### The Honorable Jimm Larry Hendren, United States Distric t 1 

### Judge for the Western District of Arkansas. ___________ No. 95-1794

___________ United States of America, * * Appellee, * * Appeal from the United States v. * District Court for the * Western District of Arkansas. George David McManus, * * Appellant. *

___________ Submitted: September 12, 1995 Filed: November 30, 1995

___________ Before WOLLMAN, MAGILL, and LOKEN, Circuit Judges.

___________ WOLLMAN, Circuit Judge.

George Mc Manus entered a conditional plea of guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922 (g)(1). He was sentenced to 84 months' imprisonment and fined $10,000

. On appe al, McManus contends that the district court should have grante d 1 his motion to suppress evidence. We affirm.

I.

Because the identification number (VIN) listed on the inspectio n sticker on his vehicle differed from the VIN con tained on the registration slip and the car itself, McManus was unable to re-register his vehicle

. A d ifference in a VIN can occur in two situations: (1) when a typographical error has been made or (2)

### The Nationa l Crime Information Center (NCIC) is a department 2 

### wi thin the Federal Bureau of Investigation which provide s computerized information to la w enforcement concerning the vehicle identification numbers of stolen vehicles, individual crimina l records, and outstanding warrants. -2- when the car has been stolen. When there is a problem with a VIN , licensing officials refer the matter to the state police for investigation

. A form co rrecting the VIN is issued only after the police are satisfie d that the problem is merely technical.

For the purpose of satisfying the Arkansas Department of Revenue' s re gistration requirements, McManus went to the Arkansas State Polic e Hea dquarters in Clarksville on July 6, 1994, to verify the VIN on hi s veh icle. Corporal Jerry Roberts assisted McManus in performing the VI N verifi cation. At Roberts' request, McManus produced the registration , which listed him as t he owner of the vehicle. Roberts then verified that the VIN on the registration matched the VIN on the car. After verifying the ma tch, Roberts requested McManus's driver's license for proof o f identification. Robe rts then ran three computer checks. First, he ran a registration check on the vehicle's VIN and on the registration itself to determine whether the vehicle was stolen. Next, he ran a driver's license check to determine whether McManus's license was current. Finally, he ran
a Nation al Crime Information Center (NCIC) check to further investigat e 2 the p ossibility that the car was stolen, a procedure that he routinel y conducted in the course of verifying a VIN even though there was no writte n policy requiring that that be done.

At some point during the foregoing sequence of events, McManu s started to leave the station in order to retrieve additional information regarding the registration from his vehicle. Roberts, however, told him to com e back in and, in McManus's words, "have a seat," with th e indication, again in McManus's words, that "this wouldn't take too long." The VIN and driver's license checks

### The Honorable Beverly R. Stites, United States Magistrat e 3 

### Judge for the Western District of Arkansas. -3- cleared, but the NCIC search indicated that McManus was wanted for a felon y probation violation. Roberts confirmed that the warrant was valid an d plac ed McManus under arrest. During the ensuing inventory search o f McManus's vehicle, police officers discovered various firearms.
McManus filed a motion to suppress, contending that he was seized in violat ion of the Fourth Amendment when he was asked to turn over hi s driver's license and told to take a seat. He al so contended that the NCIC search of his crimina l history violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The district c ourt denied the motion, adopting the magistrate judge's report 3 and recommendation to that effect.

II.

We examine the district court's denial of the motion to suppres s under the clearly erroneous standard. United States v. Delaney , 52 F.3d 182, 186 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 116 S. Ct. 209 (1995). We review d e novo the underlying question of whether a seizur e has occurred and whether the Fourth Amendment has been violated. Id.
McManus first argues that he was unl awfully detained by Roberts when he turned over his driver's license and was told to have a seat. Th e mag istrate judge found that no seizure occurred because (1) the initia l contac t between McManus and Roberts was consensual; (2) Roberts merel y requested -- rather than demanded -- the driver' s license; and (3) Roberts did not use coercive tactics.

### -4- Not every encounter between a law en forcement official and a citizen involves a seizure. Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 19 n.16 (1968). No seizur e occurs when a police officer simply questions an individual or asks to see his identification, so long as the officer does not send a message that th e individual must comply with his request. Florida v. Bostick , 501 U.S. 429 , 434 (1991). See also United States v. McKines , 933 F.2d 1412, 1419 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied , 502 U.S. 985 (199 1) (focusing on the nature of pol ice officer's questioning to determine whether a seizure ha d occurred).
We consider the totality of the circ umstances in determining whether "the police conduct would have communicated to a reasonable person that he
was not free to decline the officer's request or otherwise terminate the encounter ." United States v. Angell , 11 F.3d 806, 809 (8th Cir. 1993) , cert. denied , 114 S. Ct. 2747 (1994). In United States v. Mendenhall , 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980), the Supreme Court cited several circumstances that might evidence a seizure: "[T]he threatening presence of several officers , the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching of the perso n of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating tha t compliance with the officer's request might be compelled."

It was McManus who brought about his contact with the police

. Roberts' request to see McManus's driver's licen se was part of the routine followed in verification situations. McManus, by his own free will, hande d
over his license. Roberts did not threaten McManus or use any coerciv e tactics. He did not display his weapon or physi cally detain Roberts. See United States v. Archer , 840 F.2d 567, 572 (8th Cir.), cert. denied , 488 U.S. 941 (1988) (holding that no seizure occurred when officers merel y approached defendant and requested identification since officers did not use coercive tactics, display weapons, or physically restrain defendant). Roberts made a simple, good faith inquiry to ascertain

### -5-

whether McManus was the owner of the vehicle, the failure to do which coul d well have constituted negligence in the performance of Roberts' duties.

Roberts' direction that McManus come back in and have a seat did not transformthe encounter into a seizure, for McManus was not told that he
cou ld not leave the station. Admittedly, Roberts' statement could hav e been expressed in more precatory terms, e.g., by being prefaced with "Woul d you please," or some similar language. Nevertheless, we cannot conclude that a reasonable person would have felt compelled to remain in the statio n bas ed on this statement. See Angell , 11 F.3d at 809-10 (stating tha t offi cer's statement to "Stay there" or "Hold it right there" did no t transf orma consensual encounter into a seizure). Given thes e circumstances, then, we hold that no seizure occurred.

III.

McM anus next asserts that Roberts violated his Fourth Amendmen t rights when he conduc ted a search of his criminal history through the use of the NCIC computer data base. To preserve the integrity and privacy of the i nformation contained in the NCIC data base, the Federal Bureau o f Investigation allows access only for criminal justice purposes, justic e employment, or security clearances. United States v. Pederson , 3 F.3 d 1468, 1471 (11th Cir. 1993).

Robe rts clearly had a legitimate criminal justice purpose i n accessing the NCIC. He stated that a discrepanc y in the VIN raises a "red flag" that a car may be stolen. Thus, he automa tically checks the NCIC in this type of situation. The undisputed purpose of the investigation was to verify the VIN. T o do this, Roberts had to determine that the car had not been stolen.

### -6- McManus argues that once the VIN and driver's license checks cl eared, Robert s had completed the investigation necessary to verify the VIN

. Roberts testified, however, that a VIN check alone is insufficient t o determine whether a car is stolen. For example, a car with an altered VIN would not show up as stolen in the VIN data base. Similarly, a car whose VIN has been replaced with that from a junked ve hicle would not be listed. Based on his experience, Roberts believed that the NCIC check was necessar y in order t o thoroughly investigate the matter. By conducting an NCI C check, he could determine, for example, whether the person claimin g ownership of the vehicle had a record for stealing vehicles (although it might seem counterintuitive that a person with a record of car thefts woul d present himself at a police station to request assistance in verifyin g vehicle registration, one might equally doubt that a person with a n outsta nding warrant for felony probation violation would do the same)

. Furthermore, the NCIC data base is commonly used in determining whether a
car has been stolen. See United States v. Harris , 528 F.2d 1327, 1330 (8t h Cir. 1975) (NCIC check justified when officer observed various scratches and marks surrounding the VIN plate on car); United States v. Lopez , 777 F.2d 543, 546-48 (10t h Cir. 1985) (NCIC check warranted when out-of-state automobile was not re gistered in name of either passenger); United States
v. Diaz-Albertini , 772 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied , 484 U.S. 822 (1987) (NCIC check authorized when driver's license and registration did not match).
In addition, police frequently condu ct NCIC checks during the course of routine investigations. See United States v. Rubio-Rivera , 917 F.2 d 127 1, 1276 (10th Cir. 1990) (immigration agent authorized to conduct a n NCIC check as part of his normal inquiry at border checkpoint); Unite d States v. Fernandez , 18 F.3d 874, 877-78 (10th Cir. 1994) (during course of routine traffic stop, officer may ask for a driver's license and vehicl e registration, and run a computer check) (citing United States v. Guzman , 864 F.2d 1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988)).

### -7- We conclude that because Roberts' inquiry was directly related to the scope of his investig ation, he was justified in conducting an NCIC check. Thus, no constitutional violation occurred even if the NCIC chec k constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, a questio n we need not decide in this case.
The judgment is affirmed.

A true copy.

Attest:

CLERK, U. S. COURT OF APPEALS, EIGHTH CIRCUIT.