[Cite as State v. Caroline's Kids Pet Rescue, 2023-Ohio-761.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

ELEVENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

LAKE COUNTY

STATE OF OHIO,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

- vs -

CAROLINE'S KIDS

PET RESCUE,

Defendant-Appellant.

CASE NOS. 2022-L-024

 2022-L-025

 2022-L-026

 2022-L-027

 2022-L-028

 2022-L-029

Criminal Appeals from the

Painesville Municipal Court

Trial Court Nos. 2021 CRB 00775 A

 2021 CRB 00775 B

 2021 CRB 00775 C

 2021 CRB 00775 D

 2021 CRB 00775 E

 2021 CRB 00775 F

O P I N I O N 

Decided: March 13, 2023

Judgment: Affirmed

J. Jeffrey Holland, Holland & Muirden, 1343 Sharon-Copley Road, P.O. Box 345, Sharon 

Center, OH 44274 (For Plaintiff-Appellee).

Robert N. Farinacci, 65 North Lake Street, Madison, OH 44057 (For DefendantAppellant). 

EUGENE A. LUCCI, J.

{¶1} Appellant, Caroline’s Kids Pet Rescue (“Caroline’s”), appeals its sentence, 

following its plea of no contest and the trial court’s finding of guilt, on six counts of 

companion animal cruelty. We affirm.
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Case Nos. 2022-L-024, 2022-L-025, 2022-L-026, 2022-L-027, 2022-L-028, 2022-L-029

{¶2} Caroline’s is a non-profit corporation that operated an animal shelter in Lake 

County, Ohio. In 2020, Caroline’s’ board ejected its director, Jacqueline Childers, from

the organization. Shortly thereafter, the Lake Humane Society (“the LHS”) searched 

Caroline’s’ facility, locating 41 deceased cats and seizing 157 living cats.

{¶3} In 2021, complaints were filed in the trial court charging Caroline’s with five 

counts of cruelty against companion animals in violation of R.C. 959.131(D)(1) and one 

count of cruelty against companion animals in violation of R.C. 959.131(D)(2). Caroline’s 

initially pleaded not guilty. On December 15, 2021, Caroline’s moved the trial court to 

appoint a commission pursuant to R.C. 2945.50 to take Childers’ deposition. In support 

of its motion, Caroline’s maintained that, when Childers left the corporation, she “took with 

her all of the documents and information needed for the efficient operation of the 

Company and necessary for any meaningful defense in these cases.” The state 

responded in opposition to the motion, and the trial court summarily denied the motion. 

On December 22, 2021, Caroline’s filed a motion to reconsider its request to take 

Childers’ deposition. Thereafter, the trial court issued a judgment entry denying the 

motion to reconsider. 

{¶4} Subsequently, Caroline’s changed its plea to no contest. The trial court 

found Caroline’s guilty and held a hearing on reimbursement and sentencing. The court 

then sentenced Caroline’s to 60 months’ probation, imposed a $24,000.00 fine, ordered 

it to pay reimbursement in the amount of $31,686.63 to the LHS, and permanently banned 

Caroline’s from owning, possessing, or caring for companion animals.

{¶5} Caroline’s assigns three errors. We begin our review with Caroline’s third 

assigned error and consolidate our review of Caroline’s first and second assigned errors 

for ease of discussion.
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Case Nos. 2022-L-024, 2022-L-025, 2022-L-026, 2022-L-027, 2022-L-028, 2022-L-029

{¶6} In its third assigned error, Caroline’s maintains:

The Trial Court erred to the prejudice of the Appellant when it 

foreclosed Appellant’s ability to seek and obtain the 

necessary information and documentation to mount a 

meaningful defense and defend against the alleged offenses 

for which it was charged thereby forcing a plea to those 

offenses as charged.

{¶7} Caroline’s argues that the trial court erred in denying its motion under R.C. 

2945.50 to appoint a commission to take Childers’ deposition.

{¶8} R.C. 2945.50 provides for depositions in criminal cases, stating:

At any time after an issue of fact is joined upon an indictment, 

information, or an affidavit, the prosecution or the defendant 

may apply in writing to the court in which such indictment, 

information, or affidavit is pending for a commission to take 

the depositions of any witness. The court or a judge thereof 

may grant such commission and make an order stating in 

what manner and for what length of time notice shall be given 

to the prosecution or to the defendant, before such witness 

shall be examined.

The Supreme Court of Ohio has held that a ruling on a request made pursuant to R.C. 

2945.50 “rests within the sound discretion of the court, and, unless a plain abuse of that 

discretion is shown, no prejudicial error occurs.” State v. Hill, 12 Ohio St.2d 88, 232 

N.E.2d 394 (1967), paragraph one of the syllabus. “‘The term “abuse of discretion” is one 

of art, connoting judgment exercised by a court which neither comports with reason, nor 

the record.’” State v. Marcellino, 2019-Ohio-4837, 149 N.E.3d 927, ¶ 23 (11th Dist.), 

quoting State v. Flanagan, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 2015-A-0020, 2015-Ohio-5528, ¶ 42, 

citing State v. Ferranto, 112 Ohio St. 667, 676-678, 148 N.E. 362 (1925).

{¶9} Although not referenced by the parties here, Crim.R. 15(A) also addresses 

depositions in criminal cases, providing in part:

If it appears probable that a prospective witness will be unable 

to attend or will be prevented from attending a trial or hearing, 
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Case Nos. 2022-L-024, 2022-L-025, 2022-L-026, 2022-L-027, 2022-L-028, 2022-L-029

and if it further appears that his testimony is material and that 

it is necessary to take his deposition in order to prevent a 

failure of justice, the court at any time after the filing of an 

indictment, information, or complaint shall upon motion of the 

defense attorney or the prosecuting attorney and notice to all 

the parties, order that his testimony be taken by deposition 

and that any designated books, papers, documents or 

tangible objects, not privileged, be produced at the same time 

and place.

{¶10} At least one of our sister courts has determined that R.C. 2945.50 “was 

superseded by the criminal rules in 1973[.]” State v. Pastor, 12th Dist. Butler No. CA84-

05-056, 1984 WL 3681, *3 (Dec. 31, 1984). Criminal Rules may displace statutory 

provisions pursuant to “Article IV, Section 5(B) [of the Ohio Constitution, which] provides: 

‘The supreme court shall prescribe rules governing practice and procedure in all courts 

of the state, which rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right. * * * 

All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules 

have taken effect.’” Ferguson v. State, 151 Ohio St.3d 265, 2017-Ohio-7844, 87 N.E.3d 

1250, ¶ 20. Where a procedural rule and a statutory provision conflict, “‘the rule will 

control the statute on matters of procedure and the statute will control the rule on matters 

of substantive law.’” Ferguson at ¶ 20, quoting Boyer v. Boyer, 46 Ohio St.2d 83, 86, 346 

N.E.2d 286 (1976). 

{¶11} Here, if Crim.R. 15(A) displaces R.C. 2945.50, Caroline’s did not allege that 

Childers would be unable or prevented from attending a trial or hearing, and, on that basis 

alone, the motion to depose Childers was properly overruled. See Crim.R. 15(A) 

(permitting a deposition in a criminal case where it appears probable that the intended 

deponent “will be unable to attend or will be prevented from attending a trial or hearing”).
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Case Nos. 2022-L-024, 2022-L-025, 2022-L-026, 2022-L-027, 2022-L-028, 2022-L-029

{¶12} However, assuming without deciding that R.C. 2945.50 remains applicable, 

in its ruling on the motion to reconsider its denial of Caroline’s’ motion, issued December 

30, 2021, the trial court explained:

The Defendant asserts Jackie Childers was ejected from the 

Defendant on or about September 18, 2020. The Defendant 

has not satisfied the Court that this deposition is the only 

means to gather the information it is seeking. Further, no civil 

action was taken by the Defendant to recover the alleged 

information from Childers and the Defendant continues its 

operations with the existing conditions since September 18, 

2020.

{¶13} Given the reasons advanced by the trial court for denying the motion, we 

cannot say that it abused its discretion.

{¶14} Accordingly, Caroline’s’ third assigned error lacks merit. 

{¶15} In its first and second assigned errors, Caroline’s argues:

[1.] The Trial Court erred to the prejudice of the Appellant 

when it failed to determine on the record and disclose to the 

Parties the standard of proof required, the quantum of proof 

and evidence necessary or the definition or description of 

costs it would permit thereby depriving the Appellant of both 

procedural and substantive due process.

[2.] The State failed to submit competent, credible evidence 

of the claimed expenses by the Lake County Humane Society 

nor did it present sufficient evidence that the costs claimed 

were reasonable and necessary resulting from the unlawful 

acts of the Appellant such that would instill in the trier of fact 

a reasonable degree of certainty as to the evidence before it.

{¶16} In its first assigned error, Caroline’s argues that the trial court violated its 

due process rights by conducting a reimbursement hearing without explaining to the 

parties the applicable standards of proof required to order reimbursement or instructing 

the parties on the types of costs that could be recovered. 
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Case Nos. 2022-L-024, 2022-L-025, 2022-L-026, 2022-L-027, 2022-L-028, 2022-L-029

{¶17} “Reimbursement is payment to a government agency for costs incurred as 

a result of the offender’s actions.” State v. Thames, 11th Dist. Lake Nos. 2021-L-094, et 

seq., 2022-Ohio-1715, ¶ 23, appeal not allowed, 167 Ohio St.3d 1512, 2022-Ohio-3135, 

194 N.E.3d 381, ¶ 23, citing R.C. 2929.28(A)(3). Reimbursement is permitted in cruelty 

to companion animal cases pursuant to R.C. 959.99(E)(6)(b), which provides:

A court may order a person who is convicted of or pleads 

guilty to a violation of division (A) of section 959.13 or section 

959.131 of the Revised Code to reimburse an impounding 

agency for the reasonable and necessary costs incurred by 

the agency for the care of an animal or livestock that the 

agency impounded as a result of the investigation or 

prosecution of the violation, provided that the costs were not 

otherwise paid under section 959.132 of the Revised Code.

{¶18} Here, the trial court held a hearing regarding reimbursement. Caroline’s 

maintains that its due process rights were violated because the trial court did not explain 

the standards applicable to reimbursement prior to commencing the hearing.

{¶19} “‘The question of whether the due process requirements have been satisfied 

presents a legal question we review de novo.’” (Citations omitted.) Puruczky v. Corsi, 

2018-Ohio-1335, 110 N.E.3d 73, ¶ 17 (11th Dist.), quoting McRae v. State Med. Bd., 

2014-Ohio-667, 9 N.E.3d 398, ¶ 36 (10th Dist.). 

{¶20} Caroline’s’ first assigned error alleges both procedural due process and 

substantive due process violations. “A procedural-due-process challenge concerns the 

adequacy of the procedures employed in a government action that deprives a person of 

life, liberty, or property.” Ferguson, 2017-Ohio-7844, at ¶ 42. “‘The fundamental 

requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard “at a meaningful time and in a 

meaningful manner.”’” Id. at ¶ 42, quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 
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Case Nos. 2022-L-024, 2022-L-025, 2022-L-026, 2022-L-027, 2022-L-028, 2022-L-029

S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976), quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 

S.Ct. 1187, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965).

{¶21} Here, at the hearing on reimbursement, the state presented the director of 

the LHS as its witness, and she testified as to expenses incurred by the LHS for caring 

for the animals. Caroline’s was permitted to, and did proceed to, cross-examine the 

witness and present its own exhibits. We are unable to discern a procedural due process 

violation, and we have located no authority holding that a trial court violates procedural 

due process by failing “to determine on the record and disclose to the [p]arties the 

standard of proof required, the quantum of proof and evidence necessary or the definition 

or description of costs it would permit” or by otherwise failing to instruct counsel on the 

law applicable to a proceeding. 

{¶22} Insofar as Caroline’s’ challenges involve the quality and nature of the 

evidence, as opposed to the procedure employed by the trial court, we discuss this issue 

in conjunction with Caroline’s’ second assigned error, which we address later in this 

opinion.

{¶23} With respect to substantive due process, “‘[w]hile the Due Process Clause 

of the Fourteenth Amendment on its face would seem to be concerned with only the 

adequacy of procedures employed when one is deprived of life, liberty, or property, the 

United States Supreme Court has read it to include a substantive component that forbids 

some government actions ‘regardless of the fairness of the procedures used to implement 

them[.]’” Stolz v. J & B Steel Erectors, Inc., 155 Ohio St.3d 567, 2018-Ohio-5088, 122 

N.E.3d 1228, ¶ 13, quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331, 106 S.Ct. 662, 88 

L.Ed.2d 662 (1986). The Supreme Court of Ohio has “also recognized substantive-due-
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Case Nos. 2022-L-024, 2022-L-025, 2022-L-026, 2022-L-027, 2022-L-028, 2022-L-029

process protections under the Ohio Constitution.” Stolz at ¶ 13, citing Arbino v. Johnson 

& Johnson, 116 Ohio St.3d 468, 2007-Ohio-6948, 880 N.E.2d 420, ¶ 48-49.

{¶24} “In a substantive-due-process challenge, ‘[t]he first (and often last) issue * 

* * is the proper characterization of the individual’s asserted right.’” Stolz at ¶ 14, quoting 

Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. School Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 393 (6th Cir.2005), citing Reno v. 

Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302, 113 S.Ct. 1439, 123 L.Ed.2d 1 (1993). “Government actions 

that infringe upon a fundamental right are subject to strict scrutiny, while those that do not 

need only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.” Stoltz at ¶ 14, citing 

State v. Lowe, 112 Ohio St.3d 507, 2007-Ohio-606, 861 N.E.2d 512, ¶ 18.

{¶25} Here, although Caroline’s’ stated assigned error includes a substantive due 

process challenge, we are unable to discern an argument in support of this contention in 

Caroline’s’ brief. If an argument exists in support of a substantive due process argument, 

“‘it is not this court’s duty to root it out.’” Village of S. Russell v. Upchurch, 11th Dist. 

Geauga Nos. 2001-G-2395, 2001-G-2396, 2003-Ohio-2099, ¶ 10, quoting Harris v. 

Nome, 9th Dist. Summit No. 21071, 2002-Ohio-6994. 

{¶26} Accordingly, Caroline’s’ first assigned error lacks merit.

{¶27} In its second assigned error, Caroline’s maintains that the reimbursement 

order was not supported by competent, credible evidence of the reasonable and 

necessary costs incurred by the LHS for the care of the cats. 

{¶28} “Ordering restitution and reimbursement is part of criminal sentencing.” 

Thames, 2022-Ohio-1715, at ¶ 34, citing State v. Danison, 105 Ohio St.3d 127, 2005-

Ohio-781, 823 N.E.2d 444, ¶ 6. “‘Misdemeanor sentencing is evaluated under an abuse 

of discretion standard of review.’” Thames at ¶ 34, quoting State v. Petrovich, 11th Dist. 

Lake No. 2017 CR 000862, 2019-Ohio-3547, ¶ 23. “Thus, we review restitution and 
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Case Nos. 2022-L-024, 2022-L-025, 2022-L-026, 2022-L-027, 2022-L-028, 2022-L-029

reimbursement orders in a misdemeanor case for an abuse of discretion.” Thames at ¶ 

34, citing State v. Dent, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2020-L-110, 2021-Ohio-2551, ¶ 15, 

Marcellino, 2019-Ohio-4837, at ¶ 23, and State v. Flanagan, 11th Dist. Ashtabula No. 

2015-A-0020, 2015-Ohio-5528, ¶ 42. In the context of restitution, this court has held that 

“’“[p]rior to imposing a restitution order, a trial court must determine the amount of 

restitution to a reasonable degree of certainty, ensuring that the amount is supported by 

competent, credible evidence.”’” Marcellino at ¶ 24, quoting State v. Flanagan, 11th Dist. 

Ashtabula No. 2015-A-0020, 2015-Ohio-5528, ¶ 43, quoting State v. Coldiron, 12th Dist. 

Clermont No. CA2008-06-062, 2009-Ohio-2105, ¶ 21. Due to the similarity between 

restitution and reimbursement, we can discern of no reason why reimbursement orders 

would not also require support by competent, credible evidence to a reasonable degree 

of certainty. See Thames at ¶ 22-23 (restitution involves payment to the victim of a crime 

for economic losses caused by the offender, and reimbursement involves “payment to a 

government agency for costs incurred as a result of the offender’s actions”). We 

therefore review the reimbursement order to determine if the trial court abused its 

discretion in determining the reimbursement amount to a reasonable degree of certainty, 

ensuring that the amount is supported by competent, credible evidence.

{¶29} At the reimbursement hearing, Megan Newkirk, the shelter manager for the 

LHS, testified that she is familiar with the costs incurred by the LHS resulting from the 

seizure of the 157 living cats in this case. Newkirk identified an exhibit that summarized 

the medical, dental, lab work, and disposal services involved with these cats. She 

maintained that she determined the costs of the medical services by assessing the cost 

of the medication, supplies, and veterinarian time. Newkirk identified another exhibit 

listing every cat that was seized from Caroline’s and the medications administered. The 
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Case Nos. 2022-L-024, 2022-L-025, 2022-L-026, 2022-L-027, 2022-L-028, 2022-L-029

medical expenses amounted to a total of $26,212.63. Newkirk indicated that this was a 

conservative estimate because she included only one veterinarian examination per cat, 

at the rate of $20.00, for the exam administered as each cat was processed into the 

shelter; however, many of the cats required further veterinary care. 

{¶30} With respect to the boarding and nonmedical care, Newkirk indicated that 

the LHS charged a standard fee of $15.00 per day, per cat, to cover the costs of food, 

water, shelter, cage-cleaning, exercise, supplies, and facility overhead. However, 

Newkirk only requested boarding and nonmedical care charges for four days for each cat, 

which was a conservative estimate, as many of the cats remained at the LHS for over two 

weeks, and some for up to five months. In total, Newkirk requested $9,360.00 for 

boarding and nonmedical care. 

{¶31} Newkirk acknowledged that this case was used in the LHS’ fundraising 

materials. However, she maintained that the donations received were not earmarked 

toward these specific cats but were used toward the LHS’ general operations. Newkirk 

further acknowledged that the LHS received fees for these cats as they were adopted, 

but those fees did not fully compensate the organization for the care of the animals. 

{¶32} On cross-examination, defense counsel presented an exhibit that depicted 

a screenshot from a news story regarding the seizure of the cats from Caroline’s. The 

news article directed those interested in donating to the LHS to assist with the cats 

rescued from Caroline’s to visit the LHS website. In addition, Newkirk acknowledged that 

one of the cats from Caroline’s, Polly, was very sick for a long period of time, and that the 

LHS sought to raise money for Polly through an “angel fund.” Newkirk did not know how 

much was specifically raised for Polly’s care, although the organization requested 

$700.00 from donations, and Polly’s medical care cost $736.48. Newkirk further testified 
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Case Nos. 2022-L-024, 2022-L-025, 2022-L-026, 2022-L-027, 2022-L-028, 2022-L-029

that one method of fundraising used by the LHS is to solicit “cage sponsors,” who donate 

a specific amount and receive a plaque on a cage. However, the donations are not 

specifically utilized in caring for the animal being caged. Newkirk acknowledged that a 

defense exhibit demonstrated that the LHS sought a cage sponsor in relation to one of 

the cats seized from Caroline’s but reiterated that the donations solicited from cage 

sponsors are used for the organization in general. Newkirk contended that all donations 

received by the LHS are used for the general operation of the organization, unless a 

donation is in the form of an angel fund specific to one animal, in which case donations 

up to the amount requested by the LHS are used for that specific animal’s care. 

{¶33} Further, on cross-examination, Newkirk testified that it cost $46.00 to 

spay/neuter a cat. However, she indicated that the exhibit of medical costs that she had 

prepared assessed a cost of only $25.00 per cat that required spaying/neutering. With 

respect to $4,900.00 allocated on Newkirk’s exhibit for dental care, Newkirk maintained 

that 47 cats were identified by the veterinarian as requiring dental care, and two of the 

cats required two dental procedures due to the severity of their conditions. Newkirk 

requested $100.00 per dental procedure, explaining that this was also a conservative 

estimate because dental procedures of this type would cost a minimum of $500.00 at a 

veterinarian’s office. 

{¶34} On redirect, Newkirk confirmed that the medical expenses should have 

included an additional $20.00 per cat that was spayed or neutered, and she testified that 

13 cats required spaying/neutering. Further, Newkirk clarified that a $20.00 flat fee for 

the initial veterinary examination was charged for each cat, but, again, no further 

veterinary examinations were included in the calculation regardless of whether the cats 

received follow-up veterinary care. 
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Case Nos. 2022-L-024, 2022-L-025, 2022-L-026, 2022-L-027, 2022-L-028, 2022-L-029

{¶35} The trial court ordered reimbursement to the LHS in the amount of 

$31,686.63, representing the costs that Newkirk had identified in her testimony, including 

the additional $260.00 for the spaying/neutering, less the fees recouped by the LHS 

through adoption.1 

{¶36} Caroline’s argues that the trial court erred to its prejudice by refusing to 

offset moneys paid by third parties for the care of the animals, resulting in duplicate 

payments to the LHS for the same expenses. Additionally, Caroline’s maintains that the 

trial court erred in permitting reimbursement in the amount of the LHS’ flat rates. In 

making these arguments, Caroline’s relies on case law pertaining to restitution.

{¶37} Although restitution and reimbursement share characteristics, restitution 

orders pursuant to statute “shall not exceed the amount of the economic loss suffered by 

the victim as a direct and proximate result of the commission of the offense[.]” R.C. 

2929.28(A)(1). Accordingly, cases have limited a victim’s ability to recover restitution 

where the victim has been reimbursed by a third party, as, in such cases, courts have 

held that the victim “‘has not suffered an economic loss.’” State v. Wiley, 10th Dist. 

Franklin No. 16AP-686, 2017-Ohio-2744, ¶ 10, quoting State v. Crum, 5th Dist. No. 12 

CAA 08 006, 2013-Ohio-903, ¶ 12. 

{¶38} However, R.C. 959.99(E)(6)(b) does not limit reimbursement in the same 

manner as restitution is limited under R.C. 2929.28. Instead, R.C. 959.99(E)(6)(b) 

permits the court to order reimbursement of “the reasonable and necessary costs incurred 

by the agency for the care of an animal * * * provided that the costs were not otherwise 

1. Although the LHS did not concede that adoption fees were required to be set off against its costs, it 

indicated to the trial court that it was not going to argue the issue, and the issue is not presently before this 

court.
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Case Nos. 2022-L-024, 2022-L-025, 2022-L-026, 2022-L-027, 2022-L-028, 2022-L-029

paid under section 959.132 of the Revised Code.” R.C. 959.132 provides a process for 

an animal owner to post a bond for the care of a seized animal. There is no dispute that 

no bond was paid pursuant to R.C. 959.132 in the present case. Accordingly, the trial 

court was required only to determine if the costs were reasonably and necessarily 

incurred by the LHS and was not required to offset fundraising moneys. 

{¶39} Newkirk’s testimony provided competent, credible evidence of the costs 

incurred by the facility to a reasonable degree of certainty. Newkirk explained that the 

flat fees requested for the boarding and care of the animals were based upon an 

assessment of the actual costs incurred by the LHS. In determining the boarding costs 

for an impounding agency, it would be unreasonable to require a precise dollar figure to 

be computed for the amount of such costs per specific animal, and we cannot say that 

the costs of $15.00 per day, per cat, is unreasonable, particularly where the evidence 

indicates that many of the cats were boarded for far longer than the four days for which 

the LHS requested boarding costs. Similarly, we cannot say that the veterinary exam 

cost of $20.00 per cat or the dental procedure cost of $100.00 per procedure were 

unreasonable or unnecessary. Last, we cannot say that the $46.00 spaying/neutering 

cost was unreasonable. Although Caroline’s argues that spaying/neutering is 

discretionary and not necessary, it is the nature of an impounding agency to care for 

multiple animals and provide placements for them. We cannot say that spaying/neutering 

the cats was unnecessary given the nature of LHS. 

{¶40} Accordingly, Caroline’s second assigned error lacks merit.

{¶41} The judgment is affirmed.
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Case Nos. 2022-L-024, 2022-L-025, 2022-L-026, 2022-L-027, 2022-L-028, 2022-L-029

JOHN J. EKLUND, P.J.,

MATT LYNCH, J.,

concur.