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AN UPDATE ON NASA 

EXPLORATION SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND 

TECHNOLOGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

NOVEMBER 9, 2017 

Serial No. 115–37 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

HON. LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas, Chair 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

THOMAS MASSIE, Kentucky 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

RANDY K. WEBER, Texas 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

BRIAN BABIN, Texas 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

DRAIN LAHOOD, Illinois 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

JIM BANKS, Indiana 

ANDY BIGGS, Arizona 

ROGER W. MARSHALL, Kansas 

NEAL P. DUNN, Florida 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

RALPH NORMAN, South Carolina 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

SUZANNE BONAMICI, Oregon 

ALAN GRAYSON, Florida 

AMI BERA, California 

ELIZABETH H. ESTY, Connecticut 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DONALD S. BEYER, JR., Virginia 

JACKY ROSEN, Nevada 

JERRY MCNERNEY, California 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

PAUL TONKO, New York 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

MARK TAKANO, California 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

CHARLIE CRIST, Florida 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

HON. BRIAN BABIN, Texas, Chair 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

BILL POSEY, Florida 

JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma 

STEPHEN KNIGHT, California 

BARBARA COMSTOCK, Virginia 

RALPH LEE ABRAHAM, Louisiana 

DANIEL WEBSTER, Florida 

JIM BANKS, Indiana 

ANDY BIGGS, Arizona 

NEAL P. DUNN, Florida 

CLAY HIGGINS, Louisiana 

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas 

AMI BERA, California, Ranking Member 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

DONALD S. BEYER, JR., Virginia 

MARC A. VEASEY, Texas 

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois 

ED PERLMUTTER, Colorado 

CHARLIE CRIST, Florida 

BILL FOSTER, Illinois 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

November 9, 2017 

Page 

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2 

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3 

Opening Statements 

Statement by Representative Brian Babin, Chairman, Subcommittee on 

Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 4 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 6 

Statement by Representative Ami Bera, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 

Space, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 8 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 10 

Statement by Representative Lamar S. Smith, Chairman, Committee on 

Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 12 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 13 

Witnesses: 

Mr. William Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human Exploration and 

Operations Directorate, NASA 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 15 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 18 

Dr. Sandra Magnus, Executive Director, American Institute of Aeronautics 

and Astronautics (AIAA) 

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 26 

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 28 

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 37 

Appendix I: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions 

Mr. William Gerstenmaier, associate administrator, Human Exploration and 

Operations Directorate, NASA ............................................................................ 56 

Dr. Sandra Magnus, executive director, American Institute of Aeronautics 

and Astronautics (AIAA) ..................................................................................... 83 

Appendix II: Additional Material for the Record 

Statement submitted by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of 

Representatives .................................................................................................... 88 

Documents submitted by Representative Bill Posey, Committee on Science, 

Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives .................................... 89 

(1) 

AN UPDATE ON NASA 

EXPLORATION SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT 

Thursday, November 9, 2017 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:37 a.m., in Room 

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brian Babin 

[Chairman of the Subcommittee] presiding. 
2 

LAMAR 5. SMITH, Texas 

CHAIRMAN 

liongrcss of the 'linitcd ~tares 

1l\OUS£ Of 'RtprtS£ntlltiD£!l 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, ANO TECHNOLOGY 

2321 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING 

WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6301 

(2021 225-6371 www.st:ience.h(IU11&.gav 

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON. Texas 

RANKING MEMBER 

An Update on NASA Exploration Systems Development 

Thursday, November 9, 2017 

9:30a.m. 

2318 Rayburn House Office Building 

Witnesses 

Mr. William: Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human Exploration 

and Operations Directorate, NASA 

Dr. Sandra Magnus, Executive Director, American Institute of Aeronautics 

and Astronautics (AIAA) 
3 

TO: 

FROM: 

DATE: 

SUBJECT: 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SPACE 

Charter 

Members, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Majority Staff, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

November 9th, 2017 

Space Subcommittee Hearing: "An Update on NASA Exploration Systems 

Development" 

On Thursday, November 9, 2017 at 9:30a.m. in Room 2318 of the Rayburn House 

Office Building, the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Subcommittee on Space, 

will hold a hearing titled, "An Update on NASA Exploration Systems Development." 

Hearing Purpose 

The purpose of the hearing is to examine the development of the Space Launch System, 

Orion Crew Vehicle and the associated ground systems. 

Witnesses 

• Mr. William Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human Exploration and 

Operations Directorate, NASA 

• Dr. Sandra Magnus, Executive Director, American Institute of Aeronautics and 

Astronautics (AIAA) 

Staff Contact 

For questions related to the hearing, please contact Mr. Tom Hammond, Staff Director, 

Space Subcommittee, Mr. G. Ryan Faith, Professional Staff Member, Space Subcommittee, or 

Ms. Sara Ratliff, Policy Assistant, Space Subcommittee, at 202-225-6371. 
4 

Chairman BABIN. Good morning. The Subcommittee on Space 

will come to order. 

Without objection, the Chair is authorized to declare recesses of 

the Subcommittee at any time. 

Welcome to today’s hearing titled ‘‘An Update on NASA Exploration Systems Development.’’ 

I now recognize myself five minutes for an opening statement. 

Exploration means expanding our reach as humans, as a civilization and as a country. The ability of our nation to explore space is 

a strategic imperative. Our ability to carry out this critical strategic endeavor will rely on a few key capabilities. We must launch 

the Space Launch System in order to push beyond low-Earth orbit. 

We must finish developing the Orion capsule in order to operate in 

deep space. And we must upgrade our ground infrastructure to 

support a rejuvenated and an expanded exploration agenda. 

NASA’s long-term goal, as laid out in the 2017 NASA Transition 

Authorization Act, is to extend human presence throughout the 

Solar System. The Space Launch System and Orion are the strategic capabilities that will allow and enable humans and robots to 

accomplish this goal. SLS and Orion will enable U.S. astronauts to 

return to the Moon for the first time since Gene Cernan left his 

daughter’s name in the lunar regolith in 1972. 

As Vice President Pence said in his inaugural meeting of the reestablished National Space Council, ‘‘We will return American astronauts to the Moon, not only to leave behind footprints and flags, 

but to build the foundation that we need to send Americans to 

Mars and beyond.’’ SLS and Orion are the tip of the spear that will 

lead that return. The commercial sector can contribute by supplying necessary services and providing augmenting capabilities, 

but SLS and Orion are irreplaceable strategic assets that are necessary for missions to the Moon, Mars, and beyond. 

One of the first major laws that President Trump signed was the 

NASA Transition Authorization Act of 2017. The bill, which originated with this Committee, directed NASA to stay the course with 

SLS and Orion. It also reaffirmed congressional and presidential 

direction for NASA to utilize a stepping-stone approach to exploration, which allows for a return to the Moon. 

I wholeheartedly support the Administration’s call to return to 

the Moon. This Committee has received testimony time and again 

that the Moon is the appropriate next destination for our space 

program. Returning to the Moon does not have to mean delaying 

a mission to Mars. On the contrary, it is a logical step that enables 

exploration of the red planet and beyond. 

And while I’m excited by the promise of how strategic assets like 

SLS and Orion will enable America to return to the Moon, this 

committee has a responsibility to conduct oversight to ensure that 

these programs are successful. All three exploration system elements—SLS, Orion, and Ground systems—have experienced delays 

and overruns. This year has certainly challenged the program. 

Last year, Michoud in Louisiana was hit by a tornado. In August, 

Texas and Florida were hit by hurricanes. A couple years ago the 

Michoud’s Vertical Assembly Facility foundation was not reinforced, requiring a rebuild. This year, complications with friction 

stir weld pins at Michoud resulted in poor welds on the core stage. 
5 

All of this adds up. It appears as though the new issues with tornados and hurricanes and welding will cost roughly a year of delay. 

Depending on whether the Europeans deliver the service module on 

time for integration on Orion, the delay may be greater. 

Congress needs to understand where the program is today. What 

cost, schedule, and performance deliverables can the agency commit to? What is the plan going forward? How will NASA manage 

future issues to ensure long-term program sustainability? We 

aren’t out of the woods yet on this program, but we can see the 

edge of the forest. Significant progress has been made. We’re bending metal, writing software code, and integrating hardware. Given 

a program of this magnitude, this is no small feat, particularly 

given the challenges that the program faced under the last administration. 

In order to meet our nation’s space exploration goals, it will take 

focus, discipline, and continuity of efforts going forward. The Administration and Congress must not only provide leadership and 

direction, but we must also appropriately fund and oversee the program. Similarly, NASA and the contractors have to execute. Failure to do so could have dire consequences for the program, and 

there will be no one else to blame. 

The Administration has demonstrated its renewed support. Congress consistently funds the program at healthy levels. It is time 

for NASA and the contractors to deliver. 

I am thankful that our witnesses are here today to help us better 

understand where we are with the program and how we plan to 

move forward, and I look forward to your testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Babin follows:] 
6 

COMMITIEEON 

SCIENCE, SPACE, & TECHNOLOGY 

Lamar Smith, Chairman 

For Immediate Release 

November 9, 2017 

Media Contacts: Thea McDonald, Brandon VerVelde 

(202) 225-6371 

Statement from Brian Babin (R-Texas) 

An Update on NASA Exploration Systems Development 

Chairman Babin: Exploration means expanding our reach as humans, as a civilization 

and as a country. The ability of our nation to explore space is a strategic imperative. 

Our ability to carry out this critical strategic endeavor will rely on a few key capabilities. 

We must launch the Space Launch System (SLS) in order to push beyond low Earth 

orbit. We must finish developing the Orion capsule in order to operate in deep space. 

And we must upgrade our ground infrastructure to support a rejuvenated and 

expanded exploration agenda. 

NASA's long-term goal, as laid out in the 2017 NASA Transition Authorization Act, is to 

extend human presence throughout the Solar System. The Space Launch System and 

Orion are the strategic capabilities that will enable humans and robots to accomplish 

this goal. 

SLS and Orion will enable U.S. astronauts to return to the moon for the first time since 

Gene Cernan left his daughter's name in the lunar regolith in 1972. As Vice President 

Pence said in the inaugural meeting of the reestablished National Space Council, "We 

will return American astronauts to the moon, not only to leave behind footprints and 

flags, but to build the foundation we need to send Americans to Mars and beyond." 

SLS and Orion are the tip of the spear that will lead that return. The commercial sector 

can contribute by supplying necessary services and providing augmenting 

capabilities, but SLS and Orion are irreplaceable strategic assets that are necessary for 

missions to the moon, Mars and beyond. 

One of the first major laws that President Trump signed was the NASA Transition 

Authorization Act of 2017. The bill, which originated with this committee, directed 

NASA to stay the course with SLS and Orion. It also reaffirmed congressional and 

presidential direction for NASA to utilize a "stepping stone approach" to exploration, 

which allows for a return to the moon. I wholeheartedly support the administration's 

call to return to the moon. This committee has received testimony time and again that 

the moon is the appropriate next destination for our space program. Returning to the 

moon does not have to mean delaying a mission to Mars. On the contrary, it is a 

logical step that enables exploration of the red planet and beyond. 
7 

While I am excited by the promise of how strategic assets like SLS and Orion will enable 

America to return to the moon, this committee has a responsibility to conduct 

oversight to ensure these programs are successful. 

All three exploration system elements- SLS, Orion and Ground Systems- have 

experienced delays and overruns. This year has certainly challenged the program. Last 

spring, Michoud was hit by a tornado. In August. Texas and Florida were hit by 

hurricanes. A couple years ago the Michoud's Vertical Assembly Facility foundation 

was not reinforced, requiring a rebuild. This year, complications with friction stir weld 

pins at Michoud resulted in poor welds on the core stage. All this adds up. 

It appears as though the new issues with tornados, hurricanes and welding will cost 

roughly a year of delay. Depending on whether the Europeans deliver the service 

module on time for integration on Orion, the delay may be greater. 

Congress needs to understand where the program is today. What cost. schedule and 

performance deliverables can the agency commit to? What is the plan going 

forward? How will NASA manage future issues to ensure long-term program 

sustainability? 

We aren't out of the woods yet on this program, but we can see the edge of the 

forest. Significant progress has been made. We are bending metaL writing software 

code and integrating hardware. Given a program of this magnitude, this is no small 

feat - particularly given the challenges the program faced under the last 

administration. 

In order to meet our nation's space exploration goals, it will take focus, discipline and 

continuity of effort going forward. The administration and Congress must not only 

provide leadership and direction, but we also have to appropriately fund and oversee 

the program. Similarly, NASA and the contractors have to execute. Failure to do so 

could have dire consequences for the program, and there will be no one else to 

blame. The administration has demonstrated its renewed support. Congress 

consistently funds the program at healthy levels. It is time for NASA and the contractors 

to deliver. 

I am thankful that our witnesses are here today to help us better understand where we 

are at with the program, and how we plan to move forward. I look forward to your 

testimony. 

### 
8 

Chairman BABIN. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman from California, Mr. Bera, for an opening statement. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And good morning to our 

distinguished panel. 

This is a great hearing and a great time for this hearing to get 

an update on NASA’s exploration systems development activities. 

NASA continues to progress, but as the Chairman pointed out, 

there have been some challenges beyond their control in developing 

key elements needed to move humans beyond low-Earth orbit and 

eventually send them to Mars. 

Construction of the Space Launch System, the Orion crew vehicle, and ground infrastructure at Kennedy Space Center is well underway. Major components for Exploration Mission 1, also known 

as EM–1, and EM–2, are undergoing fabrication and testing. For 

example, in August 2017, NASA completed the—welding the liquid 

oxygen tank that is scheduled for use on the SLS launch vehicle 

to be flown on EM–1. The Orion spacecraft destined for EM–1 was 

successfully powered up for the first time in August 2017 and on 

October 19, 2017, NASA engineers conducted a full duration 500- 

second test of one of the RS–25 flight engines to be used on EM– 

2. 

NASA and industry partners have not undertaken a rocket development program of this scale for more than three decades. In addition to new hardware and infrastructure, this has also necessitated 

reestablishing critical capabilities needed for U.S. leadership in 

deep space exploration. This is not just work NASA and its prime 

contractors are doing. Over 1,000 suppliers spread across every 

State are part of this program. However, a program of this size 

does not happen without challenges, and NASA’s human space exploration program is facing several, including having to maintain 

manufacturing, test, and processing schedules as SLS, Orion, and 

EGS are integrated; the recovery from tornado damage at the 

Michoud Assembly Facility that the Chairman mentioned; resolve 

first-time production issues for SLS elements; and adjust activities 

in response to unpredictable appropriations funding. 

As the Chairman pointed out, independent analysis by GAO and 

NASA’s Office of Inspector General have also identified concerns 

with NASA’s ability to meet projected launch dates. For instance, 

in an April 2017 report, GAO found that despite SLS, Orion, and 

EGS activities making progress, ‘‘schedule pressure is escalating as 

technical challenges continue to cause schedule delays.’’ GAO characterized NASA’s planned launch date of November 2018 as ‘‘precarious.’’ 

Part of what I hope to get out of today’s hearing is a better understanding of what that clear plan and an updated launch date for 

EM–1, as well as the opportunity to continue examining other important issues, including the reasons for the latest delay in launching EM–1 and the basis for having confidence in NASA’s plan moving forward; indicators and milestones Congress should use for 

measuring progress being made both by the SLS, Orion, and EGS 

programs and by NASA in establishing a production capability; and 

how a return to the Moon, including establishing a human presence, would impact the goal of sending humans to Mars in the 

2030s, as directed in the 2017 NASA Transition Authorization Act. 
9 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, you’ve often heard me talk about growing up in the middle of the Space Race, growing up in Downey, 

California, home of much of the Apollo mission and how that inspired me, along with a generation of kids, to think about the 

sciences and beyond. What we’re talking about in terms of the systems that we’re developing today is a reestablishment of American 

leadership in the space program as we start to think about going 

back to the Moon and going beyond into deep space. And that does 

have the ability to inspire another generation of kids and reinvigorate our desire to explore our curiosity about the universe around 

us. 

One of those inspirational figures of the nation’s human space 

program is actually with us today. Dr. Magnus has flown on the 

shuttle and lived on the International Space Station. We thank 

you, Dr. Magnus, for your service and appreciate you being a role 

model for millions of young people. 

I look forward to the testimony and I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bera follows:] 
10 

OPENING STATEMENT 

Ranking Member Ami Bera (D-CA) 

of the Subcommittee on Space 

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

Subcommittee on Space 

"An Update on NASA Exploration Systems Development" 

November 9, 2017 

Good morning. And welcome to our distinguished panel. Thank you Mr. Chairman for calling 

this hearing to receive an update on NASA's exploration systems development activities. 

NASA continues to progress, under challenging circumstances, in developing key elements 

needed to move humans beyond low-Earth orbit and eventually send them to Mars. Construction 

of the Space Launch System, the Orion Crew Vehicle, and ground infrastructure at the Kennedy 

Space Center is well underway. Major components for Exploration Mission-!, also known as 

EM-I, and EM-2 are undergoing fabrication and testing. For example: 

• In August 2017, NASA completed welding the liquid oxygen tank that is scheduled for 

use on the SLS launch vehicle to be flown on EM-1; 

• The Orion spacecraft destined for EM-I was successfully powered up for the first time in 

August 2017; and 

• On October 19, 2017, NASA engineers conducted a full-duration, 500-second test of one 

of the RS-25 flight engines to be used on EM-2. 

NASA and industry partners have not undertaken a rocket development program ofthis scale for 

more than three decades. In addition to new hardware and infrastructure, this has necessitated 

re-establishing critical capabilities needed for U.S. leadership in deep space exploration. This is 

not just the work of NASA and its prime contractors. Over one thousand suppliers spread across 

every state are part of this program. However, a program of this size does not happen without 

challenges, and NASA's human space exploration program is facing several, including having to 

• maintain manufacturing, test, and processing schedules as SLS, Orion, and EGS are 

integrated; 

• recover from tornado damage at Michoud Assembly Facility suffered last February; 

• resolve first time production issues for SLS elements; and 

• adjust activities in response to unpredictable appropriations funding 

Independent analyses by GAO and NASA's Office oflnspector General have also identified 

concerns with NASA's ability to meet projected launch dates. For instance, in an April2017 

report, GAO found that despite SLS, Orion, and EGS activities making progress, "schedule 

pressure is escalating as technical challenges continue to cause schedule delays". GAO 

characterized NASA's planned launch date of November 2018 as "precarious". 

I hope that today's hearing will provide us with a clear plan and an updated launch date for 

EM-I, as well as the opportunity to examine other important issues, including: 
11 

• The reasons for the latest delay in launching EM-1 and the basis for having confidence in 

NASA's plans moving forward; 

• Indicators and milestones Congress should use for measuring progress being made both by 

the SLS, Orion, and EGS programs and by NASA in establishing a production capability; 

and 

• How a return to the Moon, including establishing a human presence, would impact the goal 

of sending humans to Mars in the 2030s, as directed in the 2017 NASA Transition 

Authorization Act. 

In closing Mr. Chairman, I have frequently shared how the Apollo Program and President 

Kennedy's vision for space inspired me to become a medical doctor. The systems under 

development that we are discussing today are an investment. They are an investment in our 

continued leadership in space exploration, in our ability to one day send humans to Mars, and in 

the dreams of the next generations of Americans to be part of that journey. 

One of the inspirational figures of the Nation's human space program is with us today. Dr. 

Magnus has flown on the Shuttle and lived on the International Space Station. We thank her for 

her service and appreciate her being a role model for millions of young people. I look forward to 

today's testimony and I yield back. 
12 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you. I couldn’t agree more, Mr. Bera. 

I now recognize the Chairman of our full committee, Mr. Smith. 

Chairman SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate 

your comments and the Ranking Member’s comments as well. 

Congress has supported NASA’s Exploration Systems program 

for years. We have showed this support in law and with funding, 

from one Administration to the next. After all these years, after billions of dollars spent, we are facing more delays and cost overruns. 

Recent hurricanes and tornadoes have damaged some facilities and 

slowed localized progress, but many of the problems are self-inflicted. It is very disappointing to hear about delays caused by poor 

execution when the U.S. taxpayer has invested so much in these 

programs. 

For the last eight years, Congress has defended the Space 

Launch System and Orion crew vehicle from attempts at cancellation and proposed budget cuts. Funding for the Exploration Systems Development now is nearly $4 billion a year. 

The Government Accountability Office reported last spring that 

the first launch of the SLS likely will be delayed a year from late 

2018 to late 2019. Delays with the European Service Module also 

could push this into 2020. If this is the case, the schedule for the 

first launch with crew is also at risk because the time needed to 

upgrade the mobile launch platform. 

The NASA Inspector General reported this week that the development of Exploration Systems is one of the most significant challenges facing NASA. The IG highlighted problems facing all components of the system: SLS, Orion, and the Ground Systems. NASA 

and the contractors should not assume future delays and cost overruns will have no consequences. If delays continue, if costs rise, 

and if foreseeable technical challenges arise, no one should assume 

the U.S. taxpayers or their representatives will tolerate this forever. 

Alternatives to SLS and Orion almost certainly would involve 

significant taxpayer funding and lead to further delays. But the 

more setbacks SLS and Orion face, the more support builds for 

other options. Other space exploration programs at NASA, like the 

Commercial Crew Program, also are facing significant delays and 

challenges. 

NASA has suffered for decades from program cancelations that 

have delayed exploration goals. As NASA’s exploration systems 

progress from development to production, operations and maintenance, NASA and its contractors must bring down costs and guarantee that deadlines are met. To this end, I was glad to see NASA 

issue a request for information last November in order to explore 

ways to reduce costs. Moving to firm fixed-price contracts for production might be an appropriate path going forward, but only if it 

benefits the taxpayer. 

Congress needs to have confidence in NASA and the Exploration 

Systems contractors, which I don’t believe we have now. That confidence is ebbing. If it slips much further, NASA and its contractors 

will have a hard time regaining their credibility. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

[The prepared statement of Chairman Smith follows:] 
13 

COMMITIEEON 

SCIENCE, SPACE, & TECHNOLOGY 

Lamar Smith. Chairman 

For Immediate Release 

November9. 2017 

Media Contacts: Thea McDonald. Brandon VerVelde 

(202) 225-6371 

Statement from Lamar Smith (R-Texas) 

An Update on NASA Exploration Systems Development 

Chairman Smith: Congress has supported NASA's Exploration Systems program for 

years. We have expressed this support in law and with funding, from one 

administration to the next. 

After all these years, after billions of dollars spent. we are facing more delays and cost 

overruns. Recent hurricanes and tornadoes have damaged some facilities and slowed 

localized progress but many of the problems are self-inflicted. 

It is very disappointing to hear about delays caused by poor execution when the U.S. 

taxpayer has invested so much in these programs. 

For the last eight years. Congress has defended the Space Launch System and Orion 

Crew Vehicle from attempts at cancellation and proposed budget cuts. Funding for 

the Exploration Systems Development now is nearly $4 billion a year. 

The Government Accountability Office reported last spring that the first launch of the 

SLS likely will be delayed a year from late 2018 to late 2019. Delays with the delivery of 

the European Service Module could push this into 2020. 

If this is the case, the schedule for the first launch with crew is also at risk because of 

the time needed to upgrade the mobile launch platform. 

The NASA Inspector General reported this week that the development of Exploration 

Systems is one of the most significant challenges facing NASA. The IG highlighted 

problems facing all facets of the program: SLS, Orion and the ground systems. 

NASA and the contractors should not assume future delays and cost overruns will have 

no consequences. If delays continue, if costs rise and if foreseeable technical 

challenges arise, no one should assume the U.S. taxpayers or their representatives will 

tolerate this. 
14 

Alternatives to SLS and Orion almost certainly would involve significant taxpayer 

funding and lead to further delays. But the more setbacks SLS and Orion face, the 

more support builds for other options. 

Other space exploration programs at NASA, like the so-called Commercial Crew 

Program also are facing significant delays and challenges. 

NASA has suffered for decades from program cancellations that have delayed 

exploration goals. 

As NASA's exploration systems progress from development to Production, Operations 

and Maintenance, NASA and its contractors must bring down costs and guarantee 

deliveries on time. 

To this end, I was glad to see NASA issue a Request For Information last November in 

order to explore ways to reduce costs. 

Moving to firm fixed-price contracts for production might be an appropriate path 

going forward but only if it benefits the taxpayer. 

Congress needs to have confidence in NASA and the Exploration Systems contractors, 

which I don't believe we have now. That confidence is ebbing. If it slips much further, 

NASA and the contractors will have a hard time regaining their credibility. 

### 
15 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Now, let me introduce our witnesses. Our first witness today is 

Mr. Bill Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator of the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate at NASA. Mr. 

Gerstenmaier began his NASA career in 1977 performing aeronautical research, and he has managed NASA’s human spaceflight 

portfolio since 2011. 

He received a bachelor’s of science in aeronautical engineering 

from Purdue University and a master’s of science in mechanical engineering from the University of Toledo. 

Our second witness today is Dr. Sandra Magnus, Executive Director at the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, 

AIAA. In addition to her role at AIAA, Dr. Magnus is a former 

NASA astronaut and, prior to that, worked as a practicing engineer 

in the aerospace industry. 

Dr. Magnus received a degree in physics, as well as a master’s 

degree in electrical engineering, both from Missouri University of 

Science and Technology. She also earned a Ph.D. from the School 

of Material Science and Engineering at Georgia Tech. 

And I now recognize Mr. Gerstenmaier for five minutes to 

present his testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF MR. WILLIAM GERSTENMAIER, 

ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR, 

HUMAN EXPLORATION 

AND OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE, NASA 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Thank you. 

We’re living in an amazing time in human spaceflight. NASA 

and our international partners have had crewmembers living onboard the International Space Station for more than 17 consecutive 

years. Most high school students today have only known a time 

when humans were living and working in space. 

We are using the space station to expose a broader community 

beyond the current space industry the benefits of using microgravity as an environment to develop new systems and techniques 

for use on the Earth. These new companies and researchers have 

never seen the benefits of space to their products and processes. 

The space station is becoming a place for business to expand, grow, 

and gain competitive advantage over companies not doing research 

in space. Just as having crews in space is now accepted, business 

operating in space will become normal and accepted. 

NASA has bought services for cargo delivery from two companies 

and is adding a third. The agency is in the process of acquiring 

services and certifying two new systems to transport crews to the 

ISS. These companies are busy manufacturing and certifying their 

systems. Our partners in low-Earth orbit are helping build a strong 

commercial space industry and this allows us to focus our efforts 

on deep space exploration, which brings us to the subject of today’s 

hearing: exploration systems development. 

NASA’s Space Launch System rocket, the Orion deep space capsule with the European Service Module, and Ground System programs are undergoing manufacturing and certification in preparation for their first integrated flight. Just think about it. There is 
16 

more human spaceflight hardware in production today than at any 

time in the United States since Apollo. 

As a nation, we are building three different crew vehicles: Orion, 

Starliner, and Dragon, one for deep space and two for low-Earth 

orbit. Getting to this point was not easy, and there are still challenges ahead. However, we all need to pause and reflect on this 

amazing time. 

As we pursue human exploration further into the solar system, 

our exploration teams are building more than a rocket and a spacecraft for a single flight. Rather, we are building a flexible, sustainable system that will be used for decades to come. With this approach, we can incrementally upgrade and enhance our exploration 

systems to accomplish a variety of missions, crewed and un-crewed 

in deep space. 

We are also building a system designed with modern manufacturing technique for lower production costs than previous designs. 

The work performed in support of SLS and Orion has applications 

to other programs in aerospace. For example, hundreds of requests 

for information have been transferred from Orion to the commercial spacecraft in development for low-Earth orbit. The work on 

self-reacting—reaction friction stir welding developed for SLS will 

have application beyond SLS to other launch vehicles in development. 

It is the proper role of government to develop capabilities for use 

by all. Hardware to support the multiple flights has been built. 

Three Orion crew modules, one structural test article, one flown 

during Exploration Flight Test 1, and the current flight article 

have all been built for Orion. Four major test stands are complete 

at Marshall. The engine section structural testing is fully complete 

at Marshall. The vertical assembly building at KSC is complete. 

The launch pad is nearing completion. All RS–25 engines and controllers are ready for flight. 

Seventeen parachute development tests are complete. Four qualification parachute tests are complete with four more open. The 

data from these parachute tests are helping our commercial crew 

partners with their tests also. 

The amount of work completed today for the deep space exploration system is large, and it is documented in my written testimony. Further, this government investment in SLS and Orion is 

benefiting all. We need to be careful and not focus on a single 

launch date projection but rather take time to examine the quality, 

quantity, and future benefit of the work completed. This deeper examination will reveal the value of the work completed to the nation. 

NASA has carefully reviewed the work remaining to the launch, 

including certification, and while this review shows EM–1 launch 

date of June 2020 is possible, the agency has chosen to manage to 

a December 2019 launch. This earlier launch date is reasonable 

and challenges the teams to stay focused on tasks without creating 

undue pressure. Furthermore, NASA’s taking additional steps to 

reduce schedule risk for both known and unknown issues and protect for the earliest possible launch date. The cost for EM–1, even 

with the June date, remain within the 15 percent limit for SLS and 

are slightly above for Ground Systems operations. Exploration Mis-
17 

sion 2, Orion costs, and schedule are not adversely impacted by the 

EM–1 schedule, and, as discussed earlier, the work completed by 

SLS, Orion, and GSDO shows outstanding progress. 

I welcome your questions and thank you for this opportunity to 

discuss the amazing work accomplished by the men and women of 

NASA and their contractor partner teams. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Gerstenmaier follows:] 
18 

Statement of 

William H. Gerstenmaier 

HOLD FOR RELEASE 

UNTIL PRESENTED 

BY WITNESS 

Nov. 9, 2017 

Associate Administrator for Human Exploration and Operations 

National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

before the 

Subcommittee on Space 

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

U.S. House of Representatives 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 

today to discuss NASA's progress on our Exploration Systems Development (ESD) programs: the Space 

Launch System (SLS) heavy-lift launch vehicle, the Orion deep space crew vehicle, and the Exploration 

Ground Systems (EGS) that provide critical integration and launch infrastructure for these vehicles. The 

ESD programs are creating a new space transportation capability, the first components of an architecture 

for human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit (LEO) and into cislunar space. It is in cislunar space 

where NASA intends to conduct deep space missions to test systems and concepts, paving the way for 

long-duration human space exploration including missions to the Moon and Mars. 

NASA is now in the fabrication and assembly phase of developing SLS, Orion, and EGS, and is focused 

on bringing these capabilities together to conduct the first Exploration Missions. Exploration Mission-! 

(EM-I) is the first integrated test of these new transportation systems. Launching atop SLS, an uncrewed 

Orion spacecraft will travel into space for up to a 25-day journey beyond the Moon and back to Earth. 

EM-I is a test flight, but will also include a payload of several CubeSats that will be deployed to perform 

a variety of scientific investigations, such as to analyze the presence of water and ice on the Moon, visit 

and examine a near-Earth asteroid, and detect and measure radiation levels. The data that we gather from 

these CubeSats will be used to better understand our solar system and, in particular, cislunar space. 

Production is also underway on flight hardware for the first crewed mission, EM-2, which is planned to 

launch no later than 2023. 

Space Launch System 

SLS is planned as a national capability and designed as a heavy-lift launch vehicle for transporting 

humans and cargo to space. It can also be used as a cargo delivery rocket to enable science missions to 

reach remote destinations faster, though there are tradeoffs that should be considered when comparing to 

commercially available vehicles, such as cost and performance. SLS is intended to launch astronauts in 

the Orion spacecraft on missions to cislunar space. In future updates, it will have the highest-ever 

payload mass and volume capability, and enough energy to dramatically reduce travel times to deep space 

destinations. This will enable larger payloads beyond LEO. 

SLS capabilities are planned to evolve using a block upgrade approach. SLS Block I will have the 

capability to carry over 70 metric tons to LEO and nearly 30 metric tons toward the Moon, which for the 

first flight will be used to launch the Orion capsule. The next evolution of the SLS, Block IB, 

1 
19 

incorporates a new upper stage, the Exploration Upper Stage (EUS), now under development, along with 

updates to associated adaptors. With these planned updates, Block I B will improve vehicle lift 

performance to over I 05 metric tons to LEO and 40 metric tons to cislunar space, and enable an increase 

in payload diameter from 5 meters to 7.5 meters and total payload volume from 255 cubic meters to over 

900 cubic meters, all of which are capabilities that could help enable deep space exploration. 

SLS leverages over a half-century of experience with launch vehicles, including Saturn and Space Shuttle, 

along with advancements in technology since that time, including model-based engineering, additive 

manufacturing, high-fidelity computational fluid dynamics capabilities, new composite materials and 

production techniques, and large-scale self-reaction friction stir welding. Additionally, initial flight units 

use components already owned from the Space Shuttle, such as RS-25 engines and boosters. More 

efficient methods are under development for manufacturing these components, including new NASA 

investment in expendable RS-25 engines for the SLS Core Stage with the goal of achieving a lower perunit cost than the original reusable RS-25s used as the Space Shuttle Main Engines. The Agency 

continues to identify affordability strategies for missions beyond EM-2. Reducing overall costs of the 

systems will be critical to achieving a successful and sustainable exploration capability. 

In FY 2017, SLS continued to progress towards EM-I, and concurrently, develop the Block IB vehicle. 

The Program completed the Orion Stage Adapter (OSA)/lnterim Cryogenic Propulsion Stage 

(ICPS)/Launch Vehicle Stage Adapter (L VSA) integrated structural test qualification phase ahead of 

schedule. The !CPS has been delivered to the Kennedy Space Center in Florida and is now in storage at 

the Space Station Processing Facility. In February 2017, an F-3 tornado caused significant damage on the 

site of the Michoud Assembly Facility (MAF) in Louisiana where the Core Stage is manufactured. 

Thanks to the extraordinary work of personnel at MAF and the swift passage of an emergency 

supplemental bill that will support datnage repairs, production at MAF was quickly restored, enabling the 

Progratn to complete a major milestone with the completion of major welding of the five large Core Stage 

sections (forward section, liquid oll:ygen tank, intertank, liquid hydrogen tank, and engine section) in the 

Vertical Assembly Center (VA C). The VAC is the largest of the six new large welding tools at MAF; 

together, these tools represent a major advance in manufacturing technology that reduces the number of 

tools and touch labor by 50 percent compared to Space Shuttle External Tank production. 

The SLS program also completed the Core Stage Pathfinder build. The Pathfinder, a full-sized 212 foot 

long, 228,000 pound replica of the SLS Core Stage, will be used to test shipping and handling equipment 

and procedures at the Stennis Space Center (SSC) in Mississippi (where the Core Stage will be test fired 

on the B-2 test stand) and Kennedy Space Center (KSC). For Core Stage engines, NASA engineers 

closed a summer of successful hot fire testing for flight controllers on the RS-25 engines that will help 

power the SLS. The 500-second hot fire of a RS-25 engine flight controller unit on the A -I Test Stand at 

SSC marks the completion of the engine adaptation testing to certify the former Space Shuttle engines for 

use in the more challenging SLS environment. The test series also certified the new engine controllers 

and new control software for EM-1. All EM-I Core Stage engines have now completed their singleengine test sequences and are being packaged for delivery to MAF for integration into the Core Stage in 

FY 2018. 

Finally, the SLS Program began manufacturing on a number of components for the EM-2 mission, 

including completing major welding of the EM-2 core stage engine section in FY 2017 and completion of 

the EUS Preliminary Design Review (PDR), which validates progress to critical design and fabrication. 

In FY 2018, Core Stage integration and outfitting (including installation of the four RS-25 engines) will 

continue at MAF, though challenges remain to completing production of the Core Stage and delivery to 

the Stennis Space Center in Mississippi in December 2018 for the Green Run test sequence. FY 2018 

will also see a series of EM-I flight hardware deliveries to EGS at KSC, starting this month with the 

2 
20 

hand-over of the !CPS, followed by the OSA and L VSA. The EM-I Booster segments will arrive at KSC 

beginning final assembly with the aft and forward skirts. SLS will prepare for the EM-I Design 

Certification Review planned for early 2019, conduct the EM-2 Critical Design Review (CDR), and begin 

fabrication of components for EM-3 and beyond. 

Orion 

NASA's Orion spacecraft builds upon more than 50 years of spaceflight research and development. Its 

design is meant to be able to carry crew to space, provide emergency abort capability, sustain crew during 

space travel, and provide safe reentry at the high-return velocities typically needed for deep space 

missions. Orion is designed to support human exploration missions to deep space with a crew of four for 

periods of 21 days. However, with modifications and the support of other new deep space elements, most 

of the Orion capsule systems could be capable of operations in deep space for periods of time up to I ,000 

days. Additionally, the Orion systems are designed to operate in a contingency mode to augment life 

support systems in other space transport systems. 

Orion's crew module (CM), spacecraft adapter, and launch abort system (LAS) incorporate numerous 

technology advancements and innovations. Orion's LAS can activate within milliseconds to carry the 

crew from harm's way and position the module for a safe landing. The spacecraft's propulsion, thermal 

protection, avionics, and life support systems will enable extended duration missions beyond Earth orbit 

and into deep space. Its modular design will be capable of integrating additional new technical 

innovations as they become available. 

The European Space Agency (ESA) is providing the European Service Module (ESM) for Orion, 

including structural and propulsion qualification test articles and the flight articles for EM-I and the 

crewed EM-2 flight. ESA is providing this ESM hardware in lieu of other contributions, as part of their 

barter agreement with NASA for ESA utilization of the International Space Station (ISS). ESM 

qualification and structural hardware is currently undergoing testing at the White Sands Test Facility in 

New Mexico and Colorado, while the EM-I flight article is in production today at the Airbus Space and 

Defense facility in Bremen, Germany, for scheduled delivery in 2018. 

Orion's design, development, and testing (including flight tests) schedule is intended to have the 

spacecraft ready to carry crew to the area around the Moon no later than 2023. Any future flights ofSLS 

and the Orion spacecraft into cislunar space will be intended to extend NASA's capability for human deep 

space exploration operations, and demonstrate an evolving set of capabilities in cislunar space to reduce 

the overall risk of longer duration missions. 

In FY 2017, Orion Program structural testing made significant progress, including the delivery of the 

ESM Structural Test Article (STA) from NASA's Plum Brook Station in Sandusky, Ohio to KSC, then to 

Denver, Colorado, to support integrated Crew Module (CM), LAS, and ESM ST A testing in FY 2018. 

The Program completed a successful hot fire test of the LAS attitude control motor (HT -II) in April 2017 

and a successful test of the LAS abort qualification motor I in June 2017. ESA's ESM Propulsion 

Qualification Module was installed at NASA's White Sands Test Facility in February, and the first hot 

fire test of the Reaction Control System thrusters for Orion's ESM was conducted. The Program has 

conducted 17 full-scale development airdrop tests on the Orion parachutes at the U.S. Army Proving 

Ground in Yuma, Arizona, and is half way through the qualification program of 8 tests. Engineers at the 

Space Power Facility at Plum Brook station in Sandusky, Ohio, conducted acoustic testing on the ogive 

panels. The ogive panels protect Orion's crew module from harsh acoustic conditions at launch and in 

case of an abort. The EM-I CM and Crew Module Adapter (CMA) production at the KSC Neil 

Armstrong Operations and Checkout Building has made significant progress; both the CM and the CMA 

3 
21 

have completed initial power on. During the initial power-on tests, engineers and technicians connected 

the vehicle management computers to Orion's power and data units to ensure the systems communicated 

precisely with one another to accurately route power and functional commands throughout the spacecraft 

for the duration of a deep space exploration mission. Steady progress is also being made on the EM-1 

ESM being manufactured in Bremen, Germany. NASA and a Department of Defense team tested Orion 

exit procedures in a variety of scenarios in July in the waters off the coast of Galveston, Texas. 

In addition, the Orion Program began manufacturing of components for the EM-2 mission, including the 

crew module forward and aft bulkheads, the crew module cone panel, solar cells, and EM-2 motors. 

In FY 2018, Orion will continue qualification testing of Orion systems for the first crewed flight. As part 

of this qualification work, NASA is planning to accelerate the ascent abort-2 test (AA-2) into 2019, ahead 

of an updated EM-1 launch date. Structural work is already underway on Orion EM-2 flight hardware 

production, and this will continue in FY 2018. For EM-1, the ESM is scheduled to be delivered to the 

Operations and Checkout Building at KSC for integration with the CM in April2018 and the start of 

integrated thermal vacuum testing in November 2018, though challenges remain to this schedule, 

including timely delivery of necessary components to support the ESA hardware integration schedule and 

shipment to KSC. 

Exploration Ground Systems 

The objective ofEGS is to prepare KSC to process and launch the SLS and Orion. To achieve this 

transformation, NASA is developing new ground systems while refurbishing and upgrading infrastructure 

and facilities to meet tomorrow's demands. This modernization effort is designed to maintain maximum 

flexibility in order to also accommodate a multitude of other potential Government and commercial 

customers. Drawing on five decades of excellence in processing and launch, KSC continues to work 

toward serving as a multi-user spaceport as was envisioned post Space Shuttle retirement. 

The EGS program enables integration, processing, and launch of SLS and Orion, and the program is 

making the required facility and ground support equipment modifications at KSC to enable assembly, 

test, launch, and recovery ofthe SLS and Orion flight elements. EGS is also modernizing communication 

and control systems to support these activities. Upon completion, the KSC launch site will be able to 

provide a more flexible, affordable, and responsive launch capability for SLS and Orion when compared 

to approaches used for the Space Shuttle. 

In FY 2017, EGS completed Vehicle Assembly Building (V AB) platform installation and outfitting. 

EGS' renovation of Launch Pad 398 is progressing well and includes upgrades and modifications to the 

flame trench, environmental control system, and a new flame deflector. EGS successfully tested CrawlerTransporter 2 (CT-2) upgrades; CT-2 upgrades included new generators, gear assemblies, jacking, 

equalizing and leveling hydraulic cylinders, roller bearings and brakes. The Program is progressing with 

Multi-Payload Processing Facility (MPPF) Verification and Validation; this facility will be used for 

offiine processing and fueling of the Orion spacecraft and service module stack before launch. As of 

September 2017, the EGS Program had completed the installation of five sets of umbilicals/attach points 

on the Mobile Launcher (Orion Service Module Umbilical, Core Stage Intertank Umbilical, Core Stage 

Forward Skirt Umbilical, Vehicle Support Posts, Aft Skirt Electrical and Pneumatic Umbilicals), 

completing more than 70 percent of the umbilical and launch accessory deliveries to the Mobile Launcher 

from the Launch Equipment Test Facility. The first major integrated operation at Launch Pad 398 at 

KSC began in September 2017 with the inilial test filling of the Liquid Oxygen (L02) storage tank, a 

giant sphere that can hold about 900,000 gallons of L02 and maintain the propellant at cryogenic 

temperatures of -297 degrees Fahrenheit. Hardware delivered to EGS this year included left-hand 

4 
22 

forward skirt for SLS solid rocket boosters, service platforms for SLS booster engines, and the !CPS. 

Damage to EGS systems during Hurricane Irma was minimal (limited to some minor damage to the 

MPPF and some water intrusion on the Mobile Launcher, none of which will significantly impact EM-I 

preparations), thanks to the diligence of EGS personnel to "safe" systems ahead of the storm. 

In FY 2018, once the program has completed the system verification and validation phase, it will begin 

the operations and integration phase in preparation for Multi-Element verification and validation for the 

Mobile Launcher, Pad, and V AB. Spacecraft offline processing will begin in the fourth quarter of 2018. 

Exploration Mission-1 

The preponderance of SLS, Orion, and EGS development and production content is making sustained 

progress toward EM-I, and work is underway to prepare for the first flight of crew on EM-2 and 

subsequent exploration missions. While progress on these programs has been substantial, NASA, its 

contractors, and international partners have faced challenges with first-time design and assembly. This 

has adversely affected the schedule for the EM-I test flight, and as a result, the Agency has rescheduled 

program planning of EM-1 to reflect completion of work required to prepare for flight. While NASA's 

review shows an EM-11aunch date of June 2020 is possible, the Agency is managing to December 2019. 

NASA is taking additional steps to reduce schedule risks known and unknown, and protect for the earlier 

launch date. NASA's ability to meet the Agency's Baseline Commitment for EM-I cost, which includes 

SLS and ground systems, currently remains within original targets. Orion is included in NASA's EM-2 

Agency Baseline Commitment. 

NASA has made significant progress in addressing some ofthese development issues. For instance, the 

SLS program has resolved the VAC weld strength issues and all VAC assembly welding for EM-I is now 

complete. Additionally, NASA continues to make progress on key elements. All EM-I booster 

separation motors are cast and finalized, and the engine controller qualification testing has been 

completed. The EM-! CM and CMA production at the Operations and Checkout Building is making 

good progress; both the CM and the CMA have completed initial power on. ESM coordination on 

assembly, integration, and testing is improving, and NASA has increased involvement in resolving 

domestic and international vendor technical and schedule performance issues. The Interim Cryogenic 

Propulsion Stage has been delivered to EGS. At the Kennedy Space Center, VAB platform installation is 

complete. Pad 39B development is progressing well, and five sets of umbilicals/attach points have been 

installed on the Mobile Launcher as of September 2017. Finally, NASA is making progress with ongoing 

issues associated with spacecraft command and control software. 

Conclusion 

The Agency has developed an approach to expand the distance and duration of human space exploration, 

building off the exploration happening today on the ISS. The SLS, Orion, and EGS programs are 

developing systems intended to provide transportation capabilities for human space exploration beyond 

low-earth orbit. 

While NASA continues to shape this exploration architecture, the objective is to extend human presence 

deeper into the solar system through a sustainable human and robotic spaceflight program. On October 5, 

2017, the National Space Council finalized a recommendation to the President to alter existing policy for 

NASA's human exploration program to focus on "an innovative and sustainable program of exploration 

with commercial and international partners to enable human expansion across the solar system" and that 

such a program would "lead the return of humans to the Moon for long-term exploration and utilization, 

5 
23 

followed by human missions to Mars and other destinations." NASA is working with the Executive 

Office of the President on further policy and budgets to support this directive. 

Mr. Chairman, I would be happy to respond to any questions you or the other Members of the 

Subcommittee may have. 

6 
24 

WILLIAM H. GERSTENMAIER 

ASSOCIATE ADMINISTRATOR FOR 

HUMAN EXPLORATION AND OPERATIONS 

William H. Gerstenmaier is the associate administrator for 

the Human Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate 

at NASA Headquarters in Washington, DC. In this position, 

Mr. Gerstenmaier provides strategic direction for all aspects 

of NASA's human exploration of space and cross-agency 

space support functions of space communications and 

space launch vehicles. He provides programmatic direction 

for the continued operation and utilization of the International 

Space Station, development of the Space Launch System 

and Orion spacecraft, and is providing strategic guidance 

and direction for the commercial crew and cargo programs 

that will provide logistics and crew transportation for the 

International Space Station. 

Mr. Gerstenmaier began his NASA career in 1977 at the 

then Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio, performing 

aeronautical research. He was involved with the wind tunnel 

tests that were used to develop the calibration curves for the air data probes used during entry on the 

Space Shuttle. 

Beginning in 1988, Mr. Gerstenmaier headed the Orbital Maneuvering Vehicle (OMV) Operations Office, 

Systems Division at the Johnson Space Center. He was responsible for all aspects of OMV operations at 

Johnson, including development of a ground control center and training facility for OMV, operations 

support to vehicle development, and personnel and procedures development to support OMV operations. 

Subsequently he headed the Space Shuttle/Space Station Freedom Assembly Operations OffiCe, 

Operations Division. He was responsible for resolving technical assembly issues and developing 

assembly strategies. 

Mr. Gerstenmaier also served as Shuttle/Mir Program operations manager. In this role, he was the 

primary interface to the Russian Space Agency for operational issues, negotiating all protocols used in 

support of operations during the Shuttle/Mir missions. In addition, he supported NASA 2 operations in 

Russia, from January through September 1996 including responsibility for daily activities, as well as the 

health and safety of the NASA crewmember on space station Mir. He scheduled science activities, public 

affairs activities, monitored Mir systems, and communicated with the NASA astronaut on Mir. 

In 1998, Mr. Gerstenmaier was named manager, Space Shuttle Program Integration, responsible for the 

overall management. integration, and operations of the Space Shuttle Program. This included 

development and operations of all Space Shuttle elements, including the orbiter, external tank, solid 

rocket boosters, and Space Shuttle main engines, as well as the facilities required to support ground 

processing and flight operations. 

In December 2000, Mr. Gersten maier was named deputy manager, International Space Station Program 

and two years later became manager. He was responsible for the day-to-day management, development, 

integration, and operation of the International Space Station. This included the design, manufacture, 

testing, and delivery of complex space flight hardware and software, and for its integration with the 

elements from the International Partners into a fully functional and operating International Space Station. 

Named associate administrator for the Space Operations Mission Directorate in 2005, Mr. Gerstenmaier 

directed the safe completion of the last 21 Space Shuttle missions that witnessed assembly complete of 

the International Space Station. During this time, he provided programmatic direction for the integration 

and operation of the International Space Station, space communications, and space launch vehicles. 
25 

In 2011, Mr. Gerstenmaier was named to his current position as associate administrator for the Human 

Exploration and Operations Mission Directorate. 

Mr. Gerstenmaier received a bachelor of science in aeronautical engineering from Purdue University in 

1977 and a master of science degree in mechanical engineering from the University ofToledo in 1981. In 

1992 and 1993, he completed course work for a doctorate in dynamics and control with emphasis in 

propulsion at Purdue University. 

Mr. Gerstenmaier is the recipient of numerous awards, including three NASA Certificates of 

Commendation, two NASA Exceptional Service Medals, a Senior NASA Outstanding Leadership Medal, 

the Meritorious Executive Presidential Rank Award, and Distinguished Executive Presidential Rank 

Award. He also was honored with an Outstanding Aerospace Engineer Award from Purdue University. 

Additionally, he was twice honored by Aviation Week and Space Technology for outstanding achievement 

in the field of space. His other awards include: the AIAA International Cooperation Award; the National 

Space Club Astronautics Engineer Award; National Space Club Von Braun Award; the Federation of 

Galaxy Explorers Space Leadership Award; AIAA International Award; the AIAA Fellow; Purdue 

University Distinguished Alumni Award; and honored at Purdue as an Old Master in the Old Masters 

Program; recipient of the Rotary National Award for Space Achievement's National Space Trophy; Space 

Transportation Leadership Award; the AIAA von Braun Award for Excellence in Space Program 

Management; and the AIAA von Karman Lectureship in Astronautics. 

He is married to the former Marsha Ann Johnson. They have two children. 

October 2015 
26 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you, Mr. Gerstenmaier. 

And now, I recognize Dr. Magnus for five minutes for her testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF DR. SANDRA MAGNUS, 

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, 

AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF AERONAUTICS 

AND ASTRONAUTICS (AIAA) 

Dr. MAGNUS. Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Bera, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address you today. 

The development system of the Space Launch System and the 

Orion crew vehicle are major milestones for our nation’s space program, and I would not understate their importance. However, I 

would like to address the larger view related to the current state 

of our human spaceflight program and comment on its progress 

and direction. 

The idea of what is possible in space has been in transition over 

the last decade. When talking with the public, I use a model to describe the ecosystem that is today’s human spaceflight program. I 

refer you to the figure on the TV monitors and have you imagine 

a bubble or a balloon centered on the Earth slowly expanding. That 

expanding surface represents the outward expansion of human activity. Since the Apollo era for the last 40 years, the surface of that 

bubble has expanded only to low-Earth orbit in that initial phase, 

and it’s remained there. During this period, the government was 

the driving force behind the expansion of human activity in space, 

and this had led to an accumulation of experience, technology, and 

management operations in this environment. 

Now, private industry has become interested in engaging more 

proactively and independently in this open space, in that development phase as on the figure. As commercial activities mature, it 

creates stability and a foundation upon which the surface of the 

bubble, the initial phase, can expand yet further beyond low-Earth 

orbit. 

For the foreseeable future, expansion beyond will continue to be 

driven primarily by government-derived goals and investments. Because of the increased engagement by industry in LEO, in lowEarth orbit, NASA and the government are now free to develop beyond into cislunar space and beyond that. 

But at the core of implementing this model are two key questions. What are the technologies, knowledge, and experience that 

the government wants to have available for broad dissemination to 

industry 50 years from now? And two, what are the capabilities 

and services that are—that the government and private industry, 

each driven by their own motives, are interested in developing that 

can potential sustain viable space-based businesses after leveraging 

initial government investment? 

A core concept inherent in the model and underscored by these 

questions is the fact that there is a need for government investment and activity at the leading edge of exploration during that 

initial phase and the fact that industry will sooner or later reap the 

benefit of that government investment to create and establish new 

capabilities and business ventures in the development phase. 
27 

And I might comment the normalization phase we’re not ready 

for yet in human spaceflight but you see that happening over the 

last decades in the satellite industry where there are independent 

economic spheres active and the government is a customer. However, the government still does its own thing for its own purposes. 

So if you can add that sort of with a twist to human spaceflight, 

we’re just simply not ready for that phase yet. And this is the dynamic that’s unfolding in human spaceflight, as I mentioned. 

The model I have discussed is a powerful one, and if it’s employed strategically—if employed strategically—and that brings me 

to the important point, and this is one that you’ve heard many, 

many times and I don’t think that you disagree, and so the United 

States needs a comprehensive national space strategy. It is imperative that we commit as a nation with a constancy of purpose for 

the long term. It is the nature of the space business that it takes 

time, patience, and constant purpose to make advancements. The 

establishment of the National Space Council provides an opportunity to create this integrated approach. 

A committed long-term strategy is necessary but it’s not enough 

to ensure the success of the U.S. space program. To be effective, 

sufficient resources need to be allocated to implement the plan. 

This is something that has challenged NASA in the past and continues today. When I joined the agency in 1996, NASA received approximately 7/10 of a penny for every tax dollar. Today, the agency 

receives approximately 5/10 of a penny for every tax dollar, this despite the fact that the number, breadth, and complexity of programs has increased. 

Fundamentally, NASA is constrained by limited control on the 

expense side of its budget as well and has limited freedom to adjust 

overhead, either facilities or civil workforce, whether size or 

skillset, and in some cases the management of task assignments 

around the agency. To execute a long-term strategic U.S. space program in a constrained budget environment effectively and successively, NASA must be given the ability to make decisions and take 

actions in these areas. 

Equally important to the adequate resources is the stability insurance of those resources. Developing space hardware is complex 

and challenging, as you’ve heard today. A program with a 

multiyear phase budget can absorb more initially expensive engineering decisions knowing that the result will be lower operational 

costs and hence overall net savings over the life of the program. 

The current budgeting process and lack of a stable budgetary environment prohibits this kind of comprehensive approach to be used. 

The transition that is occurring in how humans engage in space 

has been a goal for decades. Our nation was built upon exploration, 

expansion, and economic development. From the arrival of the first 

immigrants and settlers to the westward expansion across the continent, we have faced the challenges, forged new paths, and overcome all obstacles. As we expand into space, the next frontier, I am 

confident we can tap into the same spirit and energy. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to address this body, and 

thank you for your continued support of our nation’s space program. I look forward to answering any questions you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Magnus follows:] 
28 

A~AJI= ..----- ... --.-

Shaping the Future of Aerospace 

Written Statement of 

Dr. Sandra Magnus 

Executive Director 

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 

Subcommittee on Space 

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology 

United States House of Representatives 

"An Update on NASA Exploration Systems Development" 

November 9, 2017 

Chairman Babin, Ranking Member Bera, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, I 

want to thank you for the opportunity to address you today concerning our nation's space 

program and its trajectory. My last testimony before the full committee was in February 2014, 

and many of the points I made then I will reiterate today. I will also highlight changes and/or 

progress that have been made and the potential that is unfolding before us. 

EM-1 and its attendant schedule are major milestones for our nation's space program, and I 

would not understate its importance. However, I would posit that the larger purpose of today's 

hearing is to examine the current state of our human spaceflight program and comment on its 

progress and direction. I believe that we are on the brink of an exciting new phase in human 

spaceflight. For the last decade or so numerous companies, including those working with and 

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29 

directly supported by NASA, such as Boeing, SpaceX, lockheed Martin, Sierra Nevada, and 

Orbital ATK, as well as those privately funded, such as Virgin Galactic and Blue Origin, have 

been working very hard to develop and operate the next generation of vehicles to send cargo 

and humans from U.S. soil into space. The different vehicles will have the ability to launch 

humans and cargo into suborbital trajectories, to low Earth orbit, and beyond low Earth orbit to 

the moon and to Mars. Each and every program has had its technical and management 

challenges and its setbacks. Each and every company has risen to these challenges, tackled 

problems, created solutions, and thus, incrementally, step by step, made progress toward their 

respective first flights. Some of the cargo vehicles are already operational. The next two to 

three years will be very exciting as the crewed vehicles will start flying. To the public it will seem 

as if suddenly, overnight, a whole new phase of the U.S. space program will have been initiated. 

But as those of us in the industry and in this room know, our space program has been steadily, 

determinedly working on the tools and capabilities to achieve these goals. 

Indeed for those of us here today and the many who work diligently across our country in the 

space industry, we know the hard work, planning, dedication, and commitment required to 

execute a successful human spaceflight program. We know that sending humans into space is 

hard. That despite numerous decades of experience in this endeavor the exercise of launching 

humans out of the Earth's gravity well into the challenging environment of space continues to 

be anything but straightforward. Progress in human spaceflight is measured not in days or 

weeks, but in months and years. Every human spaceflight program in development or operation 

today, whether it is driven by governmental or private motivations, is advancing steadily, but 

they will still encounter technical, management, and operational challenges. I make these 

statements not to imply that the industry is at risk, but, alternatively, to highlight the steady, 

committed, and talented community that is determined to succeed and will succeed in keeping 

America engaged and at the forefront of what is possible in space. 

The idea of "what is possible in space" has been in transition over the last decade or so. As I 

have mentioned in my previous testimony and in other venues, after 60 years of government 

investment and activities in space we have reached the point where the private sector is able to 

leverage the accumulated technological developments, operational experience, and 

management knowledge to create and execute plans for engagement in and economic 

development of space. In concert with and because of this expanded private interest, NASA has 

been able to extend its ambitions beyond low Earth orbit and outward toward the moon and 

Mars. 

Times of transition and change are chaotic: norms are challenged, creative energy and new 

ideas enter the paradigm, and what has been a well-understood landscape seems to be 

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30 

constantly shifting. During such a dynamic phase I find it useful to take a step back and examine 

the situation from some distance to better understand possible trajectories, motivations, and 

outcomes. There is a model that I like to use to describe the ecosystem that is today's U.S. 

human spaceflight program. 

I would like to refer to Figure 1. As illustrated in the figure, imagine a bubble or balloon, 

centered on the Earth, slowly expanding outward. The expanding surface represents the 

outward expansion of human activity. Putting aside our trips to the moon in the Apollo era, for 

the last forty years the surface of the bubble has expanded to low Earth orbit and has remained 

there. During this period government-directed investment and government-led missions, which 

were the driving force behind the expansion of human activity to low Earth orbit, led to an 

accumulation of experience, technology, and knowledge about operating in this environment. 

Figure 1 

Outward Expansion of Human Space Activity 

Now many decades later we are at the point where private industry has become interested in 

engaging more proactively in the open space-between the Earth's surface and the surface of 

the bubble. As these activities initiate and mature, it creates stability and a foundation upon 

which the surface of the bubble of human activity can expand yet further, for example, beyond 

low Earth orbit. Similar to the initial expansion into low Earth orbit, further expansion beyond it 

will be driven by government-derived goals and investments. Because of the increasing 

engagement by industry in the open space created by the expansion's surface, currently 

stationed at low Earth orbit, NASA can now begin to disengage as the main investor in low Earth 

orbit. In doing so, government can take advantage of the options that are created due to the 

3 
31 

maturation of the private sector and evolution in the industrial base. So, in summary, human 

activity is moving outward from the Earth with government leading the outermost expansion 

and private enterprise evolving to provide stability and sustainability in government's wake. 

While this is a simplistic model, it helps create a framework for us to establish a strategic 

approach to human spaceflight. I might note that this model is applicable to civil space and 

commercial development but not national security-related activity in space, which will remain 

the purview of government. 

This is a model that, in some form or another, many in the industry espouse even if it is not 

described as an expanding bubble as I have illustrated in Figure 1. Indeed I believe NASA is 

attempting to create a framework based on this model, but I would argue that it is difficult for it 

to achieve this vision comprehensively as a single agency, outside of a larger, more nationally 

comprehensive view of what the United States is and should be doing in space. 

Before I expand on this further, I would like to address why the government, with its goals and 

investments, is and should be (for the time being) the driver for the expansion of human 

engagement in space. I think it is important to note that true exploration is occurring at the 

leading edge of the bubble. As we expand human reach further into the solar system away from 

Earth, new technologies require development, new operational paradigms require testing, and 

potentially even new program management techniques will need to be established. Any one of 

these areas alone can be high risk and all require investment, and there is no clear 

understanding of how much investment will be necessary to be successful. In addition, the 

return on that investment is unknown or highly uncertain at best. The government is the 

natural investor and developer in such a scenario-it is not driven by profit motives, but has 

other concerns. I would add that it is quite possible that in the future companies may be driven 

to conduct exploration missions outside of a government framework and government 

investment; I would argue, though, that based on where we are today the business case and 

profit motive for such activity is still solidifying. 

Even though, for the reasons I just articulated, the government has an important role in driving 

human expansion into space, by no means does that mean that it does so alone and absent 

partnership with industry. How the government defines and executes those partnerships is the 

critical strategic question that we struggle with today. Answering this question clearly and 

thoughtfully is vital. With a truly long-term and integrated strategic plan, government 

investment can be leveraged to meet its goals in ways that address the maturation of U.S. 

industry's capabilities in space as well as the development of a non-government-based 

economic sphere off of the planet. The identification of an effective strategy requires that two 

key questions must be addressed: 

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1. What are the technologies, knowledge, and experience base that the government wants to 

have available for broad dissemination to industry fifty years from now? 

2. What are the capabilities and services that the government, for a myriad of reasons, and 

private industry, driven by their own motives, are interested in developing that can potentially 

sustain viable space-based businesses after leveraging initial government investment? 

With regard to the first question about broad dissemination in the future it is worth noting that 

Elon Musk has talked about the importance of several publications on rocketry and rocket 

propulsion, knowledge funded by government investment during the Apollo era, that were the 

genesis of SpaceX. That is just one example of how the innovations occurring today in the space 

sector were incubated by decades of government-sponsored research and development (R&D). 

So, consequently, we have to think about the investments that the government is making in 

R&D today and project into the future how the results of that investment will enable the next 

wave of innovation. I believe it is necessary to address this question on a national level from the 

viewpoint of not only what technologies the U.S. space industry can benefit from, but also from 

the lens of identifying what technologies are critical for the United States to maintain or take a 

lead in globally. The answer to this question will help guide R&D investment and spending, as 

well as shape partnerships. 

Regarding the second question about private industry developing capabilities and services that 

the government can leverage, I would like to illustrate the success of the commercial cargo 

program. Because the contracted companies were able to apply decades of NASA technology 

and know-how, they demonstrated the ability to develop and operate a reliable cargo delivery 

service, freeing NASA from the need to focus on this effort. While only the U.S. government still 

primarily uses these systems, the companies have the ability to provide these services in the 

future to other customers. Going forward NASA has to decide where it is appropriate to 

develop similar partnerships. The question should be addressed from both an economic 

viewpoint as well as an industrial base/national security lens; the government has many 

different goals driving decisions. The approach taken in addressing this question will help guide 

mission architectures, partnerships, acquisition strategies, and, to a certain extent, the types of 

international collaborations in which we might engage. Done correctly, this second question 

should begin to be addressed by the NASA Human Exploration Road map due to Congress in 

December 2017. 

Through the National Space Council we, as a nation, have an opportunity to address these 

questions and others. The Council, as it is structured, has the ability to work across government 

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33 

to create and integrate a comprehensive national space strategy and then to implement it 

effectively. I can imagine four main pillars that might inform a national strategy: continuing 

exploration beyond low Earth orbit, creating an economic sphere in low Earth orbit, national 

security, and driving and influencing the "norms" for engagement in space for humanity. A 

government-wide effort is required. The Council touched on this at its first meeting, for 

example, when discussing the topics of rules, regulations, policies, and enabling laws that might 

influence space activities. All of these issues encompass the supporting infrastructure that is 

vital for the success of a framework based on the model I have described. The Council 

strategically answering these key questions will allow several decisions related to NASA to come 

into focus-decisions about where NASA (and other government agencies) should invest in 

technology and capability, decisions about how to help industry establish an independent 

economic base in space while simultaneously pursuing NASA's mission to expand human 

presence outward, and decisions about NASA's role in leading or establishing international 

collaborations for exploration. 

Given such clarity there is no reason why a framework cannot be crafted that can send us to the 

moon, Mars, and beyond, while supporting and nurturing private economic activity in space. 

From the framework, missions can then be designed in the context of the broader strategy that 

advance humans into the solar system while developing the capabilities and experience-base of 

U.S. industry. 

I would like to pause here to emphasize an important point; one that many of us in the space 

industry have emphasized time and time again. The United States needs a comprehensive 

national space strategy accompanied by a continuous long-term commitment for its execution. 

It should be crafted such that it allows us to leverage our resources for the maximum benefit of 

achieving all goals identified. I repeat, because this is critical, to be successful in our space 

endeavors it is imperative that we commit, as a nation, with a constancy of purpose for the long 

term-it is the nature of the space business that it takes time, patience, and constant purpose 

to make advancements. 

Crafting such a strategy, while complex, is possible. It is complex because any strategy has to 

take into account the constraints of our governance structures, general politics, and our 

tendency as human beings toward short-term thinking. 

A committed long-term strategy is necessary but not, by itself, enough to ensure the success of 

the U.S. space program. To be effective and produce the desired results, sufficient resources 

need to be allocated to implement the plan. This is something that NASA has been challenged 

by in the past and continues to be challenged by today. When I joined the agency in 1996, NASA 

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34 

received approximately 7/lOths of a penny for every tax dollar paid. Today, in 2017, the agency 

receives approximately 5/lOths of a penny for every tax dollar paid. This is despite the fact that 

the number, breadth, and complexity of programs has increased in that same time frame. I 

applaud NASA for working diligently to cut costs, streamline processes, and identify new ways 

of doing things that has allowed it to manage to this point in time. 

However, fundamentally, NASA faces constraints on how efficient and streamlined it can 

become as its budget shrinks; it has limited control on the expense side of its budget. The 

politics of the situation give it no freedom to adjust overhead, either facilities or civil workforce, 

whether in size or skill set, as well as in some cases, the management of task assignments 

around the agency. To execute a long-term strategic U.S. space program in a constrained 

budget environment effectively and successfully, NASA must be given the ability to make 

decisions and take action in these areas. Without that freedom, an increasing portion of NASA's 

shrinking budgets will go to maintaining the agency as an institution and not to successfully 

executing its programs. The model I described earlier depends on both a healthy government 

effort and a strategically husbanded and growing industrial base. With a budget allocation of 

only 5/lOths of a penny per tax dollar, ignoring this dynamic and expecting lofty achievements 

cripples our collective (both government and industry) efforts to succeed now and in the future. 

I would also like to take a moment to address one other critical aspect of resource allocation. 

Clearly having adequate resources is imperative, but equally vital is the phasing and consistency 

of the flow of those resources. Developing space hardware is complex and technologically 

challenging. As stated earlier, every program in existence today, regardless of whether it is 

primarily government funded or completely privately funded, and regardless of acquisition 

approach, has had to face, and likely will face again, technical, manufacturing, and operational 

challenges. What we do is hard. Period. Uncertain and improperly phased budgets as a result of 

lack of clarity in funding timelines add extra management challenges that drive inefficiencies, 

ultimately affect schedules, and drive decisions that trade off engineering design versus 

operational complexity. I saw this dynamic at work in the early days of the International Space 

Station program. Flatline budgeting-an approach that did not take into account the changing 

funding needs during different phases of development programs-and uncertainty in funding 

levels-affected engineering decisions that resulted in driving operational costs higher in the 

long term. A program with an optimized multiyear and appropriately phased budget can absorb 

more initially expensive engineering designs knowing that the result will provide lower 

operational costs and hence overall net savings over the life of the program. The current 

budgeting process, including the regular usage of continuing resolutions, threat of government 

shutdowns, and lack of a stable budgetary environment, prohibits this kind of comprehensive 

trade space to be used. With a budget allocation of only 5/lOth of a penny per tax dollar, 

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35 

introducing flexibility and constancy into the budgeting process is another lever that will allow 

NASA to optimize program execution, regardless of the acquisition methodology being 

employed. 

We are living in a time of transition as we redefine how humans engage in space. Many decades 

of government investment and experience have produced a dynamic in private industry that is 

driving a new approach to human spaceflight. We have to consider carefully how we manage 

and drive change while continuing to explore and expand our technology and knowledge. Now, 

more than ever, the nation must commit to a bold strategy that provides multiyear stability and 

that is adequately resourced. 

This transition started about ten years ago, and I suspect that it will continue for another ten 

years or so as we figure out what the next "small step for mankind" looks like. It is a grand 

experiment, and we are forging the path and writing the rules as we go. We have a unique 

opportunity at the moment, but to take full advantage of that opportunity it is imperative that 

we establish a strategy that will guide our efforts. The strategy cannot be so constrained that it 

will stifle the energy and innovation, but must have enough structure to ensure coherency in 

direction. We still have a lot to learn; some of our lessons are going to be difficult and painful. 

We have to be prepared to meet those challenges and promise ourselves that we will 

persevere. Above all, we must remain committed, strategic, and flexible. And we must also 

provide sufficient resources to progress along our journey. 

The transition that is occurring as we evolve to the next phase of how humans engage in space 

is a goal that we have been pursuing for many decades. How we choose to guide, nurture, and 

define our expanding human presence and outward exploration of space will determine our 

country's role in the next century. The roots of our nation lie in exploration, expansion, and 

economic development; from the arrival of the first immigrants and settlers at the founding of 

our nation to the westward expansion across the continent, we have faced the challenges, 

forged new paths, and overcome all obstacles. As we expand into space, the next frontier, I am 

confident we can tap into that same spirit and energy. I know the passion and dedication of the 

people in our industry, and I know their ingenuity and determination to succeed. I know that 

our national leaders, no matter which branch of government or party affiliation, understand the 

importance of space for the future of our country. I do not know how we can fail if we apply our 

minds and energies toward success. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to address this body and thank you for your continued 

support of our nation's space program. I look forward to answering any questions you may 

have for me in this regard. 

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36 

Dr. Sandra H. Magnus 

Executive Director 

American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 

Dr. Sandra H. "Sandy" Magnus is the Executive Director of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA), 

the world's largest technical society dedicated to the global aerospace profession. 

Born and raised in Belleville, Ill., Dr. Magnus attended the Missouri University of Science and Technology, graduating in 

1986 with a degree in physics and in 1990 with a master's degree in electrical engineering. She received a Ph.D. from the 

School of Materials Science and Engineering at Georgia Tech in 1996. 

Selected to the NASA Astronaut Corps in April, 1996, Dr. Magnus flew in space on the STS-112 shuttle mission in 2002, 

and on the final shuttle flight, STS-135, in 2011. In addition, she flew to the International Space Station on STS-126 in 

November 2008, served as flight engineer and science officer on Expedition 18, and returned home on STS-119 after four 

and a half months on board. Following her assignment on Station, she served at NASA Headquarters in the Exploration 

Systems Mission Directorate. Her last duty at NASA, after STS-135, was as the deputy chief of the Astronaut Office. 

While at NASA, Dr. Magnus worked extensively with the international community, including the European Space Agency 

(ESA) and the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA), as well as with Brazil on facility-type payloads. She also 

spent time in Russia developing and integrating operational products and procedures for the International Space Station. 

Before joining NASA, Dr. Magnus worked for McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Company from 1986 to 1991, as a stealth 

engineer. While at McDonnell Douglas, she worked on internal research and development and on the Navy's A-12 Attack 

Aircraft program, studying the effectiveness of radar signature reduction techniques. 

Dr. Magnus has received numerous awards, including the NASA Space Flight Medal, the NASA Distinguished Service 

Medal. the NASA Exceptional Service Medal, and the 40 at 40 Award (given to former collegiate women athletes to 

recognize the impact of Title IX). 
37 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you very much, Dr. Magnus. 

I appreciate the witnesses’ testimony. The Chair recognizes himself for five minutes for questions. 

And I want to thank you both. I was running a little bit late this 

morning, didn’t have a chance to see you before the hearing started, so anyway, great to have you here. We appreciate you. 

One of the primary purposes of the NASA Transition Authorization Act of 2017 was continuity of purpose and expressing the importance of staying the course on program development so as not 

to delay American space exploration any longer. Can each of you 

discuss the importance of continuity of purpose and how you balance that against good program management and discipline? And 

we’ll start with you, Mr. Gerstenmaier. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, I think it’s really important we have 

a common vision of what we’re doing as we move forward so we can 

build the hardware and systems that can support that vision. And 

we’ve done that with SLS and Orion. We’ve built a system that allows us to move human presence into the solar system. So the 

Orion capsule has applications for around the Moon, can support 

activities on the Moon and lunar activities. It can also support development beyond the Earth-moon system, the same with SLS. The 

rocket is designed to really be a heavy-lift launch capability. It can 

support the human missions around the Moon, it is also absolutely 

critical and needed for Mars-class missions, and it also can serve 

a very strong role for the science activities such as the Europa mission to go out to the outer planets. It can reduce the transit time 

by 50 percent to the outer planets. 

So we have tried to build pieces of key infrastructure that enables this vision and allows us to fit within this architecture and 

framework we’ve been given, but keeping a constancy of purpose or 

a general direction when we’re moving forward is extremely important to us. Starting and stopping is very difficult in our industry. 

Chairman BABIN. Okay. Dr. Magnus? 

Dr. MAGNUS. Yes, I’d—excuse me. Yes, I’d like to echo that. 

Starting and stopping in our industry is really not healthy. 

Chairman BABIN. Right. 

Dr. MAGNUS. We saw that with the end of the shuttle program, 

and we lost a lot of our corporate knowledge, and we’re going to 

see some of that when we start launching again. We’ll have to relearn some lessons that we’ve already learned. 

But the continuity piece is important. You know, as a nation, we 

have a little bit sometimes of a short attention span, and we end 

up hurting ourselves. It was already mentioned earlier there were 

a lot of programs that we’ve seen NASA have to cancel over the 

years. 

If you look back in the Apollo era, you think of the dedication 

and the commitment they had over a decade and longer to commit 

and execute that program. That’s really what you need in the 

space—human spaceflight. You need a ten-year, 15-year, a 20-year 

program, and you need to be able to stick to it. 

I think it’s really exciting that the Committee’s interested in this 

topic. I think the oversight’s important to sort of keep people focused. I think that’s an important key as well, so it takes the whole 

community. But you have to be able to stick to the—— 
38 

Chairman BABIN. Right. 

Dr. MAGNUS. —program, and you have to be able to fund it appropriately so that the intelligent decisions can be made to do the 

tradeoffs with the expenses. 

Chairman BABIN. Excellent. Thank you very much. How will a 

delay in the first launch of an uncrewed Space Launch System 

until no earlier than December of 2019 impact the scheduled 

launch date of a crewed launch of SLS? NASA has an internal date 

it’s managing to, as well as a date is has formally committed to. 

Do either of these dates now change? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes, again, in terms of our Exploration Mission 2, our first crewed mission, so far the schedule delays, even 

if the Exploration Mission 1 went all the way to June, it doesn’t 

really impact where we are with EM–2. There’s a constraint that 

the mobile launch platform in Florida—that’s the facility that the 

rocket launches off of—it needs to be modified between the first 

flight and the second flight to allow for the exploration upper stage. 

And there’s a 33-month amount of time needed between—for that 

upgrade of that mobile launcher. So that’s what keeps EM–1 and 

EM–2 tied together, but right now, the slips that we’ve seen with 

EM–1 don’t impact where we can launch the first—— 

Chairman BABIN. Okay. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. —crewed flight at this point. But again, we 

need to be very careful of that, we need to watch for that, and we 

need to potentially discuss whether it’s advantageous to us to have 

another mobile launcher available to avoid that tie between EM– 

1 and EM–2, but that’s the current tie. 

Chairman BABIN. Okay. Thank you. Dr. Magnus, do you have 

anything to add to that? Okay. 

How will a slip in the first launch of the un-crewed Space 

Launch System impact the cost of the program? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, it’s surprising to some that the overall cost hasn’t really changed that much because what we’ve—especially for EM–1 because what we’ve done is we’re really building 

much more than just one single flight. So as work is completed on 

the first launch and the first flight, when that work is completed, 

that work can be set off to the side and the teams can go off and 

start working on the next element. So in fact—— 

Chairman BABIN. Okay. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. —we have today multiple pieces of hardware 

in flow for the multiple missions across the sequence. 

Chairman BABIN. Okay. I have got six seconds. How will a delay 

in the first un-crewed launch of the Space Launch System impact 

a potential launch of SLS for the Europa mission? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, there’s really no impact there. We 

can support—— 

Chairman BABIN. Okay. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. —pretty much whatever the Science Mission 

Directorate needs for that mission, and we’ll figure out whether it 

occurs after the first flight or after the second flight to meet their 

needs. 

Chairman BABIN. Okay. I have several more questions, but we’re 

going to go on to the gentleman from California, Mr. Bera. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
39 

Dr. Magnus, in your opening statement you talked about the importance of having a strategic vision over the long period, and we 

saw that when President Kennedy challenged us in the 1960s to 

put man on the Moon in this decade. My colleague from Colorado 

probably does have a sticker that says ‘‘Mars by 2033,’’ so we ought 

to commit to putting a woman on Mars by 2033. It does give the 

public a sense of what we’re working towards, and in that perspective as we’re thinking about SLS and Orion, the lunar mission, et 

cetera, it gives us the chance to think about it in a context of, okay, 

if we’re going to the Moon, how does that help us then think about 

how we’re going to go and take that next step. 

So in that context, as we’re thinking about EM–1 in the context 

of going to deeper space, I’m sensing that as we do the EM–1 mission we’re learning a lot. We’re reestablishing supply chains. We’re 

reestablishing a workforce and a talent base that will make EM– 

2 easier, is that correct? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes, definitely. As we—the first EM–1 flight 

is to test the vehicles and the systems and the hardware to make 

sure they’re really operating to the levels that they need to be 

when we put crew onboard. And I think as you see this movement 

outward, we go to the Moon where we can return if something goes 

wrong in several days, five days. On station today, we can be back 

in about an hour, hour-and-a-half from station. When we go to 

Mars, we’re now committed for multiple months, so I think you see 

that natural progression in taking more risk, learning to operate 

in a more challenging environment, and as you operate in that 

more challenging environment, you need systems that can support 

operating in that environment. So it’s kind of a natural stepping 

stone and movement as we use the Moon as a proving ground, a 

training ground, a development area where we can build concepts, 

processes, procedures, and hardware that will eventually allow us 

to go to the Mars-class missions in the future. 

Mr. BERA. And as we move on to EM–2 and send a crew up, are 

we also now conceptually thinking about EM–3? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes. If we’re really building continually to 

challenge what we can do, the big advantage of the Space Launch 

System is we can not only carry crew, but we can carry a substantial cargo with us, with the crew, so we can carry potentially a habitation piece with us on EM–3, and when the crew will be there, 

they can go into that habitation module and begin a crew-tended 

presence around the Moon, which is, again, starting to break that 

tie back to the home planet and getting us ready to move into deep 

space. So you can see that natural progression of where each mission builds on the past mission, and we take stronger challenges, 

we push the team more, we gain the experience. And what we 

learn from those earlier missions, it feeds directly into the next 

mission, so each mission builds on each other. 

Mr. BERA. Dr. Magnus, in the slide that you presented, you also 

showed the private commercial sector following behind, so could 

you describe how you see the private and international community 

kind of falling behind as the government starts to push further and 

further, how the private sector and international community can 

continue to support that? 
40 

Dr. MAGNUS. Yes, so that goes back to the idea of a national comprehensive strategy because, ideally, what you would want to do 

from a national viewpoint is figure out what are the technologies 

and capabilities that you want to invest in from a government 

viewpoint so that those knowledge and those pieces of technology 

are available for everybody. And then what is—what are the things 

that are a little bit more mature that you could encourage companies or companies might be interested in developing. 

And then from a national viewpoint as well when you think 

about the international piece, what are those technologies and capabilities that as a country we want to take the lead in? Do we 

want to be the transport experts? If you look at Canada, they’ve 

decided to focus on robotics, for example. 

And then understanding the concept of those priorities, you can 

then establish how do you want to bring the international partners 

in and how do you want to help the companies establish, you know, 

the leverage that they need to build into their businesses. So you 

have to kind of start with that big-picture view that has to be a 

little bit more governmentwide and nationally focused. 

Mr. BERA. In prior committee hearings—let me make sure I’m 

thinking about this correctly, when we’ve thought about a return 

to the Moon, I can visualize a day where NASA is focused on the 

science mission. They may look at the various launch vehicles that 

are available in the commercial market as opposed to having to 

build their own launch vehicles, say, okay, we’ll contract with company X to be the launch vehicle. They’ll look at various lunar landing commercial vehicles, say, okay, we’re going to contract with this 

lunar landing vehicle. That will take our science project. Is that the 

right way to think about this potentially? 

Dr. MAGNUS. Yes. If I may, if you think about—you know, you 

have a toolbox to build a house. You don’t have just one tool in a 

toolbox, and you find the right tool for the job. And so, again, in 

using the satellite business as a model, there are economic activities going on that—where the government purchases services, and 

there are government activities as well, so you need a mix, and it 

has to be driven by what are the—what is the strategic view for 

the country and what kind of capabilities do you want to create 

and make sure that you have going forward, so you have to think 

about it from that big picture. There’s a place for all of it in the 

right strategy. 

Mr. BERA. Right. Thank you. I’m out of time. I yield back. 

Chairman BABIN. Okay. Thank you. 

Now, I’d like to recognize the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. 

Brooks. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The production of the core stage element is currently driving the 

Space Launch System program schedule. The program is combining 

welding techniques and materials—specifically, the thickness of the 

metal—that have not been used before. While establishing new production techniques is laudable, the program has faced numerous 

setbacks as it is developing these processes and correcting defects. 

How confident is the program that it and its contractors will 

have gained enough knowledge to avoid these setbacks and delays 

for future flight hardware? 
41 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We’ve met the challenges of self-reacting 

friction stir welding of the thicker materials. We understand now 

how to do that. We’ll still probably continue to refine the welding 

technique as we go into future pieces, but the basic understanding 

is in place now and we know how to do the welding. 

And as I said in my opening remarks, that’s also important to 

the industry as a whole. NASA paved the way by now allowing others to use those same techniques in the larger thickness of materials. 

Mr. BROOKS. If you could, what steps does the program and contractor have in place to avoid mistakes such as welding tool 

changes that shut down production? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We’re again carefully monitoring all that activity. We’re looking at ways we can do inspection. We knew fairly 

soon and immediately that there was a problem with our welding 

when it occurred, so the good news was we had tools and techniques in place to find the defects to prevent that from extending 

into the flight hardware. That was good. 

The bad thing we didn’t know is we fully didn’t understand—we 

had done smaller samples. We had done smaller welding tests, but 

we had not done of—any of the magnitude or the scale of which 

we’re trying to do with the full vehicle. So I think we just need to 

be prepared as we build schedules going forward to know that 

these first-time things that we have never done before of a magnitude that has never been done before may need a little bit of 

extra time that first time through and not be overly optimistic in 

our schedule. So we’ll build in some time to go ahead and do those 

kind of things to make sure we don’t have that same kind of problem moving forward. And we’ve identified those areas in the future 

where we see these first-time items. We will put in place processes 

and procedures to prevent what’s—what occurred in the past. 

Mr. BROOKS. The core stage element, again, which is currently 

driving the SLS program schedule, still has to complete a major integrated test fire, which is called the green test run. The green test 

run will have the core stage integrated with its four main engines. 

The tanks will be filled with cryogenic fuel for the first time, and 

the core stage will be fired for about 500 seconds. The engines have 

been tested individually but not all together, which creates a different heat, acoustic, and vibration environment, and this will be 

the first for the core stage. What areas cause the most concern during this test, cryogenic fuel piping, leaks, material stresses, et 

cetera? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. The teams are really analyzing that test in 

all its detail to make sure that we are really prepared for that test. 

And one thing we learned out of this last schedule problem is that 

we’re going to have a dedicated person and a team that actually 

will look at that test to make sure we have accommodated and 

taken into account everything that might occurred during that test. 

The concerns are when you—when the rocket is designed to come 

off the launchpad and typically fly, it’s not designed to stay in one 

location for the entire firing, so there could be some heat that 

builds back into the systems. We’ve been analyzing that in wind 

tunnels. We’ve been looking to make sure we’re prepared for that. 

We’ve done extensive work on a test stand to look at modeling and 
42 

testing of how we do the fluid flows. We’ve looked at procedures so 

we bring in tankers to bring in the liquid hydrogen and oxygen 

during the test in the most efficient manner. We’ve protected for 

slips in schedules. 

But we see that test coming up after the core stage gets delivered 

to Stennis as one of the key tests and one of the key risks. We and 

the teams, we’ll be fully prepared for that test when it occurs. 

Mr. BROOKS. What potential damage are you testing for that 

might occur during a nominal test of this nature such as insulation 

damage, internal harnesses, boxes coming loose? Just what are you 

looking for? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. All those things you describe. I think probably our biggest concern is probably thermal and potential thermal 

damage to the bottom of the vehicle and what needs to be repaired. 

We’ll have procedures in place to go do those repairs. We’ll have 

alternate techniques to fix things if they occur during that testing. 

So we’re actively working that area, and we will have detailed test 

plans and detailed mitigations for anything that can arise. 

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Gerstenmaier. And, Mr. Chairman, 

I yield back. 

Chairman BABIN. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Next, the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Beyer. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. And thank 

you for being with us today. 

If I can be parochial for just a minute, in two days, Orbital ATK’s 

Antares rocket is going to launch from the mid-Atlantic Regional 

Spaceport at NASA’s Wallops Flight Facility up to the International Space Station with important supplies for astronauts living and working in space. And two of my wonderful staff members 

are going in to watch the launch. So I’m really proud of the role 

that Virginia plays in supporting NASA and the ISS from Wallops 

because, aside from Cape Canaveral, it’s the only launch site in the 

United States that supports the station, and it’s supported national 

security missions, including a recently announced NRO mission 

next year. And just last month, an emerging small launch startup 

Vector Space announced that its three initial launches will occur 

at Wallops next year. We had an accident here a couple of years 

ago, and Virginia has put nearly $200 million of taxpayers’ money 

into the spaceport. It’s been a really unique, successful public-private partnership between NASA, Virginia, and Orbital ATK. 

So, Mr. Gerstenmaier, as we look at our future space operations, 

can you discuss how Wallops can contribute to NASA’s planning 

and operations? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, we see Wallops playing a key role for 

cargo delivery to the space station. I think it’s already interesting 

to see how the Orbital ATK team is using that cargo vehicle in creative ways. As you see, it completes its cargo delivery mission. 

Then, that vehicle can come off the space station and then do another mission for its own uses afterwards. We’ve looked at fullscale combustion experiments on board space station or on board 

the Cygnus vehicle where we actually set a large fire inside Cygnus 

prior to reentry to understand what fire detection should be like 

and what fire suppression should be. 
43 

So it’s pretty exciting to see the Orbital ATK team look at creative ways of using their vehicles with a post-mission after the 

cargo mission is done in creative ways and bringing other folks in. 

So I think we’ll continue to see a large number of launches out of 

Virginia supporting that activity and growing in that area. 

Mr. BEYER. Great. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. You also notice the control center’s been upgraded. You’ll notice some of the other things that we’ve done in 

the times between the flight, so you’ll see NASA’s investment in 

the launch site, as well as what the State of Virginia has done. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you very much. 

And, Dr. Magnus, in your testimony, you said and you wrote, and 

I quote, ‘‘The United States needs a comprehensive national space 

strategy accompanied by a continuous, long-term commitment for 

its execution.’’ Do we not have that already? And where are the 

holes in that? 

Dr. MAGNUS. Yes, I think some of it—some of the holes came out 

during the National Space Council meeting. You know, we have— 

NASA has a comprehensive strategy for how they want to continue 

doing exploration, you know, that initial phase of the bubble, and 

they’ve been working with the private sector and the development 

stage, sort of that middle stage, but there’s a lot of work the FAA 

is still working on with respect to the licensing. There’s discussion 

about the on-orbit piece, there’s discussion about laws, there’s tax 

incentives, there’s—so there’s all kinds of the other pieces when 

you think about what you have to do to develop a healthy economy 

or a stable economy or help one get off the ground. It’s not just 

about the rockets and the habitats. There’s legal frameworks, 

there’s regulations, things like this. 

So—and then you also have to fold in the piece of what do we 

want from our international cooperation? What do we want to encourage in our private industry? How do we want to help the innovation succeed? How do we want to make sure that the government 

has its mission and stays focused on its mission? So there’s all 

these pieces that I think they’re out there, but it’s not clear to me 

they have all been brought together comprehensively. 

Mr. BEYER. So connected to that, Mr. Gerstenmaier, as you 

know, one of the ongoing debates that we hear on our Space Subcommittee is should—do we go directly to Mars or do we go to the 

Moon first and use that as the launching part for Mars? I noticed 

in your testimony you talked about how such a program would, 

quote, ‘‘lead the return of humans to the Moon,’’ the long-term exploration. So is it already decided that we go to the Moon first? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, I think, as we—I described earlier, 

this stepping-stone approach where we use the Moon as a training 

ground to move further out is a good approach, and I think that’s 

consistent with the authorization language that we’ve received and 

the direction from Congress and the Administration. So it’s a stepping-stone approach of where we use the Moon to learn the things, 

learn skills, learn things that we need to help us advance, but ultimately, we’re moving human presence into the solar system with 

the ultimate goal towards Mars. 

Mr. BEYER. Thank you. Dr. Magnus, I just want to quote from 

your written testimony. ‘‘The current budgeting process, including 
44 

the regular use of continuing resolutions, threat of government 

shutdowns, lack of a stable budgetary environment prohibits this 

kind of trade space to be used.’’ I just want to say amen. Thank 

you for putting that in writing. The entire federal workforce, the 

government contracting community, the military, everyone agrees 

with you. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Chairman BABIN. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Now, I recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Posey. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for calling 

this informative meeting. And I want to thank the witnesses, both 

of you. It’s always a pleasure to hear from you and gain your insight. 

Mr. Gerstenmaier, would you say that reaching Mars is the top 

priority of NASA right now? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, I—the way I describe it is moving 

human presence in the solar system, but it’s one of the steppingstone approaches as we move human presence into the solar system. 

Mr. POSEY. I mean—but, I mean, as a priority basis, how would 

you prioritize things? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, I think we need to be careful, and I 

don’t pick destinations. I talk more about kind of building a capability or the expanding bubble that Sandy described where we kind 

of move out into the solar system and we bring the commercial sector, the economy with us as we move. So I’m looking for a much 

longer strategic vision than a particular single destination. And I 

see this as a continuum of gaining the skills that we need to have 

as we move further into the solar system. 

Mr. POSEY. Well, I really appreciated hearing you use the words 

stepping-stone in reference to the Moon just a few moments ago in 

answer to that question, and I think that Congress has kind of expressed they’d like pretty much everything you do in space to be 

a stepping-stone to Mars, that that ought to be a goal. And you 

know and I know that if everything’s a priority, nothing’s a priority, and so I’d really like to hear it acknowledged that reaching 

Mars is a top priority, and everything that we do is in fact a stepping-stone to reaching that goal for a number of reasons. 

You’re familiar with Buzz Aldrin’s Cycler program. He’s my constituent, and I hear about that plan frequently. Would you just 

take a moment to share with me why the plan that you’re pursing 

is superior to the plan that he suggests with his cyclers? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Again, I think in our world we often like to 

contrast things and show how they’re different and we try to pick 

one or the other. If you look at the approach that we’ve laid out 

where we have potentially some kind of crew-tended platform 

around the vicinity of the Moon and we use that as a staging 

ground to go to Mars, that’s very—that has very similar aspects to 

many of the cycler concepts that Mr. Aldrin talks about. It doesn’t 

continually cycle, but we’re using the Moon potentially and the 

high elliptical orbit around the Moon as a staging position to go to 

Mars rather than returning directly back to the Earth. 

So it’s a—there’s pieces of what he describes in our plan. It may 

be not as much as he would like. He would like to have the pure 
45 

plan the way he describes it with a large cycler in place, but I 

think we look—and we look to the community to get good ideas 

from everyone. We look to academia. We look from our Apollo astronauts. We look from commercial industry. We want to take all 

those great ideas and put them together and then build the strategic plan that was—we’ve been describing here to keep us moving 

forward. 

So I don’t see it as one or the other. I’m not going to say our plan 

is superior to his or his is superior to ours. There’s advantages and 

disadvantages of both, but possibly a hybrid between those two 

might be the actual best solution for all of us. 

Mr. POSEY. That’s a pretty good answer, and I assume funding 

approvals play a big part in that. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Definitely. If we’re constrained by the financial environment. You know, we’re given the adequate resources to 

do what we need to go do, but we need to reflect that in our planning, that we don’t try to build a program that requires more funding then is reasonably available, and that’s a consideration and a 

concern as we do the planning. 

Mr. POSEY. Dr. Magnus, do you care to weigh in on this? 

Dr. MAGNUS. Yes. I would just like to comment that we have to 

quit talking about either the Moon or Mars because, as Bill mentioned, it’s an ‘‘and.’’ And if you think about the model that I presented, if we’re—and—if we’re really thinking carefully about how 

we’re, you know, moving that initial phase—— 

Mr. POSEY. I think everyone here in this room understands we 

want to go Mars for a number of reasons, as a launching area, the 

potential of fuel there. I mean, at one time there was quite a bit 

of opposition to it, and people who were opposed to it that said 

been there, done that have pretty much acknowledged that to go 

further, that’s the smartest way to do it. 

Dr. MAGNUS. Right. And we can do it to—in a way that, as we 

bring industry behind us, they can, you know, expand that development phase out to the Moon. The government continues to go to 

Mars and leaving that charge if you will, so there’s a smart way 

to do this where you pass through the Moon, you do the things that 

you need to do there to continue to build your operational capability to go to Mars. The government keeps expanding to Mars, and 

you bring that economic system behind you so that it’s stable and 

provides the additional capability to continue that outward thrust. 

There’s a way to do this. 

Mr. POSEY. Thank you, Doctor. 

Mr. Chairman, I see my time is up. Thank you. 

Chairman BABIN. Yes, sir. Thank you. 

Yes, the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Perlmutter. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Thanks, Dr. Babin. And I’ll just put up my 

prop for one second. 

And to be parochial, in three days or four days from Vandenberg 

Air Force Base we will launch the JPSS, which that satellite was 

built in Colorado up on the United Launch Alliance rocket, which 

was also built in Colorado. So each of us from an economic point 

of view but also just from a point of view of pride has a stake in 

our space program, period. And all of us up here are pretty much 

on the same page when it comes to getting us to Mars. 
46 

I don’t care how we get there; just get there by 2033, if not a lot 

earlier. And so my job, whether it’s a stepping stone to the Moon 

or we use a hyperloop or we—you know, somehow somebody comes 

up with beaming us over to Mars, I just want our astronauts on 

Mars. Orion and SLS are the main vehicle we have to do this now. 

And, Mr. Gerstenmaier, you’ve heard me talk about this, and obviously, our job up here is to get you the funding so you can have 

that constancy of purpose on a 16-year project. And we don’t have 

that yet, and it’s our responsibility to do that. But for me, I’m a 

results-oriented guy, okay? I don’t know what the best engineering 

and the best science and, you know, exactly how to do that. That’s 

your responsibility, Dr. Magnus. That’s your responsibility, Mr. 

Gerstenmaier. Me, I got to try to find you the resources so that you 

can do that. 

But others up here are more sort of accountant types and, you 

know, want to make sure we hit our benchmarks and the milestones, as do you, your engineers. I mean, that’s how you guys operate. So the anxiety that some feel that we’re already missing 

kind of a milestone early in this 16-year journey is something I 

think we all have to take seriously. But our responsibility as Members of Congress are to provide you the resources to get this done 

and for you—let me just ask a couple just basic questions. 

In sort of developing this program, how do you see us adding 

international partners? Has there been any discussions with other 

countries about partnering with us in a major project like this, Mr. 

Gerstenmaier? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. There’s been quite a bit of work discussed 

with an overall framework. There’s a Global Exploration Roadmap 

that’ll be published next January, and that kind of provides a 

framework of moving forward and of which is consistent with everything we’re building. They see SLS, they see Orion, they see 

what we’re doing with space station as part of that overarching 

framework. 

The activities around the Moon where we talk about potentially 

a crew-tended activity in the vicinity of the Moon, the international 

partners are extremely interested in that, as well as commercial industry, so we’re working with both commercial industry and international partners. 

As was described earlier, I think this is really a team activity 

where NASA does a piece. We have the Space Launch System that 

can take 45 metric tons to the vicinity of the Moon, but then we 

can use commercial launch vehicles to take 5 or 10 metric tons of 

cargo routinely to the vicinity of the Moon, so SLS doesn’t have to 

be every flight to the Moon. The rockets you talked about from Colorado, the United Launch Alliance Stuff, what’s being done by Falcon, what’s being done with Blue Origin, those can all be used as 

part of this architecture so—— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. And we better not forget Sierra Nevada and 

the Dream Chaser—— 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. And Sierra Nevada, who has—— 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. —or I’ll be in real trouble. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. And they have a drop test on the 14th of this 

month to look at their vehicle coming back. All that fits together 

as part of this interactive framework, and I’ve seen tremendous in-
47 

terest from all partners in seeing how they can participate, how 

they can be part of this endeavor. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. Dr. Magnus, in your position with the association, what are you seeing in terms of the willingness by the private 

sector, as well as when you’re doing outreach to other countries? 

How do you see us building the team that will help us, you know, 

get to Mars? 

Dr. MAGNUS. There’s a huge amount of interest in the private 

sector in the United States to participate in this project in any 

way, shape, or form. There are a lot of small companies that are 

engaging in space that never existed before. There are established 

companies who are taking innovative approaches to how they want 

to engage in space. There’s a lot of energy out there. There’s a lot 

of great ideas out there. I have no doubt that we can do it. 

Internationally, I think they look to us, our international partners look to us to provide the vision and the energy and the drive, 

not necessarily to be the dictators and direct everybody what to do, 

but Bill mentioned the roadmap. There’s a lot of enthusiasm to 

have the United States—‘‘You guys, you know, this is great. You’ve 

got this vision. We all want to take a part of it. Let’s figure out 

how we can do that.’’ So we can do it if we just keep constancy of 

purpose and funded. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. And at the bottom of it, it says, ‘‘We can do 

this.’’ 

Dr. MAGNUS. Right. There you go. 

Mr. PERLMUTTER. All right. Thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman BABIN. Thank you, Mr. Perlmutter. 

I now recognize the gentleman from Florida, Mr.—Dr. Dunn. 

Mr. DUNN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. It’s always a 

lot of fun to come here and listen to the interesting and intelligent 

people that you bring to these hearings. I have a thousand questions and 5 minutes, so I’m going to jump right in. 

We spoke earlier. You know my background as a surgeon, so I’m 

going to ask a lot of questions about life sciences if I can. So what 

are the special risks or are there special risks in deep space missions that differ from long-duration, low-Earth orbit missions? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Probably the biggest risk that occurs is the 

risk to radiation and radiation exposure to take humans in deep 

space. Around the Earth, we’re shielded somewhat from some of 

the radiation by the magnetosphere. In deep space, that shielding 

is gone, so we’re going to have to go look at techniques to shield 

the crews and look at the—if there’s any other techniques we could 

even do in terms of medication and other things to help with radiation during their journey. It’s not an insurmountable problem, but 

it’s a problem that we need to address that we can’t look at as easily around the Earth as we would like. 

Mr. DUNN. So you’re already opening up new avenues of research 

in life sciences for the extended deep space missions. That’s exciting. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes. 

Mr. DUNN. Can—and of course some of that can obviously translate to Earth, too? So what interesting things have we learned from 

the Kelly astronaut twin experiments? And you don’t have to go too 

long. I mean, I know how about the telomeres and all that. 
48 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes, I think that’s the exciting thing is looking at how the genome changes just exposed to microgravity. And 

we believe that it’s a microgravity change that is causing changes 

to the—— 

Mr. DUNN. Microgravity, not radiation? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes. And they can differentiate between radiation and microgravity changes and why certain genes 

upregulate some way. They downregulate when exposed to microgravity. That’s a fascinating research subject. I would have to bring 

some of the researchers here that are much better versed than myself, but they can explain to you what they’re seeing. And it’s really 

opened up a whole new line of questioning. And this is how I think 

science and medicine really advance, that new questioning, something you never thought about and now you’re exposed to it, it puts 

into—calls into question your basic theory. Then, that basic theory 

changes, and now, you’re going to develop a brand-new way to go 

solve some problem or to do something in the future. So this is a 

very exciting phase of research. 

Mr. DUNN. Yes, we look forward to hearing from that side of your 

shop as well. How does this affect it? There some interesting design 

modifications for deep space missions then that vary from our lowEarth orbit. What are you doing with that Orion capsule to make 

that more habitable? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes, one big thing is the radiation environment, again, we look at some potential shielding. When we took 

Orion on the exploration flight test, we flew radiation sensors on 

it. When we take it on Exploration Mission 1, it will also fly radiation sensors. We’ll also fly a mockup of a human torso inside the 

capsule, and embedded in the human torso will be radiation monitors to simulate the various organs inside the human. And then 

we’ll look at a radiation protection vest on the outside of the 

human on Exploration Mission 1 to gain insight to see if that provides some protection for our crews. But I think there will be some 

type of storm shelter or radiation shelter design into our future 

deep space vehicle. 

Mr. DUNN. Well, we talked about changes in DNA in long-duration microgravity and radiation. Are we going to put animal experiments on the—— 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We presently—— 

Mr. DUNN. —unmanned Mars missions? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We presently don’t have any—I don’t believe 

we have any animal missions on the Exploration Mission 1, the 

first mission. We just have the instrumentation and the hardware, 

but we—— 

Mr. DUNN. It’d be interesting. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. —could look at that. We don’t have the life 

support system there, so we’d have to put some kind of life support 

system on that first test flight to accommodate some animals, but 

we’re doing significant animal research on board space station. We 

have all the basic animal models, which you’re familiar with—— 

Mr. DUNN. Or tissue cultures even, something with—— 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. And tissue cultures—— 

Mr. DUNN. —DNA in it. Right. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes. 
49 

Mr. DUNN. So, Dr. Magnus, you have kind of a personal relationship with radiation in space, so can you comment on this? 

Dr. MAGNUS. No, I found—you know, I was on space station for 

4–1/2 months, and I felt like the exercise protocols that we had 

were sufficient. I came back with no bone mass or muscle loss—— 

Mr. DUNN. No loss of bone density? 

Dr. MAGNUS. No. So I think we’ve got that licked, and it’s—I 

think Bill’s right; the radiation is the key issue, and we still are 

learning a lot about what can happen in a radiation environment. 

I think the ability to do some work around the Moon will inform 

us a little bit more about what we don’t know and, as Bill mentioned, give us new lines of inquiry to make sure we’ve got our 

bases covered before we go to Mars. 

Mr. DUNN. Well, you have an excited and engaged, interested 

committee here, so keep us in your thoughts and keep us informed. 

Thank you very much. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BABIN. Yes, sir. Thank you for those good questions. 

And now, I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and I 

apologize for having—you know, you have to jump between various 

events that you’re committed to, and so I will go back and look at 

the testimony we’ve had so far. 

I am on the Foreign Affairs Committee, as well as the Science 

Committee, and I am very interested now what our next major step 

into space as to what we see it as an international goal and not 

just an American goal meaning when we’re talking about going to 

the Moon and establishing a long-term presence on the Moon, we— 

in the space station we have people from other countries and other 

countries have partnered with us. Are we planning anything like 

that for our moon presence? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes, we are, and in fact, as we discussed earlier, the service module that provides the propulsion and life support gases for the Orion capsule come from the European Space 

Agency, and that’s being manufactured by them. And this is their 

contribution in the real way to the first steps in exploration. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And does the Administration have any plans 

on this? Do we—that we need to know about? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I don’t know that we’ve—you know, we’ve 

got some—we had the 45-day report action that came out of the 

Space Council. We continue to work on that and see and refine details, but I think there’s been a general agreement that international support is a good thing for deep space, and we’ll continue 

to build off of what we’ve done with the space station and look for 

ways that we can continue that same partnership as we move out 

towards the Moon and out towards Mars. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would hope so. You know, I—when I first 

got here, we’ve both been around a long time, and I remember that 

my vote was actually very instrumental in the space station. And 

if I had switched my vote, it would—the station would not have 

moved forward. I’m actually very pleased with how that turned out 

and how my vote actually made a positive difference. 
50 

I would hope that we actually have a plan that is a little bit 

more detailed in terms of the Moon and what we’re planning to do 

there now that we’ve made that decision because up until now, 

we’ve had a great deal of debate as to whether we’re going to go 

right on to Mars and how—you know—and now, I think we’ve 

reached a consensus that the Moon is the step to Mars and—but 

I need to—I would hope that we get a little bit more details exactly 

what we’re planning to have on the Moon, what type of cooperation—if it’s an international effort, what type of cooperation we can 

expect and how much money of course it will cost us to accomplish 

the specific goals that we have in our Mars mission next but in a 

Moon mission now. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We have an exploration report that’s due to 

Congress in December, and in that report, we’ll start to show you 

some of the specifics of the kind of questions and agreements and 

how we’ll do some of these things internationally in that report 

when you see it in December. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman BABIN. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Now, I’d like to recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. 

Higgins. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I very much appreciate your appearance before this Committee 

today. We’re all united in our enthusiasm for moving this program 

forward, and we all have many questions and very little time. 

I represent Louisiana. The Michoud facility in New Orleans has 

developed a friction stir welding process. Mr. Gerstenmaier, could 

you explain that, please, for the Committee? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. The—there’s a large facility, the largest in 

the world that essentially welds our large—the tanks, the hydrogen 

tank and the oxygen tank for the Space Launch System. The way 

reaction friction stir welds are, the two plates of aluminum are together; then, there’s a spinning rod and then self-reacting—instead 

of having a tool behind it that holds the two plates together, 

there—the pin itself goes through and it actually spins at high 

RPM and actually melts and fuses the two pieces of aluminum 

sheet together. It’s different than fusion welding when you use like 

an arc or a tool to weld and the fact that there’s no heat distortion, 

it actually just molds and puts those two pieces of structure together. 

Mr. HIGGINS. And this is the latest welding technique on the 

planet, am I correct, and provides a very, very strong weld and allows you to use new, thinner layers of steel that allows them to be 

sufficient and strong, stronger than in the past and yet lighter, is 

that correct? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes, it provides a superior weld performance 

and the fact that the defects are typically less, and the fact that 

there’s no heat distortion allows for the components to be joined together and put together in a much stronger manner than they 

could through another process. 

Mr. HIGGINS. All right. Thank you. And let me jump forward to 

manned presence on the Moon, as we have discussed earlier, as a 
51 

stepping-stone to Mars. Have landing sites, lunar landing sites 

been discussed and determined? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. From a robotics standpoint, I think what 

we’re interested in now is if you look at the Apollo missions, they— 

most of those missions were equatorial, around the equator of the 

Moon. We see potential water or at least water in the north and 

south pole of the Moon. That could be very, very important to us 

as we think about moving forward. If we don’t have to carry all our 

resources with us as we move into the solar system, if we can get 

water from the Moon, that would be very interesting to us. So we 

see some permanently shadowed regions in the north and south 

pole of the Moon that we would like to investigate maybe first 

robotically and then potentially if it makes sense with humans in 

those areas. But as soon as we can understand how that water’s 

potentially held in the lunar regolith, that can be really important 

to a market and how we use that and how we move presence into 

the solar system. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes, sir. Regarding shelter for human presence on 

the Moon for extended exploration and extended periods of time on 

the Moon’s surface, one of the major challenges is developing habitant, you know, protected areas where the astronauts could stay. 

Last month, the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency discovered a 

large and stable lava tube beneath the surface approximately 300 

feet deep, 300 feet wide, accessible through what they refer to as 

skylights, areas where the ceiling or the roof of the tube had collapsed. Does this change the paradigm of what you and your team 

might be considering regarding human habitation? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I think it’s definitely something to be considered because if you can take advantage of the radiation shielding 

provided by the lunar regolith and you can have a structure or a 

location to actually go into for storm shelters, that could be interesting. So I think that’s something that we need to continue to 

keep looking at and see how that fits into—— 

Mr. HIGGINS. And this could be explored robotically. Am I correct? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes. You could definitely do it robotically. 

We’ve talked sometimes about having an orbiting crew-tended capability around the Moon. You could do that, and then you could 

use astronauts on board this gateway concept that we’ve talked 

about to actually command rovers to drive into these potential lava 

tubes, explore them, understand what’s available prior to committing humans to go to—— 

Mr. HIGGINS. Yes, sir. And one more thing regarding these underground caverns and tubes. As opposed to on Earth because of 

the low gravity of the Moon, it’s been stated by reputable scientists 

that these tubes could be as large as two or three miles in diameter. Do your studies concur with that? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. I’m not familiar with those studies, and I’d 

have to go research that or ask someone. 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you for your response. Could you—if that information becomes available during the course of your studies, 

sir—and thank you for your continued research—could you possibly 

provide that to this Committee? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes, we will. 
52 

Mr. HIGGINS. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Chairman BABIN. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Higgins. 

They’ve called votes, so I’m—there’s several of us that had questions, and we’re going to take a minute apiece, one minute apiece. 

I’m going to go quickly. The recent slip in the un-crewed launch 

of the Space Launch System seems to be the result of many factors, 

which we’ve mentioned today, hurricanes, tornadoes, the core stage 

welding issues. What impact will a delay in delivery of the Orion 

service module by the Europeans have on the December 2019 date? 

And what tools does NASA have to ensure that the European Service Module does not lead to further delays? If you can answer that, 

please, Mr. Gerstenmaier? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We’re working extensively with the European Space Agency. They’ve committed some extra funding to make 

sure that they can do it from a schedule standpoint, be prepared. 

We know there’s some high-pressure helium valves that are actually manufactured in the United States for the Europeans. We 

know those valves are having trouble being manufactured. We’ve 

sent some of our people to the plant to actually help with that activity, to help mitigate that concern. We actually have a NASA design for a valve, which we may manufacture and provide for that 

application. Lockheed Martin has also gotten State Department approval to send some of their technicians to Europe to actually assist 

with some of the manufacturing of the European Service Module. 

So I think we’re doing everything we can. I think the current 

service module delivery date is supposed to be April of next year. 

I think we’re very likely to see that schedule slip a little bit maybe 

to May or June, and then we’re looking at what we can do to help 

with that downstream. So we might do a simulator on top of the 

SLS when it goes to Florida to do a modal testing instead of having 

the actual Orion and European—— 

Chairman BABIN. Okay. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. —Service Module on top, but we’re well 

aware of that. That is probably one of our key risk areas. 

Chairman BABIN. Yes. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. We’re doing everything we can, but it’s really just this first-time manufacturing that’s causing us the problems 

that we’re seeing. 

Chairman BABIN. It is a great concern. Thank you very much. 

Now, the gentleman from California, Dr. Bera. 

Mr. BERA. Thank you. 

Quick question. One of the exciting parts of this is I’m looking 

at newer propulsion systems as well, and one that we certainly 

have talked about is solar electric propulsion as part of SLS and 

Orion. Could either one of you talk about the importance of why 

solar electric propulsion’s important, particularly as we want to go 

into deeper space and—— 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Sure. I can start and Sandy can help. I think 

that the big advantage is that in terms of efficiency and the 

amount of propellant that needs to be there to actually go move 

things, it’s very, very efficient to move large masses throughout the 

solar system. And so you can move—if we have this crew-tended 

facility around the Moon, it can be in one orbit. Then, we can use 

electric propulsion to move it to a totally different orbit. So we can 
53 

be in an equatorial; we can go to polar. It takes a long time to do 

that. It may take up to a month, but if the crew’s not on orbit or 

with the vehicle, it can move. So I think the big advantage is it allows us to move large masses, although slowly, throughout the 

solar system, and that’s the advantage to us in the architecture. 

Dr. MAGNUS. Yes, I would just add, you know, in the context of 

our discussions that were more strategic, because NASA’s developing this system, it’ll be technology that’s available for everyone 

to use, and so it’s one of those feeders if you will that will allow 

our economy to advance and other companies to take advantage of 

that kind of capability. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. And I might add we just recently awarded 

some study contracts to typical communication satellite manufacturers to see if they would have interest in using the next generation of electric propulsion thrusters in a higher-powered propulsion 

bus. So we might actually be enabling the commercial communication satellite industry to get a jump over other foreign competitors 

by advancing the state-of-the-art in electric propulsion and power 

generation beyond where they are today. And we—so we gain— 

they gain directly from what we’re trying to do, and then we get 

a capability we can use around the Moon for our needs, so this is 

kind of a win-win between industry and us. 

Chairman BABIN. Yes, sir. Now, I think Mr. Rohrabacher has— 

from California has one question. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Well, you just mentioned commercial activities and I had asked before what we thought about international 

cooperation. Is there anything part of the plans for this extended 

moon presence that we’re talking about now that would include the 

private sector? And we know now—you know, 20 or 30 years ago 

we didn’t have these private companies like SpaceX and all the others making their contribution. Do we expect there to be private involvement and commercial involvement in a way that will help 

bring down the cost as well? 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. Yes, we currently have the NextSTEP Broad 

Agency Announcements where we’re working with five companies 

to go look at habitation capability around the Moon, and we’re actively engaged with them. They’re very interested in what they can 

do with us, and then they may have application for that in lowEarth orbit as maybe a follow-on to the International Space Station. So we’re actively very much involved with them. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Right. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. As I described earlier, SLS meets a unique 

niche. It can carry large mass to the vicinity of the Moon along 

with crew, but we will definitely use expendable launch vehicles, 

new vehicles that are coming online, the Falcon 9, Falcon 9 Heavy, 

New Glenn, all those capabilities, United Launch Alliances, they 

build their rockets. All those will be used. So I think what’s interesting as we look to this whole suite of launch capabilities and 

commercial capabilities and how do we build a plan that involves 

all of them? So just like you described, we do the best of international, the best of commercial. We put it together in a plan to 

allow us collectively as a nation to move forward. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. That’s terrific. Thank you for that answer. 

And I hope maybe Bigelow might have a little play in that as well. 
54 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. He’s one of the Broad Agency Announcements—— 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. 

Mr. GERSTENMAIER. —participants in the habitation activity. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Great. Thank you. 

Chairman BABIN. All right, sir. Thank you, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

I want to thank the witnesses for this very, very interesting 

hearing and your valuable testimony, and I want to thank all the 

members for their questions. 

The record will remain open for two weeks for additional comments and written questions from the members. 

So with this, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:56 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 
(55) 

Appendix I 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
56 

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Mr. William Gerstenmaier 
57 

• Delivery of the Orion ESM to the Operations and Checkout facility at the 

Kennedy Space Center (KSC) in late spring I early summer of2018 for 

integration with the Orion Crew Module and the start of integrated testing; 

• Delivery of the SLS Core Stage to the Stennis Space Center in December 

2018 for the start of green run testing, followed by delivery to KSC in June 

2019 for stacking; 

• Completion of spaceport command and control software testing and checkout 

in February 2019. 

Potential challenges that impact one or more of the elements might delay this 

integration and testing plan. 

c. What remaining technical, production, and integration issues have the potential to 

negatively impact NASA's latest EM-I launch date estimate? What are some 

ways by which you plan on addressing them? 

Answer: While most hardware development and activities for these systems are 

on track with multiple months of margin, the Agency's technical management 

team remains focused on the "critical paths" ofESM delivery, the SLS Core Stage 

development, and spaceport command and control software development. The 

ESM and Core Stage issues largely involve challenges related to first-time design 

and assembly. 

NASA is working closely with ESA to ensure delivery of the ESM in late 

spring/early summer 2018. This cooperation is focused on quickly solving 

technical issues as they arise, reducing schedule dependencies, and generally 

finding efficiencies through the integrated schedule. For example, NASA is 

working with U.S. vendors supplying hardware to Airbus (prime contractor for 

the ESM) to resolve technical issues seen in component-level testing; providing 

additional technician support to accelerate wire harness building, installation, and 

testing; and assessing the overall Orion integration schedule to provide 

opportunities for integrating ESM components after the ESM is delivered to KSC. 

NASA and Boeing have implemented a number of changes already having a 

positive impact on core stage production. For example, senior Boeing 

management is very engaged in monitoring program progress and quickly 

addressing challenges as soon as they occur. Boeing has increased on-site 

production labor working three shifts during the week and two shifts on 

weekends. Boeing has also set up a dedicated core stage production operations 

center with integration managers coordinating daily operations, as well as a 

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58 

dedicated green run manager to ready the first core stage for testing at the Stennis 

Space Center in Mississippi starting approximately one year prior to launch. 

NASA has moved additional engineering staff to Michoud Assembly Facility to 

reduce the cycle time for solving manufacturing problems in real time. Overall, 

NASA and Boeing are working methodically through issues that are not 

unexpected during the first-time production of such a large and complex piece of 

aerospace hardware. 

2. Regarding NASA's establishment of the December 2019 manage-to-date: 

a. Is that the date to which Congress should hold NASA accountable? How will 

NASA communicate both ( l) the status of risks as it moves towards the manageto-launch date of December 2019 and (2) the ongoing impacts that resolution of 

those risks are having on the achievability of the December 2019 date? 

Answer: NASA is managing to the December 2019 EM-I date, which is 

aggressive- with up to six months of additional schedule risk- but achievable. It 

is important to understand that in developing and integrating the Orion crew 

spacecraft, SLS heavy-lift launch vehicle, and extensive ground-based systems to 

support them, we are laying the foundation for a sustainable infrastructure for 

human deep space exploration for decades to come- one that will support 

missions to a variety of destinations, including the Moon and Mars. Thus, while 

EM-I itself is important, it also represents the first in an ongoing continuum of 

Exploration Missions. 

NASA will provide formal notification to Congress under Section I 03 of the 

NASA Authorization Act of2005 (P.L. 109-155). 

b. More generally, what indicators and milestones should Congress use to measure 

progress on the SLS, Orion, and EGS programs? 

Answer: As noted in the response to Question #lb and #lc, above, NASA is 

particularly focused on ESM delivery, the SLS Core Stage development, and 

spaceport command and control software development. 

3. In a recently released report, the NASA Inspector General said "the biggest challenge 

facing Orion for EM-I is delivery of the European Service Module." Do you agree with 

that assessment? Can you describe the challenges that have caused delays to the delivery 

of the European Service Module? Have the difficulties experienced in designing and 

developing European Service Module informed NASA on how future international and 

commercial partner participation in human space exploration programs should be 

Page3 ofl7 
59 

structured? What, if any, changes have been made to ensure that the Service Module for 

EM-2 does not encounter similar challenges? 

Answer: The critical path items at this point for EM-1 include the projected delivery of 

Orion's ESM, SLS Core Stage development, spaceport command and control software 

development. Challenges with the ESM delivery for EM-I are largely related to issues 

involving first time design and assembly. Coordination with ESA on ESM assembly, 

integration, and testing is improving, and NASA has increased involvement in resolving 

domestic and international vendor technical and schedule performance issues. 

NASA is planning on ESA supplying the service module for Orion on future deep space 

missions. The relationship we have built with ESA working on EM-1 will serve to 

strengthen our joint efforts moving forward on EM-2. Furthermore, we are working with 

both domestic and international partners to solve the great challenges of deep space 

exploration, including studying lunar activity. We will build on the partnerships we have 

established with both industry and international space agencies in low-Earth orbit as we 

move humans farther into the solar system. 

4. Regarding the Vice President's recent direction to conduct human lunar exploration: 

a. How would a return to the Moon, including potentially establishing a human 

presence there, impact the goal of sending humans to Mars in the 2030s, as 

directed in the 2017 NASA Transition Act? 

Answer: A NASA return to the Moon for long-term exploration and utilization 

will enable building and testing systems needed for other challenging missions to 

deep space destinations, including Mars. The details of NASA's lunar missions 

are currently being developed and will be reflected in future budget requests. 

b. When will NASA inform Congress of(l) the total budgetary impact of adding 

lunar surface activities the agency's exploration program and (2) how much 

funding will need to be added to the HEO budget on an annual basis to pursue 

both the Moon and humans to Mars? 

Answer: Please see response to Question #4a, above. 

5. While many people may naturally tend to focus on the EM-1 launch date, I understand 

that the factors surrounding that launch date involve establishing a development, 

production, and launch capability for NASA's human exploration missions for decades to 

come. 

a. What key challenges is NASA facing during the development of systems like 

SLS/Orion!EGS in establishing production processes for the first time and what 

will it take to achieve a production capacity capable of conducting a sustained 

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60 

human space exploration program? When do you anticipate NASA will have that 

capability in place and what do you estimate the average annual launch rate will 

be at that juncture? 

Answer: The SLS and Orion programs have made extensive investments in 

advanced manufacturing techniques like reaction friction stir welding and additive 

manufacturing, investments to help achieve a production capacity capable of 

conducting a sustained human space exploration program. 

One example of a key challenge NASA has overcome during EM -1 has been the 

development of friction stir welding techniques and equipment used in the 

manufacture ofSLS. NASA and Boeing have done extensive work to develop 

weld parameters and processes for making the first-of-their-kind large propellant 

tanks, and engineers working on the rocket have learned a great deal from 

meeting challenges ranging from the precise alignment of weld machines to 

addressing the fact that tiny threads on welding pins affect weld strength. 

Producing the SLS' propellant tanks has pushed the state-of-the-art for selfreacting friction stir welding of thicker materials. This is the first time robotic 

self-reacting friction stir weld technology has built such large rocket parts with 

thicker joints. NASA and Boeing have learned a great deal by working through 

processes to get weld parameters for the large fuel tanks adjusted to produce highquality welds that can withstand the extreme forces of launch and spaceflight. 

SLS, Orion, and exploration ground systems are being designed to be capable of 

supporting a long-term flight rate of one per year with a surge capability of three 

per year. The actual cadence of missions beyond EM-2 will be defined based on 

mission needs, available resources, and operational costs. Reducing production 

and operations costs will be critical for enabling an ambitious exploration 

program. 

b. What have NASA and its SLS and Orion contractors done to incorporate 

efficiencies into production processes? 

Answer: NASA has assessed the results from a recent affordability Request for 

Information and will work with industry to reduce overall costs once SLS and 

ground systems enter the production and operations phase. 

As one option, NASA will assess whether some elements may be reused and if 

reuse will lead to reduced costs. For example, NASA is assessing the potential 

reuse of avionics boxes on the Orion Crew Module (and possibly even the 

pressure vessel of the Crew Module itself). That assessment will take into account 

the demonstrated condition of that hardware on EM-land subsequent flights, 

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61 

after the hardware has been through long-duration missions in the hostile 

environment of deep space. 

SLS leverages over a half-century of experience with launch vehicles, including 

Saturn and Space Shuttle, along with advancements in technology since that time, 

including model-based engineering, additive manufacturing, high-fidelity 

computational fluid dynamics capabilities, new composite materials and 

production techniques, and large-scale self-reaction friction stir welding. 

Additionally, initial flight units use components already owned from the Space 

Shuttle, such as RS-2S engines and boosters. More efficient methods are under 

development for manufacturing these components, including new NASA 

investment in expendable RS-2S engines for the SLS Core Stage with the goal of 

achieving a lower per-unit cost than the original reusable RS-2Ss used as the 

Space Shuttle Main Engines. The Agency continues to identify affordability 

strategies for missions beyond EM-2. Reducing overall costs of the systems will 

be critical to achieving a successful and sustainable exploration capability. 

For ground systems, the launch and flight support infrastructure at KSC will be 

able to provide a more flexible, affordable, and responsive national launch 

capability compared to prior approaches. 

c. To what extent will establishing a development, production, and launch capability 

have benefits for other stakeholders, including commercial and international 

partners? If so, will they share the costs? 

Answer: As noted in the response to Question #Sa, above, the SLS and Orion 

programs have made extensive investments in advanced manufacturing 

techniques like reaction friction stir welding and additive manufacturing, 

investments which have helped to position the nation and U.S. companies as 

world leaders in this critical technological area. The specifics of potential benefits 

to commercial and international partners, as well as any cost-sharing plans, would 

depend on the details of partner proposals. 

d. How is NASA applying lessons learned on fabricating EM-I to its work on EM2? To what extent have these lessons affected the EM-2 production process? 

Answer: Please see response to Question #Sa, above, regarding friction stir 

welding as an example of work on EM-I that is being refined as NASA moves 

forward to EM-2. As NASA and its contractor teams overcome first-time 

production and operations issues and gain experience with new manufacturing 

processes, the Agency expects further refinements that will benefit future 

production. 

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62 

6. How important is the role of component and system suppliers in meeting SLS, Orion, and 

ground system production milestones? What has been your experience with suppliers in 

preparing for EM-I? What, if any, changes are needed to ensure that the supply chain is 

working smoothly toward making maximum progress on exploration development 

systems? 

Answer: Component and system suppliers are critical to the development ofNASA's 

exploration systems, and the Agency's experience with such subcontractors has 

demonstrated their dedication to the mission. As the U.S. aerospace industrial base has 

evolved in recent decades, the overall number of suppliers of certain highly specialized 

items used in the SLS and Orion systems have been reduced, and certain areas of 

expertise have been de-emphasized. NASA is working with its industry partners to ensure 

that the supply chain will work smoothly to provide long-term production support, and 

the teams are gaining important experience as they support EM -1 and beyond. 

7. Both the NASA Inspector General and the GAO have expressed concern about the 

limited amount of cost reserves available to address issues as they arise in exploration 

systems development. The IG states, "according to guidance developed at Marshall 

Space Flight Center (Marshall), the standard monetary reserve for a program such as the 

SLS should be between 10 and 30 percent during development." 

a. How much cost reserve do the SLS, Orion, and EGS programs currently have as a 

percentage of the development budget? How do you see this changing in the 

future? 

Answer: While NASA is not managing based upon percentages of reserves, the 

three programs do have reserves spread across their life cycles. Through the 

budget horizon through 2023, the following are being bookkept as reserves within 

the respective program offices: 

• SLS: approximately 3 percent from FY 2018 through FY 2023 

• Orion: approximately 6 percent from FY 2018 through FY 2023 

• EGS: approximately 6 percent from FY 2018 through FY 2023 

These reserves (along with the updates NASA has made to its approach to 

managing systems engineering and integration, and an increased emphasis on 

production performance for the Orion ESM, SLS Core Stage, and spaceport 

command and control software development) give NASA confidence to deliver 

EM-I and to continue evolving the overall enterprise capability. 

Page 7 of 17 
63 

b. Is maintaining a I 0 to 30 percent cost reserve a best practice NASA should follow 

in the development of systems like SLS, Orion, and EGS? If not, what is the 

optimal level of reserves? 

~: While some NASA Centers emphasize the use of a percentage of total 

life cycle costs as reserves, this best practice was developed for one-off missions 

such as the development of a science satellite or planetary mission. However, 

SLS, Orion, and EGS are not one-off missions. NASA manages the SLS, Orion, 

and EGS programs as an evolving and multi-mission capability with workforce 

and costs being divided among several different missions and objectives. As a 

result, there are many tools (in addition to holding cost reserves) which can be 

utilized to meet program goals, such as manifest and schedule management 

(including phasing the sequence of missions); evolution and upgrade management 

(including phasing of when new system capabilities are needed); contract 

management (including the phasing of contract awards); workforce management; 

and management of cost reserves. NASA has decades of experience (including 

most recently with Space Shuttle and the International Space Station) balancing 

the unknowns of an ongoing spaceflight capability within an annual topline 

budget using such a combination of tools. 

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64 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

"An Update on NASA Exploration Systems Development" 

Mr. William Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human Exploration and Operations 

Directorate, NASA 

Questions submitted by Representative Mo Brooks, House Committee on Science, Space, and 

Technology 

I. Nuclear Thermal Propulsion is one of the more promising areas that NASA is working on 

to help speed transit time and limit radiation exposure for astronauts lengthy deep space 

missions. What is the current time line for the development of technology and when can 

we expect it to become operational for deep space missions? 

Answer: In FY 2016, the NASA's Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) 

initiated development offoundational technologies and began studies to advance nuclear 

thermal propulsion systems that face numerous challenges to develop, but could 

ultimately provide a rapid and architecturally robust in-space transportation capability. 

This three-year project is taking the initial key steps to explore how to enable more 

efficient spaceflight by developing and testing low-enriched-uranium fuel elements to 

support a potential future nuclear thermal propulsion system. 

The overarching goal for this three-year plan is to assess the technical feasibility and 

affordability of nuclear thermal propulsion for faster and more flexible transport on deep 

space exploration missions. The resulting analysis will close the gaps in our current 

knowledge of low-enriched-uranium based systems, and allow NASA to make informed 

decisions on Mars exploration architectures with credible cost estimates and a higher 

level of schedule confidence. 

However, high cost, long development times, and a lack of utility for US commercial 

providers are preventing nuclear propulsion from being considered in NASA's near-term 

exploration plans. 

2. The Marshall Space Flight Center in my district has been doing some exciting work on 

Nuclear Thermal Propulsion technology over the years. Can you elaborate a little on if 

you support the plan to complete a ground demonstration project in the next few years? 

Answer: NASA has made initial investments through a three year project funded within 

Space Technology's Game Changing Development Program. As noted, this project is led 

by NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center (MSFC) with contracts to Dynetics, Aerojet 

Rocketdyne, BWX Technologies, Analytical Mechanics Associates, and with NASA's 

Stennis Space Center (SSC), NASA's Glenn Research Center (GRC), and the 

Page 9 of17 
65 

Department of Energy (DOE) as collaborating partners. At the conclusion of this threeyear activity, a determination will be made whether to continue to pursue development of 

the nuclear thermal propulsion technology. 

Dependent on the outcome of the initial three year effort, subsequent steps might include 

completing the design and building the reactor and engine, culminating in a full-scale, 

full-power engine test. During the course of these efforts, a ground test approach for 

capturing the exhaust would need to be developed and implemented. Additionally, longterm space storage of liquid hydrogen would need to be demonstrated, utilizing cryogenic 

fluid management (CFM) technologies that are currently being developed through Space 

Technology's eCryo project. The last major step would be to design and build the space 

propulsion stage that would utilize the NTP system and the CFM technologies. 

The Agency is working to reduce technology barriers for potential future 

applications. However, the total cost of the full scale, full power engine test along with 

the development of an operational NTP system, would be significant barrier in 

considering NTP for future human exploration missions. 

3. How can NASA lay the groundwork for this potentially innovative technology with 

greater foresight and ambition toward deep space exploration? 

Answer: NASA's near term objective is to find an affordable approach for the 

development ofNTP systems using Low Enriched Uranium, enabling the participation of 

industry and/or academia by lessening the burden of security requirements on the system 

and avoiding building new government infrastructure. NASA hopes to leverage 

commercial manufacturing techniques, infrastructure and business base to defray costs. 

The Agency faces several key technology challenges in developing nuclear thermal 

propulsion, including: 

• Fabricating high-temperature fuel elements that minimize erosion and accompanying 

fission product release and which use lower quantities of enriched uranium than those 

developed for past programs; 

• Testing and qualification of the fuel elements; 

• Devising a safe and affordable engine ground test and qualification approach; and, 

• Maturing reactor and engine system designs. 

As noted above, STMD initiated a technology assessment and maturation project in FY 

2016 to determine whether a design based on low enriched uranium (LEU) fuel elements 

could enable an affordable nuclear thermal propulsion system. Major tasks for the threeyear effort include: 

Page l0of17 
66 

• Design, fabrication, and testing of ceramic-metallic composite (cermet) fuel elements; 

• Performing feasibility analysis and detailed cost analysis of an LEU-based engine; 

• Developing a safe and affordable nuclear thermal engine ground testing approach; and 

• Performing a detailed cost analysis for the full development effort leading to the first 

flight system. 

In addition, the research efforts mentioned above on long-term storage of cryogenic 

hydrogen propellant is an essential part of the nuclear thermal propulsion research 

activities. Cryogenic fluid management (CFM) technologies are currently being developed 

and tested on the ground, including Space Technology's eCryo project. eCryo is 

conducting a large-scale ground demonstration of liquid hydrogen storage with very low 

boil offofthe propellant. 

These activities are the essential first step in determining the applicability for future 

exploration. 

4. Is it true that nuclear thermal propulsion technology can dramatically increase the safety 

for astronauts on a future trip to Mars? 

Answer: Nuclear thermal propulsion systems face numerous challenges to develop, but 

could ultimately provide a rapid and architecturally robust in-space transportation 

capability. The extremely high energy density of nuclear reactions makes them attractive 

conceptually as an energy source for propulsion systems. With hydrogen as the 

propellant, exhaust velocities for nuclear thermal propulsion can be more than a factor of 

two greater than the highest performing chemical propulsion systems. By comparing that 

increase with the high thrust values associated with chemical rocket engines, it is 

estimated that a nuclear thermal propulsion system could reduce the round-trip transit 

time to Mars by 25 percent or more, and also provide increased flexibility in Earth 

departure and return trip scheduling. However, as a new and complex technology, it will 

take substantial analysis, ground facilities testing, and on-orbit performance to fully 

match the safety reliability of existing chemical propulsion systems. 

5. As we march forward making the Space Launch System and Orion the system that will 

send humans into deep space, commercial companies are working to provide human 

access to low earth orbit. Safety must remain the number one priority in all these 

programs. Do you have any concerns with the Falcon 9 platform given the recent failure 

of a Merlin D engine? 

~: SpaceX continues to make good progress towards launching crew to the 

International Space Station (ISS) in 2018, and incorporates lessons learned from test 

failures. SpaceX notified NASA of the recent Merlin engine failure. The company is 

investigating internally and keeping NASA fully informed of the team's progress. 

NASA's insight into the SpaceX and Boeing Commercial Crew efforts is helping to 

Page 11 of17 
67 

ensure that our astronauts will have safe, reliable, domestic transportation to ISS in the 

years ahead. 

6. Does NASA plan to provide an incident report for all recent failures to Congress? 

~:NASA briefed its findings on the SpaceX-7launch failure to Congressional 

staff in January 2016. The Agency is in the process of producing a Public Summary 

Report for the NASA Launch Services Program (LSP)-led Independent Review Team 

investigation of the SpaceX-7 launch failure. This report is currently going through the 

appropriate reviews to ensure that International Traffic in Arms Regulations 

(IT AR)/Export Controlled, and Proprietary information is not included. 

NASA is still active with its independent review ofthe SpaceX Pad Anomaly that 

occurred on Sept. 1, 2016. The independent review's findings will be captured in a 

briefing to the Agency's Flight Planning Board. NASA is happy to brief the interested 

Congressional Members and/or staff on our findings once the investigation is 

complete. This failure is being used as the basis for analysis and design of the composite 

overwrap pressure vessel planned for use on the Falcon 9 Block 5 launch vehicle planned 

for commercial crew flights. Procedural changes are being implemented by SpaceX to 

prevent problems similar to this anomaly for commercial cargo flights. No formal written 

report or public summary is planned. For further details on the event and specific lessons 

learned, NASA recommends contacting SpaceX. 

7. What are the indemnification coverage steps that NASA has in place with regards to 

commercial companies? 

Answer: The procedure for a contractor to request indemnification for third-party 

liability and the process for NASA to consider and analyze such a request is set forth in 

Part 50 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and Part 1850 of the NASA FAR 

Supplement (NFS). This process is the same for any contractor, regardless of the type of 

contract or whether a company is "commercial". However, this process for requesting 

and granting indemnification is applicable only if NASA has specific statutory authority 

to indemnifY the contractor under the particular circumstances of the request. Among 

several factual bases required for NASA or any Federal agency to indemnify a contractor 

is that the work required to be performed under the contract must involve unusually 

hazardous risk for which commercial insurance is unavailable. Such legal authorities are 

narrowly construed because the Government's indemnification of a contractor for thirdparty liabilities represents an extraordinary contractual re-allocation of risk and 

responsibility among the parties to a contract. 

Government contract law and regulations ordinarily require that contractors will be 

responsible for the risks resulting from their own work, and accordingly, contractors 

Page 12 of17 
68 

protect themselves from resulting liability with a financial protection program that 

includes commercial insurance. In a few extraordinary circumstances, Congress has 

recognized that certain work performed by a contractor entails unusually hazardous risks 

for which commercial insurance is not available and as such Congress has authorized, 

through a few very specific legal authorities such as Public Law 85-804 and the Price 

Anderson Act Amendments, some agencies to relieve the contractor with respect to 

assuming liability resulting from the contractor's performance of that work. Specifically 

with respect to "commercial" launch services providers, under the Commercial Space 

Launch Act (CSLA), the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) handles 

indemnification for launches conducted under a FAA-issued commercial license. 

8. Is NASA able to offer indemnification to Nuclear Thermal Propulsion technology? If not, 

why not? 

Answer: NASA is currently exploring options for indemnification that would not require 

additional Congressional authority. Should new or modified authority be necessary, the 

Agency will notify the appropriate Congressional Committees. 

Page 13 of 17 
69 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

"An Update on NASA Exploration Systems Development" 

Mr. William Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human Exploration and Operations 

Directorate, NASA 

Questions submitted by Representative Bill Posey, House Committee on Science, Space, and 

Technology 

1. When it comes to space, the unimaginable has often become the imaginable and the 

achievable, especially when we commit to long-term research, development and 

strategies. As we hone in on making manned mission to Mars a reality and other lengthy 

missions - manned or unmanned - I am intrigued by the potential for resources 

available in space to be used as fuel in space. If realized, this potential will lighten 

payloads and extend the range and duration of our missions. As such, would you 

comment on NASA's strategic view or long-term architecture for in-space refueling? 

Moreover, in NASA's exploration plan will NASA evaluate the value and potential for 

utilizing in-space resources like those found on asteroids? 

Answer: The farther humans go into deep space, the more important it will be to produce 

propellants and life support system consumables with in-situ resource utilization (ISRU). 

Some of the most promising space-based commodities that could enable substantial 

reductions in the mass, cost, and risk of human space exploration include oxygen, water, 

and methane. These products are critical for sustaining crew and for space propulsion and 

power systems. They may be derived from space resources such as the carbon dioxiderich Mars atmosphere and water deposits based in lunar, Mars, and asteroid soil (also 

called regolith). Deposits of water and other useful volatiles, which are substances that 

evaporate easily at moderate temperatures, are not yet fully characterized, and work 

remains to understand their accessibility. Accordingly, NASA's priorities for advancing 

ISRU include exploring volatile deposits at destinations of interest so resource potential 

can be determined, and extraction and utilization equipment can be properly designed. 

In FY 2018, NASA is pursuing several activities that will advance ISRU technology. 

NASA is developing the Mars Oxygen ISRU Experiment (MOXIE) for the Mars 2020 

rover that will demonstrate the production of oxygen from the Mars atmosphere. In 

December 2017, NASA issued a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) to solicit 

proposals for public-private partnerships to develop and test component technologies and 

subsystems for ISRU. 

For further information on the BAA, please see: 

https://www.nasa.gov/feature/nasa-seeks-commercial-solutions-to-harvest-space-resources 

Page 14 of 17 
70 

For further information on ISRU, please see: 

https://www.nasa.gov/isru 

The Space Technology Mission Directorate (STMD) is developing capabilities for inspace propulsion, including cryogenic propellant storage, power generation and energy 

storage, and on-orbit refueling. For example, cryogenic fluid management technologies 

are currently being developed and tested on the ground, through Space Technology's 

eCryo project. eCryo is conducting a large-scale ground demonstration of liquid 

hydrogen storage with very low boil off of the propellant. Managing cryogenic fluids and 

minimizing boil-off of cryogenic propellants on long duration missions is a critical 

capability needed to enable high-performance in-space propulsion stages, as well as on 

orbit refueling. 

For information about Space Technology, please see: 

https://www.nasa.gov/directorates/spacetech/home/index.html 

2. In September, this Subcommittee held a hearing with Mr. Jason Crusan on your staff 

about NASA's work with robotic lunar lander companies, like on the Lunar CATALYST 

program, which I understand NASA just extended for an additional two years. 

During the hearing, Mr. Crusan said: 

"The agency is currently assessing possible robotic mission concepts, acquisition 

approaches, and associated payloads for a potential series of lunar cargo missions to the 

surface of the Moon starting as early as 2018, " and "the agency is interested in 

assessing the availability of commercial delivery services from earth to the lunar surface 

as early as next fiscal year. " 

As you know, Chairman Culberson and the Commerce-Justice-Science Appropriations 

Subcommittee included $30 million for Lunar Lander demonstration missions in the 

FY2018 Appropriations bill. Based on Mr. Crusan's testimony and the Appropriations 

Subcommittee support, how does NASA plan to leverage robotic lunar lander missions 

starting in FY2018, especially as the Administration is focusing on Lunar exploration 

opportunities? 

Answer: NASA is supporting the development of commercial lunar exploration. In 

2014, NASA introduced Lunar CATALYST (Lunar Cargo Transportation and Landing 

by Soft Touchdown) and entered into competitively awarded partnerships with three U.S. 

firms (Astrobotic Technologies, Masten Space Systems, and Moon Express) to provide 

in-kind support to develop commercial lunar robotic landing capabilities. NASA is 

providing engineering expertise, hardware and software, and test facilities to these 

Page 15 of 17 
71 

companies. The purpose of the initiative is to encourage the development of U.S. privatesector robotic lunar landers capable of successfully delivering payloads to the lunar 

surface using U.S. commercial launch capabilities. Initial flights of commercial lunar 

landers may begin as early as 2018, and as a result one or more of these companies will 

be able to market lunar payload delivery services for small instruments and technology 

demonstrations. Commercial lunar transportation capabilities could support science and 

exploration objectives such as sample returns, geophysical network deployment, resource 

utilization, and technology advancements. 

The details ofNASA's lunar missions are currently being developed and will be reflected 

in future budget requests. 

Page 16 ofl7 
72 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

"An Update on NASA Exploration Systems Development" 

Mr. William Gerstenmaier, Associate Administrator, Human Exploration and Operations 

Directorate, NASA 

Questions submitted by Representative Bill Foster, House Committee on Science, Space, and 

Technology 

1. The Apollo lunar landing program cost $24 billion in 1960s dollars over 10 years. That 

means NASA set aside nearly 4 percent of U.S. GDP to get to the moon. Today, 50 years 

later, NASA's budget is about $19 billion per year which is less than one tenth of one 

percent ofGDP. 

In order to begin our political and fiscal planning for a mission to Mars, it is imperative to 

have an estimate of what it would cost to meet this goal. Mr. Gerstenmaier, do you have 

what you believe is a realistic upper and lower limit to the cost for getting to Mars? If so, 

please share that estimate with this Subcommittee. 

Answer: Between 1960 and 1973, the Apollo Program accounted for approximately 0.9 

percent of total Federal outlays (peaking at approximately 2.2 percent ofF ederal outlays 

in 1966) and approximately 0.1 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product. As NASA 

learns from initial missions using SLS and Orion and develops new technologies to make 

exploration more affordable, the Agency will formulate cost and schedule details of 

future goals and hardware, and this analysis will be reflected in future budget requests. 

NASA is planning toward roughly today's budget levels. 

Page 17 of17 
73 

Material requested for the record by Representative Higgins during the November 9, 2017 

bearing at which Mr. William Gersten maier testified. 

Provide information about the large lava tubes on the Moon. 

Answer: 

NASA's Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter (LRO) and Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory 

(GRAIL) data supported the attached analysis, "The Structural Stability of Lunar Lava Tubes," 

by D.M. Blair, et al., from the journal Icarus, published by Elsevier, Inc.; the attached article 

provides the requested information on lava tubes on the Moon. 
74 

Icarus 282 (2017)47-55 

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect 

Icarus 

EL">EVIER journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locatelicarus 

The structural stability of lunar lava tubes <I> CrossMark 

David M. Blaira.1

••• Loic Chappazb, Rohan Soodb, Colleen Milbmy•, Antonio Bobet', 

H. jay Melosh'·d, Kathleen C. Howell b. Andrew M. Freed• 

• Department of Earth, Atmospheric, and Planetary Sdences. Purdue University, 550 Sfadium Mall Dr., West Lafayette, IN 47907, USA 

b. School of Aeronautics tmd Astronautics, Purdue University, 701 W. Stadium Ave~ West Lafayerre, IN 47907, US/\ 

'Lyles School of Civil Enginetring. Purdue University, 550 Stadium Mall Dr., West Laftlyttte, IN, 47907, USA 

d Department of Physics and Mtronomy, Purdue university, 525 Northwestern Ave .• West Lafayette, fN 47907, USA 

ARTICLE INFO ABSTRACT 

Artictehistory: 

Available online 8 October 2016 

Keywonts: 

Moon 

lava tube, volcanism 

Skylight (hole) 

GRAIL 

Mounting evidence from the SELENE, LRO, and GRAIL spacecraft suggests the presence or vacant lava 

tubes under the surface of the Moon. GRAlL evidence, in particular. suggests that some may be more 

than a kilometer in width. Such large sublunarean structures would be or great benefit to future human 

exploration of the Moon, providing shelter from the harsh environment at the surface-but could empty 

lava tubes of this size be stable under lunar conditions? And what is the largest size at which they could 

remain structurally sound? We address these questions by creating elasto-plastic finite element models 

of lava tubes using the Abaqus modeling software and examining where there is local material failure in 

the tube's roof. We assess the strength of the rock body using the Geological Strength Index method with 

values appropriate to the Moon, assign it a basaltic density derived from a modem re~analysis or lunar 

samples, and assume a 3:1 width~to-height ratio for the lava tube. Our results show that the stability 

of a lava tube depends on its width, its roof thickness, and whether the rock comprising the structure 

begins in a lithostatic or Poisson stress state. With a roof 2m thick, lava tubes a kilometer or more in 

width can remain stable. supporting inferences from GRAIL observations. The theoretical maximum size 

of a lunar lava tube depends on a variety of ractors, but given sufficient burial depth (500 m) and an 

initial lithostatic stress state, our results show that lava tubes up to 5 km wide may be able to remain 

structurally stable. 

t. Introduction 

Lunar lava tubes present an enticing target for future human lunar exploration. A vacant lava tube could provide astronauts shelter against small meteorite impacts, cosmic radiation, and the extreme temperature variations at the lunar surface (HOrz, 1985; 

Haruyama et al., 2012). Because lava tubes are by their nature 

found in the vicinity of volcanic vents, there may also be good 

local availability of volatile chemical species such as sulfur, iron, 

and oxygen, as well as pyroclastic debris which could be useful 

as a construction material {Coombs and Hawke, 1992). Their en~ 

dosed nature and limited exposure to the space environment may 

also make them possible storage locations for water and other ice 

deposits, useful sites for studying the stratigraphy of the lunar re- golith and dust environment. and suitable sites for finding comparatively pristine examples of mantle-derived rocks near the surface 

• Corresponding author, 

£-moil addJeSS: david. blair@brown.edu (D.M. Blair~ 

1 ~sent address: Department of Earth. Environmental, and Planetary Sciences, 

Brown University, Box 1846, 324 Brook St.. Providence, R! 02912, USA.. 

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.icarus.2016.!0.008 

0019-1035/IQ 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 

() 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 

(Haruyama et al., 2012). Locating and characterizing potential lu~ 

nar Java tubes has therefore been a priority in the lunar science 

community for some time. 

Lava tubes form when a channelized lava flow forms a roof either through the development of levees or the formation of a surficial crust, while the molten material underneath flows away and 

leaves a partially or completely vacant conduit {e.g. Cruikshank and 

Wood, 1971). Such features occur in numerous locations on Earth, 

and it has long been posited that they may also exist-or have 

existed-on the Moon. Through interpretation of images returned 

by Lunar Orbiter V, Oberbeck et a!. { 1969) were among the first 

to suggest that sinuous rilles such as those observed in northern 

Oceanus Procellarum and elsewhere may be the collapsed remains 

of lava tubes which formed during the emplacement of the maria. 

Numerous other studies during the Lunar Orbiter and Apollo mission eras supported this idea, and showed examples of similar pro~ 

cesses occurring in Hawai'i (e.g. Cruikshank and Wood, 1971; Greeley, 1971; Oberbeck et al., 1972). 

lt is only recently that we have obtained direct evidence for the 

existence of uncollapsed voids beneath the lunar surface. In 2009, 

Haruyama et al, published their discovery of a 65 m~diameter 
75 

48 D.M. Blair et a/.flcarus 282 (2017) 47-55 

vertical-walled hole in the Marius Hills region of the Moon, using 

data from the Terrain Camera and Multi-band Imager aboard the 

SEienological and ENgineering Explorer (SELENE) spacecraft The 

following year, two additional pits were identified in SELENE data, 

in Mare Tranquilitatis and Mare lngenii (Haruyama et al., 2010). 

Subsequent high-resolution imagery returned by the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter Camera (LRO/LROC) (Robinson et al., 2010) was 

then used not only to provide more detailed views of the pits discovered by Haruyama et aL (2009, 2010), but also to identifY 150 

additional pits at the lunar surface (Robinson et al., 2012). OveraU, these openings are found to have widths ranging from 49 to 

106 m, which represents a minimum size for the underlying void, 

and oblique views of the pits do show that the underlying cavern is 

wider than the hole in the surface in at least several cases (Ashley 

et al., 2011: Wagner and Robinson, 2014). Voids may also exist in 

areas such as the Al-Tusi impact melt pond near King Crater on the 

lunar far side, where skylights and sinuous fracture patterns have 

been found in high-resolution LROC images (Ashley et a!., 2012), 

suggesting a lava tube collapse. Unfortunately, the size and shape 

of a void cannot be determined by the use of imagery alone (e.g. 

Robinson et al., 2012). 

Gravity data, however, is particularly suited to the identification and characterization of subsurface density variations such as 

vacant lava tubes. Work by Chappaz et al. (2014a,b, 2016) and 

Sood et al. (2016a,b) has shown that lava tubes, buried craters, 

and other density anomalies can be located and characterized in 

the high-resolution datasets returned by NASA's Gravity Recovery 

And Interior Laboratory (GRAIL) mission (e.g. Zuber et al., 2013; 

Lemoine et al., 2014). Using a combination of techniques such 

as gravity anomaly Eigenvalue mapping. cross-correlation between 

observed gravity signals and those of hypothetical features, and 

forward modeling of the gravity anomalies caused by Java tubes, 

Chappaz et al. (2014a,b. 2016) have found possible sublunarean 

extensions of surface sinuous rilles at both Vallis SchrOteri and 

Rima Sharp. ln both cases, GRAIL observations were found to positively correlate with a buried tube 1-2 km in width. The depth 

and shape of these putative lava tubes cannot be explicitly determined from gravity data. however, as a tube even several hundred meters under the surface would produce a nearly identical GRAiL-observable gravity signature to one sitting centimeters 

under the surface since in both cases the spacecraft's altitude 

would be much greater than the feature's depth. While a collection of smaller lava tubes could also produce a gravity signature 

that would match GRAIL observations. the general pattern of volcanic flows on the Moon is one characterized by a relatively small 

number of high-volume flows. The interpretation favored here and 

in Chappaz et a!. {2014a,b, 2016) and Sood et a!. (2016a), therefore, is that these gravity anomalies are each caused by a single, 

large vacant lava tube buried at some non-zero distance under the 

surface. 

The size of the lava tubes inferred by Chappaz et al. (2014a,b, 

2016) is much larger than any known terrestrial examples, which 

reach a maximum of ~30m in width (e.g. Greeley, 1971). Oberbeck 

et al. (1969} addressed the question of how large a lava tube could 

be on the Moon and remain structurally stable by modeling the 

roof of a lava tube as an elastic beam. Doing so. they found that 

a lava tube with a roof 65 m thick could remain stable at a width 

of :!5 385 m. given a lunar basalt density of 2500 kg m - 3• They also 

suggest that lava tubes up to 500 m wide may be possible under lunar conditions, a number which has been frequently cited 

since that work was published; that calculation, however, uses 

a hypothetical vesicular basalt density of lSOOkgm-3, well below the 3010-3270 kg m-3 density of that material which is now 

known from modem re-analysis of Apollo mare samples (Kiefer 

et al., 2012). Furthermore, while Oberbeck et aL ( 1969} mention 

that an arched roof would allow a larger stable tube or a thinner 

possible roof at a given tube width than the beam model used in 

their study, they do not quantify that effect. 

In this study, we aim to constrain the maximum size at which 

vacant lava tubes could remain structurally stable under lunar 

gravity. More specifically. we seek to determine whether the large 

lava tubes inferred from analysis of GRAIL data by Chappaz et aL 

(2014a,b, 2016) are mechanically plausible, leaving aside the mechanisms for fanning tubes of that scale. Our methods incorporate 

numerical modeling techniques of a scale not available to investigations of similar questions performed during the Apollo era, as 

well as modem knowledge about the densities of lunar rocks and 

the behavior and failure mechanisms of large rock bodies in gen~ 

eral. 

2. Modeling techniques 

We approach the question of lava tube stability through the 

use of finite element models built in the Abaqus software suite 

(version 6.12; http:/]www.slmulia.com/solutions). Our models assume plane-strain conditions and are symmetric about the tube's 

longitudinal axis for the sake of computational simplicity. Models 

were verified against analytic results for simple cases (e.g. gravitational self-compression of a block) and were found to be accurate to within 1%. Zero-motion boundary conditions are set at 

the far lateral and bottom edges of the model, which are placed 

sufficiently far away (20 tube widths) so as not to influence our 

model results. In every model, we ensure that there are 20 elements through the thickness of the lava tube's roof, and then adjust other mesh parameters to ensure suitable element aspect ratios ( < 10:1 ). Our general model setup and an example mesh are 

shown in Fig. 1. We do not model the formation of the lava tube 

itself, but instead investigate the stability of the completed structure under various potential lunar conditions. 

The primary variables in this study are the width of the lava 

tube, the thickness of the lava tube's roof, and the pre-existing 

stress state of the material. The shape of the tubes is held at a constant 3:1 width-to-height ratio, mimicking the general non-circular 

arched shape of terrestrial lava tubes while remaining somewhat 

close to the drcular cross-section used in Chappaz et al. (2014a,b, 

2016) such that our models do not grossly over-predict the width 

of the tube responsible for a particular gravity defidt The fixed 

aspect ratio also means that we are varying the tube's volume linearly by adjusting only the width, which is useful for comparison 

with analyses of GRAIL data since these scales with the volume of 

the void space. While this single aspect ratio cannot represent the 

various lava tube shapes on the Moon or elsewhere, focusing on a 

single shape also enables efficient exploration of parameter space 

in terms of width, roof thickness, and initial stress state (see next 

paragraph). Because these structures are buried, the roof thickness 

is in one sense equivalent to the depth to which a lava tube has 

been buried by one or more flows after its initial formation. It can 

also be considered as the thickness of the thinnest layer within the 

lava tube's roof, however. by analogy to terrestrial caves in bedded rock which tend to collapse when individual beds start to fail 

(e.g. Ford and Williams, 1994; Palmer, 2007). We therefore test a 

range of roof thickness values from 1 to 500 m that includes both 

the range of layer thicknesses seen in the walls of lunar skylights 

(-1-12m) (Robinson et al.. 2012) and a thickness comparable to 

the larger flows in Oceanus Proce!Jarum (.-..GOO m} (Wieder et al., 

2010). Our modeled lava tube widths range from 250m to 10 krn, 

representing a size slightly smaller than the maximum size calculated by Oberbeck et al. (1969) and the approximate present-day 

width of the widest part of Vallis SchrOteri, respectively. With our 

assumed width-to-height ratio. this range also includes lava tubes 

with heights similar to the -100-150 m depths of observed skylights. 
76 

Table l 

allow the structure- to self-compress under lunar gravity 

zero-horizontal-motion (and motion) 

conditions the laterJl t>tfges of tht' modeL This only 
77 
78 
79 

52 V,i\.1. et ut.ilcwu~ 282 (2017) 47 ··5S 

to +0.03%} combined with a strongly 

con1orc•ssicmal stress state in the roof due to gravity 

to the lava tube's roof back towards a more 

state, such that several models (B and E) showed an 

remain stable under more extensional stf<lin than contra<:nonal. 

Models A, B, D, and E also show a 

between of a Java 

amount strain that it is able to withstand before failing. Those 

models which before failed vi,l downwards flexure of the 

model C in to 

quickly 

strains are supericnpc>Sed 

to pervasive failure at the base 

even farther and 

roof. 

thick, and begin~ in a 

stress st.tte. Color ('ontour<; ~how the horizontal compone"m w1th 4. Discussion negat1ve (compreo;~ional) <;tresses throughout the roofofth£> tube>. 

horizontal stress (MPa) 

results m difft'!ent final ~tr("S5 <;.tatrs, faJ!ure mode~. 

mode! with a 200m roof {model C h\'re .tnd in 

f;;n!s m extension dt tlw apex of the tub;;-: with,, 50m D) is 

shows 1mifurmly honzontal and 

E)fo!!'iin 

Our results show that Java tubes up to 5 km wide can remain 

stdb!t' under lunar which is a much width than presmaller stJb!e tubes our results, such 

wide tube with 5 m thick roof, which is possible in 

both the lithostatic and Poisson stress state cases, are several times 

than the- 385--500 m stable size calculated Oberbl't.:k 

simplification in that where lava 

in masonry stnu:tures has been well known since antiquity, so 

general result is not in 

What be 

to Skm 

the lunar horizon lies 2.4 km away. so in many of the 

modeled here one sicte of the lava tube's floor would not be vis~ 

ible from the 

lack of aqueous erosion and the assumed 

rocks (i.e. having widely-spaced fractures), 
80 

D.M. Blair et aLj Icarus 282 (2017) 47-55 53 

I stable I quasi·stable I unstable D / 0 model result 0 inferred result 

:§: (A) 5000 m, 500 m 

oo (B) l000m,2m 

~ :s 

] 

~ (C)3500m, lOOm 

·~ (D) 3500 m, 50 m 

(E) IOOOm, I m 

applied horizontal strain(%) 

F"IJ. 6. Stability of various models subjeeted to far~fieid t&tonic strains, Models a~ lettered A-E to corre-spond to those in Figs. 3-5. The ilmount of contractional or 

extension.al strilin is noted on the horizontal axis, with the column of boxes next to oo; strain representing ±0,001%, the next column out representing ±0.002%, ilnd so on. 

Triangles in the comer of boxes indicate a performed simulation, with results for intermedidte ;tmounts of strain inferred from these simulations. Colors and failure states 

for ea<h model are as in Fig. 3 and explained in the text. 

basalts to be stronger {higher cohesion and internal friction angles) than their terrestrial counterparts (after Marinos and Hoek, 

2000). In thinner roofs it is also more likely that our continuum 

assumption is incorrect due to pre-existing fractures in the lava 

tube's roof. Altering our material parameters to more Earth-like 

values or changing our continuum approach would thus likely reduce our resulting lava tube sizes, possibly bringing them closer to 

the size expected from pure gravitational scaling. 

Our results also raise the question of whether lava tubes larger 

than a kilometer across are likely to form under lunar conditions. 

Although the mechanics of lava tube formation on the Moon are 

poorly understood, there are several lines of evidence suggesting that tubes several kilometers across may be able to form under lunar conditions. The first of these is the very large, sinuous mass deficits obsetvable in GRAIL gravity data, which indicate 

some sort of void under the lunar surface-although not necessarily lava tubes-on the order of one kilometer across (Chappaz et al., 

2014a; b; 2016). The size of lunar sinuous riUes is also illustrative: 

Rima Sharp is -...840 m wide on average, Vallis Schrtiteri ---4.3 km, 

and there are numerous other rilles with widths over 1 km (e.g. 

Hurwitz et al., 2013; Garry and Bleacher, 2011 ). These rilles are 

genera11y interpreted to be volcanic in origin, suggesting very high 

eruption volumes on the Moon. It is possible that among features 

this size, those with thinner roofs collapsed to form open channels 

in the form of the obsetved sinuous rilles, and others with thicker 

roofs were stable enough to persist as sublunarean lava tubes. Even 

the global median sinuous rille width, 480m (Hurwitz et al., 2013), 

is an order of magnitude larger than known terrestrial examples. 

This disproportionately larger size of lunar sinuous rilles clearly in~ 

dicates a different volcanic environment on the two bodies, caused 

by some combination of factors like crustal stress states, material 

differences, lava production, or cooling rates. Factors such as the 

lower viscosity and higher density of lunar lavas, the higher erup~ 

tion rates inferred at the Moon from obsetved sinuous rilles, or 

the absence of convective or advective cooling may also allow the 

formation of much larger Java tubes on the Moon than on Earth 

(Cruikshank and Wood, 1971) by enabling more voluminous flows, 

more cohesive roofs, or thicker chilled Java flow margins, respectively. lt is worth noting, however, that air-cooled Java tubes cool 

more slowly than might be expected due to the insulating effect of 

gases (Sakimoto and Zuber, 1998), so a radiation-only environment 

inside a lava tube may not cool at a meaningfully different rate; 

this question requires further investigation. 

The cooling process of a lava tube in an environment such as 

a lunar mare is also poorly understood, and may have other effects on the stress state and long-term stability of the tube. Cooling of lava during the initial formation process likely does not lead 

to the development of stresses in the structure, as these will instead be accommodated by pervasive cracking. These cracks wiU 

then fill in with subsequent flows, altering the structural properties of the rock as a whole in complex ways. While we attempt to 

simulate the pervasive weakening through our use of the Geological Strength Index (Marinos and Hoek, 2000), it is possible that 

subsequent flows may also lead to further cycles of heating and 

cooling of in-place material. which are not modeled here. These 

thennal effects would depend on the exact volcanic history of a 

lava tube, the thicknesses and temperatures of subsequent flows, 

and, as mentioned above. the specifics of the cooling environment. 

While this is an admittedly complex parameter space, and is outside the scope of the present study, the complete formation-topresent thermal history of lava tubes does likely play a role in their 

long-term stability. 

lava tubes -100-150 m tall (300-450 m wide) that could potentially underlie observed skylights are found to be stable in our 

calculations even with the very thin (---1m) roof Jayer thicknesses 

observed in the skylights. With both the lithostatic and Poisson initial stress states, there are also models several times larger than 

this which we find to be stable. so we might not expect structures 

of these proportions to be particularly "close" to failure; in other 

words, changes of a factor of two or more in roof thickness or 

tube width would not affect their stability. This may indicate that, 

if the skylights are in fact openings into lava tubes. they represent 

some sort of local failure of otheiWise stable structures and not 

gravitattonal collapse of fundamentally unstable structures. Meteorite impacts. local concentration of pre-existing fractures. regionally thinner roofs or roof layers, or local material differences could 

all lead to the formation of skylight-like collapses. Different mechanisms for the formation of the lunar skylights may also be distinguishable by the obsetved shape of the hole, with irregularly 

shaped holes representing structural failure instead of an impact 
81 

54 D.M. Blair et al.flcarus 282 (20!7) 47-55 

origin (e.g. Martellato et al., 2013). It is worth noting. however, that 

a skylight could easily form due to a combination of factors, with 

a nearby meteorite impact triggering the collapse of an already 

anomalously weak part of the tube or a small but non-penetrating 

impact creating a weak area which later fails for some other reason. The relative influence of these processes likely varies between 

individual skylights. 

Regional tectonics may also play a role in the location of stable 

lava tubes. Our results show that lava tubes near the maximum 

stable size are able to withstand far-field strains between -0.2% 

and +0.08%, depending on the initial stress state, lava tube size, 

and roof thickness (see Fig. 6). The presence of any nearby tee~ 

tonic features (e.g. mare ridges. graben) should thus be carefully 

considered when attempting to locate or characterize potential lava 

tubes. as large amounts of regional strain will lead to smaiJer local 

maximum lava tube sizes and{or thicker minimum roof thickness 

than in Jess tectonically active regions. 

Due to their higher gravity, we would expect that similar lava 

tubes on either Mars or Mercury (both with surface gravity g of 

---3.7 N kg~ 1) may be able to remain stable at sizes -44% as large 

as presented here (.:5 2.2 km wide), or for terrestrial lava tubes 

(g'"" 9.8 N kg-1 ) to be ab1e to remain stable when they are ..._ 16% 

as large (.:5 soom wide), since gravity has a linear effect on the 

stresses experienced at depth due to overburden. The size of stable 

lava tubes on a given body would be further reduced by weakening the material comprising the tube either by weathering or the 

more rapid advective cooling possible in the Martian or terrestrial 

atmospheres. It is also possible that lava tube aspect ratios other 

than the 3:1 width-to-height ratio used here could produce different results for stability, and that this ratio may differ between bodies. The exact ways in which lava tube stability is affected by these 

various factors remains to be investigated. It is important to note, 

however, that calculations such as those in the present study only 

represent the sizes at which lava tubes may remain structurally 

stable; lava tubes 800 m wide are not found on Earth, omd so it 

is entirely possible that lava tubes do not exist at these maximum 

sizes on the Moon, Mars. or Mercury. The maximum size of extant 

(as opposed to structurally possible) lava tubes may thus be controlled more by the properties of the source of the tube~forming 

lava flow than by the stability of the formed lava tube. 

5. Conclusions 

We use finite element models to test the stability of lava tubes 

of various sizes and burial depths under a variety of conditions appropriate to the lunar maria. By calculating material failure in the 

lava tubes' roofs. we conclude that large (kilometer scale) vacant 

sublunarean lava tubes may be able to remain stable on the Moon 

under a wide range of possible conditions. Our results suggest that 

a lava tube -s km wide can remain stable given that it formed in 

sufficiently voluminous lava flows that it possesses a thick (SOOm) 

roof, and given a near-lithostatic initial stress state and a comparatively quiescent regional tectonic environment. Lava tubes ~ 1 km 

wide may be able to remain stable with a roof only ..-..2m thick, 

given similar initial and regional stress conditions. Both of these 

results assume a set of Geological Strength Index parameters and 

a rock density appropriate to the lunar maria, an unconfined compressive strength of 100 MPa, and a lava tube with an assumed 3:1 

width~to-height ratio. These results indicate that the interpretation 

of Chappaz eta!. (2014a,b, 2016) that GRAIL data suggests the presence of several-kilometer~wide voids buried beneath the lunar surface is within the realm of mechanical plausibility. 

The primary factor which allows large lava tubes to remain sta~ 

ble is the arched shape of the roof, which leads to a compressional 

stress state throughout the roof under gravitational loading. This 

result, when scaled for gravity, leads to stable lava tube sizes on 

Earth much larger than known examples. The size of the largest 

extant vacant lava tube on a given body may thus be limited not 

by stability issues. but by the manner and scale of their fonnation or by erosional processes that decrease the durability of larger 

tubes. Therefore, while both this study and gravitational evidence 

from GRAIL (Chappaz et al., 2014a,b, 2016) support the possibility 

that Java tubes several kilometers across may exist under the lunar 

surface, further proof of their existence gathered by methods such 

as ground-penetrating RADAR (e.g. Sood et al., 2016c), gravimetry 

(e.g. Urbanek et al.. 2015) or seismic studies wiU be needed before 

their existence can be confirmed. 

Acknowledgements 

We would like to thank Dr. junichi Haruyama of the japan 

Aerospace Exploration Agency UAXA). Dr. Tracy Gregg of the Uni~ 

versity of Buffalo, and Dr. Debra Hurwitz of the Lunar and Planetary Institute for their insightful and helpful comments. This work 

was supported by NASA Headquarters under the NASA Earth and 

Space Science Feltowship Program. grant NNX13A063H. It has also 

been supported by the GRAIL mission, which is part of NASA's Discovery Program performed under contract to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and the jet Propulsion Laboratory. 

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83 

Responses by Dr. Sandra Magnus 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY 

"An Update on NASA Exploration Systems Development" 

Dr. Sandra Magnus, Executive Director, American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 

(AIAA) 

Questions submitted by Ranking Member Ami Bera. House Committee on Science. Space. and 

Technology 

I. How important is the role of component and system suppliers in meeting SLS, Orion, and 

ground system production milestones? 

Answer: A well-functioning and well-integrated supply chain is vital for the successful 

execution of any production activity, especially for the manufacture of complex 

hardware. In addition, in particular for human spaceflight hardware, quality and attention 

to detail is imperative to ensure that the exacting standards for safety and reliability are 

met. Our nation's aerospace component and system suppliers fof!ll the backbone and 

foundation of our capabilities to produce advanced space hardware. Each component or 

system, no matter the size, embodies some level of technical expertise and knowledge, 

whether that is related to a particular design that produces the appropriate functionality or 

to a specific manufacturing technique or skill. Maintaining a healthy supplier base, with 

constancy of orders and work, keeps this corporate knowledge intact, while also ensuring 

that important delivery milestones are met. Moreover, with enough resources and 

certainty in their business environment the individuals and companies that comprise the 

nation's supply chain have the capacity to innovate and experiment. These are critical 

activities for national competitiveness and technical evolution. 

2. In your prepared statement, you state that uncertain and improperly passed budgets, 

including the regular usage of continuing resolutions and threat of government 

shutdowns, have resulted in inefficiencies and higher long-term operational costs. Is this 

a challenge that is particularly harmful to development activities in NASA's human 

spaceflight program, and if so, why? 

~: Large, complex human spaceflight programs require a systematic planning and 

execution approach that includes the definition for the concept of operations and the 

overall systems architecture, the corresponding hardware design and development, and 

the operational process and procedures. It is not uncommon when determining 

operational safety, efficiency, and cost-effectiveness that substantial up-front investment 

is required to optimize design and/or manufacturing technologies to achieve these longterm goals. One-year budget allocations or, worse, uncertainty and limitations in resource 

availability resulting from continuing budget resolutions put constraints on designs and 
84 

force a short-term decision-making mindset, regardless of the long-term consequences of 

potentially increased operational costs. While the NASA authorization is often multiyear, 

the appropriations are done annually. And even though there is often a multiyear budget 

projection, these funds are not assured. Having assured capital at the beginning of a 

program, during the development phase, to allow the most efficient trade-offs between 

near-term and long-term cost drivers is imperative to ensure the highest quality, safety, 

and efficiency in operations. In addition, when faced with insufficient funds or uncertain 

budgets, programs are forced to slow down design, development, or manufacturing 

activities. Consequently, important skill sets are at risk as people are sometimes forced to 

work elsewhere or leave the field entirely. Once important knowledge and technical skills 

are lost, a program cannot simply start again where things had left off. Inevitably, there is 

a re-learning phase that requires time, and this can potentially lead to costly mistakes. 

Adequately phased and sufficient funds with constancy of commitment are key to a safe, 

reliable, and cost-effective program. 

3. How would a return to the Moon, including potentially establishing a human presence 

there, impact the goal of sending humans to Mars in the 2030s, as directed in the 2017 

NASA Transition Act? How do we prevent a return to the Moon from becoming the de 

facto end point of the human space exploration program for the foreseeable future? 

Answer: As the government prepares to embark on sending humans beyond low Earth 

orbit, it must do so with a long-term vision and goals along with the plan for executing 

those goals. Most importantly, there must be a long-term commitment to the plan and 

adequate resources must be provided to execute the plan. For example, if we decide, as 

has been stated, that Mars is the long-term goal for human expansion then the plan we 

build must reflect this. Any activity that the government engages within the vicinity of 

and on the moon must be targeted at what is required to build and test the necessary 

equipment, gather the necessary operational experience, and mitigate all known risks 

required to travel to Mars. A clear set of milestones for activities around the moon, once 

executed, signals the moment when the journey to Mars should be implemented. Staying 

focused on these goals will ensure that the moon is not a de facto termination of human 

activity, but rather an expansion point for human activity in space beyond low Earth 

orbit. The investment in the infrastructure required to realize the goal of returning 

humans to the moon should also address the requirements for the commercial exploitation 

(nongovernmental-funded independent interests) of cislunar space and should be 

adequate to support future missions to Mars, whether robotic, human, or a combination 

thereof. Designing into the program how to leave behind a healthy economic ecosystem, 

or at least the start of one, gives the government more freedom to continually expand its 

activities over time. Under these conditions our outward expansion will not "stall" on the 

moon unless the nation so chooses. 

Page 2 of4 
85 

4. Beyond SLS and Orion, 

a. Where would international and commercial partner participation in the human 

space exploration make the most sense? 

Answer: To answer this question we first need to define what our national 

priorities are related to how the United States wants to lead in space. It is safe to 

say that we value having our own independent launch capability, for example, as 

well as setting the mark for state-of-the-art space propulsion. Deep space 

communication capability is also a key technology in which the United States 

should remain a leader, as is the ability to produce a habitable, closed system 

vehicle. What other capabilities or technologies do we, as a nation, want to ensure 

that we maintain? The answer to this question will drive how we approach our 

international partners for teaming arrangements and collaboration. Once we have 

identified the capabilities and technologies that are important to us as a nation, an 

analysis can be done to determine the state of development of those assets and 

whether it makes sense for government to invest in their maturation-making the 

resultant knowledge available to industry at large, or deciding to invest in 

companies to develop the key capabilities, which leads to economic expansion as 

opposed to shared knowledge. Such considerations will drive how and where to 

engage with private companies. 

b. What would be the role of academia? 

Answer: Academia plays two very important roles in this area. The first, and 

more important role, is attracting and training a pipeline for the highly-skilled 

technical workforce that is needed to execute a complex and expanding human 

spaceflight program successfully. Second, the nation's universities conduct 

government-funded basic and, to some extent, applied research that is 

foundational for our continuing space exploration efforts. Academic research can 

play a complementary role to the more applied and integrated research and 

development that occurs at NASA. As basic science and engineering research 

activities mature concepts and ideas, this information can be transferred to NASA, 

and potentially industry, for application development. 

c. What impact would instilling greater international and commercial partner 

participation have on our ability to maintain the vitality and relevance of the 

Nation's industrial base and domestic academic institutions? 

Answer: Done correctly, partnering with commercial entities and international 

space agencies could have a positive impact on our nation's industrial base and 

academic institutions. Done haphazardly, without a larger vision, these same 

Page 3 of4 
86 

partnerships could be a detriment. The key, again, is understanding what our 

strengths are, what strengths we want to develop and instill, and how we want to 

deal with areas we consider our weaknesses, or areas that we are not interested in 

developing. The latter are the areas where partnerships could be of benefit to both 

industry and academia. 

5. What should a meaningful roadmap contain to ensure that it provides the constancy of 

purpose needed to provide stability and maintain the Nation's commitment to NASA's 

human space exploration program? How can we avoid the human tendency toward shortterm thinking and focusing on near-term objectives? 

~: Please refer to my response to question three. The plan should be long term in 

nature-defining that Mars is the long-term goal and including activities that we hope to 

accomplish once getting there. The plan should also identifY the necessary milestones and 

risk mitigation activities that have to take place on and around the moon. Finally, the plan 

should have a coherent approach for how to leverage government investment in the 

achievement of the milestones for the benefit of establishing a lasting infrastructure in the 

lunar neighborhood independent of government support. The milestones should be built 

in such a way that progress can be illustrated on a short-term basis, but always in the 

context of where on the roadmap the program is. The plan cannot be changed 

substantially every two, four, or six years. It must be allowed to be executed coherently 

over a decade or two. Most importantly, the plan needs the appropriate long-term 

financial commitment and backing from both political parties and must be reaffirmed 

regularly by both the executive and legislative branches. 

Page4 of4 
(87) 

Appendix II 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
88 

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY RANKING MEMBER

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON
89 

STATEMENT SUBMITTED BY

REPRESENTATIVE BILL POSEY

Æ