November 2016 CSWMD Proceedings 1

wmdcenter.ndu.edu

PROCEEDINGS

Weapons of Mass Destruction:

Challenges for the New Administration

November 2016

By John P. Caves, Jr.

John P. Caves, Jr., is the Deputy Director of the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction and a Distinguished Research Fellow at the 

National Defense University. This paper will be published as “Deterrence, Escalation Management, and Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction,” 

in Charting a Course: Strategic Choices for a New Administration, ed. R.D. Hooker, Jr. (NDU Press, forthcoming).

The 2015 National Security Strategy identifies the proliferation and/or use of weapons of mass destruction 

(WMD) among the top strategic risks to the Nation’s 

interests.1

 This paper examines four pressing WMD challenges for the next U.S. administration. First, the prospects of 

a direct clash between the United States and a nuclear-armed 

adversary that could escalate to the nuclear level are likely 

to grow. Russia in particular has become more assertive in 

challenging U.S. interests and has developed concepts for the 

limited use of nuclear weapons in a conflict with the North 

Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Second, the scope of 

North Korea’s nuclear, chemical, and suspected biological 

weapons programs likely will require resources for countering WMD that exceed those currently available to the 

United States and South Korea. Third, longstanding international efforts to prohibit chemical and biological weapons 

are threatened by the reemergence of chemical weapons use 

and potentially by rapid advances in the life sciences. Finally, 

concern that the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 

may only postpone—rather than prevent—Iran’s acquisition 

of nuclear weapons will perpetuate tensions and proliferation pressures in the region. To meet these challenges, the 

next U.S. administration needs to:

♦ close gaps in capabilities, plans, and policies that weaken 

deterrence

♦ reduce incentives for further proliferation by enhancing 

monitoring and verification measures and reassuring 

allies and partners

♦ strengthen the Nation’s countering-WMD posture with 

increased resources and improved organization

♦ stay on top of and leverage rapid scientific and technological developments in the life sciences and related 

fields

♦ improve the education of military officers, civilian 

national security professionals, and the broader public on WMD challenges and the necessary responses 

thereto.

Challenges

The next U.S. administration will face numerous challenges in addressing the threats arising from WMD, both 
2 CSWMD Proceedings November 2016

large and small, but the four challenges discussed below are 

expected to be most pressing.

Deterring and Managing Escalation in Conflicts with 

Nuclear-Armed Adversaries

The United States is entering a new period of heightened 

risk of direct conflict with nuclear-armed regional powers, with the potential to escalate to the nuclear level. The 

nuclear problem is no longer just about proliferation and 

global threat reduction, the twin imperatives that characterized post–Cold War policy.2

 Today we also confront the 

challenge of deterring an adversary’s first use of nuclear 

weapons and managing the risks of further escalation.3

 Being 

better prepared for new and complex escalation situations 

requires adapting capabilities, plans, policies, exercises, and 

education.

A number of nuclear-armed states are challenging important U.S. interests through both military and nonmilitary 

means. Russia has been most aggressive, invading Georgia, 

annexing Crimea, enabling separatists in eastern Ukraine, 

and militarily intervening in Syria. Meanwhile, China has 

asserted its claims to disputed territory in the East and 

South China seas through more aggressive measures, including armed patrols,4

 commercial exploitation activities with 

armed escorts,5

 and physical enlargement of disputed formations that it controls.6

 North Korea frequently issues threats, 

including nuclear ones, against Seoul and Washington, and 

periodically perpetrates military provocations.7

 These activities threaten the territorial integrity and security of U.S. 

treaty allies, and more broadly the rules-based order that the 

United States views as central to global security. As such they 

carry the possibility of direct conflict with U.S. forces.

Russia’s and China’s increasing assertiveness may be 

explained by a confluence of ambition and opportunity. 

The ambition is their respective aspirations for a more powerful role globally and primacy in their own regions. Both 

view the United States as the principal obstacle to realizing such ambitions. The opportunity principally is the 

mitigation of U.S. military superiority resulting from their 

aggressive military modernization programs, particularly in 

antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities, power projection, and other information-centric capabilities.8

 That sense 

of opportunity may be enhanced by a perceived asymmetry 

of interests with the United States in regional conflicts and 

a certain war-weariness among the United States and some 

of its Western allies after more than a decade of conflict in 

Afghanistan and Iraq.

The ability of U.S. forces to prevail in the early stages 

of conventional conflicts with Russia and China in areas 

close to their borders—and by extension the ability to deter 

such conflicts—should no longer be assumed. Geography 

and growing deployments of modern A2/AD capabilities9

increase the vulnerability of U.S. forces in these regions and 

complicate U.S. reinforcement efforts.10 This situation makes 

it more likely that Russia or China could achieve a rapid fait 

accompli, such as seizing territory in the Baltic region or East 

China Sea, respectively, and shift the burden of escalation 

onto the United States if those gains are to be reversed.

The burden of escalation is heavy in conflicts with nuclear-armed adversaries.11 To degrade adversary capabilities 

threatening U.S. and allied efforts to assemble and employ 

sufficient force to reverse a fait accompli, U.S. forces likely 

would have to strike assets, including missile, integrated 

air defense, and command and control sites, on Russian or 

Chinese territory.12 Such attacks could be viewed as escalatory and strategic by those nations and invite retaliatory 

strikes on U.S. and other allies’ territories. Some Chinese 

strategic thinkers have suggested that conventional attacks 

on strategic targets would merit a nuclear response, notwithstanding China’s longstanding nuclear no-first-use policy.13

Of more direct concern, Russia reportedly has adopted a 

concept, generally referred to as “escalate-to-de-escalate,” by 

which it would resort early in a conflict to nuclear as well 

as conventional strikes against critically important adversary 

targets to convince the adversary that the risks of continuing 

the conflict outweigh any possible rewards.14 Indeed, Russia 

has been keen to impress upon others its readiness to employ 

nuclear weapons. It espouses a military doctrine reliant on 

nuclear weapons to deter and defeat major conventional 

as well as nuclear aggression.15 It also frequently rattles its 

nuclear saber, as it did to deter intervention in the Ukraine 

conflict and to try to dissuade European states from hosting 

U.S. missile defense assets.16

U.S. nuclear escalation options currently are more limited than those available to Russia. Nonstrategic U.S. nuclear 

weapons based in Europe and assigned to NATO are an 

important rung on the escalation ladder: they can signal 

resolve and under the right circumstances have real military 
November 2016 CSWMD Proceedings 3

effect, but can also demonstrate restraint by allowing strategic 

systems to be held in abeyance. Russia holds a much larger 

number and greater variety of nonstrategic nuclear weapons 

than the United States does.17 Some Russian delivery systems 

also are more modern and capable, for example, the Iskander 

missile system, which can deliver nuclear- or conventionally 

armed ballistic and cruise missiles that are maneuverable and 

re-targetable in flight.18 This suggests that Russia may accord 

greater importance and more roles to nonstrategic nuclear 

weapons than does NATO. The Alliance’s land-based nuclear 

deterrent is limited to aging gravity bombs delivered by dualcapable tactical aircraft (DCA) that are vulnerable to Russia’s 

integrated air defense systems.19 The planned replacement of 

most DCA with F-35s and completion of the life extension 

program for the B-61 bombs will not occur before the 2020s.20

The threat posed by Russia’s Iskander missile system to 

NATO is currently limited by range. The 1987 Intermediate 

Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty bars Russia and the 

United States from developing, testing, or deploying ballistic missiles or ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCM) 

with ranges between 310 and 3,400 miles.21 The Iskander-M 

extended-range ballistic missile system currently deployed 

with the Russian army has a range of 250 miles.22 The more 

recent Iskander-K variant launches the R-500 cruise missile, which some analysts believe has an intermediate range 

but which the United States has not identified as a treaty 

violation.23 The United States, however, has accused Russia 

of testing a different GLCM in violation of the INF Treaty, 

though it has not publicly identified the missile.24

Russia’s development and deployment of intermediaterange nuclear missiles would pose a particular problem for 

NATO. These missiles could strike targets across Europe 

within minutes without threatening U.S. territory. When 

the Soviet Union fielded such systems in the 1970s, NATO 

governments considered it so serious a threat to Alliance 

cohesion that they unanimously agreed, despite widespread public opposition, to pursue a dual-track approach 

of deploying a comparable capability in Europe while seeking to negotiate mutual limits with the Soviets. Only after 

those NATO deployments actually began did the Soviet 

Union agree to negotiate what would become the INF Treaty. 

Contemporary Russian violations would be consistent with 

dissatisfaction that Russian officials have expressed with the 

treaty in recent years for constraining their ability to counter 

intermediate-range missiles deployed by countries such as 

China and Pakistan or by missile defense and conventional 

precision-strike capabilities possessed by the United States.25

China poses its own escalation challenges for the United 

States. Not a party to the INF Treaty, it fields a large and 

growing force of modern, medium-range, conventionally 

armed ground-based ballistic missiles. These MRBMs as well 

as a variety of land-attack cruise missiles hold U.S. bases in 

Japan at risk. There are reports that China is developing a 

new advanced intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) 

that could strike U.S. bases in Guam.26 China also is fielding 

an anti-ship ballistic missile with a range of 900 miles and 

maneuverable warhead that can attack ships, including aircraft carriers, in the western Pacific Ocean.27 China’s growing 

missile force is part of its expanding A2/AD capabilities that 

challenge the U.S. ability to fulfill its security commitments 

to regional states.

China also currently deploys nuclear-armed MRBMs 

and IRBMs as well as intercontinental ballistic missiles 

and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.28 Unlike Russia, 

China does not have, nor has it sought, nuclear parity with 

the United States. It currently maintains only about 200 operational nuclear warheads in support of a long-stated nuclear 

doctrine of no-first-use and minimum deterrence.29 China, 

however, is modernizing and expanding its nuclear arsenal, 

which may promote stability in some regards by making its 

arsenal more survivable, but also may afford China greater 

scope to employ its weapons in counterforce or nonstrategic 

roles without compromising the counter-value retaliatory 

capacity at the heart of its strategic doctrine.30 Also, unlike 

Russia, China does not share a ground border with any 

U.S. ally, making its military competition with the United 

States more focused on the sea and associated air and space 

domains. These domains may be more inviting to operational use of nuclear weapons since they offer less scope for 

collateral damage.

North Korea also poses nuclear deterrence and escalation management challenges but of a different scale and 

circumstance from Russia or China. The long-feared prospect of a massive North Korean invasion of the South to 

achieve reunification has receded as the quality of its conventional forces has deteriorated along with its economy,31

but Pyongyang has managed to build a small and growing 

nuclear arsenal and a ballistic missile force of increasing 
4 CSWMD Proceedings November 2016

range with which to deliver those weapons.32 The greater risk 

of conflict now is seen as arising from an escalatory spiral 

initiated by a North Korean provocation or the possibility of serious unrest in the North that necessitates outside 

intervention to address a humanitarian crisis, secure WMD, 

and/or respond to a related attack against an external actor.33

Given North Korea’s huge investment in its nuclear weapons program and the frequency and virulence of its nuclear 

threats, it is only prudent to anticipate that it may respond to 

such developments with nuclear weapons use.

Preparing for WMD Contingencies on the Korean 

Peninsula

Beyyond deterrence and escalation management risks, North 

Korea also poses a major countering WMD (CWMD) challenge.34 In the event of a collapse of the Pyongyang regime or 

as the result of a major conflict on the peninsula, the United 

States and its allies must be prepared to defend against the 

possible use of North Korean chemical and biological as well 

as nuclear weapons and to enter North Korea to secure and 

eliminate its WMD capabilities. North Korea represents the 

most comprehensive CWMD challenge we face, one whose 

potential scale could exceed the resources currently available 

to the United States and South Korea. Being fully prepared 

for WMD contingencies on the peninsula and beyond will 

require a larger pool of forces with specialized training and 

equipment and improved organization.

North Korea may have between 6 and 30 nuclear weapons 

and could expand its stockpile, perhaps dramatically, over the 

coming years.35 Its growing and increasingly sophisticated 

ballistic missile force spans from short- to intercontinentalrange missiles.36 According to an unclassified assessment 

by South Korea’s Ministry of National Defense (MND), the 

North likely possesses between 2,500 and 5,000 metric tons 

of chemical warfare agents. This probably includes first- and 

second-generation agents, such as mustard and sarin. Less is 

known about North Korea’s biological weapons (BW) capabilities, but the MND assesses the North has the capability 

to cultivate and weaponize various types of agents, such as 

anthrax and smallpox.37

In the event of a major conflict on the peninsula and/

or the collapse of the North Korean regime, it will be a high 

priority task for U.S. and South Korean forces to locate, control, defeat, disable, and/or dispose of North Korean WMD 

capabilities to prevent their use by North Korean forces or 

agents, or their loss to third parties. This task will be complicated by incomplete knowledge of the locations and specific 

types and quantities of WMD and related capabilities. WMD 

programs, especially chemical and biological ones, are difficult intelligence targets, especially in North Korea. Parts of 

North Korea may be difficult to access, and coalition forces 

also may have to accomplish other priority tasks like noncombatant evacuations, humanitarian operations, and/or 

conventional warfighting.

The potential scale of this task exceeds existing coalition resources, particularly units with specialized training 

and equipment for CWMD missions. These units number 

in the single digits while WMD sites may number in the 

hundreds.38 It will not be possible to reach and secure all or 

most sites of concern in a timely fashion, except in the most 

limited and permissive contingencies. Even with little or no 

North Korean resistance, the difficult terrain alone is a major 

obstacle to timely access. The less warning of a crisis, the 

longer will be the response time to deploy forces from home 

bases. The United States also will have to anticipate the possibility of some WMD assets proliferating off the peninsula 

and devote resources to their interdiction.39

Successful North Korean use of WMD against U.S. and 

South Korean forces in the context of a shooting war could 

seriously complicate operations. Chemical and biological 

attacks may not preclude ultimate victory by the combined 

forces, but large-scale attacks in particular would increase 

the length and costs of the fight and could have unpredictable political consequences.40 If North Korea also employed 

nuclear weapons on the battlefield—which it will have greater 

scope to do as its arsenal expands—this would re-introduce 

a dimension to warfighting for which U.S. forces have not 

extensively prepared since the Cold War’s height.41

Holding the Line Against Chemical and Biological 

Weapons

New chemical and biological weapons threats are emerging. Some on the chemical side have already manifested. 

These developments challenge the integrity and force of 

international norms and regimes prohibiting chemical and 

biological weapons. They also impose new demands on 

Department of Defense (DOD) force protection. To hold 

the line against a resurgence in the proliferation and use of 
November 2016 CSWMD Proceedings 5

chemical and biological weapons, the United States needs to 

lead international efforts to update nonproliferation regimes 

for the new strategic environment and hold accountable 

those who defy international norms and law in these areas. 

The United States also needs a greater understanding of 

emerging technologies and the threats and opportunities 

they pose.

The Biological Weapons and Toxins Convention (BWC) 

and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) came into force 

in 1972 and 1997, respectively, to prohibit biological and 

chemical weapons. Almost all states are now party to these 

agreements.42 No state is known to have employed biological 

weapons (BW) since the BWC entered into force. Nor had 

any state been known to employ chemical weapons (CW) 

since the CWC entered into force—until 2012‒2013, when 

Syria, not then a CWC state party,43 used sarin on several 

occasions on its own territory.44 The large-scale sarin attack 

in eastern Ghouta in August 2013, which caused at least 

hundreds of civilian deaths,45 prompted threats of military 

action against the Syrian regime by the United States, United 

Kingdom, and France. That crisis was resolved when Russia 

and the United States brokered Syria’s agreement to join the 

CWC, declare its CW capabilities, and submit its declared 

stocks to destruction (largely accomplished in 2014).46 With 

this accession to the CWC by one of its most significant 

holdouts, the cause of prohibiting CW, initially undermined 

by Syria’s sarin use, appeared to be reinforced.

But that moment was short-lived. Even before the most 

dangerous of Syria’s declared chemicals were destroyed, 

reports emerged of the employment of chlorine-containing chemicals as a weapon of war in Syria. During 2015 

the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons 

(OPCW) Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM) investigated 

alleged incidents of CW use and concluded that several uses 

of chlorine likely had occurred in Syria’s Idlib Governorate 

between March 16 and 20, 2015.47 Although the FFM’s mandate proscribes it from attributing responsibility for these 

attacks, Secretary of State John Kerry and others expressed 

high confidence that at least the preponderance of attacks 

were perpetrated by the Syrian regime.48

If the Syrian regime conducted these chlorine attacks, as 

is widely believed, it would constitute an unprecedented violation of the CWC by a state party. The CWC prohibits the 

use of any toxic chemical as a method of warfare, whether or 

not it is listed in the convention’s Schedules of Chemicals.49

But in contrast to the explicit Western threats of military 

action following the Ghouta attacks, no comparable threat 

or sanction was visited upon Syria in the immediate wake of 

these chlorine uses. This may reflect several factors. First, the 

chlorine attacks have caused few deaths because chlorine is 

much less lethal than sarin. Second, the human toll caused 

by chlorine (or all CW) use in Syria pales in comparison to 

the mounting carnage there caused by conventional weapons.50 Third, the longer and more complex the Syrian conflict 

becomes, the less inclined other countries may be to take 

strong stands that complicate achievement of a political settlement. The United States and its allies chose first to seek an 

official finding of the Syrian regime’s responsibility for chlorine use from a cognizant international body. In August 2015 

the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 

2235 establishing a Joint Investigative Mechanism of the 

United Nations and the OPCW (JIM) to attribute responsibility for the use of CW in Syria.51 In August 2016 the JIM 

found the Syrian regime to be responsible for two chemical 

attacks during 2014 and was continuing to assess several other cases.52 The United States and its allies now need to decide 

how to respond.

Unfortunately, the CW use problem extends beyond the 

Syrian regime’s actions. There is increasing evidence that the 

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) also has employed 

CW in Iraq as well as Syria.53 For example, in its August 2016 

report, the JIM found that ISIL was “the only entity with the 

ability, capability, motive, and the means to use sulfur mustard” during an attack in Marea, Syria, on August 21, 2015.54

Like the Syrian regime since 2014, ISIL’s apparent CW use to 

date has caused few fatalities, featuring relatively low-lethal 

toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) and sulfur mustard.55 The 

use of mustard suggests ISIL may be producing chemical 

agents in addition to commandeering widely available TICs. 

ISIL’s conquest of territory in Syria and Iraq, including the 

major city of Mosul, has afforded it control of modern scientific facilities and perhaps also expertise seldom available 

to terrorist organizations. This may enable ISIL to develop, 

produce, and employ more lethal chemical agents than mustard and perhaps biological weapons, too, but there also is 

skepticism about ISIL’s ability to do so.56

It also is noteworthy that ISIL, like the Syrian regime, 

appears to have used CW primarily to support military 
6 CSWMD Proceedings November 2016

objectives rather than for more purely terror purposes. While 

both ISIL and the Syrian regime use chemicals against civilians and likely, at least in part, for their psychological effect, 

both are doing so in the prosecution of a war in which they are 

attempting to defeat an adversary and control territory. But 

more traditional forms of terrorism using CW or even BW 

cannot be ruled out, considering ISIL has claimed responsibility for recent mass casualty attacks outside the region.57

This has been on the mind of some European officials.58

CW use in the Middle East points to several limitations 

of the CW nonproliferation regime. The Syria case demonstrates the difficulty of mobilizing sufficiently unified, timely, 

and strong international action to deter or sanction a CWC 

state party that violates its treaty obligations, at least when 

its use of CW is killing few people. The ISIL case reminds 

us that terrorist organizations are not bound by the norms 

and agreements made by states. Both cases show that CW 

encompass more than the sophisticated chemical warfare 

agents that are the monitoring and verification focus of the 

CWC. Widely available TICs also can be employed as weapons with both military and terror effect.

No comparable recent instances of BW use have occurred, 

but this should not be cause for complacency. There are indications of interest in BW by both state and nonstate actors. 

For example, the United States discovered an al Qaeda BW 

program when it invaded Afghanistan,59 and more recently 

a document on BW production was found on an ISIL member’s captured laptop.60 On the state side, Russian President 

Vladimir Putin spoke in 2012 about the future emergence of 

genetic weapons,61 a disturbing reference in light of the Soviet 

BW program. BW also is potentially more impactful than 

CW, generally possessing a far lower mass-to-effect ratio.62

Technological barriers to BW development, production, and use also are receding. Dual-use production and 

dissemination equipment that was hard to acquire is now 

widely available.63 Rapid developments in the life sciences 

(for example, genetic mapping, “big data” genetic analytic 

capability, specific gene editing), other emerging technology areas (nanotechnology, additive manufacturing), and 

the broad dissemination of the resulting information via 

the Internet also have made it possible and/or easier to perform an ever broader range of biological activities. These 

include enhancing traditional forms of BW (for example, 

resistance to medical countermeasures), recreating agents of 

past scourges (the 1918 Spanish Influenza), and even creating entirely new organisms.64 It may even become possible to 

design BW that target specific individuals or groups on the 

basis of their unique genetic profiles.65

These rapid and far-reaching scientific and technological developments increase the prospects for technological 

surprise and pose significant challenges for the BW nonproliferation regime. The BWC was drawn broadly enough to 

prohibit new forms of BW that may emerge from technological change, but its current processes are hard-pressed to 

keep pace with such change. The BWC’s review conferences 

occur only every 5 years, a period in which major scientific and technological developments can transpire. Also, no 

standing body of experts exists to regularly assess scientific 

and technological developments and to advise state parties’ 

political representatives of their implications for the convention, as the Scientific Advisory Board and OPCW Technical 

Secretariat do for CWC state parties.

The new BW possibilities enabled by these scientific and 

technological developments also pose serious challenges for 

the protection of forces, populations, and economies, but 

they could provide means to counter these threats, too. They 

already are the source of many positive improvements in 

other areas, such as medicine, energy, and agriculture. The 

potential impacts of emerging technologies are the subject of 

increasing interest and activity across the U.S. Government, 

but the activity generally lacks structure, integration, and 

a focus on what needs to be done, though there are recent 

efforts to rectify these shortcomings. Government research, 

development, and acquisition processes in most cases also 

lack the dexterity to capitalize quickly on rapidly emerging 

technological opportunities to address biodefense and public 

health needs.66

Containing Nuclear Proliferation Pressures in the 

Middle East

The 2015 Iran nuclear agreement—the Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA)—constrains Iran’s 

ability to develop nuclear weapons but does not eliminate 

proliferation pressures within the region. Indeed, the nature 

of the agreement could heighten such pressures if regional 

rivals are concerned that Iran may resume its pursuit of 

nuclear weapons when the agreement’s key restrictions on its 

enrichment capability expire. To contain these proliferation 
November 2016 CSWMD Proceedings 7

pressures, the United States will need to reassure its regional 

partners that together they can keep an aggressive Iran in 

check while trying to induce Iran to behave more responsibly.

The JCPOA limits Iran’s ability to produce fissile material 

through a set of physical constraints and intrusive monitoring and verification measures.67 But the JCPOA also allows 

Iran to retain a substantial nuclear infrastructure (including 

virtually all of the physical infrastructure associated with its 

uranium enrichment program) and the capacity to expand 

its enrichment program after the physical constraints on 

fissile material production and most of the verification and 

enforcement provisions expire in 10 to 15 years. Assuming 

that the JCPOA is implemented and effectively deters Iran 

from producing fissile material from its declared facilities, 

there remains concern that Iran will bide its time until the 

agreement’s latter years in order to reap the benefits of sanctions relief and then resume pursuit of nuclear weapons from 

a stronger economic position.68 In addition, there is concern 

that Iran might cheat on the margins during the JCPOA by 

conducting small-scale enrichment or weaponization work 

at undeclared facilities, the detection of which will rely heavily on national intelligence capabilities.69

Iran’s regional rivals could be motivated to pursue their 

own nuclear hedging strategies to guard against the possibility of a future nuclear-armed Iran. Saudi Arabia, the leader 

of the Sunni Arab bloc opposed to Iran, has warned it would 

have to respond to Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons.70

Hedging strategies could include pressing ahead with civilian 

nuclear energy programs (which can provide a foundation 

for nuclear weapons development), developing enrichment 

and/or reprocessing capabilities (which is permissible under 

the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) if done openly 

and with safeguards), covertly investigating nuclear weapons 

technologies, and/or pursuing nuclear security guarantees 

from outside powers.

Saudi Arabia was among a number of Arab states that initiated civilian nuclear energy programs in the mid-2000s.71 It 

likely was not a coincidence that these initiatives appeared 

within a few years of revelations of Iran’s secret enrichment 

activities and the failure of the initial, European Union–led 

negotiations to end those activities. While this may represent a Saudi hedging strategy for the longer term, some 

observers believe that Riyadh might also pursue a nuclear 

deterrence strategy for the shorter term, one that presumably 

would leverage its historic relationship with Pakistan.72

Alternatively, the Saudis and other Gulf Cooperation Council 

(GCC) states could seek a formal security guarantee from the 

United States or possibly France.

Lingering questions about Iran’s ultimate nuclear intentions also could inhibit efforts to resolve or mitigate key 

sources of regional instability. Some observers believe the 

nuclear agreement could motivate both Iran and its Saudi-led 

Arab opponents to become more confrontational toward one 

another, at least in the short term. Iranian hardliners may act 

to heighten tensions to preclude the agreement from serving 

as a springboard for wider diplomatic and economic cooperation with the international community. Iranian Supreme 

Leader Ali Hoseini-Khamenei may acquiesce to assuage concerns within Iran’s conservative political establishment while 

JCPOA implementation proceeds.73 The financial windfall 

that Iran expects from sanctions relief under the agreement 

also could underwrite increased funding and weapons shipments to Shia militants and proxies in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, 

Lebanon, and Palestine.74 For its own part, the Saudi-led 

Arab coalition states may feel compelled to stand up more 

vigorously to Iran to offset any perceived lessening of the U.S. 

commitment to their security.75 Arab states are concerned 

that the agreement may lead to a closer U.S-Iran relationship or a progressive U.S. disengagement from the region.76

Saudi Arabia’s uncharacteristic commitment of its own forces and prestige to the difficult conflict in Yemen can be seen 

as a case in point. The JCPOA, moreover, has not alleviated 

Israel’s concerns about Iran’s nuclear program. Israeli Prime 

Minister Binyamin Netanyahu appealed directly to the U.S. 

Congress to oppose the agreement.77

Recommendations

The foregoing WMD challenges are serious but surmountable. To meet them, the next U.S. administration 

should:

♦ close gaps in capabilities, plans, and policies that weaken 

deterrence

♦ reduce incentives for further proliferation by strengthening monitoring and verification measures and 

reassuring allies and partners
8 CSWMD Proceedings November 2016

♦ strengthen the Nation’s countering WMD posture with 

increased resources and improved organization

♦ stay on top of and leverage rapid scientific and technological developments in the life sciences and related 

fields

♦ improve the education of military officers, civilian 

national security professionals, and the broader public on WMD challenges and the necessary responses 

thereto.

Close Gaps that Weaken Deterrence

The United States should strengthen its own and regional allies’ abilities to resist and thus deter a territorial fait 

accompli by Russia and China that would shift the burden 

of escalation on the United States and its allies. For Europe, 

this means implementing the proposed expansion of the 

European Reassurance Initiative in DOD’s fiscal year 2017 

budget request to enable a larger rotational force presence 

on the ground of NATO Allies most vulnerable to Russian 

aggression. If Russia acts more aggressively, consider a larger, permanent force presence in those allied states. If Russia 

fields MRBMs and IRBMs, accord the U.S. European missile 

defense architecture an orientation against such missiles and 

consider developing and deploying comparable U.S. missiles. Expand air defense systems in the theater to protect 

a larger array of assets against cruise missile attack. In the 

Pacific, complete the redeployment of 60 percent of all U.S. 

naval and air forces to that theater.78 Continue to expand and 

integrate U.S. and East Asian regional allies’ missile defense 

capabilities. Vigorously pursue the Third Offset strategy that 

DOD announced in 2015 to strengthen U.S. conventional 

deterrence in the face of both China’s and Russia’s growing 

capabilities.79

Modernize U.S. nuclear forces and employment plans 

to enhance nuclear deterrence. Press ahead with the programmed life extension of the B61 nuclear bombs and the 

replacement of NATO dual-capable aircraft with F-35s. 

Proceed with the planned modernization of the broader 

U.S. nuclear force, including development of the long-range 

standoff nuclear cruise missile as a replacement for the aging 

air-launched cruise missile to provide a more reliable standoff 

attack capability against modern integrated air defenses. 

The planned modernization effort will require a significant 

increase in spending for U.S. nuclear forces, but these costs 

will still represent a small portion of the overall U.S. defense 

budget,80 and there is no substitute for modernizing an aging 

nuclear force that is fundamental to U.S. security. The bomber leg of the triad, including standoff cruise missiles and 

gravity bombs deliverable by penetrating bombers, is especially important to the effectiveness and credibility of U.S. 

extended deterrence commitments to major allies.81

Expand theater nuclear planning expertise in relevant 

geographic combatant commands (GCCMDs) and better 

integrate conventional and nuclear force planning at the 

theater level.82 Because the effective posturing and potential 

employment of nuclear assets in a theater may be critical to 

preventing a regional conflict from escalating to the strategic level, GCCMDs need to be well-versed and centrally 

involved in planning for the nuclear dimensions of regional 

conflicts. They also must be able to deconflict their conventional operations with nuclear ones, which may be directed 

by U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), so as not 

to undermine the conventional campaign. Deterrence and 

warfighting will be further strengthened by GCCMDs’ 

understanding of how to enhance their forces’ resilience in 

conducting operations in a nuclear environment.

Review existing doctrine, concepts, and campaign plans 

for conflicts with nuclear-armed adversaries to assess their 

implications for nuclear escalation and revise them as appropriate to minimize that risk. This mindset was not necessary 

for post–Cold War conflicts because U.S. adversaries were 

not nuclear armed. The United States could and did apply 

overwhelming conventional force to rapidly crush those 

adversaries’ capacity to wage war wherever it existed and 

also, in some cases, to overthrow their regimes. The United 

States will need to pursue more limited aims with calibrated 

applications of force, and associated messaging, in potential 

future conflicts with states that are able to wreak nuclear devastation upon U.S. allies, forces, and even populations.83 This 

mindset is especially salient to planning for war in Korea, 

which long assumed a decisive counteroffensive to reunify 

the peninsula under South Korea, as opposed to wars with 

Russia and China, for which invasion and regime change 

have not been war aims.
November 2016 CSWMD Proceedings 9

Hold accountable those who are using CW in the Middle 

East. If other actors observe that CW use goes largely unpunished, they may be less deterred from similar resort in their 

own conflicts if they perceive advantage in doing so. To deter 

such use, the United States needs to provide leadership in 

holding the Syrian regime accountable for its CWC violations. The JIM’s continuing efforts to ascribe responsibility 

for CW use in Syria must be actively supported. If the ultimate outcome in Syria is the demise of the Bashar al-Asad 

regime, members of the regime deemed responsible for CW 

use should still be pursued and prosecuted. As concerns 

ISIL, the United States must continue to pursue aggressively 

its comprehensive defeat, including denying it the sanctuary and facilities of the territory it now controls in Iraq and 

Syria, which likely contribute to its ability to produce CW. 

In the meantime, priority should be accorded to efforts to 

understand and disrupt ISIL’s WMD activities, deter use, and 

prevent proliferation to affiliate groups.84

Determine why Syria and ISIL have resorted to proscribed chemical weapons. Do they see these weapons as 

having unique military advantages, such as the ability to 

reach opponents within structures that protect them from 

bullets and high explosives? Is it because chemical weapons 

terrorize target populations into fleeing territory that they 

are trying to seize? Is it because widely available TICs are 

cost-effective alternatives to conventional weapons, such 

as improvised barrel bombs are to military-grade bombs? 

Understanding their motivations can inform future efforts to 

dissuade and deter CW proliferation and use.

Reduce Incentives for WMD Proliferation

Advocate for and contribute to increased funding, inspectors, and intelligence resources for International Atomic 

Energy Agency monitoring and verification of Iran’s nuclear 

program. Confidence in Iran’s essential compliance with the 

JCPOA will be necessary to achieving the agreement’s goal 

of preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. These 

measures could help allay Israel’s and GCC states’ concerns 

that Iran will seek to increase its enrichment capacity during 

the JCPOA, and eventually make the decision to build nuclear weapons. The United States also should begin working as 

soon as practical with key allies and partners to identify ways 

to induce Iran, positively and negatively, to abide by its NPT 

obligations once the JCPOA’s limitations and enforcement 

provisions expire. Planning now for the post-JCPOA period 

could mitigate a tendency to assume the JCPOA is only a 

hiatus in Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear arsenal.

Address the security concerns of U.S. regional allies and 

partners arising from the JCPOA to reduce their incentives 

to pursue courses of action that could harm U.S. interests 

or lead to a more proliferated region. An effort to reassure 

partners was at the heart of President Barack Obama’s Camp 

David summit with GCC states in May 2015, a number of 

whom were reported to be dissatisfied with U.S. attention to 

their security concerns.85 The resulting joint statement reaffirmed the “unequivocal” U.S. commitment to “deter and 

confront external aggression against [its] allies and partners” 

and indicated that the assembled leaders had discussed “a 

new U.S.-GCC strategic partnership to enhance their work 

to improve security cooperation, especially on fast-tracking 

arms transfers.”86 Conventional arms transfers have gained 

additional significance given concerns that the lifting of sanctions and unfreezing of Iranian assets under the JCPOA will 

enable Iran to acquire sophisticated arms from Russia and 

elsewhere.87 The United States will need to reassure Israel, 

however, that efforts to strengthen GCC states will not come 

at the expense of its qualitative military edge. A new 10-year 

military assistance agreement that the United States and 

Israel signed on September 14, 2016, providing for a substantial increase in U.S. military aid to Israel, should help in 

that regard.88 The United States also should be open to adding 

an explicit nuclear dimension to its statements intended to 

reassure regional partners, albeit short of a nuclear security 

guarantee to any particular partner that likely would be politically unsalable.89 For example, the United States could state 

publicly that it will never tolerate the threatened or actual use 

of nuclear weapons against its vital interests in the region and 

that it would be prepared to use all of the instruments at its 

disposal to defend those interests. At the same time, it should 

reinforce privately with its nonnuclear partners that it will not 

tolerate their pursuit of nuclear weapons capabilities.

Increase Resources and Improve Organization for 

CWMD Contingencies

Make more effective use of U.S. and South Korean 

resources to prepare for countering weapons of mass destruction contingencies on the Korean peninsula, the most likely 

and demanding of current CWMD challenges facing the 
10 CSWMD Proceedings November 2016

United States. DOD should seek to expand CWMD expertise among Reserve and Guard forces and raise the readiness 

of such forces to deploy for CWMD missions. It also should 

look for ways to broaden and deepen interagency contributions to CWMD operations, such as by the Department of 

Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration, which 

has expertise and capabilities relevant to nuclear elimination tasks.90 It also should encourage South Korea to expand 

its specialized CWMD forces and ensure that their training 

and equipment are comparable to and interoperable with 

counterpart U.S. forces, especially to deal with North Korea’s 

chemical and biological programs. The United States and 

South Korea, a nonnuclear weapons state, further should 

determine to what extent South Korean forces can participate in operations associated with eliminating North Korea’s 

nuclear weapons program, consistent with the NPT and U.S. 

Atomic Energy Act.

Engage other countries with advanced CWMD capabilities to determine how they might contribute to CWMD 

operations in Korea. This includes allies and partners such as 

the Australia, France, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, 

and Singapore. China also could bring resources to bear on 

this problem. China inescapably will play a major role in any 

conflict or crisis in North Korea, possibly with forces on the 

ground. China has its own interest in ensuring that a crisis 

does not lead to the use or loss of North Korean WMD, lest it 

also become a victim of or at least be seen as culpable in such 

an eventuality. Still the obstacles to eliciting China’s cooperation in matters concerning the possible collapse or defeat of 

its North Korean ally are obvious.91 But the need remains, 

and the situation is changing as North Korea’s behavior creates more problems for China and as China bids for influence 

in South Korea. Efforts should continue to engage China in 

discussions about how it can contribute to preventing the use 

or loss of North Korean WMD.92

Implement the reassignment of the DOD CWMD mission to U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). In 

2005, DOD established CWMD as a distinct military mission and assigned U.S. Strategic Command responsibility 

for synchronizing CWMD efforts across the department.93

USSTRATCOM made strides toward increasing military focus on CWMD, including instituting semiannual 

CWMD Global Synchronization Conferences and preparing 

CWMD Concept Plan 8099. Yet with an unusually diverse 

set of missions—also including strategic deterrence; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance; space; and 

cyber—USSTRATCOM could not devote as much effort 

to the CWMD mission as it required. The reassignment of 

CWMD to another command able to give the mission greater 

attention should enable stronger leadership, improved planning, and more effective advocacy. USSOCOM is best suited 

of the combatant commands to assume the mission given its 

global scope, special authorities, existing CWMD roles, and 

interest in the mission.94

Stay on Top of and Leverage Rapid Scientific and 

Technology Developments

Actively encourage ongoing efforts across the U.S. 

Government to understand the implications of emerging 

technologies, but provide them with more structure, better 

integration, and a focus on identifying what can and should 

be done. Rapid developments in the life sciences and other relevant fields may lead to new types of biological and 

chemical weapons, but also new means for countering these 

threats. The mindset needs to be one of leveraging these 

developments to the maximum extent possible, such as in 

achieving better countermeasures and applying controls only 

where necessary and practical. Nimbler research and development capabilities will be needed to exploit rapid advances 

that offer the prospects for developing new kinds of countermeasures to address existing and emerging biological threats.

Strengthen the BW nonproliferation regime’s capacity to 

deal with rapid scientific and technological change. Create 

structures and working methods that allow BWC state parties to tackle issues in a more effective way, such as by meeting 

more frequently between review conferences and delegating 

more authority to those gatherings. A body of experts also 

should be established to regularly assess relevant scientific 

and technological developments and their implications for 

the purposes of the convention, and the annual Meeting of 

Experts should be used as an opportunity to advise state party representatives on these matters. Recognizing the limits to 

controlling the availability and utilization of rapidly developing technologies, BWC state parties also need to reinforce 

the international norm against BW through active outreach 

to the science and technology communities to dissuade their 

involvement in proliferation efforts.
November 2016 CSWMD Proceedings 11

Educate Military Officers, Civilian Officials, and the 

Broader Public on WMD Challenges

Make deterrence and escalation management essential 

elements of the education and experiential learning of all 

military officers and civilian national security officials. The 

knowledge and skills needed to address these challenges, 

once sharpened by the centrality of the Cold War nuclear 

threat, atrophied thereafter as the risk of nuclear war rapidly 

receded and attention turned to conventional wars against 

nonnuclear states, terrorism, and irregular warfare. But 

with the increased potential for nuclear weapons use today, 

deterrence and escalation management, including a greater 

understanding of adversary doctrine and the elements of 

crisis management, must again figure prominently in the 

core educational curricula for military officers and civilian 

officials.95 It also is no longer acceptable to rule out the possibility of nuclear weapons use when designing and conducting 

exercises involving conflict with nuclear-armed adversaries; 

these threats must be faced head on so military and civilian 

leaders gain valuable experiential learning in this area.

Improve CWMD education for military officers and 

civilian national security professionals with related responsibilities. Many military officers still arrive at CWMD planning 

positions with no or little CWMD background. DOD can 

improve CWMD planning by expanding CWMD training 

and education offerings and making them available earlier in 

officers’ careers.96

Inform the broader public, at home and abroad, about 

the changing nature of the WMD threat and the circumstances necessitating countermeasures like those discussed 

above, particularly as they relate to the politically difficult 

subject of nuclear weapons. The President and senior advisors need to acknowledge regularly and forthrightly the 

essential contribution that nuclear weapons and other elements of military strength make to U.S. and international 

security in the current and foreseeable international security 

environment. At the same time, they need to reiterate that 

the United States is no less committed to its NPT Article VI 

obligations to pursue negotiations toward nuclear disarmament, and show it by continuing to attempt to engage Russia, 

foremost, and other nuclear weapons states, as and when 

appropriate, toward that end. Rebutting the false premise 

that the dangers posed by nuclear weapons can be eliminated 

by simply outlawing these phenomena, as some supporters 

of the Humanitarian Initiative advocate,97 or by disarmament 

by example (unilateral disarmament), is a continuous task 

from which responsible national security leaders must not 

shrink.

Conclusion

Weapons of mass destruction pose diverse, complex, and 

enduring challenges for U.S. and international security. The 

challenges no longer are predominately about preventing 

proliferation; they are again increasingly about deterring and 

responding to the use of WMD. To surmount the most pressing WMD challenges it will face, the next U.S. administration 

will need to invest in the skills and capabilities required to 

deter and manage escalation risks in conventional conflicts 

with nuclear-armed adversaries, especially Russia and China. 

It will need to expand the resources and improve the organization required to meet the countering WMD problem 

posed by North Korea. To hold the line against a resurgence in the proliferation and use of chemical and biological 

weapons, it will need to hold accountable those who violate 

international norms and laws in these areas and to invest 

in acquiring a greater understanding of new and emerging threats and opportunities and how to defeat and exploit 

them, respectively. Finally, to contain regional proliferation 

pressures in the aftermath of the Iran nuclear agreement, the 

next U.S. administration will need to reassure regional partners that together we can keep an aggressive Iran in check 

while incentivizing Tehran to adopt a more responsible and 

moderate position in the region and around the world.

The author is indebted to the following individuals for 

their reviews and insightful comments on earlier drafts of 

this paper: Paul Amato, Paul Bernstein, Seth Carus, Diane 

DiEuliis, James Finch, Nima Gerami, Hunter Hustus, Ralph 

Kerr, Susan Koch, Charles Lutes, Vincent Manzo, Amanda 

Moodie, Robert Peters, Shane Smith, Patrick Terrell, and 

Ling Yung

Notes

1 National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: The White House, February 

2015), 2, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf>. Additionally, the National Military Strategic identifies 

maintaining a secure and effective nuclear deterrent and countering weapons 

of mass destruction (WMD) among the Joint Force Prioritized Missions. See 

National Military Strategy of the United States of America 2015 (Washington, 
12 CSWMD Proceedings November 2016

DC: The Joint Staff, 2015), 11, available at <www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/

Publications/2015_National_Military_Strategy.pdf>.

2 The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review states, “changes in the nuclear threat 

environment have altered the hierarchy of our nuclear concerns and strategic 

objectives. In coming years, we must give top priority to discouraging additional 

countries from acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities and stopping terrorist 

groups from acquiring nuclear bombs or the materials to build them. At the same 

time, we must continue to maintain stable strategic relationships with Russia 

and China and counter threats posed by any emerging nuclear-armed states, 

thereby protecting the United States and our allies and partners against nuclear 

threats or intimidation, and reducing any incentives they might have to seek their 

own nuclear deterrents.” See Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, DC: 

Department of Defense, April 2010), v, available at <www.defense.gov/Portals/1/

features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pdf>. This 

paper, in contrast, argues that subsequent developments have altered the Nuclear 

Posture Review’s assessment and have elevated the importance of deterring limited 

nuclear weapons by state adversaries.

3 For example, see Keir A. Lieber and Daryl G. Press, “The Nukes We Need: 

Preserving the American Deterrent,” Foreign Affairs, November 1, 2009, available 

at <www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2009-11-01/nukes-we-need>.

4 For example, see Christopher Harress, “South China Sea Dispute: Japan 

Spots Armed Chinese Ships Patrolling Senkaku Islands,” International Business 

Times, December 22, 2015, available at <www.ibtimes.com/south-china-sea-dispute-japan-spots-armed-chinese-ships-patrolling-senkaku-islands-2236290>.

5 For example, see Gerry Mullaney and David Barboza, “Vietnam Squares 

Off with China in Disputed Seas,” New York Times, May 7, 2014, available at 

<www.nytimes.com/2014/05/08/world/asia/philippines-detains-crew-of-chinesefishing-vessel.html?_r=0>.

6 For example, see Derek Watkins, “What China Has Been Building in the 

South China Sea,” New York Times, October 27, 2015, available at <www.nytimes.

com/interactive/2015/07/30/world/asia/what-china-has-been-building-in-thesouth-china-sea.html>.

7 For example, Jethro Mullen, “North Korea Warns U.S. It’s Ready to Use 

Nuclear Weapons ‘Any Time,’” CNN.com, September 15, 2015, available at <www.

cnn.com/2015/09/15/asia/north-korea-nuclear-program/>. North Korean military provocations are examined in Ken E. Gause, North Korea’s Provocation and 

Escalation Calculus: Dealing with the Kim Jong-un Regime (Arlington, VA: Center 

for Naval Analyses, August 2015), 4‒14, available at <www.cna.org/CNA_files/

PDF/COP-2015-U-011060.pdf>.

8 For concise discussions of Russia’s and China’s challenge to U.S. dominance, see “Why America’s Military Is Losing Its Edge,” The Economist, June 11, 

2015, available at <www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/06/economist-explains-9>; “The Great Game: America’s Dominance is Being Challenged,” 

The Economist, October 17, 2015, available at <www.economist.com/news/

leaders/21674699-american-dominance-being-challenged-new-game>.

9 Antiaccess/area-denial capabilities include such systems as advanced 

integrated air defense systems, medium-to-intermediate range ballistic and cruise 

missiles, modern attack submarines, antisatellite systems, and cyber warfare 

capabilities. While there is no official Department of Defense (DOD) definition 

of the term, at least as reflected in Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense 

Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, see, for example, Nathan Freier, 

“The Emerging Anti-Access/Area-Denial Challenge,” Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, Washington, DC, May 17, 2012, available at <https://csis.

org/publication/emerging-anti-accessarea-denial-challenge>.

10 Regarding China’s improving military capabilities vis-à-vis the United 

States, see Eric Heginbotham et al., U.S.-China Military Scorecard: Forces, 

Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996‒2017 (Santa Monica, CA: 

RAND, 2015), available at <www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_

reports/RR300/RR392/RAND_RR392.pdf>. On Russia’s military improvements, see Stephen J. Blank, “Imperial Ambitions: Russia’s Military Buildup,” 

World Affairs, May/June 2015, available at <www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/

imperial-ambitions-russia%E2%80%99s-military-buildup>.

11 See, for example, Elbridge Colby, “America Must Prepare for Limited 

War,” The National Interest, November‒December 2015, available at <http://nationalinterest.org/print/feature/america-must-prepare-limited-war-14104>.

12 Indeed, strikes against the Chinese mainland are associated with what 

used to be known as the U.S. AirSea Battle concept of operations for conflict 

with China, as described in Jan Van Tol, AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure 

Operational Concept (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary 

Assessments, 2010), available at <http://csbaonline.org/publications/2010/05/

airsea-battle-concept/>. It also is one of the aspects of the concept critiqued in 

T.X. Hammes, “Sorry, Air Sea Battle is No Strategy, War on the Rocks, August 7, 

2013, available at <http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/sorry-airsea-battleno-strategy-8846>. In January 2015 the AirSea Battle concept was renamed the 

Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons. See memorandum from Lieutenant General David L. Goldstein, director, Joint Staff, Subject: 

Joint Concept for Access and Maneuver in the Global Commons, DSJM 0009-14, 

January 8, 2015, available in redacted form at <http://news.usni.org/2015/01/20/

document-air-sea-battle-name-change-memo>.

13 Phillip C. Saunders, “China’s Nuclear Forces and Strategy,” testimony 

before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Hearing on 

“Developments in China’s Cyber and Nuclear Capabilities,” March 26, 2012, 4‒5, 

available at <www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/3.26.12saunders.pdf>.

14 Nikolai N. Sokov, “Why Russia Calls a Limited Nuclear Strike 

‘De-escalation,’” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 13, 2014, available at 

<http://thebulletin.org/why-russia-calls-limited-nuclear-strike-de-escalation>.

15 “The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in 

response to use against it and (or) its allies of nuclear and other weapons of mass 

destruction, as well as in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation 

with the use of conventional weapons, when under threat [to] the very existence 

of the state.” See Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation, 2014, Section II, 

paragraph 27, available at <www.scribd.com/doc/251695098/Russia-s-2014-

Military-Doctrine#scribd>. Russia’s reliance on nuclear weapons to offset the 

conventional military superiority that the United States and its North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies now enjoy is not unlike the United States and 

NATO’s reliance on nuclear weapons during the Cold War to counter the assessed 

conventional military superiority of the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. 

Until circumscribed in 2010, it was also U.S. policy to reserve the right to use 

nuclear weapons against those who might employ chemical and biological as well 

as nuclear weapons against the United States and its allies. Current U.S. policy is 

to “only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend 

the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners” and to “not use or 

threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party 

to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations.” See 

Nuclear Posture Review Report, vii‒ix.

Despite the broad areas of overlap between current Russian policy and 

the earlier U.S. one, there are important differences. Russia in recent years has 

explicitly threatened other nations with nuclear weapons in evident attempts to 

intimidate and coerce them (see following note), whereas the United States and its 

NATO Allies have issued no comparable threats and indeed have been generally 

reluctant to discuss the use of nuclear weapons at all. Russia also identifies NATO 

as its main external danger (Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation), and has 

been unwilling to negotiate mutual reductions in nonstrategic nuclear weapons 

(see Amy E. Woolf, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, RL32572 (Washington, DC: 

Congressional Research Service, February 23, 2015), 34‒37, available at <https://

www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf>). In contrast, NATO policy emphasizes 

that it considers no country to be its adversary, that it views the circumstances 

that would merit nuclear weapons use as extremely remote, and that it contemplates reducing the number of the Alliance’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons. See 

Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (Brussels: NATO, May 20, 2012), available 

at <www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_87597.htm>. Russia’s caveat that 
November 2016 CSWMD Proceedings 13

it would use nuclear weapons against conventional aggression only when such 

aggression threatens the very existence of the Russian state also may be less reassuring then it sounds given that some observers believe that the Putin regime 

equates its regime survival with the survival of the state. As such, any conventional 

aggression that imperils the Putin regime, which may include its impending defeat 

in a regional war of its own making if such defeat undermined popular Russian 

support for the regime, could justify the regime’s resort to nuclear weapons. See 

Kroenig, The Renewed Russian Nuclear Threat and NATO Nuclear Deterrence 

Posture, Issue Brief (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, February 2016), 2; Paul 

Bernstein and Deborah Ball, “Putin’s Russia and U.S. Defense Strategy,” workshop 

report on same subject held at National Defense University, August 19‒20, 2015, 

5, available at <http://inss.ndu.edu/Portals/82/Documents/conference-reports/

Putins-Russia-and-US-Defense-Strategy.pdf>.

16 For example, see “NATO Chief Says Russian Nuclear Threats Are ‘Deeply 

Troubling and Dangerous,’” The Guardian, May 27, 2015, available at <www.

theguardian.com/world/2015/may/28/nato-chief-says-russian-nuclear-threats-aredeeply-troubling-and-dangerous>; Adam Withnall, “Russia Threatens Denmark 

with Nuclear Weapons If It Tries to Join NATO Defence Shield,” Independent

(London), March 22, 2015, available at <www.independent.co.uk/news/world/

europe/russia-threatens-denmark-with-nuclear-weapons-if-it-tries-to-join-natodefence-shield-10125529.html>.

17 Russia possesses approximately 2,000 nonstrategic nuclear weapons, spanning antiballistic missile, short-range ballistic missile, ground-launched cruise 

missile, and a variety of naval systems. All Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons 

reportedly are in storage. See Hans S. Kristensen and Robert S. Morris, “U.S. 

Nuclear Forces, 2015,” 115, available at <http://bos.sagepub.com/content/71/2/107.

full.pdf+html>; “Russia Nuclear Forces, 2015,” 1‒2, available at <http://bos.sagepub.com/content/early/2015/04/13/0096340215581363.full.pdf+html>. While the 

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists reflects all of Russia’s nonstrategic nuclear weapons 

in storage, the Congressional Research Service notes that the status of nonstrategic 

nuclear weapons in Russia is uncertain. It notes that some estimates put the number of active Russian nuclear warheads assigned to nonstrategic delivery vehicles at 

2,000. See Woolf, Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons, 12).

18 “Iskander Tactical Ballistic Missile System, Russia,” Army-Technology.

com, available at <www.army-technology.com/projects/iksander-system/iksandersystem2.html>.

19 For a discussion of the problems that Russia’s modern integrated air defense systems pose for fourth-generation aircraft, see 

David Majumdar, “American F-22s and B-2s Bombers vs. Russia’s 

S-300 in Syria: Who Wins?” The National Interest, September 

22, 2015, available at <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/

american-f-22s-b-2-bombers-vs-russias-s-300-syria-who-wins-13905>.

20 Current NATO dual-capable aircraft are scheduled for retirement in 

the 2020s; see Rachel Oswald, “U.S. Tactical Nuclear Arms Mission Could Shift 

Among NATO Jets,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, March 26, 2014, available at 

<www.nti.org/gsn/article/aircraft-could-be-given-nato-tactical-nuclear-armsmission/>. The U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) aims to 

have the first production unit of the refurbished B61 gravity bomb ready by the 

end of fiscal year 2020. See NNSA, “Life Extension Programs,” December 23, 

2015, available at <http://nnsa.energy.gov/ourmission/managingthestockpile/

lifeextensionprograms>.

21 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet 

Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and ShorterRange Missiles, signed at Washington, DC, December 8, 1987, Articles I, II, available at <www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm#text>.

22 “Iskander Tactical Ballistic Missile System, Russia.”

23 Rod Lyon, “The Great Nuclear Guessing Game: Ha”s 

Russia Violated the INF Treaty?” The National Interest, September 

25, 2015, available at <www.nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/

the-great-nuclear-guessing-game-has-russia-violated-the-inf-13936>.

24 Interfax, interview with Rose Gottemoeller, U.S. Under Secretary of State 

for Arms Control and International Security, June 23, 2015, available at <www.

interfax.com/interview.asp?id=600960>.

25 Amy F. Woolf, Russian Compliance with the Intermediate Range Nuclear 

Forces (INF) Treaty: Background and Issues for Congress, R43832 (Washington, DC: 

Congressional Research Service, October 13, 2015), 5‒8, 16‒18, available at <www.

fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R43832.pdf>.

26 Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015 (Washington, DC: Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, 2015), 34–35, available at <www.defense.gov/Portals/1/

Documents/pubs/2015_China_Military_Power_Report.pdf>.

27 Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2016 (Washington, DC: Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, 2016), 25, available at <www.defense.gov/Portals/1/

Documents/pubs/2016%20China%20Military%20Power%20Report.pdf>.

28 Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments 

Involving the People’s Republic of China 2015, 32.

29 Saunders, 1.

30 For example, see Daniel Blumenthal and Michael Mazza, “Why 

China May Want More Nuclear Weapons,” American Enterprise Institute, 

Washington, DC, April 6, 2011, available at <www.aei.org/publication/

why-china-may-want-more-nuclear-weapons/>.

31 See, for example, Institute for International Security Studies (IISS), 

North Korean Security Challenges: A Net Assessment (London: IISS, July 21, 

2011), chapters 3, 5, 6, available at <www.iiss.org/en/publications/strategic%20

dossiers/issues/north-korean-security-challenges-4a8d>; Military and Security 

Developments Involving the Democratic Republic of Korea (Washington, DC: Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, 2015), 9,10, 13, 14, 21, available at <www.defense.gov/

Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Military_and_Security_Developments_Involving_the_

Democratic_Peoples_Republic_of_Korea_2015.PDF>; Van Jackson, “Preparing for 

the Next Korean War,” The Diplomat, August 24, 2015, available at <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/preparing-for-the-next-korean-war/>.

32 Shane Smith, North Korea’s Evolving Nuclear Strategy, North Korea 

Nuclear Futures Series (Baltimore, MD: U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, August 

2015), 7, available at <http://38north.org/2015/08/nukefuture082415/>.

33 For a discussion of the risks of a limited conflict with North Korea, see 

Jackson. For a discussion of the risks of a collapse of the North Korean regime, see 

Robert D. Kaplan and Abraham M. Denmark, “The Long Good-Bye: The Future of 

North Korea,” World Affairs, May/June 2011, available at <www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/long-goodbye-future-north-korea>.

34 The 2014 Strategy for Countering WMD defines countering WMD as 

“efforts against actors of concern to curtail the conceptualization, development, 

possession, proliferation, use and effects of WMD, related expertise, materials, 

technologies, and means of delivery.” See Strategy for Countering Weapons of Mass 

Destruction (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 2014), 17, available 

at <http://archive.defense.gov/pubs/DoD_Strategy_for_Countering_Weapons_

of_Mass_Destruction_dated_June_2014.pdf>. This is a separate DOD mission 

from the nuclear one, wherein a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent force 

is maintained to deter strategic attacks against the United States and to assure its 

allies (U.S. Strategic Command Web site, “About/Missions & Priorities,” available 

at <www.stratcom.mil/mission/>). Another way to state the difference between 

the missions is that countering WMD is what we do about other’s WMD, while 

the nuclear mission is what we do with our own nuclear forces. Clearly there is 

some overlap in that U.S. nuclear forces primarily deter others’ use of their nuclear 

weapons against the United States and its allies. U.S. Strategic Command currently 

has responsibility for both of these DOD missions.

35 Smith. The estimate of the number of nuclear weapons that North Korea 

possesses varies with assumptions about how much fissile material it has produced 

and the designs of its weapons.

36 James R. Clapper, “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence 

Community,” Statement for the Record before the Senate Armed Services 
14 CSWMD Proceedings November 2016

Community, February 26, 2015, 6, available at <www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/testimonies/209-congressional-testimonies-2015/1174-statement-for-therecord-worldwide-threat-assessment-of-the-u-s-ic-before-the-sasc>.

37 2014 Defense White Paper (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 

2014), 32, available at <www.mnd.go.kr/user/mnd_eng/upload/pblictn/

PBLICTNEBOOK_201506161156164570.pdf>. The U.S. Department of State 

also judges that Pyongyang may still consider the use of biological weapons as 

an option, even though it is a state party to the Biological Weapons Convention 

(BWC). The State Department further notes that North Korea has a longstanding biological weapons (BW) capability and biotechnology infrastructure that 

could support a BW program, although the United States does not possess definitive information to support a finding of North Korean noncompliance with 

the BWC. See 2015 Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, 

Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments (Washington, 

DC: Department of State, June 5, 2015, Part III, “North Korea,” available at <www.

state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/2015/243224.htm#North%20Korea>.

38 Bruce Bennett has estimated the existence of 200 or so WMD sites in 

North Korea. See Bruce W Bennett, Preparing for the Possibility of a North Korean 

Collapse (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2013), 99, available at <www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR331/RAND_RR331.pdf>.

39 For an expanded discussion of the challenges of WMD elimination operations in North Korea and ways of responding to them, see Robert J. 

Peters, The WMD Challenges Posed by a Collapse of North Korea (Baltimore, 

MD: U.S.-Korea Institute at SAIS, April 14, 2015), available at <http://38north.

org/2015/04/rpeters041415/>; Scott Daulton and Bill Shavce, “The Challenge of 

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Korean Peninsula,” Military 

Review, November‒December 2014, available at <http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/

MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_20141231_art011.pdf>.

40 It is worth noting that U.S. forces’ capability to fight through large-scale 

chemical and biological attacks is a matter of conjecture, based on simulations and 

noncombat testing, since U.S. forces have not encountered any such attacks since 

World War I.

41 For example, see Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “No Longer Unthinkable: 

Should US Ready for ‘Limited’ Nuclear War?” BreakingDefense.com, 

May 30, 2013, available at <http://breakingdefense.com/2013/05/

no-longer-unthinkable-should-us-ready-for-limited-nuclear-war/2/>.

42 The BWC entered into force on March 26, 1975, and the Chemical 

Weapons Convention (CWC) entered into force on April 29, 1997. Only three 

states currently remain outside the CWC: Egypt, North Korea, and South Sudan. 

Israel signed the convention in 1993 but has never ratified it. Angola, Myanmar, 

and Syria joined within the last 3 years. Fourteen states remain outside the BWC: 

Angola, Chad, Comoros, Djibouti, Eritrea, Guinea, Israel, Kiribati, Micronesia, 

Namibia, Niue, Samoa, South Sudan, and Tuvalu. Myanmar and Andorra are the 

most recent state parties, joining in December 2014 and March 2015, respectively. See Arms Control Association, Fact Sheets and Briefs, “Chemical Weapons 

Convention Signatories and States-Parties,” available at <www.armscontrol.org/

factsheets/cwcsig>; “Biological Weapons Convention Signatories and StatesParties,” available at <www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/bwcsig>; United Nations 

Office for Disarmament Affairs, “The Biological Weapons Convention, Status 

and Text of the Treaty,” available at <http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/bwc>; 

Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, “Note by the Technical 

Secretariat, Status of Participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention as at 17 

October 2015,” available at <www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/S_series/2015/en/s1315-2015_e_.pdf>.

43 Syria, however, had acceded in December 1968 to the Protocol for the 

Prohibition of the Use in War of Asphyxiating, Poisonous, or Other Gases, and of 

Bacteriological Methods of Warfare (also known as the 1925 Geneva Protocol). 

United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs, Treaties Database, available at 

<http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/1925>. As such, Syria’s use of sarin in 

2012‒2013 violated its obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

44 The White House, “Government Assessment of the Syrian Government’s 

Use of Chemical Weapons on August 21, 2013,” press release, August 30, 

2013, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/08/30/

government-assessment-syrian-government-s-use-chemical-weapons-august-21>.

45 Ibid. Estimates of the number of fatalities range from the low hundreds 

to more than 1,400. On August 30, 2013, the White House claimed 1,429 deaths 

resulted from Syria’s use of sarin. On August 29, 2013, the Chairman of the 

British government Joint Intelligence Committee report referred to “at least 350 

fatalities.” See United Kingdom Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, 

“Syria: Reported Chemical Weapons Use,” August 29, 2013, available at <www.

gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/235094/

Jp_115_JD_PM_Syria_Reported_Chemical_Weapon_Use_with_annex.pdf>. 

The term hundreds of deaths is used in a Human Rights Watch report from 

September 2013. See Human Rights Watch, “Attacks on Ghouta,” September 

10, 2013, available at <www.hrw.org/report/2013/09/10/attacks-ghouta/

analysis-alleged-use-chemical-weapons-syria>.

46 See Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), 

“Syrian Chemical Destruction Data as of 27 July 2015,” available at <www.opcw.

org/special-sections/syria/destruction-statistics/>.

47 OPCW, “Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding 

Alleged Incidents in the Idlib Governorate of the Syria Arab Republic between 16 

March and 20 May 2015,” S/1319/2015, October 29, 2015.

48 Theodore Schleifer, “Kerry: Syrian Regime ‘Absolutely’ Used Chlorine 

in Attacks,” CNN.com, June 17, 2015, available at <www.cnn.com/2015/06/16/

politics/john-kerry-syrian-chemical-weapons-chlorine/>. Numerous eyewitness 

accounts indicate that the weapons were delivered by helicopters, which the Syrian 

regime possesses but not by the rebels it is fighting. See, for example, OPCW, 

“Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria,” annex 2.

49 Inaccurate media reports have given rise to the fallacy that Syria’s use 

of chlorine as a weapon of war is not prohibited by the CWC. The likely basis 

of these reports is the fact that chlorine is not listed on the CWC’s Schedules of 

Chemicals. However, the schedules were drawn up during the negotiation of the 

CWC to inform the convention’s monitoring and verification efforts and focused 

on the types of chemical warfare agents known to be in military arsenals of the 

time. Though chlorine was the chemical released in the first successful, large-scale 

chemical attack of the modern age—by Germany in the 1915 World War I Battle of 

Ypres—the world’s militaries had long moved on to more potent agents optimized 

for warfare purposes, such as phosgene, sulfur mustard, sarin, and VX. Chlorine 

came to be viewed as a toxic industrial chemical widely used for commercial purposes rather than a chemical warfare agent. But that does not exempt it from the 

CWC’s prohibition on chemical weapons, which is defined as applying to any toxic 

chemical used as a method of warfare. Syria’s use of chlorine as a weapon of war 

unequivocally is a violation of its CWC obligations.

50 Per The Economist, “the last precise death toll published by the [United 

Nations] was 191,369 in August 2014, followed by an estimate of more than 

250,000 in August 2015. But it then stopped updating the figure because of 

dwindling sources of good information. On February 11 the Syrian Centre for 

Policy Research, a nonprofit group, claimed that the true figure is now almost 

double that estimate at about 470,000.” See “Quantifying Carnage,” The Economist, 

February 20, 2016, available at <www.economist.com/news/middle-east-andafrica/21693279-how-many-people-has-syrias-civil-war-killed-quantifyingcarnage>.

51 United Nations, “Security Council Unanimously Adopts Resolution 2235 

(2015), Establishing Mechanism to Identify Perpetrators Using Chemical Weapons 

in Syria,” SC/12001, August 7, 2015, available at <www.un.org/press/en/2015/

sc12001.doc.htm>. Russia insisted at the time that, if the Joint Investigative 

Mechanism attributes the attacks to the Syrian regime, another United Nations 

Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) would be required to authorize any punitive action. If Russia and others block adoption of such a UNSCR, the United 

States and its allies will need to determine whether the situation merits taking 

action on their own.
November 2016 CSWMD Proceedings 15

52 United Nations, “Joint Investigative Mechanism Presents Its Third Report 

to Security Council,” DC/3651, August 30, 2016, available at <www.un.org/press/

en/2016/dc3651.doc.htm.>

53 Stephen Hummel, “The Islamic State and WMD: Assessing the Future 

Threat,” CTC Sentinel 9, no. 1 (January 2016), 18–22, available at <www.ctc.

usma.edu/v2/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/CTC-SENTINEL-Vol9Iss13.

pdf>. Also see Beatrix Immenkamp, ISIL/Da’esh and “Non-Conventional” 

Weapons of Terror (London: European Parliamentary Research Service, 

2015), available at <www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document.

html?reference=EPRS_BRI(2015)572806>.

54 United Nations, “Joint Investigative Mechanism.”

55 The Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) “confirmed with utmost confidence” 

that two individuals in Syria suffered exposure to sulfur mustard and concluded 

that it was “very likely” that a baby also died from exposure to that chemical. See 

OPCW, “Report of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria Regarding Alleged 

Incidents in Marea, Syrian Arab Republic, August 2015,” S/1320/2015, October 29, 

2015. Consistent with its mandate, the FFM did not attempt to ascribe responsibility for the attack, but media reports suggested the Islamic State of Iraq and the 

Levant (ISIL).

56 For example, see Hummel, 18‒22; Robert Windrem and Tracy 

Connor, “Could ISIS Strike the West with Chemical Weapons?” NBC News, 

November 19, 2015, available at <www.nbcnews.com/storyline/isis-terror/

could-isis-strike-west-chemical-weapons-n466431>.

57 ISIL claimed responsibility for the March 2016 terror attacks in Brussels, 

Belgium. See Kim Hjelmgaard, Delphine Reuter, and John Bacon, “Islamic State 

Claims Responsibility for Brussels Attack That Killed Dozens,” USA Today, March 

23, 2016, available at <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2016/03/22/

explosions-rock-brussels-airport/82107254/>; for the November 2015 attacks in 

Paris, see Rukmini Callimachi, “ISIS Claims Responsibility, Calling Paris Attacks 

‘First of the Storm,’” New York Times, November 14, 2015, available at <www.

nytimes.com/2015/11/15/world/europe/isis-claims-responsibility-for-parisattacks-calling-them-miracles.html>.

58 In November 2015, as French Prime Minister Manuel Valls observed, 

“’Terrorism hit France not because of what it is doing in Iraq and Syria . . . but 

for what it is. We know that there could also be a risk of chemical or biological weapons.” See Hamza Hendawi, Qassim Abdul-Zahra, and Ken Dilanian, 

“Officials: Islamic State Determined to Produce Chemical Weapons,” Associated 

Press, November 19, 2015, available at <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/b6c721d1beb34b989bf46aa101cf361a/iraqi-us-officials-working-produce-chemicalweapons>. In December 2015 the European Parliamentary Research Service wrote, 

“the European Union and its Members States must prepare for the possibility of a 

chemical or biological attack on their territory by the self-styled ‘Islamic State’ in 

Iraq and the Levant.” See Immenkamp, 1.

59 Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, Al Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype 

or Reality? (Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 

January 2010), available at <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/publication/19852/

al_qaeda_weapons_of_mass_destruction_threat.html>.

60 Harald Doornbus and Jenan Moussa, “Found: The Islamic State’s Terror 

Laptop of Doom,” Foreign Policy, August 28, 2014, available at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/08/28/found-the-islamic-states-terror-laptop-of-doom/>.

61 Vladimir Putin, “Being Strong: National Security Guarantees for Russia,” 

Rossiiskaya Gazeta, February 20, 2012, available at <http://archive.premier.gov.ru/

eng/events/news/18185//>.

62 “Chemical and Biological Weapons: The Poor Man’s Atom Bomb,” North 

Atlantic Assembly, International Secretariat, AN 253, STC (96) 8, Lord Lyell, 

General Rapporteur, October 4, 1996, table 1, available at <http://fas.org/irp/

threat/an253stc.htm>.

63 John P. Caves, Jr., and W. Seth Carus, The Future of Weapons of Mass 

Destruction, Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction Occasional 

Paper 10 (Washington, DC: NDU Press, June 2014), 27, available at <http://wmdcenter.dodlive.mil/files/2014/07/CSWMD_OccationalPaper-10.pdf>.

64 Ibid., 27‒28.

65 See, for example, Andrew Hessel, March Goodman, and Steven Miller, 

“Hacking the President’s DNA,” The Atlantic, November 2012, available at 

<www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2012/11/hacking-the-presidentsdna/309147/?single_page=true>; Gigi K. Gronvall, Mitigating the Risks of Synthetic 

Biology, CFR Discussion Paper (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2015), 

available at <www.cfr.org/health/mitigating-risks-synthetic-biology/p36097>; 

Laurie Garrett, “Biology’s Brave New World,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 6 (December 

2013), 28–46.

66 For a discussion of the limitations of and possibilities for achieving a 

“rapid and nimble” medical countermeasures capability for infectious disease, 

see Theresa Wizemann, Megan Reeve Snair, and Jack Herrmann, Rapid Medical 

Countermeasure Response to Infectious Diseases: Enabling Sustainable Capabilities 

Through Ongoing Public- and Private-Sector Partnerships: Workshop Summary 

(Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 2015), available at <http://www.nap.

edu/catalog/21809>.

67 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), Vienna, Austria, July 14, 

2015, available at <www.state.gov/e/eb/tfs/spi/iran/jcpoa/>.

68 See, for example, Mark Dubowitz, congressional testimony, “Hearing 

before the U.S. House Committee on Foreign Affairs,” Washington, DC, July 

23, 2015; Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), The Joint 

Comprehensive Plan of Action “Kicks the Can Down the Road”: How to Prepare for 

the Day When the Can Finally Lands (Washington, DC: ISIS, July 22, 2015); Eliot 

Cohen, Eric Edelman, and Ray Takeyh, “Time to Get Tough on Tehran: Iran Policy 

After the Deal,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2016, 65.

69 For a discussion of the verification challenges of the JPCOA, see, for 

example, David Albright, testimony for the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 

“Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JPCOA): Non-Proliferation, Inspections, 

and Nuclear Constraints,” August 4, 2015, 9‒14, available at <www.foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/080415_Albright_Testimony.pdf>; Ollie Heinonen, 

Strengthening the Verification and Implementation of the Joint Comprehensive 

Plan of Action (Washington, DC: Foundation for Defense of Democracies 

Press, November 25, 2015), available at <www.defenddemocracy.org/media-hit/

strengthening-the-verification-and-implementation-of-the-joint-comprehensiv/>.

70 Kenneth M. Pollack, “Regional Implications of a Nuclear 

Agreement with Iran,” testimony before the House Committee on Foreign 

Affairs, July 9, 2015, 7, available at <www.brookings.edu/research/

testimony/2015/07/09-pollack-iran-nuclear-agreement>.

71 World Nuclear Association, “Emerging Nuclear Energy Countries,” updated December 2015, available at <www.world-nuclear.org/info/Country-Profiles/

Others/Emerging-Nuclear-Energy-Countries/>.

72 Saudi Arabia conceivably could attempt to purchase nuclear weapons 

or seek some form of extended nuclear deterrence commitment from Pakistan. 

Pakistan has a longstanding defense cooperation relationship with Saudi Arabia, 

and Pakistan’s nuclear weapons development program benefited from Saudi support. See Feroz Hassan Khan, Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012), 172, 280, 363. A discussion on one 

possible manifestation of a Pakistani extended nuclear deterrence commitment to 

Saudi Arabia is discussed in Kenneth M. Pollack, “U.S. Policy Toward the Middle 

East after the Iranian Nuclear Agreement,” testimony before the Senate Committee 

on Foreign Relations, August 5, 2015, 9, available at <www.brookings.edu/

research/testimony/2015/08/05-us-policy-iran-nuclear-deal-pollack>.

73 For example, see ibid., 3. Pollack considers it more likely that Iran does 

not change its regional strategy as a result of the nuclear agreement, but believes 

other courses, like the one discussed here, are possible.

74 Ben Hubbard, “Arab World Split Over Iran Nuclear Deal,” New York 

Times, July 14, 2015, available at <www.nytimes.com/2015/07/15/world/middleeast/iran-nuclear-deal-provokes-sharp-reactions-across-the-arab-world.html>.

75 For example, see Payam Mohseni, “Introduction: Views from the Arab 

World and Iranian Politics Post-Nuclear Detail,” in Iran and the Arab World after 

the Nuclear Deal: Rivalry and Engagement in a New Era, ed. Payam Mohseni 
16 CSWMD Proceedings November 2016

(Cambridge: The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, August 2015), 

8‒9, available at <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/Impact%20on%20

Arab%20World%20-%20Web.pdf>. The local observers on regional implications 

of the nuclear agreement generally believe that the short-term increase in tensions 

could give way to a longer term improvement.

76 For example, see ibid., 9‒10; Pollack, “U.S. Policy Toward the Middle 

East,” 4‒5.

77 Peter Baker, “In Congress, Netanyahu Faults ‘Bad Deal’ on Iran 

Nuclear Program,” New York Times, March 3, 2015, available at <www.nytimes.

com/2015/03/04/world/middleeast/netanyahu-congress-iran-israel-speech.

html?_r=0>.

78 According to a Deputy Secretary of Defense statement in 2014, 

this is supposed to occur by 2020. See Cheryl Pellerin, “Budget Constraints 

Won’t Halt Asia-Pacific Rebalance, Work Says,” DoD News, October 1, 

2014, available at <www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/603364/

budget-constraints-wont-halt-asia-pacific-rebalance-work-says>.

79 Third Offset strategy refers to a DOD initiative to identify and exploit new 

capabilities to preserve U.S. military technological advantages over its most capable adversaries as they “catch up” to current U.S. capabilities. Deputy Secretary of 

Defense Robert Work has described it as “new combinations of technologies, operational concepts, and organizational constructs to once again bolster a weakened 

conventional deterrence.” See “The Third Offset Strategy and America’s Allies and 

Partners,” prepared remarks by Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work at Royal 

United Services Institute, London, September 10, 2015, available at <https://rusi.

org/event/robert-work-united-states-deputy-secretary-defense-third-offset-strategy-and-americas-allies>. Deputy Secretary Work later identified five technological 

focuses for Third Offset investments: learning machines, human-machine collaboration, assisted-human operations, advanced manned and unmanned combat 

teaming, and network-enabled autonomous weapons that are hardened for cyber 

attack and electronic-warfare environments. See Jason Sherman, “DoD Unveils 

Technology Areas That Will Drive ‘Third Offset’ Investments,” InsideDefense.com, 

December 9, 2015, available at <http://nges.insidedefense.com/inside-pentagon/

dod-unveils-technology-areas-will-drive-third-offset-investments>.

80 The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that the Obama administration’s plans for nuclear forces—including the cost to field, operate, maintain, 

and modernize—would cost $348 billion over the 2015–2024 period or about 5–6 

percent of the administration’s plans for national defense. See CBO, Projected Costs 

of U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2015 to 2024 (Washington, DC: CBO, January 22, 2015), 3, 

available at <www.cbo.gov/publication/49870>. A report estimated that the United 

States plans to spend approximately $1 trillion over the next 30 years on maintaining and modernizing its nuclear forces. See Jon B. Wolfsthal, Jeffrey Lewis, and 

Marc Quint, The U.S. Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad (Monterey, CA: James Martin 

Center for Nonproliferation Studies, January 2014), 4, available at <www.nonproliferation.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/140107_trillion_dollar_nuclear_triad.

pdf>. Modernization costs will peak in the latter 2020s and early 2030s. In April 

2016 Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter stated, “We expect the total cost of 

nuclear modernization to be in the range of $350–$450 billion. Although this still 

presents an enormous affordability challenge for DOD, we believe it must be funded. Previous modernizations of America’s strategic deterrent and nuclear security 

enterprise were accomplished by topline increases to avoid having to make drastic 

reductions to conventional forces, and it would be prudent to do so again.” See 

Secretary Carter, “Submitted Statement—Senate Appropriations Committee–

Defense (FY 2017 Budget Request),” Washington, DC, April 27, 2016, available at 

<www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-View/Article/744066/submitted-statement-senate-appropriations-committee-defense-fy-2017-budget-requ>.

81 The U.S. nuclear force has been the foundation of national security as 

long as adversaries have possessed nuclear weapons. It is not only the primary 

and irreplaceable means by which the United States deters a potentially existential 

attack, but it also underpins extended deterrence commitments to major allies. 

Some have asserted that the United States cannot afford the planned modernization of its nuclear force and advocated various cost-savings measures, including 

reducing the number of delivery platforms and warheads, eliminating the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) or bomber legs of the triad, and canceling the 

development of the long-range standoff cruise missile. See, for example, James E. 

Doyle, “Better Ways to Modernize the U.S. Nuclear Arsenal,” Survival 58, no. 4 

(August–September 2016), 27–50; Tom Z. Collina et al., The Unaffordable Arsenal: 

Reducing the Costs of the Bloated U.S. Nuclear Stockpile (Washington, DC: Arms 

Control Association, October 2014), available at <www.armscontrol.org/files/

The-Unaffordable-Arsenal-2014.pdf>; and Global Zero, Modernizing U.S. Nuclear 

Strategy, Force Structure and Posture (Washington, DC: Global Zero, May 2012), 

available at <www.globalzero.org/files/gz_us_nuclear_policy_commission_report.

pdf>. Reducing the number of warheads and delivery platforms within the triad 

force may have merit, but only as part of mutual, binding, and verifiable reductions with Russia that preserve or strengthen strategic stability. The United States 

has declared its willingness to pursue further reductions, but Russia has not 

taken up the offer. See “Remarks by President Obama at the Brandenburg Gate—

Berlin, Germany,” June 19, 2013, available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/06/19/remarks-president-obama-brandenburg-gate-berlin-germany>. 

Unilateral reductions, especially given an aggressive Russia that is deploying 

multiple new nuclear weapons systems and issuing explicit nuclear threats, would 

weaken deterrence. Discarding any leg of the U.S. triad would be highly risky 

as each has attributes that complement the others and together ensure that no 

rational adversary could calculate, on the basis of capabilities (leaving aside questions of will), that it could successfully execute a disarming first strike against the 

United States or use limited nuclear strikes to decisive effect in a regional conflict. 

The latter consideration is particularly pertinent to bombers and their associated 

nuclear weapons (standoff cruise missiles and gravity bombs) as these capabilities provide less escalatory and more credible options to respond to an adversary’s 

limited employment of nuclear weapons than those afforded by higher yield 

weapons delivered by ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Both 

standoff cruise missiles and gravity bombs deliverable by penetrating bombers are 

needed to complicate sufficiently the air defense challenge of sophisticated allies 

with increasingly effective integrated air defense systems. As long as alliances and 

extended deterrence commitments remain central to U.S. national security strategy, the United States will require an effective nuclear bomber force.

82 A recent DOD Inspector General (DODIG) investigation found, inter 

alia, that theater nuclear planning expertise has not been maintained and that 

there is no resident expertise on integrated theater nuclear planning at any of 

the geographic combatant commands (GCCMD). The Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs of Staff and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy agreed with the DODIG 

recommendation that they update policy documents and provide oversight of 

the capability to integrate nuclear options into conventional plans. They also 

agreed with the DODIG that applicable GCCMD commanders should develop 

nuclear planning capabilities and processes and exercise those plans. See DODIG, 

“(U) Assessment of the U.S. Theater Nuclear Planning Process, (Report No. 

DODIG-20150134), June 18, 2015”; Information memo from John T. Rymer, 

Inspector General, DOD, to Secretary of Defense, Subject: “(U) Release of 

Inspector General Report, ‘Assessment of the U.S. Theater Nuclear Planning 

Process, dated June 18, 2015.’” These are classified documents; only excerpts specifically marked unclassified are reflected in this paper.

 “Gulf Leaders Back Out of Camp David Summit in ‘Snub’ to Obama,” BBC.

com, May 12, 2015, available at <www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32694184>.

83 See, for example, Colby.

84 In March 2016 the U.S. military conducted airstrikes against ISIL chemical weapons–related targets based on information obtained by a senior ISIS 

detainee. Barbara Starr, “U.S.: ISIS Detainee Providing Information on Chemical 

Weapons,” CNN.com, March 9, 2016, available at <www.cnn.com/2016/03/09/

politics/u-s-isis-detainee-providing-crucial-information-on-chemical-weapons/>.

85 BBC.

86 The White House, “U.S.-Gulf Cooperation Council 

Camp David Joint Statement,” press release, May 14, 2015, 
November 2016 CSWMD Proceedings 17

available at <www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/05/14/

us-gulf-cooperation-council-camp-david-joint-statement>.

87 Nicole Gaouette and Tony Capaccio, “U.S. Offers Billions in Arms to Ease 

Mideast’s Iran Anxiety,” Bloomberg.com, July 9, 2015, available at <www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-07-09/u-s-offers-billions-in-arms-to-ease-mideast-siran-deal-anxiety>.

88 Michael Bowman, “U.S., Israel Sign Record Military Aid Agreement,” 

Voice of America, September 14, 2016, available at <www.voanews.com/a/usisrael-military-aid-agreement/3509463.html>.

89 It would be a much bigger step for the United States to explicitly extend its 

nuclear umbrella to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners. It also may not be 

politically saleable to the U.S. Congress or broader public given that GCC partners 

are not treaty allies, unlike other states that enjoy the explicit protection of the 

U.S. nuclear umbrella, and given the connection that a significant segment of the 

U.S. population seems to draw between Muslims generally and terrorism, as highlighted in the 2016 Presidential primary season. Others may object to the United 

States adding to its international security obligations at a time when the country 

already is stretched by security challenges in Eastern Europe and East Asia, as well 

as in the Middle East and South Asia.

90 In the 1990s the U.S. Government seconded Department of Energy 

employees to the International Atomic Energy Agency to support South African 

elimination operations as well as the United Nations Special Commission in Iraq.

91 For a discussion of why China would not cooperate with the United 

States and South Korea concerning a North Korean contingency, see Yun Sun, The 

North Korean Contingency: Why China Will Not Cooperate (Baltimore, MD: U.S.-

Korea Institute at SAIS, July 25, 2014), available at <http://38north.org/2014/07/

ysun072514/>.

92 The value of engaging China about cooperation in the event of North 

Korean contingencies has been widely recognized. For example, see North 

Korea Contingency Planning and U.S.-ROK Cooperation (Washington, DC: Asia 

Foundation, September 2009), available at <https://asiafoundation.org/resources/

pdfs/DPRKContingencyCUSKP0908.pdf>; Paul B. Stares et al., Instability in North 

Korea and Its Impact on U.S.-China Relations (New York: Council on Foreign 

Relations, 2011), 18‒24, available at <www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/managinginstability-chinas-periphery/p25838>. The United States has sought to do so in 

both official (Track I) and unofficial (Track II) channels, but China largely has 

been unresponsive. For example, see “U.S.-China Discuss North Korean Collapse 

Possibility,” Global Security Newswire, January 13, 2014, available at <www.nti.org/

gsn/article/us-china-discussed-regime-collapse-north-korea-years-ago/>.

93 This was a significant step toward increasing military focus on WMD 

contingencies. WMD use is a low-probability (albeit increasing), high-impact 

contingency that has tended to garner more attention from civilian policymakers 

than military leaders.

94 On September 21, 2016, Marketwired.com reported that the countering 

WMD mission would soon move from U.S. Strategic Command to U.S. Special 

Operations Command. See “DTRA/SCC-WMD Hosts the 15th Combating 

Weapons of Mass Destruction Global Synchronization Conference,” Marketwired.

com, September 21, 2016, available at <www.marketwired.com/press-release/dtrascc-wmd-hosts-15th-combating-weapons-mass-destruction-global-synchronization-conference-2160546.htm>.

95 Paul I. Bernstein, “Deterrence in Professional Military Education,” Air and 

Space Journal 29, no. 6 (November‒December 2015), available at <www.airpower.

maxwell.af.mil/digital/pdf/articles/2015-Jul-Aug/C-Bernstein.pdf>.

96 This challenge, inter alia, was addressed in a U.S. Strategic Command 

DOTMLPF-P (doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities, and policy) Change Recommendation recently approved 

by the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), per the JROC decision memorandum issued by General Paul J. Selva, USAF, Vice Chairman of the 

Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: DOTMLPF-P Change Recommendation for the 

Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Leader Development Education and 

Training, JROC Memorandum 123-lS, December 7, 2015.

97 See, for example, “Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons,” 

ReachingCriticalWill.org, March 11, 2016, available at <www.reachingcriticalwill.

org/disarmament-fora/hinw>.

The Proceedings series presents key discussions, ideas, and conclusions from National 

Defense University symposia, workshops, strategic exercises and other research, 

and occasionally those of international counterparts. The opinions, conclusions, and 

recommendations expressed or implied within are those of the contributors and do not 

necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any other agency of the 

Federal Government. For information on NDU Press, visit www.ndu.edu/press.

The mission of the Center for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction is to prepare U.S. national 

security leaders to address the challenges posed by weapons of mass destruction through its 

education, research, and outreach programs.

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

Mr. Charles D. Lutes Director
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