U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Publishing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

27–643 PDF 2018

PRISONERS OF THE PURGE: THE 

VICTIMS OF TURKEY’S FAILING RULE OF LAW 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND 

COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

NOVEMBER 15, 2017 

Printed for the use of the 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe 

[CSCE 115–1–7] 

( 

Available via www.csce.gov 
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

HOUSE SENATE 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey, 

Co-Chairman 

ALCEE L. HASTINGS, Florida 

ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, Alabama 

MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina 

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

GWEN MOORE, Wisconsin 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi, 

Chairman 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

JOHN BOOZMAN, Arkansas 

CORY GARDNER, Colorado 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

THOM TILLIS, North Carolina 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS 

Vacant, Department of State 

Vacant, Department of Commerce 

Vacant, Department of Defense 

[II] 
PRISONERS OF THE PURGE: THE 

VICTIMS OF TURKEY’S FAILING RULE OF LAW 

COMMISSIONERS 

Page 

Hon. Thom Tillis, Commissioner, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe ..................................................... 1 

Hon. Michael C. Burgess, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .......................................... 3 

Hon. Randy Hultgren, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .............................................. 5 

Hon. Jeanne Shaheen, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe .............................................. 21 

Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member, Commission 

on Security and Cooperation in Europe ................................. 28 

Hon. John Boozman, Commissioner, Commission on Security 

and Cooperation in Europe 

WITNESSES 

Jonathan R. Cohen, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 

European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State 5 

CeCe Heil, Executive Counsel, American Center for Law and 

Justice ....................................................................................... 15 

Jacqueline Furnari, Daughter of Andrew Brunson .................. 16 

Nate Schenkkan, Director of the Nations in Transit Project, 

Freedom House ........................................................................ 18 

APPENDIX 

Prepared statement of Hon. Thom Tillis ................................... 33 

Prepared statement of Hon. Chris Smith ................................. 36 

Prepared statement of Jonathan R. Cohen ............................... 38 

Prepared statement of CeCe Heil .............................................. 43 

Prepared statement of Jacqueline Furnari ............................... 45 

Prepared statement of Nate Schenkkan ................................... 48 

[III] 
Page

IV 

MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD 

Questions submitted by Hon. Thom Tillis 

to Jonathan R. Cohen .......................................................... 55 

to CeCe Heil ......................................................................... 60 

to Nate Schenkkan .............................................................. 62 

Questions submitted by Hon. Jeanne Shaheen 

to Jonathan R. Cohen .......................................................... 65 

Letter from Kubra Go ̈lge to Congress ....................................... 68 

Statement from the Committee of Concerned Scientists ......... 69 

Freedom House report on internet freedom in Turkey ............ 74 
(1) 

PRISONERS OF THE PURGE: THE 

VICTIMS OF TURKEY’S FAILING RULE OF LAW 

November 15, 2017 

COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

WASHINGTON, DC 

The hearing was held at 9:30 a.m. in Room 124, Dirksen Senate 

Office Building, Washington, DC, Hon. Thom Tillis, Commissioner, 

Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, presiding. 

Commissioners present: Hon. Thom Tillis, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Michael C. 

Burgess, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation 

in Europe; Hon. Randy Hultgren, Commissioner, Commission on 

Security and Cooperation in Europe; Hon. Jeanne Shaheen, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; 

Hon. Benjamin L. Cardin, Ranking Member, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe; and Hon. John Boozman, Commissioner, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe. 

Witnesses present: Jonathan R. Cohen, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department 

of State; CeCe Heil, Executive Counsel, American Center for Law 

and Justice; Jacqueline Furnari, Daughter of Andrew Brunson; and 

Nate Schenkkan, Director of the Nations in Transit Project, Freedom House. 

HON. THOM TILLIS, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. TILLIS. Good morning, everyone. This hearing of the Helsinki 

Commission will come to order. 

I want to welcome everyone here to this Helsinki Commission 

hearing titled ‘‘Prisoners of the Purge: The Victims of Turkey’s 

Failing Rule of Law.’’ I’m honored to be chairing this hearing on 

behalf of Senator and Chairman Wicker. 

As of today, an American pastor has spent 404 days in a Turkish 

jail without a trial, without access to evidence against him, the 

subject of a vicious smear campaign from the Turkish press, and 

facing life in prison on fabricated charges of being a terrorist and 

a coup plotter. 

Elsewhere in Turkey, a Turkish-American NASA scientist has 

spent 480 days in prison, much of it in solitary confinement, on terrorism and espionage charges springing from a baseless testimony 

of a disgruntled relative and a bizarre compilation of circumstantial evidence, including a dollar bill seized from his parents’ home. 
2 

Today also marks 253 days behind bars for a veteran Turkish 

employee of the U.S. consulate in Adana who stands accused of terrorism for doing his job as he has for 30 years: communicating on 

behalf of the United States Government with local community 

contacts. 

These prisoners—Andrew Brunson, Serkan Go ̈lge, and Hamza 

Uluc ̧ay—are the innocent victims of Turkey’s collapsing rule of law. 

With every passing day, the injustice of these detentions compounds itself. For the Brunson family next week, another Thanksgiving apart. For Kubra and her two young kids, another day away 

from their home in Houston. For Hamza, another inexplicable punishment for his dedication to the job he loves. 

But the focus of this hearing is not personal, it’s principle. Just 

as Andrew, Serkan, and Hamza have been victims of Turkey’s failing rule of law, there are literally thousands more like them behind 

bars today. Since imposing a state of emergency nearly 16 months 

ago, the Turkish Government has detained more than 60,000 people and fired or suspended upwards of 100,000 others from their 

jobs. The so-called Decree Laws authorizing these punitive measures do not establish any evidentiary standard for application, 

thereby permitting wide-scale abuse as seen in the cases I’ve highlighted. 

Of course, context matters, and the Turkish Government invokes 

its constitutional state of emergency provisions in the wake of the 

July 2016 coup attempt, an unacceptable and violent attack on the 

constitutional order of a NATO ally—an attack I unequivocally condemn. But the question is not whether Turkey has the right to pursue justice after such a national trauma: the question is how it 

goes about it. 

The Helsinki Commission has called this hearing today to get to 

the bottom of the accumulating injustices under the state of emergency. As a participating State of the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe, Turkey has committed itself to upholding 

certain rule-of-law standards even under extraordinary circumstances. Among these commitments is the guarantee of equality before the law. 

However, Turkey’s commitment to this principle has been called 

into serious question. Just two months ago, President Erdog ̆an proposed an outrageous swap: Andrew Brunson, a pastor, ‘‘for a pastor’’ in his words. If the United States would circumvent its rule 

of law to extradite a free man, Erdog ̆an suggested, then Turkey 

would release a wrongfully imprisoned one. Let us be clear about 

what President Erdog ̆an proposed: This is not justice; it’s ransom. 

The United States should not expect, much less accept, this sort of 

treatment from a NATO ally. 

The harassment and detention of our consulate staff has also 

overstepped the bounds of diplomatic conduct among partners. I 

was glad to see the State Department in the past month impose 

some real cost for this behavior by suspending non-immigrant visa 

services to Turkey. While the department announced last week 

that it had resumed these services on a limited basis and received 

assurances about the security of our local employees, I hope that 

we are clear with Turkey that we will not accept anything short 
3 

of true and timely justice for our detained consulate staff and our 

citizens behind bars. 

I also hope that we will not tire in advocating for the basic rights 

and freedoms of thousands of Turks impacted by these sweeping 

purges—academics, mayors, legislators, journalists, and human 

rights defenders among them. 

Let me conclude by saying that it is in the interest of the United 

States to have Turkey as a strong and reliable ally. From strengthening NATO to fighting terrorism to resolving conflicts in the Middle East, we have important work to do together, and we will be 

more successful if we can work as partners. The urgency of these 

tasks underscores the importance of resolving distractions and rebuilding the trust we need to achieve common objectives. And, as 

always, our partners are strongest when they are rooted in shared 

principles. 

We have two excellent panels of witnesses today to examine 

these topics, and I’ll introduce the panels separately. But I would 

like to say at the outset that I am especially pleased to have with 

us a State Department witness, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Jonathan Cohen, to provide the administration’s perspective on these developments, U.S. policy towards Turkey, and the future of the bilateral relationship. 

I’m also honored to have on our second panel Jacqueline Furnari, 

Andrew Brunson’s daughter, from my State of North Carolina, and 

I understand a proud student of UNC Chapel Hill. 

Before I introduce the panels, though, I’d like to offer my fellow 

commissioners an opportunity to make opening statements. 

HON. MICHAEL C. BURGESS, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. BURGESS. Well, thank you, Senator Tillis. Thank you, Secretary, for agreeing to be here this morning. And I want to thank 

the Helsinki Commission for convening the hearing on what has 

been a pressing issue since July of 2016. 

Five days ago, Turkish and American leaders gathered at the Republic’s New York City consulate to commemorate the life and legacy of Mustafa Kemal Atatu ̈ rk, one of modern history’s great reformers. Following the conclusion of World War I, Atatu ̈ rk sought 

to create a democracy based on the rule of law amidst the ashes 

of the Ottoman Empire. 

As with all democracies, the Republic of Turkey has had its 

share of challenges and triumphs. Since its formation, Turkey has 

balanced between its constitutional secularism and its religious 

heritage. From the recognition of the Lausanne Treaty in 1923, 

there have been concerns that the country’s religious population is 

under attack by its secularists. All the while, fear that Turkey will 

fall back into a country dominated by religious hardliners remains 

an inescapable concern. The constant battle between the two extremes I’m certain has left many Turks unsure of who or what will 

come next. 

Most recently, the failed coup of July 2016—and I join with Senator Tillis in condemning in the strongest possible terms that activity—but that left the country clawing its self-inflicted wounds. 

Though carried out by military groups purportedly upholding 
4 

Atatu ̈ rk’s original vision for the country, it is hard to believe that 

the Republic’s founder would have supported open insurrection and 

violence in the streets, clashes between military and civilians, or 

the imprisonment of innocents. 

The uprising resulted in a widespread response by President 

Erdog ̆an and his ruling Justice and Development Party. Unfortunately, the crackdown has left nearly 50,000 people incarcerated. 

And within this massive group are a dozen American citizens, including Pastor Andrew Brunson and NASA scientist Serkan Go ̈lge. 

These Americans, along with many of their Turkish counterparts, 

have only a tenuous charge against them: that they are agents and 

activists of Fethullah Gu ̈len. 

Mr. Gu ̈len—a Muslim leader in teaching a tolerant, outward approach to Islam—is yet another individual who the Turkish Government has decided to indict with almost no evidence. Despite an 

alliance between the Justice and Development Party and the 

Gu ̈lenists at the onset of Mr. Erdog ̆an’s political ascendancy, the 

two leaders suffered a breakdown in relations. Following the failed 

coup, the Erdog ̆an government leveled charges against the cleric, 

claiming that he planned and incited the attempted regime change. 

Mr. Gu ̈len has been living in self-imposed exile in Pennsylvania 

since 1999. 

Though the Turkish Government submitted a formal request for 

the extradition of Mr. Gu ̈len, neither the State Department nor the 

Justice Department has received any information that would cause 

the United States to comply with this request. The Turkish Government has repeated, and with no evidence made the claim that 

Mr. Gu ̈len funds schools, including some public schools in my home 

State of Texas, to radicalize students against the current Turkish 

Government. 

Though I am opposed to much of what President Erdog ̆an does, 

I respect Turkish sovereignty and their self-determination. However, when the president begins targeting American citizens, especially our children, this is a bridge too far. 

In another incident early this year, supporters of President 

Erdog ̆an, along with the president’s own security, violently attacked a group of peaceful protesters outside of the Turkish ambassador’s residence here in Washington, D.C. In this country, we do 

not attack those we disagree with. We do not start brawls to silence our detractors. In Turkey, President Erdog ̆an may be able to 

declare a perpetual state of emergency and change the constitution 

to better suit his desires, but Washington is not Ankara, and Massachusetts Avenue is not an avenue in Turkey. 

The ongoing effort by the Turkish Government to intimidate 

Americans must end. The current detention of American citizens 

became all the more clear when President Erdog ̆an stated, ‘‘You 

have another pastor in your hands. Give him to us, and we will put 

yours through the judiciary. We will give him to you.’’ Despite the 

strong, enduring alliance between our two countries, the United 

States cannot be expected to forego the rule of law in our country 

in order to extract some hint of it in another. 

I hope we can come to an amicable solution on these matters, but 

to do so it’s going to take more than relying on the trust and goodwill that has historically been built between America and Turkey. 
5 

It must require the adherence to the rule of law. I hope we move 

toward accomplishing that today. 

Thank you, Senator Tillis, for the recognition. 

Mr. TILLIS. Thank you, Congressman Burgess. 

Congressman Hultgren. 

HON. RANDY HULTGREN, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. HULTGREN. Thank you, Senator Tillis. Dr. Burgess, good to 

be with you. Thank you so much to our witnesses. 

I’ll be very brief. I want to hear as much as I can. And I apologize, Senator Tillis; I’ve got two markups over on the House side, 

so I’m going to have to leave in a few minutes. 

But I am passionate about fighting for people who are suffering 

around the world, people who are being mistreated, and especially 

when we see governments that are doing this mistreatment. I’m 

such a proud member of the Helsinki Commission, but also proud 

to be co-chairman of the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission. 

And so I want to do everything we possibly can. 

That’s my hope out of this hearing: To hear what we can do together—Senate, House, administration coming together to make 

sure that we bring these people home. Pastor Brunson is top of 

mind for me, but so many others that are suffering, that are 

wrongfully accused in so many ways, and these governments acting 

with what appears to be no accountability whatsoever. And we 

need to do everything we can to change that. 

So thanks again, Senator Tillis and the Helsinki Commission, for 

holding this hearing. I look forward to working with all of you, but 

also with our witnesses to see what we can do to, again, bring 

these precious people home. 

With that, I yield back. 

Mr. TILLIS. Thank you, Congressman. 

Our first panel features Deputy Assistant Secretary Cohen. He’s 

been deputy assistant secretary for European and Eurasian affairs, 

governing Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, since August 2016. He previously served in Baghdad as deputy chief of mission from 2014 to 

2016, in Paris as the acting deputy chief of mission from 2013 to 

2014, and as counselor for political affairs from 2011 to 2013. 

Mr. Cohen, thank you for being here. You may proceed with your 

opening statement. 

JONATHAN R. COHEN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, 

BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND ASIAN AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Tillis, members of the Commission, thank you for inviting me to testify this morning. Today’s hearing is an important opportunity to reaffirm the abiding U.S. interest in and commitment 

to democracy, human rights, and rule of law in Turkey. It’s also an 

opportunity to underscore the enduring strategic value of the U.S.- 

Turkey alliance, despite the current strains in the bilateral relationship and the challenges facing Turkey today. 

Having spent the last 65 years as NATO allies, the United States 

and Turkey have deep, complex relations. With the second-largest 
6 

military force in the alliance, a dynamic economy, and a population 

of 80 million, Turkey’s critical position and regional clout have 

given Ankara significant influence over issues of core U.S. interest 

over the years, from Afghanistan to Iraq to the Balkans to Korea. 

For example, from the early 1990s until 2003, Turkey facilitated 

the no-fly zone over the Iraqi Kurdistan region, allowing it to develop in peace and escape Saddam Hussein’s tyranny. 

In Afghanistan, Turkey was a major troop contributor to the 

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), while also providing use of its airspace and allowing the refueling of U.S. aircraft 

on ISAF missions. 

Turkey’s an important partner in the Global Coalition to Defeat 

ISIS, and provides critical bases for United States and coalition 

military forces, from which we conduct precision airstrikes; carry 

out intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance flights; maintain 

combat search and rescue units; and resupply coalition forces. 

We enjoy a robust and growing commercial relationship, a wide 

array of educational and cultural exchanges, and a vibrant foreign 

policy dialogue on issues ranging from Russian aggression in Crimea to limiting Iranian influence in the region to ending the war 

in Syria to the territorial integrity and unity of Iraq. We deeply 

value Turkey’s contributions to global security. 

The United States and Turkey need each other. As Undersecretary of State Tom Shannon has said, ours is not a partnership of 

convenience, nor of temporary interests; it’s one of conviction, a 

time-tested alliance built on the enduring foundations of common 

interests and mutual respect. Our partnership is the result of sustained diplomacy, continuous high-level engagement between our 

governments to address challenges, explore opportunities, and 

move forward on a wide range of joint interests. 

Since August, our presidents have had several phone conversations and have met on the margins of the U.N. General Assembly. 

Secretary Tillerson and Foreign Minister C ̧ avusoglu speak regularly to consult on Syria, Iraq, and other issues. Our defense ministers have met twice since August. And of course, Prime Minister 

Yildirim visited Washington just last week to consult with Vice 

President Pence. 

The United States-Turkey relationship extends beyond our mutual interests in stability and security in the Balkans and the Middle East. Both President Trump and President Erdog ̆an have committed to strengthening our trade and investment ties. Our extensive exchanges of students, scientists, and professionals ensure that 

our countries remain interconnected on a people-to-people level, 

and provide valuable opportunities for innovation and entrepreneurship, which are vital to our knowledge-based economies. 

Ankara seeks further improvement in each of these areas of cooperation, and so do we. We will continue our efforts to develop 

constructive dialogue with Turkey in order to maximize the enduring benefits of our strategic alliance. 

My remaining remarks today will focus on the United States 

Government’s concerns about Turkey’s protracted state of emergency, which has had negative effects on democracy and democratic 

institutions, on human rights, and on rule of law. Chief among 

those concerns is the security of and protection of human rights 
7 

and fundamental freedoms for U.S. citizens in Turkey and locally 

employed staff at the U.S. Mission in Turkey, a number of whom 

have been arrested on dubious terrorism charges under the state 

of emergency. 

As I highlight these concerns, it’s in the context of Turkey being 

a longtime friend and ally, and with deep empathy and appreciation for the fact that on July 15th, 2016, Turkey endured a traumatic coup d’e ́tat attempt in which nearly 250 perished and thousands were wounded. The coup attempt was an evil attack on the 

Turkish nation and a tragedy for Turks, who bravely took to the 

streets to defend their democracy. 

A few months after that, I stood in Turkey’s Parliament building, 

the Grand National Assembly, and observed the destruction that 

Turkish Air Force F-16s had wrought on the people’s house, in 

which all political parties sit. The Turks asked me to imagine the 

national trauma for us if such an attack were to happen here on 

our Capitol dome. It was a moment of profound impact for me. The 

Turkish nation was deeply shaken by the coup attempt, and remains so. 

It’s to be expected that Turkey would—and we support its efforts 

to—investigate and arrest those who directly participated or materially aided in the planning, preparation, and conduct of the coup 

attempt. The United States Government is carefully reviewing material provided by Turkey related to the Turkish Government’s request that the United States extradite Fethullah Gu ̈len, and will 

give similarly careful consideration to any new extradition requests 

related to the coup attempt. We again underscore our willingness 

to assist Turkish authorities in their investigation of the attempted 

coup and support bringing to justice those who participated. 

But now, more than a year later, a restrictive state of emergency 

remains in place and appears to have been used expansively to target many Turks with no connection to the coup attempt. We were 

concerned to see Turkey extend the state of emergency for a fifth 

time on October 17th for an additional three months. The prolongation of the state of emergency has, in the view of the U.S. Government, negatively impacted Turkish democracy, rule of law, and respect for fundamental freedoms. We call on the Turkish Government to expeditiously end the state of emergency, release those not 

proven guilty of criminal offenses, and cease the seemingly indiscriminate prosecution of individuals—in many cases, individuals 

that appear to have been targeted because they criticized the government, its officials, or its policies, or have had contact with those 

who did. 

There have been dozens of U.S. citizens detained or delayed by 

Turkish security services in some capacity since July 2016. Several 

U.S. citizens, including U.S.-Turkish dual nationals, remain in 

prison under the state of emergency, all facing what we believe are 

dubious terrorism and coup attempt-related charges. 

Andrew Brunson, a United States citizen and Christian pastor 

who has lived in Turkey for nearly 25 years, has been in prison 

since October 7th, 2016. The outlandish charges against Mr. 

Brunson include gathering state secrets for espionage, attempting 

to overthrow the Turkish Parliament and government, and attempting to change the constitutional order. 
8 

The United States consistently calls for Mr. Brunson’s release at 

the highest levels. President Trump, Vice President Pence, and 

Secretary Tillerson have all raised his case multiple times with 

their Turkish counterparts. On August 15th, Secretary Tillerson 

publicly called for his release during the International Religious 

Freedom Report rollout. Our embassy in Ankara continues to engage on this case, and provides consular services to Mr. Brunson 

and his family, meeting with him and his wife on a regular basis. 

We remain deeply concerned about the detention of all U.S. citizens, including U.S.-Turkish dual nationals, who have been arrested under the state of emergency. We will continue to visit them 

when possible, raise their cases with our Turkish counterparts, and 

seek a satisfactory resolution of their cases. 

In addition to the other U.S. citizens I’ve mentioned, it’s worth 

pausing to note that Henri Barkey, a highly respected TurkishAmerican, has been subjected to a particularly vicious and groundless series of attacks in the Turkish media, which allege that he 

is the subject of criminal charges related to the failed coup attempt 

last year. I want to state clearly that there is absolutely no merit 

to the absurd idea that Henri Barkey, who has served with distinction in various expert capacities both inside and outside the United 

States Government, had anything to do with the coup attempt, or 

that he was acting to undermine the government of Turkey. Such 

accusations set back our relationship with Turkey, and undermine 

the credibility of the Turkish media as well as the Turkish judicial 

process. 

Under the state of emergency, the government of Turkey has arrested two of U.S. Mission Turkey’s locally employed staff on what 

we believe are specious grounds. Longtime U.S. Consulate Adana 

employee Hamza Uluc ̧ay has been in detention since February 

23rd, 2017. On October 5th, Turkish authorities detained longtime 

Consulate Istanbul DEA local employee Metin Topuz. It appears to 

us that Mr. Uluc ̧ay and Mr. Topuz were arrested for maintaining 

legitimate contacts with Turkish Government and local officials 

and others in the context of their official duties on behalf of the 

U.S. Government. 

The targeting of U.S. local staff, particularly those responsible 

for law enforcement coordination, raised our concern over Turkey’s 

commitment to provide proper security for facilities and personnel, 

leading to Mission Turkey’s suspension of non-immigrant visa services on October 8th. We have received initial high-level assurances 

from the government of Turkey that there are no additional local 

employees of our Mission in Turkey under investigation. We have 

also received initial assurances from the government of Turkey 

that our local staff will not be detained or arrested for performing 

their official duties, and that the Turkish authorities will inform 

the U.S. Government in advance if the government of Turkey intends to detain or arrest a member of our staff. Based on these preliminary assurances, we determined that the security posture had 

improved sufficiently to allow for the resumption of limited visa 

services in Turkey. 

However, Mr. Uluc ̧ay and Mr. Topuz remain in custody, and we 

continue to have serious concerns about their cases. We’ll continue 
9 

to engage with our Turkish counterparts to seek a satisfactory resolution of these cases as well. 

As a longtime ally and friend, we want Turkey to be the best 

democratic partner it can be. We have long supported—and we will 

continue to support—democratic development there, because we believe that respect for the rule of law, judicial independence, and 

fundamental freedoms are sources of strength and expand our potential for partnership. We will continue our constructive dialogue 

on the range of foreign policy and bilateral challenges, and we will 

also continue providing the assistance our imprisoned citizens and 

local employees need. We will not rest until all of their cases are 

resolved. 

Members of the Commission, thank you for your attention today, 

and I look forward to your questions. 

Mr. TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Cohen. 

I am going to defer first to Congressman Hultgren, then Congressman Burgess, so that they can get back to other business. If 

you don’t know what markups mean, that means the chairman gets 

mad when you don’t show up because they need a quorum to get 

going forward, which is one of the reasons why some of the Senate 

members may come in and out. Congressman Hultgren. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Thank you, Senator. 

And again, thank you for your service. Thanks for being here 

today. 

I’ll be very brief because, again, as I mentioned, I’m going to 

have to sneak out in a couple minutes, but wonder just briefly if 

you could talk a little bit more about what we could do as the Senate and the House, working in these specific cases. You talked 

quite a bit about Pastor Brunson. I’m grateful to hear that you’ve 

been able to provide consular service to him and his family there, 

also with the dual citizen NASA scientist Serkan Go ̈lge. I wonder 

if you could talk a little bit more of what we can be doing to help, 

if anything, especially for Pastor Brunson, to get that release as 

soon as possible. 

And then, as much as to the extent that the Privacy Act restrictions allow you to answer, I wonder how many U.S. citizens, including dual citizens, are currently detained in Turkey on couprelated charges. And do all of them have that same access to consular service? And is there anything else we can do for those people? 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you for those questions, and let me start with 

the last question first. Because I don’t have Privacy Act waivers, 

I can’t be specific on the numbers, but we have fewer than a dozen. 

I would say several, including U.S. citizens and dual nationals. 

The U.S. citizens were granted consular access quickly after they 

were detained. The dual nationals were not. Turkey does not consider dual nationals to be foreign citizens for purposes of consular 

protections. We consider anyone who has U.S. citizenship to be a 

U.S. citizen, and we pressed strongly for access for them. We were 

granted access last month—October—and we now, I believe, have 

access to all of the dual nationals who are in custody. 

Similarly, some of the people in custody had difficulty getting access to legal counsel. After we pressed, we believe that they all now 

have had access to legal counsel. 
10 

And this gets to the first part of your question, what you all and 

what we all can continue doing to help. Engagement is critical. The 

fact that the Senate and the House have sent letters to Turkish officials expressing their concern is important. I would encourage 

you, if you travel to Turkey, to meet with Turkish officials and 

raise these issues; if you have the opportunity here in Washington 

to meet with representatives from the Turkish embassy, to do the 

same; or to meet with Turkish officials when they come and visit. 

I should say I was in Ankara last month working on this basket 

of issues, and the approach that the Turkish officials had was a 

constructive one. They want to get past this problem as well. There 

are challenges on their side even for the people with the best will, 

because they also have a legal system that they have to navigate, 

and we have to be respectful of the limitations on them. 

But I would urge you to continue your engagement, and also to 

continue comparing notes with the State Department and the Department of Justice as we go forward. 

Mr. HULTGREN. Thank you. We will definitely do that, and please 

stay in touch with us if there’s anything else that comes up that 

you think would be helpful. We want to do anything we can to 

come together to get this done. So thank you again. 

Thank you, Senator Tillis and Dr. Burgess, for letting me jump 

in front here a little bit. 

Thank you. 

Mr. TILLIS. Thank you. 

Congressman Burgess. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Senator Tillis. And again, thank you 

for convening this hearing. 

Secretary Cohen, thank you for your mention of Northern Watch. 

My youngest child was a young airman back in 2000 and was stationed at Incirlik and was part of that activity, and at least 

through the eyes of a 19-year-old at the time was always welltreated by the citizens of Incirlik. And he certainly enjoyed his time 

there. 

You mentioned that you’re now able to visit the people who are 

being held. Can you speak to the fact as to how you perceive, or 

your staff perceives, the people who are being held and how they’re 

being treated? Is their physical condition good? 

Mr. COHEN. The reports that I’ve seen indicate that their physical condition is acceptable. Again, I don’t have Privacy Act waivers 

for most of them—— 

Mr. BURGESS. Sure. 

Mr. COHEN.——so I can’t get into the specifics. But the concern 

is with detention, not so much the conditions of the detention. 

Mr. BURGESS. I understand. 

Mr. COHEN. There have been some instances where people were 

detained in overcrowded facilities. In some cases they were able to 

get moved to less-crowded facilities. So there have been some improvements, and I want to acknowledge the cooperation of the 

Turkish authorities in that regard as well. 

Mr. BURGESS. And in response to Mr. Hultgren’s question, you 

gave an answer of less than a dozen United States citizens are 

being held. Does that include dual nationals in that number? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, sir. 
11 

Mr. BURGESS. OK. 

Just to give context for people who may be watching and unfamiliar with the situation, how is the crackdown that’s occurred in 

Turkey, how is that affecting the average Turkish citizen? How are 

they dealing with that? 

Mr. COHEN. I think it’s hard to speak about the average Turkish 

citizen. What I can say is that it has a chilling effect on public discussion about politics, certainly. It has had a chilling effect on the 

freedom of media, free expression, civil society organizations, all 

the points that were mentioned in the opening remarks by the 

members of the Commission. It’s palpable when you’re in Turkey. 

You can feel that the nature of public debate has been narrowed. 

Mr. BURGESS. Very diplomatically put. What—and, again, forgive 

my lack of depth of knowledge of this—this state of emergency, is 

that in place at the order of the Turkish President, or is that the 

Turkish Parliament? Who has actually enacted that state of emergency? 

Mr. COHEN. If you’ll bear with me, I have a little fact sheet that 

I can go through. 

Mr. BURGESS. OK. 

Mr. COHEN. The government decrees issued under the state of 

emergency restrict suspects’ access to legal assistance, allow suspects to be held without charge for up to a month and, in some 

cases, froze the assets of suspended or fired civil servants and their 

family members. Human rights groups documented some cases in 

which family members were held or subjected to restrictions on 

their freedom of movement in lieu of suspects who remained at 

large. 

Under the state of emergency, detainees could be held without 

charge for up to 30 days, but there were numerous accounts of people waiting beyond the 30-day mark to be formally charged. Bar associations reported that detainees had difficulty gaining access to 

lawyers, both because government decrees restricted lawyers’ access to detainees in prisons, especially those not provided by the 

state, such as legal aid lawyers, and because many lawyers were 

reluctant to defend individuals suspected of ties to the coup attempt. 

A variety of sources reported instances of individuals wrongfully 

detained for ties to the coup based on poison pen allegations driven 

by personal or other rivalries. And the state of emergency itself is 

extended by the Parliament, proposed by the government. 

Mr. BURGESS. Those restrictions of rights, those were applied to 

your two consular employees who were detained, or still are detained? 

Mr. COHEN. I don’t have the detailed information on that, but to 

the best of my knowledge they both have had access to their legal 

counsel. Hamza Uluc ̧ay is actually on trial. So his case has been 

brought to court on several occasions. I believe his next hearing is 

in December. So he has been formally charged. I’m not sure if 

Metin Topuz has been formally charged yet or not. 

Mr. BURGESS. But still held? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, still held. 

Mr. BURGESS. That 30-day requirement has long since passed. So 

under what authority has that been extended? 
12 

Mr. COHEN. Well, Metin was arrested on October 5th. So we’re 

still relatively close to the one-month mark. And I can get back to 

you on whether or not the charges have been formalized. 

Mr. BURGESS. And just, if you can—you may not be able to do 

this, but for those two consular employees, you mentioned assets 

have been frozen. Did that apply to our two consular employees? 

Mr. COHEN. I am not aware of that. 

Mr. BURGESS. All right. Thank you. 

I realize this is asking for an editorial opinion. You may not be 

able or at liberty to give it. But what would have to happen for the 

Turkish Parliament to decide that it’s no longer necessary to impose these restrictions? 

Mr. COHEN. When I asked this of Turks—and I’ll rely on what 

Turkish contacts have told me—they say given the breadth of the 

conspiracy that was perceived to be behind the coup, they believe 

they have more work yet to do before they end the state of emergency. And they cannot point to a time on the calendar when they 

believe that will be accomplished. To our mind, the number of people that have been swept up in the counter-coup is such, and the 

amount of time that has passed is such, that it looks to us like the 

state of emergency has exceeded its reasonable limits. 

Mr. BURGESS. Have they—and, again, forgive me for asking 

something that may be just absolutely obvious—but have they 

identified the one, two, or three critical points that they need to see 

altered, changed? 

Mr. COHEN. I think that’s a question you’d have to address to the 

Turks. 

Mr. BURGESS. OK. 

Mr. COHEN. Sorry. 

Mr. BURGESS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I’ll gladly yield back to 

you. 

Mr. TILLIS. Thank you, Congressman. 

Mr. Cohen, to what extent is there any evidence to support the 

Turkish administration’s position that there were those in the military associated with the Gu ̈len movement that were responsible for 

the coup? 

Mr. COHEN. The military participation in the coup is the most 

clear cut. It is indisputable that Turkish military officers used 

Turkish military hardware against state institutions and facilities 

on July 15th, 2016. So that’s not an issue of dispute. What gets 

into a less clear category is who they were working with. And that 

is, I think, what is behind the scope of the purchase that we’ve 

seen. 

Mr. TILLIS. I am interested in the current state of the rule of law, 

particularly in light of the April 17th constitutional referendum. 

Can you tell me a little bit about what the current state of the rule 

of law is in Turkey? 

Mr. COHEN. Well, the April 17th referendum was to make 

changes to the constitution that transferred the state system from 

a prime ministerial, parliamentary-based system to a presidential 

system, putting more power in the executive. Those changes don’t 

go into effect until 2019. So it’s too early yet to be able to say how 

that will impact day-to-day life in Turkey. But I can refer you to 

the Venice Commission report, which suggests that Turkey will be 
13 

losing a number of checks and balances in its system by implementing these changes. 

Mr. TILLIS. To what extent do we really understand the mood of 

the Turkish people with respect to these changes, the current situation and future situation with these constitutional changes. Do we 

do any polling to get some idea of what the Turkish people think 

about this new change in leadership? 

Mr. COHEN. Yes, we do, as well as some very well-known American institutions, like IRI, which is out there doing excellent work 

in Turkey. But the best indicator, I think, is the result of the referendum itself. It passed by the thinnest possible majority, sort of 

51 percent, which suggests that some 49 percent of the Turkish 

public has misgivings about the changes. 

Mr. TILLIS. Can you tell me a little bit about the charges against 

Mr. Brunson and Mr. Go ̈lge? And in your own opinion, the reasons 

for their detainment and the charges brought against them, and 

shed light on your own view, or the view of the department, about 

the veracity of the charges? 

Mr. COHEN. Well, as I said in my testimony, the charges against 

Pastor Brunson include gathering state secrets for espionage, attempting to overthrow the Turkish Parliament and government, 

and attempting to change the constitutional order. We do not believe there’s any merit to any of these charges. We believe Pastor 

Brunson is an innocent, wrongly accused. 

Mr. TILLIS. And on Mr. Go ̈lge? 

Mr. COHEN. We don’t have a Privacy Act waiver for Mr. Go ̈lge, 

so I can’t comment on his case. But we also have not seen any indication that he’s guilty of any criminal wrongdoing. 

Mr. TILLIS. We have several questions that I want to submit for 

the record, but we’ll move to the next panel in a moment. I have 

spent nine days in Turkey. I was there briefly for two days last 

year, but was focused on the refugee camps. But about 2011, I was 

there for about nine days and it was a very different Turkey. While 

the United States and several other countries were going through 

a serious downturn in the economy, there was just huge optimism 

in this country. We met with chambers of commerce. We met with 

a lot of Turkish families, spent time with Turkish families. That’s 

when I learned you never tell somebody their food looks good, because you’ll be eating most of what’s on their plate. They’re very 

good people. They were very optimistic. How would you view the 

mood of the Turkish people today? 

Mr. COHEN. It’s more tentative. As I mentioned in my remarks, 

Turkey suffered a national trauma. And the sense of that trauma 

permeates every aspect of society and it remains palpable today, or 

after the coup attempt. That said, the economy continues to grow 

at something like 5 percent, which is an enviable growth rate. And 

the Turkish economy continues to have great potential, including 

for American business. And I would reference the prospective deal 

between Boeing and Turkish Airways to sell some 40 Dreamliners, 

which is a deal worth over $10 billion that would employ 25,000 

Americans. So there’s a lot still to be accomplished in our bilateral 

economic relationship. And the Turkish people will benefit from 

continued economic growth, provided that it continues on the path 

it’s on. 
14 

Mr. TILLIS. After that visit I hosted a delegation from Kayseri. 

I was in Izmir, Ankara, Kayseri and Istanbul. And my last city was 

Kayseri. And I spent a day with the mayor there, and other members of Parliament who came back to visit me in my then-capacity 

as Speaker of the House in North Carolina. And we were all optimistic about building great business relationships. I think the 

sooner we get past these sorts of things—which do not make me 

inclined to do anything with Turkey at this point in time—then we 

can get on to building those great relationships that I think would 

be mutually beneficial. 

The last thing you mentioned about, in traveling to Turkey, 

meeting with officials there—one question that I had is, we met 

with several members of Parliament when we were in Ankara. Are 

there any members of Parliament who are openly sympathetic to 

our desire to have these people, who we think were inappropriately 

detained, released? 

Mr. COHEN. I suspect there are. I haven’t had any conversations 

since these arrests took place with any members of Parliament 

which led to this line of conversation. But it’s an excellent question. 

I’ll ask my colleagues in Ankara to see if we can find out. 

Mr. TILLIS. I would like to do that. We had a very good discussion with several members that were there. And I would like to 

know that. Also, I’d like to know, if some of us were to travel to 

Turkey, would we be allowed to meet with the detainees? 

Mr. COHEN. I hope so. That would be up to the Turkish legal authorities. But we have facilitated Turkish official visitors here having access to people that are incarcerated in the U.S. So it’s certainly something for which we would advocate. 

Mr. TILLIS. Well, we’ll work with your office, because I have an 

interest in going there. And I would have an interest in seeking the 

opportunity to meet with the detainees and to also identify any 

members of Parliament that we may be able to meet with to really 

build a case for doing what I think is the just and right thing. 

Mr. Cohen, thank you for being here. We’ve got a number of 

questions that the staff have prepared that I think would be very 

helpful and instructive to the Commission in terms of our path forward. So we’ll submit them to you and would appreciate your response. Thank you. 

I should have said this to begin with, thank you for your very 

long service to the country. And thank you for the very enlightening testimony. 

Mr. COHEN. Thank you, Senator. 

And thank you, Commission. 

Mr. TILLIS. We will take a brief pause and transition to the next 

panel. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. TILLIS. Our second panel consists of three superb witnesses. 

First, we’ll hear from CeCe Heil, Pastor Brunson’s U.S. attorney. 

Ms. Heil is executive senior counsel for the American Center for 

Law and Justice, specializing in public policy and global legal matters, including the United Nations. She manages the ACLJ’s global 

partners and heads a team of lawyers handling cases in defense of 
15 

life, protection of U.S. national security interests, and dealing with 

Islamic extremism. 

Then we’ll hear from Jacqueline Furnari, Pastor Brunson’s 

daughter. Ms. Furnari is the 19-year-old daughter of Andrew 

Brunson. She has two brothers, Jordan and Blaise. She’s currently 

earning her bachelor of science and business administration from 

the Kenan-Flagler Business School at the University of North 

Carolina at Chapel Hill. She expects to graduate in December 

2017, with a concentration in entrepreneurship and operations 

management. Jacqueline was raised in Izmir, Turkey, where her 

father served as pastor of the Izmir Resurrection Church. In February Jacqueline married a Blackhawk pilot in the U.S. Army— 

which is why I’m convinced you’re going to end up living in North 

Carolina after he retires from distinguished service, Jacqueline. 

Finally, we’re going to hear from Nate Schenkkan. A long-time 

Turkey expert who serves as project director for the Nations in 

Transit, Freedom House’s annual survey of democratic governance 

in Central Europe and Eurasia. He previously served as senior program officer for Freedom House’s Eurasia programs, covering Turkey and Central Asia. He was a lead researcher and co-author of 

two Freedom House special reports, including ‘‘The Struggle for 

Turkey’s Internet,’’ and ‘‘Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media 

and Power in Turkey.’’ 

Ms. Heil, we’ll recognize you first for your testimony. 

MS. CECE HEIL, EXECUTIVE COUNSEL. AMERICAN CENTER 

FOR LAW AND JUSTICE 

Ms. HEIL. Thank you, Senator Tillis, Representative Burgess, for 

inviting me to speak before you today to discuss the case of our client, Andrew Craig Brunson, who’s a United States citizen from 

North Carolina who is wrongfully imprisoned in Turkey. Pastor 

Brunson has lived peacefully in Turkey for 23 years, serving as the 

pastor of the Izmir Resurrection Church, and raising his family 

with no incident. But after the failed coup attempt in July of 2016, 

President Erdog ̆an started arresting anyone he deemed a threat, 

which included Christians. So on October 7th, 2016, Pastor 

Brunson was arrested as a threat to national security and detained, pending deportation. 

However, Pastor Brunson was never deported. He still sits in a 

prison cell today, wondering if he’s been forgotten, as today marks 

the 404th day of his detention. And as unbelievable as that may 

seem, given the current state of emergency and the subsequent 

emergency decrees from Turkey, all protections afforded in the Turkey constitution and with international declarations and covenants 

to which Turkey is a member, including the OSCE, all of those protections just disappear. And as a result of the rapidly diminishing 

state of law in Turkey, Pastor Brunson’s file has been sealed, all 

of his visits from his attorney are recorded, and he can literally be 

held for up to seven years without ever being formal charged, completely destroying any ability to prepare an adequate defense, and 

obliterating all rights to due process. 

So Pastor Brunson has remained languishing in a prison cell 

with literally no end in sight. And while Pastor Brunson has been 

in prison, he has lost over 50 pounds, he has lost precious time 
16 

with his family that can never be replaced. And, worst of all, he 

has lost all hope, wondering why Turkey, a NATO ally and a country that he has loved and served for over two decades, has been 

able to hold held him hostage, an innocent United States citizen, 

for over a year. 

Pastor Brunson’s plight has caught the attention of hundreds of 

thousands of people across the world, and there’s been an unprecedented amount of demands for his release from the highest level. 

As we’ve heard, President Trump has repeatedly demanded his release. Vice President Pence has repeated demanded his release. 

And Secretary Tillerson has demanded his release. And actually, 

most of you on this panel signed a bipartisan, bicameral letter that 

was sent to President Erdog ̆an, demanding his release. 

And yet, on August 24, Turkey responds by levying additional ridiculous accusations against Pastor Brunson, these just as ludicrous as and disconcerting as the original. And still, not one piece 

of evidence has been presented to support any of the accusations 

against this innocent pastor. Pastor Brunson maintains his innocence and denies all the accusations, and reiterates that he has 

been in Turkey for the past 23 years for one purpose, and one purpose only, and that was to tell about Jesus Christ. So the question 

remains, why are they still holding him? 

And perhaps President Erdog ̆an has given us the answer to that 

question in his recent demands for a swap of Pastor Brunson for 

either Fethullah Gu ̈len or Reza Zarrab. So Pastor Brunson has literally become a bargaining chip for Turkey, proving that he is not 

a criminal to be prosecuted or convicted but a political hostage that 

Erdog ̆an wants to trade. Turkey is our NATO ally, and we should 

be able to say, give us our American, and they should give us our 

American. So we are asking you today to demand that Turkey give 

us our innocent American. 

Thank you. 

Mr. TILLIS. Thank you, Ms. Heil. 

Jacqueline. 

MS. JACQUELINE FURNARI, DAUGHTER OF ANDREW BRUNSON 

Ms. FURNARI. Thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf 

of my father. 

Having grown up in Turkey, it has been so hard for me to understand the current state of events. My parents moved to Turkey in 

1993, so that’s where my brothers and I grew up. In fact, my brothers were raised there—they were born there. We even went to 

Turkish grade school because my parents wanted us to learn the 

language and feel comfortable in the culture. To me, it was home. 

My family, school, and friends were in Turkey. I grew up in the 

mix of Turkish and American culture, and loved seeing the beauty 

in both. On holidays, we sometimes hung a Turkish flag from our 

balcony, as our neighbors did. We loved and respected the Turkish 

people, and my parents were dedicated to serving them for as long 

as they could. My brothers and I used to joke that we would have 

to bring our future children to Turkey to see their grandparents. 

As I grew up, I saw how my father poured himself into his work, 

and how willing he was to sacrifice his needs and wants for the 

sake of others. He believed—as I do—in a greater purpose in life, 
17 

and actively lived out his life with the purpose of showing people 

the love and grace of God. He taught this message in the home, 

too. My parents’ continued commitment to serving God and the 

people of Turkey was such a wonderful example for my brothers 

and me to see. We were truly blessed to be raised by such faithful 

parents. 

I know my dad and his character as only a daughter can, and 

I know the charges against him are absurd. My father is not an 

armed terrorist trying to overthrow any government, my dad is a 

pastor who went to Wheaton College, then on to seminary, and got 

a Ph.D. in New Testament. He has selflessly served Turkey for 24 

years now. Everything in his life is centered on his faith. For my 

family, who has loved, served, and prayed for Turkey and its people, seeing these absurd charges brought against my father has 

been an extremely painful experience. The past year of our lives 

has been filled with uncertainty, worry, tears, and countless unanswered questions. 

My family kept assuming this situation would end soon. But it 

kept dragging on, month after month. My brothers and I didn’t get 

to spend Christmas with my mom, because she was scared of what 

might happen to us if we flew into Turkey. I missed a last Christmas as a single woman with my family. I was about to transition 

into a different phase of life, and I wanted that one last family 

Christmas before things changed. In February I got married. We 

didn’t want to get married without my parents present, but because my husband is in the military we could not postpone it. We 

had received my dad’s blessing, but we felt so terrible about getting 

married while he was imprisoned. Neither of my parents were 

there, and I will never get that moment back. 

For those of you who are fathers to daughters, I’m sure you 

would want to walk your daughter down the aisle. My father didn’t 

get that. My husband and I decided to have a civil ceremony and 

to postpone our wedding until my father is home. I’m still waiting 

for my wedding. I’m still waiting to wear the wedding dress that 

I got almost a year and half ago. I’m still waiting for my dad to 

walk me down the aisle. And I’m still waiting for that fatherdaughter dance. 

I’m graduating from college in December. My dad doesn’t want 

to miss seeing graduate. He invested a lot in helping me find a career path. However, unless a miracle happens, I will be achieving 

yet another life milestone without my parents. In his letters, my 

father says that the hardest part of his imprisonment is missing 

out on being with his family. That is what he most wants. He has 

missed his only daughter getting married, and might miss my college graduation. He has missed helping my older brother make career choices and witnessing his accomplishments at Cornell. He has 

missed being with my younger brother who has so badly needed his 

dad and mom in the last year. These are the things that pain my 

dad the most, not being able to be with us. 

In August, I took a risk and flew to Turkey to visit my dad and 

support my mom. I never really processed that visit because it 

makes me too emotional. I will never forget any moment of the day 

we got to visit. I remember hearing my dad’s voice for the first time 

in a year as they brought him into the room. I remember how bro-
18 

ken, tired, and desperate he sounded as he tried to fight to meet 

in a room where he could hug and hold us for the only hour he 

would have seen us the whole year. We sobbed the entire visit. It 

was hard to fit words in because the emotions were too strong and 

only led to more tears. It was difficult to see my dad so broken, so 

thin, and so desperate. He hated having his kids see him that way. 

During my summer visit, he was already talking about how fearful he was at facing the cold winter in that poorly insulated prison. 

That he was already concerned about the winter in the middle of 

August shows how hopeless he was. And now, the cold that he 

feared so much has started. Seeing him in that much pain broke 

me. He’s been changed by this experience. My whole family has 

been changed. In a recent visit with my mother, my father said: I 

plead with the Lord to release me by Christmas so I can be with 

our son in his last year in high school and at our daughter’s graduation before she moves to Germany. But if I’m still here at Christmas, I’ll thank God for sending Jesus to be born. If I’m still here 

at New Year, I’ll thank him for helping me make it through this 

year. If I’m here on my birthday I’ll give thanks for the life I’ve 

lived. 

My father is now dealing with anxiety and depression, but he is 

handling his situation better than he was before. But we still want 

so desperately for him not to have to face another Christmas imprisoned. We want him to be home again, with his family. My family has suffered greatly because of these absurd and false charges. 

Please, make any and all efforts to secure my dad’s release and 

bring him home for Christmas. He’s been imprisoned falsely for far 

too long. 

Mr. TILLIS. Thank you, Ms. Furnari. 

Mr. Schenkkan. 

MR. NATE SCHENKKAN, DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONS IN 

TRANSIT PROJECT, FREEDOM HOUSE 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Thank you. Senator Tillis, members of the Commission, it’s an honor to testify before you today. I’m going to focus 

in my spoken testimony on some of the developments in rule of law 

since the coup attempt. I know we’ve covered some of this ground 

already. But I think, if anything, we may be understating how severe the crisis is in Turkey. 

And I think that affects how we look ahead in the U.S.-Turkish 

relationship, and how it needs to be approached. My written testimony contains some more context about the state of rule of law in 

Turkey prior to the coup attempt. So I ask that you refer to that 

with questions on the matter. 

Under the emergency rule for the last 16 months, some 150,000 

people have passed through police custody on the basis of terrorist 

offenses, membership of armed groups, or involvement in the attempted coup. Of these, at least 62,000 have been arrested. One 

hundred and fifty-three journalists are in prison. More than 

111,000 people have been fired from public service, which also 

means that they are placed on a blacklist, which largely prevents 

them from finding private employment. 

The state has also closed and seized institutions around the 

country: 1,412 associations, 15 universities run by foundations, 162 
19 

media outlets, 2,271 private educational institutions, and 19 

unions, 969 companies valued at roughly $11 billion have been 

seized, 94 mayors have been removed from office and replaced by 

appointed trustees, 10 members of Parliament are in prison, two 

members of the Constitutional Court were removed from office and 

arrested, along with 37 personnel of the Constitutional court, 4,240 

judges and prosecutors have been dismissed, 28 lawyers’ associations or law societies have been closed, at least 550 lawyers have 

been arrested, and 1,400 lawyers are facing criminal prosecution. 

As has been discussed, these emergency decrees under the state 

of emergency reduced very important protections for those accused 

or under investigation for crimes related to the coup attempt or 

membership of terrorist groups. These have led to increasing, and 

increasingly credible, reports of torture and forced disappearances 

in detention, which was a problem considered largely eradicated 

prior to the coup attempt in Turkey. 

Regarding the constitutional referendum and the changes, I must 

respectfully disagree, slightly, with DAS Cohen regarding the effect 

on rule of law. Yes, the changes do not go into effect until 2019, 

but it is clear what that effect will be. The referendum changes increase the president’s control over the judiciary. The president will 

have the power to appoint six out of the 13 members of the Council 

of Judges and Prosecutors, which controls the appointments of the 

judiciary. The remaining appointments will be made by the Parliament which is currently, of course, under majority control of the 

president’s party. The oversight role of the Constitutional Court 

has been downgraded, as has that of the Council of State. In addition, of course, in this shift to a presidential system, the prime 

ministership is eliminated as an office and the president gains the 

power to appoint ministers. 

It’s within this context and the ordeals of Pastor Brunson, America’s foreign service nationals, and tens of thousands of Turkish 

citizens, including leaders of civil society like Osman Kavala, that 

we need to understand this context of deteriorating rule of law. The 

executive branch in Turkey is constrained at this point neither by 

the balance of powers nor by the rights of individuals when it 

chooses to use politicized justice to achieve its political ends. 

There will be three major elections in 2019 in Turkey. There will 

be nationwide local elections in March, parliamentary and presidential elections currently scheduled simultaneously for November. 

Each of these will be extremely important for President Erdog ̆an’s 

goal of remaining in power and of retaining or, even better, 

strengthening his control over the levers of the state. We should 

not expect an improvement in the rule of law prior to the elections. 

It’s not in President Erdog ̆an’s interest, and it’s not in the AKP’s 

interest to have the system work more fairly or more justly at this 

time. Nor should we expect an improvement after the elections, unfortunately. If President Erdog ̆an and the AKP win, they will continue their effort to consolidate a paternal regime. If they lose even 

one election, they will have to tighten the screws in order to maintain power. This is what happened after the AKP lost its majority 

in Parliament in the June 2015 general election. So this problem 

of rule of law in Turkey is one that will be with us for a long time. 
20 

So let me say in that light a few words about United States policy towards Turkey in this area, regarding rule of law. The biggest 

problem is, first, that we treat it as something that we believe can 

be solved soon, or solved quickly. Of course, the first priority is returning U.S. citizens and protecting American employees, foreign 

service nationals, from persecution. But we need to recognize, no 

matter what the outcome is of these cases, this is a durable problem that will be with us. We need to recognize that the use of antiAmericanism and anti-Westernism by President Erdog ̆an and other 

political leaders in Turkey is driven by a domestic political dynamic. And nothing that the United States does is going to change 

that. 

Instead of starting from a position of seeking to solve the problem of Turkey’s political leaders taking anti-Western stances for 

their political gain, we need to define clearly first, for ourselves, 

what the United States core interests and values are in our relationship with Turkey, and then articulate policies to achieve those 

interests and values, including taking measures with Turkey to enforce them if they’re threatened and violated. And I think there’s 

been a lot of progress on this in the last year. 

We also, though, need to keep an eye on the medium and the 

long term in Turkey, and what we want to see in Turkey. I believe 

the United States has a long-term, strategic interest in Turkey 

being a stable state, based on the rule of law, in which political and 

ethnic minorities enjoy fundamental rights, including the ability to 

participate fully in political processes. The United States cannot 

make Turkey into such a state. But this should be a key pillar for 

any U.S. strategic vision for the Middle East, and one that can be 

supported through measures taken now. 

Some of those measures would include, first, using new instruments, including the Global Magnitsky Act, to sanction Turkish officials responsible for grave human rights violations. And of course, 

the congressional role in collecting those cases and forwarding 

them to the State Department can be very important. Second, I believe Congress should mandate funding for human rights defenders, civil society activists, and journalists in Turkey. Congress 

should create a special fund for those who support the country’s future as a democratic, rule-of-law state. 

Third—and this is where I think most of the progress has been 

in the last year—the United States can make clear that the rule 

of law in the United States and the rights of American citizens and 

employees of the U.S. Government are non-negotiable in the relationship with Turkey. If Turkish officials flout U.S. law, they will 

face criminal prosecution. We’ve seen this already, I think, in the 

Reza Zarrab case, which is one of the reasons why it’s so important, beyond its implications, of course, as simply enforcing U.S. 

laws. The Van Hollen amendment is also an important step in this 

direction, reinforcing the importance of United States laws by underscoring that violations of our laws will affect U.S. support and 

cooperation with Turkey. 

We also have to do the same regarding American employees and 

American citizens overseas. If the U.S. concludes that the detention 

of an American citizen is not based on a legitimate, criminal accusation, it should sanction officials responsible for their detention. 
21 

And this is why I support the Lankford-Shaheen amendment, and 

why Freedom House supports it. The U.S. must also stress that attacks on U.S. employees, including the offensive conspiracy theory 

regarding Henri Barkey and the imprisonment of foreign service 

nationals, will also result in the continuation of visa restrictions or 

other punitive measures, as needed. And I think Congress should 

be prepared to request sanctions against individual officials responsible for illegitimate detentions of U.S. employees. 

There are no magic bullets for improving the U.S.-Turkey relationship. There are diverging values between these two allies. We 

should prepare for a very rocky short-term relationship and take 

necessary measures to guard the U.S.’s core interest and lay the 

groundwork for future improvements. It’s my hope that the United 

States will stand with the many Turkish citizens working for democracy and rule of law in Turkey, and that circumstances will one 

day to improve to allow the bilateral relationship to return to a less 

tense basis. 

Thank you. 

Mr. TILLIS. Congressman Burgess, would you like to ask any 

questions before—— 

Mr. BURGESS. I have to leave, but thank you. 

Thank you for your testimony. 

Mr. TILLIS. Thank you. 

Senator Shaheen. 

HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN, COMMISSIONER, COMMISSION ON 

SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mrs. SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all very much for being here and the work that you’re 

doing. And, Ms. Furnari, I’m sorry I pronounced your name incorrectly, but no one should have to go through what your family has 

gone through. And I think all of us are in sympathy with your situation, and will do everything we can to try and address it. 

Mr. Schenkkan, I appreciated the opportunity to work with you 

as we were working on the legislation with Senator Langford and 

on trying to restore some of the funding to address the efforts in 

Turkey around civil society. I wonder, in your testimony you said 

that we should not expect any improvement in the next few years. 

Can you talk about how matters could further deteriorate? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. I may, yes. What I think we should expect, unfortunately, in the short term politically, prior to the 2019 elections, is an expansion, in fact, of the prosecutions on conspiracy 

theory grounds around the state of emergency. I think it was asked 

in one of the earlier questions at what point the Turkish Government would consider their response adequate or to be finished regarding the coup attempt. I was in Turkey a month after the coup 

attempt interviewing various members of civil society, as well as 

politicians and others. At that time, the most fervent hope, in August 2016, was that the investigation of the coup attempt would remain within the appropriate framework, and confine itself to the 

coup attempt. 

It was already clear within two weeks after that, that it was beyond that framework. And it has now spilled far, far, far beyond 

that. Unfortunately, under the state of emergency and under exist-
22 

ing Turkish laws prior to the state of emergency, there are virtually no limits to how far a prosecutor, with a cooperative judge, 

may go in persecuting people for normal interactions with others. 

It’s a guilty by association system. So the allegations currently 

being pressed against Osman Kavala, whose case I mentioned, a 

very prominent civil society leader, that involve Henri Barkey, 

former State Department official—these allegations in and of themselves can expand to include hundreds, maybe even thousands of 

people. Unfortunately, we face a very severe conspiracy theory scenario in Turkey. 

Mrs. SHAHEEN. So, given what’s happened, can you talk about 

how that’s affecting the Turkish economy, and to what extent 

Erdog ̆an is affected by—I don’t want to say a downgrade—but a 

worsening economic situation in the country? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Yes. The economy is built on fragile ground. 

The Turkish economy had previously been orienting itself more and 

more towards an export-led approach, driven especially by cultivating new markets in the Middle East, in the Balkans, in Europe. 

Strained relations with Europe—that, again, President Erdog ̆an 

has cultivated for his own domestic political reasons—have begun 

to affect economic relations and investments coming from Europe. 

The strained relations with Russia that Turkey had previously engaged in—although now there’s been a de ́tente—had also contributed to undermining some of the bases for economic development. 

So while DAS Cohen mentioned the very strong growth rate that 

Turkey currently posts, that’s possibly based on some meddling 

with the numbers, according to economists. They changed how they 

calculate GDP recently. It also ignores the very high inflation right 

now in Turkey, which is well over 10 percent, and may be quite 

higher when we talk about food products which, of course, is the 

most important for the largest part of the population. So economic 

issues are very important for President Erdog ̆an. He’s looking for 

ways prior to the 2019 election cycle to make sure that the average 

Turk, or at least his core base, feels that the economy is working 

for them. That requires some short term measures—as it has over 

the past several years—that may not be best for the long term. 

Mrs. SHAHEEN. Thank you. I see my time is up. 

Mr. TILLIS. If you have other questions, you’re welcome to—— 

Mrs. SHAHEEN. No, go ahead. 

Mr. TILLIS. I’ve been deferring to everybody to make sure you 

had an opportunity. Thank you for attending. 

Ms. Furnari, you spent so much time in Izmir, right? How big 

is the congregation? 

Ms. FURNARI. The church congregation? The size varies. Depends 

on the week, depends on the year, honestly. I would say, to the best 

of my knowledge, around 50 people. Some weeks lower, some weeks 

higher. 

Mr. TILLIS. And in your time there, do you recall any time where 

you felt like you were being harassed or targeted by Turkish authorities, or your parents? Before the events that led to your father’s detainment? 

Ms. FURNARI. I would say there wasn’t a feeling of that from 

Turkish authorities. But I think about six or seven years ago there 

was an attempt on my father’s life by a gunman that came to the 
23 

church. So I did have that sense of some risk and some fear and 

concern for my parents. 

Mr. TILLIS. And Mr. Cohen testified that from the State Department’s perspective, the conditions of your father’s detainment were 

adequate. And then Ms. Heil and you both testified that he’s lost 

50 pounds in the 404 days that he’s been in confinement. How do 

you reconcile adequate facilities with that outcome? And Ms. Heil, 

either you or Ms. Furnari. It sounds like the conditions are not the 

least bit acceptable. 

Ms. HEIL. I would say the other situation that Mr. Cohen also 

referenced was being kept in a cell that was overcrowded—well, 

that was Pastor Brunson as well, because during a time of his detention he was kept in a cell that was built for 8, but had 22 prisoners in it. And of course, he’s the only Christian. So, being kept 

up all hours of the night, not being able to walk outside, just the 

stress of not being able to sleep. And, again, being the only Christian—just the verbal abuse and the stress of missing his family 

have just led him to losing weight and being beside himself, with 

no end in sight. 

Mr. TILLIS. Ms. Furnari, are you able to communicate with him, 

either through written correspondence or through the telephone? 

Ms. FURNARI. Yes, I have been able to send him letters. Every 

once in a while, I get one from him. It’s been very difficult for him 

to bring himself to write, though, because it reminds him of what 

he’s missing out on. 

Mr. TILLIS. Ms. Heil, it almost seems to me that maybe from the 

beginning of his apprehension that they viewed him as possible 

trade bait for someone here in the United States. Do you see anything that any reasonable person—have you seen any evidence that 

would substantiate any of their reasons for detainment that in a 

U.S. court would hold water at any level? 

Ms. HEIL. No. In fact, his file has been sealed under the state 

of emergency, so no one has seen any evidence. So we have no idea. 

We have heard that there is a secret witness, but that’s all. And 

every chance we’ve had, we’ve tried to demand concrete evidence. 

But no one has seen any evidence. And he has not been charged 

with any crime. He’s still simply a suspect being detained. 

Mr. TILLIS. Doesn’t it defy logic that if the Turkish Government 

and Erdog ̆an had a compelling case against Mr. Brunson that they 

would want to put that forth to really communicate more effectively their basis for the illegal detainment? 

Ms. HEIL. Certainly. If they had evidence to support their accusations of the crimes, you would think that they would go ahead and 

charge him and let the case proceed. But they have not. 

Mr. TILLIS. Mr. Schenkkan, the referendum back in April of 

2017—how have international observers judged the legitimacy of 

that referendum? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. The OSCE had a long-term observation mission 

in Turkey, as well as short-term observers, a full team. And their 

appraisal was very negative, in the measured terms, of course, that 

the OSCE monitors, ODIHR, typically uses. 

Mr. TILLIS. Yes, so you’ve got a referendum that passed by the 

slimmest of margins, and then questions about the legitimacy of 
24 

the referendum to begin with. Is that fair to characterize it that 

way? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. It’s very fair. 

Mr. TILLIS. You mentioned something, I want you to go back to 

it—I can’t remember your precise words, but you were talking 

about the seizure of certain businesses that equated to the billions. 

Can you tell me a little bit about those businesses and why they 

would have necessarily been targeted? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Of course. The Turkish Government’s position 

is that the Fethullah Gu ̈len organization, which they call FETO— 

which is not a name that the network uses for itself, but was provided by the Turkish Government in the last three years—included 

large business interests. And so businesses and businesses owned 

by affiliated businessmen were seized and handed over to the 

treasury, and they will be gradually auctioned off, again, in a process that is starting now. 

In those auctions in the last 10 years, we have many examples 

of this auction process taking place when companies go into bankruptcy or are otherwise passed over into state hands. These auction 

processes are very frequently, if not universally, manipulated to ensure that especially strategic interests in areas like media wind up 

in the hands of parties friendly to President Erdog ̆an and to his 

government. 

Mr. TILLIS. When I was in Turkey for that extended period a few 

years ago, I had the opportunity to meet with the ecumenical patriarch, Bartholomew. And interestingly enough, at that time he was 

pretty optimistic that things were getting better. What’s the state 

of Christians in Turkey today? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Well, I would have to say, first of all, that like 

we say in freedom of the press issues, the death of one journalist 

or the imprisonment of one journalist has a very severe chilling effect. The imprisonment of one pastor has an extremely severe 

chilling effect throughout a whole community. 

Of course, the Orthodox and the Armenian communities in Turkey have special legal constitutional protections under the Lausanne Treaty, and in that sense also have a different relationship 

with the authorities than do Protestant Christians in Turkey. I 

think the main factor undergirding what’s happened—which is affecting all Christian communities, including the official protected 

ones—is a very hard nationalist turn of the last three years; that 

has President Erdog ̆an embarking on a very anti-Western and very 

Turkish nationalist course in order to consolidate a different political coalition than the one that had backed him in the 2000s. He 

increasingly needs to marginalize and to push out ethnic minorities 

and religious minorities. And so the hate speech against them has 

certainly increased. 

Mr. TILLIS. How much of Erdog ̆an’s behavior, do you think, is 

rooted in his own belief of where he wants Turkey to go, versus 

just reading the political tea leaves and trying to maintain some 

order within the nation? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. It’s one of the top questions among anyone interested in Turkey. I think it is principally about the political moment first and second about where he wants to go, because where 

he wants to go falls within a very wide spectrum, but where he 
25 

wants to be when Turkey gets there—which is at the very top— 

is always the same. And so Turkey can get to a lot of different 

places with President Erdog ̆an at the top, and I think he’s been 

maneuvering back and forth along different options as the political 

dynamics and the geopolitical dynamics change around him. 

Mr. TILLIS. I did also want to ask you just briefly, you mentioned 

an amendment by Senator Van Hollen, I believe, and you also mentioned the effort on the part of Senators Shaheen and Lankford. 

What more should we be considering, beyond being supportive of 

those measures, as specific actions of Congress? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Correct. Regarding the U.S. employees, foreign 

service nationals, I think we should be considering either widening 

Senator Shaheen’s and Senator Lankford’s amendment to include 

employees of the United States or adding a separate amendment 

for that purpose, because I think where we’ve arrived now—and it’s 

correct, as DAS Cohen indicated in his testimony—that there has 

been some progress in the past couple of months, and in particular 

since the visa suspension, that that got the attention of the Turkish authorities and improved access to some detainees. It led to 

some changes regarding the potential detention of a third foreign 

service national. 

That said, it hasn’t led to the release of Serkan Go ̈lge, of Pastor 

Brunson, or Metin Topuz, Hamza Uluc ̧ay. We’re still just back at 

the beginning, which is not a good situation. So I think that it 

needs to continue to press forward. I think that’s one. 

I think, two—and this is more about the medium term and the 

longer term and how, I think, want to see Turkey as a stable ruleof-law state that is more inclusive and more democratic—there 

should be funding for civil society, for journalists in Turkey. The 

U.S. Government typically has not provided this kind of democracy 

and governance assistance for Turkey, except in very small ways— 

through the party institutes, through the occasional State Department Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor call. USAID 

does not do work oriented inside of Turkey. There should be consideration for whether there should be a special fund or other mechanism for those who support a democratic rule-of-law state in Turkey. 

Mr. TILLIS. Thank you. 

Senator Shaheen. 

Mrs. SHAHEEN. First of all, let me go back to the coup. Has there 

been any reliable information released from the Turkish Government about who was responsible for the coup, who in the United 

States we believe is objective and factual? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Well, I can’t speak for the United States Government or how they are perceiving. 

There are multiple trials currently going on of varying relationship to the coup attempt. So you have some that are very much on 

the periphery and that prosecutors have claimed are connected to 

the coup attempt, like the case against Pastor Brunson or against 

others, the case against Osman Kavala or against the Amnesty 

International human rights defenders. All of these mentioned the 

coup attempt and implied that these people were somehow involved, but there was, obviously, no evidence. 
26 

There’s another set of cases involving officers, involving military 

figures, as well as some civilians who are around the military 

bases. Those cases are taking place. There is a gradual buildup of 

evidence around what happened. 

A couple of really severe problems with that. 

Mrs. SHAHEEN. Yes, and I’m really asking not what happened, 

who were the responsible for the events of that period. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Yes. 

Mrs. SHAHEEN. I’m more asking is there any evidence around 

who was behind initiating that. The military—I haven’t seen anything that suggests the Gu ̈len network was actually responsible, 

but is there any evidence that’s come out that would suggest that? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. There is evidence that there were members of 

the Gu ̈len movement or network, some in the military and some 

who were civilians, who participated in the coup attempt. What 

their role was, whether they were the exclusive leaders or whether 

they were co-participants along with members of other factions in 

the military, is not yet clear, in my opinion. And this is, obviously, 

hotly, hotly debated right now. 

Mrs. SHAHEEN. Right. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Second—and I would say this even more strongly—there has been no genuine evidence offered of the coup attempt 

being directed from Pennsylvania, which is of course the implication, from Fethullah Gu ̈len. 

Mrs. SHAHEEN. Right. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. That evidence continues to be circumstantial. It 

continues to be based on inference and not based on something that 

would stand up, I would say, in a U.S. court of law. 

Mrs. SHAHEEN. And so what has been the impact of the recent 

reports that someone associated with the current administration, in 

the Trump administration, was meeting around the potential to extradite or to send Gu ̈len back to Turkey? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Well, I think the biggest impact is that it damaged the clear message that the U.S. needs to send and has been 

working to send, that our system of rule of law is inviolable. The 

implication that there could be a side deal outside of the normal 

legal channels for the extradition or rendition of an individual 

who’s legally entitled to be residing in the United States right now 

is very damaging. And so I think it is very important that—and I 

think the State Department has likely done this—we communicate 

that this is not the way to go about business. 

Mrs. SHAHEEN. And how much does it undercut that message 

when we have the President embracing Erdog ̆an and not raising 

concerns about human rights issues in Turkey? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. I think it’s a genuine issue that we want to 

make sure that human rights issues remain at the forefront of the 

agenda with Turkey. And we want them to remain there not only 

because they’re our values and because this is what we stand for, 

but because this is in our strategic interest. This is an important 

part of how the United States wants to see events develop in the 

Middle East. Many of the issues that we see ourselves grappling 

with in Syria, in Iraq, as well as in the Balkans, have strong ties 

to the settlement and development of a democratic rule-of-law society in Turkey. 
27 

Mrs. SHAHEEN. Nate, Turkey has played an important role in 

NATO, and they have certainly been helpful in a number of the 

conflicts where NATO has participated. Can you talk about what, 

if anything, NATO might be able to do to address some of the rule 

of law and other issues that are happening in Turkey right now? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Certainly, NATO remains principally a military 

alliance. It is a military alliance—— 

Mrs. SHAHEEN. Right. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN.——and it has military tasks that it performs. 

The integrity of that relationship with Turkey has also been threatened by these developments, and that is one of the reasons why 

this is a strategic goal, to create democracy and rule of law in Turkey. 

I think the NATO relationship will primarily be of use in this regard in that it is a means to communicate with Turkey how seriously the United States takes these issues. 

Mrs. SHAHEEN. And the EU, I assume. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Yes, of course. 

To indicate that the kind of cooperation within NATO that Turkey will be involved in, and the level of Turkey’s rank within 

NATO and what it has access to and where it falls within the hierarchy—because, of course, as such a large alliance, there is a hierarchy—that connecting these two will help. And I think it can be 

used in that way. I would not put on the table any kind of withdrawal or any kind of exclusion of Turkey from NATO, but—— 

Mrs. SHAHEEN. I would agree with that. I don’t think that’s helpful. 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Yes. But within the alliance itself, there continue to be very differing levels of cooperation. And I think making 

sure that when the United States says we value Turkey’s strategic 

alliance and participation in NATO, what is understood by that is: 

and that participation will increase, along with improved cooperation on these other measures, rather than ‘‘and we will continue to 

participate no matter what, we will continue to offer you the same 

access no matter what,’’ would be an improvement. 

Mrs. SHAHEEN. Finally, I would just say that one of the things 

you point out—and I agree with this—is that we should recognize 

in the United States that Erdog ̆an’s anti-Western, antiAmericanism message is about his own interests, and that there’s 

nothing that we can do that’s going to change that tide. I would 

just qualify that a little bit, because you then go on to point out 

that, based on some of the proactive actions that we’ve taken in the 

United States, it has changed Turkey’s behavior. And I would 

argue that we need to continue to look at those proactive ways in 

which we can change Turkey’s behavior, and in some cases that 

means not only with incentives but also, as we’ve done through the 

Van Hollen amendment, try to provide some disincentives for Turkey, some penalties that they have to expect in terms of how we 

deal with them, and that that’s very important for us to do. And 

as we look at how we deal with some of the people that they’ve imprisoned, we ought to be thinking about what ways we can invoke 

some of these incentives and disincentives to try and influence 

their behavior in terms of releasing those people who are improperly imprisoned. 
28 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. Absolutely. And I agree with how you understood or reframed my point. I think what I was trying to get at is 

we should not react on the basis of rhetoric and we should not 

react on the basis of trying to assuage or placate something that 

the Turkish Government is doing. We should act on the basis of 

these are our interests, these are our values, this is what we need 

to do to enforce them, because there’s been a shifting and a perception from the Turkish side that maybe what were red lines are not 

red lines anymore. And those need to be enforced. 

Mrs. SHAHEEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. TILLIS. Thank you, Senator Shaheen. 

Senator Cardin. 

HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, RANKING MEMBER, COMMISSION 

ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 

Mr. CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize for not being 

here throughout the hearing. We have a little tax bill in the Senate 

Finance Committee that we’re bringing up. But I wanted to stop 

by. 

Thanks, Senator Tillis. Thanks, Senator Wicker; Senator 

Shaheen, who is a key member of the Senate Foreign Relations 

Committee as it relates to this issue in Europe. 

Our dilemma is this: Turkey is a very important strategic partner of the United States. Its location is critically important. It’s 

critically important in regards to our campaign against ISIS, and 

it’s a NATO partner. All of the above. But we ignore human rights 

and values at our own peril. If we don’t package our policies in 

Turkey based upon respect for human rights of the Turkish citizens, it’s going to be counterproductive to United States national 

security interests. 

And it’s been really challenging. It’s been challenging under this 

administration because the Trump administration has not been 

clear at times as to American values. That makes it more complicated for us to stand up and say that we will not tolerate the 

mass arrests and the violations of dissent being tolerated in their 

country. So this is not an easy issue for us to figure out how we 

need to proceed. 

But we have direct problems when Turkey is purchasing its military arms from Russia, which violates NATO uniformity and consistency, and violates our sanction bill with Russia. We’ve got to 

take action. You can’t sit by and let those types of activities occur 

without the United States being strongly engaged on that issue. 

I was in Europe this past weekend and had a conversation with 

our German colleagues in regards to Turkey. There is concern well 

beyond the United States on these issues. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I don’t have any specific questions for the witnesses, but I just really wanted to thank the Helsinki Commission 

for holding this hearing. I think this is extremely important. We’ve 

got to get this right. We need Turkey. I would suggest Turkey 

needs us. And their sensitivity on certain issues is, quite frankly, 

beyond our understanding. But we do stand for universal values, 

and they need to embrace a more open way in which we can have 

those discussions as partners. 
29 

Thank you. 

Mr. TILLIS. Thank you, Senator Cardin. 

Ms. Heil, we’ve had some questions about what more we can do 

as a matter of policy, and some of the amendments we’ve talked 

about already. But what more can we do to help you? 

Ms. HEIL. As has been mentioned before even when you discontinue visa services out of Turkey, if there’s any opportunity for 

negotiation, that Pastor Brunson never be forgotten as part of 

those negotiations. 

As far as what will make Turkey respond, I think we would defer 

to the administration and the State Department because they have 

had direct negotiations and talks with Turkey, and they would be 

in a better position to tell you what they think would be helpful. 

But I would urge you to let them know how important this issue 

is to you. 

Mr. TILLIS. Mr. Schenkkan, the discussion around the challenges 

that Senator Cardin did a great job of summarizing—on the one 

hand, they’re an important ally in the fight on terror, and they’re 

actually host to tens of thousands of refugees who are seeking refuge from the fighting in Syria. But the President has publicly 

asked for the release of the detainees. The Secretary of State has. 

What more should we ask of the administration beyond the posture 

and the public positions they’ve taken? 

Mr. SCHENKKAN. I think that these issues of detention, especially 

the treatment of American citizens first and foremost, can be 

worked into other aspects of the relationship. I think, as my cotestifier was saying, there are many, many, many interactions with 

the Turkish Government on a daily basis, on a bilateral basis at 

the working level, of course. There are also many more mediumlevel and then high-level interactions. And I think that making it 

clear that this is not a matter of a single public statement or two 

public statements—that this will affect the NATO relationship, it 

will affect the security relationship—is an important thing to communicate to Turkey, and to communicate how it will affect that relationship going forward. 

One of the things that we’re seeing now regarding Turkey due 

to the detention of American citizens, due to the charges and conspiracy theories advanced about other Americans, is fewer Americans, especially those who would be most interested in working 

with Turkey—whether on a business basis or on a foreign policy 

basis or in other areas—being unwilling to travel there. And I 

think it’s important that Turkey understand they’re going to lose 

a large generation of people who would otherwise be very supportive and would be their allies if this continues. 

Mr. TILLIS. Thank you. 

Well, thank you all for your testimony. And, Ms. Furnari, I look 

forward to your father being at your ceremony. 

Ms. FURNARI. Thank you. 

Mr. TILLIS. We’re going to hold the record open till the end of the 

week. We will have other members probably submit questions for 

the record. I have some that we’ll be submitting to seek your input. 

But certainly, you have an invitation to contact my office, with a 

North Carolinian illegally detained, and all of the offices of the 
30 

members of the Commission, to do everything we can to continue 

to provide support. 

So at this point we will adjourn the hearing. But we will leave 

the record open through the end of the week. If you have any other 

additional information you’d like to submit for the record, we welcome you to do that. 

And again, thank you again for your testimony and for being 

here today. Commission’s adjourned. [Sounds gavel.] 

[Whereupon, at 11:06 a.m., the hearing ended.] 
(31) 

A P P E N D I X 

(33) 

PREPARED STATEMENTS

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. THOM TILLIS

This hearing of the Helsinki Commission will come to order. 

Good morning and welcome to this Helsinki Commission hearing 

titled ‘‘Prisoners of the Purge: The Victims of Turkey’s Failing Rule 

of Law.’’ I am honored to be chairing this hearing on behalf of 

Chairman Wicker. 

As of today, an American pastor has spent 404 days in a Turkish 

jail without trial, without access to the evidence against him, the 

subject of a vicious smear campaign in the Turkish press, and facing life in prison on fabricated charges of being a terrorist and 

coup-plotter. 

Elsewhere in Turkey, a Turkish-American NASA scientist has 

spent 480 days in prison—much of it in solitary confinement—on 

terrorism and espionage charges springing from the baseless testimony of a disgruntled relative and a bizarre compilation of circumstantial evidence, including a dollar bill seized at his parents’ 

home. 

Today also marks 253 days behind bars for a veteran Turkish 

employee of the U.S. Consulate in Adana who stands accused of 

terrorism for doing his job as he has for over 30 years, communicating on behalf of the U.S. Government with local community 

contacts. 

These prisoners—Andrew Brunson, Serkan Go ̈lge, and Hamza 

Uluc ̧ay—are the innocent victims of Turkey’s collapsing rule of law. 

With every passing day, the injustice of these detentions compounds itself. For the Brunson family next week: another Thanksgiving apart. For Kubra Go ̈lge and her two young kids: another day 

away from their home in Houston. For Hamza, another inexplicable 

punishment for his dedication to the job he loves. 

But the focus of this hearing is not personal—it’s principle. Just 

as Andrew, Serkan, and Hamza have been victims of Turkey’s failing rule of law, there are literally thousands more like them behind 

bars today. 

Since imposing a state of emergency nearly 16 months ago, the 

Turkish Government has detained more than 60,000 people and 

fired or suspended upwards of 100,000 others from their jobs. The 

so-called ‘‘decree laws’’ authorizing these punitive measures do not 

establish any evidentiary standard for application thereby permitting wide-scale abuse as seen in the cases I’ve highlighted. 

Of course, context matters, and the Turkish Government invoked 

its constitutional state of emergency provisions in the wake of the 

July 2016 coup attempt—an unacceptable and violent attack on the 

constitutional order of a NATO ally—an attack I unequivocally con-
34 

demn. But the question is not whether Turkey has the right to pursue justice after such a national trauma—the question is how it 

goes about it. 

The Helsinki Commission has called this hearing today to get to 

the bottom of the accumulating injustices under the state of emergency. As a participating State of the Organization for Security and 

Cooperation in Europe, Turkey has committed itself to upholding 

certain rule of law standards even under extraordinary circumstances. Among these commitments is the guarantee of equality before the law. 

However, Turkey’s commitment to this principle has been called 

into serious doubt. Just two months ago President Erdog ̆an proposed an outrageous swap involving Andrew Brunson—‘‘a pastor 

for a pastor’’ in his words. If the United States would circumvent 

its rule of law to extradite a free man, Erdog ̆an suggested, then 

Turkey would release a wrongfully imprisoned one. 

Let us be clear about what President Erdog ̆an proposed: this is 

not justice—this is ransom. 

The United States should not expect—much less accept—this 

sort of treatment from a NATO ally. The harassment and detention 

of our consulate staffs has also overstepped the bounds of diplomatic conduct among partners. 

I was glad to see the State Department in the past month impose 

some real costs for this behavior by suspending non-immigrant visa 

services in Turkey. 

While the Department announced last week that it had resumed 

these services on a ‘‘limited basis’’ and received assurances about 

the security of our local employees, I hope that we are clear with 

Turkey that we will not accept anything short of true and timely 

justice for our detained consulate staff and our citizens behind 

bars. I also hope that we will not tire in advocating for the basic 

rights and freedoms of the thousands of Turks impacted by these 

sweeping purges: academics, mayors, legislators, journalists, and 

human rights defenders among them. 

Let me conclude by saying that it is in the interest of the United 

States to have Turkey as a strong and reliable ally. 

From strengthening NATO to fighting terrorism to resolving conflicts in the Middle East, we have important work to do together 

and we will be more successful if we can work as partners. The urgency of these tasks underscores the importance of resolving distractions and rebuilding the trust we need to achieve our common 

objectives. 

And as always, our partnerships are strongest when they are 

rooted in shared principles. 

We have two excellent panels of witnesses today to examine 

these topics. I will introduce the panels separately but I would like 

to say at the outset that I am especially pleased to have with us 

a State Department witness, Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs Jonathan R. Cohen, to provide the Administration’s perspective on these developments, U.S. policy toward Turkey, and the future of the bilateral relationship. I am also 

honored to have on our second panel Jacqueline Furnari, Andrew 

Brunson’s daughter, from my State of North Carolina. 
35 

Our first panel features Deputy Assistant Secretary Cohen. He 

has been the Deputy Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs covering Cyprus, Greece and Turkey since August 

2016. He previously served in Baghdad as Deputy Chief of Mission 

from 2014-2016, in Paris as the Acting Deputy Chief of Mission 

from 2013 to 2014, and as the Minister Counselor for Political Affairs from 2011 to 2013. 

Mr. Cohen, thank you for being here. You may proceed with your 

opening statement. 

[Second Panel] 

Our second panel consists of three superb witnesses. 

First we will hear from CeCe Heil, Pastor Brunson’s U.S. attorney. Mrs. Heil is Executive Senior Counsel for the American Center 

for Law and Justice, specializing in public policy and global legal 

matters including the United Nations. 

She manages the ACLJ’s global partners and heads a team of 

lawyers handling cases in defense of life, protection of US National 

Security interests and dealing with Islamic extremism. Next we 

will hear from Jacqueline Furnari, Pastor Brunson’s daughter. 

Mrs. Furnari is the 19-year-old daughter of Andrew Brunson. She 

has two brothers: Jordan, 22, and Blaise, 16. She is currently earning her Bachelor of Science in Business Administration from the 

Kenan-Flagler Business School at the University of North Carolina 

at Chapel Hill. She expects to graduate in December 2017 with a 

concentration in Entrepreneurship and Operations Management. 

Jacqueline was raised in Izmir, Turkey, where her father served as 

pastor of the Izmir Resurrection Church. In February, Jacqueline 

married a Blackhawk pilot in the US Army. 

Finally, we will hear from Nate Schenkkan, a longtime Turkey 

expert who serves as Project Director for Nations in Transit, Freedom House’s annual survey of democratic governance in Central 

Europe and Eurasia. He previously served as Senior Program Officer for Freedom House’s Eurasia programs, covering Turkey and 

Central Asia. He was the lead researcher and co-author of two 

Freedom House special reports including The Struggle for Turkey’s 

Internet and Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media and Power in 

Turkey. 
36 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. CHRIS SMITH

Good morning. We will hear today about the catastrophic breakdown of the rule of law in our NATO ally Turkey and its personal 

consequences for several American citizens and thousands of 

Turks. 

A key matter before us today is the Turkish government’s apparent decision to hold hostage an innocent American pastor in order 

to extort political concessions from the United States. This ‘‘hostage 

diplomacy,’’ as it has been called, is unacceptable when it is practiced by our enemies and appalling from our supposed allies. 

Pastor Andrew Brunson was detained over a year ago on October 

7, 2016. We know from Pastor Brunson’s U.S. attorney, CeCe Heil, 

that the Turkish Government prepared an order of deportation on 

the day of his detention. The Turkish Government could have easily expelled him from the country then and there, bringing to an 

unjust close his 23 years of peaceful work in Turkey but sparing 

him indefinite detention. And yet it chose not to. Why was this 

order of deportation never executed? 

Pastor Brunson’s daughter, Jacqueline, will testify that prior to 

her father’s detention the ‘‘worst case scenario for Christian pastors 

who were not nationals in Turkey was deportation.’’ Again, why 

was Pastor Brunson not deported consistent with this precedent? 

In February, I joined 77 of my colleagues from the House and 

Senate in writing to Turkish President Erdog ̆an urging him to release and then promptly deport Pastor Brunson. Nine months have 

passed without any response to that letter. 

In the past 13 months that Pastor Brunson has spent in jail in 

Turkey, the President of the United States, the Vice President, and 

the Secretary of State, among many others, have interceded with 

the Turkish Government seeking his release. And yet to this day, 

he languishes in a punishing legal limbo without trial and without 

access to the evidence against him. 

On September 28, President Erdog ̆an publicly suggested trading 

US-based Islamic cleric Fethullah Gu ̈len for Pastor Brunson. Rhetorically addressing the United States, Erdog ̆an declared in reference to Gu ̈len ‘‘you have one pastor as well. Give him to us, then 

we will try him [Pastor Brunson] and give him to you.’’ 

With this statement, all doubt was removed as to why Turkey 

has failed to release Pastor Brunson for more than a year. Turkey 

is holding an American citizen hostage for a deal the United States 

will never accept. 

Sadly, this is not President Erdog ̆an’s only outrage against an 

American citizen. In May, during an official visit to the United 

States, Erdog ̆an’s personal security detail—or, more appropriately, 

his goon squad—viciously attacked a group of peaceful protesters 

in broad daylight outside the Turkish Ambassador’s residence in 

Washington, D.C. In the melee, 26-year-old Ceren Borazan from 

my home state of New Jersey was thrown to the ground, punched, 

kicked, and held in a chokehold by a Turkish bodyguard who 

threatened her life. Video footage shows President Erdog ̆an calmly 

looking on at the brazen violence. Even as 15 of his bodyguards 

have been charged in the US for the assault and the United States 
37 

has cancelled handgun and ammunition sales to his security detail, 

President Erdog ̆an has never apologized. 

I believe that we should examine the applicability of individual 

sanctions against grave human rights abusers in Turkey under the 

provisions of the International Religious Freedom Act and the 

Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act. These existing 

sanctions regimes, or a new tailored set, should be used to hold to 

account those responsible for the detention of Pastor Brunson and 

other cases of prolonged and unjustified detention in Turkey. 

Thank you to our witnesses for their presence here and in particular to Pastor Brunson’s daughter for her courage and candor in 

testifying today before the Commission. 
38 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JONATHAN R. COHEN

Chairman Wicker, Co-Chairman Smith, Ranking Member 

Cardin, Ranking Member Hastings, Senator Tillis, and Members of 

the Commission. Thank you for inviting me to testify this morning. 

Today’s hearing is an important opportunity to reaffirm the abiding U.S. interest in and commitment to democracy, human rights, 

and rule of law in Turkey. It is also an opportunity to underscore 

the value of the U.S.-Turkey Alliance, despite the current strains 

in the bilateral relationship and the challenges facing Turkey 

today. 

U.S.-Turkey Alliance 

Having spent the last 65 years as NATO Allies, the United 

States and Turkey have deep and complex relations. With the secondlargest military force in the Alliance, a dynamic economy, and a 

population of 80 million, Turkey’s critical position and regional 

clout have given Ankara significant influence on issues of core U.S. 

interest over the years. For example, from the early 1990s until 

2003, Turkey facilitated the no-fly zone over the Iraqi Kurdistan 

Region, allowing it to develop in peace and escape Saddam Hussein’s tyranny. In Afghanistan, Turkey was a major troop contributor to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), while 

also providing use of its airspace and allowing the refueling of U.S. 

aircraft on ISAF missions. Our long history of allied military cooperation also includes operations in Korea, the Balkans, and Somalia. 

Apart from military affairs, we share many goals and concerns. 

Like us, Turkey wants to limit Iranian and Russian influence in its 

region; it supports a unified and sovereign Iraq; and it remains a 

partner in efforts to resolve the war in Syria. The Turkish government and people also deserve recognition for the enormous hospitality they have displayed in hosting more than three million Syrian refugees. We value Turkey’s efforts to foster regional stability 

and its contributions to global security. 

Turkey is an important partner in the Global Coalition to Defeat 

ISIS and provides critical bases for U.S. and Coalition military 

forces, from which we conduct precision airstrikes; carry out intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance flights; maintain combat 

search and rescue units; and resupply Coalition forces in closer 

proximity than possible from a U.S. base in the Persian Gulf. Turkish forces were critical in liberating key territory from ISIS along 

Turkey’s southern border and degrading ISIS’s lines of communication to the outside world. For our part, we underscore our commitment to stand with Turkey against terrorist threats, including the 

PKK and ISIS. 

The U.S.-Turkey relationship extends beyond our mutual interest 

in stability and security in the Balkans and the Middle East. Both 

President Trump and President Erdog ̆an have committed to 

strengthening our trade and investment ties, as underscored by 

discussions in September on our bilateral Trade and Investment 

Framework Agreement. The recent proposal for Boeing to provide 

Turkish Airlines with forty Dreamliner passenger aircraft—a deal 
39 

that, if finalized, is worth $10.8 billion and is expected to sustain 

25,000 U.S. jobs—illustrates the potential of our economic relationship. Our extensive exchanges of students, scientists, and professionals ensure our countries remain interconnected on a people-topeople level and provide valuable opportunities for innovation and 

entrepreneurship, which are vital to our knowledge-based 

economies. 

Ankara seeks further improvement in each of these areas of cooperation—and so do we. We will continue our efforts to develop 

constructive dialogue in order to maximize the enduring benefits of 

our strategic alliance. 

Democracy, Human Rights, and Rule of Law 

In my remaining remarks today, I would like to focus on the U.S. 

Government’s concerns over Turkey’s protracted state of emergency, which has had negative effects on democracy and democratic 

institutions, on human rights, and on rule of law. Chief among 

those concerns is the security of and protection of human rights 

and fundamental freedoms for U.S. citizens in Turkey and locally 

employed staff at the U.S. Mission in Turkey, a number of whom 

have been arrested on dubious terrorism charges under the state 

of emergency. 

As I highlight these concerns, it is in the context of Turkey being 

a longtime friend and Ally, and with deep empathy and appreciation for the fact that on July 15, 2016, Turkey endured a traumatic 

coup d’e ́tat attempt. We continue to support Turkey’s efforts to 

bring to justice those responsible for the failed coup. It is in the national interest of both the United States and Turkey for Turkey to 

be stable, democratic, and prosperous. We continue to support Turkey’s democratic development and vigorously encourage application 

of the rule of law, including due process, transparency, and judicial 

independence. 

The July 2016 attempted coup, in which nearly 250 perished and 

thousands were wounded, was an evil attack on democracy and a 

tragedy for Turks, who bravely took to the streets to defend their 

democracy. A few months later, I stood in Turkey’s parliament 

building, the Grand National Assembly, and observed the destruction that Turkish Air Force F-16s had wrought on the people’s 

house, in which all political parties sit. The Turks asked me to 

imagine the national trauma if such an attack had happened here 

on our Capitol dome. The Turkish nation was shaken by the coup 

attempt and remains so. 

It is to be expected that Turkey would—and we support its efforts to—investigate and arrest those who directly participated or 

materially aided in the planning, preparation, and conduct of the 

coup attempt. The U.S. Government is carefully reviewing material 

provided by Turkey related to the Turkish Government’s request 

that the United States extradite Fethullah Gu ̈len and will give 

similarly careful consideration to any new extradition requests related to the coup attempt. We again underscore our willingness to 

assist Turkish authorities in their investigation of the attempted 

coup and support bringing to justice those who participated. 

Now, more than one year later, a restrictive state of emergency 

remains in place and appears to have been used expansively to tar-
40 

get many Turks with no connection to the coup attempt. We were 

concerned to see Turkey extend the state of emergency for a fifth 

time on October 17 for an additional three months. 

The prolongation of the state of emergency has, in the view of 

the U.S. Government, negatively impacted Turkish democracy, rule 

of law, and respect for fundamental freedoms. The Turkish government has expropriated nearly one thousand private businesses and 

dismissed well over 100,000 from their jobs. Tens of thousands 

have been arrested on terror-related charges. Authorities have imprisoned a growing number of opposition lawmakers, journalists, 

leading intellectuals, academics, civil society activists, and respected human rights defenders—including respected philanthropist Osman Kavala, Amnesty International Turkey’s Chairman 

Taner Kilic, and its recently released Director Idil Eser. We call on 

the Turkish government to expeditiously end the state of emergency, release those not proven guilty of criminal offenses, expedite 

due process for dismissed civil servants, and cease the seemingly 

indiscriminate prosecution of individuals—in many cases, individuals that appear to have been targeted because they criticize the 

government, its officials, or its policies, or have had contact with 

those who did. 

As the Department of State has made clear in numerous press 

statements since the coup attempt, these detentions and prosecutions, often with little evidence, transparency, or effective mechanism for redress, undermine confidence in the rule of law in Turkey. The U.S. Mission in Turkey is closely following these cases, 

monitoring trials, engaging with civil society leaders, and working 

with like-minded partners to underscore the importance of respect 

for rule of law and individual rights, including fair trial guarantees. These rights are enshrined in the Turkish Constitution and 

are part of Turkey’s international obligations and commitments. 

Additionally, we have seen a worrisome diminishment in freedom 

of the media and freedom of expression. Detentions of journalists 

under emergency rule have effectively silenced most independent 

media, most notably via the trial of 17 journalists and media executives—four of whom remain in custody—for Turkey’s leading independent newspaper, Cumhuriyet. As we have expressed publicly 

and to the Turkish government on numerous occasions, curbs on 

freedom of expression, freedom of assembly and association, and 

other fundamental freedoms erode the foundations of democratic 

society, and are impediments to re-establishing the social and legal 

underpinnings of state and public security. Turkey benefits from 

having more engaged voices, not fewer—even voices it may find 

controversial or uncomfortable. 

American Citizen Detentions 

One of the Department of State’s highest priorities is assisting 

U.S. citizens abroad and providing all possible consular services to 

U.S. citizens in need. 

There have been dozens of U.S. citizens detained or delayed by 

Turkish security services in some capacity since July 2016. Several 

U.S. citizens, including U.S.-Turkish dual nationals, remain in 

prison under the state of emergency, all facing dubious terrorism 

and coup attempt-related charges. 
41 

As there is no international obligation to grant consular access 

to dual nationals, and as Turkey does not consider U.S.-Turkish 

dual nationals to be U.S. citizens for the purposes of consular notification, we were long denied access to our dual nationals detained 

under state of emergency provisions. After sustained U.S. Government engagement, the Government of Turkey for the first time 

granted us consular access to these dual nationals in mid-October 

of this year. High-level conversations continue to enhance cooperation and are yielding progress on a range of legal issues. 

Andrew Brunson, a U.S. citizen and Christian pastor who has 

lived in Turkey for nearly 25 years, has been in prison since October 7, 2016. Of the U.S. citizens now detained in Turkey under the 

state of emergency, he has been held the longest without a judicial 

hearing. The outlandish charges against Mr. Brunson include gathering state secrets for espionage, attempting to overthrow the 

Turkish parliament and government, and attempting to change the 

constitutional order. The United States consistently calls for Mr. 

Brunson’s release at the highest levels—President Trump, Vice 

President Pence, and Secretary Tillerson have all raised his case 

multiple times with their Turkish counterparts. On August 15, Secretary Tillerson publicly called for his release during the International Religious Freedom Report rollout. Our Embassy in Ankara 

continues to engage on this case and provide consular services to 

Mr. Brunson and his family, meeting with him and his wife on a 

regular basis. 

We remain deeply concerned about the detention of all U.S. citizens, including U.S.-Turkish dual nationals, who have been arrested under the state of emergency. We will continue to visit them 

when possible, raise their cases with our Turkish counterparts, and 

seek a satisfactory resolution of their cases. 

Locally Employed Staff and Visa Suspension 

Under the state of emergency, the Government of Turkey arrested two of U.S. Mission Turkey’s locally employed staff on what 

we believe are specious grounds. Longtime U.S. Consulate Adana 

employee Hamza Uluc ̧ay has been in detention since February 23, 

2017. On October 5, Turkish authorities detained longtime Consulate Istanbul DEA local employee Metin Topuz. A number of 

other locally employed staff have come under investigation, and one 

employee’s wife and daughter were held in jail without charges for 

nine days last month. The Turkish government has leveled flimsy 

terrorism charges against both Mr. Uluc ̧ay and Mr. Topuz. It appears they were arrested for maintaining legitimate contacts with 

government officials and others in the context of their official duties on behalf of the U.S. Government. We have and will continue 

to push for their release. 

The targeting of U.S. local staff, particularly those responsible 

for law enforcement coordination, raised our concern over Turkey’s 

commitment to providing proper security for our diplomatic and 

consular facilities and personnel, leading to Mission Turkey’s suspension of non-immigrant visa services on October 8. We have received initial high-level assurances from the Government of Turkey 

that there are no additional local employees of our Mission in Turkey under investigation. We have also received initial assurances 
42 

from the Government of Turkey that our local staff will not be detained or arrested for performing their official duties, and that 

Turkish authorities will inform the U.S. Government in advance if 

the Government of Turkey intends to detain or arrest a member of 

our local staff. 

Based on these preliminary assurances, we determined the security posture had improved sufficiently to allow for the resumption 

of limited visa services in Turkey. However, Mr. Uluc ̧ay and Mr. 

Topuz remain in custody and we have serious concerns about their 

cases. We will continue to engage with our Turkish counterparts to 

seek a satisfactory resolution of these cases, as well. 

No Linkage Between Cases in U.S., Turkey 

Some in the Turkish government have made efforts to equate 

cases involving our local staff with the arrest in the United States 

of a senior executive of Turkey’s state-owned Halk Bank. The two 

situations and contexts are very different and the U.S. Government 

strongly objects to any effort to link them. The executive, Mehmet 

Hakan Atilla, has been charged with conspiring to evade U.S. sanctions against Iran. Our employees were arrested on terrorism 

charges based on contact, in the course of their official duties, with 

Turkish officials whom the Turkish state now finds unpalatable. 

Enduring U.S.-Turkey Relations 

As a longtime Ally and friend, we want Turkey to be the best 

democratic partner it can be. We have long supported—and will 

continue to support—democratic development there, because we believe that respect for the rule of law, judicial independence, and 

fundamental freedoms are sources of strength and expand our potential for partnership. We will also continue providing the assistance our imprisoned citizens and local employees need, and will not 

rest until all of their cases are resolved. 

Members of the Commission, thank you for your attention today. 

I look forward to answering your questions. 
43 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CECE HEIL

Chairman Wicker, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Cardin, 

Ranking Member Hastings, and distinguished Commissioners, 

thank you for inviting me to speak before you today and for the opportunity to highlight a case that warrants your careful attention. 

Andrew Craig Brunson is a United States citizen and pastor 

from North Carolina. For over 23 years, Pastor Brunson has lived 

peacefully in Turkey, serving as pastor of the Izmir Resurrection 

church, and raising his family without incident. Then, on October 

7, 2016, Pastor Brunson arrived home to find a written summons 

to report with his passport to a local police station. Believing the 

summons was related to his routine application for a renewal of his 

residence visa, Pastor Brunson promptly reported to the Izmir police, only to be arrested and informed that an order of deportation 

had been entered against him, as he had suddenly been deemed a 

threat to national security. He was to be held in the Harmandali 

Detention Centre pending deportation. However, Pastor Brunson 

was never deported; instead he remains unjustly incarcerated in 

Turkey, wondering if he has been forgotten, as today marks the 

404th day of his detention. And just what crime has Pastor 

Brunson committed? He literally has no idea, and has yet to be 

charged with any crime. 

As unbelievable as that may seem, under the current State of 

Emergency in Turkey, and subsequent emergency decrees, all protections afforded by Turkey’s Constitution, or in International Declarations and Covenants, including those contained in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), of which 

Turkey is a member, just disappear. Despite President Erdog ̆an’s 

recent public declarations that Turkey is indeed a state of laws, the 

fact that he has the sole power to change the law at his whim, and 

remove any obligation to be bound by it, wholly undermines those 

claims. As a result of the rapidly diminishing rule of law, Pastor 

Brunson’s file has been sealed, all visits from his attorney are recorded, and he can be held without any formal charges for up to 

7 years, completely destroying any ability to prepare an adequate 

defense, and obliterating all rights to due process. 

Accordingly, after his arrest, Pastor Brunson continued to remain 

in detention at the Harmandali Centre, and was denied access to 

an attorney until December 9th, 2016—over two months later— 

when he was transferred in the middle of the night to a high security prison in Izmir. At that time, he was informed that he was 

being detained as a suspect, although evidence had yet to be gathered, on the absurd grounds of Membership in an Armed Terrorist 

Organization. The ensuing months were filled with multiple appeals contesting his detention, which cited the legal deficiencies of 

such a decision, and all of which were summarily denied, even 

though no evidence has been set forth to substantiate any crime. 

So, Pastor Brunson has remained, languishing in a prison cell with 

no end in sight. 

While in prison, Pastor Brunson has lived under inhumane conditions, and has spent extended periods of time in a cell meant for 

eight people, but which at times has held as many as 22 prisoners, 

of which Pastor Brunson is always the only Christian. During his 
44 

incarceration, Pastor Brunson has lost over 50 pounds, he has lost 

precious time with his family that can never be replaced, but worst 

of all, he has lost hope, wondering why Turkey, a NATO ally and 

a country he loves and has served for over 2 decades, has been able 

to hold held him hostage, an innocent United States citizen, for 

over a year. 

During this ordeal, Pastor Brunson’s plight has caught the attention of hundreds of thousands of people around the world and there 

have been an unprecedented amount of high level demands for Pastor Brunson’s release. And yet, on August 24, 2017, the Turkish 

Government decided to levy new and additional accusations against 

Pastor Brunson, these just as ludicrous as and even more disconcerting than the original. They include, Political or Military Espionage, Attempting to overthrow the Government, Attempting to 

overthrow the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and Attempting 

to overthrow the Constitutional Order, with the last three not only 

carrying aggravated life sentences, but requiring that the accused 

used force and violence. And once again, no evidence has been put 

forth to substantiate such ridiculous accusations. Pastor Brunson 

has and continues to adamantly maintain his innocence and deny 

all the accusations. He has reiterated that his sole purpose for 

being in Turkey for the past 23 years was ‘‘for one purpose only. 

To tell about Jesus Christ.’’ He has further stated that he has 

‘‘done this openly, in front of the government.’’ And so the question 

remains, why are they still holding him? 

Perhaps President Erdog ̆an himself answered this question when 

he recently demanded a swap of Pastor Brunson for Fethullah 

Gu ̈len, the cleric Erdog ̆an blames for the failed coup attempt in 

July of last year. So, Pastor Brunson’s incarceration has simply become a bargaining chip for Turkey. However, I would submit that 

President Erdog ̆an has mistakenly been led to believe that Pastor 

Brunson’s value lies simply as a pawn in a swap. In reality, Pastor 

Brunson’s greatest value to Turkey lies in President Erdog ̆an’s approval of his immediate release back to the U.S. as a sign of good 

will, and as a major step toward restoring amicable relations between Turkey and the United States; an invaluable move with immeasurable and long-lasting benefits. We should use every effort to 

make sure that President Erdog ̆an gets that message. 
45 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JACQUELINE FURNARI

Chairman Wicker, Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Cardin, 

Ranking Member Hastings, and distinguished Commissioners, 

thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of my father. 

Having grown up in Turkey, it has been so hard for me to understand the current state of events. My parents moved to Turkey in 

1993, so that’s where my brothers and I grew up. In fact, my brothers were born there. We even went to Turkish grade school because 

my parents wanted us to learn the language and feel comfortable 

in the culture. To me, it was home. My family, school, and friends 

were in Turkey. I grew up in the mix of Turkish and American culture, and loved seeing the beauty in both. On holidays, we sometimes hung a Turkish flag from our balcony, as our neighbors did. 

We loved and respected the Turkish people, and my parents were 

dedicated to serving the Turkish people for as long as they could. 

My brothers and I used to joke that we would have to bring our 

future children to Turkey to see their grandparents. 

As I grew up, I saw how my father poured himself into his work, 

and how willing he was to sacrifice his needs and wants for the 

sake of others. He believed—as I do—in a greater purpose in life, 

and actively lived out his life with the purpose of showing people 

the love and grace of God. He taught this message in the home, 

too. Their continued commitment to serving God and the people of 

Turkey was such a wonderful example for my brothers and me to 

see. We were truly blessed to be raised by such faithful parents. 

I know my dad and his character, as only a daughter can, and 

I know the charges against him are absurd. My father is not an 

armed terrorist trying to overthrow any government, my father is 

a pastor who went to Wheaton College, then on to seminary, and 

got a Ph.D. in New Testament. He has selflessly served Turkey for 

24 years now. Everything in his life is centered on his faith. For 

my family, who has loved, served, and prayed for Turkey and its 

people, seeing these absurd charges brought against my father has 

been an extremely painful experience. 

Previously, the worst case scenario for Christian pastors, who 

were not nationals, in Turkey was deportation, which is why I 

never could have guessed my father would be imprisoned there for 

over a year. This is unheard of. My family has been shocked and 

deeply hurt during the past year. The past year of our lives has 

been filled with uncertainty, worry, tears, and countless unanswered questions. 

I didn’t even know when my parents were detained in October 

last year. I only found out several days after the fact because they 

took their phones and did not let them contact anyone. For what 

felt like weeks, I was in a state of panic. This hadn’t happened before. I couldn’t find out any information about what the charges 

were. There was no communication for two weeks, although we 

tried desperately to find out any information. Then, my mother was 

released. I called her the moment I got her message. I will never 

forget how shocked and brokenhearted she was because my father 

was still detained and no one knew why. 

My family kept assuming this situation would end soon. But it 

kept dragging on, month after month. My brothers and I didn’t get 
46 

to spend Christmas with my mom because she was scared of what 

might happen to us if we flew into Turkey. I missed a last Christmas as a single woman with my family. I was about to transition 

into a different phase of life, and I wanted that one last family 

Christmas before things changed. 

In February I got married. We didn’t want to get married without my parents present, but because my husband is in the military, 

we could not postpone it. We had received my father’s blessing, but 

we felt so terrible about getting married while he was imprisoned. 

Neither of my parents were present when I got married. I will 

never get that moment back. For those of you who are fathers to 

daughters, I’m sure you would want to walk your daughter down 

the aisle. My father didn’t get that. I didn’t get that. My husband 

and I decided to have a civil ceremony and to postpone our wedding 

ceremony until my father is home. I’m still waiting for my wedding. 

I’m still waiting to wear the wedding dress that I got almost a year 

and half ago. I’m still waiting for my dad to walk me down the 

aisle. I’m still waiting for that father-daughter dance. 

I’m graduating from college in December. My dad doesn’t want 

to miss seeing me graduate. He invested a lot in helping me find 

a career path. However, unless a miracle happens, I will be achieving yet another life milestone without my parents. 

In his letters, my father says that the hardest part of his imprisonment is missing out on being with his family. That is what he 

most wants. He has missed his only daughter getting married, and 

might miss my college graduation. He has missed helping my older 

brother make career choices and witnessing his accomplishments 

at Cornell. He has missed being with my younger brother who has 

so badly needed his dad and mom in the last year. These are the 

things that pain my dad the most, not being able to be with us. 

In August, I took a risk and flew to Turkey to visit my father 

and support my mother. I never really processed that visit because 

it makes me too emotional. I will never forget any moment of the 

day we got to visit. I remember hearing my dad’s voice for the first 

time in a year as they brought him into the room. I remember how 

broken, tired, and desperate he sounded as he tried to fight to meet 

in a room where he could hug and hold us for the only hour he 

would have seen us the whole year. We sobbed the entire visit. It 

was hard to fit words in because the emotions were too strong and 

only led to more tears. It was hard to see my father so broken, so 

thin, so desperate. He hated having us kids see him that way. 

During my summer visit, he was already talking about how fearful he was of facing the cold winter in that poorly insulated prison. 

That he was already concerned about the winter in the middle of 

August shows how hopeless he was. And now, the cold that he 

feared so much has started. My father is now dealing with anxiety 

and depression. Seeing him in that much pain broke me. He’s been 

changed by this experience. My whole family has been changed. 

In a recent visit with my mother, my father said ‘‘I plead with 

the Lord to release me by Christmas so I can be with our son in 

his last year in high school and at our daughter’s graduation before 

she moves to Germany. But if I’m still here at Christmas, I’ll thank 

God for sending Jesus to be born. If I’m still here at New Year, I’ll 

thank him for helping me make it through this year. If I’m here 
47 

on my birthday, I won’t be like Job and curse the day I was born. 

I’ll give thanks for the life I’ve lived.’’ My father is handling his situation better than he was before. But we still want so desperately 

for him not to have to face Christmas imprisoned again. We want 

him to be home again, with his family. 

My family has suffered greatly because of these absurd and false 

charges. Please, make any and all efforts to secure my father’s release and bring him home for Christmas. He’s been falsely imprisoned for far too long. 
48 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NATE SCHENKKAN

We have heard today already about some of the ways in which 

the erosion of the rule of law in Turkey has entrapped and endangered Americans. I will speak today about the state of the rule of 

law in Turkey, what to expect in the next few years, and how the 

U.S. can rebalance its relationship with Turkey around the rule of 

law. Modern Turkey’s institutions have always been weak in terms 

of democratic accountability and the protection of human rights. 

Modern Turkey’s legal and constitutional tradition places greater 

priority on the unity of the nation and the integrity of the state 

than on the rights of the individual and the separation of powers. 

There was a brief window in the 2000s when Turkey sought to 

align with European Union standards, during which Turkey made 

a number of cardinal reforms to strengthen the independence of institutions and protect human rights, but that was followed by a 

sustained attack on the rule of law and democratic institutions for 

much of the last decade. 

The partnership between the ruling AKP and the Gu ̈len movement that became entrenched during the 2000s did severe damage 

to the judiciary through instrumentalized trials of Kurdish activists, the military, media, and secular elites. After the AKP and the 

Gu ̈len movement fell out in late 2013, the government turned on 

the judiciary in order to eliminate its former allies. 

Two changes stand out: 

• In February 2014, the government amended the law on the 

High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK), which controls appointments to the judiciary, to strengthen the Minister 

of Justice’s role in the Council, including by reassigning members of the Council. This reversed key reforms to ensure the 

independence of the judiciary that the government had supported in 2010. 

• In June 2014, the government established a new institution 

called ‘‘peace judgeships’’ (Sulh Ceza Hakimlikleri) with responsibility for so-called ‘‘protective measures,’’ including approving pretrial detentions, and removing content from the 

internet and closing internet websites. These new peace judgeships lack appropriate mechanisms for appeal and oversight, 

and have been a major factor in the increased use of pretrial 

detention and internet blocking in the period after 2014. 

Following the coup attempt of July 2016, the government has 

used the state of emergency to eradicate what it perceives as 

sources of opposition, to subordinate the judiciary even further, and 

to dismantle rule of law protections. 

Turkey has been under emergency rule for 16 months. During 

this time: 

• Some 150,000 people have passed through police custody on 

the basis of terrorist offenses, membership of armed groups, or 

involvement in the attempted coup. Of those, at least 62,000 

have been arrested. 

• 153 journalists are in prison. 

• More than 111,000 people have been fired from public service 

through emergency decrees without adequate due process pro-
49 

tections. They are effectively blacklisted, which means they 

will be unable to find public employment and are evicted from 

public housing; many if not most will not be able to find private employment, either. 

• The state has also closed and seized institutions around the 

country: 

- 1,412 associations have been closed 

- 15 universities run by foundations have been closed 

- 162 media outlets have been closed, including 6 news 

agencies, 48 newspapers, 20 magazines, 31 radio stations, 

28 TV stations, and 29 publishing houses 

- 2,271 private educational institutions have been closed 

- 19 unions have been closed 

- 969 companies valued at approximately $11 billion have 

been seized 

- 94 mayors have been removed and replaced by ‘‘trustees’’ 

appointed by Ankara 

- 10 members of parliament are in prison, including the coleaders of the second-largest opposition party 

• 2 members of the Constitutional Court were removed from 

their positions and arrested, along with 37 personnel of the 

court. 

• 183 staff were dismissed from the Supreme Court; 91 from the 

Council of State; and 153 from the General Accounting Bureau 

• 4,240 judges and prosecutors have been dismissed (2956 judges 

and 1284 prosecutors). 

• 28 lawyers’ associations or law societies have been closed 

• 550 lawyers have been arrested; 1,398 lawyers are facing 

criminal prosecution. 

• At least 39 lawyers have already been sentenced to prison 

I give this long list in order to underscore the scale of the transformation that is taking place in Turkey through the post-coup attempt purge. The media, civic sector, legal profession, and judiciary 

have been massively weakened, crippled even, in these purges. 

This is a generational event. These firings, arrests, and closures 

have largely been done on the basis of guilt by association, without 

due process or appropriate legal remedies. 

Emergency decrees under the state of emergency also significantly changed important protections for individuals subject to investigation: 

• Suspects could be held for up to 30 days without access to a 

lawyer. A later emergency decree reduced this length of time 

to 14 days. 

• The right to confidential conversations with a lawyer and family members was suspended. 

• The prosecution was empowered reject the defendant’s choice 

of lawyer. 

• A suspect’s lawyer may have restricted access to the case file. 

These and other serious derogations from due process protections 

have contributed to an environment in which there are increasing 

reports of torture and forced disappearances in detention. 
50 

In April 2017, Turkey approved in a referendum changes to the 

constitution that will strengthen the presidency at the expense of 

other branches of government, including the judiciary. The referendum, held under a state of emergency with media seized by the 

government, and journalists and opposition leaders in prison, was 

neither free nor fair. There are reasonable grounds to suspect that 

the government used fraud to get it barely above the 50 percent 

threshold. 

The referendum changes increased the president’s control over 

the judiciary by giving him power to appoint almost half (6 out of 

13) of the members of the Council of Judges and Prosecutors. Others will be appointed by the parliament, which currently is under 

control of the president’s party, the AKP. The oversight role of the 

Constitutional Court (Anayasa Mahkemesi) has been downgraded, 

as has that of the Council of State (Danis ̧tay). Other changes in the 

referendum strengthened the president’s powers over other 

branches, including through powers to appoint and dismiss ministers, to dissolve parliament, and to issue decrees with the force 

of law. This has turned Turkey’s system of governance into a 

‘‘super-presidential’’ system that is alien to democratic traditions. 

It is within this context that we should understand the ordeal 

that Pastor Brunson and his family have suffered, as well as the 

treatment of tens of thousands of others under arrest, including 

people like the arrested civil society leader Osman Kavala and 

America’s two detained foreign service nationals, Metin Topuz and 

Hamza Uluc ̧ay. Having eliminated due process protections and the 

separation of powers, the executive branch is constrained neither 

by the balance of powers nor by the rights of individuals. 

Looking ahead 

Turkey will hold three major elections in 2019: nationwide local 

elections, scheduled for March, and the parliamentary and presidential elections, both scheduled for November. Each of these is extremely important for President Erdog ̆an’s goal of remaining in 

power and retaining or even better strengthening his control over 

the levers of the state. Erdog ̆an and his AKP no longer command 

the dominant big tent coalition of the 2000s that combined business, Islamists, Kurds, and liberals. The big tent has shrunk, and 

Erdog ̆an’s appeal is based now more on patronage and appeals to 

Turkish nationalism, Islamic identity, and Eurasianism. Regardless of what the U.S. and the EU do or don’t do, President Erdog ̆an 

and the AKP need anti-Western and nationalist appeals to keep his 

coalition together. Where the appeals fail, repression and 

instrumentalization of the judicial system will fill in the gaps. 

For this reason, we should not expect an improvement in the rule 

of law in Turkey in the next two years. It is not in Erdog ̆an’s or 

the AKP’s interest to make the system work more fairly or more 

justly. Nor should we expect an improvement after the elections. If 

Erdog ̆an wins, he will continue his efforts to consolidate a patronal 

regime. If he loses, he will have to tighten the screws in order to 

maintain his grip on power, just as he did after the AKP lost its 

majority in parliament in the June 2015 general election. The problem of rule of law in Turkey is a durable one that we will be dealing with for a long time. 
51 

Conclusion and recommendations 

1. The biggest problem with U.S. policy presently towards Turkey is that it is driven by trying to figure out what will placate 

Turkey, but more specifically, President Erdog ̆an, rather than by a 

clear definition of U.S. interests and values in the relationship. 

This has given the inaccurate impressions that the U.S. needs 

Erdog ̆an more than Erdog ̆an needs the U.S. The U.S. should recognize that Erdog ̆an’s use of anti-Americanism and antiWesternism is driven by a specific domestic political dynamic, and nothing the United States does will change this. 

2. Instead of starting from the position of seeking to solve the 

problem of anti-Western actions and rhetoric from Turkey’s political leaders, the U.S. should define clearly first for itself what 

its core interests and values are in its relationship with Turkey, and then articulate policies to achieve these interests, 

including by taking measures with Turkey to enforce those 

interests and values if they are threatened or violated. 

3. I believe the U.S. has a long-term, strategic interest in 

Turkey being a stable state based on the rule of law, in 

which political and ethnic minorities enjoy fundamental 

rights, including the ability to participate fully in political 

processes. I believe this strategic interest is of equal importance 

to the immediate interest of keeping Turkey in NATO. While the 

U.S. cannot make Turkey into such a state, this should be a key 

pillar of any U.S. strategic vision for the Middle East, and one that 

can be supported through measures taken now. 

• First, the U.S. should consider the use of additional 

instruments, including Global Magnitsky sanctions 

on Turkish officials responsible for grave human 

rights violations. Congress should make use of its lawful 

role in forwarding such cases and requesting the State Department’s official review of evidence. The compilation of 

such cases will play an important role in any future transition in Turkey towards a more just and inclusive regime. 

• Second, both Congress and the State Department 

should provide funding for human rights defenders, 

civil society activists, and journalists in Turkey. 

Statements of support are welcome, but Congress should 

take the next step. Congress should create a special fund 

for Turkish civil society and independent media, and make 

a priority support for the tens of millions of Turkish citizens who see the country’s future as a democratic, rule of 

law state. 

• Third, the United States should make clear that 

the following items are not up for transaction in the 

U.S.-Turkey relationship: 

The rule of law in the United States. Attempts to 

change the outcome of judicial processes in the United 

States with disregard for normal diplomatic and legal 

channels, as has occurred with the hiring of American lobbyists on behalf of Reza Zarrab and the attempt to make 

the extradition of Fethullah Gu ̈len a political and not evi-
52 

dentiary issue, will damage the U.S.-Turkey relationship. 

Similarly, if Turkish officials flout U.S. law, they will face 

criminal prosecution. The prosecution of Reza Zarrab and 

Turkish officials for the flagrant violation of the sanctions 

regime on Iran is an important signal that violations of 

U.S. laws will be punished. On a lesser scale but also important is the prosecution of individuals and presidential 

bodyguards who assaulted protesters at Sheridan Circle in 

May. The Van Hollen amendment to SFOPS reinforces this principle by underscoring that such 

criminal actions may affect U.S. support and cooperation with Turkey. 

American citizens and employees of the U.S. Government. The U.S. will protect its citizens accused of crimes 

overseas, and insist on both consular access to them and 

access for them to lawyers of their choosing. If it concludes 

the detention of an American citizen is not based on a legitimate criminal accusation, it should sanction officials responsible for their detention. This is why the LankfordShaheen amendment to SFOPS is a good idea. The 

U.S. should also stress that the offensive conspiracy theory 

put forward by prosecutors and pro-government media 

about former State Department official Henri Barkey will 

have consequences for bilateral relations, and make clear 

it will protect its employees, including non-Americans, 

from undue and illegitimate criminal prosecution. The continuing detention of two of our foreign service nationals 

should result in the continuation of visa restrictions and 

other punitive measures as needed. Congress should 

also request sanctions against individual officials responsible for the illegitimate detention of U.S. employees. 

These are practical recommendations for strengthening U.S. Turkey policy, but they are not a magic bullet. We should prepare ourselves for a very rocky short-term relationship, and take the necessary measures to protect the U.S.’s core interests. The U.S.-Turkey relationship is of great consequence. It is my hope that the 

U.S. will stand with the many Turkish citizens working for true democracy and rule of law in Turkey, and that circumstances will one 

day improve to allow the bilateral relationship to return to a less 

tense basis. 

Thank you. 
(53) 

M A T E R I A L F O R 

T H E R E C O R D 

(55) 

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY HON. THOM TILLIS TO

JONATHAN R. COHEN

Question 1: 

In recent months, Turkey has withdrawn from three ‘‘Human Dimension’’ meetings of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) because of its objections to the participation 

of a U.S.-registered NGO it considers to be associated with the 

Gu ̈len movement. Ankara is engaged in a campaign to block such 

NGOs from participating in other UN and OSCE events. Turkey 

has also withdrawn its major contributor status from the Council 

of Europe after the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) awarded the Va ́ clav Havel Human Rights Prize 2017 

to someone Turkey considers associated with Gu ̈len. How is the 

United States responding to these actions? 

Answer 1: 

The State Department is concerned about recent Turkish government actions that have complicated operations at the OSCE, and 

by Turkey’s announcement that it would withdraw its major contribution status from the Council of Europe. Civil society participation is a cornerstone of these organizations and a critical part of 

many events, including the OSCE’s Human Dimension Implementation Meeting. We have raised this issue at high levels with the 

Government of Turkey, emphasizing the importance of international organizations in preserving stability and facilitating international cooperation, and encouraging Turkey to share any evidence that might help the international community respond to its 

concerns. 

The Austrian Chairperson-in-Office of the OSCE formed a ‘‘reflection group’’ led by the Swiss delegation to discuss Turkey’s concerns. The U.S. delegation is a part of this group, which has met 

several times and continues to seek a resolution. 

We are also closely monitoring Turkey’s recent actions in the 

Council of Europe and engaging allies in the organization on how 

its member states and the Council itself will respond. Turkey’s full 

participation, including upholding its human rights, democracy, 

and rule of law commitments under the European convention and 

maintaining its major donor contribution, is important to the credibility and operations of the organization and of significant benefit 

to Turkey. 

Question 2: 

What human rights and rule of law-focused training or capacity 

building programs does the U.S. Government provide to Turkish 

government institutions, particularly the judiciary and law enforcement, if any? 
56 

Answer 2: 

At present, the Department of State’s targeted programming in 

Turkey prioritizes work with civil society and other diverse stakeholders in support of human rights and fundamental freedoms. 

These programs contribute to safeguarding rule of law, government 

transparency, and public awareness of government policy and practices. We would be happy to provide further details in a classified 

setting. 

Question 3: 

To the extent that Privacy Act restrictions allow you to answer, 

does the State Department have consular access to all U.S. citizens 

detained on coup-related charges in Turkey, including dual citizens? Are you satisfied with the degree of consular access? Do all 

of these individuals have access to legal counsel? 

Answer 3: 

In mid-October, after sustained U.S. Government engagement, 

the Government of Turkey granted the Department of State consular access to dual nationals after we permitted a senior Turkish 

official to meet with arrested U.S.-Turkish dual nationals in the 

United States. Our subsequent requests for follow-up consular access to U.S.-Turkish dual national detainees are pending with the 

Turkish government. We appreciate the consular access that we 

have received, and encourage the Turkish government to continue 

to allow regular consular access to U.S. citizens who also hold 

Turkish citizenship. Due to the requirements of the Privacy Act, we 

are unable to comment on access to legal counsel. 

Question 4: 

While Turkey is not required by the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations to provide consular access to dual US-Turkish citizens, what sort of consular access to dual US citizens does the 

United States receive in other NATO countries? 

Answer 4: 

Although not legally required to do so under international law, 

other NATO partners—as a courtesy—generally give us consular 

notification of detention and access to dual U.S. nationals detained 

abroad in their respective countries when requested by the U.S. citizen. Such notification and access, however, can be inconsistent 

when the detained individual’s U.S. citizenship is unknown to the 

country of detention and/or the individual does not request access. 

Question 5: 

Has Pastor Brunson been formally charged? 

Answer 5: 

Pastor Brunson’s arrest warrant contains five charges: membership in the armed terrorist organization ‘‘FETO,’’ military espionage, attempt to overthrow or thwart the government of the Republic of Turkey, attempt to overthrow or thwart the Parliament 

of the Republic of Turkey, and attempt to overthrow the constitutional order of the Republic of Turkey. It is our understanding that 

the prosecutor is still preparing an indictment against Pastor 
57 

Brunson. Under Turkey’s current state of emergency provisions, an 

individual may be held in detention for up to five years without an 

indictment. 

Question 6: 

What is the Administration’s reaction to statements from President Erdog ̆an seeming to imply an interest in an exchange of Andrew Brunson for Fethullah Gu ̈len? 

Answer 6: 

U.S. officials have clearly and at senior levels categorically rejected any linkage between the arrest of Andrew Brunson and Turkey’s extradition request for Fethullah Gu ̈len. The two situations 

and contexts are very different and the U.S. Government strongly 

objects to any effort to connect them. 

Question 7: 

Do you support proposed appropriations legislation for FY2018 

that would require the State Department to identify and, in certain 

cases, possibly deny visas to senior Turkish officials linked by credible information to ‘‘wrongful prolonged detention’’ of U.S. citizens? 

Why or why not? 

Answer 7: 

One of the highest priorities of the Department of State is the 

safety and security of our citizens traveling and living abroad, particularly in cases where they have been wrongfully detained. The 

State Department supports the proposed appropriations legislation 

with a recommendation to modify the language in Section 7046(d) 

to mirror the waiver language in 7046(e). The restrictions target 

elements of the Government of Turkey that have engaged in activities against U.S. interests. Section 7046(d) targets the Presidential 

Guard, several members of which have been indicted in relation to 

the violent incidents in May 2017 at Sheridan Circle. Section 

7046(e) targets yet to be identified individuals responsible for the 

unlawful detention of American citizens. The Department recommends replacing the certification requirement in 7046(d) with a 

waiver authority similar to that contained in 7046(e) to provide the 

Secretary of State greater flexibility to respond to changing conditions. 

Question 8: 

What is the Administration doing on behalf of detained U.S. consulate employees Hamza Uluc ̧ay and Metin Topuz regarding their 

treatment, visitation rights, due process, and possible release? Do 

they have access to legal counsel? Are they charged? Are the family 

members of any U.S. Mission locally employed staff currently detained or facing other official penalties? 

Answer 8: 

U.S. Government officials have raised multiple times and at the 

highest levels the cases of U.S. Consulate Istanbul employee Metin 

Topuz and U.S. Consulate Adana employee Hamza Uluc ̧ay, including with President Erdog ̆an, Prime Minister Binali Yildirim, and a 
58 

range of other Turkish officials. We continue to do so as we seek 

a satisfactory outcome of these cases. 

Despite initial delays, Mission Turkey engagement helped facilitate access to legal counsel for both Mr. Topuz and Mr. Uluc ̧ay. 

Both have been charged and Mr. Uluc ̧ay’s trial is ongoing; his next 

hearing is scheduled for December 27. Our engagement is ongoing 

to ensure satisfactory treatment and visitation rights are maintained. Though the wife and daughter of a third Mission Turkey 

local employee were held without charges for nine days in October, 

they have since been released and no other Mission Turkey local 

staff or their family members are in detention. 

Question 9: 

Are there any members of the Turkish parliament who are openly sympathetic to our desire to release the U.S. citizens and consulate employees who have been unjustly detained? 

Answer 9: 

Some members of Turkey’s opposition parties have criticized the 

Government of Turkey’s actions against our locally employed staff. 

However, there has been no sustained public support from any 

party or any singular figure, likely in part due to fear that open 

association with the United States on these sensitive matters could 

prompt political or legal reprisals. 

Question 10: 

What, if anything, does the resumption of visa services mean for 

existing cases against local Turkish employees of the U.S. government and U.S. citizens arrested under the state of emergency? 

Under what conditions do you expect full visa services to resume? 

Answer 10: 

We implemented the suspension of non-immigrant visa services 

out of concern over the Government of Turkey’s commitment to the 

safety and security of our diplomatic and consular personnel and 

facilities. We have subsequently received initial high-level assurances from the Government of Turkey that there are no additional 

local employees of our Mission in Turkey under investigation, that 

our local staff will not be detained or arrested for performing their 

official duties, and that Turkish authorities will inform the U.S. 

government in advance if the Government of Turkey intends to detain or arrest a member of our local staff. Based on these preliminary assurances, we determined the security posture had improved 

sufficiently to allow for the resumption of limited non-immigrant 

visa services in Turkey. 

With Mr. Uluc ̧ay and Mr. Topuz still in custody, our concerns 

about the safety and security of our personnel and facilities remain. We will continue engaging our Turkish counterparts to seek 

a satisfactory resolution of these cases. Resumption of full visa 

services will depend on our assessment of the Government of Turkey’s commitment to the safety and security of our diplomatic and 

consular personnel and facilities. 
59 

Question 11: 

What core U.S. interests are at stake in the U.S-Turkey relationship? 

Answer 11: 

Turkey is a key NATO Ally and a valuable contributor to the 

Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. Turkey has the second-largest military in the Alliance, a dynamic economy, a population of 80 million, 

and control over key energy transit pipelines and routes. Its critical 

position and regional clout have given Ankara significant influence 

on issues of core U.S. interest over the years—from Korea to the 

Balkans to Iraq to Afghanistan. 

Turkey provides critical bases for U.S. and Coalition military 

forces, from which we conduct precision airstrikes against ISIS; 

carry out intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance flights; 

maintain combat search and rescue units; and resupply Coalition 

forces. 

We share a growing commercial relationship, a wide array of 

educational and cultural exchanges, strong scientific cooperation, 

and a valuable foreign policy dialogue on issues ranging from Russian aggression in Crimea, to ending the war in Syria, to ensuring 

the territorial unity of Iraq. Turkey and the United States also 

maintain a strong defense trade relationship that currently supports upwards of $9 billion in defense sales. 

Question 12: 

What is the State Department’s assessment of the information 

Turkey has supplied to justify the extradition of Fethullah Gu ̈len? 

Where does the extradition request currently stand? What are the 

next steps for an extradition request? 

Answer 12: 

The information Turkey has provided to justify the extradition of 

Fethullah Gu ̈len, reviewed by the Department of State and the Department of Justice, has not yet met the standard required for 

probable cause. We remain in close touch with Turkish authorities 

to ensure they understand the requirements for extradition under 

U.S. law and our bilateral extradition treaty. On November 20, 

2017, Turkey provided additional materials related to its provisional arrest request for Mr. Gu ̈len. The Department of State and 

the Department of Justice are in the process of reviewing these materials. 
60 

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY HON. THOM TILLIS TO

CECE HEIL

Question 1: 

Based on your familiarity with Andrew Brunson’s case, why do 

you believe he was detained last year? 

Answer 1: 

Andrew Brunson’s detention on October 7, 2016 is indeed perplexing. He had lived peacefully in Turkey for 23 years without any 

incident with Turkish authorities. Therefore, the only supposition 

one can make is that Pastor Brunson’s detention was a part of the 

purge President Erdog ̆an implemented after the failed coup attempt in July, 2016, just a few months before Pastor Brunson’s detention. Furthermore, the ridiculous nature of the allegations, as 

well as President Erdog ̆an’s recent requests to trade Pastor 

Brunson, seem to support the supposition that Pastor Brunson’s arrest and continued detention is purely political in nature. 

Question 2: 

Has Pastor Brunson been formally charged? 

Answer 2: 

Pastor Brunson has not been formally charged. He is being detained as a suspect, pending an investigation that has gone on for 

over a year. Meanwhile, his file has been sealed and there has been 

no access to any alleged evidence. 

Question 3: 

Do Turkish authorities give any explanation for the delay in beginning Andrew Brunson’s trial? What court proceedings has he 

undergone in the past 13 months? 

Answer 3: 

According to the most recent court document, to which we have 

access, the Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office is still conducting a judicial investigation, which remains at the evidence gathering stage, 

and Pastor Brunson is being detained as a suspect pending that investigation. The court proceedings have only consisted of detention 

hearings and appeals, as there have yet to be any formal charges. 

Question 4: 

To the extent you are familiar, what is Andrew Brunson’s legal 

representation in Turkey? What challenges does his Turkish representation face? 

Answer 4: 

I stay in direct contact with Pastor Brunson’s attorney in Turkey, 

Ismail Cem Halavurt. As there is no current legal proceeding occurring, the most that Mr. Halavurt can do is to continue to file 

appeals regarding Pastor Brunson’s detention pending the investigation. One can only imagine the legal and political challenges of 

defending an innocent American pastor with a sealed file, who has 

been turned into a Turkish political prisoner. 
61 

Question 5: 

Are you aware of any other Christian ministers who have been 

targeted by the Turkish Government in connection with the failed 

coup? 

Answer 5: 

Yes, according to the Association of Protestant Churches in Turkey, there were several Christian ministers from the United States 

and other countries who were accused of being a ‘‘threat to national 

security’’ and were denied entry or detained and deported, after the 

failed coup attempt in July of 2016. 

Question 6: 

Please describe the conditions of Andrew Brunson’s detention. 

How often is he allowed outside of his cell? 

Answer 6: 

Pastor Brunson is only allowed outside of his cell once a week 

for his visitation time, as well as once a month for a phone call and 

a visit from the U.S. Embassy, should one occur. 
62 

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY HON. THOM TILLIS TO

NATE SCHENKKAN

Question 1: 

You describe the changes to Turkey’s judiciary as a ‘‘generational 

event.’’ What prolonged effects do you foresee of these changes for 

Turkey’s governmental institutions, business climate, and society? 

Answer 1: 

In terms of governmental institutions, the narrow approval of the 

constitutional referendum of April 2017 means that Turkey is shifting to a ‘‘super-presidential’’ system. Under this system, which will 

go into full effect after the 2019 elections, the presidency’s powers 

vis-a-vis the legislative and judicial branches of government will increase. The position of prime minister will be abolished, and the 

president will appoint and dismiss vice presidents and ministers, 

the appointment of which the parliament may not veto (in distinction from the United States, where cabinet appointments are subject to Senate confirmation). The president may issue decrees 

vaguely defined as ‘‘on matters related to executive power,’’ may 

dismiss parliament, and may declare a state of emergency. The 

president will be able to appoint almost half of the Council of 

Judges and Prosecutors and will exercise disproportionate influence 

over the judiciary. 

There have also been negative de facto changes to local governance in Turkey. Turkey’s local governance has two levels: governors 

appointed by Ankara, and mayors directly elected by citizens of 

municipalities. Due to the large size of some of Turkey’s cities, 

mayoralties have been among the most powerful political positions 

in the country; President Erdog ̆an built his career as mayor of 

Istanbul. A previous round of reforms increased the powers of mayors in order to strengthen local governance and initiate decentralization. Following the resumption of conflict in the southeast, 

however, the government has de facto rolled back these changes, 

using extraordinary powers to remove dozens of mayors, mostly 

from Kurdish-affiliated parties, and replace them with appointed 

‘‘trustees.’’ In addition, President Erdog ̆an has recently used political pressure to force out of office the most powerful mayors of his 

party, including those of Istanbul and Ankara. The model is similar 

to that of President Putin in Russia, who has restored direct elections for governors, but regularly removes governors prior to elections in order to install appointees who then will have an incumbent advantage. 

The cumulative effect of the changes of the last four years is that 

Turkey’s governmental institutions are becoming consolidated into 

a pyramid of influence with the president at the top—the famous 

‘‘power vertical’’ of the Russian case. While the president, as in any 

system, may still face political constraints, the institutional constraints that distinguish a functioning democracy from an authoritarian system have largely been hollowed out. 
63 

In terms of the business climate, this consolidation increases political risk for investors. Politically guided expropriation and punitive tax inspections are now established tools of this government, 

and investors and businesses that run afoul of the government may 

face direct sanctions, for which they will have minimal recourse 

due to the absence of rule of law. More broadly, the loss of institutional independence affects Turkey’s economic policy-making. The 

constitutional reforms give the president the power to draft the 

central government budget, and President Erdog ̆an has repeatedly 

attacked the Central Bank’s independence in recent years. In particular, he has pressured the bank to lower interest rates, in contradiction to orthodox advice that insists on keeping rates higher 

to limit inflation. The downside risks of unaccountable and unprofessional fiscal and macroeconomic policies are growing with consolidation and the elimination of institutional checks on the president. 

In terms of society at large, one of the most important long-term 

effects of the purge will be brain drain. The pressure on businesses, 

universities, media outlets, and civil society associations is driving 

some of Turkey’s best human capital to leave, or causing Turkish 

citizens studying and working abroad to remain outside of the 

country. 

Question 2: 

What recourse do individuals who lost their jobs and shuttered 

organizations have to appeal these decisions? Are you aware of individuals or organizations who have managed to reverse these decisions? 

Answer 2: 

An extremely small number of individuals—as of August 31, 

2017, it was 1,852 out of 113,000 people purged, less than 2 percent—have been reinstated into public service via later emergency 

decrees, for reasons that remain unclear. Even for these individuals, there remains the stigma of having initially been purged, and 

the damage of having lost their jobs and possibly housing for what 

could have been several months. Similarly, a very small number of 

associations and media outlets have had their closures reversed 

under unclear reasons. 

For the 98 percent of purged individuals who are not reinstated, 

because they were fired through being named individually in decrees issued under the state of emergency, the dismissals have the 

force of law and cannot be reviewed by the regular court system. 

Due to the large number of complaints about dismissals filed directly to the Constitutional Court, and under international pressure, the government said in January 2017 it would create a special commission to review cases. Tens of thousands of purged individuals have already applied to the commission for review, but it 

is unclear on what timeline the commission will review cases; it 

has yet to issue any decisions, and has only started receiving appeals this summer. With potentially over 100,000 appeals, it could 

take years for the commission to review all cases. 
64 

On the basis of the commission’s formation, both the Constitutional Court and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 

have ruled that domestic remedies have not yet been exhausted, 

and therefore that they cannot hear appeals concerning the purges. 

Human rights defenders in Turkey have strongly objected to the 

ECtHR decision to consider the commission an effective domestic 

remedy, given that five of its seven of its members are appointed 

by the government, which issued the emergency decrees in the first 

place, and the other two are appointed by the Council of Judges 

and Prosecutors, which has itself been a target of the purges. 
65 

QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD SUBMITTED BY HON. JEANNE SHAHEEN

TO JONATHAN R. COHEN

Question 1: 

You were recently in Turkey to discuss the aftermath of the 

U.S.’s decision to not process visas until the Turks assured the 

safety of Embassy officials from arrest and shared more information on potential security threats. How did these conversations go? 

It is our understanding that in the period that the United State 

stopped processing non-resident visas for Turks, Turkey made 

some headway on other issues, which we don’t have to detail in an 

open setting. Do you feel this signals the need for a new approach 

to Turkey? 

Answer 1: 

My October visit to Ankara resulted in progress that allowed for 

the November resumption of limited non-immigrant visa services, 

which were suspended due to security concerns. My discussions 

with Turkish officials led to assurances from the Government of 

Turkey that there are no additional local employees of our Mission 

in Turkey under investigation, that our local staff will not be detained or arrested for performing their official duties, and that 

Turkish authorities will inform the U.S. government in advance if 

the Government of Turkey intends to detain or arrest a member of 

our local staff. Based on these preliminary assurances, we determined the security posture had improved sufficiently to allow for 

the resumption of limited visa services in Turkey. 

However, Mr. Uluc ̧ay and Mr. Topuz remain in custody and we 

continue to work tirelessly to secure a satisfactory resolution of 

these cases. 

Our relationship with Turkey has always been complex. Despite 

current strains in the relationship, Turkey is a NATO Ally and valued partner. We will continue to cooperate with Turkey in areas 

where we share common goals and concerns and we will continue 

engaging Turkey’s leadership in areas where we have disagreements. 

Question 2: 

Fifty percent of Turkey’s population spoke out against Erdog ̆an 

centralization of power through the April 2017 referendum. How is 

the U.S. government engaging with these Turks and building 

bridges to those who are not necessarily in the Turkish government 

or security structures? What is the full U.S. contribution to developing civil society in Turkey (please breakdown according to account/program)? I appreciate that the funding was restored, but 

could you explain why the decision was made earlier this year to 

eliminate the minimal amount of funding that the U.S. devotes to 

help bolster Turkish civil society? This is concerning particularly 

since President Erdog ̆an is targeting and jailing prominent leaders 

in Turkey’s civil society. 

Answer 2: 

The quality of Turkey’s democracy, in which civil society plays a 

vital role, matters deeply to the United States. We regularly engage Turkey’s leadership about our concerns over the government’s 
66 

targeting of civil society groups and leaders. We also use a broad 

range of traditional State Department Public Diplomacy and other 

tools and programs promoting civil society and democracy in Turkey. The Mission Turkey Public Diplomacy Section administers an 

active small grants program, providing grants to Turkish civil society organizations that support issues such as freedom of expression, countering violent extremism, understanding of democratic 

values and rule of law, entrepreneurship, women’s rights, and 

STEM education. Grants have supported visits from U.S. experts, 

extracurricular activities for high school and university students, 

film festivals, cultural programs, and a host of other programs. Although these grants are relatively small in dollar value, they provide much needed support to strengthen Turkey’s civil society and 

underscore U.S. commitment to upholding democratic values in 

Turkey. 

Through engagements with Turkey’s government and other tools, 

the Department of State has also worked to enhance and protect 

fundamental freedoms, including: supporting the human rights of 

particularly threatened or at-risk communities; freedom of speech 

and the media; promoting transparency and accountability; and enhancing legal frameworks to protect human rights. The Department would be pleased to provide further details in a classified setting. 

Question 3: 

Nate Schenkkan testified to the need for U.S. assistance to Turkish civil society. Since Turkey does not have a USAID mission, 

what is the best way to administer such assistance? Can there be 

parallels found in the way the U.S. administers assistance to civil 

society groups in other areas without a USAID mission that are 

also hostile to the U.S., like Russia? Which civil society groups are 

in the most need? Is the EU providing assistance to Turkish civil 

society? 

Answer 3: 

The Department of State implements programs worldwide focused on advancing democracy and human rights priorities, including breaking barriers that limit access to free and credible information, combatting threats against journalists, promoting freedom of 

religion and conscience, and addressing the shrinking space for 

civil society as a means to promote long-term stability. The European Union also provides civil society assistance in Turkey. 

The Department’s programs operate in closed and closing environments around the world, including in some of the most restrictive and hostile operating environments. We work closely with our 

implementing partners to continually evaluate and adjust programmatic approaches and operating procedures, and we apply lessons-learned from our experiences in other countries. All of our programs require risk mitigation strategies and contingency plans to 

ensure both safety of our participants and ability to adapt to worsening situations. 

The Department would be pleased to provide further details in 

a classified setting regarding lessons learned from implementing 

programs in other non-USAID presence countries, and how our pro-
67 

grams could assist civil society and help to address human rights 

concerns in Turkey. 

Question 4: 

Given the mass arrests in Turkey, do you feel that TurkishAmericans who may have been critical of the Turkish government 

should visit Turkey at this time? Is it safe for those who have been 

public about their criticisms? When do you think these TurkishAmericans should know that their safety may be in jeopardy? Do 

travel warnings to Turkey reflect the risks to Turkish-Americans? 

Answer 4: 

The most recent Turkey travel warning, issued on September 28, 

2017, recommends that all U.S. citizens carefully consider the need 

to travel to Turkey at this time. The travel warning notes that 

under the state of emergency, security forces have expanded powers, including the authority to detain any person at any time. It 

also notes that the Turkish government has at times restricted political gatherings, scrutinized non-governmental organizations, restricted internet access, and blocked media content. The travel 

warning informs Turkish Americans that consular access to detained U.S. citizens who hold Turkish nationality may be denied 

and that Turkish authorities have legally banned some U.S. citizens, most of whom are dual U.S.-Turkish nationals, from departing Turkey. 
68 

LETTER FROM KUBRA GO ̈ LGE TO CONGRESS

November 15, 2017 

Dear Congressmen: 

My husband, Serkan Go ̈lge, and I and our two small children are 

dual U.S.-Turkish citizens. Until my husband’s arrest last year, we 

were residents of Houston, Texas, where my husband had been 

working as a senior research scientist at the NASA Johnson Space 

Center. In July 2016, while we were visiting Serkan’s family for a 

few days in Turkey, he was suddenly taken into custody as we 

were packing to return home to Houston. Like hundreds of others 

in Turkey, he has been charged with membership in the movement 

founded by Islamic cleric Fethullah Gu ̈len. Because President 

Erdog ̆an has accused Mr. Gu ̈len of ordering followers of his movement to carry out the attempted coup last year, the Gu ̈len movement is now considered a terrorist organization. Serkan’s trial 

began in April 2017, and his fifth hearing is scheduled for this Friday. 

There is no credible evidence to support the charges against my 

husband. Some law enforcement officers claim that possession of a 

U.S. $1 bill can indicate membership in the Gu ̈len movement. I do 

not understand why a U.S. citizen having a $1 can be considered 

criminal. I am very afraid that my husband is not receiving a fair 

trial. There is an atmosphere of fear in Turkey. Lawyers who defend people charged with connections to Gu ̈len risk losing their 

jobs, as do the judges hearing these cases. Serkan has been imprisoned for more than 15 months—much of that time in solitary confinement—and his health is deteriorating. He has high blood pressure and kidney stones. This situation is unbearable for me and my 

children. We worry about Serkan’s poor health. Although I am not 

accused of any wrongdoing, the police have told me that I am not 

allowed to leave Turkey. My children are only seven and two years 

old, and I am afraid that I won’t be able to protect them if they 

or I are threatened by the authorities. We simply want to go home 

and feel safe again. 

I respectfully ask for you to look into our untenable situation and 

help us in any way that you can. Thank you for your kind attention 

to this important human rights matter. 

Sincerely, 

Kubra Go ̈lge 
69 

STATEMENT ON THE STATUS OF ACADEMICS AND SCIENTISTS IN

TURKEY FROM THE COMMITTEE OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, 

NOVEMBER 15, 2017 

HISTORY: 

Good morning distinguished members, Congressmen and women, 

and guests. The Committee of Concerned Scientists (‘‘CCS’’), has 

been working with scientists and academics in Turkey for a very 

long time. Since January 2016 requests for our assistance have increased dramatically from this country. Problems for this population, from Turkey, have escalated as they have been the target 

of the Erdog ̆an government’s recriminations for the most recent 

coup attempt. 

The Committee of Concerned Scientists has been advocating for 

the human rights of scientists, physicians, engineers and academics 

since February 1974. Prior to that, many of our members were actively involved with the Russian Refusnik movement, which assisted scientists in communist countries get materials and information they needed; as well as helping them to get their work out of 

their respective countries and made available to the scientific 

world-at-large. Additionally, several of our Board members are 

Nobel Laureates. Currently, CCS works with scientists, academics, 

physicians and engineers whose human rights have been violated. 

At this point in time, Turkey is well on its way to making it to the 

top of the list of countries that are involved in human rights violations. 

The current actions of the government of Turkey, in its sweeping 

purge of dissent, both real and imagined, is crippling the credibility 

and integrity of Turkey’s academic and scientific institutions, and 

doing real damage to the Turkish economy and the Turkish state. 

The May 2017 assault by bodyguards of President Recep Tayyip 

Erdog ̆an on peaceful protestors in Washington, D.C., demonstrates 

how Turkish repression has the potential to spill across borders, 

and the detention of scores of Turkish scholars who are either resident in, or citizens of, European countries or the United States 

demonstrates how Turkey’s continuing attack on academia is a significant threat to scholarship throughout the OSCE region. 

The Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (U.S. 

Helsinki Commission) is uniquely positioned to make a difference, 

and we urge the Commission to make it a top priority to confront 

this challenge. 

There was evidence of civil unrest in Turkey in January of 2016, 

when a Peace Petition was published accusing the Erdog ̆an government of carrying out heavy-handed operations against Turkey’s 

Kurdish population. It was signed by more than 1,000 academics. 

At that time, the existence of such a petition upset Erdog ̆an and 

the ruling AKP Party. The government began taking retribution 

against the academics who signed the petition. Hundreds of academics who signed the petition were either terminated from their 

positions at universities, or were detained when police raided their 

homes and/or offices. 
70 

Shortly thereafter, an attempted coup took place on July 15, 

2016. Since that time the government has mounted a widespread 

purge in the name of security. On the night of the coup attempt, 

234 persons were killed and more than 2,000 were injured. 

Erdog ̆an was away from the seat of government at that time but 

was informed, and mounted a defense, ultimately thwarting the 

coup attempt. 

The government then declared a state of emergency, suspended 

the rule of law (which continues to this day—over a year later) and 

blamed the coup on Fethullah Gu ̈len, who earlier had been 

Erdog ̆an’s ally. The relationship has deteriorated into an extremely 

contentious one, causing Gu ̈len to retreat from Turkey and live in 

exile in the United States. (Gu ̈len continues to deny any involvement in this coup attempt.) It appears that the academics and scientists who signed the Peace Petition back in January have been 

lumped into the class of those considered against the state, and 

therefore, ‘‘terrorists’’ or supporters of terrorists. 

As of August 2017, 50,000 people have been arrested, and 

150,000 have lost their jobs or been suspended. Of those, 7,500 are 

academics and college administrators, with 60,000 students being 

displaced. Hundreds have been arrested and jailed, awaiting outcomes of lengthy investigations and trials. Many have been charged 

and released while awaiting trial. Under these circumstances, 

those released have had to relinquish their passports, making it 

impossible for them to leave the country. 

To add to their problems, when they apply for new jobs employers are notified that they were terminated by decree, so nobody is 

willing to hire them. In addition, they are banned from civil service 

positions. Supporting themselves and their families has become difficult to impossible. The Executive Director of Scholars at Risk, 

Robert Quinn, has noted that these actions against higher education institutions, scholars, staff and students strongly suggest retaliation for the non-violent exercise of academic freedom, freedom 

of expression and freedom of association. This is especially true of 

actions against individuals based solely on their public endorsement of the Academics for Peace petition or their alleged affinity 

for the so-called Gulenist movement. 

PROBLEMS FOR ACADEMICS/SCIENTISTS: 

• Loss of jobs 

• Loss of tenure 

• Loss of freedom 

• Criminal charges 

• Inability to Pursue Studies 

• Inability to Provide for Self/Family 

• Inability to Leave Country—Jailed within country borders or 

passport seized 

• Inability to Enter Country 

• Missing family events (weddings, graduations, births, funerals, 

etc.) 
71 

• Long periods of detention 

• Long periods awaiting trials 

• Labeled as traitors and terrorists 

• Names end up on decree lists, virtually ending life as once 

lived 

• Growing number of classes and courses without instructors 

Prominent Cases of Scientists/Academics Impacted: 

Istar Gozaydin: 

A professor of Sociology from Gediz University and a founder of 

Turkey’s branch of the Helsinki Citizens’ Assembly, Istar Gozaydin 

was detained and arrested in December 2016 on vague terrorismrelated charges. She started a hunger strike, and one hundred days 

after her detention she was released, but barred from traveling, 

and she is expected to return to court to face charges of ‘‘being a 

member of a terrorist organization.’’ 

Muzzafer Kaya, Esra Mungan and Kivanc Ersoy: 

The government of Turkey was cracking down on dissent, human 

rights and academic freedom, well before the July 2016 coup attempt. A Peace Petition, signed by over 1,000 academics and read 

out at a press conference in January 2016, drew a swift and brutal 

response from the government of Turkey, with 27 academics suspended and at least 30 dismissed from their jobs. All the signers 

of the Peace Petition were placed under investigation, perversely, 

for crimes of ‘‘terrorism’’. By March 2016, three academics— 

Muzzafer Kaya (social work), Esra Mungan (psychology), and 

Kivanc Ersoy (mathematics)—had been arrested for ‘‘making terrorist propaganda’’. They have had been arrested for ‘‘making terrorist propaganda’’. They have had five hearings and are awaiting 

a sixth in December while the court considers a request from the 

prosecutor in the case to change to charges to ‘‘insulting the Turkish nation’’. 

Serkan Go ̈lge: 

A Turkish-American scientist who works for NASA, Serkan 

Go ̈lge has been detained since July 2016 and placed in solitary confinement after an estranged family member reported him for spying. Has since been charged with being a supporter of Gu ̈len. 

Nuriye Gu ̈lmen and Semih O ̈ zakc ̧a: 

After the July 2016 coup attempt, the crackdown on academia intensified. Like thousands of other scholars and academic professionals, professor of literature Gu ̈lmen and an elementary school 

teacher O ̈ zakc ̧a were summarily dismissed from their jobs in November 2016, without explanation. Exercising their right to protest, 

they began a hunger strike in March 2017, and in May they were 

detained on absurd charges of ‘‘membership in a terrorist organization’’ and ‘‘propaganda for a terrorist organization’’. O ̈ zakc ̧a was ordered released on October 20 (though required to wear an elec-
72 

tronic monitor), but Gu ̈lmen remains imprisoned. On November 8, 

their lawyer, who is also the president of the Progressive Lawyers’ 

Association (C ̧ HD), Selc ̧uk Kozag ̆ac ̧li, was also detained, and on 

Monday was remanded to prison, also charged with membership in 

a terrorist organization. Their case illustrates the uncompromising 

intolerance of dissent and complete disdain for human rights that 

has overtaken the Turkish government. Its ongoing purge has destroyed tens of thousands of promising academic careers. 

Ismail Kul: 

Many scholars have been arrested by the government of Turkey 

because of perceived connections to Fethullah Gu ̈len, the U.S. 

based expat alleged by the Turkish government to bear responsibility for the July 2016 coup attempt. Some Turkish-American academics have been detained and are clearly being held as bargaining 

chips in the Turkish government’s quest to have Gu ̈len extradited 

back to Turkey. Ismail Kul, a U.S.-based chemistry professor at 

Widener University in Delaware, was arrested in August 2016, and 

has been in detention ever since, because he had met Fethullah 

Gu ̈len. This, despite the fact that it was Ahmet Aydin, a prominent 

member of the current ruling Justice and Development Party 

(AKP) of Turkey who had introduced Professor Kul to Gu ̈len. This 

cynical effort to detain academics and scholars on such flimsy pretexts, all for the purpose of facilitating a trade for Gu ̈len, is cruel 

and profoundly unjust, and it is destroying innocent lives. 

Ahmet Turan O ̈ zcerit: 

An Associate professor at Sakarya University’s Faculty of Computer and Information Science, Ahmet Turan O ̈ zcerit was arrested 

and detained for 13 months. He was eventually release after being 

diagnosed with liver and intestinal cancer. 

There are just stories, after stories, after stories of professors and 

scientists who have lost their jobs, are being detained, and have 

been arrested and charged as members of ‘‘terrorist’’ organizations. 

Action for the Helsinki Commission, Congresspersons, 

Citizens 

The ongoing systematic and ruthless degrading of Turkey’s academic and scientific institutions is a profound tragedy, not just for 

Turkey, but for the whole OSCE region, and indeed the world. It 

is vital that action be taken to reverse this trend and restore Turkey to its rightful place as an indispensable player on the global 

scientific and academic stage. We urge the U.S. Helsinki Commission to make the current assault of science, scholarship, and basic 

human rights in Turkey a top priority. 

We urge the Commission to develop and promote policies that 

will protect the rights of Turkish scientists and scholars to travel 

within the OSCE region, and to proactively work to ensure that 

academics at risk in Turkey are able to relocate safely to other 

OSCE countries where they can continue their scholarly pursuits. 

We urge the Commission to actively engage all OSCE governments to demand that the government of Turkey respect the 
73 

human rights of scholars and scientists, including the rights to 

freedom of speech, assembly, and belief; as well as the rights to 

travel and enjoy basic academic freedoms. The government of Turkey must also be called upon in the strongest possible terms to end 

the use of torture, arbitrary detention, and unfair trials. 

We urge the Commission to work with OSCE governments to 

bring about a just resolution in the cases of the scholars mentioned 

above, as well as the thousands of other Turkish scholars and scientists who have been unjustly imprisoned or wrongfully dismissed 

from their academic institutions. 
74 

• O"'most fr·ee, 100,ieast free 

After protests erupted over the remova! from f 28 mayors in the Kurdish-majority 

southeast authorities restricted internet access for approximate!y million residents in 

the regfon (see Restrictions on Connectivity). 

Access to Facebook, and You Tube was repeatedly disrupted in the aftermath 

of terrorist attacks, while Wikipedia permanently b!ocked over articles on Turkey's 

involvement in the civil Blocking and Filtering). 

Turkey accounted for 65 percent of a !I content that was locally by Twitter during 

coverage period, as the government 

Content Removal). 

down on independent reporting 

The hacktivist group Red Hack leaked over 57,000 ema!ls fron1 Albayrak, son-in-law 

of President Recep Tayyip ErdoQan, the extent of a government campaign to 

maniputate social media and smear prominent opposition f1gu Media, Diversity, 

and Content Manipulation and Technical Attacks) 

government has implemented an arbitrary and disproportionate purge of state 

officials, eachers, journalists, and others, dismissing or arresting them for alleged ties 

July 2016 coup attempt on flimsy cumstantla! including communication 

apps a!teged!y found on their phones, attendance at a digital security training in lstanbu!, 

and that criticized the govermnent Prosecutions and Detentions for Online 

Activities). 

wwwfreedomontt~<:~rwt org 
75 

TURKEY 

Introduction 

lntem-et freedom sharply dedined in Turkey in2017 due to the repeated suspension of 

telecommunkations networks and social media access, as well as sweeping arrests for political 

speech online. 

During the coverage period, Turkey suffered more than a dozen terrorist attacks, an economic and 

monetary crisis, and a failed coup on July 15, 2016, in which a rogue faction of the Turk!sh military 

attempted to overthrow the government Internet connections were throttled, and major social 

media platforms were blocked. Loyalist forces later reestablished internet service, and President 

Erdo§an addressed the nation through a Face Time video made to a television news anchor on 

CNN TUrk, urging citizens to take to the streets in a show of support for the government. Order 

was eventually restored, but not before some 300 people were kU!ed in dashes between pro- and 

antkoup forces. Government officials pub!idy blamed exiled !sfamk p eacher Fethullah GUlen for 

instigating the coup. A state of emergency was dedared on Ju!y 20, altowing Council of Ministers 

(tabinet), chaired by President ErdoQan, issue decrees without parliamentary or judkial oversight 

Since then, the government implemented a massive purge in which more than 60,000 citizens 

have been arrested for alleged tonnections to GOlen or other banned groups, while over 14-0,000 

have been suspended or dismissed from their jobs.1 In addition, at least 5 news agencies, 62 

newspapers, 16 television channels, 19 periodicals, 29 publishing houses, and 24 radio stations have 

been forcibly dosed down by decree,2 Despite the ongoing authorities went 

ahead with a referendum to grant greater power to the president and abolish the office f prime 

minister.~ The constitutional amendments, which would take effect in passed with 51.4 percent 

of the vote in Apr!! 2017, though the process was criticized by independent monitors from the 

Organization for Security and Co~operation 

in 2003 and then beta me president in 

clause that reset term !imits.4 

Europe, Erdogan, who was elected as prime minister 

could theoretkally remain ln power until 2029 due to a 

The government has repeatedty suspended access to Facebook, Twitter, You Tube, and WhatsApp on 

national security grounds, while Wikipedia has been permanently blocked due to articles related to 

Turkey's ro!e in the Syrian dvl! Papular services offering virtual private networks (VPNs) and the 

Tor anonymity network have been blocked to prevent users from accessing censored content. At the 

same time, ongoing tensions between the Kurdish minority and the centra! government resulted 

in the arrest of parliamentarians, om the pro-Kurdish People's Democratic 

Party (HOP), which the government accused of ties to the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), a Kurdish 

militant group that is classified as a errorist organization by Turkey, the United States, and a number 

of other governments. A 23-yearwold fine .a ts student was sentenced to more than four years 

in prison after posting politka! tweets that were deemed to promote terrorist propaganda and 

insultthe president The government has used similar charges to detain scores of journalists, pofitkal 

activists, and ordinary citizens for little more than criticizing the ruling Justice and Development 

Party (AKP), often using thelr social media evidence in court Turkish users must also 

www.freedomonthenetorg 
76 

TURKEY 

contend with intrusive government surveil!ance and the proven use of sophisticated malware tools 

by law enforcement agencies. In a country where the government reportedly listed sodal media 

as one of the main threats to national security,5 internet freedom remains on a starkly negative 

trajectory. 

Obstacles to Access 

The most significant obstacle to internet access in Turkey remains the practice of shutting down 

telecommunicotlons networks during security operations, mainly in the southeastern part of the 

country. Internet penetration continues to grow, particularly through mobile broadband, as three 

companies have begun to offer "4SG" services. 

Availability and Ease of Access 

' ' 

2016 58.4% 

Internet penetration (ITU)" 2015 53.7% 

2011 43.1% 

2016 97% 

Mobile penetration (lTU)' 2015 96% 

2011 89% 

Average connection speeds {Akamai)t 2017(Ql) 7.6 Mbps 

2016{Ql) 7.2 Mbps 

Internet penetration has continued to increase over the last few years. According to the International 

Telecommunication Union, it stood at 58.35 percent at the end of 2016, up from 43.07 percent fi e 

years ear1ier5 There were 535 million mobile broadband subscribers as of the fi st quarter of 2017, 

while the number of fi ed broadband subscribers stood at 772,325.7 Regular mobile subscriptions 

reached 75.7 million, representing a penetration rate of over 107 percent 

According to the results of the Turkish Statistical Household Usage of Information 

Technologies Survey, the share of households with internet access has risen to 76 perc€nt.S For 

individuals aged 16-74, computer usage stood at 95.9 percent, and internet usage was 93.7 peri'.:ent 

www.freedomonthe-netorg 
77 

TURKEY 

Prices remain high in comparison with the minimum wage. Turkey ranked 70th on the g!oballCT 

Development Index (ID!) for 2016, one spot down from the previous yeac9 

Restrictions on Connectivity 

Restrictions on connectivity are frequent, particularly in the restiv-e southeastem region, where 

ethnic Kurds form a majority. On September 11, 2016, landline, mobile phone, and internet services 

were shut down in 10 cities for six hours, affecting some million residents. The shutdown related 

to the forced removal of 28 Kurdish mayors from their posts. 10 One month later, the government 

suspended mobile and fi ed~llne internet service in 11 cities for several days, leaving 6 million 

dtizens offline. ey public services, such as banks and payment mechanisms, were reportedly 

unavailable. The shutdown coincided with mass protests prompted by the detention of !oca! Kurdish 

politicians, including the two co-mayors of Dlyarbaku; and was appare-ntly intended to delay or 

inhibit coverage of the police response. Reporters were forced to travel to nearby cities in order 

to upload and share footage of police beating protesters.11 Shutdowns have often be-en imposed 

during mllitary operations in the region. Connectivity is also affected by poor telecommunications 

infrastructure and electricity bfackouts. 

Turkey's internet backbone is run by TTNET, .a subsidiary of TUrk Te!ekom that is also the largest 

internet service provider (!SP) in the country. TUrk Te!ekom, which partly state owned, has 234,176 

km of flbe ~optic infrastructure, with around half of it serving as backbone lnfrastructure. Other 

operators have a combined total of 63,444 km of fiber length 12 

There are three internet exchange points (!XPs) owned by private companies: !ST -!X, established by 

Terr.amark ln 2009; TNAP, established by seven leading !SPs in 2013; and DEC-IX, a German company 

that established its operation in Istanbul as "a neutral interconnection and peering point for internet 

service providers from Turkey, !ran, the Caucasus region and the Middle Ease13 

ICT Market 

There were 446 operators providing information and communications technology (ICT} services in 

the Turkish market in the fist quarter of 2017.14 There are around 359 !SPs, though the rnajority act 

as resel!ers for TUrk Telekom. TINET, founded ln 2006 by TUrk Telekom, is the dominant player, with a 

market share of more than 70 percent. ~ 

Turko;!! is the leading mobile phone provider, with 44.1 percent of the market, followed by Vodafone 

>wAv.freedomonthenetorg 
78 

TURKEY 

and Avea {which currently operates under the brand TUrk Te!ekom).16 An auction of 4G frequency 

bands was he!d in August 2015, and by April20'l6, ait three of these companies had started offering 

"4.SG" technology to mobile subscribersY 

Though aU !~al entities are allowed to operate an !SP, there are some requirements to apply 

for authorization, pertaining to issues like the company's legal status, its scope of activity, and 

its shareholders' qualifications. !nfo mal obstacles may also prevent newty founded companies 

without political ties or economic dout from entering the market. ISPs are required by law to submit 

an application for an ~activity certifica e~ to the Information and Communication Technologies 

Authority (BTK) before they can offer services. Internet cafes are StJbject to regulation as well. Those 

operating without an .activity certifica e from ioca! rnunidpality may face fines f TRY 3,000 to 

15,000 (US$800 to US$4,000). Mobile phone servke are subject to licensing through the 

BTK. Moreover, the BTK has the authority to requ~st written notifications f om !SPs.ln December 

2016, BTK asked all ISPs to submit weekly progress reports on the status of new restrictions on 

virtual private networks (VPNs). 18 

Regulatory Bodies 

Po!icymaking, regulation, and operation functions are separated under the bask laws of the 

telecommunications sector. The Ministry of Transportation, Maritime Affairs, and Communications is 

responsible for polkymaking, while the BTK is in charge of regu!ationY 

The BTK has own dedicated but its board members are government appointees and its 

dedsion-making process not transparent Nonetheless, there have been no reported instances 

of certifica es or !kenses being denied. After the 2016 coup attempt, the Telecommunication and 

Communication Presidency (TIB), which implemented the country's website blocking law, was shut 

down under an emergency decree. AI! of its responsibilities were transferred to the BTK.10 The TISdescribed by President Erdofjan as "among the p!a-ees that has all the dlrt"-was closed due to 

suspicions that it was used by GOienists as a "headquarters for !!legal wiretapping."'"-1 

The Computer Center of Middle East Technical University has been responsible for managing domain 

names since 1991. The BTK oversees and establishes the domain~n.ame operation policy and its 

bylaws. Unlike in many other .countries, individuals in Turkey are not permitted to register and own 

domain names ending with the country extension .tr, such as .com.tr and .crg_tr, unless they own a 

trademark, company, or dvil sodety organization with the same name as the requested domain_ 

lNww.freedomonthenetorg 
79 

TURKEY 

limits on Content 

Limits on content continued to increase in Turkey over the past year: In response to a series of deadly 

terrorist attacks and the coup attempt, the government repeatedly blocked or throttled social media 

platforms as well os instant messaging services in a bid to halt the dissemination of images and 

other information pertaining to the events, Jn addition, scores of n£'1Ns sites and Twitter accounts 

were blocked or removed, particularly those covering the government's conflict with Kurdish militants. 

Journalists, scholars, and public figures who are critical of the government {aced coordinated 

harassment by progovernment trolls on Twitter. 

Blocking and Filtering 

Blocking continues to expand steadily in Turkey. Engelliweb, a website that tracked total blocking 

figu es, found that more than 114,000 websites were inaccessible as of November 2016, up from 

about 4D,OOO in 201l More recent figu es are unavailable, as the website and its social media 

accounts have been dosed down without explanation, Over 9{) percent of websites were blo-cked 

due to '"obscenity," which includes any site with certain sexual keywords in the domain, resulting 

in the collateral blocking of several websites related to the LGBT {lesbian, gay, bisexual, and 

transgender) community,22 Websites are also blocked if they are deemed defamatory to lslam, 

indudtng websites that promote atheism:'' However, the most recent uptick in censored content 

during the coverage period re!ates to news sftes, particularly those whose editorial polldes conflict 

with the populist media narrative of the government 

The BTK and Turkish courts blocked access to at least 17 news sites during the coverage period, 

induding Medyascope, Yeni Hayat GazetesL Can Erzincan TV, Gazeteport, Haberdar/4 

Gazete, dokuz8habe1; and the relaunched website of the ieft~leaning news outlet Jlyan, Jiyan. 

A judge closed the pro· Kurdish daily Ozgur Gundem and news agency DIHA due to alleged 

~terrorist organisation propaganda,"26 and the website and social media accounts of !MC TV were 

blocked after its license was revoked by decree.21 A news website operated by prominent journalist 

Can Dundar, Ozguruz.org, was blocked ft had even pubi1shed any news:~a 

Facebook, Twitter, You Tube, and other services were briefly bloc ed or throttled on mufti pie 

occasions during the coverage period: 

www.freedomonthenetorg 
80 

TURKEY 

Facebook and Twitter were throttled for two hours after a terrorist attack on Istanbul 

Ataturk Airport kiUed 38 peop1e on June 28, 2016.2)\ 

Twitter, Facebook, and YouTube were blocked between 11 p.m. and 12 local time 

on the day of the coup attempt July 15, 2016. The government subsequently ordered 

!SPs to lift the ban on social media sites to help spread President Erdogan's call on 

citizens to defend the country.* 

On August 20, 2016, a suicide bomber targeted a Kurdish wedding in Gaziantep, killing 

57 people and wounding 60 others. After the attack, Turkey's Radio and Television 

Supreme Council (RTDK) issued a media ban, resulting in the blocking of facebook, 

Twitter, and YouTube for six hours.31 

On August 25, 2016, Twitter, Facebook, and You Tube were inaccessible for more than 

seven hours,32 Observers could not definiti ely point to one incident to explain the 

outage. 

Following the arrest of 11 HOP parliamentarians on November 4, 2016, Twitter, 

Facebook, You Tube, and WhatsApp were throttled. Prime Minister Binaii Y1!dmm 

justified the blocking as a " emporary security measure33 

On December 19, 2016, Facebook, Twitter, You Tube, and WhatsApp were blocked for 

over 10 hours following the assassination of Russian ambassador Andrey Kar!ov. 34 Later, 

a judge ordered the blocking of more than 100 URLs related to the assassinatlon,35 

including the news site of the Dutch Broadcast Foundation (NOS).% 

After the release of footage of the immolation of two Turkish soldiers by Islamic State 

(lS) militants on December 22, 2016, Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, 37 and the Turkish social 

media site Ek~i SOziOk were either blocked or throttled for four days. Officials ne er 

confi med the restrictions, instead stating that the outage was due to a cyberattack. ~ 

www.freedomonthenetarg 
81 

TURKEY 

Orr October 8, 2016, Dropbox, OneDrive, GitHub, Google Drive, and Internet Archive were 

temporarily blocked after they were used by hackers to host 17 GB of leaked government emails. 

The documents were obtained by Red Hack, Marxist~ Leninist hacker group, from the 

private account of Berat Albayrak, the energy minister and Prestdent ErdoQan's son-in-law.39 The 

BTK banned news regarding the leak, and Twitter banned the accounts of RedHack !n a separate 

incident, Turkey blocked access to Wildleaks after nearly 300,000 emails from the AKP were indexed 

on the website. 40 

In November 2016, the BTK order !SPs to ban more than 10 VPN services, 41 as we!! as the 

circumvention tool Tor.42 1n May 2017, Wikipedia was blocked in the country. The ban was approved 

by Ankara's 1st Criminal Court in order to prevent access to two articles, "Foreign Involvement in 

the Syrian Civil War~ and "State-Sponsored Terrorism," that mentioned the Turkish government's 

involvement in Syria.4

·" 

The blocking and removal of online content {see Removal~ below) is regulated under Law 

No. 5651, whose full name "Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Suppression of Crimes 

Committed by Means of Such Publication.~·14 !twas initially enacted in 2007 to protect children and 

prevent access to !!legal and harmful internet content. This includes material related to child sexual 

abuse, drug use, the provision of dangerous substances, prostitution, obscenity, gambling, sukide 

promotion, and crimes against Mustafa Kemal AtatUrk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey.45 

The responsibilities of content providers, hosting companies, public access providers, and !SPs are 

delineated in law No. 5651. Donlestical!y hosted websites with proscribed content can be taken 

down, while websites based abroad can be blocked and f!! ered through lSPs. The law has already 

been found to be in contravention of the European Convention on Human Rights. 

!n December 2015, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the blocking of You Tube in 

violated Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights, specifically the right o freedom 

of expression. The case was brought to the court by law professors Yaman Akdeniz and Kerem 

Alt!parmak, as we!! as lawyer Serkan 

No, 5651 has repeatedly been amended in recent years to broaden the scope for censorship.47 

A set of amendments enacted in March 2015 authorized cabinet ministers to order the T!B to block 

www.freedomonthenet.org 
82 

TURKEY 

content when necessary to "defend the right to life, secure property, ensure national security and 

public order, prevent crime, or protect public health.~ The orders are then taken up within four hours 

by the TiB {now the BTK after the TlB's closure in which must a!so submit the decision to a 

crimina! court within 24 hours. If a judge does not vafidate the decision within 48 hours, the blocking 

order must be resdnded.~s A similar bill passed ln September 2014 had been overtumed by the 

Constitutional Court in October of that year. While the original of law No. 5651 fnduded 

only notice-based liability and takedown provisions for content that violates individual 

changes passed ln February 20'14 extended this provision to include URL-based blocking orders to 

be issued by a criminal court judge. The February 2014 amendments also entrusted the TlB with 

broad discretion to block content that an individual or other !ega! claimant perceives as a vtolation 

of privacy, while failing to estabfish strong checks and balances. These changes came after leaks of 

the alleged phone conversations oftop government officials on December 17, 2013, and they laid 

the groundwork for the eventual blocking of soda! media platforms. 

The February 2014 amendments to Law No. 5651 also shielded TlB staff if they committed crimes 

during the exercise of their duties. Criminal investigations into TiB staff could only be initiated 

through an authorization from the TiB director, .and investigations into the director could only 

be tnitiated by the relevant minister. This serious doubt on the functioning and 

accountability of the TiB. 

!SPs must join an Association for Access Providers in order to obtain an "'activity certifica e" to legally 

operate in the country. !SPs must also comply with blocking orders from the BTK within four hours 

or face a penalty of up to TRY 300,000 (US$80,000). Failure to take measures to block a!! alternative 

means of accessing the targeted site, such may result in fine f up to TRY 50,000 

(US$13,000)'' 

The vast majority of blocking orders have been issued by the TiB and its successor the BTK, so rather 

than by the courtsY The procedures surrounding blocking dedsions are opaque in both cases, 

creating significant challenges for those seeking o appeaL Judges can issue blocking orders 

during preliminary investigations as well as during trials. The reasoning behind court dedsions is 

not provided in blocking notices, and the relevant rulings are not easily accessible< As a result, it 

is often difficult for si e owners to determine site has been blocked and which court has 

Issued the order. The BTK's mandate includes executing judicia! blocking orders, but it can also issue 

administrative orders for foreign websltes, content involving sexual abuse of children, and obscenity. 

Moreover, in some cases it successfully asks content and hosting providers to remove offending 

items from their servers, order to avoid issuing blocking order that would affect an entire 

website. This occurs despite the fact that intermediaries are not responsible for third-party content 

on their sites. The fil ering database is maintained by the government without dear criteria. A "Child 

www.freedomonthenet.org 
83 

TURKEY 

and Family Profiles Cri eria Working CommitteeN was introduced to address this problem in 2012, 

but it was largely rnade up of BTK members or appointees and does not appear to be active. 

In addition to these blocks, lSPs offer ~child" and qfamily~ fil ering options under rules established 

by the BTK in 2011, though the fi! ering have been criticized as arbitrary and d1strlminatory52 

The BTK tried to mandate fi! ering for a!! users in 2011, 53 but withdrew the proposal following a legal 

challenge. Sol The child filer obstructs access to Facebook, YouTube, Yasam Radyo (Life Radio), the 

Armenian minority newspaper Agos, and several websites advocating the theory of evolution, 55 even 

as some antievolution websites remain accessible. 56 Internet access is fi! ered at primary education 

institutions and public bodies, resulting in the blocking of a number of minority news sites. 5

7 

Content Removal 

ln addition to widespread fi! ering, state authorities are proactive in requesting the deletion or 

removal of content. Socia! media platforms comply with administrative decisions and court orders 

as promptly as possible in order to avoid blocking and, more recently, throttling. like international 

social media platforms, popular Turkish websites are subject to content removal orders. Courts 

issued several orders pertaining to user-generated content websites such as Ek~i SOz!Ok {Sour 

Dictionary), lnd SOzhJk {Pear! Dictionary), and !TO (Istanbul Technical University Dictionary). 

Turkey has consistently ranked among the countries with highest number of removal requests 

sent to Twitter. Turkey accounted for 65 percent of a!! accounts reported to Twitter for the period 

of June 2016 to May 2017. The company withheld at least some content in 11 percent of the 

removal requests in the f1 st half of 2017.w !t explained, "Whenever possible under Turkish law, 

Twitter filed legal objections in esponse to all court orders involving journalists and news outlets .... 

Disappointingly, none of our objections 

According to Facebook's Government Requests Report for the period of Ju!y to December 2016, 

the company restricted 1,111 pieces of content on orders from both the BTK and Turkish law 

enforcement agencies, particularly in compliance with Law No. 5651.6

° Figures from Reddit lndlcate 

that it complied with all six requests it received from the Turkish government in 2016, resulting 

in the blocking of one post fi e subreddits for Turkish IP addresses.61 The requests related to 

On September 27, 2D1i, the Council of State n~jected the "stay of executlonft request by BlAnet referring to the annulment 

ofthe February22.2011. 

55 Dorian JoMs. "Turkey 81-ocks Web Pages Touting Darwin's Evoluti-on Theory," Voice of America, D&ember 23. 2.01 L lill.Q;il 

b.ll~ 

56 Sar.a Reardon, ~contmversi.al Turkish Internet Censorship Program Targets Evolution Sites," Science Magazine, December 9, 

10 www.freedomonthenetorg 
84 

TURKEY 

content deemed "obscene" under Turkish law. Although Reddit did not revea! the nature of the 

content, researchers discovered that some of the subredd1ts related to LGBT!-friendly secttons of the 

website.l\2 

Media, Diversity, and Content Manipulation 

Digital media are inhibited by self<ensorship, government manipulation, and shutdowns of 

independent outlets. A steep rise in prosecutions under the charge of defaming the president has 

also had a chilling effect on soda! media users. This has been compounded by decrees passed under 

the state of emergency that have expanded surveillance. Turkish-Armenian relations have become 

less controversial in recent years, but they remain sensitive, particularly during periods of ethnic 

tension and violence in the southeast< 

Turkish users increasingly rely on internet-based publications primary source of news, despite 

the country's restrktive legal environment and growing self-censorship. There are a wide range of 

blogs and websites through which citizens question and criticize Turkish politics and leaders, though 

many such platforms have been blocked s!nce the attempted coup and the fla e~up in hostil!ties 

between government forces and Kurdish separatists. The November 2016 blocking of Tor and 

popular VPN services made it more difficult for use s to reach blocked websites.63 

!n addition, several well-known news outlets have been taken over or shut down by the authorities. 

The GOlen-linked newspapers Zaman and Today:s Zaman, as weH as Cihan News Agency, were 

seized on March 4, 2017. New progovernment editorial boards were established by court order.64 

The online archives of each paper were deleted, as was Zaman's previous Twttter activity.65 Zaman 

and some 130 other news (Ompanies had been on July 27, 2016, by Decree No. 

668, immediately after the government arrested 89 media workers for alleged ties to the GG!en 

movement.66 

As of mld~2017, the progovernment newspaper Sobah had the most visited news site in the country, 

followed by Haberl and Ensonhaber.137 New models for dtizen journalism and volunteer reporting 

have recently gained traction; examples include 140journos, dokuz8haber, and Otekilerin Postas1, 

whose editor was arrested in November 2015. Media coverage regarding the Kurdish-popu!ated 

southeastern region heavl!y influenced by the go ernment Frequent power outages, mobile 

internet shutdowns, and censorship of prominent local news sites make information gathering even 

more difficult in that a ea. 

11 www,freedomonthenetorg 
85 

TURKEY 

Numerous reports have revealed that an "army of troHs,"&l numbering around 6,000 individuals, has 

been enlisted by the ruling AKP to manipulate discussions, drive particular agendas, and combat 

government critics on media.6'1 Emai!s leaked in October 2016 (see "Technical Attacks~) 

provided insight into a coordinated campaign by President Erdogan's inner drde to counter critical 

narratives and weaken protest movements on soda! media.70 Messages sent to Berat Albayrak 

discussed the establishment of '"a team of professional graphic designers, coders, and former army 

offidafs who eceived training tn psychological warfare," according to a report by the Daily Dot. One 

email proposed exposing the drug habits of celebrities who had supported the 2013 Occupy Gezi 

movement, resulting in a pollee raid on the homes of 55 directors, and other celebrities 

two months later. The images of the celebrities were widely shared by progovemment outlets on 

soda! media. Also using social media, an AKP lawmaker ralli-ed an angry mob to physically attack 

the headquarters of Hurriyet in September 2015 after the newspaper criticized President ErdoQ:an's 

security policy, 71 

Journalists and scholars who are critical of the government have faced orchestrated harassment on 

Twitter, often by dozens or even hundreds of usersY Shortly before the November 2015 elections, 

progovernment trolls circulated allegations that Oy ve Otesi (Vote and Beyond), the fi st dvic 

election-monitoring initiative in Turkey, was committing fraud and alding terrorist organizations. 

A Twitter account named ~vote and Fraud" wfth 42,000 followers warned supporters not to get 

involved with the group. Only a week before the smear campaign, the same account had purported 

to be a young girl sharing romantic quotes, adding to speculation that "Vote and Fraud~ was a 

fake account created solely for the purposes of tro!ling:13 Progovernment trolls have also bee-n 

active amid rapid shifts in relations with foreign governments, such as Russia, which commenced a 

propaganda campaign against Turkey after Turkish forces shot down a Russian jet near the Syrian 

border in December 2015, !n response, "Tro!!State Russia" became .a trending topic on Twitter in a 

campaign allegedly orchestrated by Erdogan's public communication office .

74 

Digital Activism 

Digital activism has played a significant ole the country since the 2013 Occupy Gezl protests, 

although activism has waned somewhat as a result of the repressive climate after the coup attempt 

Ten activists-eight Turkish human rights activists and two foreign trainers-were detained while 

participating in a digital security workshop at a hotel in Istanbul in July 2017.15 The individuals 
86 

TURKEY 

included ld!! Eser, director of Amnesty International's Turkey branch. As of mid~2017, they were 

awaiting trial on trumped-up charges of aiding a terrorist group.JP 

Turkey Blocks, an organization that tracks censorship in real time, was granted Index on Censorship's 

2017 .award for digital activism." Organizations such as: Oy ve Otesi used soda! media toots to enlist 

over 60,000 volunteers to monitor more than 130,000 ballot boxes during the general elections of 

November 2015. n Operations were scaled back for the 2017 constitutional referendum over fears 

of legal repercussions for their members.79 Oy ve Otesi later published a report about irregularities 

affecting around 100,000 ballots.8() Dogruluk Payi {~Share of Truth"), Turkey's fi stand only political 

fact-checking website, was also a popular source far information during the coverage period.111 

Violations of User 

While prison sentences for online speech have been rare, several individuals were sentenced to lengthy 

terms over the past year for allegedly insulting public officials or spreading terrorist propaganda. 

Journalists, public figures, and students have been targeted for nonviolent speech that is critical of the 

government or touches on controversial issues like Kurdish identity. Surveillance remains a key concern, 

but cybersecurity made headlines over the past year due to a massive leak of a government official's 

emails. 

legal Environment 

The state of emergency, in place sinceJu!y 20,2016, weakens parliamentary and constitutional 

checks on executive decrees issued by President Erdogan and his {abinet. Decrees have been used 

to arrest over 50,000 people allegedly linked to the coup attempt, suspend or dismiss over 140,000 

individuals from their jobs, block websites, shut down communication networks, and dose civil 

society organizations and news outlets.82 Decree No. 671, published on August 15, 2016, amended 

the law on Digital Communications to autholize the government to take "any necessary measure" 

on the grounds of "national pub!k order, prevention of crime, protection of public health 

and public mora!s, or protection of the rights and freedoms" guaranteed under Artide 22 of the 

www.freedomonthef'letorg 
87 

TURKEY 

constitution. The decree a!so obliges telecommunk:ations providers to enforce government orders 

within two hours of receiving them.83 

The Turkish constitution in-dudes broad protections for freedom of expression. Article 26 states that 

"everyone has the right to express and disseminate h!s thought and opinion by speech, in writing 

or in pictures or through other media, individually or co!lectlve!y."84 Turkish legislation and court 

judgments are subject to the European Convention Human Rights and bound by the dedsions. of 

the European Court of Human Rights. The constitution also seeks to guarantee the right to privacy, 

though there are limitations on the use of encryption devices, and surveiUance by security agencies 

is believed to be widespread. There are no laws that specifically crimlna!ize online activities fi e 

posting one's opinions, downloading information, sending ema!i, or transmitting text messages. 

Instead, many provisions of the criminal code and other laws, such as the Anti~ Terrorism Law, are 

applied to both on!lne and offline activit , 

Defamation charges have frequently been used to prosecute government critics. According to Artlde 

125 of the Turkish crimina! code, u.anyone who undermines the honor, dignity or respectability of 

another person or who attacks a person's honor by attributing to them a concrete act or a fact, or by 

means of an insult, shall be sentenced to imprisonment for a of three months to two years, or 

punished with a judicial fine" Defaming a public official carries a minimum one- ear sentence, while 

insulting the president entails a sentence of one to four years in prison, according to Article 299. 

Severa! courts deemed Article 299 unconstitutional in the fi st half of 2016 and called for the matter 

to be taken up by the Constitutional Court.05 Cases related to insulting the president have seldom 

resulted in jail sentences, although some defendants have been jailed whi!e awaiting trial. 

According to Artide 7 of the Anti-Terrorism "those who make propaganda of a terrorist 

organization by legitimizing, glorifying or inciting violent methods or threats" are liable to 

terms of one to fi e years. The law has been widely criticized for its broad definition f terrorism, 

which has been exploited by courts to prosecute journalists and academics with no link to terrorism 

for the simple act of criticizing the government&> 

Prosecutions and Detentions for Online Activities 

The past year featured unprecedented increase in the number of prosecutions and detentions of 

Turklsh citizens for their online activities. 

Tens of thousands of Turkish have been arbitrarily detained for their alleged use of the 

encrypted communications app Sylock. Legal and technical experts have disputed the government's 

daim that the app was primarily used by members of the GOlen movement, pointing to its wide 

availability and popularity in 41 countries. lt was once available to download at no cost on the app 

V-iww.freedomonthenet.otg 
88 

TURKEY 

stores of Apple and Google, until it was removed by the deve!oper.e7 Turkish officials that 

the app was designed by a senior member of the GUien movement Experts believe that Turkey's 

Nationallntef!igence Organization (MIT) hacked ByLock: server located in lithuania, which listed 

its hundreds of thousands of users in an unencrypted form. Despite a lack of evidence, and the 

arbitrary nature of the blanket arrests, numerous users have been deemed guilty by association for 

simply downloading the app. ln the month of October 2016 alone, arrest warrants were Issued for 

404lndividua!s for al!eged!y using Bylock, including members of the police andjudidary88 

The Bylock controversy has also ensnared members of the human rights -community. Taner Kil1~, the 

Turkey chair of Amnesty lntemational, was detained in June 2017, and the on!y known evidence in 

his case was the allegation that he had used Sylock, which he has denied. 

One month later; police arrested 10 human rights activists taking part in a digital security training in 

Istanbul. Turkish citizens ldil Eser, GOna! Ku~un, Ozlem Da!k!ran, Veli Acu, llknur OstQn, and Na!an 

Erkem were placed in pretrial detention, as were their trainers, G-erman citizen Peter Steudtner and 

Swedish All Gharavi. ~eyhmus Ozbekli and Nejat Ta~an were arrested and released on batt 

They all fate prison sentences of up to 15 years for membership in a terrorist organization.89 

Arrests and prosecutions for soda! medl.a increased in recent years, and in some cases, 

individuals have been imprisoned. Over the past year, hundreds of Twitter users fac-ed charges of 

insulting government officials, defaming esldent Erdogan, or sharing propaganda in support of 

terrorist organizations. 

According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, a total of 81 journalists were imprisoned in Turkey 

as of December 2016.00 Several journalists were charged for their sodal media activities, including 

but not limited to the following Individuals: 

15 

Journalist Hayri Tun~, who works for the news site Jlyan, was sentenced to two years in 

prison in June 2016 for "terrorism propaganda," "abetting criminal acts,~ snd "glorifying 

criminal acts"" He was targeted for tweets, Facebook posts, and You Tube videos that mainly 

covered fighting bet een the security services and Kurdish mllitants.S1 He appealed the 

dedsion shortly after hts sentendng:.'l? 

Ahmet ~!k, a leading investigative journalist with the opposition outlet Cumhuriyet, was 

arrested for his social media activity !n December 2016. He was accused of "spreading 

www.freedomonthenetorg 
89 

TURKEY 

terrorist propaganda" and "denigrating the Turkish Repub!ic.N~3 He daimed he was denied 

drinking water for three days while in custody. 514 

In September 2015, journalist and writer Aytekin Gezki received a combined prison 

sentence of fi e years and nlne months, in addition to a judicial fine equi alent to 21 

months in prison, for "insulting" President Erdogan, former deputy prime minister BO!ent 

Ann~, and former justice minister Bekir Bozdag on Twitter?' He was acquitted of similar 

;:;:harges against two other public officials. Gezid had been detained in Oc aber 2014 in 

Adana after a police raid on his home.96 Although he was not immediately imprisoned (likely 

due to an appeal), he was again in July 2016 for .alleged !inks to the fai!ed coupY 

Hi.isno Maha!li was arrested ln December 2016 on charges of insulting the president and 

defaming public officials a ter he criticized Turkish media's -coverage of the Syrian conflict 

Mahalli, a journalist and political analyst, was born in Syria but a-cquired Turkish citizenship 

in 

Beatriz Yubero, a Spanish journalist who had been performing research on IS at Ankara 

University, was taken into custody over tweets she posted about President Erdogan. She was 

deported on August 6, 2016,99 

Atifla Ta~, an eccentric singer and Meydan columnist, was arrested in September 2016 

on suspicion of membership of a terrorist organization.100 The evidence used in his case 

induded a tweet in which he stated, "Edison wouldn't have invented the 'light bulb' if he 

saw these days!" reference to the AKP's "!ight bulb"' logo. He was released in March, 

only to be detained once again by another judge. 101 

Authorities have also targeted ordinary citizens and university students for their social media 

activity. Gizem Yerik, a 23-year-old fine a ts student, was sentenced to a combined four years and 

efght months in prison for allegedly insulting the president and spreading terrorist propaganda on 

Twitter. Her sentence was confi med by the Supreme Court of Appeals in May 2017. 10~ In April, police 

arrested Ali Gu!, a 22-year-o!d university student, for sharing a pop!J!ar video calling on Turkish 

16 wwwJreedomonthenet.org 
90 

TURKEY 

citizens to vote "Non in the constitutional referendum. He rece-ived a two-year suspended sentence 

and was released in May. 103 

President Erdogan has reportedly fHed criminal against mo ethan 250 people for 

"insu!tingff him online and more than 2,000 people for "insuaing" him by any means from 2014 

to 2.016.w" Speaking on July 30, 2016, after the fail-ed coup, Erdo§an announced that he would 

withdraw all pendlng insult -c.ompla!nts.105 Nevertheless, Article 125{3) and Artide 299 of the penal 

code remained in place, and new cases continued to be fJled during the co erage period. 

Surveillance, Privacy, and Anonymity 

Government surveillance, the bulk retention of user data, and limitations -on encryption and 

anonymity are all concerns in Turkey. Leaked revealed a contract between the ltahan 

surveillance software company Hacking Team and the General Directorate of Security (GDS), 

dvHian poHce force, for the use of Hacking Team's "Remote Control System" from June 2011 to 

November 2014.'06 Under Turkish law, the inte-rception of electronic communications had fallen 

under the purview of the TlB {now the BTK), and questions remain over the legality of the GDS 

using software that can infi!tra e targets' computers. The prominence of alleged GO!enists in the 

police and judkiary had been a major point of discussion in the country in recent years, partku!ar!y 

after GUI-enlsts were widely blamed for leaked wiretaps that led to various government corruption 

scandals in 2013 and 2014. Further scandals prompted high-level dismissals and reshuffHng within 

the police and judiciary, apparently aimed at suspected GOlenist officials 1()7 The 2016 

coup attempt prompted a new wave of surveH!ance as part of the broader purge of individuals 

with alleged !inks to banned groups, Almost 70,000 social media accounts have been put under 

surveillance since July 2016, according to figu es reported in January 2017.'w 

According to Article 22 of the constitution, "everyone has the right to freedom of communkatlon, 

and secrecy of communication is fundamentaL" This right can only be violated under a court order ln 

cases of "national security, pubHc order, prevention of the commission of crimes, protection of public 

health and pub!k morals, or protection of the rights and freedoms of others, or unless there exists 

a written order of an agency authorized by law in cases where delay is prejudkiaL"'109 for the most 

part, .any action that could Interfere with freedom of communication or the right to privacy must be 

authorized by the judiciary. For example, judldal permission is required for technical surveillance 

under the Penal Procedural Before the passage of the Homeland Security Act 1n March 2015, 

the law a!!owed Turkish security forces to conduct Intelligence wiretapping hours without a 

judge's permission in urgent situations. However, under the new !aw the time limit was increased 

107 

108 

109 The Constitution of the Republic of Turkey. 
91 

TURKEY 

to 48 hours, with a new requirement that wiretapping officials not! y their superiors. !n addition, 

only the Ankara High Criminal Court is authorized to dedde whether the wiretapping legitimate. 

Despite constitutional guarantees, most forms of telecommunication continue to be tapped and 

interceptec:L 110 

Furthermore, the MiT received expanded powers to conduct surveil!ance in April 2014. law No. 6532 

on Amending the Law on State Intelligence Services and the National Intelligence Organization 

grants intelligence agents unfettered access to communications data without a court order. The law 

forces public and private bodies-including but not limited to banks, archives, private companies, 

and professional organizations such as bar associations--to provide the MiT v.~th any requested 

data, documents, or information regarding certain crimes, such as crimes against the security of 

the state, national security, state espionage. Failure to comply can be punished with 

imprisonment In a clause related to the MIT's ability to intercept and store prlvate data on "external 

intelligence, national defense, terrorism, international crimes, and cyber-security passing through 

telecommunication channels,~ no requirement to procure a court order is mentioned.11 t The 

a!so limits MiT agents' accountability for wrongdoing. Courts must obtain the permission of the 

head of the agency in order to investigate agents, and j-ournalists or editors who pubHsh leaks on 

MiT activities via media channels may be imprisoned for three to nine years. Some observers have 

argued that the bid to shield the MlT from judidal investigations was intended to provide legal cover 

for the agency's negotiations at the time with the PKK, which Is offlclal!y ecognized as a terrorist 

organization; it also facilitated on government opponents such as the GO!enists, 112 

The anonymous purchase of mobile phones is not allowed; buyers must provide official identification. 

According to a Council of Ministers decision dated 2000, Turkish citizens may on!y import one 

mobile phone every two years. Imported devices can be registered at mobile phone operators' 

subscription centers and an e-government website, for a fee of TRY 149.20 (US$40). Devices that 

are not registered within 60 days are shut off from telecommunications networks. In 2011, the 

BTK imposed regulations on the use of encryption hardware and software. Suppliers are required 

to provide encryption keys to state authorities before they can offer their products or services to 

individuats or companies within Turkey. Failure to comply can result ln administrative fines .and, in 

cases related to national security, prison sentences. 

Under Law No. 5651, hosting and access providers must retain all traffic info mation for one year 

and maintain the .accuracy, integrity, and -confidentiality f s1..1ch data. !n addition, access providers 

must file the data ogether with a time stamp and provide assistance .and support to the TiS {now 

the BTK) in monitoring internet traffic On December 8, 2015, the Constitutional Cou t nuUified a set 

of amendments passed in February 2014, including a requirement that hosting providers must store 

data for up to two years.m The decision entered into force in December 2.016. 

Public-use internet providers hold different responslbihties depending on their status as either 

110 

Interception of Communications and Sttrv<!i!lance] (Ank<~ra: Umit Yayincillk, 2000). 

111 

18 
92 

TURKEY 

commercia! or noncommerciaL Commercial providers are defined as entities that p ovide internet 

service for a certain payment, such as internet cafes. Noncommercial public-use internet providers 

are defined as entitles that p ovide internet service at a certain venue for a certain period of time, 

such as in hotels and restaurant~ While all pubtic-use internet providers are expected to take 

measures to prevent ac<:ess to criminal store interna!IP distribution logs, commercia! 

providers must also receive permission from the local administration, use a content~fil ering service 

approved by the BTK, and keep accurate daily records of internal lP distribution logs using software 

supplied by the BTK, which must be stored period of one year. ln addition, these commercial 

providers are required to instal! a video surveillance system so as to identify users, retain such 

records for seven days. Ail data must be made available to the BTK upon request-and without the 

need for a court order--under penalty of TRY 10,000 to '100,000 (US$2,600 to US$26,000) in fines'" 

In a largely positive development new Data law entered into force on April 2016, 

aligning the country's legislation with European Union standards.115 

Intimidation and Violence 

Since January 2016, the International Press Institute (lPI) has collected at least 760 instances of 

abusive behavior against journalists online and 176 threats Twitter account(@ 

ustakiloyunlari) ~with over 100,000 followers has regularly smeared journalists and threatened to 

release personal information about them. Spee-ch on ls!am or the prophet Muhammad, posts about 

the ~Kurdish problem,~ and even mi!d criticism of the president, government, or ruling party can 

result in death threats and legal battles. reporters for online news outlets 

operate in an environment in which media workers have often been physically assaulted for their 

reporting, and in some cases, ki!led. 117 

Technical Attacks 

News sites have frequently come under technical attack at polltk:a!ly sensitive moments or after 

publishing controversial information. The arts-and-culture news website Sanatatak.com suffered 

technical attacks after pub!ishi09 a letter supporting Turkish actress FUsun Demlrel, who declared 

that she "wanted to be to be a [Kurdish] guerrl!la" in her youth. The website was inaccessible for 

about 48 hours in March 2016 due to distributed denial-of-service {DDoS) attacks.11s The HDP's 

website was attacked two days before the June 2015 elections and could not be accessed for over 

24 hours. Popular news organizations such as Zaman, Todoy's Zaman, Cihan News Agency, Rotahaber, 

10 www.freedomonthenet.org 
93 

Æ 

TURKEY 

Radikal, SOzcD, and Tarof reported cyberattacks against theirwebsites during the November 2015 

elections 

While opposition news sites and Twitter accounts are frequently targeted by progovernment hackers, 

government ministers have also been affected. ReciHa•ck's per1etraticrn o,f the perS<mal err>ai' 

of Berat Albayrak yielded more than 57,000 messages from 2000 to 2016, including many that 

covered state affairs. The material was uploaded to Dropbox, OneDrive, GltHub, and Goag!e Drive 

in October 2016.ln January 2-017, the BTK announced that the government would set up an army of 

~white-hat hackers~ to defend Turkey in cyberspace.119 

20 www.freedomonthenetorg 
This is an official publication of the 

Commission on Security and 

Cooperation in Europe. 

★ ★ ★ 

This publication is intended to document 

developments and trends in participating 

States of the Organization for Security 

and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 

★ ★ ★ 

All Commission publications may be freely 

reproduced, in any form, with appropriate 

credit. The Commission encourages 

the widest possible dissemination 

of its publications. 

★ ★ ★ 

http://www.csce.gov @HelsinkiComm 

The Commission’s Web site provides 

access to the latest press releases 

and reports, as well as hearings and 

briefings. Using the Commission’s electronic 

subscription service, readers are able 

to receive press releases, articles, 

and other materials by topic or countries 

of particular interest. 

Please subscribe today.