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S. HRG. 109–1139 

REAUTHORIZATION OF THE 

PIPELINE SAFETY PROGRAM 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

NOVEMBER 16, 2006 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

TED STEVENS, Alaska, Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

CONRAD BURNS, Montana 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Co-Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

LISA J. SUTHERLAND, Republican Staff Director 

CHRISTINE DRAGER KURTH, Republican Deputy Staff Director 

KENNETH R. NAHIGIAN, Republican Chief Counsel 

MARGARET L. CUMMISKY, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SAMUEL E. WHITEHORN, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel 

LILA HARPER HELMS, Democratic Policy Director 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on November 16, 2006 ...................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Inouye .................................................................................. 2 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 2 

Statement of Senator Lautenberg .......................................................................... 13 

Statement of Senator Pryor .................................................................................... 51 

Statement of Senator Stevens ................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES

Barrett, Thomas J., Vice Admiral, USCG (Retired); Administrator, Pipeline 

and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, Department of Transportation ..................................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 4 

Bender, E. Frank, Vice President, Gas Distribution and New Business Division, Baltimore Gas and Electric Company; on behalf of the American 

Gas Association and the American Public Gas Association ............................. 42 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 44 

Boss, Terry, Senior Vice President, Environment, Safety and Operations, 

Interstate Natural Gas Association of America ................................................. 31 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 33 

Felt, Timothy, President/CEO, Explorer Pipeline Company; Member, American Petroleum Institute Pipeline Committee; and Vice Chairman/Treasurer-Elect, Association of Oil Pipe Lines ........................................................... 24 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 26 

Weimer, Carl, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety Trust .................................... 17 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 18 

APPENDIX

Barrett, Thomas H., Administrator, Department of Transportation, letter, 

dated December 4, 2006, to Hon. Jim DeMint .................................................. 55 

Peters, Hon. Mary E., Secretary of Transportation, letter, dated November 

28, 2006, to Hon. Ted Stevens ............................................................................ 56 

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to: 

Thomas J. Barrett ............................................................................................ 58 

E. Frank Bender ............................................................................................... 58 

Terry Boss ......................................................................................................... 59 

Timothy Felt ..................................................................................................... 60 

Carl Weimer ...................................................................................................... 61 

Sandherr, Stephen E., CEO, Associated General Contractors of America, prepared statement ................................................................................................... 56 

(1) 

REAUTHORIZATION OF THE 

PIPELINE SAFETY PROGRAM 

THURSDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 2006 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room SR– 

253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens, Chairman 

of the Committee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA 

The CHAIRMAN. We are here today to hear testimony on the reauthorization of the pipeline safety program. 

The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration has 

jurisdiction that covers approximately 160,000 miles of hazardous 

liquid interstate transmission pipelines, 305,000 miles of natural 

gas transmission pipelines, and 1.9 million miles of natural gas distribution pipelines throughout our Nation. Generally, this Administration is responsible for overseeing interstate transmission pipelines, while the states are responsible for monitoring the safety of 

intrastate pipelines. 

The state’s authority is delegated by the Administration to the 

intrastate pipelines safety offices. The Administration also allows 

state officials to act as agents in administering interstate pipeline 

safety programs excluding enforcement actions which are handled 

by the Administration directly for those sections of the interstate 

pipelines which are within a state’s boundaries. 

Now, pipelines are one of the safest forms of transportation, in 

most cases their safety records have steadily improved. Unfortunately, recent events in our State of Alaska demonstrate there is 

much that can be done. All of that, by the way, occurred in 22 

miles of pipe. 

In September, Senator Inouye, Senator Lott, Senator Lautenberg 

and I introduced legislation known as the PIPES Act to reauthorize 

and strengthen the Federal pipeline safety programs through the 

Fiscal Years 2007–2010. This comprehensive bill is based upon the 

draft pipeline safety authorization legislation submitted by the Administration, reports and testimony from the Government Accountability Office and the Department of Transportation Inspector General. In addition, representatives from the pipeline industry and 

pipeline safety advocate community, many of whom are represented by the witnesses here today, also provided valuable input 

and perspective. 

2 

The House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the 

House Energy and Commerce Committee are also working on pipeline safety legislation. A total of three hearings pertaining to pipeline safety were held in the House, and our Alaska delegation held 

a listening session in October on the overall topic in Alaska. 

I appreciate Vice Admiral Barrett and his staff for driving down 

to Anchorage to be with us at that listening session. It is my hope 

that the three of our committees can work together to develop a 

joint legislative product that both Chambers will pass this year. 

We’ve had contact with the House, and the House has been willing 

to work toward a bill prepared that it will be a joint bill that can 

pass in the first week of December. As far as I know, there are no 

political differences with regard to the goals of this bill so I hope 

that this hearing will produce the information we need to proceed 

to work with the House and to work out a bill before the first week 

in December. Senator Inouye? 

STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII 

Senator INOUYE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I hope 

that our presence here this morning would indicate to one and all 

that this is a bipartisan matter. That our energy supply depends 

on a safe and efficient pipeline system. The House has similar legislation, and time is of the essence. We hope to get this through 

right away. I ask that my statement be made part of the record. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Inouye follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE, U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII

Our Nation’s energy supply depends on a safe and efficient pipeline system. As 

we saw this summer in Alaska, pipeline disruptions can have a major impact on 

consumers. With this in mind, Chairman Stevens and I, together with Chairman 

Lott and Senator Lautenberg, approached the task of reauthorizing the Federal 

pipeline safety program with great care and keen interest. 

We met with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (Pipeline Administration) to review the Administration’s reauthorization proposal and listened to the interests and concerns of the pipeline industry and pipeline safety advocates. We then crafted S. 3961, the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, 

and Safety Act of 2006, known as the PIPES Act, this September. The bill builds 

upon the successes of the reauthorization in 2002 and all of the good work already 

done by the Office of Pipeline Safety and the Pipeline Administration over the past 

several years. Much of the bill comes from the Administration’s own proposal and 

refines the current Federal safety program to ensure that we have the safest and 

most dependable pipeline system in the world. 

Additionally, our bill takes several new steps to address areas of growing concern 

including the prevention of third-party damage, low-stress pipeline standards, 

human factors mitigation, and increased pipeline security and disaster recovery. 

Most importantly, the bill also significantly increases funding for pipeline safety inspectors and pipeline safety research, allowing us to double our efforts on these important fronts. 

I know many of the witnesses here represent different elements of our complex 

pipeline system and you each have different interests. I believe our legislation presents an excellent opportunity to strengthen our current system, and I hope that 

you will work with us toward this goal. I understand that the House Transportation 

and Infrastructure and Energy and Commerce Committees both have bills similar 

to ours and I look forward to working with them to quickly pass a bill into law as 

soon as the opportunity arises. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, it will be part of the 

record. The statements of the witnesses will be printed in full in 

3 

the record, we hope that you will summarize them to the extent 

that you can. Our first panel is just one person. Once again, Vice 

Admiral Thomas Barrett, retired. He’s the Administrator of the 

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. Thank 

you for appearing, we’d be pleased to have your statement. 

STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. BARRETT, VICE ADMIRAL, USCG 

(RETIRED); ADMINISTRATOR, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS 

MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF 

TRANSPORTATION 

Admiral BARRETT. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. Co-Chairman, 

thank you both for your opportunity to testify and for the leadership you’ve exhibited on this particular issue. I’m pleased to discuss your proposal to reauthorize the Federal Pipeline Safety Program. 

As you know, pipelines—as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman—are 

a safe way to transmit and transfer energy. But the data shows 

that we have an opportunity here to close some remaining gaps in 

the pipeline safety program and do a better job for the public in 

terms of ensuring that energy can be transmitted across our country safely. 

It’s abundantly clear at this time that the risk posed by construction-related damage to underground gas distribution systems is 

growing. In fact, it’s the only area where our safety trends are 

headed in the wrong direction. It is the leading cause of pipeline 

accidents in which people are killed or seriously hurt. And that’s 

why I ask for your help in passing this legislation now. 

On a daily basis I see reports reflecting incidents on gas distribution pipelines. These distribution pipelines are located where the 

majority of American families live, where schools are located. Recently, for example, in Oklahoma, a residential developer using 

Earth-moving equipment struck a natural gas pipeline and caused 

the evacuation of a nearby elementary school. Over 14,000 schools 

nationwide, from elementary through colleges, are located near distribution pipelines. And in my judgment, the safety margin between a precautionary evacuation of a school and tragedy following 

an incident is not adequate. 

We need to cut these incidents off better, up-front. And we believe the best approach, as proposed by the Administration and reflected in your Committee proposal is to support our state partners 

who oversee nearly 1.7 million miles of distribution pipeline systems with incentives that would raise the cap on grants to their 

agencies from 50 percent to 80 percent over 6 years, an incentive 

approach coupled with stronger civil enforcement authority. And 

we need this authority to be successful, and the states need it. 

The benefits of this enhanced authority and enhanced damage 

prevention programs will benefit oil and gas distribution lines and 

the gas distribution system in particular. 

I would invite your attention and maybe we can turn that picture 

so you can see it, I was up recently at Baltimore Gas & Electric, 

this is a picture—can you see all right, sir? This is what the underground looks like—you have telecommunications, you have water, 

you have gas, you have sewer all in very compacted areas. In this 

case, you had a telecommunication line run across the top of a gas 

4 

line. That runs the risk of taking the coating off the line. Perhaps, 

eventually—had it not been discovered, leading to a failure and the 

resultant risk of breach. 

And the benefits of preventing distribution problems, the OneCall systems, the incentive programs, better state enforcement, run 

to not simply the gas lines, but they run to everybody in that underground—the telecommunications industry, they run to the 

water supply, they run to the sewer lines—you will have less disruption, less accidents, less traffic jams, if we are able to move this 

program forward successfully, to say nothing of less safety risks to 

life and property. 

I particularly appreciate the Committee’s attention also, to better 

leadership accountability. I think that is a key way of improving 

the emphasis on the accuracy and the data that are reported to the 

Federal Government, and allows us to assess and get at problems. 

I particularly appreciate your personal leadership on that. I think 

it’s key to involve senior corporate leadership in understanding the 

conditions that are reflected in their own organizations and what 

they report to us. 

I would point out as you indicated, that the core reauthorization 

concepts are supported very broadly across our stakeholder community. And as you indicated there are—as far as we can tell—this 

is a bipartisan issue, it is a fundamental safety issue. And I believe 

that the core concepts in the Senate provision as you work out 

issues with the House are fundamentally sound. And I am hopeful 

that with your support, we will be able to bring this to a successful 

conclusion. 

I assure the members of the Committee, that the Administration, 

Secretary Peters and the men and women of PHMSA draw on your 

strong personal and Committee commitment to improving the safety, the liability and public confidence in our Nation’s pipeline infrastructure safety. I appreciate the opportunity to be here, and I 

would be pleased to answer any questions that you have for me. 

Thank you, sir. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Barrett follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF THOMAS J. BARRETT, VICE ADMIRAL, USCG (RETIRED); 

ADMINISTRATOR, PIPELINE AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

I. Introduction 

Chairman Stevens, Co-Chairman Inouye, members of the Committee, thank you 

for the invitation to appear today to discuss your proposal to reauthorize the Federal program our Nation depends on to maintain safety in its energy pipeline network. I very much appreciate the Committee’s interest in pipeline safety and I am 

pleased to provide my testimony on your proposal and the need to pass a reauthorization bill this year. 

I believe your bill embodies key concepts that will help us reach our goal of eliminating pipeline safety incidents. It provides a solid foundation for the energy transportation infrastructure we need to continue our strong economic growth into the 

future. 

Your bill addresses the most important safety concern we face—the growing rate 

of construction-related pipeline accidents, driven by a growing economy. These accidents, the leading cause of pipeline-related injuries and deaths, can and must be 

prevented. To do so, we need to strengthen the ability and authority of the states 

and ourselves to address these safety issues. That is why we need reauthorization 

now. 

5 

II. Why Two Issues Matter More Than Any Others 

In the past few years, PHMSA has taken a hard look at incidents, their causes 

and what can be done to prevent them. Issue number one is crystal clear—the leading cause of incidents in which people are hurt or killed is construction-related activities that cause an immediate rupture or damage which later grows to failure. 

Construction related damages on gas distribution systems has increased at a rate 

of 50 percent from 1996 to 2005 and will continue to get worse if we don’t do something about it. These gas distribution systems run through the neighborhoods where 

people live and work and, even more concerning near our children’s schools. Just 

last week a careless residential developer using Earth-moving equipment, ruptured 

a natural gas pipeline and caused the evacuation of an elementary school in Oklahoma. Over 14,000 schools nationwide, including elementary and secondary schools, 

are located in the vicinity of pipelines. Fortunately, this school and its community 

experienced only an evacuation and a temporary suspension of natural gas service. 

It could have been worse. Reducing the frequency and community impacts of incidents such as this receives the foremost attention of PHMSA and our closest partners in public safety, state pipeline safety agencies. The natural gas pipeline distribution network is almost entirely under the jurisdiction of states. 

Where operators are improving their pipeline safety performance, the gains come 

because operators are managing pipeline safety based on system risk. Clearly, to 

make a difference in saving lives, we must minimize damage to pipelines and other 

underground utilities, associated with construction related activity. Construction 

damage is almost always preventable and we have worked to find practices that will 

eliminate this problem. The challenge is managing this activity without damaging 

a very crowded underground infrastructure—one that gets more crowded everyday, 

not just with pipelines but new telecommunications, electric, water and sewer, and 

other infrastructure. 

The photo below is a depiction of this crowded infrastructure and the very problem we’re continuing to face. The photo shows an instance in which an operator discovered newly installed fiber optic lines directly over its natural gas pipeline. In this 

case, One-Call was not contacted and the operator was unaware of construction taking place in the vicinity of its pipeline. 

Several states including Virginia and Minnesota have led the way with strong 

damage prevention programs and have seen up to 50 percent reductions in this and 

other construction-related damages. We need to prioritize the resources for pipeline 

safety to be sure that our state partners have sufficient resources to share responsibility with us in getting this job done. The Committee’s proposal recognizes this 

need by adopting important concepts which the Administration forwarded, including 


bar1.eps
6 

new civil enforcement authority, incentives for states to improve their damage prevention programs, technology grants to advance the safety and efficiency of the OneCall notification process, and more funding for state pipeline safety programs. 

The following chart from a PHMSA report gives a picture of the progress possible 

with a strong enforcement program. There are degrees of success with enforcement 

and two model states, Virginia and Minnesota both have fewer than 3 damages per 

1,000 One-Call tickets by enforcing the practice of calling before digging. (A ‘‘OneCall’’ ticket is a record of receipt by a state agency of a notice of the caller’s intention to excavate.) 

Issue number two is helping states more. We need new authority to address this 

concern by establishing a grant program to encourage states to develop effective 

damage prevention programs. State agencies and PHMSA would also gain authority 

to conduct civil enforcement actions against anyone who fails to contact ‘‘One-Call’’ 

prior to digging. Our focus, however, will continue to be placed on state enforcement. 

Ensuring the safety of 2.3 million miles of pipelines is an enormous task. Our 

state partners oversee 90 percent of operator compliance with pipeline safety regulations. We seek to raise the cap on grants provided to state pipeline agencies over 

6 years from 50 percent to 80 percent to offset the increasing cost of the programs 

they execute, consistent with the programs of the Department. State agencies do 

utilize PHMSA’s national regulatory pipeline safety standards to inspect the majority of the pipeline infrastructure and we increasingly invest in state training and 

decision-support as we function as a coordinated workforce. We need them, and they 

need our help to be most effective. 

III. Senate Reauthorization Proposal 

Your proposal incorporates the Administration’s proposed core safety improvements to address these top two issues—additional authority to extend effective enforcement of state ‘‘one-call’’ laws to any violator and improve damage prevention 

programs through greater incentives, and additional authority to strengthen state 

oversight of distribution pipelines generally. 

Your proposal also addresses a third issue, the importance of a strong and resilient energy transportation infrastructure. Americans depend on pipeline transportation for the safe movement of the vast majority of critical energy supplies. Over 

97 percent of the Nation’s transportation energy needs are met by petroleum products, and 64 percent of these energy products are moved through America’s pipeline 

networks. The system is near capacity all the time. 

Your proposal would authorize the Administration’s proposed petroleum transportation capacity study, intended to identify limitations in the pipeline network that 

could adversely affect supply. This is important to improving our understanding of 

how to protect strategic energy supplies, a question that has been of increasing concern in recent months. 


bar2.eps
7 

In times of emergencies, a lack of redundancy and system capacity makes it important for PHMSA to work along with our state partners and other Federal agencies to assure that energy product transportation is not interrupted. Last year’s devastating Gulf Coast storms taught us lessons about the vulnerability of pipelines to 

natural and man-made disasters. We believe we can help minimize pipeline system 

disruption while maintaining safe operations. To clarify our objective, we sought authority in the statute to address the need for PHMSA coordination within the Federal family to assist with recovery of the energy infrastructure. In the years to come, 

we hope to contribute to increasing the resiliency of this infrastructure. 

Your Committee’s proposal reflects significant bipartisan collaboration on a range 

of proposals, some of which have been offered by the Administration and some 

which have not. We believe that the Administration’s interests would be best served 

by passage of a bill this year, and we do not believe that any one or the combination 

of provisions we did not propose presents a serious concern. Some of the provisions 

are welcome additions. 

We support the initiative on executive certification of integrity management performance. This places an increased emphasis on the importance and accuracy of performance reporting. To get the results we want out of pipeline operators, we need 

to increase management’s accountability and place additional attention on the importance of having more precise information to target safety risks. 

We strongly favor a systems-based approach to assessing and managing safety related risk, especially as the risks to large infrastructure systems, like pipelines, 

often change over time. We expect to see increasing results from our effective systems risk management approach, which this committee helped devise. For integrity 

management programs to be effective, operators must be free to focus on making 

the best use of information as it becomes available. This must be a dynamic process 

in which the operator is able to deploy attention and resources against the greatest 

risks, worst first. 

In keeping with this approach, we urge the Committee to grant the Secretary 

broader authority to adjust the inspection intervals for natural gas pipelines on the 

basis of risk factors. Reliance on prescribed 7 year retest intervals as established 

in current law goes against this process. It seems a disincentive to the continuous 

evaluation and readjustment of a dynamic systems approach that is a basic element 

of an ongoing ‘‘whole-health’’ review of a pipeline system. The goal is to regularly 

and systematically utilize the most current information about the pipeline system 

so that it may be maintained to operate safely in the best condition for the longest 

amount of time. We believe that if the Secretary determines that pipeline safety will 

be enhanced by establishing risk-based reassessment intervals, the Secretary should 

be able to issue rules establishing criteria for reassessing natural gas pipeline facilities on shorter and longer intervals not exceeding 10 years. 

In issuing such rules, the Secretary should be able to consider all significant risk 

factors, including, but not limited to, design, fabrication, and environmental and operating conditions. The Secretary should be able to determine the pipelines to which 

these rules apply. For a pipeline to be subject to a reassessment interval in excess 

of 7 years, we would consider as a prerequisite that the pipeline is operating under 

an integrity management program that has been reviewed by the Department or an 

authorized state agency and a determination is made that the operator is providing 

appropriate risk analysis and control. 

Your proposal would also require DOT to impose standards for low-stress liquid 

transmission lines. Although we already have a notice of proposed rulemaking on 

this subject, we have not determined yet whether covering more pipeline mileage 

and imposing more requirements can be justified by cost/benefit analysis. We have 

this matter under consideration and would appreciate having flexibility for the Secretary to make an appropriate decision to maximize protection of public safety, the 

environment and the reliability of energy supply. 

Another provision would require DOT to develop standards to address risks associated with pipeline control operations and would require some limitation on hours 

of service. In keeping with our systems risk management philosophy, we believe operators should have flexibility to develop their own systems plans to assess pipeline 

control management risks associated with human factors. We find this provision 

limits the development of risk control measures to certain prescribed solutions. We 

believe the Secretary should have more flexibility to consider the need for procedures, processes and other system measures to ensure effective performance in pipeline control functions, communication, information exchange, warning, or management of controller schedules and rest periods. 

We appreciate the Committee’s leadership in recognizing the importance of several other issues, such as pipeline security and incident recovery; corrosion research; 

the advancement of national consensus standards; and inspection and enforcement 

8 

staffing. These provisions can each strengthen the Department’s hand in meeting 

the growing challenges of pipeline safety. The Administration is making progress in 

pipeline security and incident recovery through the Department’s and Department 

of Homeland Security’s Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and PHMSA and 

TSA’s recently implemented annex to the MOU. We appreciate the concern about 

the need to plan to build a workforce for building pipelines in the future, and we 

will be happy to work with the Congress on making use of existing programs within 

the government. 

We would be concerned that the added costs of the provisions significantly exceed 

that of the Administration’s proposal. We would be pleased to work with the Committee to ensure appropriate fiscal controls and accountability are provided in any 

mechanism for recovering extraordinary inspection expenses. Perhaps the Congress 

also should consider providing for a more equitable distribution of cost over the entire pipeline industry, instead of limiting the burden to the transmission industry. 

The vast majority of the benefits of this proposal, if authorized, accrue for the first 

time to the distribution segment of the pipeline industry. 

IV. Conclusion 

Over the past 5 years we have seen a steady decline in the leading causes of pipeline failures, with the exception of construction damage in distribution systems. We 

need to step up our efforts to address this problem. Each of the authorizing committees with jurisdiction over the pipeline safety program has developed a proposal for 

reauthorizing the program for the years 2007–2010. Each of the proposals incorporates the Administration’s core safety reforms—strengthening the ability of states 

to address our most serious safety concerns. The similarities are much more significant than the differences. 

We understand that some efforts are being made to reconcile differences among 

the bills at the Committee level, with the hope that a single proposal could be voted 

on in both Houses before the end of the session. We ask Congress to pass a reauthorization bill this year, focusing on the key similarities among the bills. 

As important as a reauthorization bill will be for the enhancement of pipeline 

safety, especially natural gas distribution lines, benefits of a final bill would extend 

far beyond pipelines. Indirectly, additional customers of a reauthorized pipeline 

safety program include other stakeholders in America’s underground infrastructure, 

the electric, telecommunications, water and sewer and other industries. 

The following chart shows the rate of which one of our leading states in underground damage prevention receives locate requests from utility sectors not related 

to pipelines—over 80 percent. Strengthening the Nation’s pipeline safety program 

to include increased resources for states will ensure the safety of not only pipelines, 

but the underground infrastructure owned and operated by these utilities as well. 

I assure the members of this committee, that the Administration, Secretary 

Peters, and the dedicated men and women of PHMSA share your strong commitment to improving safety, reliability, and public confidence in our Nation’s pipeline 

infrastructure. 

Like you, we understand the importance of our mission to the safety of our citizens and the energy reliability and continued economic growth of our great Nation. 

I would be pleased to answer any questions you may have. 

Thank you. 


bar3.eps
9 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much. Are there any developing new technologies that will be put into place into pipelines to 

increase the safety of them? 

Admiral BARRETT. There are multiple technologies, Senator, and 

we have a quite robust research and development program— 

partnered with industry, I might add—on a cost-sharing basis to 

bring those forward. They are extensive in the areas of corrosion 

detection and prevention in terms of assessing the condition of the 

pipelines, and in terms of maintaining the integrity of the system. 

Our key program, as you know, is integrity management, so in 

terms of understanding the condition of the lines, you are very familiar with the pigging, the inline inspection devices, making those 

devices able to detect better the conditions of the internal portions 

of the lines as well as external corrosion, is enormously important. 

And as technologies are coming forward, we will continue to push 

for them. 

The CHAIRMAN. The 2002 Act required regulations to be issued 

by your agency, and operators were required to complete their initial baseline assessments within 10 years of that Act and to reassess the lines not less than 7 years on an ongoing basis. Do you 

believe that that Act has been followed so far? 

Admiral BARRETT. Yes, sir. The baseline assessments are progressing quite well, more than 50 percent of them are completed, 

the others are moving forward timely. I do not believe that the 

mandatory 7 year assessment is the most desirable approach—I 

would prefer that the assessment interval be based on an ongoing 

system risk analysis of the line and as an agency also we would 

be prepared to address that through waiver provisions on a caseby-case basis if we have to. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have that power now, to have a waiver? 

Admiral BARRETT. We do, sir. And we can exercise it—it is more 

resource intensive, it’s a company-by-company, specific -by-specific 

approach—it’s more burdensome on the particular company and on 

us, I’d rather have a set of standard criteria, but yes sir, we do 

have that authority. 

The CHAIRMAN. One of the provisions of our bill would prohibit 

that future exercise of that power to exempt operators from the 7 

year assessment, do you object to that? 

Admiral BARRETT. Yes sir, I would. I would want the ability to 

exercise the waiver authority where it’s suitable, because from a 

safety management point-of-view, I believe some flexibility is desirable. 

The CHAIRMAN. Why would we want to exempt them altogether 

from a reassessment? 

Admiral BARRETT. From a reassessment, no. I believe you absolutely have to have a reassessment. The integrity management program fundamentally requires, on an annual basis, that an operator 

look at the condition of their lines and determine where the greatest safety risks are and address those risks in a timely manner and 

we oversee that. And in some cases that—all I was saying is 7 

years may not be the right interval—in some cases it might need 

to be earlier, in other cases it could well be later, as much as, say, 

10 years. 

10 

The CHAIRMAN. I understood that you did object to that, all that 

really does is prohibit you from exempting any operator from the 

7 year reassessment. 

Admiral BARRETT. Maybe I misunderstood your question. 

The CHAIRMAN. I’d appreciate it if you’d take a look at that because we heard that you disagreed with it, but I don’t know why. 

I understand you’re working on a low-stress pipeline rule and 

you have a proposed rulemaking with regard to, not all low-stress 

pipelines, but to some. The bill that the four of us have introduced 

would require you to regulate a wider portion of the pipeline industry, particularly low-stress pipeline. What are your thoughts on 

that? 

Admiral BARRETT. Sir, as you know, we have proposed regulating 

a portion of those lines, including the type of lines that BP operated up at Prudhoe Bay, the low-stress transmission lines and 

gathering lines. We received a fairly broad range of comments in 

response, our rulemaking period just closed November 6th. The 

commentary ranges from, what we proposed is too stringent and 

should not include mandatory cleaning or pigging requirements on 

one end, to another end that says we should regulate every lowstress line in the country and we are in the process of evaluating 

those comments right now. And obviously we will, early next year, 

bring forth a final ruling in that regard. But we are still evaluating 

the comments we received. 

The CHAIRMAN. Those 16 miles of transit lines were actually 

high-stress pipelines but they’re operated at a low-stress pressure 

level. 

Admiral BARRETT. Yes sir, that’s correct. 

The CHAIRMAN. They were exempt, then, by means of operation 

in spite of the fact that they were designed for higher stress. 

Admiral BARRETT. Yes, sir. Our rules exempt lines that are operated at less than 20 percent of the maximum operating rated 

strength of the lines. 

The CHAIRMAN. Why? 

Admiral BARRETT. Again, because of the perceived risk prior to 

this summer of those lines. We had started a rulemaking proposal 

to bring those lines under regulation about 2 years ago, and we’re 

working that forward. Our view was not that they didn’t need more 

oversight, but that was not the agency’s highest priority, we were 

more concerned with getting at lines where there was a demonstrated greater safety risk to life and the performance record on 

lines of that type prior to this summer was relatively—I use that 

term—relatively, better. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I’m still mystified by what happened up 

our way that the very fact that there are so many miles and it’s 

just those 16 miles which were low-pressure which built up the corrosion which led to the leaks. Now, what you’re saying is, is if they 

operate at a low enough pressure, we don’t pay any attention to 

them. Why? 

Admiral BARRETT. Again, I’m not saying that we not pay any attention to it, we had not gotten a regulatory package in place on 

those lines prior to the BP spills. 

But what I’d also say, too, and you’re of course very familiar with 

this—we also, frankly, would not have expected anybody to not 

11 

clean lines like that regularly, to not pig lines like that regularly. 

The standard of care exercised by BP on those lines was surprisingly well below what we typically see elsewhere in the industry. 

And the history of failures on lines like that, it has been modest 

in terms of oil spills or damage. And we were discouraged, and 

frankly it’s a mystery to me why BP in contrast to other operators 

up there, did not maintain those lines better. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, I’ve taken up to the North Slope of Alaska 

over the years, probably the entire Senate at one time or another, 

and we got briefings about all of the safety programs and how all 

of these things were pigged and how there was this maintenance, 

and yet here these 16 miles of lines which carry the basic product 

after they’ve gone through the conditioning plants to the big pipeline, not only did they not pig it, but they didn’t have a shunt to 

take out any material that gathered in that pipeline, in those pipelines before they had a pig pipeline. 

Admiral BARRETT. Yes, sir, that’s correct. 

The CHAIRMAN. And one of the reasons for the low pressure was 

that they didn’t want to try to push that stuff so it actually went 

into the big pipeline, because they would have had liability in the 

big pipeline if something happened. But I really don’t understand 

a system that allows the operator to determine regulations simply 

by the amount of pressure. 

Admiral BARRETT. Again, it was relatively—in the Agency’s judgment—a relatively lower risk. There’s the risk of failure to the line 

at lower pressure is less than the risk of failure on a line operating 

at high pressure, near its maximum operating strength. Particularly, as you always run the risk of some type of overpressure in 

a line that could test the rated strength of the line. So the pressure 

is one of the factors that affects the integrity of the line, or the risk 

that the line would fail, as will corrosion as you earlier mentioned. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well there was some indication that at times 

that pressure may have been increased in order to do some cleaning of the line instead of pigging, did you know that? 

Admiral BARRETT. Not specifically for that purpose, I know when 

you start-up a line or shut it down you may see some modest fluctuation around the pressure, so you might have seen a small bump 

on start-up, but not specifically for the purpose that you mentioned, I’m not aware of that. 

The CHAIRMAN. Our bill will allow low-stress pipelines to be 

mapped in the National Pipeline Mapping System, and comply with 

regulations in place for other pipelines with respect to instant reporting. Have you looked at that provision? 

Admiral BARRETT. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you agree with that? 

Admiral BARRETT. We support that. Yes, sir, we do. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Inouye? 

Senator INOUYE. In the year 2000, the El Paso Pipeline had a 

terrible accident. 

Admiral BARRETT. Yes, sir. 

Senator INOUYE. And the Pipeline agency announced a $2.5 million fine, but apparently nothing has happened to it. Can you tell 

us what happened? 

12 

Admiral BARRETT. Yes, sir, I can. And that’s not completely 

closed, but the Agency’s penalty, if you will, is wrapped into a 

broader approach with the Department of Justice in terms of a 

more macro-settlement of issues related to that incident. Our penalty became wrapped up in a larger penalty settlement. I can provide the specifics on it, but I don’t believe that is quite settled out 

yet. 

Senator INOUYE. Do you think there should be better transparency? 

Admiral BARRETT. I think that transparency is always welcome, 

I strongly support it, and one of our objectives certainly is to improve the transparency of enforcement and inspection results generally so that everybody knows where we are taking enforcement 

actions and what the ultimate outcomes are. And we have recently 

posted up on our website better information on our enforcement 

record over the last 5 years, shows a steadily increasing use of that 

authority. It has about quadrupled over the last 5 years, but we 

will be looking to make our actions more transparent and more 

traceable. I take your point, though, I agree with you. 

Senator INOUYE. On the National Pipeline Mapping System, 

there are those who say you should do away with it, others say let’s 

have it because otherwise states would have to bear the burden. 

What are your thoughts? 

Admiral BARRETT. I think the mapping system is essential for 

several reasons. First, it’s a terrific aid to local, county-level community planning efforts. And if you’re deciding where to put in a 

new subdivision, where to locate a school, I think both local officials and quite frankly the public needs to understand what lines 

are running through those neighborhoods, and generally where 

those lines are. 

Post-9/11, obviously the security of the national energy infrastructure and knowledge about key nodes on those systems and on 

a national level knowing where all of those lines are poses a security risk. We have been working closely—I’ve been working with 

Kip Hawley and TSA to find a way to reconcile both of these needs. 

But I think both, in terms of community planning and, by the way, 

we’re fairly close to finding ways to accommodate that and also protecting our security interests—I think the mapping system provides 

substantial benefit to the public, and also to local planning and 

state planning officials. And I think the lines, as you know, in some 

cases are simply at a state level, but in many cases they are interstate. And I believe, to use your word, Senator, transparency to the 

extent it’s consistent with security, is very helpful. 

Senator INOUYE. Mr. Chairman, may I submit a couple of questions? 

The CHAIRMAN. Go ahead. Oh, you want to submit them. The 

Senator wishes to submit some questions to the record, he’d appreciate it if you could respond to them. 

Admiral BARRETT. Absolutely, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lautenberg? 

13 

STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes, thanks Mr. Chairman for holding this 

really timely hearing as we see the capacity requirements for moving our energy supplies increasing fairly rapidly. And we in New 

Jersey had a terrible incident in 1994, residents of Edison, New 

Jersey, fast asleep, suddenly a gas pipeline exploded and sent fire 

nearly 400 feet into the sky. And the Mayor of the town recalled 

that it was daylight at midnight, the fire consumed 8 apartment 

buildings, left 128 families with no homes, sent some 1,500 men, 

women and children fleeing into the night. Just this past August, 

I understand, Mr. Chairman, you discussed the BP spill up in 

Prudhoe Bay, and with Prudhoe Bay producing some 400,000 barrels of oil a day. And this summer when we’re faced with a major 

oil supply shortage due to severe corrosion in the pipeline for maintenance and inspection seemed out of sync with what it was that 

we could have done to prevent that. 

Now that private companies own and operate so many of these 

pipelines that bring natural gas to us and these pipelines supply 

25 percent of the energy that we use in the United States. So, if 

anything, the last decade has demonstrated that strong Federal 

regulations can lead to better pipeline safety, stronger industry, 

safer homes and offices for everyone. And I’m pleased to be a cosponsor of the PIPES Act that, Mr. Chairman, you and Senator 

Inouye have authored, affording introduction of new technology, excess flow valves for new or replacement pipes. These valves automatically shut off when there’s a line that’s ruptured to help prevent injury, protect property and most importantly, save lives. So, 

I hope our colleagues will support this bill and Admiral Barrett, 

thanks for being here today. 

When we look out at things and we, I’m sure, can’t possibly see 

reductions in the need for increased capacity, so how do we continue to expand that capacity? Do we just, exchange sizes of pipe 

or lay pipe alongside the—what do we do to keep up with this, even 

as we make sure that the pipelines that we presently have, have 

the capability and are operating in the most efficient manner? 

Admiral BARRETT. Senator, thank you. And I do appreciate, sincerely, your support for this bill. 

I think you need to do several things, and the list I would give 

you is not exhaustive. One solution we recently took action on, was 

to allow some new construction pipelines to operate at higher operating pressure, and that is, instead of limiting them to 70 percent 

of their maximum operating strength, allow them to operate at 80 

percent, which allows the line to carry more capacity, these are gas 

lines we’re talking about. But that was conditioned on new materials, new design, construction oversight and agreements on operating practices and procedures and inspection. So by providing a 

more rigorous, if you will, regime, we were able to issue waivers 

to let some newly constructed lines operate at higher pressure. So 

that was on the margins, but 6 or 7 percent more product moving 

through a line is very positive. So that’s one approach. 

I think we have to work more broadly and more closely with all 

communities, if you will, that are affected by new lines so that they 

can be put in with the assurance that they can be operated safely. 

14 

And by that I mean, we have an agreement and we work with the 

National Association of State Fire Marshals, we’re working with 

the fire services, first responders, we do support and have— 

through hazmat grant programs helped to train first responders, 

but fundamentally to, through a public process, understand the 

risks to an area of bringing in new lines, and then provide a vehicle to manage those risks safely. And I believe that the job of pipeline safety with the support of this committee, the types of things 

we’re talking about in this bill, the damage prevention programs 

with our state partners, can manage the risks in a way that will 

allow these developments to go forward with more confidence that 

they do not pose an unacceptable risk for our schools or our Nation. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Admiral Barrett, I’m sure that the physical ability to do these, to increase pipelines and increase capacity 

can be found, but the community resistance to these things is yet 

another major problem. Especially where there has been an incident along the way in a state or a town and people see what kind 

of a threat this poses. And I can tell you, we’ve tried to help companies put more pipe down and improve efficiency, and it’s a battle 

of major proportions. 

Admiral BARRETT. Senator, I could not agree with you more, and 

to take Senator Inouye’s word, though, I believe what can help 

most is transparency, transparency in where the lines are, what 

the benefits are that they provide, what the risks are and how 

those risks can be managed. 

You have a witness later, Carl Weimer from Pipeline Safety 

Trust, I was recently down in New Orleans at their annual meeting, I was up in Bellingham at the site of a tragedy up there, similar to the one you mention in New Jersey. I met with the families 

involved, and the commitment I gave them was that I understand 

how tragic these incidents can be. And I am committed, and this 

agency is committed to doing everything we can to ensure lines operate safely. And I think that’s the assurance that we have to be 

able to provide communities, and to get there, is to have honest 

dialogue and robust dialogue about the concerns they have and 

how we would propose to address them. 

And I agree with you, it is not an easy process. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I would propose your presence when we 

have these town meetings, I think. 

Admiral BARRETT. I would be delighted to that, and—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I don’t know whether you’ll be delighted— 

you’re nice to volunteer, but that’s true of your background. 

Admiral BARRETT. Senator, I do think we have to listen and understand. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. You have the jurisdiction under the 

PHMSA as it is to issue technical assistance grants to local communities, have you done any? 

Admiral BARRETT. Not specifically, and I believe there are provisions in some of the bills that would actually require us to do some 

demonstration grants. And part of the issue is devising criteria to 

make those grants smart and effective. And I believe we would 

support having a provision that would allow us to do some demonstrations, determine if they’re effective, and go forward. 

15 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Hard to understand why something like 

that couldn’t be expedited, especially if we’re turning more to the 

states and the localities to participate more actively. 

Your testimony calls for restoring public access, Senator Inouye 

talked about transparency to the National Pipeline Mapping System. Do you believe there are any valid security-related concerns 

about making that information more widely available? 

Admiral BARRETT. Yes, sir, I do. We met with TSA and depending on how much fidelity is provided in the information and what 

type of information, but I think there’s a way to balance those security concerns that are legitimate and they are serious in some 

cases. But nonetheless, I believe on a local level we can provide the 

information that community planners and community citizens 

need, and we are working closely with TSA to achieve that. And 

TSA, by the way, I would add, is supportive of finding a way to 

meet the public information need, at the same time protecting the 

legitimate security concerns. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Chairman, I think it’s awful tough to have 

transparency, full knowledge in the communities without having 

those we do not like to see the map be able to see it. So, there are 

a compliment of problems here. I, for one, can’t see how we can bypass the communities in terms of that information. 

Mr. Chairman, thanks very much for having this hearing. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral BARRETT. thank you, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral one of the things that came out of our 

listening session in Alaska was that the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline, 

because of some apparent action and the Pipeline having become 

a conductor for induced electrical current, developed a series of 

grounds so that that current could not lead like electrolysis to affect any water that might be inside the pipeline. As we looked at 

these transit lines, they were supposed to have been cleaned by the 

cleaning plants, and the oil in the transit line is supposed to be 

free of gas and water and sludge. However, all three built-up in 

those transit lines, and the question has been asked, why doesn’t 

your Administration look at the problem of this concept of induced 

electricity and the possibility of electrolysis having something to do 

with the erosion and corrosion inside the pipeline that lead to the 

leaked sections we had? 

Admiral BARRETT. Senator, I think you’re correct but we do. I 

think electrolysis-electrochemical reactions obviously are a risk of 

corrosion in any line, and in northern latitudes, you also have the 

possible, the telluric-type current effect from things like the Aurora. That has been an issue on the Trans-Alaska Pipeline. 

I met, about 2 weeks ago, with Dr. Wong to talk about how we 

could get a better handle on that type of risk with respect to northern latitude pipelines in general. But it is an area that warrants 

attention and research and it is one that is actively looked at. But 

I agree with you that it’s an area we will—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Are you going to pursue that? I think the Aurora 

comes down to, or Canada comes down to the northern part of what 

we call the South 48 states, but beyond that, some of it could be 

induced just from electrical storms. 

16 

Admiral BARRETT. Yes, sir. And we are going to pursue the further research in some appropriate way in that area, and I also intend to talk to the State of Alaska about it as well, because they 

obviously have some concerns, particularly in northern latitudes. 

The CHAIRMAN. My last question—are you going to do anything 

about putting additional burdens on states? After all, they are 

monitoring the vast majority of the pipelines in this country, not 

you. They only come to you when there’s a problem. But are you 

going to put them on notice of additional requirements if they are 

going to be delegated the right, as you do now, you delegate your 

authority under the law to the states. 

Admiral BARRETT. We delegate a lot of authority to them, we do 

assess how strong their programs are and as you know this proposal would not simply strengthen their enforcement authority on 

damage prevention. But we’re also looking to increase the grants 

authority from up to as much as 80 percent to help better resource 

them to execute the programs that they help us do. We view them 

very much as partners, and I believe they view us the same way. 

And as you indicated, they have more than three times, three and 

a half times the number of inspectors that the Federal Government 

does, and it’s absolutely essential that our inspections and enforcement actions be coordinated. 

But, fundamentally, also they are closer to the problems in many 

cases, certainly the gas distribution line issue that Senator Lautenberg mentioned, they’re going to be closer to it in many cases, 

they’ll get quicker, smarter solutions than we could from a little 

distance back. So, our goal would be to strengthen their programs, 

but also with the help of the Congress, provide additional resources 

to back-stop them. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for your testimony, Admiral, I appreciate it and look forward to working with you on the 

subject, we hope to get you a bill before the Congress recesses. 

Admiral BARRETT. Senator, thank you very much, Mr. Co-Chairman, thank you, Senator Lautenberg, thank you for coming in and 

I look forward to working with you all the time. Thanks, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Our second panel is Mr. Carl Weimer, he is the 

Executive Director of the Pipeline Safety Trust of Bellingham, 

Washington, Mr. Timothy Felt, the President and CEO of the Explorer Pipeline Company of Tulsa, Oklahoma, he’s speaking on behalf of the Association of Oil Pipe Lines and the American Petroleum Institute. Third witness is Mr. Terry Boss, Senior Vice President for Environment, Safety and Operations to the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America and Mr. Frank Bender, Vice President of Gas Distribution and New Business Division of Baltimore 

Gas and Electric Company in Baltimore, Maryland on behalf of the 

American Gas Association and American Public Gas Association. 

Gentlemen, we appreciate your courtesy in coming to be with us 

today. This hearing is necessary in order that we may move our 

bill, and we would appreciate your statements as I indicated, your 

statements will be printed in the record in full, we look forward to 

your comments. Mr. Weimer, may we call on you first, please. 

17 

STATEMENT OF CARL WEIMER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

PIPELINE SAFETY TRUST 

Mr. WEIMER. Yes, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, 

thank you for inviting me to speak here today on the important 

subject of pipeline safety. 

The Pipeline Safety Trust came into being after the Olympic 

Pipeline tragedy in Bellingham that left three young people dead, 

killed every living thing in a beautiful salmon stream, and caused 

millions of dollars of economic disruption. Similar tragedies have 

happened in other places before and since the Bellingham tragedy. 

I’d like to start this morning by saying we’re quite pleased with 

S. 3961 and we want to thank you for bringing it forward. In our 

opinion, there are many things in it that will increase pipeline 

safety. Just to mention some of our favorites, we support the provisions in the Senate bill regarding low-stress pipelines. We support 

the inclusion in the Senate bill that requires an executive signature 

on integrity management reports. We support the 1-year requirement for the development of integrity management standards for 

gas distribution systems, and we support the language in the Senate bill which requires PHMSA to electronically post monthly summaries of its enforcement actions. 

The House Energy and Commerce bill provided language that 

provides operators the opportunity to provide response to PHMSA 

enforcement actions, to better illustrate both sides of the enforcement story. This only seems fair, and we hope the Committee will 

adopt this and additional enforcement transparency language as 

well. 

We support the language in the Senate bill which would authorize technical assistance grants to communities and provide PHMSA 

incentive to move demonstrations of this program forward sooner 

rather than later. There is one small change of an item already in 

the bill which we think would make the bill even stronger. The National Transportation Safety Board, and the International Association of Fire Chiefs has recommended to PHMSA that excess flow 

valve installation be mandatory in new construction when pipelines 

are being replaced or upgraded. 

The Pipeline Safety Trust commissioned a review of excess flow 

valves, and that review came to the same mandatory installation 

conclusion. For these reasons, we support the language in the Senate bill that includes the development of criteria for requiring the 

installation of excess flow valves, but ask that that language be 

strengthened to ensure that these inexpensive safety devices are 

installed, unless a company can prove that they will not operate 

correctly on their particular system. In our opinion, the current 

language, which requires these valves on the basis of feasibility 

and risk analysis, provides too much wiggle room. 

The only disagreement we have with the Senate bill is concerning permit streamlining. We have not seen any documented 

need for streamlining for the construction and expansion of pipelines. Until such need is proven, we oppose the language in Section 

13 of the Senate bill. 

Since my time today is so short, let me just briefly mention important areas where we believe all the bills still need improvement. 

After the 2001 terrorist attacks, the National Pipeline Mapping 

18 

System was removed from public access. We believe that maps that 

allow local government to know where pipelines are in relation to 

housing developments and businesses are critical to prevent pipeline damage and to increase pipeline safety. Current security concerns makes the mapping system mainly useless for local government, since the map information cannot be added to local GIS systems or planning maps because of the required nondisclosure. The 

location of pipelines are no secret, in fact, they are required to be 

marked at each public road crossing and railroad crossing and in 

sufficient number along each buried line, so that the location is accurately known. If terrorists want to find pipeline, they will. 

For these reasons, we ask that you direct PHMSA to reinstate 

access to the National Pipeline Mapping System so that local governments can plan safely. 

One of the most important functions that PHMSA provides is the 

ongoing independent inspection of pipeline companies’ operations. 

We support the additional inspectors in the bill. Unfortunately, 

none of these inspection findings are available to local government, 

or the public for review. PHMSA should be required to create an 

Internet-accessible inspection docket similar to the enforcement 

transparency requirements in the Senate bill where the public 

could review basic company inspection information. 

And finally, in 2004, the Transportation Research Board released 

a study on developing risk-informed land-use guidance near transmission guidance near transmission pipelines for use by state and 

local governments. One of the major pieces of that report was the 

recommendation to PHMSA for the establishment of a Pipeline and 

Informed Planning Alliance, a multi-stakeholder effort aimed at 

moving this risk-informed land-use guidance forward. 

The Pipeline Safety Trust was invited to be on the steering committee for that effort in early 2005. Since that time not one meeting has been held, and progress on this important initiative seems 

to have stalled. We think that Congress should help move this 

process forward by setting a date certain for this initiative to get 

started, and require PHMSA to report to Congress on progress 

made at regular intervals. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify today. In the past 

5 years, pipeline safety has moved forward on many fronts, and we 

appreciate the part that PHMSA, the industry, and particularly 

Congress has had in this progress. We hope you will consider the 

ideas we have brought forward today, which we believe will take 

pipeline safety up another significant notch, and I’m glad to answer 

any questions now, that you have now, or any time in the future. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Weimer follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CARL WEIMER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

PIPELINE SAFETY TRUST

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: 

Good morning, and thank you for inviting me to speak today on the important 

subject of pipeline safety. My name is Carl Weimer and I am testifying today as 

the Executive Director of the Pipeline Safety Trust. I am also a member of the Office of Pipeline Safety’s Technical Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Safety Standard Committee, as well as the Chairman of the Governor-appointed Washington State CitiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:50 Jun 22, 2011 Jkt 066984 PO 00000 Frm 00022 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\66984.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
19 

zens Committee on Pipeline Safety. I also bring a local government perspective to 

these discussions as an elected County Commissioner in Washington State. 

The Pipeline Safety Trust came into being after the 1999 Olympic Pipeline tragedy in Bellingham Washington that left three young people dead, wiped out every 

living thing in a beautiful salmon stream, and caused millions of dollars of economic 

disruption to our region. After investigating this tragedy, the U.S. Justice Department recognized the need for an independent organization that would provide informed comment and advice to both pipeline companies and government regulators; 

and, would provide the public with an independent clearinghouse of pipeline safety 

information. The Federal trial court agreed with the Justice Department’s recommendation and awarded the Pipeline Safety Trust $4 million which was used as 

an initial endowment for the long-term continuation of the Trust’s mission. 

The vision of the Pipeline Safety Trust is simple. We believe that communities 

should feel safe when pipelines run through them, and trust that their government 

is proactively working to prevent pipeline hazards. We believe that the local communities who have the most to lose if a pipeline fails should be included in discussions 

of how better to prevent pipeline failures. And we believe that only when trusted 

partnerships between pipeline companies, government, communities, and safety advocates are formed, will pipelines truly be safer. 

The Pipeline Safety Trust is the only nonprofit organization in the country that 

strives to provide a voice for those affected by pipelines that normally have no voice 

at proceedings like this. With that in mind, I am here to speak today for the families who lost their husbands and fathers in the 2004 Walnut Creek California pipeline explosion caused when the pipeline company incorrectly marked the location of 

their pipeline. I am speaking today on behalf of the people living along the Kentucky and Ohio Rivers who in 2005 awoke to find 290,000 gallons of crude oil had 

been dumped by a pipeline into those rivers. And I am here to speak today on behalf 

of the people who were affected by the more than $846 million of property damage 

that pipelines are responsible for in the past 5 years. 

The Pipeline Safety Trust has already provided testimony this year to both the 

House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the House Energy and 

Commerce Committee. As the reauthorization process has proceeded many different 

ideas have been incorporated into the different bill versions, so I would like to start 

this morning by providing our opinion on which of these ideas will do the most to 

make pipelines safer. 

Best Provisions in the Different Bills 

Low-Stress Pipelines—We support the provisions in S. 3961, and appreciate the 

addition in Section 3(3) that clarifies that certain exemptions do not apply to incident reporting and the National Pipeline Mapping System. 

The 200,000 gallon crude oil leak on the North Slope of Alaska last winter, the 

additional leak found this past summer followed by a partial shut-down of the 

Prudhoe Bay Oil Field, and the ensuing fiasco concerning BP’s previously inadequate pipeline maintenance and testing have made it clear that all such low-stress 

pipelines should fall under the same minimum Federal standards as other transmission pipelines. Likewise, those sections of pipeline, which could affect Unusually 

Sensitive Areas, should be required to meet the same integrity management provisions as other transmission pipelines. 

The Pipeline and Hazardous Material Safety Administration (PHMSA) is currently engaged in a rulemaking on these low-stress pipelines that has as a starting 

point a proposal that is much weaker, and more confusing, than what is included 

in S. 3961, and the version of the bill coming forward from the House Energy and 

Commerce Committee. We hope that Congress will pass these provisions soon so 

that PHMSA understands the importance Congress has put on ensuring these pipelines are maintained in a way that protects the environment and the economy. 

Senior Executive Signature on Integrity Management Reports—We support this inclusion in S. 3961, and believe it is an excellent method to ensure that the senior 

management that makes decisions regarding maintenance, testing, and budget decisions affecting pipeline safety are also aware of the current integrity of their federally-regulated pipelines. 

Distribution Integrity Management Program & Deadline—The majority of deaths 

and injuries from pipelines occur from incidents on the distribution pipeline systems 

that bring gas to our towns, businesses, and homes. From the period 2001 through 

2005 sixty-one people died along these pipelines, and two hundred and thirty seven 

were injured. PHMSA, states, industry, and private organizations have undertaken 

an aggressive work plan to come up with an integrity management program for distribution pipelines. The Phase 1 report on this plan was released earlier this year, 

and all involved deserve our thanks for their efforts. 

20 

It is imperative that this plan now moves to the adoption of rules as soon as possible. We applaud and support the one-year requirement in all the present bills for 

the development of such standards. 

One area that bills differ is regarding requirements to include criteria for the installation of excess flow valves. The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) 

has recommended to PHMSA that excess flow valve installation be mandatory in 

new construction and when existing service pipelines are being replaced or upgraded. The International Association of Fire Chiefs supports this mandatory installation position. The Pipeline Safety Trust commissioned an independent review of 

the literature and science on excess flow valves, and that review came to the same 

mandatory installation conclusion. 

For these reasons we support the language in S. 3961 that includes the development of criteria for requiring the installation of excess flow valves. 

Enforcement Transparency—One of the things that PHMSA has been criticized for 

in the past is the lack of the use of enforcement to deter future accidents. In our 

own Bellingham tragedy, PHMSA announced with great fanfare a proposed penalty 

of $3.02 million. Then for nearly 5 years the regulators and the pipeline company 

went behind closed doors, and when they emerged the fine had been mysteriously 

reduced to $250,000. The only information available to the public regarding why 

this drastic reduction had occurred was the short phrase in the Settlement Order 

that said ‘‘In order to avoid further litigation or expense, OPS and Olympic resolve 

this case.’’ This did not sit well with the people in Bellingham, and certainly does 

not instill confidence or trust in a regulatory agency. 

In 2000, the El Paso Pipeline in New Mexico blew up killing an entire extended 

family of twelve. Again PHMSA announced with much fanfare a proposed $2.52 million fine. Now, over 6 years later, there is no information available about the status 

of that penalty, and it appears that not one cent of it has been collected. 

Most law enforcement in this country takes place in public for good reasons. Public scrutiny enhances credibility, accountability and fairness. Seeing PHMSA expeditiously enforce its regulations would instill confidence that safe pipeline operation 

is a requirement rather than a guideline. If companies challenge fines because regulations are poorly crafted, the public could demand better rules. 

We support the language in S. 3961, which requires PHMSA to electronically post 

monthly summaries of its enforcement actions. We also support the language in the 

House Energy and Commerce Bill that provides operators the ability to provide response to PHMSA enforcement actions to better illustrate both sides of the enforcement story. This only seems fair, and we hope the Senate Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation Committee will adopt this additional language as well. 

Technical Assistance Grants—The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 included a new program to enhance the understanding and involvement of local communities and state initiatives in pipeline safety issues by making grants of up to 

$50,000 available for ‘‘technical assistance to local communities and groups of individuals relating to the safety of pipeline facilities in local communities.’’ 

These grants were envisioned as a way to keep valuable independent pipeline 

safety initiatives moving forward, and to ensure that those most directly impacted 

by pipeline failures have the resources to become legitimate stakeholders in processes to improve pipeline safety. Examples of groups that could benefit from such 

grants include the Washington City and County Pipeline Safety Consortium and the 

Kentucky Pipeline Safety Advisory Committee. Both of these groups formed after 

major pipeline failures and involve a broad spectrum of stakeholders looking for solutions to keep their communities safe and avoid further pipeline accidents. These 

grants would be a small price to pay to help foster such outstanding examples of 

independent pipeline safety initiatives, and pipeline safety involvement. Such local 

involvement is critical as PHMSA moves forward in the areas of pipeline damage 

prevention and encroachment. Another potential use of the grants is to pay for increased public and local government involvement in industry standards development 

and to assist in public comments on technical regulations. 

To date none of these grants have been awarded, and to our knowledge PHMSA 

has not even begun the process to develop procedures to award such grants. We support the language in S. 3961, which would reauthorize these grants, and provide 

PHMSA an incentive to move demonstrations of this program forward sooner rather 

than later. 

State pipeline damage prevention programs—For years now PHMSA has 

partnered with the Common Ground Alliance and One-Call centers to provide a nationwide structure to educate contractors, utilities, local government, and the public 

on the need to be aware of the underground pipeline infrastructure, develop best 

management practices, and use one-call locator services. These have been valuable 

21 

programs, and have laid the start of a national network to improve pipeline damage 

prevention. 

It has become apparent over the past few years that for these efforts to be truly 

effective there needs to be enforceable laws, and adequate local enforcement of those 

laws, to provide the incentive for all who dig to pay attention to how and where 

they dig. Progressive states such as Virginia and Minnesota have proven that with 

good education programs coupled with data collection and adequate and fair enforcement, the number of incidents of damage to pipelines decreases considerably. 

The only way that state and local enforcement will increase is if Congress provides increased funding to the state’s pipeline programs, and allows PHMSA to distribute that funding in such a way that it is an incentive for states to increase their 

capacity for enforcement. We support the language in S. 3961, which provides for 

greater funding of state damage prevention programs, and provides clarity of what 

such programs should include. We also believe that at this point in time it is important that this money is available to help states develop such programs, so we also 

support the language that was included in the House Energy and Commerce Bill 

that amends 60105(b)(4) to make it clear that a state that is ‘‘encouraging and promoting the establishment of a program’’ can receive the grant funding even if the 

program is not yet fully in place. 

Safety Orders—We fully support the language in S. 3961, which allows PHMSA 

to waive notice and a hearing in an emergency. We oppose the language in the Senate bill, which requires the new rules be in place before a safety order can be issued. 

We hope that these rules will be promulgated swiftly, and support the ‘‘within 1 

year’’ provision in the House Energy and Commerce Bill, but we do not believe 

issuance of such important orders should be put on hold until these new rules are 

promulgated. 

Permit Streamlining—We supported the language in Section 16 of the Pipeline 

Safety Improvement Act of 2002 that gave PHMSA authority to help expedite and 

coordinate the repair of existing pipelines to help ensure timely safety repairs without preempting any Federal, state, or local environmental laws. We have not seen 

any documented need for permit streamlining for the construction and expansion of 

pipelines. Until such documented need is proven we oppose the language in Section 

13 of S. 3961. Additionally, this section does not contain critical language prohibiting preemption of Federal, state, or local environmental laws. 

One-Call Civil Enforcement—We support the language in S. 3961. We agree that 

PHMSA’s authority should not be limited in any state, and that calling 911 to report 

damage should not be the only method included. We also support the language that 

includes operators who fail to respond to location requests in a timely manner, or 

who mark pipelines incorrectly. 

Gas Pipeline Integrity Reassessment Interval—The first cycle of integrity management assessment for gas pipelines has not even been completed yet, so we support 

the Senate bill’s authors who chose not to address the reassessment interval at this 

early date. 

Human Factor Risk Management Rulemaking—We support the 18 month requirement for development of these standards, and also support the specific language in 

S. 3961 that requires these standards to address work hours and schedules. 

Leak Detection Technology Report—We support the language in S. 3961 which requires a report from PHMSA within 1 year on the effectiveness of current leak detection technology. 

Although S. 3961 and the associated House Bills contain many important improvements to pipeline safety, we feel that there are still some significant omissions 

from all of these bills. We ask that you amend S. 3961 to include the following provisions. 

Needed Improvements Missing at This Time 

The Need for More Publicly Available Information 

One of the Pipeline Safety Trust’s highest priorities is to ensure that there is 

enough accurate information easily available to local governments and the public to 

allow them to independently gauge the safety of the pipelines that run through their 

communities. PHMSA has made a good deal of progress in this area, but some of 

the most important information pieces are still missing. We ask that you help make 

this information available. 

Maps—Maps that allow local government emergency responders, planners, and 

zoning officials to know where pipelines are in relation to housing developments and 

a variety of infrastructure are critical to prevent pipeline damage and increase pipeline safety. Maps that allow the public to see what pipelines run through their 

neighborhoods are also the best way to capture the public’s attention regarding pipeline safety, increase their awareness of pipeline damage issues, and enlist them to 

22 

be the eyes to help prevent pipeline damage. Maps also allow homebuyers to decide 

their own comfort level with living near pipelines. 

The 2002 Pipeline Safety Improvement Act required that pipeline companies provide PHMSA with data for the National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) so such 

maps could be available for the above purposes. Unfortunately after the September 

11, 2001 terrorist attacks the NPMS system was removed from easy access and became a password-protected system that approved users have to agree not to share 

with anyone else. This new NPMS security removes the maps from the public altogether, and makes the system mainly useless for local government since the map 

information can not be added to local GIS systems or planning maps because of the 

required nondisclosure. 

This removal of maps out of fear that terrorists may use them to find targets flies 

in the face of common sense. The location of pipelines are no secret, in fact 49 CFR 

195.410 requires that ‘‘Markers must be located at each public road crossing, at 

each railroad crossing, and in sufficient number along the remainder of each buried 

line so that its location is accurately known.’’ If terrorists want to find pipelines, 

they will. All that has been accomplished by removing maps from the public is to 

increase the growing problem of encroachment near pipelines, and of unintentional 

damage to pipelines. 

This removal of the NPMS from the public has also caused some states, such as 

Washington, Texas and Louisiana, to spend their limited state dollars to duplicate 

this mapping system so that local government and the public have access to this 

valuable information. 

For these reasons we ask that you direct PHMSA to reinstate access to the 

NPMS, so local governments can plan safely and the public can be aware of the 

pipelines that run through their midst. 

Access to Inspection Findings—One of the most important functions that PHMSA 

provides is the ongoing independent inspection of pipeline companies’ operations, 

maintenance, and training programs. The findings of these inspections form one of 

the very basic protections to the public. Unfortunately none of these inspection findings are available for local government or the public to review, leaving them to only 

guess the condition of pipelines, or even if such inspections are taking place. 

The pipeline industry themselves complains about this system. Individual companies do know when they have been inspected, but often have to wait months or 

years to learn the outcome of the inspections, and most times if no problems were 

found they hear absolutely nothing. This lengthy, or nonexistent, feedback system 

to pipeline companies is unfair, and does not improve safety the way a timely feedback system would. 

Somewhere there must exist, or there should exist, a simple coversheet for each 

inspection that includes basic information such as pipeline segment included, the 

date of the inspection, type of inspection, concerns noted, and corrections required. 

If this basic information, along with associated correspondence between the agency 

and the pipeline company, were provided on an Internet-based docket system that 

could be searched by state or pipeline company name, we believe it would go a long 

way toward demonstrating progress, and thus increasing trust in pipeline safety. 

This inspection transparency would go hand-in-hand with the enforcement transparency that is already included in S. 3961. 

Reporting of Over-Pressurization Events—One of the clearest measurements of 

whether a pipeline company has good control of their pipeline system is the number 

of times that they allow their pipeline to exceed the maximum allowable operating 

pressure plus a permitted accumulation pressure for gas pipelines, or 110 percent 

of the maximum operating pressure for liquid pipelines. Unfortunately the vast majority of these events are not required to be reported to PHMSA, so neither PHMSA 

nor the public can use this indicator to determine whether the pipeline company is 

causing unwarranted stress on their pipeline and therefore needs greater scrutiny. 

In the 1980s when it was decided to provide an exemption to reporting most of 

these important events the reasoning was that the reporting would be extremely 

time intensive and costly for the industry, and PHMSA (RSPA at that time) had 

no database that would handle the data in a way that would be valuable for the 

agency. Fifteen years ago e-mail, the Internet, and integrated databases were a 

vague dream. That has all changed, so the arguments used against the collection 

of this valuable information no longer apply. Furthermore, with increased capabilities in control room technology, remote communications, and integrity management 

the number of over-pressurization events should have reduced. Without this reporting requirement we have no way to know. 

For these reasons the exemptions from reporting these events contained in 49 

CFR 191.23(b) and 49 CFR 195.55(b) should be removed. 

23 

Pipelines and Informed Planning Alliance (PIPA) 

In August of 2004, the Transportation Research Board of the National Academies 

released a study on the feasibility of developing risk-informed land use guidance 

near existing and future transmission pipelines for use by state and local governments. This study was an attempt to address the need for local governments to use 

land use and zoning laws to try to protect citizens and pipelines from encroachment 

by development near existing pipelines and in the siting of new pipelines. 

The vast majority of local planning departments have little expertise or knowledge of pipelines, so developing such guidance is a crucial part in the overall strategy of damage prevention. PHMSA provided a report to Congress on the development of these guidance activities in January of 2005. One of the major pieces of that 

report was the establishment of the Pipelines and Informed Planning Alliance 

(PIPA), a multi-stakeholder effort aimed at designing and moving this risk-informed 

land use guidance forward. 

This effort will not be easy because many of these stakeholders have little reason 

to add concern for pipelines very high up on their already crowded list of priorities, 

but it is essential that this effort get underway. This is another area where increased funding for state participation, and funding of the Pipeline Safety Information Grants to allow these stakeholder groups to participate as equal partners, will 

be required for a successful outcome. 

The Pipeline Safety Trust was invited to be on the steering committee for the 

PIPA effort in early 2005. Since that time not one meeting has been held, and 

progress on this important initiative seems to have stalled. We think that Congress 

should help move this process forward by setting a date-certain for this initiative 

to get started, and require PHMSA to report to Congress on progress made at regular intervals. 

Greater Citizen Involvement—State Pipeline Advisory Committees 

The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 provided a vehicle for greater public 

involvement in pipeline safety issues for pipeline advisory committees appointed by 

state Governors. The states of Washington and Kentucky have both taken advantage of this opportunity to involve a broader range of stakeholders in pipeline safety 

discussions. The creation of state advisory committees is essential for greater public 

involvement, especially as PHMSA moves forward on efforts to involve local communities on issues regarding pipelines, encroachment and smart local planning. In 

Washington State the Citizen Committee on Pipeline Safety has become an integral 

part of rulemaking and public involvement, as well as a valuable sounding board 

for concerned citizens, local government, industry, and the state legislature. 

We believe that greater public involvement, leads to greater trust and understanding, which leads to smarter, more comprehensive pipeline safety initiatives. 

For this reason we hope that Congress will encourage the creation of more state 

pipeline advisory committees. This could be accomplished by having PHMSA promote such advisory committees, while tying a small percentage of the state pipeline 

safety program grant to the appointment and ongoing meeting of such a Governorappointed committee. 

Financial Responsibility Requirements for Pipeline Corporations 

Large corporations can shield themselves from liability for poor safety practices 

through certain strategies, such as holding assets that may generate liability (e.g., 

pipelines) in subsidiaries or as shares of separate corporations. As part of this strategy, the parent corporation drastically undercapitalizes its subsidiary. In the case 

of pipelines, this is common. It is not unusual for a pipeline company to be capitalized by virtually 100 percent debt, lent by the large corporate shareholders. 

In fact, the owners of the Olympic Pipeline used a similar strategy. In a major 

spill like Bellingham, the undercapitalized pipeline company is forced into bankruptcy when the owners decline to provide further financing. In the usual bankruptcy, the shareholders lose the company assets to the debt holders, but in this 

case, those are the same entities. Bankruptcy presents no meaningful threat to 

these shareholders but it does allow pipeline companies to avoid financial consequences for inadequate safety measures. 

Congress should consider imposing financial responsibility requirements for pipelines as it already does for other companies under the Resources Conservation and 

Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA). To get this process started 

we urge Congress to ask for a study from either GAO or CRS, to describe how this 

works in other regulatory realms, and how it could best be adapted for pipelines. 

24 

Expansion of High Consequence Areas (HCA) 

Finally, we would like Congress to consider a phased expansion of what is included within the definition of high consequence areas (HCA). This definition, to a 

large extent, is what determines which transmission pipelines are required to be inspected under the integrity management rules. At this time HCA’s mainly include 

populated areas, areas where people congregate, and for liquid pipelines drinking 

water sources, and navigable waterways. This was a good starting place for integrity 

management since it represented the most crucial areas and a significant undertaking for the industry. 

As the first phase of integrity management testing is accomplished we believe operator and regulator experience, along with the increases in industry infrastructure 

needed to undertake these inspections, makes it possible to expand the definition 

of HCA to include important areas that were left out of the initial definition. These 

left out areas would include things like important historical sites, national parks 

and wildlife refuges, and in the case of liquid pipelines swimable and fishable 

waters. 

Before I finish I would like to comment on the progress that PHMSA has made 

under its current leadership. In the past seven and a half years, since the Bellingham pipeline tragedy, due to strong efforts from citizens, Members of Congress, 

PHMSA, and the industry itself, progress has been made to prevent further tragedies like those that have occurred in Edison, NJ; Walnut Creek, CA; Blenheim, NY; 

Mounds View, MN; Lively, TX; San Bernardino, CA; Bellingham, WA; Carlsbad, 

NM; and elsewhere. 

For the first time parts of gas and liquid transmission pipelines now have to be 

internally inspected, and rulemaking is proceeding to include integrity management 

requirements for gas distribution pipelines where the majority of deaths and injuries occur. Pipeline operators now have clear requirements for communicating to the 

public and local government, and OPS has unveiled new additions to their own 

website and communication programs. Perhaps just as significant, many progressive 

thinking pipeline companies have taken pipeline safety seriously enough that they 

are now leading by example by operating and maintaining their pipelines in ways 

that go beyond the minimum Federal standards. 

We should all celebrate this progress, while acknowledging that continuous evaluation and improvement can make pipelines considerably safer yet, and thereby restore the public’s trust in pipelines. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify today. We hope that you will consider the ideas we have brought forward today, which we believe can take pipeline 

safety up another significant notch. If you have any questions now, or at anytime 

in the future, I would be glad to try to answer them. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Felt? 

STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY FELT, PRESIDENT/CEO, EXPLORER 

PIPELINE COMPANY; MEMBER, AMERICAN PETROLEUM 

INSTITUTE PIPELINE COMMITTEE; AND VICE CHAIRMAN/ 

TREASURER-ELECT, ASSOCIATION OF OIL PIPE LINES 

Mr. FELT. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Co-Chairman, members of the 

Committee, my name is Tim Felt, I am President and CEO of Explorer Pipeline, headquartered in Tulsa, Oklahoma. 

Explorer operates 1,400 miles of petroleum products pipeline, 

serving 16 states, extending from the Gulf Coast and throughout 

the mid-western United States. I appreciate the opportunity to appear today on behalf of API and AOPL. Together, these organizations represent the companies responsible for the vast majority of 

U.S. oil pipeline transportation. I will summarize my written testimony, and ask that the full text and attachments be included in 

the record of this hearing for the Committee’s consideration. 

Our primary message today is that we believe a pipeline safety 

reauthorization bill can be passed in this Congress. Congress 

should act now, not at some indefinite future date, to reaffirm and 

strengthen a program put in place with the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002. The 2002 Act is a success—industry and 

25 

DOT have cooperated to achieve significant improvement in pipeline safety, and this improvement is demonstrated by our industry’s record. This record is reflected in the charts that accompany 

my testimony. The oil pipeline industry plans to invest over $1 billion in pipeline safety improvements over the next 5 years. Because of this, it 

is very important that Congress reauthorize the DOT pipeline safety program in 2006. Reauthorization sends a clear signal that these 

investments are appropriate, and that DOT is on the right track 

in implementing the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002. 

In addition, several billions of dollars of investment in new oil 

pipeline infrastructure are underway or planned in the near-term. 

Certainty in the safety requirements this infrastructure must meet 

is very important for these investments. The prospects for a compromise pipeline safety reauthorization bill should be excellent— 

the proposals before us have a number of elements in common, and 

address for the most part, the same issues. 

We’ve come this far and worked together so well that we must 

achieve passage of a bill. We should not wait for some future Congress to enact a compromise bill that could be passed now. 

Let me discuss a few provisions of interest. Damage prevention— 

at the center of all bills are similar provisions that will strengthen 

enforcement of state laws designed to prevent underground damage. All include a comprehensive list of the elements, including effective enforcement, that characterize successful state underground 

damage prevention programs. DOT is given important new authority to assist in enforcing damage prevention laws. We strongly support these provisions and urge the Committees to build their final 

legislative product around underground damage prevention. 

I serve on the Common Ground Alliance Board as a Member for 

the oil pipeline industry. The CGA is one of the best things that 

has happened to pipeline safety in many years. The CGA provides 

a forum to work underground damage prevention issues that simply doesn’t exist anywhere else. 

One of the current roles is to lead the public awareness campaign 

to promote use of the nationwide toll-free 8-1-1 telephone number 

for One-Call notification that was required by the 2002 Act. Your 

bill should explicitly authorize funds to support the 8-1-1 campaign. 

Regarding safety orders—section 6 of S. 3961 contains a provision that modifies DOT current authority to issue mandatory orders to pipeline operators. As I explain in more detail in my written statement, we have concerns with this provision. As drafted, 

the Secretary of Transportation may order an operator to make extensive expenditures, including replacement of the operator’s entire 

system to address any condition that poses a risk based on any factors the Secretary considers appropriate. Under these provisions, 

an operator could be powerless to contest a DOT order for unnecessary expenditures of scarce resources to address questionable risks. 

We urge the Committee to transform the provision into a problem-solving tool instead of a provision that assumes a contest 

among lawyers is always necessary. We suggest the Committee direct that the administrative procedures implementing this order 

offer the pipeline operator an opportunity to confer informally with 

26 

DOT before exercising the operator’s right to a hearing. Any action 

by mutual agreement as a result of the consultation could be reduced to words and made both public and enforceable. This simple 

modification will save time and legal costs and bring about safety 

improvements sooner. If the operator and DOT cannot agree 

promptly on a remedy, the DOT would still retain authority to conduct a formal hearing and issue its order. 

In summary, current pipeline safety law is working, and working 

very well. The legislative proposals before Congress all would make 

real improvements in an already sound DOT safety program. The 

important goal at this point is enactment of the legislation reauthorizing this program. The passage of compromise legislation is 

more important than any concerns we have with individual provisions. We need to move promptly to agree on the improvements 

that can gain broad support and incorporate these improvements in 

a pipeline safety reauthorization bill that can be enacted this year. 

The public should not have to wait until next Congress to make the 

improvements we can agree on now. 

We need to pass a pipeline safety reauthorization bill in this 

Congress and the oil pipeline industry stands ready to help in any 

way we can to achieve this worthwhile goal. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Felt follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TIMOTHY FELT, PRESIDENT/CEO, EXPLORER PIPELINE

COMPANY; MEMBER, AMERICAN PETROLEUM INSTITUTE PIPELINE COMMITTEE; AND

VICE CHAIRMAN/TREASURER-ELECT, ASSOCIATION OF OIL PIPE LINES

Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, my name is Tim Felt. I am President 

and CEO of Explorer Pipeline Company, headquartered in Tulsa, Oklahoma. Explorer operates 1,400 miles of petroleum products pipeline serving 16 states extending from the Gulf Coast throughout the mid-western United States. 

I am a member of the API Pipeline Committee, Vice Chairman and TreasurerElect of the Association of Oil Pipe Lines, and the oil pipeline industry’s Board 

Member for the Common Ground Alliance, a voluntary, private-sector organization 

dedicated to the prevention of excavation damage to underground facilities. I appreciate the opportunity to appear today on behalf of API and AOPL. Together, API 

and AOPL represent the companies responsible for the vast majority of U.S. oil 

pipeline transportation. 

Summary 

As the Committee reviews the current state of pipeline safety and the progress 

that has been made since the 2002 Act, these are the main points I would like to 

emphasize: 

• We need to enact pipeline safety reauthorization legislation before the end of 

this Congress. A lot of work has gone into the current bills, and there are no 

major disagreements about what a compromise among the various bills should 

look like. Let’s get a good bill passed now. 

• The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 is a success. Industry and DOT 

have cooperated to achieve significant improvement in pipeline safety, and this 

improvement is demonstrated by our industry’s record. This record is reflected 

on the charts that accompany my testimony. 

• The oil pipeline industry is making the investments needed to fully comply with 

the law and related regulations and in many cases to exceed their requirements. 

We plan to invest over $1 billion in pipeline safety improvements over the next 

5 years. Because of this, it is very important that Congress reauthorize the DOT 

pipeline safety program in 2006. Reauthorization sends a clear signal that these 

investments are appropriate, and DOT is on the right track in implementing 

the 2002 Act. 

• In addition, several billions of dollars of investments in new oil pipeline infrastructure are underway or planned in the near-term. Certainty in the safety reVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:50 Jun 22, 2011 Jkt 066984 PO 00000 Frm 00030 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\66984.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
27 

quirements this infrastructure must meet is very important for these investments. 

• The Administration, the jurisdictional Committees of the House and Senate, the 

industry and the pipeline advocates are in virtual agreement on the core provisions of a compromise reauthorization bill that could be passed in 2006. Passage 

of a bill before final Congressional adjournment is our shared goal. 

• If this Congress passes a reauthorization bill, the protections provided by this 

compromise will be available now. If this Congress fails to pass a bill, a subsequent Congress must start over to adopt new legislation approving the needed 

authority. That could take months or years. Congress can act now and should 

act now. 

We urge you to act promptly to reconcile any differences between the Senate bill, 

S. 3961, and the bills approved by the House Committees and send a compromise 

bill to the President this year. 

The Role of Pipelines in Petroleum Supply 

In discussing pipeline safety legislation, it is useful to remind the Committee of 

the role oil pipelines play in energy supply. An understanding of this role leads to 

appreciation of the need for effective and workable policies that provide certainty 

so this key part of the petroleum distribution system operates efficiently and safely. 

About 40 percent of the total U.S. energy supply comes from petroleum, but the 

transportation sector depends on petroleum for 97 percent of its energy. Two-thirds 

of domestic crude oil and refined products transportation is provided by pipeline. 

Pipelines do this safely and efficiently. The cost to deliver a gallon of petroleum by 

pipeline is very low, typically 2–3 cents per gallon. Transportation—airlines, automobiles, trucks, barges and ships—could not function without pipelines to deliver 

crude oil to refineries and refinery output of petroleum fuels to consumers in various 

parts of the country. The national oil pipeline system is a bargain for consumers 

and an absolutely essential part of the U.S. economy. 

Oil pipelines are common carriers whose rates are regulated by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. Oil pipeline income is driven by the volume delivered 

and does not depend on the price of the products transported. Oil pipeline companies do not profit from high oil prices. In fact, high oil prices have a negative impact 

on oil pipeline income by raising power costs and reducing demand for petroleum. 

Progress in Pipeline Safety 

Oil pipeline operators have been subject to the DOT’s pipeline integrity management regulations since March 2001, before enactment of the 2002 Act. DOT’s inspections of operators’ plans show that integrity testing will eventually cover approximately 82 percent of the Nation’s oil pipeline infrastructure. The oil pipeline industry is well past the halfway point in the implementation of integrity management. 

DOT has audited each of these operators under these regulations at least two 

times—an initial ‘‘quick hit’’ audit and one subsequent full audit. Many are involved 

in a third audit cycle. Operators are finding and repairing conditions in need of repair and less serious conditions discovered in the course of investigating defects. Operators are fixing what they find, often going beyond the requirements of the regulations. 

Improved Spill Record 

These inspections and repairs have improved the oil pipeline spill record dramatically in the last 5 years, as the exhibits show. The data for these exhibits comes 

from a voluntary industry program that since 1999 has collected extensive data on 

oil pipeline performance. These figures represent line pipe releases, which are those 

that occur outside the company’s facilities and are the releases most likely to impact 

the public and the environment. Line pipe is rightly the primary focus of DOT’s program, so the improvement in our record is direct evidence of the wisdom of the DOT 

approach. 

The trend in oil pipeline incidents is down for each cause category. The number 

of total releases dropped 51 percent, releases due to corrosion dropped 67 percent, 

and releases due to operator error dropped by 63 percent. Finally, releases from 

third-party damage from excavation dropped 37 percent. 

This safety improvement record only covers half the 7-year baseline assessment 

period for oil pipelines. We expect the record to show continued improvement as we 

complete the first full cycle and move through subsequent mandatory 5-year reassessment intervals. 

The Federal pipeline safety program is working. Congress needs to pass a reauthorization bill that endorses and, where appropriate, strengthens this excellent program. 

28 

Legislation 

The legislative proposals—the Administration’s H.R. 5678, the House versions of 

H.R. 5782 and the Senate’s S. 3961—all assume continuation of the current DOT 

program and seek to make it better. I would like to highlight the provisions of these 

proposals that we believe are the most significant and deserve the most attention 

by the Committee. My testimony will also discuss improvements we recommend for 

certain of the provisions. While none of these bills are perfect from our perspective, 

the Committee should understand that we see nothing that would cause AOPL and 

API to oppose enactment of compromise pipeline safety reauthorization legislation 

based on these bills. Enactment of the legislation is more important than any concerns we have with individual provisions. 

Underground Damage Prevention 

Pipeline releases caused by excavation damage are the most traumatic, the largest, and are the most likely to threaten the public and the environment. At the center of H.R. 5678, H.R. 5782 and S. 3961 are similar provisions that will strengthen 

the impact of state laws designed to prevent underground damage. Incentives are 

provided to states that adopt strong damage prevention laws and programs. To 

qualify for these incentives a state must also be adequately enforcing its damage 

prevention laws. Improvement in enforcement of state damage prevention laws 

would make real improvement in pipeline safety. 

In addition, these bills all make it a Federal civil violation to ignore state underground damage prevention laws. We believe this expression of the seriousness the 

Federal Government attaches to damage prevention enforcement is one of the most 

important safety advances proposed in these or any recent pipeline safety bills. 

Common Ground Alliance 

As noted at the beginning of my testimony, I serve as the Common Ground Alliance Board Member for the oil pipeline industry. The CGA is one of the best things 

that has happened in pipeline safety in many years. CGA provides a forum to work 

underground damage prevention issues that simply doesn’t exist anywhere else. 

CGA brings solutions to the table instead of problems. One of CGA’s current roles 

is to lead the public awareness campaign to promote use of the nationwide, toll-free 

8-1-1 telephone number for one-call notification that was required by the 2002 Act. 

Section 17 of S. 3961 should specifically authorize funds to support the 8-1-1 campaign. 

Low-Stress Pipelines 

Earlier this year there was a significant leak from a crude oil pipeline on the 

North Slope of Alaska that was under DOT’s jurisdiction, but was operating at less 

than 20 percent of specified minimum yield strength—low-stress. Crude oil from 

this release covered an approximately two-acre area. Based on API’s Pipeline Performance Tracking System, our industry’s internal data library on oil pipeline spills, 

this particular leak was a statistical anomaly in its size and is not at all typical 

of releases from low-stress pipelines. Nevertheless, the leak shows that anomalies 

do occur and must be considered in managing the risks pipelines present. That pipeline was regulated by the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, but 

was not covered by the DOT regulations then in effect because it was operating at 

low-stress, did not cross a navigable waterway, was in a rural area and did not 

transport highly volatile liquids. 

DOT has accelerated a rulemaking process that was underway before the leak occurred to address the regulation of low-stress pipelines. In the House, one of the 

pipeline safety reauthorization bills directly addresses the regulation of low-stress 

pipelines other than gathering lines. AOPL and API worked with the House Energy 

and Commerce Committee and are supporting a provision in that Committee’s 

version of H.R. 5782 that would subject the pipeline on the North Slope that leaked 

and similar pipelines to the same DOT regulation that currently covers high-stress 

pipelines. Section 13 of S. 3961 is similar to this House provision. We continue to 

support the House Energy and Commerce Committee low-stress provision and urge 

this committee to adopt the same language so that the treatment of low-stress pipelines will be the same in each bill. 

Safety Orders 

Sec. 6 of S. 3691 modifies DOT’s current authority to issue mandatory orders to 

pipeline operators. Title 49 section 60117(l) was added by the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 to allow DOT to issue a ‘‘safety order’’ to an individual operator in situations that appear to require action, but do not rise to the level of danger 

implied in a ‘‘hazardous facility’’ designation under section 60112, the principal authority available to DOT to order actions by an operator. The intent in 2002, as we 

29 

understand it, was to provide DOT with an enforcement tool with a lower threshold 

that would not require DOT to first declare that an operator’s facility ‘‘is or would 

be hazardous’’ before actions would be required of the operator that could be documented in the public record. Unfortunately, the existing section 60117(l) does not 

provide for notice or an opportunity for a hearing before an order would be issued. 

This existing provision is seriously lacking in due process protection for pipeline operators who might be subject to such an order. 

The Administration’s bill, the House Energy and Commerce bill and Sec. 6 of S. 

3961 all amend section 60117(l) to add a welcome notice requirement and opportunity for a hearing at DOT before any order could be issued. Ensuring a modicum 

of due process addresses a significant omission in the 2002 Act. However, Sec. 6 

goes on, in effect, to eliminate the due process benefit by practically abolishing any 

threshold or burden of proof for DOT in triggering a safety order. The Secretary of 

Transportation may order an operator to make possibly extensive expenditures on 

all or a portion of the operator’s system to address ‘‘any condition that poses a risk’’ 

based on any ‘‘factors the Secretary considers appropriate’’. Under these provisions 

an operator could be virtually powerless to contest effectively any DOT requirement 

to make what the operator believes to be unnecessary expenditures of scarce resources to address questionable risks. 

Notwithstanding these concerns, we recognize that some version of Sec. 6 is likely 

to be included in any final pipeline safety reauthorization bill. Therefore we urge 

the Committee to transform the provision into a problem-solving tool instead of a 

provision that assumes a contest among lawyers is always necessary. We suggest 

the Committee direct that the administrative procedures implementing this order 

offer the pipeline operator an opportunity to confer informally with DOT before exercising the operator’s right to a hearing. We believe informal consultation will 

produce remedies acceptable to both operator and DOT that will resolve the vast 

majority of DOT’s concerns without the need for a formal hearing. Any action taken 

by mutual agreement as a result of the consultation could be reduced to writing and 

made both public and enforceable. We believe this simple modification will save 

time and legal costs and bring about safety improvements sooner. If the operator 

and DOT cannot agree on a remedy, the DOT would retain the authority to conduct 

a formal hearing and issue its order. 

Finally, we suggest the Committee to modify Sec. 6 of S. 3961 to focus the authority on pipeline integrity risks and remove pipeline ‘‘replacement’’ as a remedy for 

this low-threshold order. If DOT is going to take the expensive step of ordering replacement of a pipeline, it should be done under the higher-threshold hazardous facility order authority of title 49 section 60112. 

Enforcement Transparency 

Sec. 9 of S. 3961 requires DOT to post information on a monthly basis about pipeline enforcement actions taken by the Secretary or the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. We have no objection to this proposal as long as the 

normal due process and confidentiality attaching to negotiation and settlement of 

cases is preserved. The House Energy and Commerce Committee language captures 

these safeguards and in addition ensures that no information will be disclosed under 

this provision that would not be disclosed under the Freedom of Information Act. 

We believe consistency with the Freedom of Information Act should be required in 

whatever bill passes. 

Cost Recovery for Extraordinary Events 

Sec. 19 of S. 3691 authorizes DOT to recover DOT’s costs of investigating major 

pipeline safety incidents ‘‘from the person or persons responsible for the incident.’’ 

The amounts collected would not be returned to the Treasury, but would remain 

available to DOT until expended to cover the cost of investigating and monitoring 

incidents. We question the wisdom of this provision. DOT should budget for these 

types of expenses through the normal Federal budget process. The additional fees 

authorized by Sec. 19 would not be subject to Congressional control or oversight 

through the appropriations process. There would be no effective check on the operation of this authority once this bill passes. 

Other Provisions 

My comments today have not addressed every provision of every proposal. Most 

of the provisions I have not discussed we do not oppose or do not directly affect the 

oil pipeline industry. I would reiterate that the important goal at this point is enactment of the legislation. Passage of compromise legislation is more important than 

any concerns we have with individual provisions. 

With so little time left in the current Congress, we hope the Committee will work 

with the House to put together (and quickly) a bill that has broad appeal and can 

30 

pass both Houses. The test for inclusion of a provision should be whether it is acceptable to all the interested parties. We need to move forward by consensus, and 

we need to move rapidly if a bill is to pass. It would be a shame to have come this 

far and worked together so well and yet not achieve passage of the bill. The protections for the public that a bill would provide are within reach, particularly in the 

area of damage prevention and state cooperation. These protections should be made 

available now. We should not make the public wait for some future Congress to 

enact these protections. 

Closing 

In summary, current pipeline safety law is working, and working very well. Improvements can be made, particularly in strengthening underground damage prevention, but fundamental changes are not needed. The legislative proposals before 

Congress all seek to make improvements in the fundamentally sound DOT pipeline 

safety program based on the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002. We need to 

move promptly to agree on the improvements that can gain broad support and incorporate these improvements in a pipeline safety reauthorization bill that can be enacted this year. The oil pipeline industry stands ready to help in any way we can 

in the achievement of this worthy goal. 

This concludes my remarks, I will be happy to respond to questions. 


felt1.eps
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The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Senator Inouye has been 

called away because of a problem relating to the death of a friend, 

so he’s not going to be here the balance of the time. 

Mr. Boss, you’re next, please. 

STATEMENT OF TERRY BOSS, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, 

ENVIRONMENT, SAFETY AND OPERATIONS, INTERSTATE 

NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA 

Mr. BOSS. Good morning Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am Terry Boss, Senior Vice President of Environment, 

Safety and Operations of the Interstate Natural Gas Association of 

America, or INGAA. 

INGAA is a trade association that represents virtually all of the 

interstate and inter-provincial pipelines and natural gas pipelines 

in North America. Pipelines represented by INGAA have been regulated for safety issues by the Federal Government since 1968. Our 

pipelines were, in fact, the first to be covered under the Federal 

Pipeline Safety Act. Some of you may know that the 2002 reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Act included a provision requiring the 

establishment of a natural gas pipeline integrity management program. 

This program requires each natural gas pipeline operator first to 

identify all segments located in high consequence areas. Second, to 

develop an integrity management program for reducing risks to the 

public in these areas. Third, to undertake baseline integrity assessments of all of the segments identified in these areas within 10 

years of enactment. Fourth, develop a process for making repairs 

to any anomalies found as a result of these assessments; and fifth, 


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32 

reassess segments at least every 7 years thereafter in order to 

verify continued pipe integrity. 

How has this program worked so far? To quote the GAO in its 

recent report, 06–946, ‘‘The gas integrity management program is 

benefiting public safety by supplementing existing safety requirements with risk-based management principles that focus on safety 

risks.’’ INGAA agrees that this largely has been a successful program. The amount of inspection and repair work completed to date 

is covered in my written testimony. To keep it brief, what I can say 

is that the natural gas pipeline industry is on track for completing 

the baseline assessments within the 10 year requirement. We have 

not found a large number of problems with the pipelines that have 

been inspected, but the anomalies that are being found are being 

corrected. 

As I noted, the program requires we focus on these high consequence areas, which we call HCAs. These segments represent 

about 7 percent of the total natural gas transmission mileage in 

the U.S. However, because we are principally using internal inspection devices called smart pigs for the vast majority of this work, 

and because these smart pigs can primarily be put into and taken 

out of the pipelines at compressor stations placed about 75 miles 

apart, we are really assessing far more than just the HCAs targeted in the program. In fact, we anticipate we will actually inspect 

between 55 and 60 percent of the total pipeline mileage during this 

baseline period. Any anomalies found are corrected, even though 

they are not located in HCA areas. 

In looking forward to the current reauthorization bill, I would 

like to focus on two of the INGAA priorities in the limited time I 

have. The highest priority for INGAA is changing the current requirement that all of the reassessments be completed at least once 

every 7 years. This static, one-size-fits-all number was—and remains the source of—continued frustration for the INGAA membership and that it has no basis in engineering or risk analysis and 

actually limits the effectiveness of the program. A risk-based reassessment interval determined for each pipeline segment is the most 

logical and effective alternative for focusing efforts and improving 

safety performance overall. 

When the House and Senate were renegotiating the 2002 bill, 

INGAA agreed to the 10 year baseline requirement, but had strong 

misgivings about the fixed 7 year reassessment interval. Our support for that bill hinged on the fact that Congress included a provision requiring the GAO to perform an analysis on this interval. The 

GAO has, in fact, released this report in September, and it supports the idea of changing the 7-year requirement with one based 

on risk and engineering analysis. The title of the report really says 

it all. Risk-Based Standards Should Allow Pipeline Operators To 

Better Tailor Reassessments to Pipeline Threats. 

Mr. Chairman, we urge the Committee to heed GAO’s recommendation and include risk-based standards for reassessment 

intervals in your reauthorization bill. 

I also want to mention one other issue—excavation damage, the 

primary cause of serious incidents on our pipelines. In 1998, Congress approved legislation to encourage improvements in state 

damage prevention programs. The 1998 legislation accomplished a 

33 

great deal with respect to improving these programs, but we believe the time has come to take things to the next level. We suggest 

the development of national standards, including enforcement, for 

state One-Call programs. INGAA supports the damage-prevention 

provisions in S. 3961, and believes these efforts would result in the 

reduction of serious incidents. 

My written testimony includes comments on several additional 

issues, but at this point I would like to conclude my remarks. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to testify 

before the Committee. I’d be happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Boss follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF TERRY BOSS, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, ENVIRONMENT, 

SAFETY AND OPERATIONS, INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: 

Good morning. My name is Terry Boss, and I am Senior Vice President of Environment, Safety and Operations for the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA). INGAA represents the interstate and inter-provincial natural gas pipeline industry in North America. INGAA’s members transport over 90 percent of the 

natural gas consumed in the United States through a network of approximately 

212,000 miles of transmission pipeline. These large capacity pipelines spanning multiple states or regions are analogous to the interstate highway system. 

Industry Background 

Mr. Chairman, natural gas provides 25 percent of the energy consumed in the 

U.S. annually, second only to petroleum and exceeding that of coal or nuclear. From 

home heating and cooking, to industrial processes, to power generation, natural gas 

is a versatile and strategically important energy resource. 

As a result of the regulatory restructuring of the industry during the 1980s and 

early 1990s, interstate natural gas pipelines no longer buy or sell natural gas. Interstate pipelines do not take title to the natural gas moving through their pipelines. 

Instead, pipeline companies sell transportation capacity in much the same way as 

a railroad, airline or trucking company. 

Because the natural gas pipeline network is essentially a ‘‘just-in-time’’ delivery 

system with limited storage capacity, customers large and small depend on reliable 

around-the-clock service. That is an important reason why the safe and reliable operation of our pipeline systems is so important. The natural gas transmission pipelines operated by INGAA’s members and by others historically have been the safest 

mode of transportation in the United States. The interstate pipeline industry, working cooperatively with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 

(PHMSA), is taking affirmative steps to make this valuable infrastructure even 

safer. 

Congressional involvement in pipeline safety dates back almost 40 years to enactment of the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act in 1968. This legislation borrowed 

heavily from the engineering standards that had been developed over the previous 

decades. The goals of this Federal legislation were to ensure the consistent use of 

best practices for pipeline safety across the entire industry, to encourage continual 

improvement in safety procedures and to verify compliance. While subsequent reauthorization bills have improved upon the original, the core objectives of the Federal 

pipeline safety law have remained a constant. 

How Safe Are Natural Gas Pipelines? 

While the safety record of natural gas transmission lines is not perfect, it compares very well with that of other modes of transportation. Since natural gas pipelines are buried and isolated from the public, pipeline accidents involving fatalities 

and injuries are unusual. 

Pipeline accidents generally are reported to the Department of Transportation 

when one of three things occurs: (1) a fatality, (2) an injury, or (3) $50,000 or more 

in property damage. Recently, the Department of Transportation has categorized 

most ‘‘reportable incidents’’ either as ‘‘significant incidents’’ or as ‘‘serious incidents’’ 

and placed that data on its website. 

‘‘Serious incidents’’ are defined as incidents that involve fatalities and injuries. 

The PHMSA graph below shows the decreasing trend of ‘‘serious incidents’’ on natural gas transmission pipelines from 1989–2005. For the last 5 years, the number 

34 

of serious incidents that occurred on natural gas transmission pipelines has averaged five incidents per year. 

It is instructive to look at the causes of these serious incidents for clues on where 

to devote resources that can prevent serious incidents in the future. The pie chart 

below depicts the causes of these serious incidents. Since 2002, all the fatalities that 

have occurred during ‘‘serious incidents’’ on natural gas transmission pipelines have 

been excavation-related. 


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35 

‘‘Significant incidents’’ include not only the aforementioned ‘‘serious incidents,’’ 

but also reportable incidents where property damage and gas lost exceeds $50,000 

in 1984 dollars. Property damage and natural gas cost are adjusted using the Consumer Price Index for property damage and the Energy Information Administration 

data for delivered gas cost. The PHMSA graph below shows the trend of ‘‘significant 

incidents’’ on natural gas transmission pipelines since 1989. It is worth noting that 

the spike in ‘‘significant incidents’’ reported in 2005 reflects the pipeline damage 

caused by hurricanes Rita and Katrina. Property damage jumped from an average 

of $40 million a year (2005 dollars) to over $220 million in 2005. It is interesting 

to note that over 75 percent of these property damage costs associated with gas 

transmission pipeline incidents are either damage to the pipeline operator’s facilities 

or the value of the natural gas lost (i.e., these are not damages to third-party property). 

As with the serious incidents, it is informative to understand the causes of these 

significant incidents so that technology and management practices can be focused 

on preventing future incidents. For example, periodic inspections using smart pig 

technology are effective at discovering ‘‘time dependent’’ defects, such as corrosion, 

before they result in significant incidents. Periodic inspections, however, are not effective in preventing ‘‘time independent’’ incidents such as external force (i.e., excavation and weather-related damage). The pie chart below depicts the causes of the 

reported significant incidents. 


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36 

One note on the reportable incident statistics. From the raw data on reportable 

natural gas transmission accidents over the last 10 years, it could be concluded that 

the safety of natural gas transmission pipelines has deteriorated, especially over the 

last 6 years. This conclusion would be misleading, however, because the increase in 

the commodity value of natural gas has skewed the number of reportable incidents. 

As noted earlier, ‘‘reportable incidents’’ include those in which property damage exceeds $50,000 including the value of the natural gas lost in the incident. Natural 

gas commodity prices have increased by over 200 percent since 2000, and this has 

significantly affected the number of incidents where property damage has exceeded 

the $50,000 threshold. In examining the natural gas transmission integrity management program, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) noted this anomaly (in 

report 06–946) and suggested that DOT amend the reporting criteria to eliminate 

the linkage to natural gas commodity prices. While the establishment of the significant and serious incidents categories by PHMSA accurately depicts incident trends, 

INGAA agrees that the recommendation by GAO would provide more accurate and 

useful accident data. 

The Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 and Integrity Management 

While the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act of 2002 (PSIA) focused on a variety 

of issues (including operator qualification programs, public education, and population encroachment on pipeline rights-of-way), the most significant provision of the 

2002 reauthorization law that would improve long-term pipeline safety was the ‘‘Integrity Management Program’’ (IMP) for natural gas transmission pipelines. 

Section 14 of the PSIA requires operators of natural gas transmission pipelines 

to: (1) identify all the segments of their pipelines located in ‘‘high consequence 

areas’’ (areas adjacent to significant population); (2) develop an integrity management program to reduce the risks to the public in these high consequence areas; (3) 

undertake baseline integrity assessments (inspections) at all pipeline segments located in high consequence areas, to be completed within 10 years of enactment; (4) 

develop a process for making repairs to any anomalies found as a result of these 

inspections; and (5) reassess these segments of pipeline at least every 7 years thereafter in order to verify continued pipe integrity. 

The PSIA requires that these integrity inspections be performed by one of the following methods: (1) an internal inspection device (or a ‘‘smart pig’’); (2) hydrostatic 

pressure testing (filling the pipe with water and pressurizing it well above operating 

pressures to verify a safety margin); (3) direct assessment (digging up and visually 

inspecting sections of pipe selected based on various electronic measurements and 

other characteristics); or (4) ‘‘other alternative methods that the Secretary of Transportation determines would provide an equal or greater level of safety.’’ The pipeline 

operator is required by regulations implementing the 2002 law to repair all non-innocuous imperfections and adjust operation and maintenance practices to minimize 

‘‘reportable incidents.’’ For natural gas transmission pipelines, internal inspection 

devices are the primary means for assessing integrity because, when they can be 

used, such devices are more versatile and efficient. The other assessment methods 

enumerated in the reauthorization law are useful when smart pig technology cannot 

be effectively used. A drawback associated with such alternatives is that they require a pipeline to cease or significantly curtail gas delivery operations for a period. 

There are some practical issues that must be addressed in order to utilize ‘‘smart 

pig’’ inspection devices more fully: 

• First, older pipelines were not engineered to accept such inspection devices because these pipelines often were built with tight pipe bends, or non-full pipe diameter valves, continuous sections of pipe with varying diameters, and side lateral piping. While these features do not impede the movement of natural gas 

through the pipeline (because natural gas can be compressed), moving a solid 

object through such pipelines is another matter. These older pipeline systems 

must be modified to allow the use of internal inspection devices. 

• Another legacy issue is modifying pipelines to launch and receive internal inspection devices. Since a pipeline is buried underground for virtually its entire 

length, the installation of above-ground pig launchers and receivers is usually 

done at or near other above-ground locations, such as compressor stations. Occasionally, however, new sites must be obtained for these facilities. Compressor 

stations are typically located along the pipeline at a spacing of 75 to 100 miles 

apart. Therefore, a set of launchers and receivers must be installed for every 

pipeline segment between compressor stations because the inspection device 

cannot go through a compressor. Once installed, these launchers and receivers 

can usually remain in place permanently. 

37 

Surveys conducted by our industry about 5 years ago suggested that almost onethird of transmission pipeline mileage could immediately accommodate smart pigs, 

another one-quarter could accommodate smart pigs with the addition of permanent 

or temporary launching and receiving facilities, and the remainder, about 40–45 

percent, would either require extensive modifications or never be able to accommodate smart pigs due to the physical or operational characteristics of the pipeline. 

Scheduling these extensive modifications to minimize consumer delivery impacts 

has been one of the most challenging aspects of the integrity management program. 

The natural gas pipeline industry will use hydrostatic pressure testing and direct 

assessment for segments of transmission pipeline that cannot be modified to accommodate smart pigs, or in other special circumstances. There are issues worth noting 

with both hydrostatic testing and direct assessment. In the case of hydrostatic testing, an entire section of pipeline must be taken out of service for an extended period 

of time, limiting the ability to deliver gas to downstream customers and potentially 

causing market disruptions as a result. In addition, hydrostatic testing—filling a 

pipeline up with water at great pressure to see if the pipe fails—is a destructive 

or ‘‘go—no go’’ testing method that must take into account pipeline characteristics 

so that it does not exacerbate some conditions while resolving others. Also, because 

of this ‘‘go—no go’’ nature, testing must go on continuously until the segment successfully completes the test, generally 8 hours at pressure, with no leaks or failures. 

Direct assessment is generally defined as an inspection method whereby statistically chosen sections of pipe are excavated and visually inspected at certain distance intervals along the pipeline right-of-way based on sophisticated above ground 

electrical survey measurements that predict problem areas. The amount of excavation and subsequent disturbance of landowner’s property involved with this technology is significant and does not decrease with future reassessments. Disturbing 

other infrastructure, including roads and other utilities, also creates a risk and an 

inconvenience for the public. 

Finally, while the pipeline modifications and inspection activity generally can follow a pre-arranged schedule, repair work is an unpredictable factor. A pipeline operator does not know ahead of time how many anomalies an inspection will find, how 

severe such anomalies will be, and how quickly they must be repaired. Only the 

completed inspection data can provide such information. Repair work often requires 

systems to be shut down even if the original inspection work did not effect system 

operations. The unpredictable nature of repair work must be kept in mind, especially during the baseline inspection period, when it can be expected the number of 

required repairs to be the greatest. 

Integrity Management Progress to Date 

The integrity management program mandated by the PSIA is performing very 

well. The program is doing what Congress intended; that is, verifying the safety of 

gas transmission pipelines located in populated areas and identifying and removing 

potential problems before they occur. Based on 2 years of data, the trend is that 

natural gas transmission pipelines are safe and becoming safer. 

PHMSA immediately initiated a rulemaking to implement the gas integrity requirements upon enactment of PSIA in December of 2002. The Administration successfully met the one-year deadline set by the law for issuing a final IMP rule. 

Therefore, 2004 was the first full year of what will end up being a nine-year baseline testing period (the statute mandates that baseline tests on all pipeline segments in high consequence areas must be completed by December of 2012). 

PHMSA’s final rule credits pipeline companies for some integrity assessments completed before the rule took effect, thereby mitigating the effects of the shorter baseline period. 

PHMSA has summarized the progress achieved through 2005 as follows: 

1. Total Gas Transmission Mileage in the United States—There are 295,665 

miles of gas transmission pipeline in the U.S. (INGAA’s members own approximately 200,000 miles of this total, with the remainder being owned by 

intrastate transmission systems or local distribution companies.) 

2. Total High Consequence Area (HCA) Mileage—There are 20,191 miles of 

pipeline in HCAs (i.e., mileage subject to gas integrity rule). This represents 

about 7 percent of total mileage. 

3. HCA Pipeline Miles Inspected through 2005— 

• 2004—3,979 miles (incorporated some prior inspections before rule took effect). 

• 2005—2,744 miles. 

38 

• Therefore, 6,723 miles of HCA pipeline inspected to date, or 33 percent of 

total. 

4. Total Pipeline Miles Inspected (including non-HCA pipeline)— 

• 2004—30,452 miles (7.65 to 1 over-test ratio). 

• 2005—19,884 miles (7.24 to 1 over-test ratio). 

• Therefore, 50,366 total miles, or approximately 17 percent of total transmission pipeline mileage. 

The total HCA pipeline mileage inspected to date suggests that the industry is 

generally on track to meet the 10-year baseline requirement. With 3 years of the 

baseline period completed at the end of 2005, about 30 percent of the HCA mileage 

had been inspected. This translates into 10 percent being completed annually—exactly the volume of work needed in order to meet the baseline requirement. 

The 2002 law also required a risk-based prioritization of these HCA assessments 

so that higher-ranking HCA pipeline segments would be scheduled for assessment 

within 5 years of enactment. This means that by December of 2007, the industry 

must complete at least half of the total HCA assessments, by mileage; and that 

work contains the segments with the highest probability of failure. Again, we appear to be on track for meeting this requirement. 

The mileage counted as being assessed in 2004 is higher than what we anticipate 

will be the average annual mileage going forward because the industry was able to 

include some HCA segments that had been inspected in the few years immediately 

prior to the rule taking effect. As mentioned, this jump-started the program and 

compensated some for the fact that the final IMP rule did not take effect until December of 2003, thus reducing the de facto baseline period to 9 years. 

The vast majority of the assessments to date have been completed using smart 

pig devices. As discussed, these devices can only operate across large segments of 

pipeline—typically between two compressor stations. A 100-mile segment of pipeline 

may, for example, only contain 5 miles of HCA, but in order to assess that 5 miles 

of HCA, the entire 100-mile segment between compressor stations must be assessed. 

This dynamic is resulting in a large amount of ‘‘over-testing’’ on gas transmission 

systems. While it has completed assessments on 6,723 miles of HCA pipe thus far, 

the industry actually has inspected over 50,000 miles of pipe up through 2005 in 

order to capture the HCA segments. Any problems identified as a result of inspections, whether in an HCA or not, are repaired. 

In summary, while only about 7 percent of total gas transmission pipeline mileage 

is located in HCAs, it is anticipated that, due to over-testing situations, about 55 

to 60 percent of total transmission mileage actually will be inspected during the 

baseline period. 

In addition, PHMSA has made the data available for the first half of the 2006. 

This shows that an additional 1,885 miles of natural gas transmission line in HCAs 

were inspected during this period, keeping the program on track to meet its target. 

Now let us look at what the integrity inspections have found through 2005. This 

data focuses on information from HCA segments since these segments are the only 

ones specifically covered under the integrity management program. 

1. Reportable Incidents in HCAs (in 20,191 miles) 

• 2004—9 (2 time-dependent). 

• 2005—10 (0 time-dependent). 

2. Leaks (too small to be classified as a reportable incident) in HCAs (in 20,191 

miles) 

• 2004—117 (29 time-dependent). 

• 2005—104 (20 time-dependent). 

3. Immediate Repairs in HCAs Found by Inspections (repair within 5 days) 

• 2004—101 (3,979 miles inspected). 

• 2005—237 (2,744 miles inspected). 

4. Scheduled Repairs in HCAs Found by Inspections (repair generally within 1 

year) 

• 2004—595 (3,979 miles inspected). 

• 2005—403 (2,744 miles inspected). 

Time-dependent defects are separated out in the data for incidents and leaks because these types of defects are the prime target of reassessment under the integrity 

management program. By time-dependent, we mean problems with the pipeline that 

develop and grow over time and, therefore, can be managed by reinspecting on a 

periodic basis. The most prevalent time-dependent defect is corrosion; therefore, the 

39 

IMP effort focuses most intently on corrosion identification and mitigation. These 

same assessments might also be able to identify other pipeline defects such as original construction defects or excavation damage. Original construction defects (stable 

defects) are usually found and addressed during post-construction inspections; any 

construction defects found with this new, more sensitive inspection technology would 

be fixed ‘‘for good’’ so that future assessments looking for these types of anomalies 

will be unnecessary. Most reportable incidents caused by excavation damage (more 

than 85 percent of the incidents in these HCA areas during this time period) result 

in an immediate pipeline failure, so periodic assessments are unlikely to reduce the 

number of these types of time-independent incidents in any significant way. Periodic 

assessments on a reasonable schedule are, therefore, most effective for time-dependent defects. 

The number of incidents associated with time-dependent defects in HCA areas is 

fairly low, and these reportable incidents (e.g., one reportable incident per year average) have occurred in HCA areas not yet assessed under this program. As critical 

time-dependent defects are found and repaired, these incident and leak numbers 

should approach zero since the gestation period for these defects is significantly 

longer than the reassessment interval. 

As for repairs, we have identified the number of ‘‘immediate’’ and ‘‘scheduled’’ repairs that have been generated by the IMP inspections through 2005. These are 

anomalies in pipelines that have not resulted in a reportable incident or leak but 

are repaired as a precautionary measure. ‘‘Immediate repairs’’ and ‘‘scheduled repairs’’ are defined terms under both PHMSA regulations and engineering standards. 

As the name suggests, immediate repairs require immediate action by the operator 

due to the higher probability of a reportable incident or leak in the future. Scheduled repair situations are those that require repair within a longer time period because of their lower probability of failure. 

Even though it is early in the baseline assessment period, the data suggest a very 

positive conclusion regarding present state of the gas transmission pipeline system 

and the effectiveness of the integrity management programs. ‘‘Immediate repairs’’ 

in HCAs removed 50 anomalies for every 1,000 pipeline miles inspected. ‘‘Scheduled 

repairs’’ removed an additional 140 anomalies per 1,000 miles inspected. By completing these immediate and scheduled repairs in a timely fashion, the pipeline industry is reducing the possibility of future reportable incidents or leaks. Also, data 

from operators who have completed more than one such periodic assessment over 

a number of years strongly suggests there will be a dramatic decrease in time-dependent defects requiring repairs the second time around. 

For the inspections that have occurred during the first half of 2006, the trend is 

continuing with removing 38 ‘‘immediate’’ anomalies and 50 ‘‘scheduled’’ anomalies 

for every 1,000 miles inspected. 

Many of the gas pipelines being inspected under this program are 50 to 60 years 

old. While is it often hard for non-engineers to accept, well-maintained pipelines can 

operate safely for many decades. Policymakers often compare pipelines to vehicles 

and ask questions such as: Would you fly in a 50-year-old airplane? From an engineering standpoint, the comparison to aircraft or automobiles is an unsound one. 

Natural gas pipelines are built to be robust and are not subject to the same operational stresses as vehicles. Much of the above inspection data comes from pipelines 

that were built in the 1940s and 1950s. And yet, the number of anomalies found 

on a per-mile basis is low. Once these anomalies are repaired, the ‘‘clock can be 

reset’’ and these pipelines can operate safely and reliably for many additional decades. One important benefit of the integrity management program is the verification 

and re-establishment of the known safety factors on these older pipeline systems. 

Issues for the 2006 Reauthorization 

The PSIA authorized the Federal pipeline safety program at the Department of 

Transportation through Fiscal Year 2006, and it has, therefore, expired. INGAA 

would like the Committee to consider amendments addressing three issues in the 

pipeline safety law. Each of these would achieve an evolutionary change in the current pipeline safety program: (1) reconsideration of the seven-year reassessment interval, to one based instead upon a more reasoned, data-driven and scientific approach; (2) improvements in state excavation damage prevention programs; and (3) 

change in the jurisdictional status for direct sales lateral lines. 

Seven-Year Reassessment Interval 

Under the PSIA, gas transmission pipeline operators have 10 years in which to 

conduct baseline integrity assessments on all pipeline segments located in HCAs. 

Operators are also required by law to begin reassessing previously-inspected pipe 

7 years after the initial baseline and every 7 years thereafter. PHMSA has interVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:50 Jun 22, 2011 Jkt 066984 PO 00000 Frm 00043 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\66984.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
40 

preted these two requirements to mean that, for those segments baseline-inspected 

in 2003 through 2005 (including those for which a prior assessment is relied upon), 

reassessments must be done in years 2010 through 2012—even though baseline inspections are still being conducted. 

In 2001, INGAA provided Congress with a proposed industry consensus standard 

on reassessment intervals that had been developed by the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME). The ASME standard used several criteria to determine 

a reassessment interval for a particular segment of pipe, such as the operating pressure of a pipe relative to its strength and the type of inspection technique used. This 

standard relied upon authoritative technical analyses and a ‘‘decision matrix’’ based 

on more than 50 years of operational and performance data for gas pipelines. 

For most natural gas transmission pipelines (operating at high pressures), the 

ASME standard proposed a conservative 10-year reassessment interval. The standard suggested longer inspection intervals for lower pressure lines (a small number 

of pipelines that are lower in risk due to their lower operating pressures). The 

standard also suggested shorter intervals for pipeline segments operating in higherrisk environments, including those where unusually aggressive corrosion would be 

more likely to occur. Recent and past pipeline inspection data confirms that the 

ASME criteria are conservative. 

There are several reasons for being concerned about whether the seven-year reassessment interval is appropriate. First, there is the ‘‘overlap’’ in years 2010 through 

2012. The ability to meet the required volume of inspections is daunting given the 

limited number of inspection contractors and equipment available. In addition, this 

stepped-up level of inspection activity would be difficult to accommodate without effecting gas system deliverability. This last point is critical. Some assume that we 

are focusing on the re-assessment interval only because of the costs to industry. In 

fact, our costs will be modest compared to the potential costs to consumers in the 

form of higher natural gas commodity prices if pipeline capacity becomes too constrained. Some regions of the country can handle more frequent reductions in pipeline deliverability due to the volume of pipeline capacity serving those regions. The 

Chicago region and the Gulf Coast, for example, are better equipped to handle frequent pipeline capacity interruptions due to the abundance of pipeline capacity in 

those regions. Other regions, such as the Northeast and Southern California, face 

greater risk that gas commodity prices will spike if pipeline capacity is reduced too 

often. These downstream market effects should be carefully considered, especially 

during the baseline inspection period when pipeline modifications (to accommodate 

inspection equipment), inspections, and repair work will all be at peak levels. 

Some also suggest that if the pipeline industry is technically capable of inspecting 

its lines for corrosion more frequently than engineering standards suggest, it should 

do so and not worry about the costs or the logistics. It is certainly true that large 

interstate pipelines could, in fact, be inspected more frequently than every 7 years, 

especially once systems have been modified to accommodate smart pig devices. But 

just because pipelines can be inspected more often does not mean it is rational to 

require a one-size-fits-all inspection policy. Most automobile manufacturers recommend vehicle oil changes every 3,000 miles. Congress could instead mandate that 

all vehicles have oil changes every 1,000 miles, but, of course, there would be little, 

if any, additional benefit to the more frequent oil changes, and the costs associated 

with the more frequent oil changes would take money away from other, more beneficial maintenance activities. 

The integrity management program requires that the industry identify and mitigate risks to the public associated with operating our pipelines. Inspections are but 

one tool to achieve that end and they do not accomplish all of the required goals 

of the program. The inspections carried out pursuant to the integrity management 

program focus primarily on one cause of pipeline accidents—corrosion. Corrosion 

causes about 25 percent of the failures on gas transmission lines. What about the 

other 75 percent of accidents? What can be done to mitigate the risks of those? A 

credible and effective integrity management program prioritizes risks and develops 

strategies for addressing all risks. A program that mandates system-wide inspections too frequently can seriously affect an operator’s ability to perform even more 

frequent inspections at the very few locations that may warrant shorter time-frames 

and may detract from other important integrity activities such as damage prevention. Focusing attention and resources on unnecessarily frequent inspections may 

also lead to a false sense of security that such inspections are addressing all significant threats to pipeline safety. 

We recognize that some lawmakers may be hesitant to change to the seven-year 

reassessment interval given the debate on this issue in 2002. The authors of the 

PSIA realized this discussion would be ongoing and requested that the Government 

Accountability Office (GAO) review this issue. GAO has completed its report (Report 

41 

06–945) and has concluded that the fixed re-inspection interval (i.e., 7 years) is too 

conservative for the majority of the natural gas transmission pipelines and, therefore, has recommended intervals be based on risk and engineering analysis. INGAA 

concurs with the GAO recommendation. The baseline assessments already underway are yielding valuable information from which to make reasoned decisions about 

re-assessment intervals going forward. INGAA therefore urges the Congress to address the reassessment issue in this reauthorization bill. As the GAO stated in its 

report, there is no compelling reason to wait and address this issue at a later time— 

the facts already support a risk-based program of re-assessments. 

Damage Prevention 

In 1998, the Transportation Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA–21) highway 

legislation included a relatively modest program called the ‘‘One-Call Notification 

Act.’’ The goal of this legislation was to improve the quality and effectiveness of 

state one-call (or ‘‘call-before-you-dig’’) damage prevention programs. By developing 

Federal minimum standards and then giving grants to those states that adopted the 

minimum standards, this law contributed to improving damage prevention efforts 

all across the Nation. And it did so without mandating that states adopt the Federal 

minimum standards. 

Over the last 8 years, there has been a great deal of improvement in damage prevention. INGAA believes that the time has come to take these efforts to the next 

level. Excavation damage prevention has been, and should remain, a major focus for 

pipeline safety. On gas transmission pipelines, accidental damage from excavation 

equipment is the leading cause of fatalities and injuries. The majority of incidents 

that have raised public and Congressional concern have been due to excavation 

damage. These accidents are the most preventable of all, and better communication 

between pipeline companies, excavators and the public is the key to such accident 

prevention. Despite all the progress that has been made since 1998, some excavators 

still do not call before they dig. 

Unfortunately, there was a fatal accident involving excavation damage to one of 

our member company pipelines just last week in Wyoming. While the investigation 

is still in progress, it is not unreasonable to assume that there was at least some 

level of misunderstanding between the excavator and the pipeline operator. With 

the right level of communication and understanding, however, these accidents are 

avoidable. 

One state, in particular, has developed an outstanding damage prevention program based on improved communication, information management, and performance monitoring and enforcement. That state is Virginia. Not only does Virginia require broad participation by all utilities and excavators, but also it has effective 

public education programs and effective enforcement of its rules. INGAA believes 

that effective enforcement is the most important element to improving state programs beyond the progress already made, and we believe Virginia offers a model 

for other states to adopt. Statistics demonstrate the success of the Virginia program—the state has experienced a 50 percent decrease in the excavation damage 

since implementing its program. 

For 2006, INGAA asks the Congress to emphasize once again the importance of 

excavation damage prevention by including a new program of incentives for state 

action. A modest amount of focused grant funds could go a long way to encourage 

states to improve the content and enforcement of their damage prevention programs. 

Safety Regulation of Direct Sales Laterals 

One of the goals of the original Pipeline Safety Act enacted in 1968 was to establish a clear line of demarcation between Federal and state authority to enforce pipeline safety regulations. Prior to 1968, many states had established their own safety 

requirements for interstate natural gas pipelines, and there was no particular consistency in such regulations across the states. This created compliance problems for 

interstate pipeline operators whose facilities crossed multiple states. The Pipeline 

Safety Act resolved this conflict by investing the U.S. Department of Transportation 

with exclusive jurisdiction over interstate pipeline safety while delegating to the 

states authority to regulate intrastate pipeline systems (generally, pipelines whose 

facilities are wholly within a single state). 

The statutory definition of an ‘‘interstate gas pipeline facility’’ subject to Federal 

regulation was clarified further when the Congress reauthorized the Pipeline Safety 

Act in 1976 (Pub. L. 94–477). As part of this clarification, the Congress stated that 

‘‘direct sales’’ lateral pipelines were not subject to Federal jurisdiction. Direct sales 

laterals are typically smaller-diameter pipelines that connect a large-diameter interstate transmission pipeline to a single, large end-use customer, such as a power 

42 

plant or a factory. Such direct sales laterals often are owned and maintained by the 

interstate transmission pipeline operator to which they are connected. 

This clarification was made necessary by a 1972 U.S. Supreme Court decision 

(Federal Power Commission v. Louisiana Power and Light, 406 U.S. 621) in which 

the Court ruled that for purposes of economic regulation (i.e., rate regulation), direct 

sales laterals were subject to preemptive Federal jurisdiction. This ruling created 

uncertainty regarding the authority to regulate the safety of direct sales laterals because when the Pipeline Safety Act was enacted in 1968, it was assumed by the 

Congress that such pipelines would be subject to both economic and safety regulation at the state level. 

While this exemption from Federal jurisdiction may have made sense 30 years 

ago, it now is an anachronism. As mentioned, many of these direct sales laterals 

are owned and operated by interstate pipelines. The natural gas transported in such 

lines travels in interstate commerce, and the lateral lines are extensions of the 

interstate pipelines to which they are interconnected. 

Additionally, interstate natural gas pipelines are now subject to the PHMSA’s Gas 

Integrity Management Program and are required to undergo a specific regimen of 

Congressionally-mandated inspections and safety verification. State-regulated pipelines are not covered under the Federal program. Instead, states are allowed to create their own safety programs, which may have different processes/procedures covered than the Federal integrity management program. Given the comprehensive 

Federal program, there is no particular reason for small segments of the interstate 

pipeline system to be subject to differing and potentially inconsistent regulation at 

the state level. The inefficiency of this approach is further compounded by the fact 

that an interstate pipeline operator with direct sales laterals in multiple states likely will be subject to inconsistent regulation across the states. It is therefore understandable that interstate pipelines wish to have their direct sales laterals subject 

to the same Federal integrity management requirements as mainline facilities. This 

would ensure a consistent and rational approach to integrity management systemwide, in contrast to being compelled to exclude parts of the pipeline network on the 

basis of an outdated set of definitions. 

INGAA supports amending the definitions of ‘‘interstate gas pipeline facilities’’ 

and ‘‘intrastate gas pipeline facilities’’ in the Pipeline Safety Act to eliminate the 

jurisdictional distinction between direct sales laterals and other segments of an operator’s interstate natural gas pipeline system. This would make such segments of 

pipeline subject to Federal safety regulation consistent with the approach taken for 

the economic regulation of such pipeline facilities. 

Direct sales laterals that are not owned by an interstate pipeline would still be 

regulated by states. This amendment also would have the benefit of permitting the 

states to concentrate their resources on developing and enforcing integrity management programs for their natural gas distribution lines. 

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, thank you once again for inviting INGAA to participate in today’s 

hearing. I would like to provide some written comments on S. 3961 for the record. 

INGAA has made the reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Act a top legislative priority, and we want to work with you and the Committee to move a bill forward as 

soon as possible. Please let us know if you have any additional questions, or need 

additional information. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Boss. Mr. Bender? 

STATEMENT OF E. FRANK BENDER, VICE PRESIDENT, 

GAS DISTRIBUTION AND NEW BUSINESS DIVISION, 

BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY; ON BEHALF OF 

THE AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION AND 

THE AMERICAN PUBLIC GAS ASSOCIATION 

Mr. BENDER. Thank you, Senator. 

Good morning, I’m pleased to appear before you today and would 

like to thank the Committee for convening this hearing on the important topic of pipeline safety. My name is Frank Bender, I’m Vice 

President of Gas Distribution and New Business at Baltimore Gas 

and Electric Company, and we deliver natural gas to 634,000 customers in Maryland. 

43 

I’m testifying today on behalf of the American Gas Association, 

and the American Public Gas Association. Together, AGA and 

APGA represent more than 850 local gas utilities serving more 

than 56 million customers nationwide. 

I’d like to begin my testimony by first commending the Committee, particularly Chairman Stevens and Co-Chairman Inouye 

and their staffs, as well as Senators Lott and Lautenberg, for putting together what we believe is a good legislative proposal. We 

hope that the Committee will act quickly to get a bill passed this 

year. 

In our opinion, the Pipeline Safety Act of 2002 has been working 

well, and only minor adjustments should be considered at this 

point, with one exception. Our companies have identified one major 

area we believe requires considerable improvement, and that is excavation damage prevention. 

The term ‘‘excavation’’ as I use it here, and as defined by the Department of Transportation in its regulations includes all types of 

digging, demolition, tunneling or construction activities. 

Congressional attention to more effective state excavation damage programs can and will result in real, measurable decreases in 

the number of incidences occurring on natural gas distribution 

pipelines each year. Excavation damage is the single-largest cause 

of natural gas distribution pipeline incidents, and we are very 

pleased that S. 3961 addresses this very important issue. 

I’m pleased to report here also today that natural gas utilities do 

a good job in minimizing incidents that they can control. The 

record shows that between 2002 and 2005, 82 percent of all reported incidents were the result of excavation damages by a thirdparty, not under the control of the utility. In many cases, the typical ‘‘little or no control’’ incident involves a party that is even outside the jurisdiction of authorities overseeing pipeline safety. 

Most unfortunately, during this same 4-year period, incidents 

due to third-party excavation more than doubled. Excavation damage thus represents the single greatest threat to distribution system safety, reliability and integrity. AGA and APGA are pleased 

that the provisions of S. 3961 outline nine elements of an effective 

state damage prevention program in the legislation, and provide for 

additional funding for state implementation of the program. The 

Associations also urge Congress to provide continued funding authority over the upcoming reauthorization period for grants to 

states to support One-Call programs, and to the Common Ground 

Alliance. 

I might digress a minute and say while I was sitting here, I received a page saying that there was a gas main struck by thirdparty excavation in Laurel and 37 homes are impacted. This is not 

an unusual occurrence. I get sometimes one, sometimes two, sometimes even three of these a day. 

The other issues of importance I would like to highlight briefly 

for the Committee have to do with gas transmission pipeline integrity management, and pipeline controller fatigue management. 

With regards to pipeline integrity, GAO suggests allowing operators to reassess their systems at intervals based on technical data, 

risk factors and engineering analyses. AGA and APGA agree with 

using technically-based assessment intervals. 

44 

Finally, AGA and APGA support the proposed directive that DOT 

proscribe standards to reduce risk associated with managing fatigue in pipeline controllers. However, we are concerned about the 

possibility of complex regulations on ‘‘mandatory’’ working hours. 

DOT, in fact, recently held a public meeting on that topic, and the 

excellent information exchanged served to reinforce our belief that 

controller functions in the natural gas transmission, hazardous liquid and gas distribution industries are too diverse to be addressed 

by a one-size-fits-all regulation. 

In summary, AGA and APGA believe that Congressional passage 

of Pipeline Safety reauthorization this year will result in timely 

and significant distribution system safety improvements. We commend the Committee for putting together a solid bill and commit 

to working with you to secure passage of the final bill this year. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bender follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF E. FRANK BENDER, VICE PRESIDENT, GAS DISTRIBUTION

AND NEW BUSINESS DIVISION, BALTIMORE GAS AND ELECTRIC COMPANY; ON

BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN GAS ASSOCIATION AND THE AMERICAN PUBLIC GAS

ASSOCIATION

Good morning, I am pleased to appear before you today and would like to thank 

the Committee for convening this hearing on the important topic of pipeline safety. 

My name is Frank Bender, I am Vice President of Gas Distribution and New Business Division of Baltimore Gas and Electric Company, a subsidiary of Constellation 

Energy. BG&E delivers natural gas to 634,000 customers in Maryland. 

I am testifying today on behalf of the American Gas Association (AGA) and the 

American Public Gas Association (APGA). Together AGA and APGA represent more 

than 850 local natural gas utilities serving more than 56 million customers nationwide. 

I would like to begin my testimony by first commending the Committee, particularly Chairman Stevens and Co-Chairman Inouye and their staffs, as well as Senators Lott and Lautenberg, for putting together what we believe is a good legislative 

proposal. We hope that the Committee will act quickly to get a bill passed this year. 

In our opinion the Pipeline Safety Act of 2002 has been working well and only 

minor adjustments should be considered at this point with one exception. Our companies have identified one major area we believe requires considerable improvement: excavation damage prevention. Congressional attention to more effective state 

excavation damage programs can and will, result in real, measurable decreases in 

the number of incidents occurring on natural gas distribution pipelines each year. 

Excavation damage is the single largest cause of natural gas distribution pipeline incidents—and we are very pleased that S. 3961 addresses this very important issue. 

There are two kinds of incidents involving natural gas distribution systems: Those 

caused by factors the pipeline operator can to some extent control (such as improper 

welds, material defects, incorrect operation, corrosion or excavation damage by a 

utility’s contractor) and those caused by external forces, which are due to factors the 

pipeline has little or limited ability to control, such as excavation damage by a 

third-party, earth movement, floods, vandalism, lightning and structure fires). 

The term ‘‘excavation’’ as I use it here and as defined by the Department of Transportation in its regulations includes demolition, excavation, tunneling or construction activities. Excavation is wide spread—from directional boring for new cable 

lines to installation of fences. 

I am pleased to report here today that natural gas utilities do a good job in minimizing incidents that they can control. 

The record shows that between 2002 and 2005, 82 percent of all reported incidents were the result of excavation damage by a third-party or other factors the 

utility company had little or no control over. In many cases, the typical ‘‘little or 

no control’’ incident involves a party that is outside the jurisdiction of authorities 

overseeing pipeline safety. 

However—and most unfortunately—during the same four-year period, incidents 

due to 3rd party excavation more than doubled. Excavation damage thus represents 

the single greatest threat to distribution system safety, reliability and integrity. 

45 

The Common Ground Alliance (CGA) is a member-driven organization dedicated 

to ensuring public safety by reducing damage to underground facilities. Along with 

pipeline operators, the CGA membership includes excavators, locators, road builders, electric utilities, telecommunications, regulators and other stakeholders. Efforts 

by the Common Ground Alliance damage prevention organization, such as the nationwide education program to educate the citizenry about the three-digit One Call 

‘‘8-1-1’’ number to prevent excavation damage, are steps in the right direction. But 

clearly more is needed. 

AGA and APGA are pleased that the provisions of S. 3961 outlines nine elements 

of an effective state damage prevention program in the legislation and provide for 

additional funding for state implementation of the program. 

Other issues of importance that I would like to highlight briefly for the Committee are: 

Gas Transmission Integrity Management 

The Department of Transportation and pipeline operators have put forth a tremendous amount of effort to implement the gas transmission pipeline integrity management requirements of the Pipeline Safety Act of 2002. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently issued a report on the subject of transmission integrity 

management reassessment intervals. The report states that the gas integrity management program appears to be working. 

The GAO also suggested allowing operators to reassess their systems at intervals 

based on technical data, risk factors and engineering analyses. AGA and APGA 

agree with using technically-based assessment intervals. 

Safety Orders 

AGA and APGA believe that the language in S. 3961 that allows a safety order 

to be issued for ‘‘any condition that poses a risk to public safety, property, or the 

environment’’ is overly broad. DOT already is using its authority to issue corrective 

action orders to enforce safety rules on facilities that are determined to present a 

hazard to life, property and the environment. 

Human Risk Factors Risk Management 

AGA and APGA support the proposed directive that DOT prescribe standards to 

reduce risks associated with fatigue, but we are concerned about the possible development of complex regulations on ‘‘mandatory’’ working hours. 

DOT recently held a public meeting on the topic, and the excellent information 

exchanged served to reinforce our belief that controller functions in the natural gas 

transmission, hazardous liquid, and distribution industries are too diverse to be addressed by a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ regulation. 

Funding for One Call Grants and the Common Ground Alliance 

AGA and APGA urge Congress to provide continued funding authority over the 

upcoming reauthorization period for grants to states to support One Call programs 

and to the Common Ground Alliance. 

Enforcement Transparency 

We support the idea of enhancing enforcement transparency, so long as due process is preserved and confidentiality during the administrative process of individual 

cases is protected. The Department of Transportation has a system where notices 

of probable violations are issued and operators are given an opportunity to promptly 

respond. If transparency during enforcement activities improves public confidence, 

we support enhancements with administrative due process. 

Summary 

AGA and APGA believe that Congressional passage of pipeline safety reauthorization this year will result in timely and significant distribution system safety improvements. We commend the Committee for putting together a solid bill, and commit to working with you to secure passage of a final bill this year. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well thank you all very much. We’re pleased 

with the general endorsement of the work we’ve done so far, Senator Inouye and I have agreed we will ask the staff to prepare the 

final draft and have a vote to report this bill out this afternoon, 

sometime after the vote around five o’clock. We’ll be prepared to go 

to conference with the House when we get back from having an opportunity for both the House and Senate staff to work on trying to 

46 

get a compromise ready for us so we can get it done for the 2 weeks 

we’re back in December. 

We generally thank you for your positive comments. None of you 

mentioned the certification by CEOs of the safety program—did 

any of you find objections to that provision? 

Mr. BOSS. No, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Good, thank you. 

It’s my understanding that there are a number of gas transmission lines in high consequence areas that cannot be pigged. And 

these are inspected using different methods. Is there anything 

that’s going to come forward—new technology or a new process or 

new procedure that will give us the same protection that pigging 

might give in those areas? Would any of you wish to comment on 

that? Mr. Bender? 

Mr. BENDER. Yes, sir, I’d like to comment. We have—even 

though we’re a distribution company—because we have about 150 

miles of distribution pipeline that operates at the pressure that requires that it comes under the transmission integrity management 

program. About 54 of those miles are in what we call high consequence areas. 

We actually have an improving, very effective means of detecting 

problems in that pipe with a process called Direct Assessment. In 

fact, the picture that Admiral Barrett had on display, that situation was discovered by using Direct Assessment, which is essentially measuring along the path of the pipe externally at the 

ground level with electronic sensing devices to determine defects 

and things of that nature. So we feel that pigging is not appropriate, and that’s of course what makes distribution systems so 

much different. 

Many of those lines in the distribution system don’t have alternate feeds, so if you have to shut down that line to pig, in all likelihood you’re inconveniencing customers and taking them out of 

service. So, the Direct Assessment technique is finding defects, so 

it is working, and we think in our case that technology is proving 

its effectiveness. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boss? 

Mr. BOSS. Yes, I agree with Frank on that subject. In my former 

life I worked as, handling research for pipeline integrity. That technology is very good, it is a flexible technology, so as new tools become available—and the key to this technology is the integration 

of separate tools to give you refined information about the location. 

And the way the regulation is designed it gives the flexibility as 

new technology comes along to incorporate it to improve it as we 

move forward. But we feel it’s a very effective technology in finding 

some of these things. 

The CHAIRMAN. In looking at what happened to our transit lines 

in Alaska, I was surprised to find that in places there was corrosion, erosion inside the pipeline that eliminated almost 80 percent 

of the thickness of the pipeline in a small location, but that’s what 

lead to the failure of the pipeline. 

I was told we’re developing some things like ultrasound and 

other things that will be able to locate that kind of a defect. Are 

you all working on similar technologies? Do you have similar problems? 

47 

Mr. BOSS. There have been extensive programs going on for 

many years with Pipeline Research Committee and GTI, PHMSA 

has a significant amount of funds that they are using for those 

technologies, and we are proving a lot of those technologies out. 

One thing, we’re a very conservative industry, we want to be sure 

the technology really does work before we do apply it, so there are 

a lot of efforts going that way. The thing that we had talked about 

on the Direct Assessment work is that it puts a very, a lot of rigor 

into the process, so that people do a very much step-by-step process 

which helps significantly. 

The CHAIRMAN. Would Direct Assessment find where the pipeline 

integrity has been weakened by corrosion and erosion inside? 

Mr. BOSS. There are standards for both external corrosion and 

internal corrosion, and like I said, the National Association of Corrosion Engineers have published this, those have been incorporated 

into the regulation and it’s a matter of using the right tools in combination with that rigorous process to help find some of those 

areas. 

The CHAIRMAN. It’s hard for this Senator to imagine the ability 

of using Direct Assessment on thousands of miles of pipe. That 

comes to my mind—how do you deal with thousands of miles of 

pipe and say that the system works? 

Mr. BENDER. In the case of distribution systems, pigging is just 

not a good option, so even though it is expensive to use Direct Assessment, we have found it a useful tool to do, you know, the miles 

that we have, at least as a distribution company under the Pipeline 

Integrity regulation. Distribution systems—if you looked at a distribution system on a map, essentially they would look like, almost 

like spaghetti, a lot of elbows, a lot of turns, a lot of regulators, a 

lot of valving, different sizes, different soil conditions, so Direct Assessment, we find, works. So, to Mr. Boss’s point, we’re not currently just using one method, we’re using three methods and correlating the effect. So, it’s not an inexpensive approach, but by the 

time we took customers out of service, by the time we had to deal 

with elbows and regulators and valving, Direct Assessment still 

would be less expensive than pigging, and more effective in our 

system than pigging. 

The CHAIRMAN. Most of those pipelines are buried, aren’t they? 

Mr. BENDER. That’s correct, Senator. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Boss? 

Mr. BOSS. Yes, and that’s a very important part of the 7-year reassessment. If you’re actually inspecting these lines quite a bit 

more often than you need to be, given the risk that’s involved with 

those, and the deterioration, the expense of doing this Direct Assessment process does not depreciate over the years, it’s a very, 

very expensive process. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lautenberg? 

Senator LAUTENBERG. We talked earlier about access to the mapping data. Now, I ask you, Mr. Weimer, and I asked Admiral Barrett about this as well—do you believe that there are valid security-related concerns about having more public access to the mapping? 

Mr. WEIMER. I guess my answer would be the same as Admiral 

Barrett’s that there probably are valid security concerns, depending 

48 

on the level of information provided. We’ve been having this argument in Washington State, because Washington State is about to 

put maps on the Internet live that they’ve went out and collected 

the data on themselves. And what they’re doing is providing just 

the maps of the line pipe and not all of the attributes on those 

pipes, so they’re not showing where the valves are and where the 

taps are and those types of things, they’re just showing a map at 

a 1-to-24,000 scale that would allow local governments to know 

where the maps run in relation to proposed housing developments 

and hospitals and schools and those types of things. And at that 

level, I don’t think that there is a security concern. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Yes, you know one of the things, unfortunately, in the age in which we now live, this question arises in 

many ways. For instance, chemical plant storage facilities, do you 

put out an alert to the community that these are highly dangerous 

facilities if attacked, incinerated in any way, and so we have to decide between safety from the routine causes, and that which could 

invite an attack of some sort. And I don’t think that you get by by 

not disclosing this information, this is of significant value. We talk 

about excavations being a primary cause of problems, accidents in 

pipes, and so I think it’s awful hard to eliminate public access to 

mapping. How do any of you feel about it? Is there a difference in 

view? 

Mr. FELT. Sir, I have a little bit of a concern, we will support the 

bill and whatever is finally decided, but we personally meet with 

the communities, we meet with the homeowners and homeowner’s 

associations, we spend considerable money trying to educate the 

public on the location of the pipeline and what to look out for on 

a pipeline. There are markers all over the place, and yes, the terrorists could see the markers, but so could the public. It’s been my 

experience—and I don’t say that this is the case all over—but we 

can meet with communities and they don’t seem to have a concern 

until there’s an issue. We’ve met with communities, for example, 

on new developments and shopping centers where people know 

there’s a pipeline there, they want to pave over it and they want 

to put a building right next to it. We’ve met with the local city 

council and expressed our opinions, but the developer would win 

out. Now, we’ve actually met with Mr. Weimer and some of his associates, and they’re going to help come to some of these communities and help educate them. Because until they have an accident, 

they don’t appreciate it. Having the maps there ahead of time, to 

me, makes it easier for someone looking to do damage by having 

access to the entire scope of all of the pipes in the country, which 

makes it easier for them—yes, they could do the research, but 

make them do the research. Someone interested in their local community is better off getting the information locally. We are very 

willing to have that information available to the communities and 

to the homeowners, I’m just not sure that the National Pipeline 

Mapping System—with too much information—is the best way to 

do that. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. There are questions raised, but as life has 

its risks, normally, crossing roads and that kind of thing, at some 

point I think we’re better off, we’ll continue to know what’s there, 

and to be able to take the precautions. And I think as has been 

49 

said, if the community is made aware of the fact that this is where 

these pipes run, but particularly on permits on excavation and so 

forth to be fairly reliably managed is a critical issue. 

Mr. Weimer, the excess flow valves—what do you think we might 

do to improve the bill with respect to requiring excess flow valves? 

First of all, are these—these are safety devices, not without cost. 

And, what’s the value in these? To try and implant these all over, 

especially in new construction? 

Mr. WEIMER. Right, this is one of the things that the National 

Transportation Safety Board has been recommending for some time 

that PHMSA hasn’t implemented, and PHMSA is going through 

the process, through the distribution integrity management program of looking at this. What the bill says, I think, is commendable 

and probably goes exactly where we want to go to encourage the 

criteria to be developed that requires these excess flow valves in 

just new pipelines and pipelines that are being replaced. Depending who you talk to, and excess flow valve costs from seven to thirty dollars, fifteen dollars is what we hear most of the time. So, if 

you’re putting in a new pipeline that’s already exposed, it’s not that 

costly to install one of those. 

The problem we saw with the bill is the language in there talks 

about the criteria would be based on feasibility and risk analysis, 

and that kind of provides a lot of wiggle room for a company to 

argue that it’s not feasible because of cost or not feasible because 

of some other reason. Where I think it should be turned around, 

let the company prove that it’s not feasible for their own system, 

and if they can’t prove that, then they should be installed. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Well, if the question of cost is really not 

significant you’re saying it is seven dollars—did I understand you 

correctly?′′ 

Mr. WEIMER. Yes, seven to thirty dollars is what the valve itself 

costs and then—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Are these things one per leg, close to the 

house or within the house? 

Mr. WEIMER. Typically it would be one per house between the 

main on the street and where the house is, because they operate, 

if the line is—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Tell me what you can do for seven dollars 

to put something in that’s not a—it’s obviously not a mechanical 

thing—seven—a soda pop almost costs seven bucks in some places. 

What do you get with a—? 

Mr. WEIMER. It’s a little valve that automatically shuts if the 

pressure breaks in the pipeline. So it shuts off the gas coming from 

the main to the house if there is excavation damage, or if a homeowner is out shoveling and breaks the—— 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Does it buildup pressure behind the valve? 

Mr. WEIMER. No, because that’s already, that pressure is already 

in that pipeline and it just stops it at that point so it doesn’t continue to leak into people’s basements or into the house, causing an 

explosion. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. It sounds like a pretty good investment, 

Mr. Bender? 

Mr. BENDER. I’d just like to say that AGA, APGA supports the 

legislation, the current wording in the legislation. We don’t conVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:50 Jun 22, 2011 Jkt 066984 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\66984.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
50 

sider cost when we’re talking about our customer’s safety, so the 

word feasibility to us means, although excess flow valves do work, 

there are certain conditions where they don’t work. If the gas pressure, if the house is on a low pressure main, which is essentially 

a third of a pound, it’s almost like puffing on a soda straw. Our 

belief and from the manufacturers of these excess flow valves is 

that you have to have at least 10 pounds of pressure for them to 

work. So, I think PHMSA’s approach is the right approach because 

you don’t want to mandate something where you could be redirecting that effort and those resources to something that could 

really make a difference. So we like the wording as it currently exists, and support PHMSA’s approach. 

I would say also that use of excess flow valves is increasing 

across the country by many utilities, and so I think utilities on 

their own are finding the benefit of excess flow valves and are introducing them in new construction as well and I’ve got to tell you, 

PHMSA’s made it pretty clear they expect to see the use of excess 

flow valves increase. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. What kind of a record do you have that 

highlights the number of incidents that result from excess pressure 

building up? Is that a frequent occurrence? 

Mr. BENDER. In our service territory, we’ve never seen a case 

where we thought an excess flow valve being installed would have 

prevented a house explosion. We’ve seen house explosions many 

times, people try to commit suicide, believe it or not, by disconnecting the gas line. But nationally I know down in Virginia, 

the case down in Virginia, was it Riding, Virginia? They felt that 

an excess flow valve would have prevented that there. So, we’re not 

disputing that. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. It’s not a high incidence of accident, I take 

it? Are there numbers of these reported where the pressure became 

excessive and an explosion or a fire resulted? 

Mr. WEIMER. If I can try to answer that, I think you could probably get the best accurate answer if you ask the National Transportation Safety Board to provide their information, they’ve been looking at that. Certainly as we’ve heard, third-party damage, excavation damage to these types of distribution pipelines is the highest cause of damage, so any time you have—between the main and 

the house—some kind of excavation damage, these valves can potentially save people’s lives. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. I have one last question, Mr. Chairman. 

The PHMSA inspections—do you support making the results of 

these inspections publicly available? 

Mr. WEIMER. I certainly support that, that was in our testimony. 

We don’t support everything, we don’t need to have the pig data 

and all of that stuff, but a basic cover sheet that talks about the 

company’s name, what section of the pipeline was inspected, what 

was found, when it was fixed, and the company’s response to that, 

so both sides of the stories are shown, seems like a relatively easy 

thing to put up along with the enforcement transparency that we’re 

talking about. That’s already done in certain states, I know in 

Washington State you can go onto the Internet, type in any company’s name, and all of the intrastate pipelines that Washington 

State is in control of, you can look at the inspection records. And 

51 

it helps, I think people realize how often pipelines are inspected 

and how good the companies are doing, so I think it would be a 

benefit to both the public and the company. 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Seems so to me. Any objection to—— 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pryor? 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARK PRYOR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ARKANSAS 

Senator PRYOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have a couple of 

questions for Mr. Boss, if I may, about the reassessment, which I 

understand—or assessment—as I understand that’s your term used 

for inspections and you, as I understand, you do not like the 7-year 

inspection. Is that arbitrary? Is that why you don’t like it? And you 

prefer kind of a risk-based formula, is that right? 

Mr. BOSS. Yes, Senator, there is an engineering consensus standard out there from the American Society of Mechanical Engineers 

that makes recommendations on how to do it. I would use an analogy, it basically gives you some idea on when to change the oil, 

every 3,000 miles. Right now as we’re looking at this, it’s looking 

to change our oil every thousand miles. We’re looking at a lot of 

new technology that will be very similar to some of the automobiles 

that basically tell you when to inspect this and turn to the findings. So, we think it’s very arbitrary and it’s taking a lot of investment to these areas that don’t need to be done at this time where 

we could use that investment otherwise. 

Senator PRYOR. I’d say from the regulators standpoint, it’s easier 

to have a flat rule, like a 7-year investment, you force industry to 

look every 7 years on every part of their system, and you have sort 

of done that and you know it’s up to standards and blah, blah, 

blah, it may be a little overkill, but it does seem to be a safe approach. From a regulator’s standpoint, or from an oversight standpoint from the government’s perspective, if you go into some different approach, some different formula, calculation, whatever it 

is—how does the public know that you are maintaining a safe pipeline? One of the things you’re saying is—7 years costs too much 

money. How does the public out there know, well, these pipeline 

companies aren’t going to skimp, and they’re going to push their 

pipeline safety issues out to the very edge, the very limit and 

maybe to the breaking point and maybe then your system is dangerous over time—what assurance does the public have there? 

Mr. BOSS. Well as mentioned in the GAO studies, there are extensive inspections that go on by PHMSA inspectors up to 3 weeks 

at a time with these different companies, look at these details. The 

engineering standards are built with a lot of different safety factors, to give an example, a table may say every 5 years, every 10 

years, every 15 years, simplifying that sort of thing, and there’s extensive work being used in all the international communities where 

the regulators look at, on a risk-based methodology, in Canada and 

also in Europe. 

Senator PRYOR. So, you like the risk-based because you get to 

look at each section of the pipe based on all of the circumstances 

around it, based on all of the circumstances around it, based on 

52 

whatever environmental circumstances and whatever capacity it 

has, and all of the various factors you take into consideration. 

Mr. BOSS. Senator, since 1953, the engineering standards had 

specific requirements for high-density population areas for natural 

gas transmission, PHMSA adopted those in regulation in the 

1970s. We’ve had risk-based standards for high population density 

areas. This program has added to that effort on the assessment 

area on that. 

Senator PRYOR. So, in other words, you’re comfortable with the 

risk-based assessment. 

Mr. BOSS. Yes, and there are limits and believe me, PHMSA is 

out there checking very hard to be sure things are being done 

right. 

Senator PRYOR. And in your industry, from your perspective, the 

7-year flat rule just doesn’t make a lot of sense. 

Mr. BOSS. No, there are some places where we may have to do 

it more often, there are some cases where we should be doing it at 

a longer period. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Bender, let me ask you in your testimony, 

you mention Section 15 of S. 3961 and you talk, I think you said 

it was a one-size-fits-all regulation. 

Mr. BENDER. Right. 

Senator PRYOR. I’d like to get a little more detail on your 

thoughts on that because the way I read it, and maybe I misunderstand it, but it looks like the approach that we’re taking actually 

recognizes the diversity and the varying circumstances on pipelines, so could you tell me what you mean by ‘‘one-size-fits-all?’’ 

Mr. BENDER. Thank you, Senator. The distribution systems and 

how they’re operated are different than liquid pipelines and gas 

transmission pipelines—the control rooms, the equipment, the 

pressures, the amount of gas that you’re moving, the risk of inappropriate action, the staffing of a control room, you may have two 

or three people in a control room, you may only have one person 

in a control room. To have a mandatory limit or prescription regarding schedules, and I guess the example I’ll give is we have 

three people normally in our control room and we, in flu season, 

somebody may call in sick. And if the mandatory restriction or window or plan has been submitted that an operator won’t work past 

8 hours, that would not be good for us because you’ve got to sometimes say, ‘‘Tell the operator that he or she may have to stay over 

and work a second shift.’’ Now that is within their realm of ability, 

it’s not a physical job and we do that frequently, and plus there are 

other people in the control room, there’s not a case where somebody’s going to be asleep at the throttle. 

Now I’m not saying there are cases where working a second shift 

wouldn’t be appropriate, depending on the circumstances of the 

staffing of the control room, of the system and what was going on 

in the system, so that’s when I say, really, one size doesn’t fit all, 

and that’s our concern. You know, it’s not, it’s just, we are just concerned that because the systems are different, we wouldn’t want to 

have very prescriptive regulation regarding the schedules. 

Senator PRYOR. Mr. Chairman, that’s all I have, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator. We thank you—all of you— 

for your testimony and for your support of our endeavors so far. 

53 

We’re going to do our best to get this bill passed this year, and 

we’ll be obviously in a period of some negotiation with the House 

when we come back in December if we can get the bill out of here 

today or tomorrow. We’d be happy to have your comments along 

the line, this is a bill we want no surprises, we’re pleased with the 

general support we have now, you’ve made some suggestions here 

this morning, I’ve asked the staff to pursue those suggestions. We’ll 

do our best to make sure we have a good bill and I do thank you 

for your attitude, it is very supportive of what we want to do, and 

increases the confidence in this inspection and safety system. 

Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 11:25 a.m. the hearing was adjourned.] 

(55) 

A P P E N D I X 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Washington, DC, December 4, 2006 

Hon. JIM DEMINT, 

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Senator DeMint: 

The Senate may have an opportunity this week to reauthorize the pipeline safety 

program by adopting the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety 

Act of 2006. I am writing to urge your support for reauthorization and to explain 

how the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) intends 

to use its statutory authority in connection with the current requirement (codified 

at 49 U.S.C. § 60109(c)(3)(B)) that operators of natural gas pipelines reassess the integrity of their pipelines at intervals not to exceed 7 years. 

As you know, the Administration’s reauthorization proposal would have granted 

the Secretary of Transportation authority to establish through rulemaking riskbased reassessment intervals that would have superseded the seven-year statutory 

standard. Our proposal was strongly supported by industry and endorsed by the 

Government Accountability Office in a report issued earlier this year, but it appears 

doubtful that any bill considered this week would propose the new authority. 

Nevertheless, as I testified before the Committee on Commerce, Science, and 

Transportation last month, PHMSA is prepared to address the need for risk-based 

reassessment intervals under its existing authority. The Secretary of Transportation 

has specific authority under existing law to modify the seven-year reassessment requirement on a case-by-case basis through issuance of regulatory waivers. Under 49 

U.S.C. 60109(c)(5), the Secretary may waive or modify the 7-year reassessment requirement if the Secretary determines that such a waiver is ‘‘not inconsistent with 

pipeline safety.’’ In making waiver determinations, the Secretary may consider ‘‘any 

relevant factor,’’ including the need to maintain local product supply or the unavailability of inspection equipment. Waiver applications under the current provision 

must be decided in accordance with the Act’s general waiver provision (Section 

60118(c)), which imposes certain procedural requirements, including notice and opportunity for a hearing. 

Under that standard, an operator requesting a waiver of the seven-year reassessment requirement would have an opportunity to demonstrate that a longer interval 

is justified considering all of the relevant operating parameters and conditions on 

the pipeline. PHMSA is inclined to grant such a waiver where an operator can demonstrate that the subject pipeline is covered by an integrity management program 

that has been reviewed by PHMSA and determined to provide appropriate risk analysis and control; a baseline assessment has been completed; the data on the current 

condition of the pipeline is sufficient to validate its integrity; and the proposed interval is consistent with the overall risk profile of the line. 

In the circumstances, with the Congress’ support, we expect to be able to accomplish the objective underlying our rulemaking proposal—moving to a risk-based reassessment program—even though the specific provision proposed by the Administration will not be adopted. My staff has discussed this matter with the staffs of 

the authorizing committees, and we understand that a risk-based approach such as 

I have described has been specifically contemplated in the drafting, staff deliberation, and pre-conference processes. 

Thank you for your continued interest in, and support of, the pipeline safety program. If I may be of assistance to address any additional concerns, please do not 

hesitate to contact me. 

Sincerely and very respectfully, THOMAS H. BARRETT, 

Administrator. 

56 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Washington, DC, November 28, 2006 

Hon. TED STEVENS, Chairman, 

Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 

Washington, DC. 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

On behalf of the Administration, I want to thank you and your Committee for the 

commitment you have shown to pipeline safety and to the continued improvement 

of programs administered by the U.S. Department of Transportation. When I appeared before the Committee as a nominee in September, I pledged to make reauthorization of the pipeline safety program a top priority. I urge Congress to do the 

same as it heads into the final weeks of the session. 

As you know, four pipeline reauthorization proposals are pending before this Congress. Each of the bills would give the Department and our state partners new tools 

to address safety risks, including growing risks posed by construction-related damage to underground pipelines, an unfortunate and largely preventable consequence 

of our growing economy. The Administration and the Department are committed to 

addressing this problem, but we need additional authority to be successful. 

The rate and severity of construction-related pipeline incidents are growing. These 

incidents hit close to home—on distribution lines that run through neighborhoods 

where families live and schools are located. And the consequences are tragic; excavation damage is the overwhelming cause of pipeline accidents in which people are 

injured or killed. 

To reduce these accidents, we need to better support and strengthen our state 

partners. State pipeline safety agencies oversee nearly 1.7 million miles of the pipeline distribution system that is at greatest risk of serious construction damage. Consistent with sound integrity management, the Department needs greater flexibility 

to put pipeline safety resources where they are needed most. When it comes to addressing construction-related damage, this means fostering comprehensive programs 

for enforcing existing ‘‘one-call’’ laws, as a few States have demonstrated with positive results. 

Beyond helping states with damage prevention and overall integrity management, 

each of the legislative proposals builds on the success of past safety reforms, with 

somewhat varying detail and emphases. I would be happy to share our views on 

particular provisions or to assist the Congress in any other way in reconciling differences among the four bills. In the final analysis, however, what the bills have 

in common is vastly more important than any one or combination of their differences. I urge Congress to reauthorize the pipeline safety program this year to 

give us more authority to help save lives. By preventing damage to pipelines, Congress will also strengthen the Nation’s energy highways, improve the reliability of 

critical energy supplies, and, in the case of one-call enforcement, enhance the protection of other underground infrastructure and utilities, including communications 

and electrical distribution. 

Thank you for the opportunity to provide the Department’s views on reauthorization of the pipeline safety program. We would be pleased to provide assistance as 

legislation is considered by the Congress. The Office of Management and Budget has 

advised that there is no objection to the presentation to Congress of these views 

from the standpoint of the Administration’s program. 

An identical letter has been sent to the Co-Chairman of the Senate Committee 

on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, and the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House Committees on Transportation and Infrastructure and Energy and 

Commerce. 

Sincerely yours, 

MARY E. PETERS, 

Secretary of Transportation. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF STEPHEN E. SANDHERR, CEO, 

ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS OF AMERICA

On behalf of the Associated General Contractors of America (AGC), I appreciate 

the opportunity to comment on S. 3961, the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement and Safety Act of 2006. AGC is especially concerned about Sec. 4(a) which creates a new permanent Federal one-call enforcement program. While this provision 

may be good to encourage the few states that do not have strong one-call laws that 

include enforcement and civil penalties, it takes a step back from the progress we 

57 

have made to ensure a strong partnership for damage prevention. The success of 

the Common Ground Alliance and the successful records of state one-call laws comes 

from the participation of the construction industry, the locating industry and the 

underground facility owners in a true partnership committed to damage prevention. 

AGC believes that Federal enforcement provisions do not further the partnership 

that we have been committed to for the last 8 years. A permanent Federal program 

is unnecessary. AGC and the Common Ground Alliance both support the premise 

that the best place for enforcement decisions to be made is in the states themselves. 

The Federal Government should encourage states to adopt policies and procedures 

that promote effective one-call programs, then withdraw and allow the states to operate and enforce them. 

We strongly believe that the most important thing the Committee can do to improve safety would be to modify the bill to ensure that all owner/operators, locating 

personnel, and excavators share equally in the responsibility for facility integrity, 

and most importantly public and worker safety. Absent this focus in the enforcement language, the successful partnership may begin to falter. 

AGC is proud of our history as a construction industry sponsor of the Common 

Ground Alliance (CGA). AGC believes that in the spirit of ‘‘shared responsibility,’’ 

a concept promoted by the CGA, owner/operators and locating personnel must be 

held to just as high a standard as excavators for damage prevention process enforcement to be equitable. States such as Virginia and Minnesota have demonstrated 

that enforcement works—when it is equally applied to all stakeholders to the damage prevention process across the board. We are pleased that these state’s One-Call 

programs were used as models for the nine points listed in the Administration’s proposal. the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee’s bill and the House 

Energy and Commerce Committee’s bill as well as S. 3961. 

AGC supports best practices as outlined by the CGA. AGC members call before 

they dig; wait the required amount of time for utilities to locate and mark their facilities; dig with care; and so much more. It is just as important, if not more so, 

that utilities respond in a timely manner and that locators mark the facilities clearly and accurately as prescribed by law. 

The Commonwealth of Virginia provides an excellent example of how an effective 

program operates. They enjoy a successful partnership between the excavators, the 

facility owners, the locators and the state. One of their hallmarks is strict enforcement—across all stakeholder groups. Virginia has data from 1996 to 2005 indicating 

a 60 percent increase in one-call excavation notices while documenting a 50 percent 

reduction in excavation damage to gas pipelines. 

Clearly, no one wants to cause damage. Criminal penalties are not appropriate 

for any stakeholder be they a locator, utility owner, professional excavator or a private citizen operating in good faith. They should not be included in any reauthorization of the Pipeline Safety Act. Civil penalties, however, send a strong message that 

stakeholders must operate in a responsible, safe manner. 

AGC also urges the Committee to include authorizations for funding for the Common Ground Alliance, promotion of 8-1-1 three-digit nationwide dialing for one-call 

(which goes online in 2007), and for technology development grants to enhance locating technologies and render underground utilities more locatable. These programs are critical to getting universal adoption of our common best practices. 

Again, AGC encourages the Committee to promote successful damage prevention 

programs. But the most important lesson we have learned from our successful efforts in the Common Ground Alliance are that these laws must take into account 

the entire damage prevention process, not simply focus on the excavator. AGC encourages leveling the playing field between stakeholders—easing the inequitable 

burden included in the bill which currently lies primarily with the excavator when 

it should recognize that to be successful these programs must recognize the role that 

all parties have in public and worker safety, facility integrity and damage prevention. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to comment on this important issue. I look 

forward to working with the Committee to enact meaningful and fair legislation reauthorizing the Pipeline Safety Improvement Act. 

Thank you. 

58 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

THOMAS J. BARRETT

Question 1. I understand that the Administration generally supports the enforcement provisions of S. 3961, with some added changes that were incorporated into 

the House Energy and Commerce Committee’s bill. The 2000 El Paso Pipeline accident in New Mexico, which killed an entire extended family of twelve, triggered the 

need for the provision. The Pipeline agency originally announced a proposed $2.52 

million fine. Today, 6 years later, no penalty has ever been collected. Can you provide the Committee with information regarding the status of that penalty and 

whether any funds have been collected from the operator? 

Answer. PHMSA proposed a $2.52 million fine against El Paso Natural Gas Company following the New Mexico accident and we remain determined to bring this 

matter to a just resolution. We are working with the Department of Justice to apply 

our strongest options available. The United States is in nonpublic discussions with 

the company at this time. 

Question 2. Do you believe that a similar enforcement transparency policy might 

be a good practice for your hazardous materials enforcement actives at the Pipeline 

agency or the other DOT administrations? 

Answer. Yes, we believe this to be a good practice. PHMSA’s hazardous materials 

enforcement program has led our effort in enforcement transparency, making comprehensive enforcement data available on a PHMSA webpage. We have designed a 

new webpage about our pipeline safety enforcement actions, which will provide information on each action and current status. I am committed to making our inspection and enforcement activities more transparent. 

Question 3. Some feel that the security restrictions imposed on the National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) do little to improve security, but do hamper safety 

efforts to reduce building encroachment near pipelines and third-party damage. Additionally, I understand that the removal of the NPMS from the public domain has 

forced some states, such as Washington, Texas and Louisiana, to spend their limited 

state dollars to duplicate this mapping system so local government and the public 

have access to this valuable information. Are you considering reinstating public access to the NPMS so local governments can plan safely and the public can be aware 

of the pipelines that run through their area? 

Answer. Yes. PHMSA is working to restore public access to the NPMS information that will be available in mid-2007, in a way that accommodates both public and 

security concerns. We believe the restored information will meet the needs for environmental, emergency, land use and other planning activities. We are consulting 

with all relevant parties—including pipeline safety advocates, the Department of 

Homeland Security’s Transportation Security Administration, other Federal agencies, the pipeline industry and our state partners in developing our approach. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

E. FRANK BENDER

Question 1. In your testimony, you seem to suggest that Section 15 of S. 3961 requires the development of a ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ regulation to address pipeline controller fatigue and other human factors. In fact, our bill requires each pipeline operator to develop their own rules on worker’s hours of service, consistent with current 

science on fatigue management. This approach recognizes the ‘‘diversity’’ of pipeline 

controller functions among different pipeline operations by letting operators devise 

their own strategies to reduce human factors. What about this approach is troubling 

to your members? 

Answer. We commend the Senate for the recent passage of the Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement, and Safety Act of 2006, which includes requirements 

for controller work plans to address fatigue and other human factors. I acknowledge 

the flexibility that was provided in the Senate bill. The language should be sufficient for DOT to develop regulations that provide the needed flexibility for the more 

than 1,100 natural gas distribution operators, whose control operations are vastly 

different from gas transmission and hazardous liquid operators. 

Question 2. Regarding third-party damage, I believe much of the prevention effort 

has focused on the commercial excavation community, including contractors, utility, 

cable and telecommunications companies. Is there also a third-party damage problem from ordinary citizens engaged in routine excavation near their property, particularly in urban areas? If so, should our damage prevention programs take this 

into account? 

59 

1 Common Ground Alliance Best Practices, Version 3.0 Public Education and Awareness Practice Statements & Description. 

Answer. Yes, and I believe the language in the reauthorized Pipeline Act successfully addresses that problem. There is the potential for problems with ordinary citizens engaged in routine excavation near their property causing damage to underground utilities. The reauthorized Pipeline Safety Act states in 49 U.S.C. 60134(b) 

that and effective damage prevention program includes ‘‘A process for fostering and 

ensuring active participation by all stakeholders in public education for damage prevention activities.’’ 

Some operators are already working to educate ordinary citizens about the dangers of not using one-call before digging. The Common Ground Alliance best practice 

for public education includes children and property owners as target audiences, as 

well as excavators and contractors.1

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

TERRY BOSS

Question 1. Under existing authority and the nonemergency waiver provision of 

S. 3961, gas transmission pipeline operators would be able to request a waiver of 

the seven-year reassessment interval. While I know INGAA had hoped that the interval would be changed statutorily, why wouldn’t this approach work just as well? 

In effect, the seven-year interval would become a back-stop and operators who could 

demonstrate to the Pipeline agency that a longer interval would not have an impact 

on safety, would be allowed to change it. 

Answer. INGAA agrees that gas transmission operators can request waivers from 

the seven-year reassessment interval. Senator DeMint had raised this issue with 

PHMSA Administrator Thomas Barrett prior to the passage of H.R. 5782 in the 

Senate. Administrator Barrett’s response (see pages 55 and 56) makes it clear that 

PHMSA does intend to entertain waiver requests of this nature, so long as the operator can ‘‘demonstrate that a longer interval is justified considering all of the relevant operating parameters and conditions on the pipeline.’’ We appreciate the willingness of Administrator Barrett—and the Congress—to support these waivers 

where they can be justified. INGAA remains convinced, however, that waivers are 

a temporary solution. 

Congress chose to enact a specific statutory requirement for reassessment intervals in 2002. The seven-year requirement was never based upon an actual analysis 

of the safety and engineering associated with natural gas transmission lines; it was 

instead the product of political compromise. This is why the provision in the 2002 

bill requiring an analysis by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) was so 

important. The GAO was able to spend over a year gathering and analyzing data 

on this issue so that it could recommend a more reasoned alternative. As you know, 

the GAO (Report 06–945) did recommend to Congress that the statute be changed 

to allow PHMSA to undertake a rulemaking for changing the seven-year interval 

to one in which reassessment intervals are based upon risk analysis. Until the statute is changed by Congress, though, the seven-year requirement remains the standard—even though it does not have any justification from an engineering standpoint. 

PHMSA has the authority to review waiver requests, but those requests do not have 

to be acted upon, and if granted, can be revoked at any time. INGAA also has concerns about the consistent application of waiver authority across a large number of 

pipelines. INGAA’s members have consistently advocated regulatory certainty in 

such matters—an opportunity to participate in the rulemaking process and a clear 

understanding by both operators and regulators of the requirements. The waiver 

process leaves much more uncertainty for both parties to manage. 

In terms of using the seven-year requirement as a ‘‘back-stop,’’ INGAA would be 

much more comfortable with using a time-frame that actually has some justification. 

The GAO report highlights the work that has been done by the American Society 

of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), which has recommended prescriptive intervals of 

10 years for most high-stress natural gas pipelines (i.e., the vast majority of INGAA 

member company pipelines). This ten-year standard has undergone review and approval by the American National Standards Institute, and therefore has been demonstrated to have a scientific and engineering justification. If there is to be any 

back-stop on reassessment intervals, the ASME standard is the one that makes the 

most sense. 

The reauthorization bill approved by Congress requires PHMSA to report back 

within 60 days on a legislative provision for enacting the GAO recommendation. 

INGAA hopes that Congress will seriously consider and approve the legislative proVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:50 Jun 22, 2011 Jkt 066984 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\66984.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
60 

posal from PHMSA. Granting waivers from the seven-year requirement is a shortterm solution at best. There is no reason why Congress cannot allow PHMSA to develop a more logical and justifiable reassessment interval policy for the long-term. 

INGAA believes this development is best accomplished through the rulemaking procedure, with public notice and participation, consideration of comments by all interested parties, and advice from the Technical Advisory Committee. 

Question 2. In the GAO report on the seven-year reassessment interval, the GAO 

noted that it was difficult to evaluate the nature and cause, such as corrosion, of 

individual pipeline problems discovered during initial pipeline assessments because 

the Pipeline agency does not require pipeline operators to report such information. 

Would you be opposed to providing such information to the Pipeline agency? 

Answer. No, INGAA would not be opposed. We are in the process of surveying our 

own association members as to the nature and causes of the defects that were repaired in the high consequence areas subject to Integrity Management Program for 

years 2004–2006 and plan on sharing the results of that information with PHMSA. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

TIMOTHY FELT

Question 1. In your testimony, you reference the Association of Oil Pipe Lines’ opposition to the requirements in S. 3961’s section 3 that all low-stress pipelines be 

subject to Federal incident reporting and National Pipeline Mapping System regulations. Can you explain your opposition to these regulations? 

Answer. In our testimony we supported the House Energy and Commerce Committees bill language that significantly broadens the regulation of low-stress pipelines and exceeds the Administration’s proposed requirements for these lines. This 

bill language would subject oil pipelines operating at low-stress that are similar to 

the Prudhoe Bay lines that leaked in March 2006 to the same regulations as oil 

transmission pipelines operated at high-stress. 

We oppose additional DOT mapping and reporting requirements for the remaining 

lines operated at low-stress that would not be covered by the House bill. These remaining lines are: 

I. regulated by the Coast Guard; or 

II. serving refining, manufacturing, or truck, rail or vessel terminal facilities, 

if the pipeline is less than 1 mile long (measured outside the facility grounds) 

and does not cross an offshore area or a waterway currently used for commercial navigation. 

These are the reasons for this opposition: 

1. With respect to I., we recommend against dual regulation of facilities or disrupting existing regulatory arrangements by shifting regulatory responsibility 

from one agency to another unless there is a very good reason. The Coast Guard 

is not lax in its attention to the facilities it regulates. Pipelines regulated by 

the Coast Guard should be all the Coast Guard’s responsibility, not part the 

DOT’s and part the Coast Guard’s responsibility. 

2. With respect to II., these pipelines are short and so closely associated with 

the facilities they serve that mapping details would be obscured and not helpful. 

The facilities served by these pipelines are not subject to DOT regulations currently, and we do not believe adding DOT reporting requirements for them is 

merited. 

3. Also with respect to II., leak reporting for these pipelines could be required 

by PHMSA under existing law if the benefits would justify the costs. PHMSA 

has not chosen to do so, most likely because the benefits do not justify the costs. 

These facilities are for the most part inside a company’s fence. So are the infrequent and generally quite small leaks, which occur primarily at valves rather 

than in pipe itself. Rather than a Congressional mandate for a program to collect data on leaks from these facilities, it would be better for PHMSA to propose 

such a program through the administrative process and tailor it to meet a costbenefit test. 

Question 2. In your testimony, you note that oil pipelines are subject to a baseline 

assessment period of 7 years and a reassessment period of 5 years under integrity 

management rules. Do you anticipate problems or difficulty in meeting the five-year 

reassessment interval for your members’ pipelines in high consequence areas? 

Answer. When these requirements were proposed by PHMSA’s predecessor in 

2000–2001, we were concerned that the vendor capacity available for pipeline asVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:50 Jun 22, 2011 Jkt 066984 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\66984.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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* The information referred to has been retained in Committee files. 

sessment—internal inspection devices and the people to interpret the output of the 

devices—might not be sufficient to the requirements of the regulations. We have 

worked through these concerns, in part because the vendor community has responded to the need and in part because PHMSA’s regulations provide flexibility to 

the operator to design assessment schedules. The oil pipeline industry is on track 

to meet the pipeline integrity regulatory requirements applicable to our pipelines. 

Our industry has embraced integrity management as good business. The application 

of integrity management is successfully making lasting improvements in the oil 

pipeline infrastructure, and not just in those portions of the infrastructure that are 

in high consequence areas. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

CARL WEIMER

Question. In your testimony, you recommend that Congress consider studying the 

imposition of financial responsibility requirements for pipelines as it already does 

for other companies under the Resources Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) 

and the Oil Pollution Act (OPA). Can you further explain why this is needed? 

Answer. Thank you for the opportunity to expand on our testimony regarding the 

possible need for financial responsibility (also referred to as financial assurance) 

measures for pipelines to increase protection of communities and the environment. 

As stated in our earlier testimony because of the corporate structuring of pipeline 

companies as independent companies owned solely by larger corporations there exists the potential to under-capitalize these pipeline companies, and thus avoid or 

significantly delay large liabilities caused by accidents by simply declaring bankruptcy. This in fact was exactly what happened with the Olympic Pipeline Company 

after the Bellingham tragedy, where two of the largest corporations in the world, 

(British Petroleum and Shell), allowed their solely-owned pipeline company to enter 

bankruptcy. 

There are a number of Federal statutes that include financial assurance clauses 

to prevent this type of liability dodging, and also to help ensure that safety will be 

internalized into a company’s management. Financial assurance is required under 

the Oil Pollution Act (OPA), the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, or Superfund), the Resource Conservation 

and Recovery Act (RCRA), the Safe Drinking Water Act, the Outer Continental 

Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, and the 

Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (SMCRA). 

A number of studies have been done that show the value of such financial assurance. A Programmatic Regulatory Assessment of OPA 90 done by the U.S. Department of Transportation in 2001 showed that the single largest contributor to reducing spills was the financial responsibility rule within OPA 90. Other studies done 

by the independent group Resources For The Future have shown a similar successful effect of financial responsibility rules in a number of different statutes. 

Here is a list of what we have found to be the most relevant studies, and where 

they can be found. We have also attached copies of these studies for your convenience. * 

OPA 90 Programmatic Regulatory Assessment (PRA)—Benefit, Cost, and Cost Effectiveness of Eleven Major Rulemakings of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (May 

2001)—Prepared by: Economic Analysis Division, John A. Volpe National Transportation Systems Center, Cambridge, Massachusetts http://www.uscg.mil/hq/g-m/ 

regs/PDF/pra-main.pdf. 

Financial Assurance Rules and Natural Resource Damage Liability: A Working 

Marriage? James Boyd (March 2001)—Discussion Paper 01–11 http://www.rff.org/ 

rff/Documents/RFF-DP-01-11.pdf. 

Financial Responsibility for Environmental Obligations: Are Bonding and Assurance Rules Fulfilling Their Promise? James Boyd (August 2001)—Discussion Paper 

01–42 http://www.rff.org/rff/Documents/RFF-DP-01-42.pdf. 

While it is clear to us that financial assurance rules do serve as a valuable way 

to prevent spills and internalize the costs of such prevention for many industries, 

we are not as clear on what benefits these rules would provide to pipelines. Because 

of the lack of public information on the bankruptcies of pipeline companies, and the 

collection of fines and total damages, there is no way for us to assess whether such 

additional rules are needed. For this reason, in our testimony we suggested that 

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Congress ask for a study of the need and benefit for such financial assurance rules 

for pipelines. We still believe that such a study is called for, and should be able to 

answer whether financial assurance rules would be beneficial to increasing pipeline 

safety. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to provide additional testimony. 

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