that back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank 

my colleagues here, and certainly the witnesses for focusing on 

what we just discussed. What is strategic, and Mike laid that out. 

And General Milley, your answer of strategic is something that we 

need to be very, very aware of. 

Normally when we talk strategic, we talk nuclear. But you said 

something different. And I think that we need to understand that. 

Specifically, question, Secretary James, what is the cost of a single 

F–35? 

Secretary JAMES. I think the current unit is $105. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I am sorry how much? 

Secretary JAMES. It is $105 million is the current unit cost. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And you are delaying how many F–35s which 

you earlier said were essential for your mission? 

Secretary JAMES. In fiscal year 2017, five. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. How many? 

Secretary JAMES. Five. In fiscal year 2017. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Five. 

Secretary JAMES. With the greatest of reluctance. That is the 

budget. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So $600, $700 million, something like that? 

Secretary JAMES. That sounds about right. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And General Milley, to address your question of 

risk, how much money? 

General MILLEY. We have submitted a UFR through the Department of Defense that would mitigate the risk. Again, it goes back 

to what is the task, the task that were given to us—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. No. We are talking about the strategic, your discussion of strategic. 

General MILLEY. That is what I am talking about. So the tasks 

that were given to us, is be prepared to deter, fight, and win. I 

would have to really talk to you in a classified basis to tell you the 

exact tasks that were given to the Army or any of us, because it 

is a classified document. It is Defense Planning Guidance. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Is the dollar also classified? 
33 

General MILLEY. No. The dollar is not. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And that number is? 

General MILLEY. Well, that number would vary. Again, it goes 

back to what tasks are you willing to accept risk on? 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Let’s just say Europe. 

General MILLEY. I think that the European task that we are covering with the ERI [European Reassurance Initiative] in this budget of three-point-something billion dollars, I think, will go a long 

way towards deterring Russia and assuring allies and we would 

ask for your support of that ERI. Should more be done? Yes, I 

think more should be done. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And is the cost of that much more? 

General MILLEY. Well, again, Congressman, that would depend 

on the task. I am not trying to be cagy. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. No, I understand. 

General MILLEY. It depends on the specifies tasks. And there is 

a menu of options. If we threw more money at it, we could put— 

you know, ERI, we could put more equipment—— 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I am going to move on. Thank you. I get a sense 

of additional money reducing the risk. 

General MILLEY. Sure. That is right. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. General Neller, you talked about your needs. 

You have got needs that are not being addressed. Where I am 

going here is to this nuclear issue. We are going to spend $3.3 billion on every single one of the nuclear weapons. That is the bomb 

and related services to it. And we are going to be spending somewhere around, I don’t know, $113 million preparing for the Minuteman IV, the next missile. And there has been discussion back and 

forth around this table about priorities. 

And the question that we need to ask ourselves is, are we prepared to set all of you on a mission to spending close to a trillion 

dollars over the next 25 years or so on revamping, rebuilding our 

entire nuclear arsenal and delivery systems? You know, we need to 

make that choice now and somebody said it is the next President’s 

choice. No, it is our choice today because we set you on a path to 

do that. 

And the question is, what are the real important things that we 

need to do? Do we really need to replace the Minuteman IIIs with 

Minuteman IVs in the next 20, 25 years? Do we need to do that? 

Do we really need to have a new long-range cruise missile, or can 

we delay that and instead, spend the money on ramping up the 

Army? 

General MILLEY. May I take a shot at that from an Army perspective just briefly? I just want to be clear. I don’t have a part of 

the triad in a sense, but I can tell you that in my view, my professional military view, and I am a member of the JCS [Joint Chiefs 

of Staff], that the nuclear triad has kept the peace since nuclear 

weapons were introduced and has sustained the test of time. That 

is not unimportant. And that system has deteriorated, Congressman. And it needs to be revamped. It is not even an Army system. 

It needs to be overhauled and brought back up to its level of readiness. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. We are not debating that it needs to be revamped. The question is how much and when? 
34 

General MILLEY. Okay. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And as we make that choice, right now the 

choice is to do it now and get on with it and to spend an extraordinary amount of money, which will come out of every other program, not just the military, but every other program. So there are 

some hard choices that need to be made. 

General MILLEY. Uh-huh. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And right now our choice is to do it all. I yield 

back. 

The CHAIRMAN. The time of the gentleman has expired. Mr. 

Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen and lady. 

Thank you for being here today. 

Mr. Murphy, it is good to see you. Mr. Rooney says hi, by the 

way. Great to see you. Last time I saw you we debated Don’t Ask, 

Don’t Tell on the floor, I think. It was a long time ago. 

Secretary MURPHY. That is true. 

Mr. HUNTER. It is great to see you. And let me just tell you, it 

fills my heart with joy that no matter what administration we 

have, whether it goes back and forth, to see the uniformed leaders 

in front of me right now that we have today, it just makes me 

happy. It is a very reassuring feeling to see all of you here. The 

cream has risen to the top, and we are glad you are in charge. 

General Milley, I would like to just say, I want to go through a 

few things that I have worked on over the last couple of years with 

the Army. You had Will Swenson who ended up getting the Medal 

of Honor [MOH]. His nomination got lost. My office found it. It 

wasn’t lost. It was mishandled. CID [Criminal Investigation Command] agents even went through his trash at his house, but he got 

the MOH and the Army did the right thing in the end. 

Major Matt Golsteyn. He killed a bomb maker who killed several 

Marines. The Army wanted to put him in jail for about 20 years. 

Went to a Board of Inquiry. The violation could not be substantiated. His case was handled okay. Secretary McHugh revoked his 

Distinguished Service Cross over something that he did that was 

unrelated. The Army kind of did the right thing there. 

Lieutenant Colonel Jason Amerine. The Army investigated him 

for talking to me about hostage recovery. But because of Jason, we 

were able to change the hostage policy for the country. This committee and this Congress, and the President then followed suit. We 

changed the hostage policy and this committee benefited from his 

contribution to the Bergdahl report. 

Earl Plumley. He was a soldier nominated for the Medal of 

Honor in Afghanistan, supported by you and General Dunford. 

Both of you signed down on it. The Army downgraded him to a Silver Star, not even a Distinguished Service Cross. That case is now 

with the IG [Inspector General]. 

Charles Martland roughed up a child rapist and the Army tried 

to expel him. He has now been extended three times and let me 

just tell you, he was rated number 2 out of 400 SF [Special Forces] 

instructors. He is before a board now. We are hoping the Army will 

do the right thing. 

These are not just personnel cases to me. What they represent 

are systemic issues that have huge policy ramifications stemming 
35 

out of each one of these issues. Each one exposed a certain unique 

problem. We tried to fix the problems by first fixing the personnel 

cases themselves, and then trying to make a systemic change, and 

do our oversight role here in Congress. 

For the most part, the Army does the right thing, but it does it 

kicking and screaming sometimes. You are restoring my faith in 

what the Army should be. Your predecessor, the previous Secretary 

never came to my office, never called, wouldn’t answer my phone 

calls, nothing. So everything that we did, it wasn’t a nice conversation with the Army or actually trying to fix the problem. We had 

to bludgeon the Army with media, and going in and doing as much 

as we can to make them react to stuff that they should have reacted to simply with a phone call to me, and we could have worked 

these things out. 

You personally are restoring my faith and confidence in the 

Army. My dad was in the Army, the 173rd. My little brother was 

in the 4th Stryker Brigade. I forgive them for joining the wrong 

service. I think you are the right leader for today’s Army. And I 

want to just keep engaging with you because I know you are going 

to put the warfighter first. And in the end, your dad is a United 

States Marine. So you can’t be that bad. And I just want to say 

thank you. Thanks for doing what you are doing. 

General MILLEY. Thanks Congressman, I appreciate that. And I 

am very proud to be part of a joint team. My mother was in the 

Navy as well, and brothers and cousins in the Air Force. So like 

one of the other Congressmen, it is a joint family. So it is a great 

team. And all of the services, every one of them, are really doing 

a great job so I appreciate your confidence. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Ashford. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just briefly, I am from 

Omaha, and obviously, Offutt Air Force Base is in our district. And 

I go way back. My father actually flew a B–26 bomber that was— 

we talked about this—it was manufactured at the Martin Bomber 

Plant. The Martin Bomber Plant is still there, and hopefully it will 

remain for a couple more years anyway. 

I was very impressed by so much that is going on there, the sexual assault project at Offutt is an immense success. And your comment on that is absolutely correct. I mean, they have a mentoring 

project, a mediation project. The young airmen who are involved in 

that project are making a significant difference. Specifically, on the 

55th and all other ISR wings, the mission has changed dramatically in the last—as has been mentioned by everyone here. 

How do you see on the budget side, I know there are, I think, 

11 or 12 planes that are deployed at any given time, at least on 

the 55th, and many of them are at Offutt being maintained. Do we 

have adequate platforms and how do you see the ISR function 

being maintained and sustained under this budget and going forward? Madam Secretary. 

Secretary JAMES. So I will begin, if I may, and I am sure the 

chief will jump in. There is a lot going on in the world of ISR to 

state the obvious. It is the number one desire of the combatant 

commanders. If you would go to any of them and say what more 

of the Air Force do you want, it is ISR, ISR, ISR. So we are adding 
36 

some additional platforms, as I mentioned, some additional MQ–9s, 

but even more importantly, let me come back to the people. 

So there is a lot going on to try to alleviate some of the stresses 

to build up that force. Everything from, we are looking at standing 

up some new units so that there are additional places to rotate to. 

Other quality-of-life oriented areas, additional compensation, if you 

will, to recognize the special types of duties. So there is a lot going 

on and we do need to build up that force some more. 

Mr. ASHFORD. General. 

General WELSH. Sir, I would just add that the focus for us over 

the last 7 to 8 years has been a different part of the ISR enterprise 

than the part that lives at Offutt Air Force Base. The big wing ISR 

platforms have not been where we have invested most of our time, 

energy, and money over the last 8 to 9 years. That has been in the 

medium altitude unmanned fleet primarily, because of the demand 

to support combat and contingency activity over that time period. 

We have got to get back at looking at what does a theater’s 

worth of ISR look like to a joint force commander in a bigger, 

broader theater that is not involved in just a low-intensity conflict 

or a counterterrorism fight. And when we do that, I think we will 

find that we are going to have to also follow up on recapitalization, 

modernization over time for the capabilities of the 55th Wing because they are invaluable and they contribute at the national level, 

to decision making. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Right. And I realize the challenges on the infrastructure side, and I appreciate the attention being paid to that as 

well. 

General Milley, could I just ask one question? I was very impressed by your testimony, and your candor, and your discussion 

about what happens after ISIS is destroyed. How do you see that 

from a financial budgetary perspective as we move forward after 

the destruction of ISIS and related affiliates? 

General MILLEY. Well, I mean, it is obviously too early to tell. 

The strategic task or the operational task given to us by the President is to destroy ISIS. I am 110 percent confident that we will do 

that over time. And we have made adjustments to the current campaign plan, and I think over time, that will be effective. 

What comes next, though, what happens after ISIS is destroyed? 

I think that is yet to be decided. I think there is going to have to 

be a strategic choice that if we are successful and ISIS is destroyed, 

something will have to go into that space in order to stabilize that 

terrain for a period of time, the terrain and the population. Ideally, 

that would be international capability of some sort led by Sunni 

Arabs. But we are a ways away from that and I think that the 

planning and the thought and the analysis will have to go into 

that. How much will that cost? I don’t know. I haven’t seen any 

cost estimates, but I would imagine that wouldn’t be cheap. 

Mr. ASHFORD. Thank you, General. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Fleming. 

Dr. FLEMING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Welsh, I am 

encouraged by the Air Force’s plans to move forward on recapitalization of the weapons storage facilities and was disappointed that 

despite the Schlesinger report, that the previous facilities were decertified, but I am glad we are back on track. So would you com-
37 

ment on the weapons storage facility recapitalization programs in 

terms of timeline and what we can expect for the near future. 

General WELSH. Yes, sir. We have, over this next year, roughly $40 million in our budget in 2017 to move forward with that effort. 

It is almost $700 million over the FYDP. As you know, F.E. Warren 

is being done right now. The weapons storage facility is being renovated. The next step is Barksdale, and that would begin in 2018. 

Beyond Barksdale, then I think the order after that would be 

Malmstrom and then Whiteman. And so we are on track. It is 

funded. The plans are in place. And we think the design work that 

we have done so far in F.E. Warren has been very well done, and 

it will provide us a standard footprint that we can then modify as 

appropriate for each wing, and that contract should be let this 

year. 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay. Great. Great news. Okay. 

General Milley, I certainly want to endorse your comments you 

made a few weeks ago about the Army not planning to cut one 

more infantry brigade. We feel like we are already below where we 

should be on this. I am very interested to learn about the Army’s 

repatching initiative. I understand that this will not impact Active 

Duty forces’ structure within the 310 Brigade at Fort Polk and 

would like to know more about this concept of repatching. I have 

not heard of that before, so if you could comment and expand on 

that. 

General MILLEY. Yes. Repatching is probably a misnomer, if that 

is what people have mentioned to you. So what we are looking at 

is really associated units—we took a page out of the Air Force— 

so associated units between the National Guard and the Active 

Component of the Regular Army. 

Years ago there was a concept called ‘‘roundout.’’ It is very similar to that. It is not exactly the same. And I wanted to go both 

ways in the sense of National Guard units are affiliated or associated with Regular Army divisions or brigades, and they are essentially rounding out that force structure. And then it can go the 

other way as well. Specifically with 310, we are looking at putting 

310—I think we said for them Texas—I might be wrong on the division, but—— 

Dr. FLEMING. I believe it is Texas. 

General MILLEY [continuing]. To make them part of the 36th Division. 

Dr. FLEMING. Yes. 

General MILLEY. And that was an option. It has not yet been decided, by the way—these are options—— 

Dr. FLEMING. Okay. 

General MILLEY [continuing]. That are coming forward after, and 

we are going to do rigorous analysis and study that is ongoing with 

the Army staff, and ultimately the Secretary of the Army will be 

the guy making the decision. 

But the idea is to associate National Guard with Active Duty 

Component units, and we think that will overall increase the readiness of both components. So that is the idea behind it. 

Dr. FLEMING. Right. You don’t anticipate any change in manpower at Fort Polk? My understanding is—— 

General MILLEY. No. 
38 

Dr. FLEMING [continuing]. While these Active Duty members 

would be—— 

General MILLEY. No. 

Dr. FLEMING [continuing]. In essence, assigned to the National 

Guard in Texas, they would remain stationed at Fort Polk. 

General MILLEY. They would be Regular Army Active Duty soldiers. They would remain at their base station. There would be no 

budgetary implications in terms of 304 funds or mobilization funds 

or any of that kind of stuff. This is an association of Active and National Guard units where they would train together, Office of Professional Development classes, NCOPD [Noncommissioned Officer 

Development Program]. They would do FTXs [field training exercises] together. They would go on deployments together and so on 

and so forth. What we are trying to do is integrate the force to put 

teeth behind the idea of total force, to make that real, to walk the 

walk, not just talk the talk sort of thing. 

Dr. FLEMING. Right. Okay. That is great. And I will just say in 

closing, I just want to thank all of the chiefs and secretaries for 

being here today and the great service you provide to our Nation. 

Thank you, and I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. Gabbard. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning. Thanks 

to all of you for your service and your leadership. 

General Milley and Secretary Murphy, I just want to say, as a 

soldier in the National Guard, I appreciate very much your leadership and the role that you have taken in highlighting the importance of this total integrated force that you have just talked about 

and actually backing it up with plans and actions and training that 

you have just laid out. 

I think capitalizing on the resources and assets that we have 

within our National Guard and Reserve Components is critical. 

They have often been underutilized. And largely many of the challenges have come from really a problem with the culture in providing that wide gap between the Active Component versus the Reserve Components. So I just want you to know that the leadership 

you have taken on this has already trickled down to the unit level 

that I have seen and heard when I go to my drill training on the 

weekend and provided a very serious morale boost where people 

feel like they are actually being utilized for what they have been 

trained to do. 

I want to touch a little bit on the end strength, this 980 number, 

and I think a lot of us have come at this from different directions. 

I think it highlights the concern that many of us have on what that 

number means and where we need to be. I think the Commission 

on the Future of the Army talked about, quote—this number being 

a, quote, minimally sufficient force. 

Secretary Murphy, you used the words, I think, ‘‘minimally acceptable force that has created a situation of high-risk.’’ Considering the both unconventional and conventional threats that we 

have, whether you are ranging from groups like ISIS to North 

Korea, what is that end strength number that would be sufficient 

to be able to confront these threats on at least two fronts? 

Mr. MURPHY. Well, Congresswoman, first, thanks for being part 

of the Army team and your service as well. You know, we are obvi-
39 

ously planning at that 980 level where we are still drawing down 

and still we have a little bit to go there. But, you know, we have 

been very clear; it is not just the end strength numbers. I mean, 

Congress could pass a bill that gives us higher end strength, but 

if it doesn’t come with funding, that will very much hurt our Army 

because then you have to cut from—we have already cut from modernization. 

As I said in my opening testimony, we are mortgaging future 

readiness. We are mortgaging modernization to focus on current 

readiness with the OPTEMPO that we are under right now. So, 

you know, I can’t give you an exact number. That is for policymakers and the President to put forth. But unless that end 

strength number comes with dollars behind it, it will hollow out 

our Army. It would not be a wise decision. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. 

General MILLEY. And I would echo that, Congresswoman. This 

budget, this President’s fiscal year 2017 budget, takes us to 460 in 

the Active Component in the Regular Army by the end of the year, 

and it takes the Guard to 335 and the Reserve to 195. You know, 

is that sufficient? Again, it is readiness or capability to do what? 

Yes, we can do the National Military Strategy on a day-to-day 

basis, but can you do the tasks that are embedded within the other 

documents that are classified, and the answer to that is yes, but 

at high risk. 

Okay. So then your question is, how do you lower that risk? End 

strength is one of the variables. Readiness is another one. Technology is another. Time, and there is a whole assortment of that, 

but end strength is just one. So I caution everyone about getting 

fixed on a fixed number, an end strength, a million, 500 thousand, 

2 million, or whatever the number is. That can lead you to a bad 

solution. And I would be concerned as the Chief of Staff of the 

Army if someone put into law that the Army will be at number X, 

but no money came with it for readiness or modernization. That 

would actually hurt, not help. 

If someone wanted to increase the end strength of the Army, I 

am all for it. I think it is a good thing. I think it is necessary, but 

it would need to come with the additional moneys for readiness and 

modernization. Otherwise, it would end up actually hurting. 

Ms. GABBARD. Thank you. I think that is a critical point. As we 

go through this, oftentimes people are throwing around different 

numbers without really explaining what the rationale behind that 

number would mean and what the cost would be. 

I have got just a few seconds left. I just want to highlight a concern about the reduction in National Guard MILCON [military construction] funding. As you well know, over half the National Guard 

readiness centers were built between the end of World War II and 

Vietnam. Places like the Pohakuloa Training Center in Hawaii, 

host not only our Active and Reserve Components, but also foreign 

military officers for RIMPAC [Rim of the Pacific Exercise]. It was 

built during the Korean War and is really in despicable shape. And 

just as we work through this, I ask you to place that at a high level 

of priority with regards to readiness. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gibson. 
40 

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate the 

panelists. Let me follow up on that question from Ms. Gabbard, 

and also earlier from Beto O’Rourke, and build on some of the testimony earlier today but perhaps come from a different perspective 

or different angle, because I am interested in the best military 

judgment from General Milley and General Neller. 

Many of us here listening very carefully, building the record, 

having testimonials about the risk, and even today, we are hearing 

today about the very high risk associated to where we are. And I 

understand there is a bit of a dance that has to go on politically. 

I get that. But I want to cut through some of that with this assumption that, you know, a number of us here, in a bipartisan way, 

are building a bill that stops the drawdown of the land forces. And 

when you consider the fact that by 2018, we are talking about taking our land forces to pre-World War II levels, I think it is important the American people hear that, hear directly about where we 

are heading. 

Now, with this bill, of course, and I heard the Chief of Staff of 

Army mention just moments ago, and I concurred with him completely, that this would have to come with the money necessary for 

readiness and modernization. And I say the same. And I met with 

General Neller about a week or two ago. But I am coming at it differently saying it this way: If the Congress was able to build the 

coalition to vote for and to pass stopping the drawdown, essentially 

to bring with it the moneys necessary so we don’t hollow out the 

force, so that would be 55,000 numbers different from 2018 in 

terms of the 980 number would go to 1,035, and the United States 

Marine Corps instead would basically have 2,400 different, when 

you look at instead of 182, the Active Marine Corps would 184. And 

the Marine Corps Reserve instead of being 385, would be 389. 

So my question is this: If we were able to get that done, please 

explain to my colleagues and the American people how this would 

impact readiness. Explain to us what you would do, Army, Marine 

Corps Generals, in terms of this increased end strength, what 

would that mean for the formations? How would that address the 

risk? And what would that mean to the families in terms of deployment and dwell? Thank you. 

General MILLEY. Thanks, Congressman. Well, in terms of readiness, it would, I think, assist us with the deployment dwell and 

buy time because you would have the capacity and the force to do 

the day-to-day OPTEMPO—because as the wars draw down in Iraq 

and Afghanistan, they didn’t end but they came down considerably, 

but so didn’t the size of the force. So the OPTEMPO, the DEPTEMPO for the Army, has remained very high. We are still at, you 

know, 1 to 1 or 1 to just a little bit less than 2 in some capacity. 

So time is critical to building readiness, the time to train, the 

time to rebuild the force. It would also, I think, probably allow for 

an increased number of capabilities, not necessarily brigade combat 

teams, but various other capabilities. Earlier, people talked about 

Patriot; Patriot is one of our significantly increased or high-stress 

units. And then on the families it would clearly reduce some of the 

OPTEMPO stress on a day-to-day basis. 

So if that were to happen, that would be wonderful. We would 

welcome it. But, again, I just caution everybody; it would have to 
41 

come with the dollars associated with it in order to fund the readiness, in order to fund the modernization associated with those 

forces. 

General NELLER. Congressman, I think it would do two things. 

If we increased the number of like units, it would improve our depto-dwell, which gives us more time to train before we deploy again, 

which overall improves our readiness, reduces stress on the force 

and stress on the families. 

That said, we are in a process right now, and we are looking at 

what the force design looks like and—because I think we have realized it is because we have been doing what we have been doing 

successfully, but we have to look to the future. Do we have the 

right force design for the future? Do we have the right number of 

marines doing the right things? Do we have enough people that do 

information warfare, do electronic warfare, do cyber? Do we have 

enough communicators, enough intel analysts, and I think the answer is no. 

And so we would probably take that number of people and use 

them to get those types of marines which would add those capabilities to make the force better and more ready and better prepared 

to go face the conflicts we think that we have the highest probability of operating in in the future. 

Mr. GIBSON. I appreciate those comments. And for the record, 

both general officers talked about the impact on service members 

and their families. A lot of emphasis here in the Congress has to 

do with post-traumatic stress, TBI [traumatic brain injury], and 

other associated concerns for our veterans. And, you know, this bill, 

fully funded, would help address it. 

And also in terms of the European Reassurance Initiative, concerns with the Islamic State, dealing with North Korea, some challenges potentially with China, you know, this is a very important 

bill that we need to muster the political will to pass. I thank the 

panelists. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to begin 

by thanking our wide array of distinguished witnesses before us 

today, and we certainly appreciate both your insight and your dedication and service to our Nation. So thank you for that. 

Secretary Mabus, and—actually before that, if I could just acknowledge Mr. Murphy, and great to see you back before the committee and to have you with us today. So thanks for your service 

and what you are doing. 

Secretary Mabus and Admiral Richardson, with the resurgence of 

Russia and the ascendance of China, and the role the Navy plays 

in the conflicts throughout the Middle East, there is obviously clear 

urgency to add more submarines to the fleet. In light of the impending submarine shortfall, can we count on efforts to extend the 

life of the Los Angeles-class boats? And how can we best direct our 

immediate and long-term investments to effectively mitigate any 

risks posed by the shortfall? 

Secretary MABUS. Number one, Congressman, the Russian activity that you were talking about is the highest level we have seen 

since the Cold War. And the OPTEMPO for the Navy, and particularly for our submarine forces, has been exceptionally high for at 
42 

least the last decade. The number of submarines that we have 

today and the number that we are going to have into the 2020s, 

is an example of why it is so important not to miss a year in submarines. We have missed years building only one attack submarine, and we just can’t make those years back up. 

Where we can focus now is, number one, on making sure that the 

submarines that we do have in service reach the end of their life 

span, the Los Angeles class that you have mentioned in particular, 

that to the extent we can extend those, but to make sure that they 

reach that in a safe and effective manner. 

Number two, right now we are looking at one Virginia-class submarine in 2021, because that is the year that the Ohio-class replacement begins to be built. We would very much like to and need 

to have a second Virginia class in that year. We are undergoing the 

studies, the look right now, to make that happen. And we simply 

need, as we go forward, to build more submarines, and particularly 

the attack submarines, and not let the Ohio-class replacement effort have an impact on so many of our other shipbuilding programs 

and in particular the attack submarine program. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I couldn’t agree more, Mr. Secretary, and I share 

that concern. And the faster we can get these boats into the water, 

obviously the better. 

Secretary Mabus and Admiral Richardson, as you know, the last 

eight Virginia-class submarines have been delivered ahead of 

schedule, and the program has been touted as a model for acquisition reform, largely due to the multiyear contracting strategy and 

its use of economic order quantities, something that I along with 

my then colleague from Connecticut, at times several years ago 

strongly advocated for that change in how we bought and paid for 

our submarines, allowing for a multiyear contract, which never had 

been done before. 

Now, based on the initial industry estimates of the cost impact 

to module manufacturing, final assembly and testing, and the supplier base, the estimated long-term cost impact of an $85 million 

shortfall in AP [advance procurement] funding in fiscal year 2017 

could be between $110 million and $210 million. So with this in 

mind, what ramifications might the Navy see, should we fail to provide robust funding for advance procurement for the Virginia-class 

submarine program, and how would the health of the force be affected? 

Secretary MABUS. Everything you pointed out, you know, shows 

why it is important to do these things 10 at a time as a multiyear 

buy. We appreciate Congress allowing us to do that very much. 

Part of that multiyear buy is the advance procurement so that 

shipyards can buy in economic order quantity. 

And to show you the impact that something like that has, in 

2014, when we signed the last multiyear for 10 subs over 5 years, 

we paid for 9 subs, so we basically got a submarine free because 

we, with the help of Congress, let suppliers buy in economic order 

quantity. They were able to keep and train the workforce that was 

going to be needed. They were able to make the infrastructure investments that they needed to make. 
43 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. I know my time is expired. I hope we 

are not going to let advance procurement slip. So thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ms. Welsh, welcome to 

the Armed Services Committee. The behavior in here is not always 

this good. We might need you back in a few weeks. But congratulations on your Easter Seals award dinner. I apologize I didn’t see 

you when I was congratulating General Welsh on it and certainly 

look forward to having you back in Valdosta. I think it has been 

10 months and 2 weeks since I saw you down there. I remember 

that because my baby was exactly 6 weeks old at that time and so 

I look forward to seeing you again in Valdosta, and General Welsh 

as well. 

General Milley, I read about the issue with regard to the pistols, 

and I think it is absolutely ridiculous that you don’t have the authority to pick a pistol for the Army. I would bet that the four of 

you in uniform could probably, in 10 minutes, come up with an 

agreement on what that platform should be. I would think that 

with a quick click or two on an iPad, you could figure out what the 

retail price of the pistol was, what a decent price for the pistol was, 

and what we should be paying for that pistol if we were buying it 

in the quantities that we would buy it in. And I want you to know 

that I do believe you should have that authority. 

And I can’t help but wonder that if it is this bad with a pistol, 

what about optics? What about rifles? I mean, all of the things that 

we are buying. How much bureaucracy is in there that we could 

remove that would allow you to equip your men and women better, 

faster, and with less money? 

General MILLEY. Thanks, Congressman, and you are correct. The 

pistol is only one of the systems that is symptomatic of the system 

at large. First of all, we do, Secretary of the Army and I, do have 

the authority to pick the weapon, but that is at the end of the day. 

The problem is getting to the end of the day and how long it is taking. So this thing has been going on for like 9 years. And you have 

heard the whole litany of woe, about 300 pages, and so on and so 

forth. The test itself is 2 years long on known technology. We are 

not talking about, you know, nuclear subs or going to the moon 

here. We are talking about a pistol. 

So, yes, it is a long, drawn-out process. It is not as adaptive. It 

is not as agile, it is not as quick. We don’t have as many authorities. There are a lot of legal requirements and oversight and so on 

and so forth. We, the Army, would like to cut to the chase a little 

bit more on some of these things. And in the case of the pistol, we 

happen to be the one who’s the proponent. All the other services 

would use the pistol that we get. 

Mr. SCOTT. I would encourage all of you to get specific language 

that you would like to see in the National Defense Authorization 

Act that would help you cut through that red tape. 

General MILLEY. Right. 

Mr. SCOTT. I mean, I heard it on the sniper fields at Benning 

with regard to what a scope can be purchased for over the Internet 

versus what it costs to get the same scope on a rifle at a military 

base. 
44 

Secretary Mabus, real quick, thank you for naming the series of 

ships after John Lewis, my colleague from Georgia. Nobody deserves it more. 

I want to go to Secretary James now with regard to the JSTARS, 

if I can. We have discussed the ISR shortfalls. I know we are making progress with the JSTARS. My concern still is the ISR gap between the old platform of JSTARS and fielding the new platform 

of JSTARS and how we intend to close that gap and what suggestions that either you or General Welsh have for closing that gap. 

Secretary JAMES. So, again, let me begin and then I will yield to 

the chief. Just a couple of data points. I mentioned we are getting 

going now with the recap of JSTARS. It has taken too long for a 

variety of reasons, but in this 5-year plan, we do have it funded. 

So that is point one. 

We have three contractors already that are under contract that 

are doing pre-EMD types of technology maturations, risk-reduction 

types of activities, and we believe that we will get a contract 

awarded for EMD, engineering, manufacturing and development, in 

about the first quarter of fiscal year 2018. It is one of those highdemand, low-density areas. And you are right; combatant commanders want JSTARS and they want that equivalent as well a 

lot. So we are moving forward with it, and regrettably it has taken 

as long as it has. 

General WELSH. Congressman, I think by the time we finish this 

risk-reduction work and the technology maturation work in fiscal 

year 2017, and we approach that EMD contract decision, we will 

have a better idea of how much we can accelerate, if any, at that 

point in time. We would like to accelerate from a fiscal year 2024 

IOC [initial operating capability] and move it forward. 

Mr. SCOTT. General, thank you for your time and for your many 

years of service. 

Ms. Welsh, good to see you again. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Gallego. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Mr. Chair. This question is for General Neller. We now have two special purpose MAGTFs [Marine 

air-ground task forces], a new UDP [unit deployment program] requirement to Australia, the Black Sea Rotational Force [BSRF], additional requirements for embassy security, and an uptick in exercise and security cooperation missions and, of course, the regular 

MEUs [Marine expeditionary units] that our marines go on. So I 

have three questions regarding the sustainability of this OPTEMPO. 

One, is the current deployment-to-dwell ratio of 1 to 2 sustainable in terms of training and also just general retention of marines? Two, will we have the ability to surge forces in the event of 

a full-spectrum conflict? And, three, are there more opportunities— 

and I brought this up in private with you—more opportunities to 

better leverage the Reserves in any way to help in regards to the 

first two questions? 

General NELLER. So, Congressman, based on the current force 

structure, we deploy the MEUs to maintain a 1.0 presence for 

CENTCOM [Central Command]. There is also a forward-deployed 

naval force MEU in Okinawa, but that comes off of unit rotational 

forces. The BSRF and one of the special purpose MAGTFs is one 
45 

force, and the other one is in CENTCOM. So is it sustainable? At 

a 2-to-1 ratio, at 24 infantry battalions and the aviation logistics, 

yes, it is. We can sustain this. 

Ideally, when I came in the Marine Corps, we were a 3-to-1 force. 

We had 6 months deployed, 18 months to reset. We had been a 2- 

to-1 force. That is right at the very edge. And so we do have some 

units that are inside that, and that is of concern. 

So can we surge? The force that can surge is the force that is getting ready to replace these units that are forward deployed or the 

units that have just got back from these same deployments. And 

then there is always a life cycle to a unit, and the readiness ebbs 

and flows. It is a very kind of complicated algorithm involving people, the equipment, the readiness of the gear, the training of the 

unit. 

Depending upon what the requirement is and how much we have 

the ability to surge with those that have just gotten back and 

where they are in their training cycle, they would be at least prepared to surge. The bottom line is we are going to go. The Marines 

are going to go. And we are going to go, and we are going to provide the best ready force that we can because that is what you expect of your Marine Corps. 

And part of that surge is the Reserves, the 38,500 marines in the 

Reserve Component, which are part of the total force. Just like 

with the Army, Navy, and the Air Force Guard and Reserve, we 

are a total force. There is 2,400 Reserve marines activated today 

that are forward deployed, and they are out there as part of the 

186,000 marines, 184,000 Active. So we wouldn’t be able to do what 

we do without the Reserves. 

To have the Reserves surge, obviously we have to bring them on 

Active Duty; we have got to mobilize them, and they have to be 

paid. And if we were to replace one of these capabilities with a Reserve battalion or a Reserve flight squadron, that is expensive, and 

that is where you get in the issue of using the Reserves as effectively as we probably could. 

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you. I yield back my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Nugent. 

Mr. NUGENT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 

this panel for being here today. It is always enlightening to hear 

from you. 

Just a little disclosure here. I was an airman back right after the 

Wright Brothers did their thing. But all three of my sons are currently in the Army, two Active Duty, and one Black Hawk pilot in 

the Florida Army Guard, and so, you know, that is an Army family 

from that standpoint. 

But this is for everyone. You know, SOF [special operations 

force] is often referred to as the tip of the spear. In keeping with 

that analogy, the vast majority of the rest of the spear is provided 

by all of you, the service branches. Some in Congress believe that 

national security could be provided much cheaper by investing a 

little more in SOCOM [Special Operations Command] and cutting 

a lot more from the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines. I know 

that without the enormous share of the service support you contribute to SOCOM, SOF doesn’t function. 
46 

And while digging for hard data to support both your traditional 

and special operations support expenses, I was surprised to discover that none of the branches, none of the branches, have a comprehensive list of common service support that contribute to SOF 

or understanding of what it really costs for you to annually support 

SOF. 

So in this year’s NDAA, I am pursuing language that would direct each service to identify the support that they give and how 

much it costs, because what I want to make sure is that you are 

resourced properly and that, you know, this I think sometimes misguided aspect that SOF can solve all of our problems—you know, 

if we are going to resource SOF, then how does it affect, you know, 

and we don’t want it being taken from the general services. 

So if you could, and like I said, we have checked, would you support that in regards to that kind of language? 

General MILLEY. For the Army, absolutely, sure. In fact, it is a 

great idea to come up with a list if I were supporting SOF, because 

as General Votel testified, I think it was last week, and I can certainly attest to that, is that the United States military special operations forces depend upon the parent services of all of us in the 

conventional forces for their very existence, not only in their training, in their manning, and their equipping, but also operationally. 

It is much, much more difficult for them to operate when they are 

out there just by themselves, but when they have got an architecture around them, conventional forces, air, naval, and land, then 

they are much more effective. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Sir, the Navy would absolutely support 

that. 

General NELLER. Sir, we would support it. And I, again, I think 

all of us realize we are part of a joint team. And we need the SOF 

guys and gals to do what they do, and as General Milley said, and 

General Votel I am sure would validate, that they can’t do what 

they do without us being there to provide the capability. So we operate as a joint force. And I think, quite frankly, there are lot of 

things that conventional—and I don’t really like that term—that 

conventional forces do that are part of what are perceived or seen 

as what the SOF is doing, particularly in Iraq and other places 

where we are involved in advising and assisting and training foreign militaries. 

But it is not about the credit. It is just about we work with each 

other, and I would be certainly willing to show what the costs are. 

Mr. NUGENT. General Welsh. 

General WELSH. Yes, sir, we completely agree with that. By the 

way, the good news for all of us is the greatest spokesman for this 

necessity of a strong conventional force to support SOF is the commander of U.S. Special Operations Command. He has been for a 

while. 

Mr. NUGENT. He has repeated that on numerous occasions, that 

SOF is great. It can do certain things and do them really well, but 

they can’t reopen the Strait of Hormuz. They can’t withstand an 

assault by a conventional force. You know, so there is limitations, 

and we need to have all of that as a joint task. 

One last thing. And I appreciate when you talk about readiness, 

in regards to deterrence. I truly believe, and this is just, you know, 
47 

an old sheriff saying this, that, you know, when you have a high 

deterrence, it does deter nation-state actors from doing something 

that is really stupid, I think. It is not going to stop, you know, the 

knuckleheads out there that are nonconventional, but it really does 

have a direct impact. 

You know, I have a son currently over in Europe for 6 months 

and supporting what is going on over there. We are not fooling anybody, you know, as it relates to Putin in regards to what force 

structure we have. And so I think that as the Army moves forward 

in regards to having prepositioned assets there but also actually 

having, the old terminology, boots on the ground to respond, is you 

can’t do it from afar, particularly on a conventional force. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the extra time, and I appreciate 

all of you being here. God bless you. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Byrne. 

Mr. BYRNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to reiterate my 

thanks to all of you for being here today and for being so patient 

with us. 

Secretary Mabus, I want to talk to you about my favorite topic, 

the littoral combat ship [LCS]. You testified before the Senate committee yesterday and reiterated the Navy’s need for 52 littoral combat ships. You will recall very well that 2 years ago, you undertook 

a study at the direction of the then Secretary of Defense of the entire LCS program and recommended 52 ships, but the latter 20 be 

upgraded to frigates. 

We had Secretary Stackley before the Seapower subcommittee 

couple of weeks ago, and he said there is no new study that validates a downsized 40. So what I would like for you to respond to 

is, in light of all of that, what would be the negative impacts of a 

reduction of the LCS program from 52 to 40? 

Secretary MABUS. Well, first, it is absolutely correct that we have 

a validated need. The force structure assessment says we need 52 

small surface combatants, and your discussion of the study that 

was undertaken because of concerns with lethality and survivability. And literally thousands of alternatives were looked at. We 

came out the frigate program, the last 20, are going to be far more 

survivable, far more lethal, and we are going to be able to backfit some of the original LCSs with that survivability and lethality. 

Any time you reduce the numbers in a shipbuilding program, 

number one, the price goes up for what you are going to get. If we 

down-select only one version, one shipyard would almost certainly 

close. One of the things that we have learned and other countries 

have learned, and it is a hard lesson, is that if you lose these 

unique skills, it is almost impossible to get them back. It takes 

years. It takes far more to get them back than it does to maintain 

them. 

Number three, the way that the 52 number was arrived at is 

looking at all the missions that are required from the Navy and 

what it takes to meet that, that goes from everything from highend combat against a near-peer competitor to the presence operations that we have ongoing every single day of the year to do what 

Mr. Nugent just said, deter and reassure, to the things like disaster relief, humanitarian assistance. And also we are very lacking 

in ships in SOCOM on the drug interdiction front. So looking at all 
48 

the needs that the Navy has, those would be the impacts, if you 

reduced those in absolute numbers. 

And, again, what we are talking about now, we are talking about 

the fleet of the future. We are not talking about the fleet of today. 

We are talking about the workforce of the very near future. But the 

fleet of the future, how many ships we have, what their capabilities 

are, how they can meet the strategy, is dependent on that force 

structure analysis. We did the one in 2012. We refreshed it in 

2014. And a lot of people, myself included, have been willing to bet 

the CNO’s paycheck that that number of the one we are doing 

today, right now, that the number 308 is not going to go down. 

And so even if you look at keeping 308 as a number, if you look 

at the 30-year shipbuilding plan, if you reduce numbers of any type 

of ship, you simply don’t meet the requirement. 

Mr. BYRNE. And that was a good lead-in to my question for you, 

Admiral. And that is, that if you look at the shipbuilding plan with 

the recommendation of the administration, we get to 308, but then 

within a short period of time we go down precipitously. So if we 

want to avoid dipping down pretty quickly under the 308 after we 

get there, aren’t we going to have to continue to build these littoral 

combat ships at the 52 level instead of going down to 40? 

Admiral RICHARDSON. Certainly, sir. And that is, you know, exactly the fact of shipbuilding, that they come out of service as fast 

as they went in when they reach the end of their service life. You 

can extend that a little bit, but eventually they are going to come 

out at that same rate. And so you have to be minding the decisions 

of the past, putting together a program that is very thoughtful in 

terms of reaching and maintaining the requirements of the future. 

Underneath that 308 number, it is the composition of that number 

that is important as well, and the small surface combatant is an 

important contribution. 

Mr. BYRNE. Well, thank you for that answer, and I do not want 

to bet your paycheck. I want you to keep your paycheck, but we 

want to keep building these ships too. 

Admiral RICHARDSON. I should be clear that after Mrs. Richardson and our five kids get their cut, there is very little discretionary 

money left in that paycheck. 

Mr. BYRNE. With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Ms. McSally. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you gentlemen 

and ladies for your service and your patience during this long hearing. 

Mr. Murphy, I want to start off with you. Talking about the 

WASPs [Women Airforce Service Pilots], these amazing women 

who served in World War II as pilots, 1,074 of them, pioneers 

opened the door for people like me to be able to serve. Do you believe that they should be allowed to be in Arlington? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Do you believe you have the authority to let them 

into Arlington quickly? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, through an individual exception of policy. 

Ms. MCSALLY. How about just as a group, the WASPs, we want 

to let the WASPs into Arlington because of the amazing service 

that they did? 
49 

Mr. MURPHY. No, ma’am, and that is why I support your legislation. That is why I have done another course of action. Again, you 

know, ma’am, we all take an oath to support and defend the Constitution. In that Constitution we have the rule of law. I cannot 

violate law or U.S. regulations. U.S. regulations right now—and I 

am not trying to give you mumbo jumbo. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Yeah, that’s okay. 

Mr. MURPHY. No, no. 

Ms. MCSALLY. I hear you. 

Mr. MURPHY. But, ma’am, that is why I support your legislation. 

That is why I support a commission to address it, but the quickest 

way to do this would be individual exception of policy. These 

women, Air Force—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. That is not what we are looking for, Mr. Murphy. 

Mr. MURPHY. I am sorry. 

Ms. MCSALLY. We are looking for all the WASPs to be able to let 

in. And just to be clear, so you are saying you can’t make that happen right now for all the WASPs. Can the Secretary of Defense? 

Mr. MURPHY. No. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Can the Commander in Chief? 

Mr. MURPHY. No. 

Ms. MCSALLY. You believe nobody in the executive branch—— 

Mr. MURPHY. The Congress can. 

Ms. MCSALLY [continuing]. Has the authority to make the exception? 

Mr. MURPHY. The Congress can. I am trying to right the wrong, 

ma’am. I agree with you. I support you 100 percent. But Congress 

in 1977—— 

Ms. MCSALLY. I just want to make sure—— 

Mr. MURPHY [continuing]. After decades of service, they allowed 

WASPs to be buried in veterans’ cemeteries. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Right. Do you really believe the Commander in 

Chief doesn’t have the authority right now—I mean, he makes executive orders all the time—that he can’t say the WASPs are allowed or a group exception to policy? 

Mr. MURPHY. Individual exception to policy, ma’am, he can, but 

not groups. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So if I submitted an exception to policy for 1,074 

of my closest friends, would that be considered? 

Mr. MURPHY. I would support that legislation, like I support your 

current legislation, as long as it is an above-the-ground inurnment, 

yes. 

Ms. MCSALLY. So you think it literally does take an act of Congress as the fastest way to fix the problem? 

Mr. MURPHY. There was an act of Congress in 1977, ma’am, in 

1977, which said they were allowed to be buried in veterans’ cemeteries, but they didn’t allow them to be buried in Arlington, ma’am. 

But what I am saying is Congress needs to change what Congress 

did in 1977. I can’t change it unilaterally. SECDEF [Secretary of 

Defense] can’t change it unilaterally. The Commander in Chief 

can’t. That is why we have co-equal branches of government. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

Mr. MURPHY. Now, I support your effort. 
50 

Ms. MCSALLY. Thanks. I just wanted to clarify whether you 

thought the executive branch had any ability to change it right 

now, and the answer is no. 

Mr. MURPHY. To my understanding, I taught con [constitutional] 

law at West Point. Again, from my counsel and everything that I 

have researched in support of your efforts, yes, ma’am. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. 

Mr. MURPHY. And I know it is not the answer you want to hear, 

but that is the answer. 

Ms. MCSALLY. That is okay. I just wanted to get the answer on 

the record. 

All right. Secretary James, it was great to see you last week at 

Davis-Monthan, and thanks for coming out to visit. 

General Welsh, I only have a couple minutes left. I do want to 

follow up on the A–10. Thank you for not trying to put the A–10 

in the boneyard this year and continuing to keep it flying, although 

I am concerned about the future plans, and it seems like there is 

some inconsistencies within the Pentagon. 

When the Secretary of Defense announced his budget, before we 

actually saw the details, he said the A–10 won’t be retired until 

2022, and his quote was, ‘‘they will be replaced by F–35s only on 

a squadron-by-squadron basis as they come online, ensuring that 

all units have sufficient backfill to retain enough aircraft needed to 

fight today’s conflict.’’ So we got the impression as the F–35 became 

FOC [full operational capability], squadron by squadron after 2022, 

that would happen. 

When we actually got the budget and we saw the plans of the 

Air Force, we see that starting in fiscal year 2018, actually 2 

squadrons are going in the boneyard; 2019, 49 more aircraft; 2020, 

64 more aircraft; and 2021, 96 more aircraft. Last August, the Test 

and Evaluation Office, Dr. Gilmore, agreed that there is going to 

be a fly-off between the A–10 and the F–35 to compare capabilities 

side-by-side. The earliest that will happen is 2018. They think 

maybe even 2019. By the time we get a report to Congress, that 

will be 2020. 

Our perspective is that we shouldn’t put one more A–10 in the 

boneyard until this test is complete and we actually have a report 

to assess any sort of risks, and then we move forward. It seems like 

there is just a number of inconsistencies in the timing here. Are 

you not willing to wait until the test is complete to make a decision 

to move forward on putting any more A–10s in the boneyard? 

Secretary JAMES. This is, once again, a budgetary issue, and I 

will let the chief talk about how the SECDEF’s comments relate to 

the squadrons of the F–35. So we will come back to that. I was impressed with the boneyard, by the way. I was impressed with 

everything that I saw at Davis-Monthan. 

It is strictly a budgetary matter. It was last year and the year 

before as well. And you are right; our 5-year plan does begin in fiscal year 2018, gradually to retire the A–10. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Chief, do you have any comments? I mean, when 

Dr. Gilmore mentioned the fly-off, you said, I think—let me just 

make sure that is you—the idea that the F–35 is going to walk in 

the door next year when it reaches IOC and take over for the A– 

10 is just silly. It has never been the intent. We were never going 
51 

to do that. That is not the plan. And really gearing more towards 

FOC, which we are talking much further down the road. 

General WELSH. Yes, ma’am. And the idea, the F–35 is considered to be the highest ranked CAS [close air support] platform. We 

are losing CAS capacity. That is what the Budget Control Act has 

done to us. The real issue in 2018, and the reason that we start 

the divestiture in 2018, and I can’t account for why Secretary of 

Defense’s comments were this way, but the plan has been the same 

since it was submitted with our budget; is that the workarounds 

we have put in place until now allow us to bed down the F–35 

through IOC by getting maintenance manpower from other places, 

by contracting it out. In fiscal year 2018, all those things kind of 

run out, and we are now short people to stand up F–35 units. 

And so if we keep the A–10, by fiscal year 2021, the scheduled 

FOC date for the F–35, we will be about 50 percent short of the 

maintenance manpower required to field the F–35. So it is a manpower problem. 

Ms. MCSALLY. Okay. I am over my time, but we will follow up 

with you. Thanks a lot. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I came back because I 

have a great interest in our military, to have a strong military, 

with the hopes that a strong military can make sure that we get 

the attention of foreigners who want to attack America and foreign 

countries. 

It is pretty distressing really to hear the testimony today, knowing that our readiness, knowing that our modernization accounts 

need money, need to really rebuild this military that most Americans, including myself, feel like we need to have a strong military 

because of the world situation. 

I want to touch on, and then I will get to my question very quickly, many of my colleagues on the Armed Services Committee don’t 

agree with me on this, and that is fine. That is what makes America great. I just get incensed by the waste of money in Afghanistan. 

I had the former Commandant, Chuck Krulak, has been my adviser 

for 5 years. I email him, he emails me back. He gives me questions 

from time to time, or he will give me thoughts that I can share. 

In the last 2 weeks, this article appeared, ‘‘Twelve ways your tax 

dollars were squandered in Afghanistan, $10 billion.’’ Then there 

was an article about the fact we spent $18 billion in Afghanistan 

to train Afghanis to be policemen, and 36,000 walked off the job. 

Then you had John Sopko before the Senate a month ago testifying 

that the Department of Defense spent $6 million to buy 9 goats 

from Italy—they are blond in color—to ship to Western Afghanistan so they could start a goat farm and get the wool and then 

start a cashmere business. He further testified to the Senate, he 

doesn’t know where the goats are. And someone asked him, do you 

think they ate them? You know, this is not a joke. I hear you telling us today that America is not ready to defend this country if we 

keep going down this path. So this is what I want to ask. 

General Dunford I have great respect for, as I have great respect 

for you as well. I know that from time to time he wants your counsel because he has got the responsibility to say to a President, Mr. 
52 

President, this is the right policy. We must continue this policy. Or 

maybe he would say, Mr. President, I don’t know if we should continue going down this black hole or not. 

So what I would like to note from you, primarily the generals, 

because you would be the ones, maybe the secretaries as well, that 

from time to time General Dunford would say we need to have a 

policy discussion. And I would understand it would be confidential 

and informal. But do you as a general feel that if a policy—forget 

my position on Afghanistan—but a policy that this country is pursuing is wrong for the American people and wrong for the military, 

would you feel that it is your duty, not publicly now, but your duty 

to say to General Dunford in this case, you need to let the President know that 10 to 12 more years of trying to train the Afghans 

to take care of themselves is not worth one dime, and it is certainly 

not worth one pint of blood? Do you feel that this is part of your 

responsibility—forget Afghanistan—but to be an adviser to the 

President so we can give the President the support or not give him 

the support, meaning money, in a lost cause? Would anyone like to 

answer that? 

General MILLEY. Congressman, you can get a quick spot from all 

of us, I suppose. For me, we meet regularly with General Dunford, 

very candid conversations amongst the senior leadership you see 

here at the table. We talk policy. We talk all kinds of strategic 

issues, very candid. And I have no doubt in my mind, speaking for 

myself, that if I had a doubt in a certain policy, et cetera, that I 

would bring it up to him, and I have already done that on many 

occasions. Point one. 

Point two is, we also have an obligation to render best military 

advice to the Secretary of Defense, the President, National Security 

Council, and Congress, and I believe that I recognize that, and I 

accept that as a personal responsibility, and I will execute it without failure as long as I am in this seat. 

Mr. JONES. General Milley, thank you very much. I think my 

time is about to expire, and I tell the chairman all the time, I am 

going to try to stick to the time. So thank you for at least listening. 

I appreciate that very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Lamborn. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for your 

service. 

There has been a lot of talk in the Senate on changing Goldwater-Nichols. In fact, our Senate colleagues have started hearings 

on that. Now, from your perspective, and I am going to ask General 

Welsh and Secretary James this in particular, because one of the 

wild rumors that are now flying around is that SPACECOM [Space 

Command] is going to be moved or NORTHCOM [Northern Command] and SOUTHCOM [Southern Command] are going to be 

merged, or who knows what other rumors are out there. 

Is the proposed Senate process sufficiently transparent and deliberative? Those are two things I think that are critical. Could you 

both comment on that, please? 

Secretary JAMES. I would begin, Congressman Lamborn, by simply saying that I am not fully familiar with the full Senate process. 

I am sure it is transparent and so on. But any law that has been 
53 

around for 30-plus years, it probably makes sense to stand back 

and take a look at it. So I believe that was the spirit with which 

they have initiated this. And by the way, the Department of Defense is also reviewing some of these matters in their working 

groups and so on. So that would be my comment. 

General WELSH. Sir, like the boss, I am not familiar with the internal Senate process on this, so I really can’t comment on that. We 

have been asked for our views and our inputs, which I think is 

wonderful. The one thing I would comment on about GoldwaterNichols is sometimes we forget that it has been a raging success, 

in my view. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Excuse me? 

General WELSH. It has been a raging success, since 1986. The 

joint capabilities of this force are night and day compared to what 

they were in 1985, and all of us were serving back then, so I hope 

we don’t throw out the baby with the bathwater. I don’t think that 

will happen. But it has been 30 years. It is time to take a look and 

see how we can make it better. 

Mr. LAMBORN. All right. Thank you both for your perspective. 

General Neller, I would like to shift to you. I want to turn to Secretary Carter’s recent decision to open all specialties and units to 

women without exception. And I am concerned about the very rapid 

implementation timeline that has been given to you. And to me, if 

it is a very quick timeline, I would be concerned that there is more 

politics involved than actually what is best for the warfighter. So 

I want to ask you about the timeline. If there is too quick of a timeline to implement, does that make it difficult to resolve all of the 

questions? 

General NELLER. Well, Congressman, I don’t think we are—we 

are on a timeline for a decision. The Secretary said by 1 April he 

would tell us, he would accept our implementation plans, which he 

has done. So we had been building in parallel an implementation 

plan because we did not ask for an exception for all ground combat 

elements, but now they are all open. 

So we are going through the process, like the other services, to 

find out what the propensity to enlist is. We have changed—we 

have developed standards for men and women in the pool to go in 

these MOSs [military occupational specialties]. We have got standards that, when they are in recruit training, that they have to meet 

in order to go on to the MOS school. We have got MOS-specific 

standards at the school that all marines have to go through to earn 

the MOS. And then if and when female marines pass, which I am 

sure they will, we have a plan to successfully put them into these 

units so that they can contribute, and then we can continue on 

with mission effectiveness. 

So there is three lenses that we look at this at the end: the admission effectiveness for the unit, the health and welfare of the 

force, and overall best use of talent of the human capital that we 

have. So we are going to go through this process. Our recruiters 

are out there now to see if there is any indications that there is 

a propensity to do these particular MOSs, and we will put people 

through school. 

So how long is that going to take? I have no idea, but I think 

we have got a plan. I think we are prepared to go forward on this, 
54 

and we will continue to track it. I think it is going to take all of 

us, but I think more so the Army and the Marine Corps. I am not 

going to speak for General Milley. But I think we know we are 

going to collect the data on this, and so we will see how this all 

plays out over the next 5 to 10 years before we really have a good 

idea of how it has worked out. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Well, I just hope that the needs of the warfighter 

are first and foremost, and rushing too quickly, to me, might compromise that. I would hate to see that compromised. 

General NELLER. I don’t personally feel under any pressure, and 

I don’t think the force does because we want every marine to be 

successful. And this is about mission effectiveness and effectiveness 

of the force. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. We have touched on a variety of topics. I appreciate you all being here. We will need to stay in touch with you 

moving towards markup and the floor, everything from GoldwaterNichols and acquisition reform, to dealing with our readiness problem. But for now, again, you have our thanks. And the hearing 

stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:59 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 16, 2016 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 16, 2016 

(59) 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 16, 2016 

(171) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Secretary MABUS. Because of the long lead time needed for shipbuilding, it is not 

the job of one administration. It is not the job of one Congress. This Administration 

and Congress, in previous budgets, have guaranteed we will reach a Fleet of 300 

ships by FY19 and 308 by FY21. With the strong support of Congress and close adherence to the long range shipbuilding plan over the period 2009—2016, the Navy 

is certain to reach a Battle Force of 308-ships in 2021 (the nominal year in which 

those ships procured by 2016 will have been delivered to the Navy). This twelve 

year span required to go from a Navy of 278 ships in 2009 to 308 ships in 2021 

exemplifies why shipbuilding must remain a top priority for the Department of the 

Navy (DoN) if we are to continue to provide the measure of maritime security and 

power projection required of our naval forces in the decades ahead. The FY 2017 

President’s Budget and the corresponding FY 2017 to FY 2021 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) establish the shipbuilding trajectory that will shape our Battle 

Force and its underpinning industrial base in the years following FY 2021. 

In the 2020s the strict requirement to replace SSBNs of the Ohio-class on a onefor-one basis as they retire, dictates that the Navy procure the lead OR SSBN ship 

in FY2021, the second ship of the class in FY2024, followed by funding one OR 

SSBN each year between FY2026 and FY2035. In developing our FY 2017 President’s budget, the Office of Management and Budget increased the Navy’s shipbuilding funds by about $2.3 billion in FY2021 specifically for the start of OR SSBN 

construction, allowing the Navy to better balance our resources across the entire 

Navy portfolio. Within the Navy’s traditional Total Obligation Authority (TOA), and 

assuming that historic shipbuilding resources continue to be available, the OR 

SSBN and CVN funding requirements would consume about half of the shipbuilding 

funding available in a given year—and would do so for a period of over a decade. 

The significant drain on available shipbuilding resources would manifest in reduced 

procurement quantities in the remaining capital ship programs. Therefore, if additional funding is not available to support the shipbuilding procurement plan 

throughout this period, knowing that the OR SSBN will be built, the balance of the 

shipbuilding plan will be significantly impacted. 

Ohio Replacement (OR) remains our top priority program. The Navy continues to 

need significant increases in our top-line beyond the FYDP, in order to afford their 

replacement. Absent top-line relief, OR SSBN construction will seriously impair construction of virtually all other battle force ships. Without additional funding, the resulting force composition and ship numbers will not only fail to meet the requirements of the Navy’s Force Structure Assessment (FSA), but there will also be significant negative impacts to the shipbuilding industrial base. The Navy greatly appreciates Congressional support in overcoming the challenges posed by funding the 

OR Program, characterized by the establishment of the National Sea-Based Deterrent Fund (NSBDF) as an element of a funding strategy, and will work with Congress to maximize the benefits provided by Economic Order Quantity (EOQ), Advance Construction (AC), and Incremental Funding authorities. [See page 15.] 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS 

Secretary JAMES. The programmed cost of current and planned mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability associated with the Intercontinental Ballistic Missile 

(ICBM) convoy support mission is $8.3M. These measures include the expansion of 

infrastructure and personnel capacity, fielding of aerial gunnery capability, installation of terrain avoidance systems, and establishment of multiple refueling locations 

throughout the missile fields. For ICBM emergency security response, the Air Force 

is unable to meet the full response requirement because of the UH–1N’s speed, 

range, and payload limitations. 

Should non-Air Force assets and personnel be employed to perform the emergency 

security response mission at the three ICBM wings, preliminary estimates indicate 

the Air Force would incur approximately $20M in up-front, one-time only infrastructure expenses (for hangars/clam shelters, ramps, lodging, and operations/maintenance/alert facilities). Additionally, approximately $40M in annual operating ex-
172 

penses (for flight hours, per diem, and pay and allowance) would be incurred by the 

service providing the interim capability. 

The infrastructure expenses would be non-recoupable, regardless of the timeline 

on which a replacement helicopter is fielded. However, it is possible that the Air 

Force could repurpose some portion of this infrastructure to support the operational 

requirements of a replacement platform. The annual operating expenses incurred by 

the service providing the interim capability would presumably cease once the Air 

Force helicopter replacement program attains full operational capability. [See page 

20.] 

Secretary JAMES. General Mitchell’s study does say that the worldwide ‘‘launch 

capacity exceeds demand by a 3 to 1 ratio’’ and appears to be based on 2013 FAA 

Commercial Space Transportation Advisory Committee data. My assessment is that 

we have the opportunity to make the U.S. launch industry more competitive worldwide as encouraged by our National Space Transportation Policy. In fall 2014, the 

Air Force solicited feedback from industry via a Request for Information. Those responses and continuous engagement with industry provided evidence that a viable 

competitive launch market could exist if commercial companies are able to close 

their business case with a combination of commercial and government missions. 

This feedback supports government investment in industry and enables the Department of Defense, in accordance with National Space Transportation Policy, to provide assured access to space with at least two families of commercially viable launch 

vehicles that meet all National Security Space requirements. [See page 21.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 16, 2016 

(175) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I believe we must ensure that you and your counterparts here 

today have the flexibility and the agility needed to acquire and utilize off-the-shelf 

capabilities that can quickly transition to the warfighter. Can you describe how the 

services are promoting public-private partnerships and leveraging the capabilities of 

the private sector? 

Mr. MURPHY and General MILLEY. The Army works with the private sector in a 

variety of ways. For example, we leverage the capabilities of the private sector 

through the use of Other Transaction Authorities (OTA). An OTA is a legally binding agreement that is not subject to the traditional Federal and Defense Acquisition 

Regulations (FAR), which apply to procurement contracts. Therefore, OTAs are more 

flexible agreements. The Army recognizes the value and benefit of using OTAs to 

bring new sources of technical innovation to the Department quickly and economically to remain competitive in the commercial marketplace and improve current capability. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2015, the Army had 240 OTAs valued at $634 million, 

double the amount in FY 2013 (117 totaling $316 million). 

Another way the Army leverages the capabilities of the private sector is through 

the expertise resident in our labs and engineering centers. Thanks to our highly 

skilled workforce of over 11,000 scientists and engineers, the Army is able to quickly 

assess the ability for commercial solutions to meet the Warfighter needs (either with 

or without modifications) and/or identify developing capabilities that could address 

the immediate needs of the Warfighter. This is why it is critical to maintain a 

strong Science and Technology enterprise with a world class infrastructure and 

workforce. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I believe we must ensure that you and your counterparts here 

today have the flexibility and the agility needed to acquire and utilize off-the-shelf 

capabilities that can quickly transition to the warfighter. Can you describe how the 

services are promoting public-private partnerships and leveraging the capabilities of 

the private sector? 

Secretary MABUS and Admiral RICHARDSON. The Department of Navy (DON) has 

multiple initiatives in place, particularly within the Naval Laboratories and Warfare 

Centers, where DON scientists and engineers routinely collaborate with their private sector peers to identify, evaluate and use off-the-shelf capabilities. Some examples include: 

(1) Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs): Joint research 

and development efforts allowing the sharing of facilities, knowledge, experience 

and/or intellectual property between industry and the DON. Provides data and intellectual property protection from the Freedom of Information Act for an established 

period of time. 

(2) Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) program: Promotes small businesses and is phased to permit technology feasibility and demonstration before fullscale development commercialization. 

(3) Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR): Provides R&D funding directly 

to small companies working cooperatively with researchers at universities and other 

research institutions. STTR firms and the research partner agree to a division of 

intellectual property prior to the start of the STTR effort. As a result, each party 

retains the intellectual property rights to technologies they develop under the program. 

(4) Memorandums of Understanding and/or Agreement (MOU/MOA): High level 

agreements documenting and identifying areas of potential collaboration and/or a 

strategy to do so. 

(5) Patent License Agreement: Assigns the right to make, use or sell government 

intellectual property. License fees and/or royalties may be involved. 

(6) Partnership Intermediary Agreements (PIAs): Allows DON activities to partner with semi-private institutions to develop potential interactions with State and 

local business entities. 

(7) Other Transactions (10 U.S.C. 2371): ‘‘Research projects: transactions other 

than contracts and grants,’’ allows for basic, advanced, and applied research to be 

acquired through transactions other than contracts, cooperative agreements, and 
176 

grants. These agreements stimulate new sources that have not historically dealt 

with the Government. 

(8) Educational Partnership Agreements (10 U.S.C 2194): Authorizes the director 

of each defense laboratory to enter into one or more education partnership agreements with educational institutions for the purpose of encouraging and enhancing 

study in scientific disciplines at all levels of education by loaning equipment, providing personnel to assist in course development, and providing academic credit for 

participation in research. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I believe we must ensure that you and your counterparts here 

today have the flexibility and the agility needed to acquire and utilize off-the-shelf 

capabilities that can quickly transition to the warfighter. Can you describe how the 

services are promoting public-private partnerships and leveraging the capabilities of 

the private sector? 

General NELLER. 1. Acquisition of Commercial Items. The current acquisition 

process requires lengthy procurement action lead times (PALT) and processes in 

order to award requirements that support our Marines. For commercial off-the-shelf 

capabilities the Government can utilize FAR Subpart 12.1, Acquisition of Commercial Items that provides an expedited acquisition process. 

Some of the other acquisition expediting tools that are utilized by the Marine 

Corps are as follows: 

a. External Contracting Waiver (ECW) Determination and Finding (D&F) 

Process. 

Marine Corps Systems Command and supported program executive offices (PEOs) 

utilize the ECW D&F, enabling program managers to send funding to other DOD 

components or civilian agencies to make awards under existing contracts competitively awarded by the servicing agency. This enables the Marine Corps to quickly 

obligate funds in order to receive the necessary warfighting capabilities and technology solutions without repeating the lengthy PALT times encountered by the servicing agency. 

b. Unsolicited Proposals. Private Sector firms can submit ‘‘Unsolicited Proposals’’ for innovative concepts and technologies. The Government has stated interest in receiving unsolicited proposals that contain new ideas and innovative concepts 

pertaining to our military capability requirements. 

An ‘‘unsolicited proposal,’’ as defined in FAR 2.101, is a written proposal for a new 

or innovative idea that is submitted to an agency on the initiative of the offering 

company (i.e., private sector firm) for the purpose of obtaining a contract with the 

government, and that is not in response to an RFP, broad agency announcement, 

or any other government-initiated solicitation or program. For an unsolicited proposal to comply with FAR 15.603(c), it must be: innovative and unique, independently originated, and developed by the offering company. The unsolicited proposal: 

(1) Must be prepared without government supervision, endorsement, direction or 

direct government involvement. 

(2) Must provide sufficient detail to show that government support could be 

worthwhile, and that the proposed work could benefit the agency’s research and development (or other mission responsibilities). 

(3) Cannot be an advanced proposal for a contract requirement that the offering 

company knows the agency will need and that could be acquired by competitive 

methods. 

c. Broad Agency Announcements (BAA). The Office of Naval Research (ONR) 

utilizes BAAs under FAR Subpart 35.016, for the acquisition of basic and applied 

research and that part of development not related to the development of a specific 

system or hardware procurement. BAA’s are used by the Navy and Marine Corps 

through ONR to fulfill requirements for scientific study and experimentation directed toward advancing the state-of-the-art or increasing knowledge or understanding rather than focusing on a specific system or hardware solution. ONR: 

(1) Constantly seeks innovative scientific and technological solutions to address 

current and future Navy and Marine Corps requirements. 

(2) Actively wants to do business with educational institutions, nonprofit and forprofit small and other than small businesses with ground-breaking ideas, pioneering 

scientific research and novel technology developments. 

d. Federally Funded Research and Development Centers (FFRDC). Additionally, FAR Subpart 35.017, the provision for FFRDCs, enables the Marine Corps 

to meet special long-term research or development needs which cannot be met as 

effectively by existing in-house or contractor resources. FFRDCs: 

• Enable government agencies to use private sector resources to accomplish tasks 

that are integral to the mission and operation of the sponsoring agency. 
177 

• Are provided access, beyond that which is common to the normal contractual 

relationship, to Government and supplier data, including sensitive and proprietary data, and to employees and installations equipment and real property. 

• Are required to conduct business in a manner befitting the special relationship 

with the Government, 

• To operate in the public interest with objectivity and independence, 

• To be free from organizational conflicts of interest, and 

• To have full disclosure of their affairs to the sponsoring agency. 

• Are operated, managed, and/or administered by a university or consortium of 

universities, other not-for-profit or nonprofit organization, or an industrial firm, 

as an autonomous organization or as an identifiable separate operating unit of 

a parent organization 

It is not the Government’s intent that an FFRDC use its privileged information 

or access to installations equipment and real property to compete with the private 

sector. However, an FFRDC may perform work for other than the sponsoring agency 

under the Economy Act, or other applicable legislation, when the work is not otherwise available from the private sector. 

e. Marine Enhancement Program. The Marine Enhancement Program provides an opportunity for Marines, industry, and the public to nominate commercial 

off the shelf items focused on the infantry community for funding, testing, procurement, and fielding in a 9–24 month timeframe. The program utilizes a web based 

submission process http://www.marines.mil/mep for nominations that anyone can 

submit. All nominated items are reviewed and feedback provided to the submitter. 

Outreach events and advertising are used to inform Marines and industry about the 

program as recently as Marine South at Camp Lejeune NC on 6–7 April 2016. The 

program provides an opportunity for anyone with an innovative idea for a commercial item that provides added value to the Marines to have their idea heard and reviewed. 

f. Modern Day Marine ‘‘Integration with Industry’’ Workshop. The Integration with Industry workshop provides a venue for industry to bring their product 

into the Marine Corps Systems Command’s rifle squad integration team for a collaborative integration workshop. The products can range from prototype items to 

fully completed items ready for sale. The integration team provides engineering and 

human systems integration expertise coupled with all the rifle squad equipment and 

weapons to enable a full system solution. The integration team provides the tools 

and resources to conduct the workshop. Active duty Marines provide feedback to the 

vendor on the usability and utility of the completed integration solution. This event 

supports small business ventures that may not have access to Marine Corps equipment in order to optimize the integration of their product. This workshop has been 

offered to industry during the annual Modern Day Marine event held in late September at Quantico, VA. 

2. Technology Transition 

a. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab provides for the experimentation that 

enables adapting off-the-shelf capabilities. Technology experimentation seeks to put 

prototypes into the hands of end users, in relevant environments, to collect feedback 

on how well those prototypes meet the users’ needs. Technology must not only work 

well in the laboratory but accomplish its mission when exposed to an operational 

environment. MCWL works closely with ONR on Future Naval Capabilities (FNC). 

FNC is an S&T program designed to develop and transition cutting-edge technology 

products to acquisition managers within three to five years. The program aims to 

deliver mature products for integration into platforms, weapons, sensors or specifications that improve Navy and Marine Corps warfighting and support capabilities. 

MCWL and ONR facilitate informed Technology Transition Agreements with program managers, which can tap into and rapidly adapt private sector off-the-shelf solutions. 

b. PEO Land Systems Marine Corps has published its Advanced Technology Investment Plan (ATIP) 2016, the seventh edition of this key document. 

The ATIP provides a thorough understanding of the S&T challenges facing PEO LS 

programs and how proposed solutions/technologies can meet those challenges. The 

document is accessible on the Defense Innovation Marketplace (DIM), a web-based 

forum managed by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering. The DIM provides industry with improved insight into the R&E investment priorities of the DOD. The Independent Research and Development program is a contractor’s own investment in basic and applied R&D for which DOD may reimburse 

the company. 

c. Naval Warfare Centers and Labs can be a means for private sector participation when they award contracts for work not required to be performed by govern-
178 

ment personnel. So too can Army organizations, such as Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, and Aberdeen Test Center. 

d. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR)/Small Business Technology 

Transfer (STTR). The Marine Corps utilizes the SBIR and STTR programs established by Congress to strengthen the role of innovative small business concerns 

(SBCs) in Federally-funded research (Federal R) or research and development 

(R&D). Specific program purposes are to: 

(1) Stimulate technological innovation; 

(2) Use small business to meet Federal R/R&D needs; 

(3) Foster and encourage participation by socially and economically disadvantaged 

SBCs in working in technological innovation; and 

(4) Increase private sector commercialization of innovations derived from Federal 

R/R&D, thereby increasing competition, productivity and economic growth. 

SBIR has the advantage of tapping into a broad array of otherwise innovative 

companies that may be marginally or infrequently engaged with the Defense Department. It also is a relatively low-risk approach with distinct stages of technology 

development and incremental levels of investment. This provides off ramps if a technology is not panning out—or allows the opportunity to elevate quickly a promising 

technology to the next level of development. 

e. Rapid Innovation Fund (RIF). The RIF provides opportunities for agencies 

to award directly to companies who have demonstrated a capability in response to 

DON requests for ‘‘White Papers’’ to meet an innovative technology or need. MCSC 

is utilizing the Rapid Innovation Fund program to transition innovative technologies 

(primarily from small businesses) that can be rapidly inserted into acquisition programs to meet specific defense needs. RIF efforts often build on SBIR projects to 

transition mature technologies to programs of record. In less than two years, a technology can go from mature to ready for transition into a program for fielding. The 

deliberate planning and use of these and many other science and technology tools 

enable program managers to develop long-term strategies to modernize their programs. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. As we work to manage cybersecurity at an enterprise level and 

evaluate the state of much-needed programs, such as OCX, it is critical that the 

services understand the cybersecurity requirements laid before them. Can you tell 

us how much was spent defending space systems against cyber vulnerabilities last 

year, and how the Air Force is working to incorporate cybertechnologies into requirements sooner? Do you believe that other legacy systems may be vulnerable to 

cyberthreats, and if so, to what extent? 

Secretary JAMES and General WELSH. Spending for the mitigation of cyber 

vulnerabilities on space systems is included in developmental/operational testing 

and information assurance (IA) efforts required for Authority to Operate. These activities do not have discreet funding lines and differ significantly from program to 

program. 

The Air Force considers cybersecurity throughout cradle to grave lifecycle, and is 

working to incorporate cyber technologies into requirements sooner. Cyber technologies are incorporated into the requirements process at Pre-Milestone A when 

the draft Capability Development Document is written. 

For space systems, Communications Squadron Next pathfinders will examine 

standing up operations centers with manpower and tools to actively defend ‘‘blue’’ 

networks, including the space control ground networks. In addition, Headquarters 

Air Force, Air Force Space Command, and 24th Air Force are analyzing the cost to 

employ cybersecurity technologies in defending both the ground and space segments. 

For other legacy systems, the Air Force has a Cyber Campaign Plan (CPP) that 

will examine how to incorporate cyber resiliency technologies into requirements earlier in the process. Specifically, one planned line of action would integrate cyber system security engineering into Air Force systems engineering. This effort specifically 

would ‘‘bake-in’’ cyber resiliency to future warfighting systems. 

On a regular and recurring basis, the Air Force completes IA (level 1 and level 

2) cyber threat assessments on legacy systems. These assessments have indicated 

that cyber vulnerabilities do exist in our legacy systems at a low level of risk; however, no definitive cyber threat evidence has been found. Lines of action in the CPP 

examine the possibility of using intelligence collection to validate cyber threats. In 

addition, the CCP would also assess mission threads across the Air Force and system-by-system vulnerabilities as well as demonstrating mitigations. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I believe we must ensure that you and your counterparts here 

today have the flexibility and the agility needed to acquire and utilize off-the-shelf 

capabilities that can quickly transition to the warfighter. Can you describe how the 

services are promoting public-private partnerships and leveraging the capabilities of 

the private sector? 
179 

Secretary JAMES and General WELSH. The Air Force promotes public-private partnerships and leverages the capabilities of the private sector this through multiple 

venues. For example, the Defense Innovation Marketplace contains DOD research 

and development (R&D) strategic documents, solicitations, and news/events on 

warfighter requirements that can be fulfilled by leveraging commercial off-the-shelf 

capabilities. 

A second example of public-private partnership is the Air Force’s Small Business 

Innovation Research and Small Business Technology Transfer program. The program stimulates technological innovation by using small businesses to meet the Air 

Force’s R&D needs. It also offers frequent opportunities for small businesses to compete for federal funding, build partnerships with program offices and industry leaders, and to commercialize technological innovations. The Air Force also uses Industry Days, Broad Area Announcements, Requests for Information, and technology 

workshops to promote collaboration between the Government, Federally Funded Research and Development Centers, and the private sector to exchange information on 

off-the-shelf capabilities that may quickly transition to fulfill warfighter needs. 

A third example of an innovative public-private partnership is the Other Transaction Authority (OTA) Agreements for the Rocket Propulsion System Prototype Investment. These OTAs facilitate a competitive, flexible selection process allowing the 

shared investment of a commercially viable product with four industry partners supporting the Air Force strategy to transition from the RD–180 engine. 

Lastly, the Air Force also leverages the newly formed DOD-wide initiative Defense Innovation Unit—Experimental. This initiative is designed to create a hub for 

facilitating increased communication, knowledge exchange, and access to innovating, 

high-tech start-up companies and their leading edge technologies. By connecting the 

Air Force with non-traditional companies developing inventive technological solutions, this initiative enables the Air Force to learn how to identify and leverage 

leading-edge technologies, business practices, and ideas. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. As you know, Patriot Missile Battalions are some of the most deployed units in the Army, and crucial to our military efforts around the world. 

Given this high operations tempo, how comfortable are you with the level of readiness of Patriot Battalions? 

General MILLEY. The Army Air and Missile Defense (AMD) force continues to 

meet mission readiness requirements despite an unprecedented rotation rate. AMD 

units are a key strategic enabler of choice that provide a ready, reliable, credible, 

and non-provocative deterrent force demonstrating U.S. resolve. We are constantly 

working on initiatives to increase not only the readiness of our short range air defense and Patriot batteries, but their availability and strategic flexibility as well. 

These initiatives to reduce stress on the Patriot force will improve operations tempo 

and personnel tempo challenges, which may have a positive effect on readiness. We 

will assess the progress of these initiatives and adjust as necessary. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Do you believe that if Kim Jong-Un started marching on Seoul tomorrow, we would have adequate Patriot resources available on the Korean Peninsula? 

General MILLEY. The Army, as part of the Combined and Joint force, has enough 

Patriot resources to meet the requirements of the Combatant Commander. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Our industrial base is critical to supporting readiness across the 

Armed Forces and particularly in the Army. In my district I have seen firsthand 

the highly technical and extremely important work being done at Letterkenny 

Depot, and I believe we must continue fully support our nationwide depot network. 

My question is this: Do you believe we have enough depot capacity to support the 

Army’s worldwide commitments? Do you specifically believe we have enough depot 

capacity to meet the needs of Patriot recap and recertification? 

General MILLEY. Yes, we have sufficient capacity at the five maintenance depots 

to sustain readiness and to support the Army’s worldwide sustainment maintenance 

requirements. Specifically, the Army has sufficient capacity to modernize (recap) Patriot ground support equipment and meet missile recertification requirements for 

the Patriot Advanced Capability-2 missile at Letterkenny Army Depot. Additionally, 

actions are underway to establish a capability for support to the Patriot Missile Segment Enhancement 
180 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Mr. CONAWAY. Who at DOD is charged with overseeing the Farm-to-Fleet initiative? 

Secretary MABUS and Admiral RICHARDSON. DOD oversight for all operational energy initiatives is conducted at the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Operational Energy), which reports to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense 

(Energy, Installations, and Environment). 

Farm-to-Fleet is a Department of Navy (DON) partnership with the US Department of Agriculture (USDA). DON participation in the partnership is overseen by 

the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Energy), which reports 

to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Energy, Installations, and Environment). 

USDA, not the DoN, administers Commodity Credit Corporation funding and 

makes payments to eligible alternative fuels producers. 

Mr. CONAWAY. The National Defense Reauthorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 restricted the Department of Defense from making bulk purchases of drop-in biofuels 

unless the price is at cost parity with conventional fuels. Were CCC funds used by 

the DOD to bring biofuels into cost parity with conventional fuels? 

Secretary MABUS and Admiral RICHARDSON. Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Energy’s September 2015 alternative fuel contract award fully complied with applicable law, including the Fiscal Year (FY) 2015 National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA). While the FY 2016 NDAA was not signed into law until November 25, 

2015, DLA Energy’s award was also compliant with its requirements. 

The law requires that the fully burdened cost of alternative fuel purchased for 

operational purposes be cost competitive with the fully burdened cost of traditional 

fuel. That determination of cost competitiveness is made by DLA, not by the Department of the Navy or the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA). 

DLA Energy’s April 2015 Rocky Mountain West Coast (RMWC) bulk fuel solicitation stipulated that alternative fuel producers who used U.S. agricultural feedstocks 

might be eligible for up to $0.25 per gallon in USDA Commodity Credit Corporation 

(CCC) funding. 

In September 2015, DLA issued a contract award to AltAir to supply a total of 

77.6 million gallons of F–76 containing a blend of 10 percent alternative fuel and 

90 percent traditional fuel. The amount paid by the Department of Defense for the 

AltAir fuel blend is approximately $2.04 ($2.00 per gallon to AltAir for the fuel 

blend plus $0.04 per gallon for transportation of the fuel). AltAir qualified for just 

under $0.16 per gallon in USDA CCC funding. 

To determine cost-competitiveness, DLA compared the alternative fuel blend offered by AltAir with traditional fuel offers for both the 2015 and 2014 RMWC solicitations. AltAir’s offer was not reduced or otherwise lowered by the amount that 

would be paid with CCC funds. Rather, DLA’s cost competitiveness analysis considered the full $0.16 per gallon in CCC funding. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Under what authority did DOD use USDA Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) funds to buy down the cost of biofuels? 

Secretary MABUS and Admiral RICHARDSON. Pursuant to the Commodity Credit 

Corporation (CCC) Charter Act, 15 U.S.C. § 714(c) et seq., alternative fuels producers who use U.S. agricultural feedstocks are eligible for payments from CCC 

funding. The Department of Agriculture (USDA) administers USDA CCC funding 

and makes payments directly to eligible alternative fuels producers. This is consistent with the 2011 Memorandum of Understanding between the DoN, USDA, and 

the Department of Energy. 

As explained in the response to Question 14, the law requires that the fully burdened cost of alternative fuel purchased for operational purposes be cost competitive 

with the fully burdened cost of traditional fuel. That determination of cost competitiveness is made by DLA. In DLA’s assessment of cost competitiveness for the 2015 

Rocky Mountain West Cost solicitation, DLA did not ‘‘buy down’’ or reduce the cost 

of the alternative fuel from AltAir by the amount that would be paid with CCC 

funds. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Provide an accounting of all CCC funds expended by the DOD 

under the Farm-to-Fleet initiative. 

Secretary MABUS and Admiral RICHARDSON. The Department of Agriculture 

(USDA), not the Department of the Navy (DON) nor the Defense Logistics Agency 

(DLA), administers USDA CCC funding and makes payments directly to eligible alternative fuels producers. 

Mr. CONAWAY. What is the current difference in dollars/gallon between conventional fuels and biofuels that DOD is paying using CCC funds? 

Secretary MABUS and Admiral RICHARDSON. The price paid by the Department of 

Defense (DOD) for the drop-in alternative fuel blend supplied pursuant to the 2015 
181 

Rocky Mountain West Coast bulk fuel award is equal to the price DOD would have 

paid for 100 percent traditional fuel. In accordance with the terms of the solicitation, the alternative fuels vendor qualified for $0.16 per gallon in Department of Agriculture (USDA) Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) funding. USDA, not DOD, 

administers the CCC funding and makes payments to the alternative fuels vendor. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Are there other service programs that expend money on their behalf that was appropriated to other Federal Departments? 

Secretary MABUS and Admiral RICHARDSON. Farm-to-Fleet is a Department of 

Navy (DON) partnership with the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The other military Services are not involved in Farm-to-Fleet. DON cannot speak to programs that 

the other Services may have with other Federal Departments. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. There has been a lot of talk on the need for Goldwater-Nichols reform and our colleagues in the Senate have undertaken a hearing series on the 

topic. a. What is the problem that such reform is trying to solve? Is there a problem 

we need to solve? b. How can we best prioritize the ‘‘do no harm’’ principle as we 

consider potential major reform? c. How is the communication between the defense 

committees and the OSD and Joint Staff working groups that are also examining 

the same issues? 

Mr. MURPHY and General MILLEY. Although the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986 successfully restructured our national security establishment, consideration of possible reforms is appropriate and timely. The current global situation 

has changed dramatically since the Cold War. There are opportunities worth exploring. Potential consolidations within the military departments could help make us a 

more agile institution, and better position us to respond to and shape the future. 

For specific answers to your questions, the Army defers to the Office of the Secretary of Defense on this issue. OSD is the lead for examining Goldwater-Nichols 

reform. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Can you each outline your top cyber challenges in terms of manning, resourcing and authorities? Are you properly resourced to handle these challenges? 

Mr. MURPHY and General MILLEY. Manning: Recruiting and retaining the Army’s 

cyber workforce, both military and civilian, remains a challenge; one that arises 

from having to develop work role requirements and competing opportunities in the 

private sector. On September 1, 2014, the Army established a cyber branch and continues to closely monitor its progress. Current manning will not prevent our ability 

to respond to a cyber attack and support the Joint force. 

Resourcing: The Army’s number one priority is readiness. Current funding levels 

require the Army to prioritize the advancement of cyber capabilities and capacity. 

In accordance with the DOD Cyber Strategy, the Army is building the capability 

and capacity to support our cyber mission in an ever increasing operational tempo. 

The Army is continuously trying to balance between readiness, end strength, and 

modernization; a balance that takes years of stable funding levels and flexibility in 

execution of resources to achieve. There are some major initiatives still under review, such as Army Cyber Resiliency, that will have resourcing implications; the full 

impact of these initiatives on the Army’s resources is unknown at this time. 

Authorities: The Army is providing its portion of the Cyber Mission Force in coordination with USCYBERCOM, operating under its current authorities. Within the 

Army, we assess our current authorities as sufficient to meet our mission. 

Mr. LAMBORN. There has been a lot of talk on the need for Goldwater-Nichols reform and our colleagues in the Senate have undertaken a hearing series on the 

topic. a. What is the problem that such reform is trying to solve? Is there a problem 

we need to solve? b. How can we best prioritize the ‘‘do no harm’’ principle as we 

consider potential major reform? c. How is the communication between the defense 

committees and the OSD and Joint Staff working groups that are also examining 

the same issues? 

Secretary MABUS and Admiral RICHARDSON. a. The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 was the last major legislative initiative 

which sought to improve DOD efficiency and effectiveness. In the 30 years since 

Goldwater-Nichols, evolving threats and the emerging strategic environment compel 

us to identify and evaluate potential reforms to ensure the Department of the Navy 

is optimally organized to support Joint Warfighting in current and future national 

security challenges. 
182 

b. During this period of military reform, our priority must be to protect U.S. forces 

involved in military operations today and to maintain those policies and structure 

that enable agile and effective military responsiveness in the future. 

c. The Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff have kept the Services and Military Departments informed of the working level dialog. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Can you each outline your top cyber challenges in terms of manning, resourcing and authorities? Are you properly resourced to handle these challenges? 

Secretary MABUS and Admiral RICHARDSON. Manning Current manning meets Department of the Navy (DON) requirements, but it is an area of concern, because we 

must compete with industry and the other Services for cyber talent. DON and Joint 

mission demands are increasing, and with the added need to support the Cyber Mission Force (CMF), cyber manning will continue to be a challenge. Besides the fact 

that we cannot compete directly with the salaries that our commercial competitors 

can pay, we are further hampered by such impediments as the slow, complicated 

Federal hiring process. 

Authorities The DON has the necessary authority to execute its cyber missions, 

however additional hiring flexibility will assist the Navy in recruiting and retaining 

skilled cyber professionals (i.e., authorities similar to Title 10 Chapter 83 for cyber 

workforce). 

Resourcing We are finding it increasingly difficult to address steadily growing 

cyber requirements without jeopardizing mission accomplishment elsewhere. For instance, beginning with its President’s Budget for 2015 submission, the Navy reprioritized hundreds of millions for Command, Control, Communications, Computers 

and Intelligence (C4I) security. When a budget is already as lean as that the Navy 

was working with, it is a nearly impossible feat to repurpose such significant sums 

without creating unacceptable risk somewhere else. 

For the Navy and Marine Corps to do what they need to do to secure their information and data, without jeopardizing operational success elsewhere, considerable 

new investment will be required. 

Training A shortcoming in the deployment of the CMF is a persistent training capability. Request Congress’ support in funding this training capability that will prepare the CMF to conduct offensive and defensive cyber operations. 

Mr. LAMBORN. There has been a lot of talk on the need for Goldwater-Nichols reform and our colleagues in the Senate have undertaken a hearing series on the 

topic. a. What is the problem that such reform is trying to solve? Is there a problem 

we need to solve? b. How can we best prioritize the ‘‘do no harm’’ principle as we 

consider potential major reform? c. How is the communication between the defense 

committees and the OSD and Joint Staff working groups that are also examining 

the same issues? 

General NELLER. a. What is the problem such reform is trying to solve? Is there 

a problem we need to solve? Over the last 30 years since the enactment of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Department of Defense and the Marine Corps have adapted 

to the end of the Cold War and have fought major conflicts in the Middle East. In 

the meantime, the overall global situation has changed and both our and our adversaries’ military capabilities have changed. We need to take a critical look inward 

to ensure that we are properly structured and that we have the correct processes 

in place in order to make the most effective and efficient use of the resources provided by the congress. The ‘‘problems’’ driving reform efforts are less about structures and processes that are broken, but that were designed for previous threats 

and an earlier global environment and have had to be adapted to the present and 

to the future. These include the combatant command structure that is regionally focused where our current and evolving threats stretch transregionally, and if you include the cyber and space aspect, globally. Our acquisition system has been built 

to accommodate an older pace of technology development, where the government 

was in the lead, and where numerous regulations have been added over time. Many 

of these regulations were legislated for good reasons. However, the result has been 

an unwieldy system that is not responsive and doesn’t allow service chiefs to exercise the responsibility and authority which goes hand in hand with their accountability for equipping the force. 

b. How can we best prioritize the ‘‘do no harm’’ principle as we consider potential 

major reform? The original Goldwater-Nichols Act and other defense legislation 

mandated specific actions, but also provided a great deal of flexibility to the Department. Flexibility in direction has allowed us to evolve and adapt, to make corrections, without recourse for new legislation. In order to maintain this positive environment that supports growth and flexibility, we will take a conservative approach 

to recommending actual changes in legislation, and prioritize making changes within the authority already existing under current laws. We will take the approach of 
183 

focusing on the outcomes we want, which allows for flexibility in the ‘‘hows’’, vice 

trying to dictate very specific processes and structures that are difficult to undo. 

c. How is the communication between the defense committees and the OSD and 

Joint Staff working groups that are also examining the same issues? The Marine 

Corps has been participating in the OSD and Joint Staff-led reform efforts and, from 

our perspective, have seen no issues with their communication with legislative defense committees. However, I would defer an answer to this question to the responsible OSD and Joint Staff leadership. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Can you each outline your top cyber challenges in terms of manning, resourcing and authorities? Are you properly resourced to handle these challenges? 

General NELLER. We project MARFORCYBER’s manpower models to be sufficient 

to present forces to USCYBERCOM as planned in the Cyber Mission Force build. 

While we anticipate achieving the hiring goals required for MARFORCYBER teams 

to reach FOC, we will continue to face challenges recruiting top-tier talent for critical, niche billets such as tool developers. The demand for cyber-related military occupational specialties has out-paced our ability to fill them, particularly in the staffnoncommissioned officer ranks. In the near-term, we are strengthening our manpower posture by employing manpower tools such as re-enlistment bonuses and lateral movement career opportunities. Our long-term solution will require a largescale force modernization effort of the communications/cyber occupational field. 

While we are making strong progress towards building capacity and achieving operational outcomes with our current resource baseline, maintaining a credible force 

will remain a resource intense challenge beyond the initial build due to the constantly changing cyber environment. Equipping cyber teams with effective cyber incident response tools and acquiring cyber tools to obtain real time awareness of network activity and defend our networks, are our top priorities. We continue to refine 

our requirements in response to the rapidly evolving threat environment, leveraging 

industry and government resources where appropriate. We continue to be challenged by the lack of a rapid acquisition authority responsive enough to meet the 

demands of a dynamic, rapidly changing operating environment. While we are working within the service to refine our existing procedures, we continue to accept risk 

by using acquisition procedures that favor efficiency over effectiveness. Similarly, we 

remain challenged by the need to build and maintain a specially trained, highly 

skilled workforce of contract civilians to provide capabilities complimentary to those 

of the uniformed force. Sourcing solutions constrained to lowest cost vendors are unlikely to satisfy this requirement. 

Mr. LAMBORN. There has been a lot of talk on the need for Goldwater-Nichols reform and our colleagues in the Senate have undertaken a hearing series on the 

topic. a. What is the problem that such reform is trying to solve? Is there a problem 

we need to solve? b. How can we best prioritize the ‘‘do no harm’’ principle as we 

consider potential major reform? c. How is the communication between the defense 

committees and the OSD and Joint Staff working groups that are also examining 

the same issues? 

Secretary JAMES and General WELSH. The Goldwater-Nichols Act has been hugely 

successful in achieving joint levels of operation that we did not have 30 years ago 

when the Act was passed. After 30 years of experience operating under the Goldwater Nichols Act, a review can help identify needed improvements. The trans-regional, multi-functional and multi-domain integration required to engage in today’s 

security environment is quite different from 30 years ago. It is the right time to assess roles and responsibilities to effectively plan and react to threats; identify opportunities to ensure we continue to provide the best military judgement and advice 

across the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President, Secretary of Defense and Service 

Secretaries; and continue to find areas where we should eliminate duplication in 

structure and staffs to put resources towards operational capability versus management overhead. 

As we consider potential major reform the ‘‘do no harm’’ principle is very important. We suggest first consideration to the changes developed and presented from 

the ongoing DOD Organization and Responsibilities Review. Where there are more 

ambitious proposals for reform being considered by defense committees from those 

proposed by the Department, we should ensure they have been adequately studied 

and there has been thoughtful discussion between defense committees and Department leadership (to include Service Secretaries and Joint Chiefs) before those proposals are legislated and acted upon. 

Regarding communications between the defense committees and the OSD and 

Joint Staff working groups the insights we have indicate they have been helpful, 

but more discussion is needed as the Department recommendations for reform and 

those proposed by defense committees become more mature. 
184 

Mr. LAMBORN. Can you each outline your top cyber challenges in terms of manning, resourcing and authorities? Are you properly resourced to handle these challenges? 

Secretary JAMES and General WELSH. To date, the Air Force has fielded 26 Cyber 

Mission Force (CMF) teams at initial operating capability or better and the remaining 13 teams are tracking toward initial operating capability by the end of 2017. 

All 39 teams are projected to be at full operating capability in 2018. Within the current fiscal constraints, there are manning and resource challenges in meeting these 

target dates: 

The Air Force’s top resourcing challenges are (1) establishing Squadron support 

staffs and (2) creating adequate training capacity. The resourced CMF billets (1,715 

Air Force) did not include classroom instructors, on-net trainers, polygraphers, and 

unit support staff. To meet these requirements, the Air Force moved manpower authorizations, hired additional personnel and organized support staffs within an already strained force structure and budget. Further, the increased training capacity 

requires an increase in physical space and some modifications to existing structures 

to include: constructing a new schoolhouse at Joint Base San Antonio; renovating 

the schoolhouse at Hurlburt Field, Florida; and accrediting classrooms as Sensitive 

Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) at the existing Keesler AFB schoolhouses. 

With respect to authorities, there are no challenges. USCYBERCOM possesses 

and has delegated the required authorities to subordinate commands to accomplish 

their assigned missions. 

To meet these challenges, the Air Force is partnering closely with USCYBERCOM 

and the other services in the fielding of the cyber mission force. Within the Air 

Force, we are continually monitoring and adjusting personnel and training policies 

and processes to speed the fielding of the cyber mission force, while building a sustainable Air Force cyber enterprise. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN 

Mr. COFFMAN. Since 2009, the Army has separated at least 22,000 combat veterans who had been diagnosed with mental health disabilities or traumatic brain 

injury for misconduct. These discharges have significant impact on those veterans’ 

eligibility for benefits and services from the Department of Veterans Affairs, including mental health services. The Department has instituted several changes to its 

discharge process to prevent the improper separation of servicemembers suffering 

from PTSD, but I believe many are still falling through the cracks, and thousands 

more were discharged prior to the Department’s changes. I also believe that this situation applies to all of the Armed Services, not just to the Army. Do any of you 

believe that your services’ discharge review boards should be more friendly to veterans appealing their discharge on account of PTSD diagnosis? And if so, do you 

have any specific proposals? 

Mr. MURPHY. Yes, the Army Review Boards Agency (ARBA) is committed to providing Army Veterans due consideration for each application. Since June 2015, 

ARBA has taken a more aggressive approach in requesting medical reviews of all 

cases involving claims of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) or Other Behavioral Health (OBH) issues. As of November 2015, ARBA has a full-time civilian Clinical Psychologist on staff specifically to review those types of cases. In the near future, ARBA will add another civilian Clinical Psychologist, a uniformed Clinical Psychologist and a civilian Psychiatrist. 

If a previous applicant reapplies for a discharge upgrade and claims PTSD, given 

the new guidance, ARBA will consider it as a new case. As we review the Army 

process, we will identify any required additional authorities and work them through 

the Department of Defense accordingly 

Mr. COFFMAN. Currently, veterans of the National Guard and Reserve forces are 

disproportionally denied on their VA claims for service-connected disabilities. I believe a major reason for this is the fact that the services can decline to provide them 

separation physicals, which are actually mandatory for active duty members. Do any 

of you believe that end-of-service physicals should be permitted for National Guard 

members and Reservists if they’d like a physical to document any service-related injuries or disabilities? How do you ensure that Guard and Reserve members’ serviceconnected injuries are documented? 

Mr. MURPHY. In accordance with current policy, any Army Soldier, whether Active 

or Reserve Component, may request a Separation Health and Physical Exam 

(SHPE) even if one is not required. The Army believes that every Soldier with a 

validated service connected injury should receive treatment at a DOD military treat-
185 

ment facility, DOD TRICARE network, or Department of Veteran Affairs (VA) facility. The Army supports this by ensuring that all eligible Soldiers complete a SHPE 

prior to separation in accordance with Headquarters, Department of the Army 

(HQDA), Execute Order (EXORD) 162–15. There is a pending Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) that will supersede this guidance and apply to all Services. 

The Separation Physical and Health Exam requirement applies to members of the 

Reserve Components on contingency orders for greater than 30 days or active duty 

orders other than training for 180 days or more. 

Service-connected injuries, illnesses, or exposures for Reserve Component Soldiers 

are documented and adjudicated using the Line of Duty (LOD) determination process in accordance with AR 600–8–4. All clinical documentation relating to the injury 

is captured in the Health Readiness Record (HRR). Any Reserve Component Soldiers with an ‘‘in line of duty, yes’’ (service-connected) determination are eligible for 

treatment at a military treatment facility or through the Military Medical Support 

Office (MMSO). If the Soldier does not reside in in the general area of a military 

treatment facility, the Soldiers and his unit, coordinates through MMSO for civilian 

provider care, which is then paid through TRICARE. Soldiers may be eligible for 

loss-of-income payments via the Incapacitation Pay (INCAP) program or Reserve 

Components Managed Care (RCMC). Detection and discovery of service-connected 

injuries can result from information transfer at the time of injury, from PHA medical surveillance events, or from Soldier disclosure. It is the Soldier’s unit’s responsibility to initiate an LOD investigation as appropriate upon discovery. All clinical 

medical documentation compiled over the career of the Soldier will be electronically 

transferred to the VA via the Healthcare Artifacts and Images Management Solution (HAIMS) interface upon request, or within 45 days of Soldier discharge, for use 

in determining disability. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Please outline your plans for operationalizing the Guard and Reserve forces? Where might the Air Force’s model could be applicable as a guide? 

What do you need from Congress to assist you in working toward an operationallyready Guard and Reserve Force? 

General MILLEY. We are committed to operationalizing the Army National Guard 

(ARNG) and Army Reserve in support of Army requirements. This begins with increasing the number of ARNG Combat Training Center rotations from two to four 

per year and increasing the number of Army Reserve forces’ annual training days. 

We also plan to increase ARNG and Army Reserve Component deployments to Europe, the Middle East, and Asia, reinforcing our commitment to the Army Total 

Force Policy. The U.S. Air Force’s associated unit model has proven instructive as 

we examine additional ways to integrate Active and Reserve Component formations 

in support of operational missions. The Army just announced the Associated Units 

Program to associate ARNG units with Active Component formations and vice versa 

to deepen ties and increase the readiness of both components. Going forward, we 

request Congress fully support the Department’s Overseas Contingency Operations 

and Base funding request for 12304(b) authorizations—roughly 3,000 man-years— 

so that the Army can resource its Total Force Policy and operationalize ARNG and 

Army Reserve forces. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Since 2009, the Army has separated at least 22,000 combat veterans who had been diagnosed with mental health disabilities or traumatic brain 

injury for misconduct. These discharges have significant impact on those veterans’ 

eligibility for benefits and services from the Department of Veterans Affairs, including mental health services. The Department has instituted several changes to its 

discharge process to prevent the improper separation of servicemembers suffering 

from PTSD, but I believe many are still falling through the cracks, and thousands 

more were discharged prior to the Department’s changes. I also believe that this situation applies to all of the Armed Services, not just to the Army. Do any of you 

believe that your services’ discharge review boards should be more friendly to veterans appealing their discharge on account of PTSD diagnosis? And if so, do you 

have any specific proposals? 

Secretary MABUS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. COFFMAN. Currently, veterans of the National Guard and Reserve forces are 

disproportionally denied on their VA claims for service-connected disabilities. I believe a major reason for this is the fact that the services can decline to provide them 

separation physicals, which are actually mandatory for active duty members. Do any 

of you believe that end-of-service physicals should be permitted for National Guard 

members and Reservists if they’d like a physical to document any service-related injuries or disabilities? How do you ensure that Guard and Reserve members’ serviceconnected injuries are documented? 

Secretary MABUS. All members of the Department of Navy (DON) preparing for 

release from active duty are required to take a comprehensive Separation History 
186 

and Physical Examination (SHPE) prior to their scheduled date of release. This also 

applies to Reserve Component (RC) members in an active duty status for 180 days 

or more or RC members serving on active duty for a period of more than 30 days 

in support of contingency operations. 

Additionally, if at any time an RC member incurs or aggravates an illness or injury while on active duty for 31–179 days, their current health status will be documented on DD Form 2697, Report of Health Assessment, before completing their 

scheduled tour of duty. 

Service members separating from Selected Reserves not otherwise required to receive a SHPE may request a SHPE within 6 months before the scheduled date of 

separation. 

All medical documentation from the SHPE is filed into the Service member’s Service Treatment Record. All Service members are required to provide complete and accurate information for the documentation of the history and symptoms of illnesses 

or injuries in the Service Treatment Record. This includes documentation of care received from civilian sources. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Since 2009, the Army has separated at least 22,000 combat veterans who had been diagnosed with mental health disabilities or traumatic brain 

injury for misconduct. These discharges have significant impact on those veterans’ 

eligibility for benefits and services from the Department of Veterans Affairs, including mental health services. The Department has instituted several changes to its 

discharge process to prevent the improper separation of servicemembers suffering 

from PTSD, but I believe many are still falling through the cracks, and thousands 

more were discharged prior to the Department’s changes. I also believe that this situation applies to all of the Armed Services, not just to the Army. Do any of you 

believe that your services’ discharge review boards should be more friendly to veterans appealing their discharge on account of PTSD diagnosis? And if so, do you 

have any specific proposals? 

Secretary JAMES. The Air Force Discharge Review Board (AFDRB) adjudicates 

cases with a focus on fairness, equity and due process for all who appear before the 

Board. While cases that entail a PTSD diagnosis are a small subset of the total 

cases reviewed by the AFDRB, the Board does provide close scrutiny for these cases, 

regardless of the service characterization, and carefully addresses the unique conditions related to a PTSD diagnosis and a corresponding administrative discharge. 

Prior to administrative separation from service, processes are in place to ensure 

that mental health conditions are considered. All Airmen subject to administrative 

separation are afforded a medical evaluation. Members identified with PTSD or 

other potentially disqualifying mental health conditions receive evidence-based 

treatment and have their progress tracked by the installation Deployment Availability Working Group (DAWG), which makes recommendations for the appropriate 

disposition for members with conditions that may render them unfit or unsuited for 

military service. Service members who have served in an imminent danger pay area 

and have an unsuiting mental health diagnosis as the basis for an administrative 

separation recommendation have a secondary review of their case by an additional 

mental health professional, the Air Force Surgeon General or their Flag Officer designee. Additionally, if an Airman is being discharged for reasons other than mental 

health, providers must consult with the DAWG if the Airman reasonably alleges 

PTSD or traumatic brain injury (TBI) affected their behavior or the conditions that 

led to their pending discharge. 

Through the AFDRB, mental health conditions of veteran’s are again considered. 

When a veteran’s case reaches the AFDRB, all applications receive review by a medical professional for any mental health diagnosis (including PTSD and TBI). Applications with a mental health diagnosis are referred to a Mental Health specialist 

(psychiatrist or clinical psychologist) for thorough review. The Mental Health specialist is also a voting member of the AFDRB for applications with a mental health 

diagnosis. 

These procedures ensure any behavior associated with the PTSD diagnosis is addressed during the AFDRB proceedings and explained to all AFDRB members. Additionally, the AFDRB offers the following Personal Appearance options: personal appearances before the Board may be made in the DC area (Joint Base Andrews, MD) 

and via regional video teleconference (VTC) for other AF installations. Regional 

VTCs are scheduled on a quarterly basis in Georgia, Texas, and California. The 

Board is exploring the possibility of expanding the VTC option for applicants to use 

other Federal Agencies (not limited to AF installations). The Board is also reviewing 

options to include SkypeTM or Face Time® related applications—including how to 

handle the pre-hearing records review with the applicant. These options allow all 

applicants an opportunity to present their case, including those with a PTSD diagnosis who may have travel restrictions. 
187 

Mr. COFFMAN. Currently, veterans of the National Guard and Reserve forces are 

disproportionally denied on their VA claims for service-connected disabilities. I believe a major reason for this is the fact that the services can decline to provide them 

separation physicals, which are actually mandatory for active duty members. Do any 

of you believe that end-of-service physicals should be permitted for National Guard 

members and Reservists if they’d like a physical to document any service-related injuries or disabilities? How do you ensure that Guard and Reserve members’ serviceconnected injuries are documented? 

Secretary JAMES. Yes, in fact Guard and Reserve members currently have multiple avenues to report service-related injuries or disabilities in a timely manner 

throughout their career. These include: 

a) Members complete the mandatory AF Web Health Assessment (self-reporting 

health status tool) annually IAW AFI 44–170, Preventive Health Assessment. 

b) AFI(s) 10–203, Duty Limiting Conditions and 48–123, Medical Examinations 

and Standards, directs members to notify commander and medical unit of any 

change in health status. 

c) AFI 36–2910, Line of Duty (LOD) Determination, Medical Continuation 

(MEDCON) and Incapacitation (INCAP) Pay directs members who incur or aggravate an injury, illness or disease while in a duty status to report within 24 hours 

to the member’s commander and servicing medical facility/unit. For Air Reserve 

Component (ARC) members, when not in a duty status, report ideally within 72 

hours or less. This instruction also provides guidance for case managing to ensure 

ARC members receive the proper treatment, evaluation, benefit counseling, and referral services. 

d) DOD requires a total of five Deployment Related Health Assessments (DRHAs) 

[DRHA #1–DD Form 2795, DRHA #2–DD Form 2796, DRHA #3–DD Form 2900, 

DRHA #4–DD Form 2978, and DRHA #5–DD Form 2978]. DRHAs assist with the 

early identification and management of deployment-related health concerns and conditions that may surface in the months before or the months to years after deployment. 

e) AFI 48–145, Occupational and Environmental Health Program, ensures all occupational and environmental illnesses reported are investigated, initiated in Air 

Force Safety Automated System (AFSAS), and closed within 30 days IAW requirements in AFI 91–204, Safety Investigation and Reports. 

f) The Separation History and Physical Examination which occurs after being on 

orders for named contingencies 30 continuous days or greater, or on orders of 180 

days or longer, DOD Instruction 6040.46. 

Mr. COFFMAN. There have been recent discussions about eliminating the use of 

the Atlas V launch vehicle. Please explain about how this might increase costs or 

create scheduling delays for our national security space program? Are there other 

risks or implications? 

Secretary JAMES and General WELSH. A majority of launches performed by United 

Launch Alliance (ULA) use the Atlas V launch family. As a result, not as many 

Delta IVs are produced and ULA has not maximized the throughput for the Delta 

IV family. It will take time to increase this capability, resulting in launch delays 

until ULA’s manufacturing capability catches up. This will lead to increased satellite storage costs and increased costs to fund any obsolescence costs associated 

with the Delta IV. Tory Bruno, CEO of ULA, publicly stated at the HASC Strategic 

Forces subcommittee hearing on 26 Jun 15 that it costs 35% more to build a Delta 

IV launch vehicle than an Atlas V. Since the Delta IV is not commercially competitive, ULA currently plans to end single core Delta IV production after Phase 1 

launches are completed in FY 2019. 

ULA has committed to producing the Delta IV Heavy Launch Vehicle to meet National Security Space (NSS) requirements for as long as the DOD requires, funds, 

and/or until the ULA Vulcan or another New Entrant is certified to meet those 

Heavy Spacelift requirements. At this time, the pre-decisional Air Force estimate 

projects a cost increase in excess of $1.5B to shift from executing Phase 2 with a 

mix of Falcon, Atlas V, and Delta IV Heavy launches to a Delta IV/Falcon split buy. 

In testimony Secretary James provided a range of $1.5 billion to $5 billion in potential extra costs for responsibly transitioning our space launch from reliance on the 

RD–180 rocket engine. The $5 billion estimate represents Air Force projections considering a worst case scenario of an immediate loss of RD–180s. Such a scenario 

assumed planned launches would be re-manifested, a lack of competition until 2022, 

and infrastructure for Delta IV rockets would be maintained. 

Mr. COFFMAN. On the subject of space access and launch, can you explain the Air 

Force’s position on the necessity to optimize the launch vehicle with the first stage 

engine? 
188 

Secretary JAMES. As Dr. LaPlante, former Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 

Acquisition, testified during last year’s Space Launch Hearing, we know from our 

prior experience in developing rockets throughout the past several decades that a 

rocket engine and its associated launch vehicle must be designed concurrently. In 

essence, we build the rocket around the engine. In cases where launch vehicle families had new engines installed, the launch vehicles were either significantly redesigned or the overall system was operated with limitations that provided less capability than would have been possible if the launch vehicle were redesigned. Technical challenges that must be addressed include vibrations from the engine that ripple throughout the vehicle during its travel, potentially damaging the satellite; ensuring the launch vehicle structure can withstand these ripples and loads without 

breaking; optimizing fuel storage and flow for the engine’s performance characteristics; and one of the greatest challenges, combustion stability of a high-performance 

engine. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS 

Mr. BROOKS. Secretary Murphy, Congress has demonstrated their desire for the 

Department of Defense to use Tubular LED (TLED) lights to replace fluorescent 

lights through many legislative means in the recent past. Congress has also encouraged the DOD to change the Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) to allow greater usage 

of TLEDs on military bases. I was surprised to see that on 3 March 2016, the UFC 

was changed to prohibit the Army from using TLEDs. Can you please explain why 

a proven technology, which can save the Army over $50 million in energy cost each 

year, is being banned in the face of Congressional will and in contradiction to the 

Navy allowing TLEDs? 

Mr. MURPHY. The Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) prohibited Tubular LEDs 

(TLEDs) in Army lighting projects due to safety concerns over several TLED manufacturer recalls, as well as a lack of consistency in vendor products. The Army has 

been following the progression of the technology. TLED products have matured, and 

there is now more consistency in the products, allowing minimum requirements to 

be established. As a result, the Army has made the decision to allow TLEDs in retrofit projects. Waivers to the UFC are being allowed while the UFC 3–530–01 is 

being modified to allow TLEDs for the Army. The change will be published by June 

1, 2016. The lighting Unified Facilities Guide Specification that identifies the minimum TLED requirements will be published by May 15, 2016. These modified criteria documents will give the Army an additional tool to reduce energy consumption, 

while providing a safe solution for meeting our energy goals. 

Mr. BROOKS. Secretary Mabus, Congress has demonstrated their desire for the 

Department of Defense to use Tubular LED (TLED) lights to replace fluorescent 

lights through many legislative means in the recent past. Congress has also encouraged the DOD to change the Unified Facilities Criteria (UFC) to allow greater usage 

of TLEDs on military bases. Mr. Secretary, with your continued efforts to both introduce innovation and to increase energy efficient technologies, I was surprised to see 

that on 3 March 2016, the UFC was changed to restrict the use of direct wire TLED 

on Navy facilities. I was pleased when the Navy brought the new, safe direct wire 

TLED technology to the Fleet with great energy and manpower savings. Can you 

please explain why a proven technology, which can save the Navy more than $50 

million annually in energy cost for the fleet, is being banned in the face of your efforts to provide a Navy that is on the cutting edge of innovation? 

Secretary MABUS. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. BROOKS. Secretary James, Congress has demonstrated their desire for the Department of Defense to use Tubular LED (TLED) lights to replace fluorescent lights 

through many legislative means in the recent past. Congress has also encouraged 

the DOD to change the Unified Facilities Criteria to allow greater usage of TLEDs 

on military bases. I was surprised to see that on 3 March 2016, the UFC was 

changed to prohibit the Air Force from using TLEDs. Can you please explain why 

a proven technology, which can save the Air Force over $40 million in energy cost 

year, is being banned in the face of Congressional will and in contradiction to the 

Navy allowing TLEDs? 

Secretary JAMES. Over the last few months, the Air Force has been meeting with 

experts from private industry, the other Services, and the Department of Energy to 

ensure it understands the performance and safety issues surrounding TLEDs. As 

the requirements for each Service differ, the Air Force wanted to ensure the switch 

to permitting TLEDs would not jeopardize the health and safety of its Airmen. 

Based on the analysis conducted, the Air Force drafted a policy to remove the prohibition of TLED lamps found in UFC 3–530–01, Interior and Exterior Lighting Sys-
189 

tems and Controls. This policy, which is currently in coordination, had not been finalized in time to be incorporated into the last UFC revision. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BRIDENSTINE 

Mr. BRIDENSTINE. The recent rise in nuclear threats from countries like North 

Korea and Iran and non-state actors such as ISIS, who are making serious and dangerous attempts to obtain nuclear material to create a ‘‘dirty bomb,’’ puts our troops 

at increased risk for exposure to dangerous levels of radiation. Given this nuclear 

threat, what is the Army’s acquisition plan to field a modern dosimeter system capable of detecting radiation on the battlefield that is not susceptible to being incapacitated by electromagnetic pulse? 

Additionally, the United States Government has paid billions of dollars to individuals who were exposed to radiation through their participation in the nation’s defense efforts. Modern dosimetry technology allows the Government an equitable 

means to justly compensate claims in a timely manner. What steps is the Army now 

taking to ensure any fielded dosimeter system is capable of providing a legal dose 

of record which can be maintained in a soldier’s medical record for the duration of 

their military career? 

Mr. MURPHY and General MILLEY. The Army’s acquisition plan is to field a modern dosimeter system capable of detecting radiation on the battlefield that is not 

susceptible to being incapacitated by electromagnetic pulses (EMP). This plan includes continuing to field and use the current DT–236 series dosimeters and future 

fielding of the Joint Personnel Dosimeter—Individual (JPD–I). The JPD–I will also 

not be incapacitated by EMPs. 

Dosimeters are designed to record and indicate the absorbed dose of radiation received by Soldiers. The Army is ensuring that the dosimeter system being used by 

warfighters correctly records the legal dose of radiation in Soldier’s medical records 

for the duration of their service. The current system being fielded in the DT series, 

the DT–236A and the JPD–I, are both able to provide this legal dose of record. 

The Army plans to begin fielding the JPD–I to the Active and Reserve Component 

in Fiscal Year 2020. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK 

Ms. STEFANIK. Through the posture hearings of the past few months we have 

heard about evolving strategic threats from a resurgent Russia, destabilizing threats 

from both state and non-state actors in the Middle East, and increasingly provocative activity coming out of the Pacific region. I want to focus on readiness, but in 

the context of emerging threats, and maintaining the edge on a 21st century battlefield: 

1) ISIL was able to establish a presence online that allowed them to rapidly recruit and radicalize through social media at unprecedented levels even in 

ungoverned space. What is the DOD capacity moving forward to counter this capability through both digital technology and messaging strategy? 

2) We’ve seen cyber play a more significant role in our emerging strategic challenges—how confident are you moving forward that our cyber capabilities are robust 

enough to take on the threats of the future? What level of risk are we assuming 

with our cyber community, and what do you consider an acceptable level of risk 

when it comes to our cyber capabilities? 

General MILLEY. 1) With regard to countering ISIL capability through digital 

technology, the Joint Force Headquarters Cyber has prepared and continues to prepare forces to respond, in support of Combatant Commanders, across the continuum 

of threats. DOD directed the creation of 133 Cyber Mission Force Teams of which 

the Army is responsible for creating 41 teams (37 Initial Operating Capability and 

11 Full Operating Capability). A portion of these teams are actively supporting U.S. 

Central Command operations. With regard to messaging strategy, Army Service 

Component Commands support the appropriate Combatant Command with synchronized messages and actions. 

2) The Army is building our cyber capabilities to neutralize and defeat the threats 

of the future. The Army’s cyber initiatives are synchronized with the Department 

of Defense. The Army is on track to build our portion of the Joint Cyber Mission 

Force. We have developed the Army Cyberspace Strategy that address our challenges and way forward from building the cyber force to industrial outreach. When 

assessing our risk to meet Combatant Commander and Departmental requirements, 

to date, the Army has met the demands for cyber forces and is meeting the Department’s cyber goals. However, the Army is concerned about the development of near- 
190 

peer cyber threats and the Army’s capability to be resilient to those attacks and negate the threats. In response to this concern, the Army developed a Cyber Strong 

Resiliency plan and continues to monitor its impact. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. FLEMING 

Dr. FLEMING. General Milley stated before the committee: ‘‘Less than one-third of 

Army forces are at acceptable readiness levels to conduct sustained ground combat 

in a full spectrum environment against a highly lethal hybrid threat or near-peer 

adversary.’’ He also testified before the committee stating that increased end 

strength would buy Army the time needed to mitigate its readiness shortfalls and 

alleviate the strain on the force due to the high OPSTEMPO. 

Is Army’s readiness adequate and its OPSTEMPO sustainable for meeting current 

and emerging requirements and how specifically would an increase in Army’s end 

strength mitigate the strain on the force and build the readiness over time needed 

to challenge a near-peer adversary like Russia? 

Mr. MURPHY and General MILLEY. The Army provides ready forces to meet Combatant Command requirements however, this comes at the expense of building core 

readiness required for future emergent and contingency demands. Current operations tempo, growing global instability, and lack of consistent and predictable funding over time will challenge the Army’s ability to regain and sustain the combined 

arms proficiency needed for future contingencies. 

An Army at 980,000 is at high military risk of being unable to meet Defense Planning Guidance requirements to defeat an adversary in one major combat operation 

while simultaneously denying the objectives of an adversary in a second theater. 

Dr. FLEMING. General Milley stated before the committee: ‘‘Less than one-third of 

Army forces are at acceptable readiness levels to conduct sustained ground combat 

in a full spectrum environment against a highly lethal hybrid threat or near-peer 

adversary.’’ He also testified before the committee stating that increased end 

strength would buy Army the time needed to mitigate its readiness shortfalls and 

alleviate the strain on the force due to the high OPSTEMPO. 

Dr. FLEMING. General Dunford recently testified that: ‘‘the Joint Force will be 

stressed to execute a major contingency operation,’’ and that a ‘‘response to aggression by another adversary at the same time would be further limited.’’ Please explain your assessment for how the Army in particular will be ‘‘stressed’’ and ‘‘limited’’ in these scenarios. In light of the ongoing changes in the strategic environment 

as it relates to ISIS, Russia, China, and North Korea, would Army recommend that 

the Department revisit its current force sizing construct for the Army? 

Mr. MURPHY and General MILLEY. If asked to respond to a single, major contingency operation involving high-intensity ground combat against a modernized adversary, the Army will be stressed. Given current global operational tempo, such a contingency may require use of unready forces, delayed timelines, excessive casualties, 

and the inability to achieve objectives. These risks are compounded for a second adversary, and the Army may be limited in how it is able to respond. 

Æ