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STATE OF EMERGENCY: THE DISASTER OF 

CUTTING PREPAREDNESS GRANTS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, 

RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 15, 2016 

Serial No. 114–59 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas 

PETER T. KING, New York 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan, Vice Chair 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

LOU BARLETTA, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania 

CURT CLAWSON, Florida 

JOHN KATKO, New York 

WILL HURD, Texas 

EARL L. ‘‘BUDDY’’ CARTER, Georgia 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

JOHN RATCLIFFE, Texas 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

CEDRIC L. RICHMOND, Louisiana 

WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

FILEMON VELA, Texas 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

NORMA J. TORRES, California 

BRENDAN P. SHIELDS, Staff Director 

JOAN V. O’HARA, General Counsel 

MICHAEL S. TWINCHEK, Chief Clerk 

I. LANIER AVANT, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND 

COMMUNICATIONS 

DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR., New York, Chairman 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

MARK WALKER, North Carolina 

BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia 

MARTHA MCSALLY, Arizona 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas (ex officio) 

DONALD M. PAYNE, JR., New Jersey 

BONNIE WATSON COLEMAN, New Jersey 

KATHLEEN M. RICE, New York 

BENNIE G. THOMPSON, Mississippi (ex officio) 

KERRY A. KINIRONS, Subcommittee Staff Director 

DEBORAH JORDAN, Subcommittee Clerk 

MOIRA BERGIN, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

STATEMENTS 

The Honorable Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., a Representative in Congress From 

the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 1 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 3 

The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress From 

the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 3 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 5 

The Honorable Michael T. McCaul, a Representative in Congress From the 

State of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security ................. 5 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress From 

the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland 

Security: 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 6 

WITNESSES 

PANEL I 

Honorable Bill De Blasio, Mayor, New York, New York: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 7 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 9 

PANEL II 

Mr. Jim Butterworth, Director, Emergency Management Agency/Homeland 

Security, State of Georgia, Testifying on Behalf of the National Emergency 

Management Association: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 30 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 32 

Ms. Rhoda Mae Kerr, Fire Chief, City of Austin Fire Department, Austin, 

Texas, Testifying on Behalf of the International Association of Fire Chiefs: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 37 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 38 

Mr. George Turner, Chief of Police, Atlanta Police Department, Atlanta, Georgia, Testifying on Behalf of the Major Cities Chiefs: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 41 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 43 

Mr. Mike Sena, Director, Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, 

Testifying on Behalf of the National Fusion Center Association: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 46 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 48 

Sgt. W. Greg Kierce, Director, Office of Emergency Management & Homeland 

Security, Jersey City, New Jersey: 

Oral Statement ..................................................................................................... 52 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 54 

(1) 

* The information has been included as part of Hon. de Blasio’s statement included for the 

record. 

STATE OF EMERGENCY: THE DISASTER OF 

CUTTING PREPAREDNESS GRANTS 

Tuesday, March 15, 2016 

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS, 

RESPONSE, AND COMMUNICATIONS, 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, 

Washington, DC. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in Room 

311, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Daniel M. Donovan, Jr., 

[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding. 

Present: Representatives Donovan, Marino, Walker, Loudermilk, 

McSally, McCaul (ex officio), Payne, and Rice. 

Also present: Representative King. 

Mr. DONOVAN. The Committee on Homeland Security’s Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications will come to order. The subcommittee is meeting today to 

examine the proposed cuts to grant programs in the President’s fiscal year 2017 budget request. 

Before we begin, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman 

from New York, Mr. King, a Member of the full committee, be permitted to sit on the dais and participate in today’s hearing. Without objection, so ordered. 

I also ask unanimous consent to insert in the record a signed letter by 17 stakeholder organizations opposing the proposed grant 

cuts.* 

I now recognize myself for an opening statement. 

As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, 

Response, and Communications, one of my fundamental responsibilities is to ensure our Nation’s first responders have the tools 

they need to protect this country and, God forbid, respond to the 

next terrorist attack. That is why my first hearing is focusing on 

the dangerous cuts to homeland security grants proposed in the 

President’s fiscal year 2017 budget request. The President’s budget cuts more than $500 million from programs that support States, cities, ports, transit systems, and fire 

services. This funding helps provide the training and equipment so 

critical to enabling our first responders to meet threats as varied 

as active-shooter scenarios, mass casualty events from a nuclear, 

chemical, or biological attack, and bomb plots targeting civilians in 

high-traffic areas. 
2 

Such threats aren’t just theories—in the nearly 15 years since 

the tragic attacks in 2001, law enforcement has thwarted sinister 

plots like these and more, including one involving an ISIS sympathizer in my own district. As this committee documented in a recent report issued by Chairman McCaul, there have been 75 terrorism plots against the West since early 2014. Forty-three percent 

of them were successfully executed, and the United States is the 

top target. 

Law enforcement, including the New York City Police Department and Joint Terrorism Task Forces, deserve our thanks for 

keeping Americans safe. So far, there have been 81 ISIS-linked arrests in the United States, a number that will only grow as the organization continues to spread viral terrorism over the internet. 

Proposing cuts to the programs that keep the homeland safe 

would be foolish in any case, but they are particularly outrageous 

at a time when our threat level is the highest it has been since 

2001. It would seem that either the President doesn’t believe these 

threats exist or he doesn’t care. But make no mistake: This is not 

the time for the Federal Government to cut support to help our Nation’s first responders combat terror attacks. 

In discussing the budget proposal with the administration, we 

have heard various justifications for the cuts. They have told us 

that the cuts are a result of, ‘‘FEMA’s successful investments in 

prior years.’’ They have claimed that it is a result of unspent funding from prior years. They have told us that the cuts are the result 

of difficult budget decisions, and that this budget, ‘‘funds all of our 

vital homeland security missions in these challenging times.’’ 

The truth of the matter is, they have chosen to balance the budget on the backs of first responders knowing that many in Congress 

will vociferously oppose those cuts. We have heard time and again 

that these grant programs have made a difference. We heard it 

after the Boston Marathon bombings. We heard it after the natural 

disasters like Hurricane Sandy, which devastated my district, and 

the tornadoes in Moore, Oklahoma. 

I am especially interested in hearing how the recent investments 

made by New York City using Federal Homeland Security grants, 

such as hiring additional counterterrorism officers this year, could 

be hamstrung by the sudden drop in Federal funds. New York City 

and other jurisdictions that benefit from Federal security grants 

have made real contributions to increasing our country’s readiness 

to meet terrorist threats. 

However, for local efforts to be truly effective, there must be a 

meaningful partnership with the Federal Government. Congress, 

and this committee in particular, has a history of bipartisanship 

when it comes to protecting our country and supporting first responders. We did it last year when we came together to permanently reauthorize the Zadroga Act to give 9/11 first responders the 

health treatment and screenings they earned, and I am pleased to 

be here today working with Ranking Member Payne to oppose 

these dangerous homeland security cuts. 

[The statement of Chairman Donovan follows:] 
3 

STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN DANIEL M. DONOVAN, JR. 

MARCH 15, 2016 

As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and 

Communications, my fundamental responsibility is to ensure our Nation’s first responders have the tools they need to protect this country and, God forbid, respond 

to the next terrorist attack. That is why my first hearing is focusing on the dangerous cuts to homeland security grants proposed in the President’s fiscal year 2017 

budget request. 

The President’s budget cuts more than $500 million from programs that support 

States, cities, ports, transit systems, and the fire services. This funding helps provide the training and equipment so crucial to enabling our first responders to meet 

threats as varied as active-shooter scenarios, mass-casualty events from a nuclear, 

chemical, or biological attack, and bomb plots targeting civilians in high-traffic 

areas. 

Such threats aren’t just theories—in the nearly 15 years since the tragic attacks 

in 2001, law enforcement has thwarted sinister plots like these and more, including 

one involving an ISIS sympathizer in my district. As this committee documented in 

a recent report issued by Chairman McCaul, there have been 75 terrorism plots 

against the West since early 2014. Forty-three percent of them were successfully executed, and the United States is the top target. 

Law enforcement, including the NYPD and Joint Terrorism Task Forces, deserve 

our thanks for keeping Americans safe. So far there have been 81 ISIS linked arrests in the United States, a number that will only grow as the organization continues to spread viral terrorism over the internet. 

Proposing cuts to the programs that keep the homeland safe would be foolish in 

any case, but they are particularly outrageous at a time when our threat level is 

the highest it’s been since 9/11. 

It would seem that either the President doesn’t believe these threats exist, or he 

doesn’t care. But make no mistake: This is NOT the time for the Federal Government to cut support to help our Nation’s first responders combat terror attacks. 

In discussing the budget proposal with the administration, we’ve heard various 

justifications for the cuts. They’ve told us that the cuts are a result of ‘‘FEMA’s successful investments in prior years.’’ They’ve claimed that it is a result of unspent 

funding from prior years. And they’ve told us that the cuts are the result of difficult 

budget decisions and that this budget ‘‘... funds all of our vital homeland security missions in these challenging times.’’ The truth of the matter is they’ve chosen 

to balance the budget on the backs of first responders, knowing that many in Congress will vociferously oppose the cuts. 

We have heard time and again that these grant programs have made a difference. 

We heard it after the Boston Marathon bombings. We heard it after natural disasters like Hurricane Sandy, which devastated my district, and the tornadoes in 

Moore, Oklahoma. 

I am especially interested to hear how the recent investments made by New York 

City using Federal Homeland Security grants, such as hiring additional counterterrorism officers this year, could be hamstrung by the sudden drop in Federal funds. 

New York City and the other jurisdictions that benefit from Federal security grants 

have made real contributions to increasing our country’s readiness to meet terrorist 

threats. However, for local efforts to be truly effective, there must be a meaningful 

partnership with the Federal Government. 

Congress, and this committee in particular, has a history of bipartisanship when 

it comes to protecting our country and supporting first responders. We did it last 

year when we came together to permanently reauthorize the Zadroga Act to give 

9/11 first responders the health treatment and screenings they earned, and I am 

pleased to be here today working with Ranking Member Payne to oppose these dangerous homeland security cuts. 

Mr. DONOVAN. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 

New Jersey, Mr. Payne, for an opening statement he may have. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Before I begin, I would like to congratulate Mr. Donovan on his 

Chairmanship, and thank him for holding today’s hearing to explore the potential consequences of the proposed cuts to State and 

local homeland security grant programs. 
4 

I represent the 10th Congressional District of New Jersey. It is 

the home of Newark Liberty International Airport, the New Jersey 

Transit Authority, the Port of Newark-Elizabeth Marine Terminal, 

and a dense area of industrial facilities that the New York Times 

has coined the most dangerous 2 miles in America. 

Over 100 potential terrorist targets are interspersed between 

homes and commuter corridors along that stretch. Those targets, 

coupled with the proximity to New York City, make the NewarkJersey City metropolitan area regularly ranked among the most 

high-risk urban areas in the country. 

Although it is a somewhat dubious distinction, it has brought 

with it critical Federal funding. From the Urban Area Security Initiative to port and transit security grants, Federal funding has 

helped northern New Jersey improve preparedness planning, 

achieve interoperable communication capabilities, and harden infrastructure targets. 

Most importantly, Federal funding has supported important 

multi-jurisdictional exercises that challenge existing response capabilities so we can make them stronger. These human capital investments—planning, training, and exercises—cannot be one-off investments. Rather, they must be repeated over time, both to train new 

responders and to help seasoned responders know how to take on 

emerging threats. 

Like many of my colleagues on this panel, I am very troubled by 

the administration’s proposal to slash important homeland security 

grants in fiscal year 2017. In the 31⁄2 years I have served as the 

subcommittee’s Ranking Member, I have seen the domestic threat 

environment evolve, and our first responders are on the front lines. 

I understand that the administration has proposed to slash Federal homeland security grant funds to comply with the budget caps, 

and I take issue with that. We cannot afford to balance the budget 

on the backs of our first responders. Instead, Federal first responders’ funding should be robust and predictable so that the State and 

local governments can effectively plan for the future investments. 

I am sure that the testimony we hear today will help us build 

the case to appropriators that strong homeland security grant funding should continue. Together, we can fight these cuts and win. 

Additionally, I would be interested in learning the witnesses’ 

thoughts on the new grants to counter violent extremism, or CVE, 

and the proposed Regional Competitive Grant Program. The Department has failed to provide Congress with much detail on either 

program, and I would be interested to learn if DHS has conducted 

any outreach to the stakeholders and community about them. 

Particularly with respect to CVE grants, I am interested in hearing the witnesses’ thoughts on what can be done to guard against 

certain populations being targeted or profiled. In the past, mosques 

in my Congressional district were the subject of surveillance by an 

out-of-State law enforcement agency. 

Although the NYPD program was subsequently disbanded, it 

showed us first-hand the dangers of profiling, and I want to be sure 

that precautions to avoid such outcomes are taken as we make the 

new money available for CVE. 
5 

I want to thank the witnesses for being here today, particularly 

Sergeant Kierce, from Jersey City, New Jersey, and I look forward 

to their testimony. 

With that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the balance of my 

time. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Payne follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER DONALD M. PAYNE, JR. 

MARCH 15, 2016 

I represent the 10th Congressional District of New Jersey. It is home to Newark 

Liberty International Airport, the New Jersey Transit Authority, the Port NewarkElizabeth Marine Terminal, and a dense area of industrial facilities that the New 

York Times has coined ‘‘the most dangerous 2 miles in America.’’ 

Over 100 potential terrorist targets are interspersed between homes and commuter corridors along that stretch. Those targets, coupled with its proximity to New 

York City, make the Newark-Jersey City metropolitan area regularly ranked among 

the most high-risk urban areas in the country. 

Although it is a somewhat dubious distinction, it has brought with it critical Federal funding. From the Urban Area Security Initiative to Port and Transit Security 

Grants, Federal funding has helped Northern New Jersey improve preparedness 

planning, achieve interoperable communications capabilities, and harden infrastructure targets. 

Most importantly, Federal funding has supported important multi-jurisdiction exercises that challenge existing response capabilities so we can make them stronger. 

These ‘‘human capital’’ investments—planning, training, and exercises—cannot be 

one-off investments. 

Rather, they must be repeated over time, both to train new responders and to 

help seasoned responders know how to take on emerging threats. Like many of my 

colleagues on this panel, I was very troubled by the administration’s proposal to 

slash important homeland security grants for fiscal year 2017. 

In the 31⁄2 years I have served as this subcommittee’s Ranking Member, I have 

seen the domestic threat environment evolve as our first responders are on the front 

lines. I understand that the administration proposed to slash Federal homeland security grant funds to comply with budget caps and I take issue with that. 

We cannot afford to balance the budget on the backs of our first responders. Instead, Federal first responder funding should be robust and predictable, so that our 

State and local governments can effectively plan for future investments. I am sure 

that the testimony we hear today will help us build the case to appropriators that 

strong homeland security grant funding should continue. Together, we can fight 

these cuts and win. 

Additionally, I will be interested in learning the witnesses’ thoughts on the new 

grants to Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) and the proposed Regional Competitive 

Grant Program. The Department has failed to provide Congress much detail on either program, and I will be interested to learn if DHS has conducted any outreach 

to the stakeholder community about them. 

Particularly with respect to CVE grants, I am interested in hearing the witnesses’ 

thoughts on what can be done to guard against certain populations being targeting 

or profiled. In the past, mosques in my Congressional district were the subject of 

surveillance by an out-of-State law enforcement agency. 

Although the NYPD program was subsequently disbanded, it showed us first-hand 

the dangers of profiling and I want to be sure that precautions to avoid such outcomes are taken as we make new money available for CVE. 

Mr. DONOVAN. The gentleman yields. 

The Chair now recognizes the Chairman of the full committee, 

the gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, for any opening statement 

that he may have. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Chairman Donovan. Let me congratulate you on your first hearing, your inaugural hearing. I kind-of 

like the sound of that. 

Mr. DONOVAN. So do I. 
6 

Mr. MCCAUL. It seems like today’s a New York day. I can’t think 

of a more important topic, though, for you to hold your first hearing on. 

I want to welcome the mayor of New York, and also my fire chief, 

Chief Rhoda Mae Kerr, who is also the president of the International Association of Fire Chiefs, and she’s a friend of mine back 

home. 

As Chairman Donovan noted, we are at our highest threat level 

since 9/11, and, in fact, I recently released a report examining the 

75 ISIS-linked terror plots against the West, to date, up from 19 

in 2014. 

ISIS has reached an unprecedented level of terror plotting 

against the United States and our allies. Despite this growing 

threat, the President’s budget falls short where we need it the 

most. Our city streets have become the front lines in the war 

against Islamist terror, yet the President proposes slashing funding 

to State and local first responders. 

Let me just say for the record, I have been to New York many 

times. I know I am from Texas, but I know that New York is perhaps the No. 1 target in the Nation. It is very important that we 

keep New York safe from this very high-threat level that is out 

there. 

We cannot let these cuts stand. I look forward to working with 

Chairman Donovan, and also the Chairman of the Subcommittee 

on Appropriations for Homeland Security, and our friends across 

the aisle to ensure that our first responders have the tools that 

they need to get this job done. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. DONOVAN. The gentleman yields back. 

Other Members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening 

statements may be submitted for the record. 

[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:] 

STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER BENNIE G. THOMPSON

MARCH 14, 2016 

I have been responsible for overseeing how the Federal Government supports 

State and local preparedness and response activities for well over a decade—first 

as a Member of the Select Committee on Homeland Security in the 108th Congress 

and now as the permanent committee’s Ranking Member. 

It has been my job to make sure that we never forget about the devastating 

events of September 11, 2001. I take seriously the recommendations of the 9/11 

Commission that, should our first responders be called upon once again to respond 

to a terrorist attack, they have the training and equipment they need to do so more 

safely. 

I have worked hard to ensure that the Federal Government works with State and 

local governments to make the right investments with Federal grant dollars—to 

make sure that money is spent on building lasting capabilities rather than on equipment that may not last or work as promised. 

From where I sit, I can say with confidence that Federal grant investments have 

worked. We saw the capabilities achieved with UASI funds in action after the Boston Marathon bombings in 2013. 

Boston had used its funding to train and equip tactical and specialized response 

teams—including Explosive Ordnance Disposal detection and disruption—SWAT, 

and maritime units. The region used funds to host Integration of Bomb Technicians 

into Tactical Operations Training, which trained Improvised Explosive Device (IED) 

teams to operate with SWAT teams. 

In 2011, Boston participated in a Joint Counterterrorism Awareness Workshop. 

That exercise included more than 200 participants from Federal, State, and local 
7 

governments and involved an integrated response to a 24-hour-long scenario in 

which multiple coordinated assaults occurred, much like the 2008 terrorist attacks 

in Mumbai, India. 

These grant investments were critical to Boston’s successful response to the marathon bombings. Indeed, former Boston Police Commissioner Davis testified before 

this committee that without grant funding, the ‘‘response would have been much 

less comprehensive than it was’’ and without the exercises supported through UASI, 

‘‘there would be more people who had died in these... attacks.’’ 

Other cities and States across the country have echoed Commissioner Davis’ 

praise of the grant programs. From achievements in interoperable communications 

capabilities, to emergency preparedness planning, to bolstering our ability to respond to CBRNE events, it is clear that homeland security grants yielded real results. 

It is also clear that the threats we face are growing and evolving. From the November terrorist attacks in Paris to the December attack in San Bernardino, we 

have learned that first responders will be called on to thwart and respond to more 

unconventional attacks. 

We must do everything in our power to help them be prepared to do so. That is 

why I was disturbed that the administration proposed cutting the preparedness 

grants by nearly half a billion dollars in its fiscal year 2017 budget request. 

I would note that this is not the first time grants have been raided to balance 

the budget. 

In fiscal year 2011, the first year the Republicans regained the Majority, targeted 

homeland security grants were cut from $2.75 billion to $1.9 billion, and we have 

seen the cuts continue ever since. This year, we have been told that the proposed 

grant cuts are the result of the administration’s attempt to adhere to the arbitrary 

budget caps that continue to hamstring our ability to address evolving threats. 

Cuts like these are penny-wise and pound-foolish. Until Congress decides to act 

on meaningful budget reform legislation, we will continue to find ourselves in a predicament of our own making: Deciding whether to fund DHS operations or first responder grants. 

I thank our witnesses for being here today, and I look forward to their testimony. 

Their statements will serve as an important reminder of the value of grant investments. 

Mr. DONOVAN. We are pleased to have two panels of very distinguished witnesses before us today on this important topic. I will 

now introduce our first witness. 

Mayor Bill de Blasio is the 109th mayor of New York City. Prior 

to becoming mayor, Mr. de Blasio served 8 years on the City Council. In 2010, Mr. de Blasio was sworn in as New York City public 

advocate, the second-highest city-wide elected office. Additionally, 

Mr. de Blasio served on District 15 school board in Brooklyn and 

worked as the Department of Housing and Urban Development’s 

regional director for New York and New Jersey area. 

The witness’ full statement will appear in the record. The Chair 

now recognizes Mayor de Blasio for 5 minutes. 

Welcome, Mr. Mayor. 

STATEMENT OF HONORABLE BILL DE BLASIO, MAYOR, NEW 

YORK, NEW YORK 

Mr. DE BLASIO. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Donovan, I want to also congratulate you on behalf of 

8.5 million New Yorkers. We are very proud that you have ascended to this role. It is important to our city, but it is also important to our Nation. 

I want to thank Ranking Member Payne and all the Members of 

the subcommittee. 

I want to also offer my thanks to Chairman McCaul, who has 

been doing so much to protect the security of all Americans, including all of us in New York City. 
8 

A special thanks to Congressman King and Congresswoman Rice, 

who have been regular partners in the work we do protecting New 

York City. We all are in this together in the metropolitan area, so 

I thank you. 

I do want to also note, Mr. Chair, I want to offer again now publicly my condolences on the passing of your mother, Katherine. I 

would just say for the record, she had a lot to be proud of in the 

work that you have done in public service. 

I want to thank the subcommittee for this opportunity to speak. 

This issue is so important to all of us. I am proud to be the mayor 

of America’s largest city. On top of that, New York City is a crucial 

transportation hub, global economic hub; the center, obviously, of 

the American financial industry, among other industries; and one 

of the world’s most visited places. For these reasons and more, New 

York is the most targeted city in the United States and one of the 

most targeted cities world-wide in terms of terror efforts directed 

against us. 

Since 9/11, we have thwarted 20 terrorist plots—and I want to 

give all credit to the men and women of the NYPD and all of our 

other agencies who have done this extraordinary work—20 plots 

over 15 years, and that includes 4 in the past 2 years. Mr. Chair, 

we have submitted this list to the committee of each and every one 

of those plots to give some context. 

We have also faced natural dangers, including Hurricane Irene, 

Superstorm Sandy, Ebola, and now the Zika virus. We have safely 

hosted every year the U.N. General Assembly and papal visits, including the one most recently in September, and also annually 

major National events like the New Year’s Eve celebration in 

Times Square. 

Twenty-four hours a day, 7 days a week, thousands of brave men 

and women are on the ground closely monitoring and pursuing 

every potential threat, but they can’t do it alone. The Urban Area 

Security Initiative, or UASI, this funding is crucial to our continued safety. 

First, UASI helps us prevent terror. UASI funding helps employ 

the people who keep us safe, like the NYPD intelligence specialists 

who monitor incoming information all day every day. Our new 500- 

plus officer Critical Response Command is a full-time counterterror 

force highly-trained, well-armed to deal with the challenges of 

today. 

UASI is also critical to developing and acquiring the technology 

that protects us in the world of 21st Century threats, and that includes the Domain Awareness System, a web of 8,000 cameras and 

sensors linked to technology that can read license plates and detect 

radiation. It also includes the NYPD’s counterterrorism helicopter 

that scans nautical vessels in our waters to guard against any nuclear devices. You have images here to show you that helicopter. 

Second, UASI funds are also critical to our ability to vigorously 

respond to crises. UASI supports NYPD active-shooter tactical 

training for 3,500 officers so they can confront gunmen like those 

who brutally attacked people in Paris at multiple locations. 

The New York City Department of Health uses UASI funding to 

identify and isolate diseases and bioterror. 
9 

The Fire Department of New York City has deployed UASI funds 

to acquire a fire boat that can filter out chemical, biological, and 

nuclear contamination to allow personnel to work in the midst of 

an attack. We have an image of the fire boat there. 

So my message today is simple and urgent: We need the Congress to do its part to protect New York City and, in fact, all of the 

United States from security threats. That is why I am deeply concerned about the proposed fiscal year 2017 budget cuts to UASI. 

New York State has roughly $600 million in UASI and other 

funds from the fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015 allotment, of 

which New York City received and spent about $311 million, about 

half of the allotment for New York State. 

Under the fiscal 2017 proposal, we are facing a 50 percent cut, 

50 percent cut across the Nation, which would likely, of course, cut 

New York City’s allocation in half as well, at a time when we are 

seeing more severe and more complex terror threats. We cannot reduce our commitment to public safety. We simply can’t afford to 

stand back when these threats are becoming greater and more 

challenging. And remember, the effects of a catastrophe in New 

York City affect the entire Nation. After 9/11, the Dow dropped 

over 600 points, and the 2001 recession deepened. 

Before concluding, I want to note that NYC taxpayers are investing a great deal of their own dollars to fight terrorism. For example, city funds are equipping our 36,000 police officers with new 

technology they can use to receive terror alerts, essentially giving 

us 36,000 counterterror officers at any given moment when we 

need them. 

We have always relied on the Federal Government to be a strong 

partner. We need that partnership to continue. It is essential, not 

just for 8.5 million New Yorkers that call New York City home, but 

for all Americans. 

Again, thank you for the opportunity to testify on this crucial 

matter. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. de Blasio follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF BILL DE BLASIO

MARCH 15, 2016 

Good morning Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the 

Subcommittee on Emergency Preparedness, Response, and Communications. My 

thanks to the entire subcommittee for giving me the opportunity to speak with you 

about the importance of homeland security funding for America’s cities. 

While I can only speak for New York City specifically, I know the 27 other areas 

selected as Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) recipients consider these dollars 

to be absolutely essential to keeping their people safe. My message is simple and 

urgent: We need Congress to do its part to protect New York City and the United 

States from terror and other major security threats. That is why I am deeply concerned about the proposed fiscal year 2017 budget cuts to UASI. 

Of the fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015 allotment, New York State has roughly $600 million in UASI and State Homeland Security Grant Program funds. New 

York City represents $311 million of these, the entirety of which have already been 

allocated to keeping our region safe. Under the fiscal year 2017 proposal, we are 

facing a 50 percent National level cut to $330 million. New York City’s allocation 

would likely be halved as well. We cannot afford as a city or a Nation to reduce 

our commitment to public safety at a time when threats are increasing—in both 

number and complexity. 

And let us be clear, it is not just funding year-to-year that matters here. Continuity over time is vital to keeping us safe. Preparations require planning. For ex-
10 

ample, our counter-terrorism assets such as ambulances, helicopters, and fire boats 

were carefully designed and built for our needs. 

Before the tragic events of 9/11, and since that terrible day, New York City has 

statistically been the No. 1 most targeted city in the United States and one of the 

most targeted cities in the world. Since 2001, we have thwarted 20 terrorist plots 

against New York City. We have prevented 4 such plots in the past 2 years alone. 

This heightened environment is widely recognized. The same week these cuts were 

announced, the Director of National Intelligence testified to the Senate Armed Services Committee that the threat from al-Qaeda and ISIL was now more layered and 

complex than any other time since 9/11. And in addition to man-made threats, New 

York has faced natural dangers—including Hurricane Irene and Super Storm 

Sandy, Ebola, Legionella, and the Zika virus. 

Many of these challenges extend beyond the 5 boroughs. The UASI allocation for 

the New York City area includes Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester, Yonkers, with additional funds for the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. We are the Nation’s largest metro area, with a population of about 20 million people, close to 60 

million tourists annually, and more than half a million hard-working Americans 

who commute into our city each day. For context, the number of commuters we receive daily is almost equal to the entire population of Baltimore, Maryland. 

Our nimble and complete action to prevent threats from striking and to respond 

quickly and effectively in the event they do, depends on the resources provided by 

UASI. I would like to take you through just some of the ways that UASI helps us 

both prevent terror and be ready to meet it head-on with the most vigorous, 

proactive, and sophisticated response possible. And I want to acknowledge the extraordinary and tireless efforts of the brave men and women from a number of agencies who protect New York City—and clearly illustrate just how important UASI 

funding is to their work. 

Every day, New York City has thousands of professionals on the ground constantly monitoring and working to prevent acts of terror. It is a never-ending endeavor that permeates every corner of our city and it starts with prevention. 

For example, UASI provides the entire annual budget for vital programs like the 

New York Police Department (NYPD) Domain Awareness System. This web of 8,000 

cameras—and growing—is linked to a network of license plate readers, radiation detectors, and biological sensors that act as an early warning system. We also use 

UASI funding to employ a number of NYPD’s intelligence research specialists who 

pore over threat information 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. 

UASI funding supports NYPD’s counter terrorism helicopter specifically outfitted 

with radiation equipment that scans vessels before they enter New York Harbor to 

detect the possibility of a nuclear device—for example a dirty bomb hidden in cargo. 

This helicopter also patrols critical infrastructure that runs across miles of New 

York City like the Buckeye Pipeline that carries aircraft fuel to John F. Kennedy 

International airport. 

UASI funds pay for vital equipment that allows our Bomb Squad to neutralize 

suspicious packages and live explosive devices every day. And UASI funds have allowed us to train and deploy a dozen Vapor Wake Explosive Detection K–9s, who 

can track a suicide bomber moving through a crowd, on the subway, or in open 

spaces like Times Square. 

Now, UASI funds are also critical for our preparedness to respond to a crisis as 

it unfolds. 

UASI funding sustains our new 500-officer Critical Response Command, speciallytrained police officers assigned full-time to counter-terrorism. The same funds pay 

for the specially-designed NYPD escape masks that every police officer is issued to 

protect them in the event of a chemical attack on our streets and subways. Such 

a plot—the subway cyanide plot—was already planned by al-Qaeda, but was uncovered before it could be launched. And UASI funds support active-shooter tactical 

training for 3,500 street cops who may have to confront gunmen such as those who 

stormed the Bataclan Theater in Paris, or the office party in San Bernardino. Our 

goal is to extend this important training to 20,000 officers. 

The New York City Fire Department (FDNY) Counter Terrorism Bureau counts 

on UASI funds to maintain the special equipment and training that would be used 

in a Mumbai- or Benghazi-type attack. It is important to note our fire department 

is also responsible for the city’s ambulances. And Emergency Medical Service (EMS) 

is a vital part of our response strategy. Fire EMS is using these funds with their 

police partners to develop and train rescue task forces that can move in and remove 

the wounded even while an attack may still be in progress. FDNY has also used 

UASI funds to acquire a fireboat that houses a protective room with Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosive air filtration equipment allowing personnel to continue operations even under hazardous conditions. 
11 

The New York City Department of Health uses UASI funding to quickly identify 

and isolate diseases and acts of bioterror, and subsequently respond with vaccinations and other efforts on a mass scale. 

Our Office of Emergency Management (OEM) relies on these funds to equip a 

state-of-the-art command center that would be the hub of coordinating efforts to 

maintain operations across multiple city agencies as well as consequence-management in the aftermath of a crisis. OEM also facilitates drills and exercises that keep 

our agencies at a level of preparedness for a threat that Federal officials have characterized as something that is not an ‘‘if’’ but a ‘‘when’’ scenario. 

And these are just a few examples. UASI funds have a profound and wide-ranging 

impact on everything we do to prepare for, prevent, mitigate, and recover from disasters. Since September 11, 2001 New York City has been remarkably successful 

at staying ahead of those plotting to harm our people and reducing the impact of 

natural disasters and dangerous diseases. But we shouldn’t be lulled into complacency by our success. What we have been doing for the past 14 years has been nothing short of cutting-edge and we cannot afford to let that edge get even slightly dull. 

We must remember that disaster can strike any time. 

We must also remember the effects of a catastrophe in New York City would 

cause suffering across our entire Nation. That’s why after the September 11 attacks 

we saw the DOW drop more than 600 points, the 2001 recession deepen, and the 

beginning of the War on Terror, which has cost the United States close to $2 trillion 

so far. 

New York City is a target because it is our largest city; a major port of entry; 

a hub for air, sea, rail, and road transportation; a capital of the United States economy; a globally-recognized symbol of democracy, and one of the world’s most visited 

places. We are proud to host large audiences at events such as the United Nations 

General Assembly, the recent visit of the Pope, our annual Thanksgiving Day parade, the Rockefeller Center Tree Lighting Ceremony and our New Year’s Eve celebration, and we are equally proud to have successfully kept everyone safe. 

Before concluding, I want to note that New York taxpayers are contributing their 

fair share, investing a great deal of their own dollars to fight terrorism. For example, city funds are equipping every single one of our 36,000 police officers with a 

smartphone that will allow them to instantly receive terrorism alerts. That will, in 

effect, give us 36,000 counter-terrorism officers when we need them. Additional investments include vehicles, helmets shields, and other equipment for counter terror 

personnel, our shot spotter gunshot detection system that will isolate a gun-related 

incident across 60 square miles city-wide and the operations budget for the NYPD 

Harbor Unit that patrols our vast coastline. But we simply can’t maintain this posture without help from the Federal Government. 

Until now, we have been able to rely on the Federal Government to be a true and 

strong partner. Today, we need that partnership to continue. As elected officials, our 

primary and most sacred obligation is to ensure the safety of those we serve. 

That is as true in your districts as it is everywhere in our Nation. So I ask you, 

no matter where you come from: Take bold action to ensure the safety of cities 

across our Nation and fully fund UASI. This is tantamount to protecting not just 

the safety and economic vitality of New York City, but that of our region and the 

Nation as a whole. 

It is essential—not just to the 8.5 million Americans that call New York City 

home—but to all Americans. 

Again, I thank you for the opportunity to testify on this critical matter. 
12 
13 

ATTACHMENT 1.—UASI MAYORS’ LETTER

The Honorable THAD COCHRAN, Chairman, 

The Honorable BARBARA MIKULSKI, Vice Chairwoman, 

Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, Washington, DC 20510. 

The Honorable JOHN HOEVEN, Chairman, 

The Honorable JEANNE SHAHEEN, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, United States 

Senate, Washington, DC 20510. 

The Honorable HAL ROGERS, Chairman, 

The Honorable NITA LOWEY, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Appropriations, United States House of Representatives, Washington, 

DC 20515. 

The Honorable JOHN CARTER, Chairman, 

The Honorable LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, Ranking Member, 

Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, United States 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515. 

DEAR REPRESENTATIVES ROGERS, LOWEY, CARTER, AND ROYBAL-ALLARD: We write 

on behalf of cities across the nation that would be significantly harmed by the deep 

funding cuts to the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) as proposed in the President’s FY 17 budget. As Mayors, we share the strong belief that severe cuts to key 

homeland security grant programs directly jeopardize the safety of the citizens we 

represent. As the threat continues to grow, we ask Congress to restore these funds 

that are essential for cities to adapt and remain nimble in responding to evolving 

threats. 

We are alarmed that the proposed cuts would translate into reductions across the 

spectrum of security. The UASI program is facing an almost 50 percent cut, from 

$600 million this year to $330 million next year. This funding is essential to many 

ongoing counterterrorism operations, investments in public safety communications, 

core competency training for police and fire, public health readiness and overall 

emergency preparedness. 

These proposed reductions are particularly alarming in the wake of mounting 

global attacks in major cities like Paris and here at home in San Bernardino. In 

New York City, which continues to be the Nation’s number one terror target, twenty 

plots have been thwarted since 2001 alone. To date, the only explanation provided 

for the recommended funding decrease is the need for hard choices in the current 

budget environment. This statement is not reflective of the need we see in the distinct communities we represent across the nation. Rather the equipment, training, 

system development and best practices that have resulted from access to UASI 

funds provide far reaching region wide benefits. 

Reducing UASI funding destabilizes on-going security and intelligence gathering 

efforts that protect our citizens, commuters, and businesses. Law enforcement requires this funding to continue to procure the necessary equipment to detect potential chemical, biological, and radiological weapons. First responders utilize funds to 

train and develop innovative best practices to improve response and save lives. 

These investments in security preparedness are crucial for both the safety and security of our residents, as well as the countless tourists who visit our cities. 

We are united in urging you to reject these proposed cuts and fully fund UASI. 

Heightened concern over terrorism and violent extremism at home makes adequate 

funding more critical than ever. It is in the interest of the security of our cities, and 

indeed the nation, to do everything possible to prevent any potential attacks. When 
14 

UASI is fully funded, local governments across the nation are empowered to better 

protect the people who call our cities home. 

Sincerely, 

BILL DE BLASIO, 

Mayor of New York, NY. 

ERIC GARCETTI, 

Mayor of Los Angeles, CA. 

MARTIN WALSH, 

Mayor of Boston, MA. 

STEPHANIE RAWLINGS-BLAKE, 

Mayor of Baltimore, MD. 

MURIEL BOWSER, 

Mayor of Washington, DC. 

ED LEE, 

Mayor of San Francisco, CA. 

FRANCIS SLAY, 

Mayor of St. Louis, MO. 

MIKE RAWLINGS, 

Mayor of Dallas, TX. 

KEVIN JOHNSON, 

Mayor of Sacramento, CA. 

CHRIS COLEMAN, 

Mayor of St. Paul, MN. 

JEFF WILLIAMS, 

Mayor of Arlington, TX. 

KEVIN FAULCONER, 

Mayor of San Diego, CA. 

SAM LICCARDO, 

Mayor of San Jose, CA. 

MIGUEL PULIDO, 

Mayor of Santa Ana, CA. 

CAROLYN GOODMAN, 

Mayor of Las Vegas, NV. 

EDWARD MURRAY, 

Mayor of Seattle, WA. 

BETSY PRICE, 

Mayor of Fort Worth, TX. 

ANDY HAFEN, 

Mayor of Henderson, NV. 

ATTACHMENT 2.—UASI COALITION LETTER FROM LOCAL ELECTED OFFICIALS, LAW

ENFORCEMENT, AND FIRST RESPONDERS

February 22, 2016. 

The Honorable HAROLD ROGERS, 

Chairman, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515. 

The Honorable JOHN CARTER, 

Chairman, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. 

House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515. 

The Honorable NITA LOWEY, 

Ranking Member, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, 

Washington, DC 20515. 

The Honorable LUCILLE ROYBAL-ALLARD, 

Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Homeland Security, Committee on Appropriations, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, DC 20515. 

Dear Mr. Rogers, Ms. Lowey, Mr. Carter, and Ms. Roybal-Allard: We write on behalf of local elected officials, emergency managers, port operators, transit operators, 

police chiefs, sheriffs, and the major fire service organizations to register our strong 

concern with the severe cuts to four key homeland security grant programs proposed 

in the President’s FY (Fiscal Year) 2017 budget. In all these programs would be cut 

by 44 percent below FY 2016 levels. The Urban Area Security Initiative Program 
15 

would be cut by 45 percent, from $600 million this year to $330 million next year. 

The State Homeland Security Grant Program would be cut by 57 percent, from $467 

million this year to $200 million next year. Public Transportation Security Assistance would be cut by 15 percent to $85,000 next year, Port Security grants by 7 

percent to $93 million next year. 

There is a certain irony to the proposed cuts. They come in the wake of terrorist 

attacks not just in cities abroad, but on our shores, in Chattanooga, San Bernardino 

and Philadelphia, for example. Further, the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Budget in Brief highlights the programs’ accomplishments, and offers no explanation for the cuts: 

‘‘Through a suite of homeland security grant programs, (DHS) provided critical support to the nation’s preparedness for acts of terrorism and other threats and hazards. In 2015, FEMA awarded more than 600 grants to support state, local, tribal 

and territorial governments, transit agencies, port operators, non-profit organizations, and other partners in building and sustaining the 31 critical core capabilities 

described in the National Preparedness Goal. As a result of those grants, states and 

localities across the country reported capability increases in 12 of the 31 core capabilities compared to 2014. The federal investment in those capabilities pays off each 

day in communities across the country during incidents large and small. For example, much of the training and equipment used in response to the May 2015 AMTRAK derailment in Philadelphia, including lighting, tourniquets, and technical rescue capabilities, were paid for with grants provided by FEMA.’’ 

As you begin development of FY 2017 appropriations legislation, we urge you to 

reject these proposed cuts and to fund these critical programs at least at FY 2016 

funding levels. At a time of heightened concern about terrorism and violent extremism at home, increased funding for them would certainly be justified. They play 

a vital role in ensuring that state and local governments are prepared to respond 

to future terrorist attacks and have the necessary resources to protect their communities and their residents. 

If we can provide further information or assistance, please contact us through the 

U.S. Conference of Mayors’ Public Safety Director[.] 

Sincerely, 

AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PORT AUTHORITIES, 

AMERICAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION ASSOCIATION, 

THE ASSOCIATION OF STATE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE AGENCIES, 

BIG CITY EMERGENCY MANAGERS, 

CONGRESSIONAL FIRE SERVICES INSTITUTE, 

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE CHIEFS, 

INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE FIGHTERS, 

MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS ASSOCIATION, 

MAJOR COUNTY SHERIFFS’ ASSOCIATION, 

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF COUNTIES, 

NATIONAL FUSION CENTER ASSOCIATION, 

NATIONAL HOMELAND SECURITY COALITION, 

NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES, 

NATIONAL SHERIFFS’ ASSOCIATION, 

NATIONAL VOLUNTEER FIRE COUNCIL, 

THE UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF MAYORS, 

U.S. COUNCIL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF EMERGENCY MANAGERS

(IAEM–USA). 

ATTACHMENT 3.—TERRORIST PLOTS TARGETING NEW YORK CITY SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 

TO PRESENT

1. BROOKLYN BRIDGE

In 2002, Iyman Faris, a U.S.-based al-Qaeda operative, planned to cut the Brooklyn Bridge’s support cables at the direction of 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. However, as a testament to NYPD terrorism deterrence efforts, Faris 

called off the plot, indicating to al-Qaeda leaders that ‘‘the weather is too hot.’’ 

NYPD’s 24-hour coverage of the bridge, much of which was put in place following 

9/11 and intentionally made highly visible, played a large role in Faris’ decision to 

abandon the plot. Faris was arrested in 2003, pleaded guilty, and sentenced to 20 

years in Federal prison for providing material support and resources to al-Qaeda, 

among other charges. Knowing that the city’s bridges and critical infrastructure remain attractive terrorist targets, the NYPD maintains heightened security around 

such facilities. 
16 

2. SUBWAY CYANIDE ATTACK

In 2003, al-Qaeda had planned to release cyanide gas in New York City’s subway 

system, which carries more than 5,000,000 passengers on an average weekday, as 

well as targeted other public places for attack. According to a U.S. Government official familiar with the plot, the plan was called off by Osama bin Laden’s secondin-command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, for unclear reasons. The NYPD took appropriate 

precautions after becoming aware of the plot. 

3. THE PARACHAS

In 2006, Uzair Paracha, a Brooklyn resident, was sentenced to 30 years in Federal 

prison after he was convicted of attempting to help al-Qaeda operative Majid Khan 

enter the United States to attack gas tanks in a plot developed alongside 9/11 planner Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. In early 2003, Paracha impersonated Khan in dealings with the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and agreed to use 

Khan’s credit card to make it appear Khan was in the United States rather than 

in Pakistan. He also was in possession of several identification documents in Khan’s 

name, and written instructions from Khan on how to pose as Khan in dealing with 

the INS. Paracha was found guilty in 2005 on charges including conspiracy to provide and providing material support to al-Qaeda; conspiracy to provide, and providing funds, goods, or services to al-Qaeda; and identification document fraud committed to facilitate an act of international terrorism. Majid Khan pleaded guilty in 

February 2012 in a military court at Guantanamo to charges stemming from his involvement with al-Qaeda and admitted to the gas tank plot, planning to assassinate 

Pakistan’s President Musharraf, and complicity in a 2003 bombing of a Marriot 

hotel in Jakarta, Indonesia. The NYPD cooperated with Federal authorities through 

the Joint Terrorism Task Force to uncover Paracha’s plan. 

Uzair Paracha’s father, Saifullah Paracha, also was alleged to have aided alQaeda. The senior Paracha worked with Khalid Sheikh Mohammad to devise a way 

to smuggle explosives—including possibly nuclear weapons—into the United States 

using the New York office of Paracha’s import-export business. Saifullah Paracha, 

who attended the New York Institute of Technology and worked in the city for over 

a decade, was arrested in 2003 after Uzair stated to authorities that his father was 

a militant. 

4. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE & CITIGROUP HEADQUARTERS

Dhiren Barot (aka Issa al-Hindi) was sentenced to life in prison by a United Kingdom court in 2006 after pleading guilty to planning to attack several targets both 

in the United Kingdom and the United States, including the New York Stock Exchange, Citigroup’s headquarters in Midtown Manhattan, and the Prudential Building in Newark, NJ. In addition, Barot filmed reconnaissance video during a trip to 

the United States in March 2001 that included shots of the World Trade Center. 

He also targeted the offices of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank 

in Washington, DC and hotels and railway stations in London. Barot was arrested 

by British police in August 2004 shortly after U.S. authorities raised the Terror 

Alert level based on intelligence that al-Qaeda had conducted extensive reconnaissance of financial institutions in the United States. NYPD responded to the alert 

by reaching out to New York’s financial companies to discuss security, deploying tactical teams to high-threat locations, and increasing vehicle inspections. Seven of 

Barot’s accomplices were given long prison sentences by a British court in 2007 for 

their involvement in the plot. 

5. HERALD SQUARE

Shahawar Matin Siraj and James Elshafay plotted in 2004 to place explosive devices in the Herald Square subway station in Manhattan. Elshafay had already 

given consideration to potential targets by the time he met an NYPD informant in 

early 2004. In recorded conversations, Siraj expressed desire to bomb bridges and 

subway stations, and cited misdeeds by American forces in Iraq as a motivating factor. Siraj and Elshafay conducted surveillance of Herald Square station in late August 2004 and drew a crude diagram to aid in placing the explosives; they were arrested a few days later. Elshafay pleaded guilty to conspiracy to damage or destroy 

a subway station by means of an explosive. Siraj was found guilty in 2006 of conspiracy to place and detonate an explosive in a public transportation system; conspiracy to damage and destroy, by means of an explosive, a building or vehicle; conspiracy to wreck and disable a mass transportation vehicle; and conspiracy to place 

a destructive device in or near a facility used in the operation of mass transportation. He was subsequently sentenced to 30 years in prison. Shepherding the case 
17 

from initial lead to Federal prosecution required close cooperation with the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the Eastern District of New York. 

6. PATH TRAIN AND WORLD TRADE CENTER RETAINING WALL

In July 2006, the FBI revealed it had uncovered a plot involving an attack on a 

PATH commuter train tunnel connecting New York and New Jersey, the placement 

of suicide bombers on trains, and the destruction of the retaining wall separating 

the Hudson River from the World Trade Center site in the hopes of causing massive 

flooding in the city’s Financial District. The plot was uncovered in its early stages 

through a year-long FBI investigation that included the monitoring of internet chat 

rooms frequented by extremists, and involved at least 8 suspects spread over several 

countries. The plot’s alleged mastermind, al-Qaeda affiliated Assem Hammoud of 

Lebanon, was taken into custody by authorities there. Hammoud said he was acting 

on orders from Osama bin Laden and that he was planning to travel to Pakistan 

to receive training at an al-Qaeda camp. Another suspect was arrested in Canada 

and a third in England. 

7. JFK AIRPORT

Beginning in 2006, 4 men plotted to detonate the jet-fuel storage tanks and supply lines for John F. Kennedy Airport in order to cause wide-scale destruction and 

economic disruption in an attack they intended to dwarf 9/11. Through the Joint 

Terrorism Task Force, the NYPD worked with the FBI, which placed an informant 

next to the principle plotter, Russell Defreitas, a native of Guyana and Brooklyn 

resident who was an airport cargo handler. Defreitas’s accomplices were Abdul 

Kadir, a former parliamentarian from Guyana with admitted ties to Iran; Abel Nur 

of Guyana; and Kareem Ibrahim of Trinidad and Tobago. Relying in part on 

Defreitas’ knowledge, the men conducted extensive surveillance of the airport, and 

traveled to Guyana and Trinidad and Tobago to attempt to secure the support of 

Jamaat al-Muslimeen, an Islamic extremist group operating in the region. The 

group also discussed contacting Adnan Shukrijumah, an al-Qaeda explosives expert 

believed to be in the Caribbean at the time. Kadir was sentenced to life in prison 

in 2010; Nur was sentenced to 15 years in 2011 after pleading guilty to material 

support the previous year; Ibrahim received life in 2012. All 3 were extradited to 

the United States to stand trial. Defreitas was arrested in New York and received 

a life sentence in 2011 after being convicted of conspiracy to attack a public transportation system; conspiracy to destroy a building by fire or explosive; conspiracy 

to attack aircraft and aircraft materials; conspiracy to destroy international airport 

facilities; and conspiracy to attack a mass transportation facility. 

8. TRANSATLANTIC PLOT

In a series of 3 trials spanning 2008 to 2010, 8 men were convicted in Britain 

of attempting to simultaneously detonate explosives in 7 airliners traveling from 

London to several North American metropolises, including New York. British authorities also sought Rashid Rauf, a 27-year-old Briton of Pakistani descent and 

prominent al-Qaeda operative, as a main suspect in the plot. After Rauf’s arrest in 

Pakistan in August 2006, his detention led to the arrest of 25 additional suspects 

in Britain. Authorities believed the plan involved the use of peroxide-based liquid 

explosives that could evade air travel security measures in place at the time. The 

discovery of the plot involved cooperation between American and British authorities. 

9. SABRIHAN HASANOFF & WESSAM EL-HANAFI

Co-conspirators Sabrihan Hasanoff, a dual-citizen of the United States and Australia, and Wessam el-Hanafi, a Brooklyn resident who was extradited after his 

2010 arrest in the United Arab Emirates, pleaded guilty to providing and attempting to provide material support to al-Qaeda and conspiring to provide material support to al-Qaeda. Hasanoff was sentenced to 18 years in prison in September 2013 

and el-Hanafi was sentenced to 15 years in prison in January 2015. Both men admitted to supporting al-Qaeda in a variety of ways beginning in 2007 when the men 

developed contact with individuals they knew to be members of the group. Using 

aliases, Hasanoff and el-Hanafi funneled $67,000 to al-Qaeda operatives overseas, 

and in 2008 El-Hanafi traveled to Yemen to meet with his contacts, swearing an 

oath of allegiance to Osama Bin Laden’s organization. El-Hanafi also delivered 

money and electronics to the men during this trip, while at the same time teaching 

the Yemen-based individuals covert communication techniques using encrypted software. At the request of their Yemen-based associates and as directed by el-Hanafi, 

Hasanoff performed surveillance on potential targets in the United States including 
18 

the New York Stock Exchange. El-Hanafi forwarded the report to al-Qaeda, which 

viewed both men as operatives for a potential attack in the United States. The 

NYPD Detectives assigned to the Joint Terrorism Task Force assisted in the FBI 

investigation. 

10. LONG ISLAND RAILROAD

Bryant Neal Vinas, of Long Island, New York, traveled to Pakistan with an intent 

to die fighting against American forces in Afghanistan. He was later called to testify 

in the trial of Adis Medunjanin, one of Najibullah Zazi’s co-conspirators in the September 2009 subway plot (see below). In his testimony, Vinas stated he was motivated by the preaching of radical Yemeni-America cleric Anwar al-Awlaki. He spent 

much of his time in Pakistan shopping for a group to join before ultimately ending 

up in North Waziristan in Pakistan’s tribal areas in early 2008 and subsequently 

received over 5 weeks of terrorism training from al-Qaeda. In summer of 2008, 

Vinas spoke to al-Qaeda about targeting the Long Island Railroad using a suitcase 

bomb that would be left in a car and set to detonate. He drew maps of Long Island 

and showed that all LIRR trains passed through one tunnel when entering Manhattan; suggesting that an explosion in the tunnel would cause the most damage. Pakistani authorities arrested Vinas in November 2008 and he pleaded guilty in the 

United States to Federal charges of conspiracy to murder, material support to alQaeda, and receiving military training from al-Qaeda. 

11. BRONX SYNAGOGUES

In May 2009, 4 men placed what they believed were functioning bombs outside 

of Jewish targets in the Bronx neighborhood of Riverdale and additionally constructed plans to fire missiles at military transport planes at Stewart International 

Airport near Newburgh, NY. Suspect James Cromitie confided his desire to commit 

acts against the United States to a Federal informant in 2008 and aspired to travel 

to Afghanistan to become a martyr, and to join Pakistani extremist group Jaish-eMohammad. Cromitie recruited Onta Williams, David Williams IV, and Laguerre 

Payen to join him in the Riverdale attacks. By April 2009, the 4 targeted the Riverdale Temple and nearby Riverdale Jewish Center, and conducted surveillance at 

Stewart Airport. A Government informant supplied the group with an inert missile 

system and fake explosives. The group was arrested after they placed what they believed were functioning bombs outside of their Riverdale targets, convicted in 2010 

and subsequently sentenced to 25-year terms. 

12. NYC SUBWAY PLOT

In September 2009, the New York City subway system was targeted for attack 

by 3 individuals who planned to set off bombs in the subway during rush hour 

shortly after the eighth anniversary of 9/11. Once Queens residents Najibullah Zazi 

and Zarein Ahmedzay, of Afghan descent, and Bosnian Adis Medunjanin had selfradicalized largely through listening to on-line extremist material, including teachings by Anwar al-Awlaki. The trio plotted to travel to Afghanistan to fight alongside 

the Taliban against American and coalition forces, and said they were motivated by 

American actions against Muslim populations overseas. Although in Pakistan in late 

August 2008, Ahmedzay and Medunjanin were turned around by Pakistani security 

forces while trying to enter Afghanistan in a taxi. In looking for another approach, 

the 3 canvassed mosques in Peshawar, Pakistan until they were put in contact with 

al-Qaeda representatives. They then traveled to tribal areas in North Waziristan, 

where they received terrorist training from high-ranking members who urged their 

return to the United States to carry out an attack at home—a request to which they 

acquiesced. Zazi received further explosives training from al-Qaeda and the 3 returned to the United States separately. In January 2009, days after his return to 

the United States, Zazi moved to Aurora, CO where he began to experiment with 

explosives and eventually constructed the detonation charges for the bombs that 

were to be used by the trio in attacking the subway. He remained in contact with 

Ahmedzay and Medunjanin while in Colorado, and drove to New York from Aurora 

in early September 2009 with the explosive charges in his vehicle. 

The plot was thwarted through an intelligence tip received by the FBI and with 

the cooperation of the NYPD through the Joint Terrorism Task Force. Zazi and 

Ahmedzay pleaded guilty in 2010 to conspiracy to use a weapon of mass of destruction; conspiracy to commit murder in a foreign country; and providing material support to a foreign terrorist organization; they are awaiting sentencing. Medunjanin 

was convicted in 2012 of conspiring to use weapons of mass destruction, conspiring 

to commit murder of U.S. military personnel abroad, providing and conspiring to 

provide material support to al-Qaeda, receiving military training from al-Qaeda, 
19 

conspiring and attempting to commit an act of terrorism transcending national 

boundaries, and using firearms and destructive devices in relation to these offenses. 

He was later sentenced to life. 

13. TIMES SQUARE

Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistan-American residing in Connecticut, attempted to detonate a car bomb in Times Square on May 1, 2010. Like Vinas and the Zazi-trio before him, Shahzad received terrorist training in Pakistan’s Waziristan region during 

a trip he made to the country from July 2009 until February 2010. The training 

was provided by the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), generally referred to as the 

Pakistani Taliban. Upon returning to the United States, Shahzad received $12,000 

in 2 separate payments from a TTP-associated co-conspirator to aid his plot. The 

bomb’s failure to detonate had to do in large part with the inferior components 

Shahzad used; Shahzad was concerned that purchasing more effective ingredients 

as called for by his training would alert law enforcement. Shahzad was influenced, 

in part, by the teachings of Anwar al-Awlaki and in court, cited American foreign 

policy as a primary motivator for his actions. Cooperation between NYPD and the 

FBI led to his identification and arrest 53 hours after the attempted bombing, as 

he attempted to flee the country. Shahzad pleaded guilty to all charges against him 

and was sentenced to life in prison. 

14. MANHATTAN SYNAGOGUE

Ahmed Ferhani, a Queens resident born in Algeria, along with Mohammad 

Mamdouh, a Moroccan immigrant, were arrested in May 2011 in an NYPD operation in which Ferhani purchased a hand grenade, 3 semi-automatic pistols, and 

ammunition from an undercover detective. NYPD’s investigation into the pair revealed their desire to attack a synagogue in New York City. Ferhani was indicted 

under New York State’s anti-terrorism legislation and pleaded guilty in December 

2012 to charges including conspiracy as a crime of terrorism and criminal possession 

of a weapon as a crime of terrorism. In his allocution, Ferhani stated that he agreed 

with Mamdouh to ‘‘develop a plan to attack and damage a synagogue in New York 

County or elsewhere in New York City using explosives’’ in an effort to coerce and 

intimidate the city’s Jewish population. He further clarified that his motivation was 

to avenge the perceived mistreatment of Muslims worldwide. Ferhani was sentenced 

in March 2013 to 10 years in state prison after his guilty plea in December 2012 

to terror-related charges for plotting to target New York synagogues. The case 

marks the first application of New York’s terror laws in a terrorism case. 

15. RETURNING MILITARY TARGETED

Jose Pimentel, a native of the Dominican Republic and convert to Islam, was 

charged with plotting to detonate bombs in and around New York City in November 

2011. He used instructions on how to build a bomb published by al-Qaeda’s Inspire 

magazine. After a 21⁄2-year investigation by the NYPD Intelligence Bureau, 

Pimentel was caught while assembling 3 bombs. Pimentel’s targets included members of the Armed Forces who were returning from service in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

He also considered traveling to Yemen to participate in terrorist training and 

claimed to have emailed radical Yemeni-American cleric Anwar al-Awlaki but received no response. However, Pimentel successfully corresponded with Jesse Morton, 

the founder of the website Revolution Muslim, who was sentenced in June 2012 to 

11.5 years in prison for using the internet to solicit violence against individuals to 

include the writers of the popular TV-satire South Park. Pimentel pleaded guilty 

and on March 25, 2014 was sentenced to 16 years in State prison and 5 years of 

post-release supervision for constructing improvised explosive devices to detonate in 

Manhattan, with the intent to harm United States military personnel and civilians. 

16. FEDERAL RESERVE

Quazi Mohammad Rezwanul Ahsan Nafis, a native of Bangladesh who was residing in the United States on a student visa, was arrested in October 2012 as he attempted to remotely detonate what he believed was a bomb in front of the Federal 

Reserve Bank of New York in lower Manhattan. Nafis came to law enforcement’s 

attention in July 2012 when he unknowingly tried to recruit a confidential Government source to aid in his plan to attack the United States at home. Nafis told the 

Government source that he had al-Qaeda contacts abroad that could assist in the 

planning and execution of an attack. Nafis also drafted an article he hoped would 

be published in al-Qaeda’s Inspire magazine, in which he asserted his desire to ‘‘destroy America’’ by attacking its economy. Nafis pleaded guilty in February 2013 to 
20 

attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction and was subsequently sentenced 

to 30 years in prison. The NYPD worked with the FBI in the case through the Joint 

Terrorism Task Force. 

17. THE BROTHERS PLOT

Raees Alam Qazi and Sheheryar Alam Qazi, Pakistan-born brothers from Florida, 

were arrested by Federal authorities in Florida in November 2012 for charges relating to a plan to bomb popular New York City landmarks including Times Square, 

Wall Street, and city theaters. Raees Qazi had traveled to New York allegedly to 

gain employment to finance the building of an explosive device and to select a target; he and his brother both were charged with conspiring to provide material support to terrorists and conspiring to use a weapon of mass destruction. Authorities 

searched Raees’ home and found material and instructions related to the construction of an explosive device. Raees was reportedly seeking retribution for the deaths 

caused by drone strikes in Afghanistan. In March 2015, the Qazi brothers pleaded 

guilty in Federal court in Miami to 1 count of conspiring to provide support to terrorists and conspiring to assault 2 Federal employees. Raees Qazi pleaded guilty to 

an additional charge of attempting to provide material support to al-Qaeda. In June 

2015, Raees and Sheheryar Qazi were sentenced to 35 and 20 years in prison respectively. 

18. ZALE THOMPSON

On October 23, 2014, a 32-year-old resident of Queens named Zale Thompson attacked 4 rookie New York City police officers in Jamaica, Queens with a hatchet. 

Thompson ran at the men as they posed for a photograph, hitting 1 officer on the 

arm and another in the head before being shot and killed by the other officers. 

Thompson expressed a variety of grievances in the years and months leading up to 

the attack, including about incidents of alleged police brutality—particularly against 

African Americans. Through frequent social media posts, he also advocated for jihad 

and insurgency against the United States as a response to the plight of Muslims 

globally. His social media activity and internet searches became increasingly consumed by jihadist propaganda in the days prior to his attack, as he frequented 

websites associated with al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq in the Levant 

(ISIL), and viewed articles discussing ISIL’s beheadings of hostages. ISIL has lionized Thompson in 2 issues of its English-language magazine, Dabiq, as an exemplar 

for lone-wolf attackers. 

19. ASIA SIDDIQUI & NOELLE VELENTZAS

In April 2015, Queens residents Asia Siddiqui and Noelle Velentzas were arrested 

and charged with conspiracy to use weapons of mass destruction as well as other 

terrorism-related offenses following a joint investigation by the NYPD Intelligence 

Bureau and FBI. The defendants are alleged to have researched the construction of 

various types of explosives devices, including the car bomb used in the 1993 World 

Trade Center bombing and pressure-cooker bombs such as those used in the 2013 

Boston Marathon attacks; they also allegedly acquired some of the components to 

construct explosive devices, including propane tanks. The complaint charges that 

the defendants, who allegedly made statements backing violent jihad and supporting the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), sought to detonate explosive 

devices here at home. The 2 pleaded not guilty in May 2015; their case is still pending. 

20. ASPIRING ISIL FOREIGN FIGHTERS

In June 2015, following an FBI investigation, Queens resident Munther Saleh and 

Staten Island resident Fareed Mumuni were arrested for allegedly seeking to carry 

out an attack with pressure-cooker bombs on behalf of the Islamic State of Iraq and 

the Levant (ISIL) prior to joining the group overseas with other alleged co-conspirators, including New Jersey residents Samuel Topaz and Alaa Saadeh, who were also 

arrested. According to the criminal complaint, Saleh researched information about 

the construction of a pressure-cooker bomb and viewed images of various New York 

City landmarks and tourist attractions. Prior to their arrests, Saleh and Mumuni 

allegedly attempted to attack law enforcement officers before being subdued. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Mayor, thank you for your insightful testimony, and I can’t agree with you more. I would also like to publicly 

commend you for the team that you put together that protects our 

city every day, Police Commissioner Bill Bratton, Fire Commis-
21 

sioner Danny Nigro, and my good friend, who accompanied you 

down here today, Joe Esposito, the head of OEM. So thank you for 

that. 

Mr. DE BLASIO. Thank you. 

Mr. DONOVAN. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for questions. 

Mayor de Blasio, as I mentioned in my opening statement, we 

have heard several reasons for the proposed cuts, one of which was 

the amount of money that has yet to be spent in prior funding cycles. Can you talk about the money that is in the pipeline and how, 

while it may not have yet been spent and drawn down, that money 

has already been obligated for various projects that are vital for 

your efforts to secure our city. 

Mr. DE BLASIO. Well, that is exactly right, Mr. Chairman. Remembering that we are now seeing more threats than ever before 

and more complicated ones, we continue to innovate. This has been 

something that all our agencies do, and Commissioner Bratton is 

particularly well-known for constantly creating the concept of innovation in all we do in the NYPD, particularly in our counterterror 

work. That is why we came up with a new specially-trained, specially-armed counterterrorism group, the Critical Response Command. No city in America has such a developed apparatus at this 

point, and we need it because we are the No. 1 terror target. 

But the simple answer to your question is: All dollars that have 

been provided are in the process of being spent. They have been obligated, as you said. We all know that the process of actually acquiring equipment, for example, requires a number of steps. We 

have to very carefully follow those steps under Federal guidelines, 

and we do. But that often takes several years to be done properly. 

Every dollar is being spent and being spent on the kind of things 

that will prevent terror. Remember, our first mission, of course, is 

to prevent terror. NYPD has done that successfully now for 15 

straight years, warded off those 20 attacks I mentioned. 

But we also know if, God forbid, there was an instance of a terrorist attack, our job is to contain it and minimize it. That is why 

we put such an emphasis on the active-shooter training, on technology that would allow the fastest alert possible to our officers so 

they could intervene. We need to keep making those investments 

so we are prepared. But the bottom line is every dollar that has 

been allocated in the past has been obligated, is being spent effectively. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mayor. 

Commissioner Bratton has estimated that these cuts would cost 

an approximate amount of $90 million reduction for the funding to 

New York City for the police department. Could you explain to the 

committee, what are some of the capabilities that the New York 

City Police Department would no longer be able to fund in the absence of the grant funding that is being proposed now? 

Mr. DE BLASIO. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. 

We have a substantial domain awareness system, but we need to 

keep building on it as the threats intensify. If we did not have this 

funding, we would not be able to build out that domain awareness 

system further. We do have some explosive detection equipment, 

but, again, we need to add to that capacity. 
22 

One example I need to offer, in addition to all the other reasons 

why New York City is a target and why New York City is a challenging environment to protect and police, we just announced this 

week that we expect over 59 million tourists in the course of this 

year. It would be an all-time record. The amount of traffic, the 

amount of human intensity that happens on the streets of New 

York City every single day requires constant vigilance, and we 

need the technology to allow us to look for any and all threats. 

Finally, I would say, you know that as the area around the 

World Trade Center has come back to full life and economic vitality, and that is growing every day, we know that that site, sadly, 

remains a particular target of interest for terrorist forces. We need 

to add additional vehicle screening in that area. We would not be 

able to do that without the funds that we have traditionally received from UASI. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Wonderful. Thank you, Mayor. 

My time is running out, so let me just ask one final question: 

Secretary Johnson is testifying before our full committee tomorrow 

on the Department of Homeland Security’s budget for fiscal year 

2017. What message do you have for the Secretary about any proposed cuts? 

Mr. DE BLASIO. I will be seeing the Secretary later today. I have 

immense respect for him. He has been a great partner. But my 

message is we cannot protect New York City sufficiently without 

this funding. I believe it is a fair National priority to protect our 

largest city and a city that is so central to our National life. 

I would say to him that we in New York City invest heavily in 

counterterrorism ourselves. For every dollar we receive from the 

Federal Government, we spend one of our own dollars as well. We 

spend the taxpayers’ dollars of our city to protect our people and 

all the people who visit, those 60 million tourists, the 3 million people or so coming to town each day to work during the week. We 

are definitely going to be shouldering a big share of the burden, but 

we need our Federal partners to take their part in this effort to 

protect. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mr. Mayor. 

My time is expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman 

from New Jersey, Mr. Payne, for questions. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mayor de Blasio, New York City has benefitted from significant 

homeland security grant investments, and rightfully so. What is 

your biggest fear if those programs are slashed? 

Mr. DE BLASIO. My fear is we fall behind, Congressman. We 

have, over the last 15 years, since that horrible day of 9/11, innovated an approach to fighting terror, to preventing it before it happens. It has become a very refined approach and a very successful 

approach. It requires a close coordination of all of our city agencies, 

police, fire, emergency management, health, and others, but also 

close partnership with the Federal Government. I have to say, I 

think it is at an all-time high in terms of close cooperation and collaboration with FBI, Homeland Security, et cetera. 

But I think there is a phrase we use in New York City that describes the situation: ‘‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.’’ So far we have 

succeeded in preventing terror on a consistent basis. 
23 

Mr. PAYNE. Absolutely. 

Mr. DE BLASIO. But as we saw in Paris, as we saw in San 

Bernardino, the challenges are greater. That is why we created a 

stand-alone counterterror apparatus, and why we need ever more 

commitment to technology and to a more refined approach. If the 

bottom drops out of that, if the leg is taken out of the stool and 

we are no longer able to invest in improving our approach, sadly, 

we will be creating vulnerability. 

So Congressman, I would say, if one day we believe that the terror threats around the world are actually declining, well, that 

would be a glorious day where we could talk about the opportunity 

to reduce spending. But unfortunately, right now, those threats are 

increasing. They are becoming more complicated. Law enforcement 

is challenged to keep up with the capacity of terrorist organizations 

and their use of technology, which is one of the areas we most need 

to combat them with. 

So I would argue, we cannot perform that role or engage in that 

fight against terror effectively without this funding. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

Also, the fiscal year 2017 budget request cuts UASI and the State Homeland Security Grant Program collectively by over $.5 

billion. Port and transit security grants would also be cut. There 

is no question that those programs yield real security benefits. 

Meanwhile, the budget requests $49 million for counter violent extremism grants, though we have no idea what the program will 

look like or what benefit it will provide. 

In light of these uncertainties, what activities do you think CVE 

grants should support, and how can these programs be carried out 

in a way that avoids profiling? 

Mr. DE BLASIO. Thank you for the question, Congressman. 

We do support the notion of the countering violent extremism 

program. We believe that it is more important than ever for government at all levels to engage all communities, build partnerships, 

share information, create an atmosphere that is more positive and 

hopeful than it may have been in the past. 

We do not support profiling of any form. As you know, we have 

changed the policies of the previous administration to both more effectively police—because we do not believe those policies were the 

best way to counter terror—but also because if we create inadvertently a rift with any of our communities, it actually impedes the 

flow of information from the grassroots. 

So I want to make sure it is understood, we feel this about all 

communities because there is different types of challenges and 

threats and different types of violence that could emanate from a 

variety of communities. But the common link is establish deeper 

communication and respect, bring law enforcement and community 

closer together, don’t create a rift, and figure out other things we 

have to do through Government, whether it is in terms of education 

or efforts directed at young people to lift them up that actually increase the security of everyone. 

So that core philosophy we believe in, like you, we look forward 

to more elaboration of the concept from the Federal Government, 

but we believe in the philosophy. 

Mr. PAYNE. Okay. Thank you. 
24 

I had another question, but in interest of time, I will yield back 

and hopefully we have another opportunity to ask questions. 

Mr. DONOVAN. The gentleman yields back. 

The Chair will now recognize other Members of the subcommittee for questions they may wish to ask the witness. In accordance with committee rules and practice, I plan to recognize 

Members who were present at the start of the hearing by seniority 

on the subcommittee. Those coming in later will be recognized in 

the order they arrive. 

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. 

King. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, Mayor, thank you for your testimony here today. As someone who was born and raised in New York City, my father was in 

the NYPD for over 30 years, I really tremendously admire the work 

that is done by all of the agencies, especially NYPD emergency 

management, my good friend Joe Esposito there; FDNY, Lieutenant Nigro. The job that you have is one which I don’t think any 

of us envy. Maybe it is great to march in the parades, but other 

than that it’s, you know, a lot of abuse and a lot of attention. 

Even though Miss Rice and I represent Long Island, the fact is, 

people should realize that Nassau and Suffolk Counties, as well as 

Westchester are all part of the UASI. It is New York City, Nassau, 

Suffolk, Westchester, even parts of Rockland, and also, we have to 

closely coordinate with northern New Jersey. Whenever you go to 

any of the mock drills they have, you see how much coordination 

is involved. 

Also, as you said, New York City and the region, New York City 

region is the No. 1 target in the country. It is important for the 

rest of the country to realize the tremendous expense involved in 

that. I mean, you have well over 1,000 police officers working full 

time in various types of counterterrorism. They also work with the 

State police, Nassau and Suffolk police, working with the FBI and 

the JTTF, and it is a constant, really, state of war almost, at least 

a state of preventing a war. So any cuts at all really can be catastrophic to New Yorkers. 

I have been on this committee since the start, and I don’t think 

there is any one method or any one line of defense that is going 

to stop an attack. What you need are multiple defenses out there, 

and you certainly train and hope that at least one of those is going 

to work, is going to stop the next attackers. You don’t know where 

it is going to be coming from; it could be Times Square; it could 

be the Brooklyn Bridge; it could be the subway system; it could be 

anywhere. 

So I just think all of us on the committee should stand as one, 

not as Republicans or Democrats or from New York or from the 

rest of the country, realizing how vital this is that the funding be 

continued. Also, I think it is important to realize that the NYPD 

or the FDNY or emergency management, when they are out there 

doing the job, that is really not a New York City function. That is 

the Federal Government’s responsibility to protect local governments and local municipalities from being attacked. That is a Federal responsibility. 
25 

So if you are carrying out a Federal responsibility, at the very 

least you should be compensated for the work that you do. This 

isn’t a gift. This isn’t charity you are getting. I mean, you are doing 

the work that the Federal Government should be doing. The fact 

is, you are better equipped to do it in many ways. 

But, again, to be shortchanging you at a time like this, when the 

ISIS threats have never been greater, when we still have al-Qaeda, 

we still have al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, and we have the 

self-starters. We have the people at home sitting in their apartment with the computer who, you know, can become radicalized. 

So I am just going to give you the opportunity to expand on how 

essential it is that all of the city departments and the neighboring 

locales receive the funding they need on homeland security. 

Mr. DE BLASIO. Thank you very much, Congressman. 

Congressman, let me also thank you at the outset, and all of your 

colleagues. I know you played a particularly crucial role in finally 

passing the Zadroga Act. I want to thank you for first responders 

in New York and all over America and so many people who were 

affected by 9/11. That was such a profound victory. Thank you for 

your leadership. 

Mr. KING. Thank you, Mayor. 

Mr. DE BLASIO. You said it perfectly in that every single one of 

our officers at any given moment any day could be involved in 

counterterrorism activity. That means being aware that the smallest clue could lead to something much bigger, and that is why we 

put a big emphasis on training. So all of our officers are being 

trained to prepare for a variety of scenarios. That is why we need 

the active-shooter training, because instantly there may be a crisis. 

It is also why we emphasize technology, that now we are able with 

resources that we provide at a local level to, for example, put a description of a terrorist, an individual, out to all 36,000 officers instantly and now they are all at that moment looking for that individual. Or, again, an officer may see something on the ground that 

indicates the potential of a threat that then alerts everyone else to 

go into action. 

So because we have been hit, we don’t see this as an abstraction. 

We feel it very personally. We know this threat is very real because 

20 times threats were attempted against us. We know that every 

one of our officers has to be vigilant at all times. So we will always 

pay our fair share, but I agree with your core point. For the Federal Government to step back and create a situation where a locality can’t do all that is needed to protect against terror makes no 

sense at this moment in history. 

It is such a pervasive threat that literally every one of our officers—and that extends, of course, to emergency management and 

fire as well—knows at any given moment they have to be involved 

not only in preventing but, God forbid, responding to an incident. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Mayor, my time is expired. I just would like to 

add, I want to make sure we maintain the unity here today. I do 

have some differences with you and Mr. Payne on the whole issue 

of policing. But, again, you guys are doing a great job. Today is not 

the day to bring that up. I just want to again thank you for what 

is happening. Let’s stay united today. We worked together on other 

issues. We will do it on this. I just want to put that on the record. 
26 

Mr. DE BLASIO. I thank you. My door is always open, Congressman. 

Mr. KING. I know that as well. Thank you, Mayor. Thank you 

very much. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mr. King. 

The Chair now recognizes the Congresswoman from New York, 

Miss Rice. 

Miss RICE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to echo what my colleague Pete King just said. I 

think it is very clear the Federal Government is responsible for 

protecting the homeland. New York City is the prime target in the 

homeland, and it is really that simple. 

So as someone who, like Pete, you know, whose district we share 

a border with the city, and as a former homicide prosecutor in 

Brooklyn, I just want to extend this committee’s full appreciation 

to you, Mr. Mayor, and to Commissioner Bratton and the men and 

women of the NYPD. You have done an extraordinary job making 

the city safer under your watch, and that is a good thing for all 

of our nearby communities and for me personally, and for all of the 

members of the NYPD who happen to reside out on Long Island 

and in our district. 

So I want to ask a question that I think goes to security both 

in the city and locally in my district. I am talking about the ongoing dispute between Apple and the Justice Department. I am 

troubled mostly by what I see as the unfortunately narrow stance 

that has emerged in what is and should be a complex debate. 

As someone who cares more than anything about our security 

but also values deeply the privacy protections that allow us to live 

safely in the digital age, I wonder if the entrenched nature of this 

debate really does it justice. Does one side have to win and one side 

have to lose? Do we have to choose between being digitally safe or 

physically safe? Just your thoughts on that, Mr. Mayor. 

Mr. DE BLASIO. Congresswoman, I think that is a fantastic question because I agree with you 100 percent. I think something has 

been missed here in this discussion. The companies involved, Apple 

and others, and their customers understandably want to protect 

their privacy, and that is an American value too. 

But I have to say, I couldn’t agree more with Director Comey and 

Commissioner Bratton and others who have said that if law enforcement doesn’t have appropriate information to pursue terror 

threats and other violent crime, of course people will be literally 

physically endangered. So we can’t have these two polar opposite 

sides staring at each other and not resolving the problem. 

What I hope there can be found is a third way, if you will, wherein the Government has access to the information in a way that is 

provided voluntarily by these companies, obviously always with a 

court order and appropriate judicial process. 

But I think the companies do owe it to the Nation to come up 

with a procedure for providing that information to law enforcement. I respect that they have some limitations that they are concerned about. I believe there is a reasonable process that can be 

determined to make sure that no piece of information that could 

stop violence is ever withheld, but at the same time respect privacy 

rights. 
27 

I believe there is a compromise that could be struck. I think it 

begins with the company stating their willingness to break out of 

the current paradigm and agree that they do have more power to 

help law enforcement, that it does not implicitly mean that they 

would be giving up privacy standards. 

So that is what I hope we can all work on together, is a different 

approach that gets us to that very simple end goal, preventing violence. 

Miss RICE. Couldn’t agree with you more. The Chairman, one of 

our former colleagues, Cy Vance, came down here a year ago talking about just this whole encryption issue and what an obstacle it 

is to law enforcement, which is particularly problematic just given 

the daily threats that we face. 

Just to go back to the money, so we are all talking about how 

much of a cut has been proposed. In a perfect world, what would 

you be asking for if the funds were—well, I shouldn’t say the funds 

were unlimited because they are not, but maintain the status quo. 

Is that enough? Would you ask for an increase? Slight? Big? Give 

us some perspective. 

Mr. DE BLASIO. Look, I will state the obvious: The first is to protect the consistent funding we have received, because we have depended on it. We have bluntly assumed it would be consistent 

given the environment we are all working in. I think we clearly 

want to go farther and continue to innovate. I talked to you about 

some of the areas that we need to do more on in terms of technology, for example. 

So additional resources would help us do better. It is as simple 

as that. We want to continue this extraordinary work of preventing 

terrorists. It is in the interest of the entire Nation. So clearly, more 

resources would mean more technology, more training, more ability 

to stop terror, but at minimum, keeping consistent with previous 

funding. 

I also want to say on the previous point, I thank you for standing 

up on the issue of the information that law enforcement needs. You 

understand as a former prosecutor. But I do ask of you and your 

colleagues, please stand up for all of us at the local level who are 

trying to prevent violence and stand up for law enforcement. I 

would like to believe this would be an area of bipartisan consensus. 

Let’s work together to help those companies find an outcome that 

they can live with but that still prevents violence. 

Miss RICE. Agreed. Thank you very much, Mr. Mayor. 

I yield back. 

Mr. DONOVAN. The gentlewoman yields back. 

My colleague, Ranking Member Payne, had another question if, 

Mayor, you have time to entertain. 

Mr. DE BLASIO. Of course. Yes. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mayor de Blasio, I know that this isn’t an issue specifically within the scope of today’s hearing, but I believe that it is related. First 

responders in my district, as well in New York, rely on T-band 

spectrum for radio communications. Unfortunately, the legislation 

that authorized FirstNet requires eleven jurisdictions, including 
28 

ours, to relinquish the spectrum by 2023, unless Congress acts to 

extend the deadline. 

Can you share some of the concerns New York City’s first responders have about their emergency communication capabilities in 

light of the deadline and the associated cost of transitioning off the 

T-band? 

Mr. DE BLASIO. Thank you, Congressman. Yes, I share your view. 

T-band is a critical part of the work we do in terms of emergency 

communications. Disrupting that reality could prove to be very 

dangerous. 

We have, as you know, a very highly-developed apparatus in 

New York City to protect our people and protect, again, the 60 million people who visit every year. It has to do with a number of 

agencies constantly working together in a very crowded, complex 

environment. The current communications structure allows us to 

do that work. 

If Congress doesn’t act and we have to relinquish the current approach, we fear a situation that is really disruptive. I think this is 

a case where there should be real care taken to not upset something that is working currently. We all appreciate innovation. We 

all appreciate opportunities to do things differently, but not if they 

undermine something that is working currently and don’t replace 

it in an appropriate manner. 

So right now, I would ask that, with your support, ask that the 

Congress act to reverse the T-band give-back, because we do fear 

the consequences otherwise. 

Mr. PAYNE. Absolutely. You know, we talk about supporting our 

first responders and then we find circumstances, situations where 

something like this potentially could occur. I mean, we have a saying in Newark: ‘‘If you are going to be about it, stay about it.’’ So 

to change and disrupt that is very troubling. So we want to continue to support our first responders. We expect a lot of them and 

they do the job, and so we need to give them the support they deserve. 

Thank you. 

Mr. DE BLASIO. Thank you very much. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Mr. Mayor, I want to thank you for your valuable 

testimony and for clarifying for the Members of this committee the 

hollow excuses of the administration that there is $600 million that 

New York City hasn’t spent. I guess the administration doesn’t 

know about bidding process, VENDEXing, and everything else that 

we have to do back home to assure that the quality of the product 

we are purchasing and the preparation and the training that we 

need takes time. 

As one of the 8.5 million people who lives in the city that you 

lead, I thank you for all you are doing to protect me and my family. 

Mr. KING. Mr. Chairman, could I make one final statement? 

Mr. DONOVAN. You sure can. You are my mentor. You can. 

Mr. KING. Mayor, you generously gave me credit for being involved in the Zadroga 9/11 Act. Miss Rice was also involved. But 

I know you think Dan Donovan is such a nice guy. As soon as that 

bill was passed, he said, King, you were here for 14 years, you 

couldn’t get it done. He was here 4 months and it passed. So he 
29 

is taking all the credit for Zadroga. I think that should be on the 

record. 

Mr. DONOVAN. I would have arrived earlier if I knew he needed 

the help, Mayor. 

Mr. DE BLASIO. That is right. You just should have asked, right. 

Thank you, Congressman. 

Chairman, thank you for your very generous statement. I just 

want to thank you for your leadership. As I said, it is essential to 

the people of New York City that you are in this role, and obviously, for all the people of this country. I want to thank you for 

your leadership. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mayor. 

This panel is dismissed. The clerk will prepare the witness table 

for the second panel. 

Again, we thank you, Mr. Mayor, for all of your participation in 

this hearing. 

Mr. DE BLASIO. Thank you. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. DONOVAN. I would like to welcome our second panel to today’s hearing and thank them for their participation. 

Mr. Jim Butterworth serves as the director of the Georgia Emergency Management Agency/Homeland Security, a position which he 

was appointed to in January 2015. Prior to his appointment, Mr. 

Butterworth served for 4 years as the adjutant general of Georgia. 

Previously, he served as a State Senator representing the 50th District in northeast Georgia. Mr. Butterworth is testifying on behalf 

of the National Emergency Management Association. 

Welcome, sir. 

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Chief Rhoda Mae Kerr serves as the fire chief of 

the Austin Fire Department and previously served in the same position with the city of Little Rock, Arkansas. She was also the deputy fire chief in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Chief Kerr is the president and chair of the board of directors of the International Association of Fire Chiefs, and she is testifying in that capacity today. 

Welcome, Chief. 

Chief KERR. Thank you. 

Mr. DONOVAN. George Turner was appointed as the 23rd chief of 

police for the city of Atlanta on July 9, 2010. He is a 32-year veteran of the Atlanta Police Department and has worked in all areas 

of the department, including the uniformed division and investigations. Chief Turner previously served as the deputy chief of the 

support services division, which consists of the corporate services 

section, 9/11 communications center, information services section, 

and training academy. Chief Turner also serves as the second vice 

president of the Major Cities Chiefs Association, and he is testifying in that capacity today. 

Welcome, Chief. 

Mike Sena is the director of the Northern California Regional Intelligence Center, the fusion center in the San Francisco Bay Area. 

He currently serves as the president of the National Fusion Center 

Association, which represents the 78 State and locally-owned and 

-operated fusion centers across the country. Mr. Sena is testifying 

on behalf of the National Fusion Center Association. 
30 

Welcome, sir. 

Mr. SENA. Thank you. 

Mr. DONOVAN. I now yield to the Ranking Member to introduce 

our final witness. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

It is my pleasure today to welcome Sergeant Greg Kierce, who 

serves as Jersey City’s director of Office of Emergency Management 

and Homeland Security. Sergeant Kierce’s professional background 

encompasses more than 30 years of law enforcement. He maintains 

a successful record of achieving law enforcement objectives, including reduced crime, greater public safety and security, and stronger 

relationships with the local community. He has demonstrated a 

proven ability to lead, coach, and direct law enforcement professionals to maximize the productivity and enhance workplace efficiency through process improvement. 

I want to thank you for the time that you have allowed us to 

have you come down here before the subcommittee, and I look forward to your testimony. 

Mr. Chairman, just before I yield back, for full disclosure, there 

is a possibility that Chief Kerr taught me to swim as a child at 

Camp Kiamesha back in New Jersey. So I just wanted to put that 

on the record. I yield back. 

Mr. DONOVAN. The gentleman yields back. 

Chief, we are not going to hold you to his inability to swim. 

Welcome, Sergeant. 

Thank you, Mr. Payne. 

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Butterworth for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF JIM BUTTERWORTH, DIRECTOR, EMERGENCY 

MANAGEMENT AGENCY/HOMELAND SECURITY, STATE OF 

GEORGIA, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSOCIATION 

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Payne, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, my name 

is Jim Butterworth, and I am the director of the Georgia Emergency Management Agency and Office of Homeland Security. I am 

also the homeland security advisor to Governor Nathan Deal. 

I am here on behalf of the National Emergency Management 

Agency or NEMA. I appreciate the opportunity to come before you 

today to discuss FEMA preparedness grants and the specific impact 

proposed cuts in the fiscal year 2017 budget could have on States 

across the country. 

As stated, the administration’s fiscal year 2017 budget proposals 

include significant cuts to many of FEMA’s grant programs that 

support State and local disaster response. These grants have been 

used to enact many programs that did not previously exist in the 

scale needed, if at all, to address the new and ever-changing 

threats facing our Nation. It is impossible to imagine a scenario in 

which the significant proposed cuts do not affect the operational capabilities at the State and local level. 

The threat of terror attacks here in the United States continues 

to evolve and increase. Chattanooga, Fort Hood, Boston, and now 

San Bernardino, all illustrate the need for continued investments. 

The growing number of novel events that can take unexpected 
31 

turns has prompted greater involvement by emergency management for its capability, experience, and flexibility to deal with 

issues as they emerge. While the country has made significant 

strides in our understanding of and preparedness for these events, 

this is not the time to scale back these efforts. 

In Georgia, State homeland security grants have been utilized to 

develop and grow specialized programs, fund training and exercise, 

and build equipment caches that were beyond the reach of State 

and local governments to fund in traditional methods. 

I have included several examples in my written testimony that 

illustrate the numerous programs that have been implemented in 

my State with support from these grants. These are only a small 

portion of the resources within Georgia that rely on homeland security grant funds for continued funding to maintain and sustain the 

capability that has been built in our State. 

The issue we now face is that beginning with the decline seen 

in fiscal year 2011 cycle, many of the programs that once received 

annual funding are now only receiving funding on a rotating basis, 

roughly every 2 or 3 years. If funding were to drop further below 

their current levels, as they do in the current proposed President’s 

budget, we would begin to see a contraction in the needed capability we have been able to achieve in Georgia. 

In addition to the proposed cuts to the State homeland security 

grants, Georgia, like many States, would also feel the effects of the 

reduction of funds provided through the Urban Area Security Initiative, as has been discussed already. 

GEMA/Homeland Security works in close conjunction with the 

Metro Atlanta, UASI, and the separate but critical funding allotment they receive allows GEMA/Homeland Security to leverage 

more of a traditional State homeland security grant funding to the 

benefit of lesser at-risk, yet still critical cities and regions across 

the State, multiplying the effectiveness of both grant programs in 

enhancing the capability of both urban and suburban public safety. 

Three final points I would like to make: First, impacts to response and recovery capabilities do not stop at a State’s border. 

Through mutual aid facilitated by the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, or EMAC, any decrease in funding reverberates 

across the Nation. This year, the administration proposes a 56 percent cut to the very platform that supports the sharing of resources 

across the Nation in times of crisis. 

Using EMAC, much of the assets and capability built with homeland security grant funding is readily deployable to support emergency or disaster operations throughout the country. Funded at $2 

million, this system saves the Government money and is the backbone of a truly National response and recovery network. 

We truly appreciate the administration’s support for a fully-funded emergency management performance grant program. EMPG is 

the only source of Federal funding directed to State and local governments for planning, training, exercises, and key professional expertise for all-hazards emergency preparedness. EMPG stands as 

the beacon of Congressional commitment to ensuring communities 

and States are more ready to prepare, mitigate, respond, and recover from any number of emergencies and disasters. 
32 

Last, Federal funding for homeland security grant programs has 

decreased by more than 75 percent since the program’s inception 

in 2003, yet the structure remains unchanged. Declining budgets at 

all levels of government have increased the need to leverage resources and to facilitate cross-jurisdictional coordination. We can 

no longer afford to operate in separate silos. Given these on-going 

challenges and the current fiscal environment, the need for reform 

of these preparedness grants has never been more urgent. 

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to address these critical 

issues in the emergency management community. It speaks volumes that your first hearing as Chairman of the subcommittee 

would be dedicated to the critical fiscal challenges facing the emergency management and homeland security community in these uncertain times. 

Thank you for the opportunity to be here and to testify before the 

committee. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Butterworth follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JIM BUTTERWORTH

MARCH 15, 2016 

INTRODUCTION

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Payne, and distinguished Members 

of the subcommittee. Mr. Chairman, I do want to take a moment to congratulate 

you on your new position on the subcommittee and thank Representative McSally 

for her commitment to emergency management and public safety. We are looking 

forward to working with you in this new capacity. 

As stated, my name is Jim Butterworth, and I am the director of the Georgia 

Emergency Management Agency/Homeland Security. I am here on behalf of the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA), which represents the State 

emergency management directors of the 50 States, territories, and District of Columbia. NEMA’s members, many of whom, like me, also serve as Homeland Security 

Advisors, are prepared to deal with an ever-changing and increasingly complex set 

of challenges that test traditional approaches to natural and man-made disasters. 

I appreciate the chance to come before you today to discuss FEMA Preparedness 

Grants at large and the specific impact proposed cuts in the fiscal year 2017 budget 

could have on States across the country. 

PROPOSED CUTS THREATEN PROGRESS SINCE 9/11

In early February, the administration’s fiscal year 2017 budget proposal was released and was met with concern from State, Tribal, and local emergency managers 

and homeland security officials. Significant cuts are proposed to vital FEMA Preparedness Grants. Overall, these programs would see a cut of 44 percent below fiscal year 2016 enacted levels. The Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) Program 

would be cut by 45 percent, from $600 million for fiscal year 2016 to $330 million 

in fiscal year 2017. The State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) would 

be cut by 57 percent, from $467 million to $200 million. Public Transportation Security Assistance would be cut by 15 percent to $85,000 next year while Port Security 

grants are cut by 7 percent to $93 million. It is impossible to imagine a scenario 

in which those cuts, as significant as they are, do not, over time, affect the operational capabilities at the State and local level. 

The proposed cuts are incongruous with the current threat environment. The 

threat of terror attacks here in the United States continue to evolve and increase. 

While the country has made significant strides in our understanding of and preparedness for these events, this isn’t the time to scale back those efforts. Chattanooga, Fort Hood, Boston, and now San Bernardino all illustrate the need for continued investments in strategic priorities. The Department of Homeland Security 

recognized the need for funding aimed at addressing CVE and coordinated/complex 

terror attacks through a new grant program funding in the fiscal year 2016 Omnibus. By proposing similar funding in 2017, it is clear this investment is not a fleeting effort and we are looking forward to engaging with DHS and FEMA to better 
33 

understand how that funding will be distributed, what will be eligible, and how success will be measured. 

Emergency managers today, at all levels, must be prepared to deal with an everchanging and increasingly complex set of challenges that test traditional approaches 

to disaster and emergency preparedness and response. The growing number of novel 

events that can take unexpected turns has prompted greater involvement by emergency management for its capability, experience, and flexibility to deal with issues 

as they emerge. Regardless of the amount of funding you push towards new priorities, however, the systems, structures, personnel, and capabilities built and sustained through years of dedicated investments must not be neglected. 

Homeland Security Grant Program 

Since the inception of the State Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP), 

NEMA has maintained support of these grants as critical resources to help State 

and local governments build and sustain capabilities to address various threats and 

hazards. As FEMA describes it, this grant program plays an important role in the 

implementation of the National Preparedness System (NPS) by supporting the 

building, sustainment, and delivery of core capabilities essential to achieving the 

National Preparedness Goal (NPG) of a secure and resilient Nation. 

With the introduction and evolution of the Threat Hazard Identification and Risk 

Assessment (THIRA) process, States are becoming increasingly aware of their risks 

and creating partnerships with all critical stakeholders involved in addressing these 

challenges. As the risk assessment process improves, measuring progress towards 

common goals improves as well. The current process isn’t perfect and the National 

Preparedness Report will continue to be refined over time. 

In Georgia, SHSGP is crucial in supporting investments that help us in reaching 

the NPG and that have now been recognized as best-practice activities. The challenge we now face is ensuring these programs are funded at a level that allows 

them to continue to serve and protect the State as threats to homeland security and 

critical infrastructure increase and evolve. This challenge is only compounded by the 

dramatic decrease in SHSGP funds the State now receives compared to past years. 

Our funding for fiscal year 2015 is more than an 87 percent decrease from the 

amount ($54 million) we received in the highest year of funding. The following are 

an example of programs in Georgia that utilized the SHSGP funding over several 

grant cycles to enact many needed and noteworthy programs that did not previously 

exist in the scale needed, if at all, to address the new threats facing our Nation: 

• Fifteen multi-jurisdictional regional Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams, 

which give State-wide coverage for complicated technical rescues (ex: collapsed 

buildings and structures, wide-spread building and dwelling damage response), 

and provide command-and-control capability of disaster response assets for 

large-scale natural disasters or terroristic activity. 

• Eight K–9 teams that assist in the recovery of the remains of those who die 

in natural disasters or terrorist events. 

• Nine law enforcement teams that are trained and equipped to respond to an 

event where the involvement of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosives (CBRNE) would bar unprotected law enforcement from entering the 

scene. 

• 52 Hazardous Materials Response Teams (HAZMAT) that enable local fire departments to detect, safely respond to, and rapidly mitigate extraordinary chemical events. 

• 16 Bomb Disposal Units (BDU) and Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) response teams, to handle the rapidly-increasing threat of bomb and explosive attacks across the State. 

• 41 Bomb Dog Teams, to enable schools, colleges, Government buildings and special events to be safely checked and rapidly cleared of suspected explosives. 

• Logistical support for the Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center 

(GISAC) facility, along with salary and IT support for 5 terrorism analysts and 

2 Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) coordinators. 

• 19 jurisdictions in the Georgia Terrorism Information Program (GTIP) program, 

that enables local law enforcement in the highest-threat urban areas of the 

State to communicate and collaborate on terrorist threat activity. 

• Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources (CI/KR) Protection Team—a small 

team of GEMA/HS employees dedicated to providing site surveys and technical 

security assistance to identified CI/KR sites in Georgia. 

• 70 local Citizen Corps teams, that have proven valuable in preparing local citizens to be more self-reliant in the first hours after a disaster or terrorist event, 

thus lessening the burden of first responders. 
34 

• The Georgia Interoperability Network (GIN), where 179 local and disparate 

public safety radio systems have been given a level of interoperability across the 

State not before possible. 

Urban Area Security Initiative 

The Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grant program is designed to distribute Federal grant funding to an urban region composed of multiple local governments and first responder agencies rather than a single city. Our most critical 

urban centers are not islands unto themselves and often rely on infrastructure and 

support mechanisms far outside their city’s political boundaries. According to the 

Government Accountability Office (GAO), the purpose of the UASI program is to 

support regional collaboration among local jurisdictions and emergency response organizations in order to build and sustain preparedness capabilities vital to preventing, protecting, mitigating against, responding to, and recovering from acts of 

terrorism. This regional approach to preparedness is an efficient and effective use 

of Government funding as it discourages an individualistic pursuit of equipment and 

encourages collaboration in training and exercising. 

In the State of Georgia, we work with the Metro Atlanta UASI, to further the 

goals and objectives of DHS and the State in building an enhanced and sustainable 

capacity to prevent, protect, respond to, and recover from disasters and threats or 

acts of terrorism in the densely-populated and critically-vital metropolitan Atlanta 

area. GEMA/HS serves as a pass-through for DHS grant funding that supports the 

Metro Atlanta UASI’s activities. Its governance is executed in the form of a senior 

policy group which consists of the mayor of the city of Atlanta (who serves as chairman) and the chairpersons of the county commissions, which make up its jurisdiction. The Metro Atlanta UASI was originally comprised of the city of Atlanta, Fulton 

County, and DeKalb County; however, in 2009, its jurisdiction expanded to include 

Clayton, Cobb, and Gwinnett Counties to better encompass the region and leverage 

the capabilities being built and sustained with traditional SHSGP funds. 

The separate but critical funding allotment for the Metro Atlanta UASI allows 

GEMA/HS to leverage more of the traditional SHSGP funding to the benefit of other 

lesser at-risk, yet still critical, cities and regions across the State—multiplying the 

effectiveness of both grant programs in enhancing the capability of both urban and 

suburban public safety. 

The Metro Atlanta UASI has built a great deal of capability and capacity with 

funds from past grant cycles to address the unique homeland security needs of this 

high-threat, high-density urban area, and to assist the surrounding local governments in the Atlanta region in building and sustaining their vital public safety capabilities. However, funding levels for recent years represents a dramatic reduction 

in funds compared to what was previously made available. Over the past few years, 

the Metro Atlanta UASI received approximately $5 million annually in UASI-specific grant funds, compared to a high of more than $18 million in 2006. These extensive cuts in funding mean that the UASI can only maintain and sustain existing 

programs, training, and equipment; it can no longer make new investments or expand outside the region. Any further reductions will cause a cascading effect on both 

grant programs, as established programs could no longer be continued at the basic 

maintenance levels they are at now. If we were the target of a terroristic attack or 

if struck by a major disaster, failure to sustain these vital programs could have catastrophic effects on the ability of the region to properly protect the infrastructure, 

economy, and the local populace so critical to our State and Nation. 

MUTUAL AID SUPPORTS NATIONAL RESPONSE CAPABILITY

As explained above, cuts to critical preparedness grant programs impact individual States in substantial ways. Impacts to response and recovery capabilities, 

however, do not stop at a State’s borders. Through mutual aid, facilitated by the 

Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC), any decrease in funding for 

building homeland security and emergency management capacity reverberates 

across the Nation. EMAC was the first National disaster-relief compact ratified by 

Congress since the Civil Defense and Disaster Compact of 1950. Since ratification 

in 1996, every State, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin Islands have enacted legislation to become EMAC members. All resources in a 

State can deploy through EMAC (fire-hazmat, law enforcement, public health, medical, mass care, animal response, emergency medical services, National Guard, public works, search & rescue, transportation, human services, engineering, agriculture 

& forestry, emergency/incident management). 

Coupled with cuts to preparedness grants, the administration proposed a massive 

cut to the very platform that supports the sharing of resources across the Nation 

in times of crisis. FEMA’s proposed 56% cut of funding to EMAC would effectively 
35 

roll EMAC back to 2003–2007 administrative levels. The 2008 increase in administrative funds was a direct result of the post-Katrina report completed in 2007 by 

the Government Accountability Office (GAO). Since that time, the EMAC structure 

has matured and evolved, and has played a crucial role in disaster response to thousands of events. 

While the primary focus on EMAC training is inter-State mutual aid, EMAC is 

built upon a State’s intra-State mutual aid program and resource inventory. Nationally, States have been working with the resource providers to inventory their resources and capabilities for both intra-State and inter-State use and pre-plan the 

sharing of resources through EMAC, using the Threat Hazard Identification and 

Risk Assessment (THIRA) process to help identify resource shortfalls. The direct impacts of budget cuts on EMAC are easy to visualize but what is less obvious is the 

resounding impact these cuts would have across the Nation. The National Guard 

Bureau (NGB) has built their J–3 Operations and Defense Support for Civil Authority (DSCA) around the use of EMAC for the deployment of State National Guard 

resources between States. EMAC truly is the DSCA backbone within NGB. Without 

a strong EMAC interface the Guard would have a hard time both deploying resources timely and efficiently thus delaying vital resources to disaster-affected 

areas. 

NORTHCOM Director of Military Support (DOMS) process also relies on the 

EMAC process. DOMS is the Department of Defense’s representative on the Catastrophic Disaster Response Group (CDRG). The CDRG is the National-level coordinating group that addresses policy issues and support requirements during a disaster, emergency, and/or terrorist event from NORTHCOM. 

As this committee knows, all assets supported in part or entirely with fiscal year 

2016 Homeland Security Grant Program funding that will be distributed this year 

must be readily deployable to support emergency or disaster operations through 

EMAC. To ensure a ‘‘National’’ system for use of that equipment EMAC is the only 

solution. The proposed budget cut to EMAC would be devastating for this essential 

program that facilitates efficient and effective resource sharing across the Nation. 

BUILDING CAPACITY WITH EMPG

While NEMA is concerned with the cuts to critical preparedness grant programs 

like SHSGP and UASI, we did want to highlight a grant program that continues 

to be invaluable to the emergency management community. States and locals build 

capacity and enhance their capability to respond to disasters when they utilize the 

Emergency Management Performance Grants (EMPG). The fiscal year 2017 proposal requests sustained funding for this program at $350 million. 

EMPG is the only source of Federal funding directed to State and local governments for planning, training, exercises, and key professional expertise for all-hazards emergency preparedness. The money is often used to conduct risk and hazard 

assessments and support emergency operations centers which are the coordination 

hubs for all disaster response. The program also provides public education and outreach, enhanced interoperable communications capabilities, and the ability to manage State-wide alerts and warnings. 

For example, in fiscal year 2015, EMPG significantly contributed to, among other 

things, planning, exercising, and mutual aid efforts. In total, 1,707 State and 5,733 

local plans were developed, maintained, or updated using EMPG funds. EMPG supported 1,143 State-wide and 4,756 local and Tribal workshops, drills, and functional 

full-scale exercises, which benefited 96,361 State and 447,707 local participants. 

Without a comprehensive exercise program to complement the training efforts, the 

preparedness cycle would be compromised. Support from EMPG is crucial in maintaining mutual aid efforts across the various levels of government. In fiscal year 

2014, EMPG supported 6,453 local and Tribal and 4,819 State-wide mutual aid 

agreements, memorandums of understanding, and memorandums of agreement with 

neighboring jurisdictions, non-profit agencies, Volunteer Organizations Active in 

Disasters (VOADS), and the private sector. 

Recipients of this grant continue demonstrating a strong commitment; for every 

dollar of Federal funds invested, at least that much is matched by both grantees 

and sub-grantees. In the absence of these funds, State and local governments would 

struggle to maintain the personnel or capabilities necessary to build and sustain an 

effective emergency management system. EMPG stands as the beacon of Congressional commitment to ensuring communities and States are more ready to prepare, 

mitigate, respond, and recover from any number of emergencies and disasters. 

EMPG does far more, however, than provide funds for planning, training, exercises, 

and communications. EMPG must continue to be strengthened and maintained 

through shared investments. 
36 

GRANTS STRUCTURE OF THE FUTURE

Federal funding for homeland security grant programs has decreased by more 

than 75 percent since the program’s inception in 2003, yet the structure remains 

unchanged. Congress has recognized this continuing disconnect and included language in annual appropriations bills as recently as fiscal year 2012 to push for 

‘‘long-overdue’’ and ‘‘bold’’ reform of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s 

(FEMA) administration of its State and Local Programs. (House Report 112–91 accompanying the Fiscal Year 2012 Homeland Security Appropriations bill (H.R. 

2017), part of Public Law 112–33; September 30, 2011) 

Important improvements have been made to processes for assessing risk and strategic planning, but the current grant program design can no longer achieve the type 

of accountability Congress demands and support the preparedness capabilities our 

communities need. Given these on-going challenges and the current fiscal environment, the need for reform of these preparedness grant programs has never been 

more urgent. In the fiscal year 2013 budget, FEMA provided a proposal to consolidate grant programs into a new National Preparedness Grant Program (NPGP). 

While not a perfect proposal, it did succeed in fostering a dialogue on our enduring 

challenges with the suite of 16 separate preparedness grant programs. After unsuccessful attempts in 3 consecutive budget proposals, the administration did not include the proposal in their fiscal year 2017 proposal but some consolidation has occurred over time. The tenants of comprehensive reform, however, remain just as important as they were in 2012. Since 2003, the grant programs have allocated more than $40 billion to State and 

local governments to build and sustain preparedness capabilities. The successful 

outcomes supported by this investment must be acknowledged. At the same time, 

the need to better align these grant programs with today’s fiscal realities and operational challenges must also be recognized. At their inception, the grant programs 

were required to address an unknown threat environment after September 11, 2001. 

More than $4 billion in funding was made available through State and local preparedness grants in fiscal year 2003 alone. In addition to fiscal changes, the environment now incorporates the new ‘‘all-hazards’’ focus stemming from lessons 

learned after Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and subsequent multi-State disasters. A 

key lesson from those events is the importance of intergovernmental collaboration 

and integrating preparedness planning and response activities to ensure unity of effort. 

Declining budgets at all levels of Government have increased the need to leverage 

resources and facilitate cross-jurisdictional coordination. We can no longer afford to 

operate in separate silos. Unfortunately, the current suite of grant programs perpetuates such separations and no longer reflects on-going efforts to align State and 

local capabilities with National preparedness objectives. 

Today’s dynamic threat environment requires a grants program that prioritizes 

investments based on risk while maintaining State and local ability to sustain prior 

investments that support National goals. Grant programs must be flexible and agile 

to address changing hazards and ensure local investments synchronize with Statewide and regional priorities. 

Duplicative reporting requirements and increased administrative burden under 

the current framework also diminish return on investment (ROI) as more time and 

money must be spent on grants administration and management. Comprehensive 

reform would better facilitate maximum efficiency of taxpayer dollars and better enable accurate measure of ROI over time. This flexibility with accountability can represent the face of these reformed grant programs. For only through comprehensive 

changes to the existing structures can we achieve a more effective preparedness program for States and locals. 

CONCLUSION

Again, I appreciate the opportunity to address these issues critical to the emergency management community. This committee regularly affirms support for ensuring preparedness for our Nation’s vulnerabilities against all hazards. It speaks volumes, that your first hearing as Chairman of this committee would be dedicated to 

the critical fiscal challenges facing the emergency management and homeland security community in these uncertain times. 

Regardless of our country’s fiscal situation, physical security, and economic security are not mutually exclusive. Emergency managers have been absorbing budget 

cuts at the State level for years and understand they must do more with less on 

a consistent basis. Under the current risk stature, however, reducing available 

funds under the State Homeland Security Grant Program could reverse much of the 

progress our Nation spent decades building. 
37 

As you develop the fiscal year 2017 budget for the Department of Homeland Security, we encourage you to utilize our membership as a resource and continue efforts 

to build a strong and robust emergency management baseline in our country. Together, we will carry on the initiatives so thoughtfully developed and supported by 

this committee over the years. 

I thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of NEMA and appreciate your 

continued partnership. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mr. Butterworth. The Chair now recognizes Chief Kerr. 

STATEMENT OF RHODA MAE KERR, FIRE CHIEF, CITY OF AUSTIN FIRE DEPARTMENT, AUSTIN, TEXAS, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF FIRE 

CHIEFS 

Chief KERR. Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the subcommittee. I am Chief Rhoda 

Mae Kerr of the Austin Fire Department. I also am president and 

chair of the board of the International Association of Fire Chiefs. 

I thank you for the opportunity to testify today on behalf of the fire 

and emergency services. 

The IAFC is greatly concerned by the Draconian cuts to FEMA’s 

grant programs in the fiscal year 2017 budget proposal. We also oppose attempts to convert the AFG and SAFER grant programs into 

terrorism preparedness programs. In the wake of an evolving terrorist threat, now is not the time to break a system that works. 

The American taxpayers have spent more than $40 billion since 

9/11 on grant programs to improve the Nation’s preparedness and 

response system. Overall, this funding has been spent wisely to 

make the Nation safer. By using the State Homeland Security 

Grant and the UASI programs, State and local governments have 

been able to develop terrorism preparedness capabilities that did 

not exist before 9/11. Local jurisdictions have used these grant 

funds to build and staff intelligence fusion centers, develop mass 

casualty response units, and construct regional interoperable communication networks. We would not have had the funding for these 

projects without Federal assistance. 

In Austin, we were able to use FEMA-preparedness grants to 

fund annual CBRNE exercises. These exercises brought together all 

stakeholders: Fire, EMS, law enforcement, public health, city management, private sector, Federal and State partners, surrounding 

jurisdictions, et cetera. We were able to learn together how to respond to a potentially catastrophic threat. Also, we were able to 

make the necessary changes to improve our planning and operations for the future. 

Federal funding is important. As Austin demonstrated, Federal 

grants incentivize regional cooperation and coordination among all 

the Federal, State, local, and private-sector stakeholders. These 

grants also support the implementation of NIMS, which allows 

multiple agencies to communicate and function effectively. The incident scene should not be the first time for everyone to meet. We 

are better prepared for responding to a future terroristic attack due 

to the planning and training supported by the State Homeland Security Grant Program and UASI. 

The AFG and SAFER grant programs helped localities prepare 

for all hazards. The AFG grant program provides matching grants 
38 

for equipment and training. The SAFER grant program provides 

support for firefighter staffing. Both of these programs have improved the operational capabilities of fire departments across the 

Nation. When a major disaster or catastrophe occurs, the Nation 

relies upon neighboring local fire departments to provide critical 

mutual aid. 

As Federal funding for FEMA’s grant program has declined over 

the years, our main focus has been on sustaining the National preparedness and response system. That is why the IFC members are 

concerned by the proposed cuts in the President’s fiscal year 2017 

budget. The budget proposal would cut the State Homeland Security Grant Program by more than half, the UASI program would 

receive a 45 percent cut. Even the AFG and SAFER programs each 

would be cut by $10 million from last year’s appropriation. These 

grant programs are achieving their goals, and it is unwise to cut 

them. We must realize that the proposed cuts would occur in a 

dangerous and evolving threat environment. 

Last year, the Nation witnessed terrorist incidents in Garland, 

Texas; Chattanooga, Tennessee; and San Bernardino, California. 

Each of these attacks involved different tactics and techniques. 

FEMA preparedness grants help us to analyze threat information 

at the State and local level and develop capabilities for these new 

threats. We are also concerned by the budget proposal’s effort to 

convert the AFG and SAFER grant programs into terrorism response programs. 

These programs are aimed at helping fire and EMS departments 

prepare for incidents as diverse as structural fires, HAZMAT incidents, wild land fires, and even acts of terrorism. We ask that Congress protect the funding for the State Homeland Security Grant 

Program and UASI program by at least maintaining the fiscal year 

2016 appropriations level of $467 million and $600 million, respectively. For the AFG and SAFER grant programs, we ask that you 

fund each program at $405 million, the fiscal year 2011 level. We 

also ask that Congress reauthorizes the AFG and SAFER grant 

programs before they expire in 2018. 

Overall, the IAFC can attest to the fact that FEMA’s grant programs play an important role in developing and sustaining the Nation’s preparedness system. We ask that Congress maintain its 

support for these programs. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to explain the importance 

of these programs to America’s fire and emergency service, and I 

look forward to answering any questions that you may have. Thank 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Chief Kerr follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RHODA MAE KERR

MARCH 15, 2016 

Good morning, Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the 

subcommittee. I am Rhoda Mae Kerr, fire chief of the Austin Fire Department, and 

president and chair of the Board of Directors of the International Association of Fire 

Chiefs (IAFC). The IAFC represents more than 11,000 leaders of the Nation’s fire, 

rescue, and emergency medical services. Thank you for the opportunity to discuss 

the effects of cutting the preparedness grant programs at the Federal Emergency 

Management Agency (FEMA). 
39 

1Popularly known as the ‘‘FIRE’’ grant program. 

It is important to emphasize to the American taxpayers that the more than $40 

billion spent on FEMA grants have been used to develop a strong National preparedness and response system. From the fire and emergency service’s perspective, 

I would like to highlight a few grant programs with the most relevance. The State 

Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) and the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) help local fire and EMS departments to prepare for potential acts of terrorism by supporting planning, training, and equipment. The Assistance to Firefighters Grant (AFG) grant program1 (including the SAFER and Fire Prevention 

and Safety grants) help fire departments improve their baseline emergency response 

capability. 

The IAFC is greatly concerned by the administration’s fiscal year 2017 budget 

proposal. It would include Draconian cuts to the SHSGP and UASI program. Also, 

it would attempt to re-classify the AFG programs as homeland security grants. Additionally, the new budget would remove many of the separate accounts funding 

these programs and combine them under a new ‘‘Federal Assistance’’ account. Considering the growing threat of coordinated, complex attacks sponsored by foreign 

terrorist groups, we ask Congress to reject the administration’s budget proposal. 

Now is not the time to break a system that works. 

It is important to point out that the majority of the investments in preparedness 

are still made by local communities. As Federal grant funding continues to decline, 

local emergency response agencies will have to focus on sustaining our existing capabilities and using Federal funds wisely by learning from other grantees’ past experience. 

SUCCESSES OF THE CURRENT DHS GRANT SYSTEM

The current suite of FEMA preparedness grants are critical to building a National 

preparedness system. The great success of the Federal homeland security grant programs is that they provide an incentive for Federal, State, Tribal, territorial, and 

local jurisdictions to work together. By planning, training, and conducting exercises 

together, local fire chiefs, police chiefs, sheriffs, public health officials, emergency 

managers and State and Federal officials are able and ready to work together when 

an incident happens. This pre-planning and coordination prevents confusion during 

an incident and directly saves lives. 

In Austin, UASI-funded training brought together all of the regional stakeholders, 

including smaller neighboring jurisdictions, surrounding volunteer fire departments, 

the U.S. Attorney’s office, public health officials, and the city manager for annual 

exercises in response to mock chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or explosive 

(CBRNE) events. The UASI funds allowed the Austin region to complete training 

that it would not otherwise have been able to do, and brought all of the stakeholders 

together to learn how to work together in a catastrophic situation. In addition, Austin was able to purchase props and develop expertise with the initial Federal funding, so that the region could continue to host these annual exercises after the UASI 

funding expired. 

The SHSGP and UASI grants also help local jurisdictions develop capabilities for 

responding to terrorist attacks. In the National Capital Region (NCR), UASI funds 

have been used to help the area prepare for a future mass casualty incident. The 

NCR used its funds to develop 8 Medical Ambulance Buses and Mass Casualty 

units, which can each transport 40 patients and treat up to 100 patients. In addition, learning from the lessons of the response to the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon, 

the NCR also used UASI funds to develop a patient tracking system. This system 

allows EMS personnel to use hand-held devices to scan a victim’s triage tag, enter 

basic information about the patient’s identity and pre-hospital care, and transport 

the patient to the appropriate area hospital. 

In Clark County, Nevada, SHSGP, and UASI funds are used to support fusion 

center activities within the Southern Nevada Counterterrorism Center. These activities include suspicious activity analysis and reporting; evaluation and support of 

special events; multi-agency intelligence and information sharing; and the hardware 

and software to support these programs. The Federal funding also supports community outreach and education programs like ‘‘See Something, Say Something’’ campaigns; training and exercises; and the development of public/private partnerships 

to help protect the region. 

These preparedness grants also support regional coordination. Jurisdictions that 

receive FEMA grants must certify that they are compliant with the National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS is based on the fire service’s incident command system and allows multiple agencies to communicate and function effectively 
40 

during an incident response. The need for effective NIMS implementation is vital, 

especially in the case of a complex, coordinated attack like the one in Paris which 

took place in multiple locations. As Austin’s fire chief, I have found the Federal 

grant funds to be an effective catalyst for helping Federal, State, and local stakeholders to plan, train, and conduct threat-based exercises together. During the first 

hours of a major incident response, it is important that all responding agencies are 

familiar with each other and basic command-and-control functions to ensure an effective response and prevent confusion. 

I also would like to highlight the important role that the AFG program plays in 

improving the Nation’s preparedness. The AFG program uses a merit-based, peer 

review process to provide matching grants to local fire and EMS departments for 

equipment and training. The SAFER grant program uses a similar process to provide matching grants for hiring career firefighters and helping to recruit and retain 

volunteer firefighters. Here are some examples from the National Fire Protection 

Association’s (NFPA) Third Needs Assessment of the U.S. Fire Service of how the 

AFG and SAFER grants are helping local fire and EMS departments: 

• 51 percent of all fire departments that answered the NFPA survey do not have 

enough portable radios to equip all emergency responders on a shift. This percentage is down from 77 percent in 2001 and 75 percent in 2005. 

• 48 percent of all fire departments that are responsible for EMS have not formally trained all of their personnel involved in EMS. This percentage is down 

from 54 percent in 2001 and 53 percent in 2005. 

• 51 percent of all fire departments cannot equip all firefighters on a shift with 

self-contained breathing apparatus. This percentage is down from 70 percent in 

2001 and 60 percent in 2005. 

• 65 percent of all fire departments that are responsible for hazardous materials 

response have not formally trained all of their personnel involved in hazmat response. This percentage is down from 73 percent in 2001 and 71 percent in 

2005. 

As you can see, FEMA’s homeland security grants are meeting their goal in providing training and building capabilities that local fire and EMS departments could 

not otherwise develop. It is important to recognize that Federal homeland security 

grant funding has decreased over the years. Currently, preparedness grants like the 

UASI and SHSGP programs are focused on sustaining existing capabilities. Meanwhile, the AFG and SAFER programs have shown remarkable progress in improving baseline emergency response capabilities, but a lot of work remains. 

THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2017 BUDGET PROPOSAL

The IAFC has serious concerns about the administration’s fiscal year 2017 budget 

proposal. It drastically reduced many of these important grant programs: The 

SHSGP program would be cut by more than half to $267 million and the UASI program would be cut by 45% to $330 million. In addition, the AFG and SAFER grant 

programs would be cut by $10 million each and be classified as terrorism preparedness grants with a priority given to applications that ‘‘enhance capabilities for terrorism response and other major incidents.’’ 

As my testimony demonstrates, the SHSGP and UASI programs are achieving 

their missions of building terrorism response capabilities that a jurisdiction would 

not otherwise be able to afford and serving as an incentive to bring together all 

stakeholders for major training and exercises. Because of the steady decrease in 

SHSGP and UASI funding over the years, most of these funds are being used to 

sustain existing capabilities. It is unwise to cut programs that actually are achieving their objectives. 

It also is important to recognize that these cuts are proposed in a more dangerous 

threat environment. Last May, we witnessed an incident at the Curtis Culwell Center in Garland, Texas, involving 2 individuals inspired by communications with the 

Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). In July, an active shooter attacked a U.S. 

Naval Reserve Center and a military recruitment center in Chattanooga, Tennessee. 

In December, a husband and wife used active-shooter tactics with potential pipe 

bombs in San Bernardino, California. ISIS continues to threaten the U.S. homeland 

and we have learned that acts of terror can occur anywhere in the Nation. Grants 

like the SHSGP and UASI program help us to analyze threat information and develop capabilities to prepare for these new threats. 

We also have concerns about the administration’s attempts to convert the AFG 

and SAFER grant programs into terrorism response programs. These programs are 

meant to improve baseline capabilities for all-hazards response. Many fire departments around the Nation still have trouble meeting basic response requirements 

and the AFG and SAFER grant programs have proven successful at helping these 
41 

2 15 U.S.C. § 2229(l)(2). 

departments. Fire departments depend on each other to provide mutual aid in response to incidents as diverse as high-rise fires, wildland fires, and even acts of terrorism. It is important that fire departments around the Nation have basic emergency response capabilities, so that they can effectively aid each other during these 

incidents. The AFG and SAFER grant programs help support a Nation-wide response system that can escalate and respond to all hazards, not just acts of terrorism. 

Also, we oppose the administration’s attempts to set a priority for AFG and 

SAFER applications focused on terrorism response. As described in statute,2 the 

major National fire service organizations meet annually to discuss the criteria for 

the upcoming year’s AFG and SAFER grants. One complaint with the SHSGP and 

UASI programs is that FEMA changes funding priorities every year without much 

explanation. Priorities for the AFG and SAFER grant programs should be based on 

stakeholder-driven criteria and not bureaucratic whims. 

The IAFC also opposes the fiscal year 2017 budget proposal’s attempts to consolidate a number of programs, including FEMA’s preparedness grants, the U.S. Fire 

Administration, the AFG and SAFER grant programs, the Emergency Management 

Performance Grants and other programs into one ‘‘Federal Assistance’’ account. Historically, these programs have been funded under separate accounts to ensure that 

the appropriations were spent in a transparent and accountable manner. Our concern is that this transparency and accountability will be lost if these programs are 

merged into a single ‘‘Federal Assistance’’ account. 

CONCLUSION

I thank you today for the opportunity to testify about the importance of FEMA’s 

SHSGP, UASI, AFG, and SAFER grant programs. This suite of grants plays an important role in building and sustaining the National preparedness system. The 

changes proposed in the fiscal year 2017 budget proposal would hurt the ability of 

the Nation’s local fire and emergency service to protect their communities. 

For fiscal year 2017, the IAFC urges Congress to at least continue to fund the 

SHSGP program at the fiscal year 2016 level of $467 million and the UASI grant 

program at the fiscal year 2016 level of $600 million. For the AFG and SAFER 

grant programs, we ask you to fund these programs at the fiscal year 2011 level 

of $405 million each. This request is based on the steady increase in the cost of 

equipment. For example, the cost of personal protective equipment has increased by 

11.4% since 2011 and the cost of self-contained breathing apparatus has increased 

by 15%. In addition, the cost of fire apparatus also has increased: The cost of pumper trucks, which represent 60% of the apparatus market, has increased by 14.6% 

since 2011 based on increased labor and materials’ costs. To ensure continued transparency and accountability, we also recommend that Congress continue to fund 

these programs using the same appropriations account structure that has been used 

in the past. In addition, we urge Congress to reauthorize the AFG and SAFER grant 

programs which otherwise will sunset in January 2018. 

I am grateful for the committee’s leadership in addressing the needs of first responders as we prepare for an evolving terrorist threat. The IAFC looks forward to 

working with you during the fiscal year 2017 appropriations process to ensure that 

local fire and EMS departments are ready to protect their communities. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Chief Kerr. The Chair now recognizes 

Chief Turner. 

STATEMENT OF GEORGE TURNER, CHIEF OF POLICE, ATLANTA POLICE DEPARTMENT, ATLANTA, GEORGIA, TESTIFYING ON BEHALF OF THE MAJOR CITIES CHIEFS 

Chief TURNER. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Donovan, 

and Ranking Member Payne. I appear before you today as the chief 

of police of Atlanta, the largest metropolitan region in the South. 

It is also my privilege to serve on the board of directors for Major 

City Chiefs as the second vice president. I represent every major 

urban area in our Nation, the communities that would suffer most 

from further reduction in Federal assistance for law enforcement. 
42 

I speak today as one police chief on behalf of my colleagues from 

the 68 largest police departments in our country. I also received a 

letter of support from 17 organizations that represent local elected 

officials, emergency managers, port and transit operators, sheriffs, 

and major fire associations that have strong concerns about several 

severe cuts to 4 key homeland security grant programs. We ask the 

committee to consider the responsibility that each of you share 

with the chiefs of police protecting the American public from harm. 

As we reflect on the events of Paris and San Bernardino, here 

at home, it is evident that preparedness for a terrorist attack is the 

highest priority than ever before. There is a certain irony to the 

proposed cuts. They come in the wake of terrorist attacks not just 

in cities abroad, but on our own shores, in Chattanooga, San 

Bernardino, and Philadelphia, for an example. 

The proposed budget of DHS would reduce from $41.1 billion to 

$40.6 billion, a reduction of more than $500 million. But the 2 

grant programs which assist States and local agencies would be cut 

by $537 million, more than the entire amount of the reduction of 

the Department of Homeland Security. 

As a police chief, I have assigned personnel to Federal task forces 

and our regional fusion center. Every day we are asked to assist 

one of our Federal agencies or another. But funding from Washington does not even take up a small portion of the amount of 

money that Atlanta and the city police department provides. The 

same is true in every other major city in America. We are really 

subsidizing the Federal Government, because what we receive from 

Washington does not begin to pay the bill. 

The world’s busiest airport, Hartsfield-Jackson Airport, is protected by Atlanta personnel and a team effort from DHS that includes the model K–9 program we conduct with TSA. The Urban 

Area Security Initiative program funds purchases of specific equipment, including a robot that is equipped to board aircrafts. The 

Federal investment pays off each day in communities across the 

country during incidents both large and small. For example, much 

of the training and equipment used to respond to the May 2015 

Amtrak derailment in Philadelphia were paid for with grants provided by FEMA. 

Chairman Donovan and Ranking Member Payne, chiefs of police 

are grateful for all you do, and we look to you for leadership. To 

accept the proposed cuts would forfeit so much of what we have already invested in since the inception of DHS, and leave local agencies like mine on the fence to fend for themselves, with Federal 

agencies continuing to grow. 

As a police chief, we have our common bonds with you. It is the 

safety of the public we are sworn to protect and serve. To this end, 

we implore that you restore balance to the partnership with DHS 

by protecting the funds which sustain the work of the subcommittee. 

It is my pleasure to testify today. I look forward to any questions 

that you might have. I do want to talk about the fact that we need 

to continue to sustain the efforts that we have already pushed forward thus far in this partnership. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Chief Turner follows:] 
43 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GEORGE TURNER

MARCH 15, 2016 

Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the subcommittee, 

I appear before you today as the chief of police for Atlanta, the largest metropolitan 

region in the South. It is also my privilege to be on the board of directors and 2nd 

vice president for the Major Cities Chiefs, representing every major urban area in 

our Nation—the communities which would suffer most from further reductions in 

Federal assistance for law enforcement. I speak today as one police chief on behalf 

of my colleagues from the 68 largest cities in the United States. 

NEEDED SUPPORT FOR THE FRONT LINES OF PUBLIC SAFETY

As Mayor De Blasio has noted, local police and public safety officers today stand 

on the front lines of both preparedness and response, just as they did in New York 

and Washington, DC on September 11, 2001. But the proposed 2017 budget reductions represent the most drastic cuts in a downward spiral of declining help from 

Washington. In the face of the current threat, police chiefs agree with the title of 

today’s hearing—it is indeed a disaster. 

As the law enforcement witness in this hearing, I appeal to Congress not to abandon the officers who put their lives on the line every day. Forgive me if a term like 

‘‘abandon’’ sounds like hyperbole, but for police officers in every major American 

city, I can tell you this is not empty rhetoric. There is no other way to describe the 

dramatic decreases in DHS support for local police and first responders. DHS funding for the combined grant programs in 2010 was more than $3 billion. By 2016, 

the current fiscal year, it had fallen to half that amount. If Congress were to approve the cuts proposed for the coming year, law enforcement agencies could receive 

as little as a third of what was once provided by Washington. 

Federal agencies and other parts of DHS have not suffered any sort of comparable 

reductions. Speaking for men and women in uniform on the front lines, we implore 

the committee to reverse this alarming trend and to strengthen support for public 

safety in your own communities back home. 

URBAN AREA SECURITY INITIATIVE (UASI)

We ask the committee to consider the responsibility that each of you shares with 

a chief of police—protecting the American people from harm. Major Cities Chiefs 

counts every one of the UASI cities in our membership and that means we have 

a direct tie to the important work of this subcommittee. As we reflect on the events 

abroad in Paris and in San Bernardino here at home, it is evident that preparedness 

for a terrorist attack is a higher priority than ever before. Major Cities Chiefs 

hosted San Bernardino officials at our last meeting and we heard first-hand what 

comprised their preparedness and response to the attack. It was a case study in the 

work of this subcommittee—it was all about preparedness. Whether from ISIS 

abroad or home-grown extremists, the threat is real and it haunts police chiefs 

every day. But the DHS programs designed to support preparedness and prevention 

efforts have been diminished as the threat has increased. UASI is a small shadow 

of what it once. The proposed budget cuts UASI to $330 million. If you add the State 

Homeland Security Grant Program proposal for $200 million, that is a total of $550 

million, just a third of the more than $1.6 billion back in 2009 and 2010. 

PARTNERSHIPS TO PREVENT TERRORISM

In spite of these budget cuts, our work with the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice is stronger than ever before. We share intelligence, work joint cases, conduct preparedness exercises and all of these efforts 

make us stronger. Yet, funding for our Federal partners has grown while support 

for our partnership with DHS has been slashed to a fraction of what we received 

in the past. 

We ask the subcommittee to consider if this a balanced partnership. The proposed 

budget of DHS would be reduced from $41.1 billion to $40.6 billion, a reduction of 

$500 million. But the 2 grant programs which assist State and local agencies would 

be cut by $537 million, more than the entire amount of the reduction for the Department of Homeland Security. 

As a police chief, I have assigned many personnel to Federal task forces and our 

regional fusion center. Every day we are asked to assist one Federal agency or another. But funding from Washington does not even cover a small part of the cost 

to the Atlanta Police Department. The same is true in every other major American 
44 

city—we are really subsidizing the Federal Government—because what we receive 

from Washington does not begin to pay that bill. 

LAW ENFORCEMENT TERRORISM PREVENTION PROGRAM (LETPP)

Congress intended for law enforcement to have a law enforcement set-aside comparable to line item programs for Fire Chiefs, Emergency Management, Ports, and 

other top priorities. But the intent of Congress has not been followed when it comes 

to LETPP, as it is no longer a stand-alone program and no longer a priority. Congress directed that LETPP should be funded at not less than 25% of the sum of 

SHSGP and UASI. Rather than maintain LETPP as a program and fund it at the 

required level, FEMA eliminated the program and merely applied the percentage to 

broad definitions in the other programs. For the proposed budget, that would represent about $137 million, less than a third of the amount now proposed for cybersecurity and less than a third law enforcement funding in 2009 and 2010. 

Unlike the other programs called out in legislation, terrorism prevention and law 

enforcement have somehow disappeared. There is no line item, no set-aside, and no 

separate program. Unlike the past practice where an LETPP amount was separately 

designated for each State, now only 2 programs appear—the State grant program 

and UASI. Following Paris and San Bernardino, LETPP is gone at a time when it 

is needed more than ever before. 

FUNDING CONSISTENCY AND CONTINUITY

The process used by DHS to determine UASI funding continues to be both vexing 

and contradictory. For many of the major cities it has been a roller coaster ride of 

ups and downs. Police chiefs cannot even consider a preparedness budget when they 

do not know if they are ‘‘in or out’’. Take the case of Las Vegas, obviously an iconic 

terrorist target with more and more venues growing each year. But according to the 

formula process, Las Vegas is a threat some years and not others. We would ask 

the committee to investigate how these decisions are made, in order to ensure consistency and continuity for preparedness planning in the years to come. 

INVESTMENT AND SUSTAINMENT

Official reports indicate that Congress has invested upwards of $40 billion across 

the Nation since DHS was established. As you look forward into 2017, I would suggest to the committee that you also look back on what you have already invested. 

I have been with the Atlanta Police Department every day since the September 11 

attacks and I have witnessed all that DHS has done to help my department and 

our community. These efforts were never planned as one-time events. Baseline capabilities were reached, Federal standards were satisfied—but it’s my job to ensure 

that these preparedness capabilities are sustained. I cannot do so if the proposed 

cuts were to be approved by Congress. 

An example of a success partnership is our work with TSA and other DHS components at the Atlanta Airport. The world’s busiest airport, the Hartsfield Jackson 

Airport is protected by Atlanta personnel in a team effort with DHS that includes 

a model canine program we conduct with TSA. 

Sustainment is an on-going challenge. Exercises must be repeated for new and 

changing personnel. Equipment must be serviced and updated. Even batteries must 

be replaced. Virtually none of the DHS investments will last indefinitely. Mr. Chairman, to sustain those capabilities must be the highest priority for preparedness— 

the top priority of this subcommittee. Much will be lost without adequate resources 

for sustainment. 

TRAINING AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

The September 11 attacks in New York and Washington, DC will always serve 

as a tragic reminder of critical gaps. Communications is a major responsibility for 

this subcommittee and it is a continuing challenge for chiefs of police and sheriffs 

across the Nation. We should never forget that hundreds of New York’s first responders perished without radio interoperability on September 11, 2001, and the 

agencies responding to the Pentagon were likewise unable to communicate with 

each other. 

Investments in communications preparedness are also sustained by training and 

technical assistance provided by DHS. I call your attention to the DHS Office of 

Emergency Communications (OEC) which falls under your jurisdiction. Atlanta and 

other major cities have benefited greatly from efforts to sustain our mobile radio capabilities. Boston officials reported that emergency communications did not falter 

during the bombings, and attributed their success to preparedness training, exer-
45 

cises and technical assistance. Atlanta area agencies have received OEC training 

and technical assistance on multiple occasions, attached as an appendix to my testimony, as a key example of the important work of this subcommittee. While the 

interoperable communications grant program came to an untimely end in 2010, we 

need to strengthen current communications capabilities and migrate to new 

broadband technologies. We recommend that the subcommittee continue to ensure 

that DHS has resources to sustain and strengthen vital assistance programs such 

as OEC. 

LAW ENFORCEMENT INTELLIGENCE AND INFORMATION SHARING

We are grateful for the work of the Office of State and Local Law Enforcement 

(OSLLE) at DHS. Congress established that office to coordinate law enforcement activities and I can report to the subcommittee that it fulfills the intent of Congress 

every day. Likewise, we are working closely with the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) to strengthen our partnership with DHS, especially regarding the operation of our regional fusion centers. 

In Georgia, we have had a number of militia cases and we are deeply concerned 

about home-grown extremists. For this reason, we strongly support DHS efforts to 

Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) and Major Cities Chiefs will engage with DHS 

leadership to roll out CVE initiatives in urban areas. To this end, Major Cities 

Chiefs has established a network of Intelligence Commanders from every major 

urban area, working together as our Criminal Intelligence Enterprise (CIE). Our intelligence personnel have designed a common approach to threat assessment and 

they share information to prepare and analyze similar and common threats. We are 

grateful to DHS officials for their partnership in this unprecedented endeavor to 

prevent and interdict the terrorist threat in our communities. 

THE WAY FORWARD

Chairman Donovan and Ranking Member Payne, chiefs of police are grateful for 

all you do, and we look to you for leadership. To accept the proposed 2017 cuts 

would forfeit so much of what you have invested since the inception of DHS, and 

leave local agencies like my own to fend for themselves while Federal agencies continue to grow. 

As chiefs of police we know our common bond with you is the safety of the public 

we have sworn to protect. To this end, we implore you to restore balance to our partnership with DHS by protecting the funding which sustains the work of this subcommittee. 

APPENDIX A.—UASI FUNDING HISTORY

2009 

• UASI $798,631 

• SHSP $861,265 

2010 

• UASI $832,520 

• SHSP $842,000 

2011 

• UASI $662,662 

• SHSP $526,874 

2012 

• UASI $490,376 

• SHSP $294,000 

2013 

• UASI $558,745 

• SHSP $354,644 

2014 

• UASI $587,000 

• SHSP $401,346 

2015 

• UASI $587,000 

• SHSP $402,000 
46 

2016 

• UASI $580,000 • SHSP $402,000 

Proposed 2017 

• UASI $330,000 • SHSP $200,000 

APPENDIX B.—DHS OFFICE OF EMERGENCY COMMUNICATIONS ASSISTANCE TO

ATLANTA

July 2009.—Supported the development of an SOP for the Georgia Interoperability Network (GIN). Representative of Atlanta attended and provided comments 

on the draft (Held in Athens, GA). 

May 2010.—Performed a Communications Unit Leader (COML) training in downtown Atlanta. Included attendees from various disciplines. 

July 2010.—Performed an engineering coverage assessment for the State including the Atlanta Metropolitan area. 

August 2011.—Presented an overview of the National Interoperability Field Operations Guide (NIFOG) and its underlying principles to 60 attendees in the Atlanta 

Metropolitan area from various disciplines. 

August 2012.—Presented an overview of the National Interoperability Field Operations Guide (NIFOG) and its underlying principles to over 70 attendees in the Atlanta Metropolitan area. 

September 2012 to April 2013.—Worked with personnel from the city of Atlanta 

to update their current Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan and then utilized the components of that plan to develop a Communications Field Operations 

Guide for the Atlanta Metropolitan area. 

April 2013.—Performed a Communications Unit Leader (COML) Train-the-Trainer course in downtown Atlanta. This training is intended to build a cadre of instructors who are locally-based across the State so that the State may carry out their 

own COML courses. 

June 2013.—Carried out a Public Safety Communications Center Operations 

Workshop in the city of Atlanta attended by and focused on personnel from public 

safety answering points (PSAPs) and dispatch centers across the State and city of 

Atlanta. 

August 2015.—Performed a pilot delivery of the All-Hazards Incident Communications Center Manager Training, designed to prepare COMLs and Dispatch Supervisors and public safety communication professionals for managing all functions in 

the Incident Communications Center. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Chief Turner. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Sena. 

STATEMENT OF MIKE SENA, DIRECTOR, NORTHERN CALIFORNIA REGIONAL INTELLIGENCE CENTER, TESTIFYING ON 

BEHALF OF THE NATIONAL FUSION CENTER ASSOCIATION 

Mr. SENA. Chairman Donovan, Ranking Member Payne, and 

Members of the subcommittee, I would like to thank you very much 

for inviting me to speak on behalf of the National Fusion Center 

Association. FBI Director Comey testified last month that there 

were more than 1,000 active home-grown violent extremism investigations across the United States. In light of that, the President’s 

fiscal year 2017 budget request for FEMA preparedness grants left 

us scratching our heads. I want to share some of the reasons why 

the proposal doesn’t make sense. 

Last month, more than 100 million Americans watched Super 

Bowl 50. The game was played in Santa Clara, which falls in my 

fusion center’s area of responsibility. With the Santa Clara Police 

Department in the lead, our fusion center played a central role, coordinating with all public safety partners in protecting the Bay 

Area Super Bowl venues. Thousands of law enforcement, fire, EMS, 

critical infrastructure security, and private-sector personnel from 
47 

all surrounding jurisdictions and at all levels of government had 

access to interoperable video, voice, and data capabilities in one 

communications platform. We all were looking at the same common 

operating picture, with suspicious activity reports, positive license 

plate reader hits, and threats popping up in real time for analysis 

and response. 

Our fusion center was able to give the National Operations Center at DHS headquarters here in the District of Columbia the exact 

same view throughout the event to ensure real-time situational 

awareness. Most of this capacity was built with UASI and SHSGP 

grant funds provided through our Governor’s Office of Emergency 

Services, led by Mark Ghilarducci. 

The Wisconsin State-wide Information Center has trained thousands of fusion liaison officers, also called terrorism liaison officers, 

across the State in how to recognize and report suspicious activity. 

Privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties considerations are a centerpiece of the training, and the result has been the establishment of 

a trusted information-sharing network across the State. That same 

model has been built at fusion centers across the country. 

After the attacks in Paris, in my home town of San Bernardino, 

suspicious activity reporting through the fusion liaison network 

skyrocketed in Wisconsin and across the Nation. Analysts at fusion 

centers have been able to quickly receive those reports, vet them, 

and share information with the appropriate partners, including the 

FBI. They are connecting crucial data residing in State and local 

law enforcement databases to the Terrorist Screening Center encounters. That data would otherwise be out of reach for the FBI. 

It is now routinely shared quickly through fusion centers. 

Those capabilities in Wisconsin and across the country were built 

on and are sustained through, today, the SHSGP and UASI funds. 

At the Boston Regional Intelligence Center, or the BRIC, 9 positive 

investigative leads were generated over the past year through analysis of publicly-posted social media. Three of these leads resulted 

in FBI full field investigations. Two of the leads, 1 to the FBI and 

1 to the Rhode Island fusion center, proved to be critical in investigation of ISIL-inspired terrorists, leading to indictments by the 

U.S. Attorney’s Office. Nearly all of the BRIC’s counterterrorism 

analytical capabilities, which generate critical intelligence in these 

cases, are supported by UASI funds. 

Immediately after the San Bernardino terrorist attack, analysts 

at the Joint Regional Intelligence Center, or JRIC, were developing 

intelligence on suspects and sharing it directly with the San 

Bernardino Police Department, sheriff’s office, and the FBI. An 

alert sheriff’s deputy, who had recently received training through 

the JRIC, called the fusion center to report that an individual 

matching the description of the person wanted in connection with 

providing weapons to the shooters was about to check out of a local 

area hospital. The fusion center immediately passed the information to the task force that was about to launch a manhunt for the 

individual, enabling them to call it off before it even started. Much 

of that capacity of the JRIC, used every day in support of criminal 

and terrorism investigations, was built and sustained by UASI and 

SHSGP funding. 
48 

To be blunt, Mr. Chairman, any reduction in these grants, let 

alone hollowing them out with a 50 percent cut, would be a devastating blow to the capability built in this country for threat detention, prevention, intelligence analysis, and information sharing. 

It would be a repudiation of the reality that everyone in public 

safety knows, that the State and local data, intelligence and community relationships, are the cornerstone of homeland security. 

Federal agencies, including the FBI, are asking fusion centers for 

more information and more partnerships and expect more capability all the time to support their missions at the Federal level, 

including terrorism. 

Given all this, we have a hard time understanding why these 

cuts were proposed. The examples above are just a few of thousands of instances where my colleagues across the fusion center 

network are doing difficult but critically important work on behalf 

of the Federal taxpayers. 

This committee has advanced some important legislation over 

the past year that would strengthen fusion center partnerships and 

capabilities. We hope that the Senate acts on those bills soon. But 

I can tell you for sure that if the SHSGP and UASI programs are 

cut, the objectives of those bills would be impossible to achieve. 

Congress should reject the budget request. 

Mr. Chairman, now is the time to shore up those capabilities 

we’ve built, not to tear them down. I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Sena follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MIKE SENA

MARCH 15, 2016 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the subcommittee, thank 

you for inviting me to testify on this important topic. My name is Mike Sena and 

I am testifying today in my capacity as president of the National Fusion Center association (NFCA). I am currently the director of the Northern California Regional 

Intelligence Center (NCRIC), one of the 78 fusion centers in the National Network 

of Fusion Centers (National Network). 

The President’s fiscal year 2017 budget request for preparedness grants was 

shocking to us and all of our public safety stakeholders. We strongly oppose the 

drastic cuts because they would destroy capabilities that have developed across the 

National Network of Fusion Centers to rapidly gather, analyze, and share threatrelated information, especially information related to terror threats. If Congress enacts the cuts into law, several fusion centers would likely close. Many would continue to exist, but their missions would focus almost exclusively on State and local 

priorities. This would create a massive blindspot for Federal homeland security and 

counterterrorism partners related to information gathering, analysis, and dissemination. In other words, we would wipe out many of the gains in terrorism prevention capabilities that have been built since 9/11 at a time when the threat picture— 

according to every CT leader in the Federal Government—has never been more dynamic. 

Fusion centers bring together law enforcement, public safety, fire service, emergency response, public health, critical infrastructure and key resources (CIKR) interests, and private sector security personnel to understand local implications of National intelligence, as well as add State and local information and context to Federal 

intelligence, thus enabling local, State, and Federal officials to better protect our 

communities from terrorism and other criminal threats. 

Federal support to fusion centers includes assignment of intelligence officers and 

analysts, technical assistance, training and exercises, linkage to key information 

systems, grant funding, and security clearances. These tools add critical value to the 

resources committed by State and local governments to make the National Network 

a foundation of homeland security information sharing. Over the past several years, 

the State and local share of budget resources allocated to fusion centers has grown 
49 

substantially. In fact, State and local governments now provide well over half of all 

operating funding for fusion centers. 

Still, Federal support through FEMA Preparedness Grants—primarily the State 

Homeland Security Grant Program (SHSGP) and Urban Areas Security Initiative 

(UASI)—remains essential. State and local budget models vary widely across the 

National Network—from nearly 100 percent grant funded to nearly 100 percent 

State- or local-funded. The administration’s proposal to cut SHSGP by 57 percent, 

and UASI by 45 percent, would have a devastating impact on our ability to keep 

our States and Nation safe. 

SHSGP dollars have helped establish and maintain Terrorism Liaison Officer 

(TLO) or Fusion Liaison Officer (FLO) networks throughout the country. Through 

these efforts, fusion centers have trained tens of thousands of first responders Nation-wide regarding appropriate recognition and reporting of suspicious activity with 

full recognition of privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties requirements. These are 

the individuals walking beats, responding to incidents, working around critical infrastructure sites, and developing relationships in every community every day. The 

TLO/FLO networks have helped to enhance our ability to share critical threat information by increasing our dissemination capabilities across our States, thus building 

a trusted information-sharing network. The information shared among these networks includes Officer Safety Bulletins, BOLOs, cybersecurity alerts, intelligence 

products, and numerous other informational products that further enhance our ability to keep our States safe. Our Federal partners often leverage this dissemination 

network to get critical threat information into the hands of State and locals. 

Preparedness grant funds have also helped to improve dramatically our analytic 

capabilities across the country. Fusion centers provide local context and information 

to Terrorist Screening Center encounters, many times providing critical intelligence 

from State and local databases that is unavailable to our Federal partners. We also 

provide critical case support to criminal investigations that are transnational in nature, which in turn enhances our ability to provide these same services during a 

major criminal or terrorist event. Everything we do each day hones our ability to 

gather information from the field, rapidly analyze it, rapidly share it, and rapidly 

disseminate important information. 

In short, the capabilities and relationships that we exercise daily in support of 

criminal investigative purposes are identical to those required for dealing with 

issues of Federal consequence like a terrorist attack. Preparedness grants helped 

build this capacity, and this capacity is put at risk by the fiscal year 2017 budget 

request. 

Following are a few of the hundreds of examples across the country of how FEMA 

preparedness grants are enabling fusion centers to contribute to homeland security 

and public safety. 

In 2014/2015, 9 positive investigative leads were generated by the Boston Regional Intelligence Center (BRIC) through analysis of publicly posted social media. 

The postings exhibited behaviors indicative of terrorist radicalization specifically related to ISIL. Three of these leads resulted in FBI ‘‘full field’’ investigations, and 

1 preliminary investigation. Additionally, 2 of the leads, 1 to the FBI, and 1 to the 

Rhode Island Fusion Center, proved to be critical during an investigation of ISILinspired terrorists, leading to indictments by the U.S. Attorney’s Office. 

Fusion centers have also used grant funds to establish, maintain, and enhance 

cyber threat coordination programs. Given persistent cyber threats and the threat 

of home-grown violent extremism, these funds are essential in building, maturing, 

and sustaining capacity across the country. For instance, the Alabama Fusion Center recently added a cyber mission and has conducted a Cyber Liaison Officer (CLO) 

training event where they brought together over 40 law enforcement, DOD, academia and private-sector professionals to discuss our mission, collaborate on cybersecurity, and gain a better understanding of the roles we all have in cybersecurity 

awareness, reporting, analysis, and investigation. This training could not have happened without the SHSGP grant awarded to Alabama. 

At the Southwest Texas Fusion Center in San Antonio, FEMA Preparedness 

Grants are used by the fusion center to fund a platform to coordinate and exchange 

intel with fusion centers’ FLO networks, add functionality to tactical operations centers where fusion partners are exchanging all calls/all hazards information, provide 

joint law enforcement and fire department training on event planning and other 

media-driven events like active shooters, develop an advanced capability to house 

requests for information and intelligence, critical intelligence reports, and SARs, 

and maintain technology subscriptions and hardware used in delivering intelligence 

to fusion partners and the FLO network. 

In Austin, Texas the Austin Regional Intelligence Center invests FEMA Preparedness Grant funding to support continual enhancement of analytical capabilities. 
50 

This includes systems that enable analysts to utilize the latest technology to analyze 

open sources for threats to the Austin region as well as gather information on large 

events that could impact LE resources, provide a local context and information to 

Terrorist Screening Center encounters often from State and local databases that are 

unavailable to our Federal partners, and provide critical case support to criminal 

investigations. 

The proposed cuts to the FEMA Preparedness Grants would result in the loss of 

analysts who are subject-matter experts in a number of topics that include terrorism, human trafficking, and critical infrastructure protection. Additionally, much 

of the infrastructure we have worked to establish by way of software and other technology we use to accomplish analytical tasks would not likely be possible to maintain. 

Most recently my center played a key role in the facilitation of communication between local, State, and Federal agencies during Super Bowl 50 in the San Francisco 

Bay Area. This was no easy task, but because UASI grant funds have enabled our 

investment in various technological capabilities, we were prepared to identify potential situations and empower security personnel to rapidly coordinate and respond. 

For instance, we deployed equipment that provided real-time collaboration and communications capabilities among all stakeholders including law enforcement, fire, 

emergency medical services, hospitals, and private entities including the NFL on 

any device that was being used by that particular agency. I know interoperability 

has been an important issue for this committee, and with the capabilities we acquired using UASI funds, we were able to make that happen in reality during the 

Super Bowl. Additionally, as you can imagine, we had an enormous amount of data 

coming in from all agencies involved with a security or emergency response component. Using software capability acquired using UASI grant dollars, we were able to 

rapidly filter and analyze that data for potential threats and make that information 

instantly available to all security stakeholders through a common operating picture. 

Without UASI funding, I do not believe that we would have been able to bring the 

same level of confidence in the security and preparedness that we had for Super 

Bowl 50. 

Last year across the network, fusion centers processed thousands of requests for 

information (RFIs) which supported criminal investigations from homicide, human 

trafficking, and narcotics to terrorism-related cases and all things in between. Hundreds of those requests were from our Federal partners, which demonstrates how 

integral State and local data and intelligence is to the Federal Government’s ability 

to identify, investigate, and prevent threats. 

No other organizational structure can provide faster or more efficient access to 

State and local information that may support National counterterrorism investigations, or enable faster or more efficient situational awareness across relevant jurisdictions than that of the National Network of Fusion Centers. Each fusion center 

has methods of distribution across local, regional, and State-wide technical and personal networks that Federal investigative and intelligence agencies could not possibly build or maintain with their own resources. 

To ensure that grant funding is being used for its intended purpose, the NFCA 

has joined other law enforcement associations on a letter to Congress urging that 

the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Activities (LETP) requirement in the 

Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (Pub. L. 110– 

53) be strengthened. The law requires that 25% of SHSGP and UASI funding be 

used for ‘‘law enforcement terrorism prevention activities’’ and specifies some of 

those types of activities including support for fusion centers. While States have latitude to allocate funding according to risk and priorities, we agree with the intent 

of the 2007 law and believe that terrorism prevention activities should be constant 

priorities, especially as grant funds have declined over the past 5 years. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) found in its November 2014 report on information sharing and fusion centers that in 2012 States inaccurately categorized about 

$60 million in projects as ‘‘related to fusion centers’’ when in fact those funds did 

not support fusion centers. As we have suggested in our letter to Congress, requiring a Governor-designated State law enforcement executive to review the LETP portion of grant plans would help to ensure those funds truly support terrorism prevention activities. 

Thanks to fusion centers we are sharing more information more effectively than 

ever before. This is happening despite the fact that no single entity has the authority to enforce effective information-sharing practices. Because of the decentralized 

nature of public safety in America, policies on sharing information cannot be dictated by any one organization. Common policies and practices have been developed 

by consensus through multilateral and interagency policy bodies—including the 

Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) and the Criminal Intelligence 
51 

Coordinating Council (CICC) and must be continually reinforced through day-to-day 

engagements between Federal, State, and local partners. As you might imagine, this 

is extraordinarily difficult to achieve in practice, but we have made excellent 

progress and are continuing to build on that progress. We are assisted in this work 

by the program manager for the information-sharing environment (PM–ISE), which 

provides critical leadership and resources enabling development of standards across 

multiple law enforcement and intelligence stakeholders. Congress should bolster 

support for the PM–ISE function to ensure this coordination can continue. 

The National Network of Fusion Centers has come a long way since this committee’s 2013 report called for the development of a National Strategy for the National 

Network of Fusion Centers. We worked with various stakeholders to develop and 

publish our National strategy in 2014, and continue to develop the implementation 

plan that will prioritizes our actions through 2017 to achieve objectives under the 

strategy. In addition, this committee’s 2013 report called for a Federal strategy to 

support the National Network of Fusion Centers. Working together with our Federal 

partners, we identified a dozen initiatives that will be joint priorities over the next 

several years. For the first time, there is a clear Federal strategy that directly supports the State and locally-driven National Network. 

I am still often asked whether fusion centers duplicate the FBI’s JTTFs. Given 

the extensive work done by this committee, you understand this difference, but I 

must reiterate the differences. As you know, JTTFs are Federally-run investigative 

bodies that support the FBI’s unique mission to investigate terrorism threats in this 

country. Fusion centers play a much different role; they’re not only informationsharing hubs in States and metropolitan regions. Fusion centers are where we train 

a cadre of terrorism liaison officers (TLOs), including police officers, firefighters, 

EMS workers, and our private-sector partners on indicators and warnings of terrorism. Fusion centers have the ability to catalogue critical infrastructure in each 

State and region and analyze incoming suspicious activity reports (SARs) against 

the National threat picture and against what we know about our critical infrastructure. We have the ability to then rapidly share information and intelligence among 

the entire National Network and with the FBI and DHS. 

A case in point occurred during the lead-up to President Obama’s second inauguration. In the National Capitol Region, multiple fire departments received suspicious inquiries about fire and EMS stations, equipment, and operations. These inquiries consisted of in person and email individuals asking how one becomes a volunteer and what it would take to drive a fire truck or other emergency vehicle. The 

incidences were submitted to the Northern Virginia Regional Intelligence Center 

and SARs were developed. Working with our Federal partners, it was determined 

that the same individual was involved in all the instances, and an emergency intelligence bulletin was developed. Without the analytical training and close working 

relationships that we have with developed with our first responder partners— 

through the Northern Virginia Regional Intelligence Center in this case—the pieces 

of this puzzle could have very easily not have been put together. 

But often that SAR information has no nexus to terrorism. It’s about drug dealing 

or gang activity or firearms trafficking or mortgage fraud. So the all-crimes approach gives us the ability to analyze that information and funnel it to the right 

place. And we know that, sometimes, information that at first blush appears to be 

criminal in nature—the Torrance, California gas station robberies, the smuggling of 

cigarettes in North Carolina, the sale of pseudoephedrine in California—actually is 

linked to terrorist activity. It does not make sense to try to separate crime and terror in our daily work of analyzing threat information and criminal activity. We have 

to knock that wall down. If we’re going to continue to improve, we have to understand that the sharing of information makes communities safer. Our ultimate goal 

is to prevent terrorism. But in every community across the country there are violent 

crimes that terrorize neighborhoods and families and affect lives and businesses 

every day. Fusion centers are uniquely situated to do things that JTTFs or no other 

program can do. And FEMA Preparedness Grants ensure that these advances are 

maintained. 

In another example from the Boston Regional Intelligence Center, last year the 

BRIC received information that on-line harassment and threats were made by individuals who were scheduled to attend the Poke ́mon World Championship being held 

at the Haynes Convention Center. The convention center notified the BRIC of this 

threat because of its long-standing partnership. BRIC analysis and the sharing of 

information with other agencies enabled quick validation of the threat. Extra precautions were put in place immediately, and as a result, the individuals making 

threats were arrested at the event. Found in their vehicle were multiple weapons 

with hundreds of rounds of ammunition. UASI funding helped to build those capa-
52 

bilities and sustains them today. Without it—or with a 50% cut—these capabilities 

would likely be destroyed. 

I would like thank this committee for its work on improving information sharing, 

and strengthening the mission of the National Network of Fusion Centers. This 

committee has advanced 3 bills through the House that would provide critical tools 

to aid in our abilities to keep the Nation safe. Specifically, H.R. 3598, the Fusion 

Center Enhancement Act, sponsored by Congressman Barletta, H.R. 3503, the DHS 

Support to Fusion Centers Act, sponsored by Congresswoman McSally, and most recently, H.R. 4401, the Amplifying Local Efforts to Root out Terrorism Act, sponsored 

by Congressman Loudermilk. You have done your job to move these bills forward, 

and hope your Senate colleagues consider these bills as soon as possible. 

Mr. Chairman, on behalf of the National Fusion Center Association, thank you 

for inviting me to testify today. I commend your focus on ensuring that State and 

local governments receive the support necessary through the FEMA Preparedness 

Grants to keep our Nation safe. Federal, State, and local agencies must continue 

to be partners in this dynamic threat environment. We look forward to continuing 

to work closely with the committee to help meet those expectations. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Mr. Sena. The Chair now recognizes 

Sergeant Kierce. 

STATEMENT OF W. GREG KIERCE, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF 

EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT & HOMELAND SECURITY, JERSEY CITY, NEW JERSEY 

Mr. KIERCE. Chairman Donovan, Members of the committee, on 

behalf of Jersey City Mayor Steven M. Fulop, I wish to extend my 

sincere appreciation to Congressman Donald M. Payne, Jr., and 

Members of the committee for the opportunity to appear before you 

this morning. 

The intent of the Urban Area Security Initiative program is to 

enhance regional preparedness in major metropolitan areas. The 

UASI program provides funding to address the unique multidiscipline planning operations, equipment, and training and exercise 

needs of high-threat high-density urban areas and to assist in 

building and sustaining capabilities related to terrorism prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. 

The Jersey City-Newark UASI includes Jersey City, Newark, as 

well as the counties of Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Middlesex, Morris, 

Passaic, and Union. The mission of the Jersey City UASI is to ensure the sustainment and enhancement of counterterrorism capabilities and planning and responding to natural and man-made disasters. According to the FBI and the director of the national intelligence, the United States faces a significant and growing threat 

from individuals in this country who are willing to conduct domestic mass casualty attacks inspired by terrorist ideology. In fact, the 

DNI has said he anticipates ISIS-inspired attacks within the 

United States in the year ahead. 

The threat of violent extremism poses a great risk to the Jersey 

City-Newark UASI region due to its dense population, geographic 

importance, and target-rich environment. The total population associated with the Jersey City-Newark UASI is approximately 

4,792,594, which equates to more than half of the entire population 

of the State of New Jersey, making this region one of the most 

densely-populated areas in the United States. 

In the middle of all this is a section of the New Jersey Turnpike 

in Union and Essex Counties that run through what the FBI and 

Government officials from New Jersey have dubbed the most dangerous 2 miles in America for terrorist targets. This area includes 
53 

the largest port on the East Coast, Newark Airport, major rail 

lines, densely-populated cities, and chemical and petroleum plants. 

Former director of the New Jersey Office of Security and Preparedness Charlie McKenna described it best: ‘‘If you want to make New 

Jersey the heart of America or the heart of the northeast, the 

Turnpike is the aorta.’’ 

The Jersey City-Newark UASI region ranks 7 in the top 10 

UASIs, based on DHS vulnerability and threats assessments. In 

addition to Port Newark and Newark Airport, the region is home 

to rail lines, bridges, and tunnels to New York City. Wall Street 

and other financial service firms house important front and back 

operations, including clearance and settlement services and other 

operations essential to the functioning of America’s capital marketing, in Jersey City and Newark. 

Since 2002, funding provided through the Department of Homeland Security Urban Area Security Initiative has afforded Tier 1 

UASI regions to accomplish the following 10 goals. Goal 1 is 

strengthen CBRNE preparedness and response capabilities by acquiring the necessary equipment, training, and other resources 

needed by first responders to effectively detect, interdict, and respond to acts of terrorism or accidents involving CBRNE materials 

or agents. 

No. 2, protect critical infrastructure and key resources along the 

region based on a systemic process of identifying and cataloguing 

infrastructure, conducting site visits and risk assessments, investing in target-hardening projects, and providing additional protective mitigation measures based on the current threat level. 

No. 3, strengthen the information and sharing capabilities 

through collaborative partnerships with Federal, State, and local 

and private-sector stakeholders to better protect against and respond to terrorist threats, both foreign and domestic, incidents 

such as the active-shooter incidents. 

No. 4, strengthen counterterrorism and law enforcement capabilities by continuing to improve our counterterrorism operations and 

partnerships across the region and by building specialized capabilities to address threats and acts of terrorism. 

No. 5, enhance emergency management and response capabilities 

through the implementation of a proactive posture to prepare for 

the worst-case catastrophic scenarios at all levels of government. 

No. 6, advance interoperability emergency communications 

through the efficient utilization and development of communication 

resources and procedures to ensure that our first responders can effectively communicate with each other during a major incident in 

order to protect lives and property. 

No. 7, promote citizen and community preparedness by better 

preparing the Jersey City-Newark UASI region citizens and communities to be ready for disasters and other emergencies, including 

the ability to sustain themselves for 7 to 10 days after an event to 

assist their neighborhoods in the aftermath of a disaster. 

No. 8, build back better from disasters and become more resilient 

against future events through thoughtful resiliency planning and 

by developing long-term recovery capabilities, mitigation initiatives, and other efforts to ensure the continuity of critical systems 

during a crisis. 
54 

No. 9, support health and emergency preparedness by readying 

the Jersey City-Newark UASI for a potential pandemic, and preparing local communities to distribute medical countermeasures on 

a large scale, supporting the ability of the health care community 

to surge bed capacity and other resources to manage large numbers 

of sick and injured during an incident. 

No. 10, enhance community security capabilities through outreach and education, as well as by implementing programs and 

policies to prevent, protect, and respond to, recover from cyber attacks or other major cyber incidents in collaboration with key partners and stakeholders. 

The proposed cuts to DHS UASI funding would have a significant negative impact on our UASI region’s disaster preparedness, 

response, and recovery efforts. Hurricane Sandy and the continued 

threat of home-grown terrorism demonstrate how we must remain 

vigilant and prepared. Threats from terrorism and response and recovery efforts associated with natural disasters will not diminish 

because of the proposed budget cuts to the DHS UASI program. 

Even in the current fiscal climate we do not have the luxury of 

making significant reductions to our capabilities without placing 

our Nation at risk. If we continue to prepare for, respond to, and 

recover from evolving threats and disasters, we will need sufficient 

resources to sustain and adapt our capabilities accordingly. 

In closing, I wish to offer a quote from your colleague and Ranking Member committee Member, Congressman Donald M. Payne, 

Jr. These grants are essential to making New Jersey a safer place 

for families to live and work, and they are critical to bringing economic security to the State. Following Hurricane Sandy, it is clear 

that we need to invest more to prepare for disasters and mitigate 

casualties as well as reduce the economic damages that result from 

these tragedies. 

Thank you for affording me the opportunity to appear before you 

today. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kierce follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF W. GREG KIERCE

MARCH 15, 2016 

Chairman Donovan and Members of the committee: On behalf of Jersey City 

Mayor Steven M. Fulop I wish to extend my sincere appreciation to Congressman 

Donald M. Payne Jr. and Members of the committee for the opportunity to appear 

before you this morning. 

The intent of the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) program is to enhance 

regional preparedness in major metropolitan areas. 

The UASI program provides funding to address the unique multi-discipline planning, operations, equipment, and training and exercise needs of high-threat, highdensity urban areas and to assist in building and sustaining capabilities related to 

terrorism prevention, protection, mitigation, response, and recovery. 

The Jersey City/Newark UASI includes Jersey City and Newark, as well as the 

counties of Bergen, Essex, Hudson, Middlesex, Morris, Passaic, and Union. The mission of the Jersey City/Newark UASI is to ensure the sustainment and enhancement 

of counterterrorism capabilities and planning for and responding to natural and 

man-made disasters. 

According to the FBI and the director of national intelligence—the United States 

faces a significant and growing threat from individuals in this country who are willing to conduct domestic mass casualty attacks inspired by terrorist ideology. In fact, 

the DNI has said he anticipates ISIS-inspired attacks within the United States in 

the year ahead. The threat of violent extremism poses a great risk to the Jersey 
55 

City/Newark UASI region due to its dense population, geographic importance, and 

target-rich environment. 

The total population associated with the Jersey City/Newark UASI is approximately 4,792,594 which equates to more than half of the entire population of the 

State of New Jersey making this region one of the most densely-populated areas in 

the United States. 

In the middle of it all is a section of the NJ Turnpike in Union and Essex counties 

that runs through what the FBI and Government officials from New Jersey have 

dubbed ‘‘the most dangerous 2 miles in America’’ for terrorist targets. 

This area includes the largest port on the East Coast, Newark Airport, major rail 

lines, densely-populated cities and chemical and petroleum plants. 

Former director of the New Jersey Office of Homeland Security & Preparedness 

Charlie McKenna described it best ‘‘If you want to make New Jersey the heart of 

America or the heart of the Northeast, the Turnpike is its aorta.’’ 

The Jersey City/Newark UASI region ranks 7 in the top 10 UASI Regions based 

on DHS vulnerability and threats assessments. 

In addition to Port Newark and Newark Airport, the region is home to rail lines, 

bridges, and tunnels to New York City. 

Wall Street and other financial service firms house important front and back office operations, including clearance and settlement services and other operations essential to the functioning of America’s capital marketing in Jersey City and Newark. 

Since 2002, funding provided through the Department of Homeland Security 

Urban Area Security Initiative has afforded ‘‘Tier 1 UASI regions’’ to accomplish the 

following 10 goals; 

Goal 1.—Strengthen CBRNE Preparedness and Response Capabilities by acquiring the necessary equipment, training, and other resources needed by first responders to effectively detect, interdict, and respond to acts of terrorism or accidents involving CBRNE materials or agents. 

Goal 2.—Protect Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources across the region 

based on a systematic process of identifying and cataloging infrastructure, conducting site visits and risk assessments, investing in target hardening projects, and 

providing additional protective and mitigation measures based on the current threat 

environment. 

Goal 3.—Strengthen Intelligence and Information Sharing Capabilities through 

collaborative partnerships with Federal, State, local, and private-sector stakeholders 

to better protect against and respond to terrorist threats, both foreign and domestic, 

and other incidents, such as active-shooter situations. 

Goal 4.—Strengthen Counter-Terrorism and Law Enforcement Capabilities by 

continuing to improve our counter-terrorism operations and partnerships across the 

region and by building specialized capabilities to address threats and acts of terrorism. 

Goal 5.—Enhance Emergency Management and Response Capabilities through 

the implementation of a proactive posture to prepare for worst-case/catastrophic scenarios at all levels of government. 

Goal 6.—Advance Interoperable and Emergency Communications through the efficient utilization and development of communication resources and procedures to ensure that our first responders can effectively communicate with each other during 

a major incident in order to protect lives and property. 

Goal 7.—Promote Citizen and Community Preparedness by better preparing Jersey City/Newark UASI Region citizens and communities to be ready for disasters 

and other emergencies, including the ability to sustain themselves for 7 to 10 days 

after an event and to assist their neighborhoods in the aftermath of a disaster. 

Goal 8.—Build Back Better from Disasters and Become More Resilient Against 

Future Events through thoughtful resiliency planning and by developing long-term 

recovery capabilities, mitigation initiatives, and other efforts to ensure the continuity of critical systems during a crisis. 

Goal 9.—Support Health Emergency Preparedness by readying the Jersey City/ 

Newark UASI Region for a potential pandemic and preparing local communities to 

distribute medical countermeasures on a large scale, and supporting the ability of 

the health care community to surge bed capacity and other resources to manage 

large numbers of sick or injured during any incident. 

Goal 10.—Enhance Cyber Security Capabilities though outreach and education as 

well as by implementing programs and policies to prevent, protect against, respond 

to, and recover from cyber attacks or other major cyber incidents in collaboration 

with key partners and stakeholders. 

The proposed cuts to DHS UASI funding would have significant, negative impacts 

on our UASI regions disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts. 
56 

Hurricane Sandy and the continued threat of home-grown terrorism demonstrate 

how we must remain vigilant and prepared. Threats from terrorism and response 

and recovery efforts associated with natural disasters will not diminish because of 

proposed budget cuts to DHS UASI program. 

Even in this current fiscal climate, we do not have the luxury of making significant reductions to our capabilities without placing our Nation at risk. 

If we are to continue to prepare for, respond to, and recover from evolving threats 

and disasters, we will need sufficient resources to sustain and adapt our capabilities 

accordingly. 

In closing I wish to offer a quote from your colleague and Ranking committee 

Member Congressman Donald M. Payne: 

‘‘These grants are essential to making New Jersey a safer place for families to live 

and work, and they are critical to bringing economic security to the state. Following 

Hurricane Sandy, it is clear that we need to invest more to prepare for disasters 

and mitigate casualties as well as reduce the economic damage that results from 

these tragedies.’’ 

Thank you for affording me this opportunity to appear before you today. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Sergeant Kierce. I now recognize myself for questions. I will ask all of you if you could just comment 

on this. I asked the mayor in the first panel the same question. I 

would ask all of you just to give me your opinion on this. 

Secretary Johnson is going to be testifying before the full committee tomorrow on the Department of Homeland Security’s fiscal 

year 2017 budget request. What message would each of you give 

to the Secretary about these proposed cuts? 

Mr. Butterworth. You could just go down the panel. Just your 

opinion. 

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think 

the year-over-year investment has historically, especially since 

2011, has been in somewhat of a decline. We have seen in recent 

years a holding steady, and that reflects very much a maintenance 

mode that we are in. We are not capable of expanding in the current environment from the local level to the State level. But the 

maintenance that we are doing, the recurring maintenance on a 2- 

to 3-year basis is critical. To further decrease those funds would 

change that cycle from a 2- to 3-year refreshment of any number 

of different forms of training, resources, hardware, to a 5- to 6-year 

cycle. I think those types of things, the wrong time right now to 

do that based on the current threat level. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, sir. 

Chief. 

Chief KERR. Thank you. I really would like to echo what Mr. 

Butterworth said, that the threat is still changing, the threat is 

still increasing, and yet we are going to cut back the funding that 

allows us to prepare and respond to those events. I have just a couple of numbers here that I wanted to repeat. 

Fifty-one percent of all fire departments that answered a survey 

conducted by NFPA do not have enough portable radios to equip 

all emergency responders on a shift. This percentage is down from 

77 percent in 2001. Fifty-one percent is still way too high. 

So it just proves that the grants are working, but we have to continue to be aggressive and assertive at making sure that things 

like that are not happening across the country. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Chief. 

Mr. Sena. I am sorry, Chief Turner. I am sorry. 
57 

Chief TURNER. Just really quick, sir, I would just echo both Chief 

Kerr and also Mr. Butterworth’s comments. But I would just say 

this: We have to continue to build on our partnerships. If we are 

in a partnership, we have to provide the funding that is necessary 

for us to sustain what we are doing in the local areas. Then to take 

that further, as we continue to move into a different space, that 

technology continues to change, we have to be able to expand our 

network of intelligence, and we have to do that with funding at the 

local level. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Chief, you will be assured that we will relay your 

message to the Secretary tomorrow. 

Mr. Sena. 

Mr. SENA. Sir, since September 11, we have built the capacity 

across the country that we have never had before in information 

sharing and fusion centers, data collection. All this capacity relies 

on grant funding to be effective. Although the State and local agencies that support and own fusion centers have given over half the 

money that goes toward fusion centers, we still need that support. 

It seems like every day we get farther away from September 11, 

I feel like they want to bring us back to September 10. There are 

too many lives that have been lost. We can’t go there. Thank you, 

sir. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, sir. 

Sergeant. 

Mr. KIERCE. Just to echo my colleagues, and I think too the fact 

that we are fighting an unconventional level of domestic terrorism 

today shows the need that we have to at least sustain these grants 

at current levels. I would hope that Director Johnson fully understands, after hearing from my colleagues today and your folks, that 

we have to maintain this level of readiness. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you, Sergeant. I also would like to ask 

each of you to comment on how FEMA Administrator Craig Fugate 

had noted that the skills attained with these grants and programs 

are perishable, and that we have to constantly plan, train, exercise, 

refresh equipment, as you have pointed out, to ensure that we don’t 

lose the capabilities that we have gained since September 11, 2001. 

Would you be able to continue the training that you have been 

able to do so far with personnel in the absence of any Federal funding or in the absence of the funding that is being proposed to be 

cut? 

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. The short answer is no, sir, we would not. 

We would have to drastically reduce the recurrence of that training 

and basically do more with less. We fully understand the idea of 

caps and the necessity to find efficiencies. I would submit to you, 

Mr. Chairman, that we have done that. The National Emergency 

Management Association, emergency managers across the country, 

and Homeland Security advisers as well, have found ways to do 

that. To further task the team with that would definitely get to the 

point of increasing the adversarial opportunities. 

Mr. DONOVAN. My time is running out. I suspect that that would 

be true with all of you with purchasing and maintaining the equipment that you need to protect the jurisdictions which you are responsible to protect. Would that be accurate to say? 
58 

Chief KERR. I will just say that is absolutely accurate. I totally 

endorse Administrator Fugate’s remarks about losing that capability and the capacity. It is really important that we maintain that 

and even build upon that. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Chief Turner, you were going to say something? 

Chief TURNER. Yes. I will just add that our problem is the attrition that we face. How do we train our individuals to get to the 

level that we need them to be? Without these funds, we fall short 

of that. We are doing everything we can to partner with our local 

and State partners and Federal partners. But the challenge with 

maintaining that becomes difficult without funds. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you very much, Chief. 

As I said, my time has run out. The Chair now recognizes the 

gentleman from New Jersey, the Ranking Member, Mr. Payne, for 

questions. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This question is for all 

the witnesses as well. As I mentioned in my opening statement, I 

am concerned about the administration’s proposal to cut the existing homeland security grant programs and divert funding to programs we know little about. Has DHS engaged with you on this vision for either the Regional Competitive Grant Program or the 

Countering Violent Extremist grants to this date? Are there 

thoughts or concerns about either program you would like to share 

with the committee? Mr. Butterworth. 

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. Yes, sir. Thank you, Ranking Member Payne. 

I appreciate the opportunity to comment on both of those. No. 1, 

we have not been contacted directly about the competitive grants. 

Quite frankly, how that process would play out remains a bit of a 

mystery at our level. To transition to the CVE program, we saw the 

value with our deputy director of Homeland Security in Georgia. 

We began conversations several months ago to have discussions 

about the countering violent extremism, where it would be placed, 

what level would be appropriate. We have built a program in Georgia, and we are excited to see the opportunity. 

We are encouraged by the investment that Congress and the administration has made to the end of countering violent extremism. 

We look forward to the opportunity of a productive conversation. 

But to this point, unfortunately, we haven’t had those at the Federal level. We continue to do that at the State level, and look forward to those conversations. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

Chief KERR. I would echo the fact that there have not been any 

conversations and we have not been consulted or asked what we 

think about that or how it could be more effective. I would just say 

that, you know, at this time, it is so important that we are involved 

in our destiny and involved in how we can best prepare our responders, who then in turn can best protect the community. We 

can’t do that if we don’t know what is happening and we don’t 

know where the funding is going to come from. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

Chief TURNER. I would just simply say this, that through Major 

City Chiefs, I do not believe that we have been approached and 

briefed. Then second, as it relates to the CVE, I think that one 

thing that we have done, we have to continue to celebrate our di-
59 

versity, as we do in Atlanta. But the question is is how we work 

more aggressively with those communities. We do that through 

community policing initiatives. We will need additional funds to be 

able to expand the programs that we put in place. 

Atlanta is the third-most visited city in America, most diverse 

city in the South. It is clear for us that we have got to do more 

than less, and being able to communicate with all the various different communities. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

Mr. SENA. Sir, CVE is a big core of what fusion centers do, and 

what we are built to do is to identify those threats. We haven’t 

been consulted on this project or this grant proposal for a program. 

It is one of those things that we don’t want to see the current situation where the grants we are looking at are being cut for a new 

program that we know nothing about. We know what we are doing 

here as far as that coordination and effort. We need to expand that 

and we need more resources to do it. But I am in great fear that 

they will be taking money from one side to fund another side that 

we know nothing about. 

Mr. KIERCE. Pretty much echoing my colleagues, Congressman. 

I think that we, through the UASI group, have had no interaction 

with the Federal Government as far as how these new programs 

are planned out. I think, you know, from the CVE perspective, if 

that developed, that is home base, it is law enforcement working 

within the community, knowing the people that you serve, and developing relationships and ensuring that the trust between law enforcement and the people that you serve is there. 

I think that we have to maintain—the current level of readiness 

is critical. Depending on the local taxpayers to bear the burden of 

substituting the dollars that we would be losing by Homeland Security I think is just intolerable. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. I will yield back at this time. 

Mr. DONOVAN. Thank you. The gentleman yields back. 

At this time the Chair recognizes Mr. Loudermilk from Georgia. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize I missed 

the earlier part of the committee. I was chairing another committee 

hearing. But this is something very important to me. I am going 

to direct my questions to my good friend Mr. Butterworth, as we 

both served in the State Senate together. He was also the adjutant 

general of the Georgia National Guard, and now in his current position is fully aware of the emergency preparedness, the status, and 

the threats that face the State of Georgia. 

Let me kind of summarize what we face here in Georgia. We 

have the busiest airport in the world, Atlanta Hartsfield. We have 

130-plus medium- and small-sized airports throughout the State, 2 

of the busiest import-export ports in the Nation in Savannah and 

Brunswick, Georgia. Atlanta is the headquarters of many Fortune 

500 companies. We also have the Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, the home of several top research universities, as well as the 

financial center of the southeast. Weather is also a consideration 

in Georgia, as we are susceptible to tornadoes, as well as hurricanes coming from the Gulf Coast or the Atlantic Ocean. 

Mr. Butterworth, with your knowledge of these, as well as the 

growing threat that we face from terrorism, how significant are 
60 

these cuts in our ability to prepare and respond to whether it is 

a natural disaster, violent extremism, or a target against our citizens? 

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. Thank you, Congressman. The first answer is 

it is highly disastrous. The first thing I would say, it is nice to see 

you. Thank you for the job that you do for Georgia in representing 

us very, very well. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Thank you. 

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. We certainly appreciate your time in that regard. 

Detrimental would be another term that I would use. Urban 

search and rescue teams would be cut in half. We currently have 

15. K–9, or explosive ordnance disposal teams, we currently have 

9 in regional areas. Those will be cut in half, if not larger. The Information Sharing and Analysis Center, the fusion center in Georgia would largely go unfunded. Currently, we put $1.4 million of 

Department of Homeland Security funds into that facility. That 

would largely go unfunded because of other areas that would have 

to be shored up, for lack of a better term. It is highly detrimental 

to the end result. 

The Emergency Management Assistance Compact. I was encouraged in the earlier discussion, earlier panel, Congressman, Mayor 

de Blasio used the term that we coined in Georgia, ‘‘if it ain’t 

broke, don’t fix it.’’ I was encouraged to hear him say that. I would 

also apply that to the EMAC operation itself. EMAC would largely 

go unfunded as well. 

As you know, if an area is impacted, it is typically not defined 

in one State, it is across State borders in many cases. There is the 

opportunity, as we saw in South Carolina last fall with the flooding, we provided individuals specifically to help them in the recovery process. All of those things would be detrimentally impacted. 

We certainly would appreciate your help in that regard. Thank you, 

sir. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Thank you. It is interesting that you brought 

up the fusion centers. Two weeks ago, we passed on the House floor 

the ALERT Act, a bill that I authored, and that was a strong bipartisan support in this committee, as well as no opposition on the 

floor. The ALERT Act was in response to the Task Force on Foreign Fighter Travel that I served on. When we realized that we 

needed to have a force multiplier for our Federal agencies regarding countering terrorism and CVE efforts, and that our local law 

enforcement were perfectly positioned to do that, but there were 

bureaucratic hurdles in the way. The ALERT Act removed those 

bureaucratic hurdles, but yet all of the training and resources 

would be funneled through the fusion centers as the center. 

So even though we are making great strides with providing better engagement with local and State resources with our Federal regarding terrorism, what I am understanding is if we lose the funding for the fusion center, then none of this would have any effect. 

Is that true? 

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. Yes, sir. That is exactly true. The fusion center is definitely the focal point for intelligence—obviously, intelligence gathering, information sharing, and analysis. I think that 

impact would basically force us to go blind in many respects. I 
61 

defer to my panel colleague Mr. Sena in that regard, specifically on 

the fusion center topic. But we would definitely be operating largely in the blind. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Mr. Sena. 

Mr. SENA. Yes, sir. Every year we train hundreds of thousands 

of officers across the country on suspicious behaviors, the things to 

look for. If we lost this funding, that training wouldn’t exist. We 

would not have the eyes and ears of State and local law enforcement to support us in gathering that information, nor would we 

have the training on privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties protections for the folks on what they can legally collect. All that would 

be gone. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Okay. I see my time has expired, Mr. Chair. 

Chief Turner. 

Chief TURNER. Thank you. I would just really add 2 things. The 

funding from Homeland Security allowed us to do something very 

unique in the city of Atlanta, and that is to begin the stand-up of 

a video integration center that allows us to bring cameras into one 

centralized location. Since that initial funding, we have expanded 

that network of cameras above 6,000 cameras that come into one 

centralized location. It gives us the kind of situational awareness 

that we need to make strong decisions as we partner with GEMA 

and all of our Federal and local agencies to deal with challenging 

issues. 

As you know, we host the largest 10K road race in the world. 

The Peachtree Road Race is a challenge for us in that we entertain 

more than 60,000 runners and more than 300,000 spectators. How 

do you deal with that without the kind of situational awareness 

that we need from programs that are provided by the homeland security grants that we previously received? 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Chief Kerr. 

Chief KERR. Thank you. I just wanted to add that, besides all of 

your law enforcement personnel that are trained on suspicious activity reporting and all those things, in Austin, Texas, we are also 

a part of our fusion center, and we have a member that sits on the 

FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force, and that there are many more 

eyes out there that can be part of like a threat liaison officer program. We wouldn’t have those things if we didn’t have the funding 

and the support of the Austin Regional Intelligence Center. I just 

wanted to add that it is more than just our law enforcement people 

that are helping, but there is firefighters out there that are your 

eyes on the ground. 

Mr. LOUDERMILK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired. I yield back. But I encourage our Members, it looks like we 

have a lot of work to do to correct this problem. 

Mr. DONOVAN. You are absolutely right. Just to continue in the 

vein that you were just speaking, Chief Kerr, Chief Turner, and 

Mr. Sena, last week the American Enterprise Institute released a 

report that claims that fusion centers are redundant to Joint Terrorism Task Forces, and that eliminating fusion centers or incorporating them into JTTFs would strengthen State and local information-sharing and intelligence activities. 

Fusion centers, my understanding is, fusion centers serve as a 

focal point for gathering and sharing vital homeland security infor-
62 

mation between Federal Government, State, and front-line law enforcement and first responders, including fire service, as you said, 

Chief, emergency managers, public health, as well as the private 

sector. The primary mission of the JTTFs is to conduct terrorismrelated investigations, which means the ability to share information with first responders would be limited because of the fear that 

leaked information could compromise an open investigation. 

So eliminating fusion centers or combining them with JTTFs 

doesn’t make sense to me. You are the experts. Have any of you 

seen the AEI report? If you have, I would appreciate your comments about their proposal. I open that up to the panel. 

Mr. SENA. Sir, I did read the report and was as dumbfounded as 

the budget. You know, this budget proposal doesn’t make any sense 

to us, and neither did the report. Very ill-informed. It did not have 

the details in that report that show what fusion centers really are. 

They are State and locally-owned and -operated. As Chief Kerr reported, you know, it is more than just law enforcement. 

We have lots of folks that work with fusion centers. We bring 

those people together, and we look at a broad range of threats to 

our communities, everything from narcotics trafficking to threats in 

the community, from criminal gangs and organized crime groups. 

We don’t know, and my experience has been where are we going 

to find that CVE threat? Where are we going to find the terrorist 

threats? Oftentimes I have found them through regular criminal 

activity, or through sources of information from criminal activity. 

That is the role of fusion centers, to bring all those pieces together. 

There is no way that State and local law enforcement, anyone 

sitting on this panel is going to say, you know, our partners in the 

FBI should take over this mission. Even our partners in the FBI 

don’t believe they should take over this mission. This is a State and 

local mission where we leverage all of our authorities, and we also 

bring our Federal partners along to work with us in our fusion centers. We do a great job, and it is through collaboration. It is not 

just focused on terrorism. Although it is a key cornerstone of what 

we do, we look at all the threats to our local community, and we 

serve every member, fire, emergency medical personnel, emergency 

management, and the law enforcement community. 

Mr. DONOVAN. I agree you do do a great job. 

Chief Turner. 

Chief TURNER. I would just really echo what he just said and 

then just add this: That both our fusion center in the State of Georgia as well as our Joint Terrorism Task Force, we have to work 

continually together. They have 2 separate missions, but at the 

same time they work very closely together. The Atlanta Police Department has members in both of those centers. Quite frankly, if 

we did not have those 2, then we would be trying to do what our 

largest city in America does regularly, and that is do it on their 

own. The New York City Police Department has a tremendous 

amount of resources that they provide to the homeland. 

Cities like Atlanta, with more than 2,500 employees, cannot do 

this work alone. We have to rely on the joint centers, as well as 

the Joint Terrorism Task Force and the fusion centers, so that we 

can work collectively to be able to resolve the challenges that face 

each and every one of us. 
63 

Mr. DONOVAN. I think, Chief, you hit a vital point that dispels 

the argument, the fact that these are 2 distinct responsibilities that 

are undertaken by these 2 entities, and that the elimination of 1 

or joining the 2 could jeopardize our ability to protect our Nation. 

The Chair now recognizes our Ranking Member for our final 

questions. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I wanted to talk about a 

topic that is very important to me. This question is, once again, for 

all the witnesses. Since I joined this panel in 2013, I have worked 

hard to promote programs and policies that advance interoperable 

communications capabilities. Unfortunately, the Interoperable 

Emergency Communications Grant has not been funded in half a 

decade. I suspect the cuts to homeland security grants will only 

further undermine interoperable communication efforts. 

Can each of you talk about how the elimination of the Interoperable Emergency Communications Grant Program has affected 

interoperability efforts and how grant cuts might further hinder 

interoperability goals? Sergeant Kierce. 

Mr. KIERCE. Congressman and Mr. Chairman, interoperability 

communication still is a challenge among the public safety folks. In 

Jersey City, Hudson County alone, with the 12 different municipalities you have operating on different frequencies, and there 

again, when you are called to a major event, many times basic fire 

services aren’t able to communicate with firefighting ground operations. It is the same thing with the police departments. 

In Jersey City alone, we have several law enforcement agencies, 

both the sheriff’s department, Port Authority Police, Jersey City 

Police, and other law enforcement agencies, all operating under different frequencies and bandwidths. Since my involvement with 

UASI in 2002, interoperability has been a communications nightmare. The cuts in funds has led towards a failure in communications as a whole. 

Mr. PAYNE. Thank you. 

Chief TURNER. I would just simply add that one of our biggest 

challenges in interoperability is not just—in large cities we do fairly well. The investment has been made, and we have systems that 

are in place that we can communicate. However, the challenges are 

those small agencies, even university police. 

Just recently, we had a conversation with some of our Atlanta 

university-centered police departments that really do not have the 

network to be able to communicate in a crisis. So we have to expand the program to be able to bring all of those smaller agencies 

into the network. 

Chief KERR. I would echo my former colleagues here, their comments, but then add the University of Texas into that, and make 

sure that we include the capital and all the different police agencies that do not have interoperable communications in the AustinTravis County area. We are fortunate in regard to the fire service 

in that we dispatch for all 15 fire departments that are part of 

Travis County. So we do have that interoperable communication 

and we are able to make that work. It is a huge difference when 

you have that. But when funding starts getting cut and you are not 

able to enhance that interoperable communications, things are 
64 

going to happen, and we are not going to be able to address them 

as we should. 

Mr. BUTTERWORTH. Thank you, sir. A quick comment. Going on 

some of my previous background as an Air Force aviator, I have 

seen the issue that having interoperability is—the problem of not 

having that interoperability brings. One airplane that I flew had 8 

different radios in order to facilitate different communications, immediate communications, with individuals both in the air and on 

the ground. I saw on more than one occasion the operation worked 

to a detriment because first-hand communication was not capable. 

I have also seen in the first responder world in Georgia, multijurisdictional problems, just like Chief Turner has referenced, across 

the State is a challenge. 

We, to that end, have initiated and perpetuated a recurring 

training cycle of interoperability, where we bring jurisdictions from 

all over the State of Georgia and put those interoperability capabilities in a close geographical location to facilitate better communication. That has made an incredible difference in the State of 

Georgia. I know my peers in other States have done the same 

thing. 

If these cuts become reality, those training opportunities would 

be minimal, and it would be an extremely detrimental impact to 

interoperability capabilities. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. PAYNE. Yes. 

Mr. SENA. From my perspective, voice, video, and data, textual 

data, are critical to saving lives. Without these grants, the equipment that we currently have in use would no longer be able to be 

maintained and we would lose that capability. So it is something 

that for me, during the Super Bowl, was an incredible asset to be 

able to share information, both the voice capability and actually 

video and textual, show them in real time, not only showed people 

in our region what was going on, but showed people in District of 

Columbia what was happening in real time. That would be gone. 

Chief TURNER. If I could just make one last point. In my 34 years 

of policing, when I first came on the police department, we had a 

radio that had 6 channels. Our problem is there are so many channels and talk groups on our radios. If we don’t have these funds, 

we don’t have the ability to continue to train the individuals that 

are coming into this business. Funding for training is absolutely essential for us to be able to be effective as we move to try to mitigate challenges that come our way. Thank you. 

Mr. PAYNE. Well, I would like to thank all of you for your testimony today. It has been very enlightening and informative as well. 

You are our eyes and ears and the people on the ground and first 

responders, and we appreciate the work that you do and the testimony that you have brought today. 

So with that, Mr. Chair, I will yield back. 

Mr. DONOVAN. I join my friend, Congressman Payne, in thanking 

you for what you do for the citizens of our Nation and your commitment to protecting them and their safety. I want to thank you all 

for your valuable testimony today, and for my fellow Members for 

their questions. 
65 

The Members of the subcommittee may have some additional 

questions of the witnesses. We will ask that you respond to those 

in writing. 

Pursuant to Committee Rule VII(e), the hearing record will be 

held open for 10 days. This subcommittee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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