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S. HRG. 111–1246 

OVERSIGHT HEARING ON THE USE OF OIL 

DISPERSANTS IN THE DEEPWATER HORIZON 

OIL SPILL 

JOINT HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT 

AND THE

COMMITTEE ON 

ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

AUGUST 4, 2010 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Environment and Public Works 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

BARBARA BOXER, California, Chairman 

MAX BAUCUS, Montana 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

JEFF MERKLEY, Oregon 

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York 

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

GEORGE V. VOINOVICH, Ohio 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE CRAPO, Idaho 

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri 

LAMAR ALEXANDER, Tennessee 

BETTINA POIRIER, Staff Director 

RUTH VAN MARK, Minority Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island, Chairman 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, New York 

BARBARA BOXER, California (ex officio) 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma (ex officio) 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

AUGUST 4, 2010 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

Boxer, Hon. Barbara, U.S. Senator from the State of California ........................ 1 

Inhofe, Hon. James M., U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma .................... 2 

Whitehouse, Hon. Sheldon, U.S. Senator from the State of Rhode Island ......... 4 

Carper, Hon. Thomas R., U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware ................... 5 

Barrasso, Hon. John, U.S. Senator from the State of Wyoming .......................... 7 

Lautenberg, Hon. Frank R., U.S. Senator from the State of New Jersey ........... 8 

Cardin, Hon. Benjamin L., U.S. Senator from the State of Maryland, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 116 

Gillibrand, Hon. Kirsten, U.S. Senator from the State of New York, prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 117 

WITNESSES 

Anastas, Paul, Assistant Administrator, Office of Research and Development, 

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency .............................................................. 10 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer ................................ 20 

Response to an additional question from: 

Senator Carper .......................................................................................... 22 

Senator Sanders ........................................................................................ 22 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Gillibrand ..................................................................................... 22 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 26 

Westerholm, David, Director, Office of Response and Restoration, National 

Ocean Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, U.S. 

Department of Commerce .................................................................................... 29 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 31 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer ................................ 40 

Response to an additional question from Senator Sanders .......................... 44 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Gillibrand ..................................................................................... 44 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 46 

Kendall, Ronald J., Ph.D., Director, the Institute of Environmental and 

Human Health, and Professor and Chairman, Department of Environmental Toxicology, Texas Tech University ........................................................ 66 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 69 

Responses to additional questions from: 

Senator Boxer ............................................................................................ 76 

Senator Sanders ........................................................................................ 79 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 82 

Smith, David C., Ph.D., Professor and Associate Dean, Graduate School of 

Oceanography, University of Rhode Island ........................................................ 85 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 87 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Boxer ................................ 89 

Response to an additional question from: 

Senator Sanders ........................................................................................ 90 

Senator Inhofe ........................................................................................... 90 

Overton, Edward B., Ph.D., Professor Emeritus, Louisiana State University 

Department of Environmental Sciences, School of the Coast and Environment ...................................................................................................................... 92 
Page

IV 

Overton, Edward B., Ph.D., Professor Emeritus, Louisiana State University 

Department of Environmental Sciences, School of the Coast and Environment—Continued 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 94 

Response to an additional question from Senator Sanders .......................... 98 

Responses to additional questions from Senator Inhofe ............................... 99 

Savitz, Jacqueline, Senior Campaign Director, Oceana ....................................... 101 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 103 
(1) 

OVERSIGHT HEARING ON THE USE OF OIL 

DISPERSANTS IN THE DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL 

WEDNESDAY, AUGUST 4, 2010 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committees met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room 406, 

Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Sheldon Whitehouse (Chair of 

the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Whitehouse, Boxer, Inhofe, Lautenberg, Carper, and Barrasso. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BARBARA BOXER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

Senator BOXER. Thank you so much. 

I want to thank Chairman Whitehouse for his excellent leadership of the Oversight Subcommittee. And this hearing is part of the 

Environment and Public Works oversight of the Federal Government’s response to the Deepwater Horizon disaster. 

Today we will be examining the issues surrounding the use of 

chemical dispersants in dealing with the Deepwater spill, which we 

now know is the largest of its kind in history, totaling an estimated 

$4.9 million barrels of crude oil—more than 200 million gallons. As 

of August 3, 2010, the Unified Command reports that BP has used 

an extraordinary quantity of dispersants in dealing with the Gulf 

spill—1.8 million gallons altogether, including 1.1 million gallons 

applied on the surface and almost 780,000 gallons beneath the surface of the sea. 

Dispersants work like detergents, breaking up oil into smaller 

droplets which may end up suspended in the water column beneath 

the surface. While this massive application of dispersants was carried out in the hopes of protecting the shoreline from oil slicks, it 

does raise serious questions about short- and long-term impacts on 

the environment and about unintended consequences. 

For example, while dispersants may have been applied in the 

hope of reducing the effects of heavy oil slicks on shorelines and 

wildlife, more needs to be done to fully understand the impact that 

dispersants and dispersed oil are having beneath the surface. 

These decisions have very real consequences, not just for fish and 

wildlife that inhabit the Gulf but for the fishermen and the oyster-
2 

men and others whose livelihoods and families depend on the longterm health of the Gulf of Mexico. 

Questions have also been raised about the process the incident 

command and Federal agencies used for approving dispersant use. 

Our witnesses today will address what we know about dispersants, 

what we have learned over the past 3 months since the start of the 

disaster. Just as important, they will speak to what we do not yet 

know about dispersants in oil and what we need to do to find the 

answers. 

This Committee has already approved important legislation, 

sponsored by Senator Shaheen, to support greater investments in 

research on oil spills and spill response. More remains to be done. 

Today’s hearing is an important step in getting answers to the 

questions raised by this unprecedented disaster. And since we have 

a joint hearing, full Committee and the Subcommittee, and I have 

asked Senator Whitehouse to chair it, I will turn back to him. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. I will yield to the Ranking Member. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA 

Senator INHOFE. All right, for an opening statement. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman, for scheduling today’s hearing. I think this is significant, on the use and impacts of the oil dispersants to mitigate 

the BP oil spill. 

Following the tragic Exxon Valdez oil spill, the National Contingency Plan was updated to address new issues that might arise in 

the event of an oil spill of national significance. I remember that 

well, and I remember being up there at the time, 20 years ago, 

when that happened. 

Among other things, the NCP was amended to require a pre-approved list of dispersants deemed safe for emergency use by the 

Environmental Protection Agency. By creating a pre-approved list, 

oil spill responders have an effective tool to fight the devastating 

effects of an oil spill quickly and without bureaucratic delay. 

Let me be clear: nobody is advocating for the use of dispersants 

unless they are absolutely necessary. But with the BP disaster, 

they appear to be the lesser of two evils. I am disappointed that 

this important tool, which was first approved for use by the EPA, 

then-Administrator, Carol Browner, in 1994, was implemented in 

fits and starts. The EPA first approved, then stopped, then approved again the use of dispersants. 

I am concerned that the EPA’s back and forth, which runs 

counter to having a list of approved prior to the emergency, may 

have exasperated the damages caused by the BP spill. The Administration’s are somewhat baffling, considering top officials have 

clearly stated that dispersants are safe and effective. Carol Browner, now President Obama’s energy and climate change czar, has 

been quoted comparing dispersants to dish soap and just last week 

said, ‘‘We have been using dispersant. We do monitor, the EPA 

monitors regularly. Right now, they are not seeing anything of concern. NOAA is also monitoring. They are not seeing anything of 

concern, and right now the monitoring is telling us that everything 

is OK. But we will continue to monitor.’’ 
3 

EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson said, ‘‘We know that 

dispersants are less toxic than oil and that they break down over 

a period of weeks, rather than remaining for several years as untreated oil might.’’ In a report last Tuesday, the NOAA Administrator stated, ‘‘The light crude oil is biodegrading quickly. We know 

that a significant amount of oil has dispersed and been biodegraded 

by naturally occurring bacteria.’’ 

The current dispersant being used was formulated following the 

Exxon Valdez spill and approved by the EPA for use in 1994. This 

dispersant is currently approved for use in 28 countries, and 30 

groups have access to samples as well as complete access to its ingredients and mixtures. These groups include 16 academic institutions, multiple Federal agencies, including numerous divisions in 

regions of EPA, and five departments within the State government 

of Louisiana. 

Legislation covering dispersants has now been introduced in the 

Senate and passed in the House. The House-passed language institutes a 2-year moratorium on dispersants and requires full public 

disclosure of ingredients. This would greatly limit our ability to respond to any potential future spills, and could drastically diminish 

our domestic manufacture and supply of dispersants in the future. 

Clearly, there are uncertainties due to the volume and method 

of use of dispersants in this current response effort. But we must 

be measured in how we address these uncertainties, because we 

could ultimately do more harm than good. 

I applaud Senator Lautenberg’s efforts in drafting a more reasoned alternative to the House bill. At this point, based on the extensive Federal research on dispersants initiated after the BP spill, 

I am not sure if Senator Lautenberg’s legislation is needed. 

I also have some additional concerns with aspects of the bill, but 

will continue to study the issue. I commit today to work with Senator Lautenberg on a bipartisan legislation and the need for it. 

So thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Inhofe follows:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES M. INHOFE, U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA

Thank you, Madam Chair, for scheduling today’s important hearing to examine 

the use and impacts of oil dispersants to mitigate the BP oil spill. Following the 

tragic Exxon Valdez oil spill, the National Contingency Plan (NCP) was updated to 

address new issues that might arise in the event of an oil spill of national significance. Among other things, the NCP was amended to require a pre-approved list 

of dispersants deemed safe for emergency use by the Environmental Protection 

Agency. By creating a pre-approved list, oil spill responders have an effective tool 

to fight the devastating effects of an oil spill quickly and without bureaucratic delay. 

Let me be clear: nobody is advocating for the use of dispersants unless they are 

absolutely necessary, but with the BP disaster they appear to be the lesser of two 

evils. I am disappointed that this important tool—which was first approved for use 

by EPA and then-Administrator Carol Browner in 1994—was implemented in fits 

and starts. EPA first approved—then stopped—then approved again the use of 

dispersants. I am concerned that EPA’s back and forth—which runs counter to having a list approved prior to an emergency—may have exacerbated the damages 

caused by the BP spill. 

The Administration’s actions are somewhat baffling considering top officials have 

clearly stated that dispersants are safe and effective. Carol Browner, now President 

Obama’s Energy and Climate Change Czar, has been quoted comparing dispersants 

to dish soap and just last week said, ‘‘We have been using dispersant. We do monitor; the EPA monitors regularly. Right now they’re not seeing anything of concern. 

NOAA is also monitoring. They’re not seeing anything of concern, and right now the 
4 

monitoring is telling us that everything is OK, but we will continue to monitor.’’ 

EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson said, ‘‘We know that dispersants are less toxic 

than oil,’’ and that they ‘‘break down over a period of weeks, rather than remaining 

for several years as untreated oil might.’’ In a report last Tuesday, NOAA Administrator Jane Lubchenco said, ‘‘The light crude oil is biodegrading quickly . . . we know 

that a significant amount of the oil has dispersed and been biodegraded by naturally 

occurring bacteria.’’ 

The current dispersant being used, Corexit 9500, was formulated following the 

Exxon Valdez spill and approved by EPA for use in 1994. This dispersant is currently approved for use in 28 countries, and 30 groups have access to samples as 

well as complete access to its ingredients and mixtures. These groups include 16 

academic institutions, multiple Federal agencies, including numerous divisions and 

regions of EPA, and 5 departments within the State government of Louisiana. Legislation covering dispersants has now been introduced in the Senate and passed in 

the House. The House-passed language institutes a 2-year moratorium on 

dispersants and requires full public disclosure of ingredients. This would greatly 

limit our ability to respond to any potential future spills and could drastically diminish our domestic manufacture and supply of dispersants in the future. 

Clearly there are uncertainties due to the volume and method of use of 

dispersants in this current response effort. But we must be measured in how we 

address these uncertainties because we could ultimately do more harm than good. 

I applaud Senator Lautenberg’s efforts in drafting a more reasoned alternative to 

the House bill. At this point, based on the extensive Federal research on dispersants 

initiated after the BP spill, I’m not sure if Senator Lautenberg’s legislation is needed. I also have some additional concerns with aspects of the bill but will continue 

to study this issue, and I commit today to work with Senator Lautenberg on bipartisan legislation if there’s a need for it. 

Thank you. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF RHODE ISLAND 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Chairman Boxer, Ranking Member Inhofe, 

thank you for holding this joint hearing. 

When the Deepwater Horizon oil rig exploded, it took 11 lives 

and triggered a chain of events that have led to what may be the 

largest and most destructive environmental disaster in our history. 

Thankfully, after 3 long months of oil continuously geysering from 

the depths of the Gulf, a temporary cap stemmed the flow, and it 

appears that the well is now on its way to being killed. 

But we are by no means through this disaster. At the surface, 

oil continues to lap at the shores of the Gulf. Oil continues to travel 

with the current to convergence zones in the Gulf, where it concentrates in areas scientists refer to as Sargasso seaweed beds, 

areas where sea life is most abundant. It continues to coat and kill 

diving birds and marine mammals. 

In something of a grand experiment, 1.8 million gallons of dispersant was used to break up the oil into smaller particles to increase the surface area of the oil and facilitate the natural degradation and digestion of the oil. Approximately 40 percent was applied in a totally unprecedented manner: at depth, 1 mile below the 

surface of the Gulf water, at the wellhead. This was done so that 

the oil would never reach the surface, or if it did, it would do so 

in a dispersed and less visible form. 

The subsurface application of dispersants is why we are seeing 

less oil on the surface of the Gulf than we expected. However, it 

is unclear if this will limit the damage from the spill or cause even 

greater harm. We are now seeing large quantities of oil present in 

the water column, and it could already be starting to settle onto 

the sea floor. We don’t know yet what effect this could have on the 

Gulf ecosystem from the plankton that form the base of the food 
5 

chain on up to the apex species, including the bluefin tuna and the 

sperm whale. 

Two types of chemical dispersant have been used in response to 

this spill. One dispersant, Corexit 9527, was identified as highly 

toxic about 1 month into its use. When EPA asked BP to identify 

less toxic alternatives, BP responded that these were the most effective dispersants available and that very little was known about 

the relative toxicity of alternatives. 

EPA then took on the task to analyze the available alternatives. 

That analysis was completed yesterday, 3 months after the spill 

began. While this was a necessary undertaking, it is regrettable 

that this analysis was not available before the spill began. We still 

know very little about the long-term ecological impact of using so 

much dispersant on top of so much oil. Whether to use dispersants, 

which dispersants to use, when to use them, these are all difficult 

decisions, and more difficult when made on the fly and without 

prior review from agencies responsible for protecting our health 

and natural resources. 

I look forward to hearing the testimony of NOAA and EPA and 

of the scientists and policymakers on our second panel. In particular, I want to thank and welcome Dr. David Smith from the 

Graduate School of Oceanography of the University of Rhode Island, for being here. My wife is a graduate of the Graduate School 

of Oceanography. I can remember lugging buckets of saltwater 

around those labs as a young man, helping her with her experiments. 

Senator CARPER. Was that part of the courtship? 

[Laughter.] 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. The key part, actually, was the winter diving. I wasn’t as up for that as you might expect. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. But I did it. When that wetsuit first fills, 

it is mighty chilly in February on Narragansett Bay. It is remarkable what one will do for love. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Anyway, I look forward to a frank discussion about the consequences of dispersant use and how to improve 

the dispersant approval regime. We owe this to the communities 

along the Gulf Coast, but we also owe it to all Americans to assure 

them that we are prepared the next time such a disaster strikes. 

And again, I thank my colleagues on the Committee and the Subcommittee. 

Senator Carper. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. CARPER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE 

Senator CARPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My thanks to both 

you and Senator Boxer for holding the hearing. I want to thank our 

witnesses for coming today and for your testimony and your responses to our questions. 

I have mentioned before, we try to start all these hearings on 

this subject just by again expressing our heartfelt sorrow to those 

who have lost loved ones and families that are suffering from the 

loss of their loved ones in this terrible accident and also to just say 
6 

that our hearts are filled for those who live in the Gulf, who work 

in the Gulf and whose livelihoods, whose lives have been in many 

cases disrupted or turned on their heads. 

With that having been said, I come from a coastal State, a little 

coastal State in the mid-Atlantic. I think I understand many be 

better than some folks who live in the middle part of this country 

what the importance is for shorelines to our economy, not just to 

Delaware’s economy, but to our Nation’s economy. 

Our oceans, whether the Atlantic or the Pacific or others, our 

oceans and our shores give life to many industries, to tourism, to 

recreation and the fishing industry, transportation, construction, 

research, education, real estate, many, many more. So we all have 

to work together to make sure that the laws and regulations we 

have in place protect these critical industries and our lives from 

harm in a fair and a real way. 

One of the lessons that I have learned as a Chair of the Subcommittee on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety, where we oversee the 

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, is the importance of effective regulatory oversight to ensure that we avoid future accidents in the 

first place. And through strong oversight and research I hope we 

can develop greener, more effective response measures going forward. 

With the unprecedented amount of oil that has leaked and the 

unprecedented efforts to clean up the oil, safeguarding public 

health and the health of our ecosystem is a very real concern. Despite the best efforts of our Nation’s best environmental scientists, 

some of whom are here today, to help us understand the environmental impacts of this spill. The reality is that we do not know and 

we may not know for some time the long-term effects of this disaster. 

Specifically, I look forward today to hearing more from our witnesses about the EPA’s efforts to oversee the deployment of chemical dispersants currently being used to clean up oil in the Gulf. On 

the one hand, our understanding is that the impact of oil on our 

shores would have been much greater without the dispersants. On 

the other hand, much is still unknown about the impacts of these 

dispersants over the long-term health of our marine environment. 

I want to hear from our talented and distinguished scientists we 

have assembled today what their best understanding is of the impact that those underwater dispersants are having on marine life 

as well as their potential impact on human health. While I firmly 

believe that we must use all resources at our disposal to mitigate 

the efforts of this disaster, I feel strongly that we must do so prudently and with the best information that is at our disposal. 

Today I hope we will discuss what steps the Federal Government 

can take to minimize the damage of the spill, to avoid an accident 

like this from occurring again in the first place through effective 

regulatory oversight, and to ensure the safe and effective use and 

advancement of tools that are at our disposal, or that will come to 

be at our disposal in the future as we seek to clean up this spill 

and any that may occur in the future. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Carper follows:] 
7 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS R. CARPER, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF DELAWARE

I want to thank the Chairman for holding this hearing today and thank the witnesses for participating. 

As I have mentioned before, our hearts go out to the folks impacted by this terrible accident—to the families of the 11 workers that died and those that were injured. 

And our hearts also go out to the thousands of workers, individuals, and families 

in the Gulf of Mexico who depend on the Gulf’s waters and shores for their economic 

livelihood. 

As a member from a coastal State, I understand well the importance of our shorelines to our local and national economies. 

Our oceans and shores give life to many industries: tourism and recreation, the 

fishing industry, transportation, construction, research and education, real estate, 

and many more. 

And so we must work to make sure that the laws and regulations that we have 

in place protect these critical industries from harm in a fair and real way. 

One of the lessons that I have learned as Chairman of the Subcommittee on Clean 

Air and Nuclear Safety, where I oversee the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, is the 

importance of effective regulatory oversight to ensure that we avoid future accidents 

in the first place. 

Through strong oversight and research I hope we can develop greener, more effective response measures going forward. 

With the unprecedented amounts of oil leaked and the unprecedented efforts used 

to clean up the oil, safeguarding public health and the health of our ecosystems is 

a very real concern. 

Despite the best efforts of our Nation’s best environmental scientists—some of 

whom are here today—to help us understand the environmental impacts of this 

spill, the reality is that we do not know—and we may not know for years to come— 

the long-term effects of this disaster. 

Specifically, I look forward today to hearing more about the EPA’s efforts to oversee the deployment of chemical dispersants currently being used to clean up the oil 

in the Gulf. 

On one hand, my understanding is that the impact of oil on our shores would 

have been much greater without dispersants. On the other hand, much is still unknown about the impacts of these dispersants over the long-term. 

I want to hear from the talented and distinguished scientists we have assembled 

what their best understanding is of the impact that these underwater dispersants 

are having on our marine life, as well as their potential impact on human health. 

While I firmly believe that we must use all the resources at our disposal to mitigate the effects of this disaster, I feel strongly that we must do so prudently and 

with the best information at our disposal. 

Today, I hope we will discuss what steps the Federal Government can take to 

minimize the damage of this spill, to prevent an accident from occurring again in 

the first place through effective regulatory oversight, and to ensure the safe and effective use and advancement of tools at our disposal to clean up the oil. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Senator Barrasso, my Ranking Member on 

the Subcommittee. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN BARRASSO, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF WYOMING. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I 

thank our guests for being here today. 

The ecological fallout of the oil spill in the Gulf is not yet fully 

understood. There was a front page story in the New York Times 

today above the fold, U.S. Report, says the oil that remains is scant 

new risk, concern still exists, 26 percent of spill is left but is seen 

as diluted and breaking down. So we still don’t fully understand 

the fallout of the oil spill in the Gulf. 

Clearly, we do need to thank those who responded for their hard 

work in the Gulf. The responders in the Gulf were faced with a 

choice. On the one hand, they could allow millions of gallons of oil 
8 

to pollute the beaches and the marshes and the wetlands. This 

would include the potential devastation of the wildlife in the area. 

It would also include hurting jobs in the fishing and tourism industry and in the towns that depend on those same industries to provide a tax base from which to pay for schools and for emergency 

services. 

On the other hand, the responders could choose to use approved 

chemical dispersants to break down the oil so bacteria could deal 

with the problem and prevent some of those tragic consequences 

from occurring. The amount of dispersant they would need to use 

would be unprecedented. But the dispersant at their disposal had 

been approved by the Clinton administration’s Environmental Protection Agency in 1994. Responders knew the use of dispersants to 

address massive oil spills is a well-documented practice. So responders chose the latter. And I think they made the right choice. 

But don’t take my word for it. In terms of the choice between 

using dispersants and allowing oil to devastate the Gulf’s economy, 

beaches, and habitat, White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs 

said, ‘‘I think far and away the most harmful substance that is 

being emitted into the environment in the Gulf is the oil.’’ EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson agreed when she said, ‘‘This spill is an 

emergency in every sense of the word, and dispersants are one tool 

in the situation that could not be more urgent.’’ 

The Wall Street Journal on August 2nd also quoted an EPA 

statement that said that the Agency ‘‘believes dispersant use has 

been an essential tool in mitigating the spill’s impact.’’ And even 

Admiral Thad Allen of the U.S. Coast Guard called this a legitimate alternative. He says that a legitimate alternative to the dispersant has not surfaced yet. 

So I would suggest that those who criticize the use of dispersants 

are the same people who cannot offer one alternative to the use of 

dispersants in this situation. They leave responders with a Catch– 

22: either you are blamed for dumping chemicals in the Gulf or you 

allow the oil to devastate the Gulf. Some who criticize the use of 

dispersants want to over-regulate the use of them. There is no 

proven need for such an action at this time. In fact, the sponsors 

of such legislation have language included in their bill that has the 

EPA do ‘‘an assessment of the adequacy of existing Federal laws.’’ 

If there are truly lessons to be learned from the response to this 

spill, let’s learn them. However, legislating new dispersant regulations before we even know how existing law is working does not 

make sense to me. It would only serve to create more regulations 

and slow the response to any future spills. 

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and look forward to hearing the testimony. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Senator Lautenberg. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY 

Senator LAUTENBERG. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

I first want to say thank you to Senator Inhofe, for his willingness to examine the possibilities of the dangers and risks associated with the dispersants and see what we ought to do about it. 
9 

Added to the woes and the horror of the largest accidental oil 

spill in the history of the world, oil pouring into the Gulf of Mexico, 

BP rushed in to apply chemical dispersants in order to break the 

oil slicks into small droplets. To date, BP has applied almost 2 million gallons of chemical dispersants to deal with the Deepwater disaster. Never before have we seen dispersants used on this scale. 

It is no wonder that EPA issued a directive on May 19th for BP 

to find less toxic alternatives to the oil company’s choice of 

dispersants. However, BP said there wasn’t enough long-term testing data available on dispersants to know which ones were safer 

to use. So they kept using the same dispersants. 

The truth is, with only minimal toxicity data available, and no 

requirements for full disclosure of ingredients, the damage these 

dispersants could cause to the environment, marine life, and potentially people, remains a mystery. That is why last week I introduced the Safe Dispersant Act. This common sense bill requires 

long-term testing of dispersants, which is critical to understanding 

the full range of their health effects. 

If a dispersant cannot meet minimum toxicity standards, then 

the dispersant should not be used on an oil spill. My bill also protects the public’s right to know by requiring the disclosure of all 

ingredients that make up a dispersant. 

The bill is endorsed by over 30 health and environmental groups, 

including the Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Oceana, to name a few. I ask unanimous consent that their letter of support be inserted into the record. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Without objection, so ordered. 

[The referenced material was not received at time of print.] 

Senator LAUTENBERG. EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson has also 

stated that the law needs to be changed to provide more information on the safety of dispersants. Almost everyone agrees that current law is inadequate; that is everyone except Rush Limbaugh. 

Earlier this week we heard him say that Mother Nature can handle the dispersants. It is callous, irresponsible, and I doubt that 

families in the area are willing to wait and see to find out whether 

or not there is any risk in the distribution of these dispersants. 

The fact is relief workers and wildlife in the Gulf have become 

unwitting participants in a dangerous science experiment. There 

are enough warning signs about the risks of the dispersants to 

know that we need more thorough testing. For example, my State, 

the State of New Jersey, and by the way, I note that here I sit with 

two colleagues to the right of me and that we are the largest State. 

It is a very comforting feeling. 

We have to do more thorough testing. In my State, New Jersey, 

classifies one of the chemicals used in Gulf dispersants as a serious 

health hazard because of its potential to cause cancer, liver and 

kidney damage, and reproductive problems. So Mr. Chairman, I 

hope we can move quickly. This was an excellent idea by the Chairman of the full Committee and yourself to get moving on this. I 

hope we can move quickly enough to require better testing and 

shine some light on these dispersants once and for all and lift the 

veil of mystery that surround it. 

Thank you. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Senator Lautenberg. 
10 

Our first witness is Dr. Paul Anastas. He is the Director of the 

Office of Research and Development at the United States Environmental Protection Agency. He has extensive previous experience, 

including a role in the White House at the Office of Science and 

Technology Policy as the Assistant Director for the Environment 

from 1999 to 2004. 

We welcome here, and look forward to your testimony, Dr. 

Anastas. 

STATEMENT OF PAUL ANASTAS, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, 

OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 

Mr. ANASTAS. Thank you very much, Chairman Boxer, Ranking 

Member Inhofe, Senator Whitehouse, members of the Committee. 

Thank you for having me here to testify about dispersants and 

their use in the BP Deepwater Horizon crisis. 

We have now passed day 100 of the BP oil spill tragedy, a tragedy that resulted in loss of life, livelihood, and put our most precious ecosystems in peril. We are relieved that the well is currently 

sealed and that dispersant use has been reduced to zero. We hope 

and expect this will continue to be the case. 

However, the tragedy does not end with the sealing of the well. 

The President and the EPA are committed to the long-term recovery and restoration of the Gulf Coast, one of our most precious ecosystems. 

In addition to its other responsibilities with spill response, EPA 

continues to rigorously monitor air, water, and sediments for the 

presence of dispersants and crude oil components that could have 

an impact on health or the environment. This data is posted on 

EPA’s Web site and is publicly available. 

EPA has a role with the use of dispersants, which are chemicals 

that are applied to the oil to break it down into small droplets. The 

dispersed oil mixes into the water column and is rapidly diluted 

and degraded by bacteria and other microscopic organisms. 

Specifically, EPA is responsible for managing the product schedule of dispersants available for use in oil spill response. When considering dispersant use, we are faced with environmental tradeoffs. The long-term effects on aquatic life are still significantly unknown. And BP has used over 1.8 million gallons of dispersant, a 

volume never before used in the United States. 

But what we do know right now is this. We aren’t seeing 

dispersants in our monitoring results. There have been thousands 

of samples, both near shore and offshore. And we are not seeing 

the dispersants away from the wellhead. Thus far both monitoring 

data and modeling data shows that the dispersants are not persistent in the environment. Dispersants are not depleting oxygen in 

the water to dangerous levels. 

Now, given the unprecedented nature of the spill, the EPA directed BP to identify less toxic alternative dispersants. When the 

company failed to provide this information, EPA decided to conduct 

this testing independently, in a rigorous, peer-reviewed manner. 

Specifically, EPA conducted acute toxicity tests to determine lethal 

concentrations of eight available dispersants. First, we tested each 

of the eight dispersants alone. Then we tested the Louisiana sweet 
11 

crude oil alone. Finally, we tested the mixture of the oil and the 

dispersants. 

Each standard test screened a species known as mysid shrimp 

and silverside fish to determine the relative hazard of each of these 

dispersants. These two species are widely considered to be representative of those found in the Gulf and were tested during the 

juvenile life stage when organisms are sensitive to pollutant stress. 

The tests were conducted over a range of concentrations, including those much greater than what aquatic life is generally expected 

to encounter in the Gulf. EPA’s testing delivered three important 

results. One, all of the dispersants were tested alone, can be categorized as slightly toxic to practically non-toxic. Two, the oil alone 

was generally moderately toxic. Three, mixtures of oil in each of 

the eight dispersants were no more toxic than the oil alone. 

All of these results indicate that the eight dispersants tested possess roughly similar acute toxicities. 

While these data are important, I want to emphasize that continued monitoring is absolutely necessary. EPA has directed BP to 

monitor for indicators of environmental stress like decreased dissolved oxygen levels and increased toxicity to small organisms 

called rotifers. To date, we have not seen dissolved oxygen levels 

approach levels of concern to aquatic life. We have also seen no excessive mortality in rotifers. 

While more work needs to be done, we see that the dispersants 

are working to help keep the oil off our precious shoreline and 

away from sensitive coastal ecosystems. To date, EPA monitoring 

has not found dispersant chemicals in water or sediment near the 

coasts or wetlands. 

The crisis has made it evident that additional research is needed. 

Congress has recently appropriated EPA $2 million to begin longterm study on the impacts of dispersants. These funds will support 

research on the short- and long-term environmental and human 

health impacts associated with the oil spill and dispersant use. 

We will also further our research efforts to include innovative approaches to spill remediation and to address the mechanisms of environmental fate, effects, and transport of dispersants. 

EPA will continue to take a science-based approach to dispersant 

use. We will continue monitoring, identifying and responding to 

public health and environmental concerns, including waste management and beach clean up and coordination with our Federal, 

State and local partners. EPA is committed to protecting the Gulf 

Coast communities from adverse environmental effects of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 

In conclusion, we will persist in asking the hard questions until 

we more fully understand the long-term effects of the BP oil spill 

and conduct investigations required to enable the Gulf’s long-term 

recovery. EPA is fully committed to working with the people of the 

Gulf Coast, our Federal partners, the scientific community, and 

NGOs toward the recovery of the Gulf of Mexico and the restoration of that precious ecosystem. 

At this time, I will welcome any questions you may have. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Anastas follows:] 
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Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Doctor. 

We will hear now from Mr. David Westerholm, who is the Director of the Office of Response and Restoration at the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. After a brief hiatus in the 

private sector, he came to that position from a 27-year career in 

the Coast Guard. We welcome his testimony. 

Mr. Westerholm. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID WESTERHOLM, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF 

RESPONSE AND RESTORATION, NATIONAL OCEAN SERVICE, 

NATIONAL OCEANIC AND ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRATION, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. Good morning, Chairman Whitehouse, Chairwoman Boxer, and members of the Committee and Subcommittee. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify on the National Oceanic 

and Atmospheric Administration’s role in the Deepwater Horizon 

BP oil spill response and the use of dispersants. 

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the critical roles NOAA 

serves during oil spills and the importance of our contributions to 

protect and restore natural resources, communities, and economies 

affected by this tragic event. 

The Deepwater Horizon spill is a stark reminder that large oil 

spills still occur and that we must rebuild and maintain our response capacity. When an oil spill does occur, there are no good 

outcomes. Once oil has spilled, responders and a variety of spill 

countermeasures are used to reduce the adverse effects of the 

spilled oil on the environment. The goal of the Unified Command 

is to minimize that environmental damage and speed recovery of 

injured resources. 

Under the Clean Water Act the EPA is required to prepare and 

maintain a schedule of dispersants and other mitigating devices 

and substances that may be used to carry out the National Contingency Plan. This plan requires a Regional Response Team, in 

which NOAA and the States participate, to plan the use for or nonuse of dispersants in advance of spills to ensure that the trade-off 

decisions between water column and surface and shoreline impacts 

are deliberated. 

Additionally, NOAA’s scientific support team is designated as a 

special team under this plan and provides a broad array of scientific services to the response, including recommendations to the 

Federal on-scene coordinator on the appropriate use of dispersants. 

NOAA is also a member of the Special Monitoring of Applied Response Technology programs, known as SMART, which is an interagency cooperatively designed program to monitor the efficacy of 

dispersants in situ burning operations. 

For the Deepwater Horizon spill the Unified Command’s response posture has been to fight the spill offshore and reduce the 

amount of oil that comes ashore, using a variety of countermeasures, including subsurface recovery, booming, skimming, 

burning, and dispersants. No single response is 100 percent effective, and each has its own window of opportunity, defined by the 

state of oil and weather and sea state, thereby establishing a need 

to consider the use of all available methods. Chemical dispersants 

can be an effective tool in the response strategy, but like all meth-
30 

ods, involve trade-offs in terms of effectiveness and potential for 

collateral impacts. 

Consideration of what we have learned from both research and 

real world experience has factored into the decisionmaking on the 

use of dispersants for the spill. Research on the effectiveness and 

effects of dispersants and dispersed oil has been underway for more 

than three decades, but vital gaps still exist. 

For example, while numerous studies have been conducted on 

the fate and transport of oil dispersed on the surface, areas such 

as the rate of biodegradation and dispersed oil modeling in deeper 

waters are much less understood. One area of focus has been on 

determining toxicity and long-term effects of dispersants and dispersed oil on sensitive marine life. We also know that effectively 

dispersed oil will decline more rapidly in concentration than untreated surface or shoreline oil due to ocean mixing and biodegradation. 

The effects of the dispersed oil on marine life depend on concentration and duration of exposure of organisms to the dispersed 

oil. At the sea surface, early life stages of fish and shellfish are 

much more sensitive than juveniles or adults to dispersants and 

dispersed oil. This increased sensitivity, coupled with the fact that 

these organisms reside just below the surface of the ocean where 

the concentrations of dispersed oil are initially the greatest, means 

that these organisms are most likely to be impacted. 

There are no data on the toxicity of dispersed oil to deep sea 

biota any life stage. So we have to make inferences based on the 

existing body of research. However, at both the surface and the 

subsurface, modeling and monitoring are confirming that dispersed 

oil concentrations decline rapidly with distance from the wellhead 

as the oil mixes with seawater and moves with the currents away 

from the treatment areas. 

NOAA has been conducting chemical analysis of seafood collected 

in the aftermath of the Deepwater Horizon incident. Seafood samples consisting of fin fish, shrimp, and oysters are analyzed for 

polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons, or PAHs, to determine the uptake of these PAHs present in oil by marine species. To date, none 

of the seafood samples analyzed have PAH concentrations that exceed NOAA and FDA guidelines, ensuring seafood reaching the 

marketplace is safe to eat. 

To conclude, as the response to this oil spill continues, the Unified Command will continually reevaluate our response strategies, 

action, and planning. NOAA will continue to provide scientific support to Unified Command and work with our co-trustees on the 

natural resource damage assessment. 

I would like to assure you that we will not relent in our efforts 

to protect the livelihoods of Gulf Coast residents and mitigate the 

environmental impacts of this spill. Thank you for allowing me to 

testify on NOAA’s response. I am happy to answer any questions 

that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Westerholm follows:] 
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Senator WHITEHOUSE. Chairman Boxer. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Thank you both. I agree with Senator Barrasso’s comments that 

there were tough choices to be made as to how you deal with this. 

And you had to look at everything that was available. 

I do, however, have some questions about the dispersants themselves. And I guess I am going to ask the EPA to comment, and 

then of course if NOAA has a comment as well. 

My understanding is that Corexit 9527 was the first dispersant 

that was used. Is that correct? 

Mr. ANASTAS. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator BOXER. Then after 30 days they switched to Corexit 

9500? 

Mr. ANASTAS. That is correct. 

Senator BOXER. And I have here the company’s data sheet on 

these two choices here. And the first one, the hazardous ingredient—and I may not say it right, I will try, butoxyethanol. That 

was the first one. And my understanding is that it is a known hazardous substance that causes liver and kidney damage and internal 

bleeding, is that correct, if there is over-exposure? 

Mr. ANASTAS. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. Then the switch was made to Corexit 9500, and 

the active ingredient then was light petroleum distillates, basically 

kerosene. Is that correct? 

Mr. ANASTAS. That is not an active ingredient. It is a solvent in 

the formulation. 

Senator BOXER. But is that the main part of it, the kerosene? 

Mr. ANASTAS. The petroleum distillates is a fraction of oil, like 

kerosene, it is not an active ingredient, it is the solvent. 

Senator. OK. Well, are you aware that on their own sheets, they 

describe their own product, human health hazard, they define it as 

acute in each case. Are you aware of that? 

Mr. ANASTAS. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. And were you on the ground, was BP or the 

Coast Guard, who was in charge as far as you know, letting people 

know about the warnings that are on these substances? 

Mr. ANASTAS. On the ground, I believe that there was, all of the 

available information was being shared, to the best of my knowledge. 

Senator BOXER. To whom? 

Mr. ANASTAS. To the people on the ground. 

Senator BOXER. OK. Because it is important to note that in the 

case of Corexit 9527A, it said, repeated or excessive exposure may 

cause injury to red blood cells, kidney, or the liver. Do not get in 

eyes, on skin, on clothing. Do not take internally. Use with adequate ventilation. Wear suitable protective clothing. Flesh-affected 

areas, keep away from heat, keep away from sources of ignition. 

And the other, it says, keep container tightly closed, do not get 

on eyes, skin, or clothing. Avoid breathing the vapor. Use with adequate ventilation. In case of contact with eyes, rinse immediately, 

seek medical advice. After contact with skin, wash immediately. 

I make these points because the companies themselves have indicated there is an acute risk to human health. And so I want to 
51 

make sure that we were letting people know. But to your knowledge, people were made known? 

Mr. ANASTAS. Yes. And also that OSHA was aware of these 

issues, and addressed them. 

Senator BOXER. OK. My understanding is that there are some 

communities involved here that are suing Corexit, because of—do 

you have that paper, because I don’t have it in front of me now. 

I will come back to that—here it is. Sorry. A personal injury lawsuit involving the chemical dispersant Corexit 9500 was filed in 

Alabama, where two Gulf Coast residents of Alabama and property 

owners allege that BP’s use of the product is causing people to get 

sick. 

Do you know, do either of you know, that people in Alabama 

have claimed that they have gotten ill and what those symptoms 

could be? 

Mr. ANASTAS. I will just say that I have seen those reports reported in the media, yes. 

Senator BOXER. But have you—do you know any more about 

that, what these symptoms are? 

Mr. ANASTAS. I have seen reported that people are reporting 

rashes. That people are reporting rashes and redness. People are 

reporting those effects. 

Senator BOXER. And in Alabama and Louisiana and different 

places? 

Mr. ANASTAS. Yes. 

Senator BOXER. How many people do you think have—— 

Mr. ANASTAS. I do not have any numbers. 

Senator BOXER. Anything, do you know? 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. No, I don’t know. 

Senator BOXER. Then, a group of Louisiana oystermen are claiming that Corexit 9500 is four times more toxic than the oil itself. 

Do either of you believe that statement is true? 

Mr. ANASTAS. I have no data to support that statement. 

Senator BOXER. Do you know whether Corexit 9500 is more toxic 

than the oil itself? 

Mr. ANASTAS. I have data that I actually just reported that 

shows that the Corexit and the tests that we ran, on aquatic species, is less toxic than the oil itself. 

Senator BOXER. OK, so you disagree with them. Did you test it 

at different levels? What level did you test it at? 

Mr. ANASTAS. Yes, this went across a wide range of concentrations, many different levels, all the way from parts per billion—— 

Senator BOXER. What was the lowest concentration that you tested it at? 

Mr. ANASTAS. Parts per billion. 

Senator BOXER. Did you consistently test at parts per billion? 

Mr. ANASTAS. So, what we did is we tested at parts per billion, 

and then you keep on increasing the concentration until you see a 

toxic effect. The way that these tests were run is that you continue 

to increase the concentration until your test species show a toxic 

effect. 

Senator BOXER. OK. I am going to place in the record a document 

from the Department of Health and Hospitals of Louisiana which 

says in summary, in Louisiana there have been 334 reports. This 
52 

is between, this is week 30 of the spill, ending July 31, 2010. There 

have been 334 reports of health complaints believed to be related 

to exposure to pollutants from the oil spill. Two hundred and fifty 

reports came from workers and 84 from the general population. 

Most frequent reports include headache, dizziness, nausea, vomiting, weakness, fatigue, upper respiratory irritation. Seventeen 

workers have had short hospitalizations. The general population 

complaints were related to odors. 

[The referenced material was not received at time of print.] 

Senator BOXER. I am concerned about the workers who got close 

to it. But you are saying that because, if you read these reports, 

I would also put in the record the reports from NALCO, the company itself. 

[The referenced material was not received at time of print.] 

Senator BOXER. You are saying that to your knowledge, the 

workers were warned; they had to wear protective gear, and they 

knew about this. 

Mr. ANASTAS. I am saying that I know that OSHA was actively 

involved in informing workers. 

Senator BOXER. Well, that is important. 

Last question, and then I will stop. In the Exxon Valdez case, in 

the impact on the fisheries, which Senator Barrasso was so right, 

we have to protect the jobs that are related to fishing, recreation, 

tourism, it took a long time to learn that some of the fisheries, especially the herring population, was just decimated. People lost everything. Because Exxon sued for 20 years, and at the end of the 

day the average recovery for these people was just minuscule. 

So it took very long to find out the impact on the fisheries. Do 

we know—I would ask NOAA whether we know today that the 

fisheries are going to be fine, or do you think it is going to take 

time to know how much time, and are you continuing to monitor 

the various fisheries there? 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. Senator, let me start with the last question, 

which was, are we monitoring, and the answer is yes. Then you 

asked how much time. I don’t think I would be able to speculate 

at this time how much time it is going to take us to actually do 

all the testing necessary to see how fast those fisheries recovered. 

But certainly there was baseline data that was taken to compare 

it against, which was pre-spill or outside of the spill zone. We have 

historic data. And so what we are going to be looking at is a number of species and the impact on that, and the fishermen over the 

course of the next years. 

Senator BOXER. And what is your monitoring showing at this 

stage? Is anything showing up? Do you feel good about what you 

see? 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. As you may be aware, at this point we still 

have a lot of the area of the Gulf, at least in Federal waters, that 

are closed to fishing. So some of the samples are just being collected now to see if it is safe to reopen those areas. So I think it 

is premature, again, to show if there was an impact of oil or dispersant on it. 

Senator BOXER. When do you think you will be able to make your 

first judgment on the state of the fishing industry? 
53 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. In those first, we have opened one area. Over 

the next month or so we will be able to get information on that. 

Senator BOXER. Good. And will you send us these monitoring results? 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. Yes. In fact, they are being posted as we get 

them on our Web site and on geoplatform.gov. 

Senator BOXER. Thank you. 

Senator Barrasso. 

Senator BARRASSO. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

If I could start with the EPA. 

Do you believe that the EPA has all the necessary ability right 

now to test, to research, and to understand and mitigate any negative impacts from the use of dispersants in the Gulf without additional legislation from Congress? 

Mr. ANASTAS. I think the Administrator has made it clear and 

stated publicly that when we look at the lessons learned that we 

do need to look back at how the National Contingency Plan brings 

us in the data that we need, the information that we need in order 

to make sound decisions going forward. I do believe that that is 

something that the Administrator has said on the record, and I 

agree with that. 

Senator BARRASSO. You had a statement August 2nd, during 

your phase two testing of the dispersants, and you said the 

dispersants are working to keep oil away from the shore. You said 

dissolved oxygen levels have not fallen below levels of concern to 

aquatic life. You said dispersant plus oil mixtures have roughly the 

same toxicity as the oil itself, and that dispersants are less toxic 

than the oil being released into the Gulf. 

Would you go further to say that the use of the dispersants has 

been effective in terms of combating this oil spill and that it was 

the right call at the time, to the extent of the spill, to use the 

dispersants? 

Mr. ANASTAS. The decision to use dispersants was a decision not 

taken lightly. Any time you are faced with adding substances into 

an ecosystem like the Gulf of Mexico, that is something that needs 

to be done thoughtfully, and that is why the constant monitoring 

was put in place, and the thoughtfulness was put in place. 

That said, when you look at all of the tools to combat this tragedy, the skimming, the burning, the oil recovery, the containment, 

dispersants have shown to be one important tool in that tool box 

in the response. 

Senator BARRASSO. I want to just read a quote if I could from 

EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson, and then at the end ask whether 

you agree with it. She said ‘‘Science tells us that dispersants can 

help protect these invaluable resources by breaking up the oil and 

speeding its natural degradation offshore.’’ She said ‘‘We also know 

that dispersants, which are less toxic than oil, break down over a 

period of weeks rather than remaining for several years, as untreated oil might.’’ 

Do you agree with her comments and statement? 

Mr. ANASTAS. I agree with the statement of the Administrator. 

Senator BARRASSO. Great. 

If I could go to NOAA, you said in your testimony that the response to date has been successful in limiting the shoreline im-
54 

pacts. You also said that no response method is 100 percent effective. So given the statements about the shoreline impacts, are the 

critics of the responders who use dispersants trying to make the 

perfect the enemy of the good here? 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. That is a great question. I think I like to use 

the analogy of—and we talked about lesser of two evils. I don’t 

know that I especially like that quote. But I like to use the analogy 

of maybe a medical doctor making a diagnosis on a particular disease, possibly cancer, where you have a lot of options, radiation, 

cut it out, chemotherapy. Over the years we have learned more and 

more and are able to apply better science to it. But at that moment 

in time you have to make the decision. You make that decision 

based on any number of options you have and tools that you have 

to combat it. 

So I would say that the decision, as Dr. Anastas pointed out, is 

not taken lightly, and that the Unified Command made that decision with a lot of factors in mind, which included the economic and 

ecological impacts that could have occurred or would likely occur 

without the use of dispersants, some of which were unprecedented 

in terms of deep, sub-sea, deepwater injection of dispersants. 

But I think in the aftermath of that, it would be difficult for me 

up here to second guess the decision process that was going on 

down there when given all the information that they had. So to answer your question, I believe that the application of dispersants, 

based on what we know about the other methodologies, did prohibit 

some of the oil from getting to the shoreline. The actual long-term 

impact and all that still needs to be studied, and in the future additional research will help us make those better decisions. 

Senator BARRASSO. Great, thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It looks like my time is expired. 

Thank you. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Senator Barrasso. 

I hope that witnesses and the audience will forgive the constant 

bustle in and out of the Committee. We have two votes happening 

back to back on the floor. So I just rushed over to vote on the first 

one, and that will continue, and I will have to rush over and vote 

again, and people are going over to make their votes. Because there 

are two of them, there is going to be a lot of back and forth. 

So just by way of explaining, it is nothing you are saying that 

is causing us to jump up and rush out. 

I went down to visit the Gulf and the Coast Guard folks who took 

us around talked a lot about how the use of Corexit as a dispersant, they used the word approved over and over, it was sort of part 

of the mantra, it is an approved dispersant. 

And I have a question about the way that the dispersants get deployed and how that approval process works. Because it doesn’t 

seem to me, at least I can’t see a point at which one agency actually takes a look at a dispersant and gives it its blessing and says, 

OK, this is actually approved. There is kind of approval creep, and 

eventually people say it is approved. But I don’t know at what 

point anything actually gets done to make it approved. 

Here is what I understand the process is, and correct me if I am 

wrong. Under the National Contingency Plan, there is a product 

schedule of dispersants that can be used. EPA maintains that prod-
55 

uct schedule, correct? In order to get a dispersant onto that product 

schedule, the manufacturer nominates it onto the list, correct? 

Mr. ANASTAS. Correct. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And the test that is done is a test of effectiveness, that it has to be more than 45 percent effective, however 

that is measured, at dispersing oil, is that correct? 

Mr. ANASTAS. Correct. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. But there is no testing of any kind that is 

done about its toxicity or its health effects at that time by EPA? 

Mr. ANASTAS. The data that is submitted to EPA includes acute 

aquatic toxicity data. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. But there is nothing done by EPA. It is 

part of the filing by the company to put some toxic quality information in the filing. But EPA doesn’t do any evaluation or assessment. It could be as toxic as all get-out, and it still goes on the list 

as long as it meets the 45 percent effectiveness threshold. 

Mr. ANASTAS. It is part of the filing. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. It is a notice filing, basically at that point, 

not an approval at that point. 

Mr. ANASTAS. That is correct. It is part of the filing. I want to 

emphasize that while I am not an attorney, and I will be happy to 

get answers to any process questions to you, yes, it is part of the 

filing of the data that is submitted. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And that is why the National Contingency 

Plan explicitly states that having a product on the product schedule does not constitute approval by the EPA. 

Mr. ANASTAS. It is a listing on the NCP list. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Yes. Not an approval of any kind, because, 

except as to the question of effectiveness, the 45 percent threshold. 

Mr. ANASTAS. That is the threshold, correct. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Right. So then it is on the list, and now 

you have an incident, and now the Federal on-scene coordinator 

has the ability to take dispersants that are on the list and determine which is appropriate for us, and then apply those dispersants. 

Mr. ANASTAS. Correct. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. The Coast Guard folks were describing the 

list as being an approved list. And when I asked them, they said 

that they did not do any approval of the list. In fact, they took the 

entire list and said, everything on it is approved for use, as best 

I can tell. Is that correct? 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. Senator, I might make one point of clarification here. There is an interim step that was left out. Any type of 

alternative technology, which would include dispersants or in situ 

burning, would have to go through the Regional Response Team. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Go through the RRT process. 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. And in that process, both the Coast Guard 

and the EPA are co-chairs. They will submit that to other Federal 

agencies. But each of the States are also in the Regional Response 

Team. And the Federal trustees, NOAA and the Department of Interior. At that point, the Regional Response Team can do a pre-approval for use of dispersants in a certain location. Usually it is offshore. And they make that for expediting decisions. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And they did that in this case. 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. They did that in this case. 
56 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. They did that for the entire product schedule. 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. If they decide not to do that, then on a case 

by case basis the Federal on-scene coordinator, with the exception 

of certain emergencies which would include peril to human life, 

would have to go through that RRT process for that approval step. 

So in this case, it was approved, the use of dispersants. And that 

the FOSC had that pre-approval in place. And at that point the 

final decision would have to be made by the Coast Guard. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Here is my question about this. When the 

RRT process pre-approved the entire product schedule of all 

dispersants, obviously that accelerated everything that the Federal 

on-scene coordinator could then do, because they would not have to 

go back through that secondary process that you described of case 

by case approval, correct? 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. Right. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. But what a lay person would consider to 

be an approval, that this particular chemical is safe for use in 

these circumstances, never anywhere in this process that I can see 

actually gets done. There are three steps. The first step is the filing 

by the manufacturer that provides toxicity, some toxicity data. 

Then there is the selection by EPA which is based only on effectiveness. It has nothing to do with toxicity. 

Then you have the RRT pre-approval, so-called. But in that case, 

there was no examination done of which might be better or worse. 

They just took the entire list and said, you are all in. And so if you 

are looking at, for instance, Corexit 7526 or a specific product, it 

strikes me that to use the word approved about it may be technically true, because it technically was in the RRT pre-approval 

process. But what a regular human would think of as something 

having been approved never actually happened. Nobody ever actually looked at that and said, you know what, that is too toxic to 

use in these circumstances. Or is more or less toxic than the other. 

That is why after the fact you had to do the relative toxicity testing, after they had all been pre-approved, correct? 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. And I think that is a great point. I think one 

of the issues that the RRT does look at is the collective of all those 

dispersants, saying if you picked any one of those, would it be safe 

to use in this particular environment. That is what they approved. 

They didn’t pre-select any given dispersant. Once it made the list, 

they had to treat that list as a collective. And your point being, it 

may be appropriate to differentiate within that list. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. It may be appropriate to differentiate 

within that list, and it may be important to have somebody other 

than the manufacturer in a basically unreviewed disclosure of certain toxicity data come to a decision about the safety or not of the 

product. 

Let me put it this way. I can’t think of another circumstance in 

which a regulatory agency approved something for use without actually coming to a formal decision that it is safe to be used and 

without any process other than that the manufacturer provides 

some information that is then posted. There didn’t appear to be an 

evaluating moment. 
57 

Mr. ANASTAS. Senator, you are making an extremely important 

point. You are certainly correct that the National Contingency Plan 

outlines the listing criteria, what needs to be submitted in order to 

be on the list. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And particularly when you have what the 

Administrator referred to as a real emergency going on, the time 

at that point for the RRT process to go through a scientific evaluative process of determining what the toxicity consequences are off 

of the public data that has been filed is, you are under a lot of pressure at that point. It is a little hard to say, sorry, BP, sorry, Mr. 

President, we are not ready to authorize the use of dispersants 

here because we need to do a little bit more studying, because we 

haven’t done that yet. You kind of have to say, well, here is what 

we have; take your best shot. 

And it sounds like that is more or less what happened. Is that 

correct? 

Mr. ANASTAS. And I think your point speaks directly to the fact 

that we want to have more science, more data, more testing up 

front. So when we are making decisions in an emergency situation 

you have that data, you have that perspective at your fingertips. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. How are you going to build that in? What 

is going to happen to this process so that an evaluation moment 

by somebody in Government takes place before a chemical gets dispersed into the environment with the nominal word approved attached to it, which I think led a lot of people to believe this stuff 

is safer than it actually is? 

Mr. ANASTAS. Administrator Jackson has said publicly that we 

need to go back to look at how the NCP is currently structured, to 

look at how we get more science, how we get more data, how we 

get more information into this process, so that it is far more transparent, far more informative. I think we are looking forward to 

bringing those proposals and recommendations forward. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. So reforming that administrative process 

is something that is underway within EPA? 

Mr. ANASTAS. That is correct. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. OK. That is very good to hear. I appreciate that. 

The other issue that comes up that I think is sort of an obvious 

one, but also a related one, is that when you have a toxin in the 

environment there is the immediate or acute effect that it could 

have, and you are able to test for that because it is immediate and 

acute, and you have done so. But an equally common and dangerous way for a toxin to get vectored into humans is through bioaccumulation. And why don’t you just briefly describe what bioaccumulation is, and then I will go on with my question. 

Mr. ANASTAS. Certainly. Based on the properties that a chemical 

has, such as how soluble it is in water or how soluble it is in fat 

or tissues, a chemical has the potential to build up in the body, 

whether it is of wildlife or fish. A chemical that does that would 

be considered bioaccumulative. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And bioaccumulation can be a very powerful and concentrating force if the ultimate animal to which the 

human is exposed is at the top of the food chain, and it is eating 

animals that are in turn eating animals that are in turn eating 
58 

animals that are in turn eating animals that are becoming exposed 

to the chemical and taking up the chemical. And now you have 

very, very high levels of concentration at the apex, correct? 

Mr. ANASTAS. Substances that are bioaccumulative can, as you 

describe, go up the food chain. That is a process known as biomagnification. If a substance were bioaccumulative it could be magnified so that you would have higher concentrations at the top of 

the food chain. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Magnified by what order of magnitude? 

Mr. ANASTAS. Several orders of magnitude. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. In each layer? 

Mr. ANASTAS. Throughout the food chain. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Throughout the food chain. So it could be 

a thousand or ten thousand times more concentrated at the top of 

the food chain than it is in a creature at the bottom of the food 

chain? 

Mr. ANASTAS. That is the biomagnifications process. Now, I do 

think we need to speak specifically about whether or not that is 

happening with the dispersants. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Let’s do that. 

Mr. ANASTAS. OK. Because one of the things that we are very 

concerned about is bioaccumulation and biomagnification, as I am 

sure NOAA is as well. We first, of course, did the modeling data, 

all of our computer modeling results, and showed that these substances, all of the active ingredients of the dispersants, were not 

bioaccumulative. We also then sought to verify that with empirical 

data and monitoring data. 

So what we are seeing is in our near shore, far away from the 

shore, deep sea that NOAA can speak to, we are seeing none of the 

components of the active ingredients of the dispersants persisting 

or bioaccumulating, certainly not biomagnifying. So we are following the data, and right now the data is telling us that we are 

not seeing that happen with the dispersants. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Would you be expecting it to happen this 

soon after the exposure? 

Mr. ANASTAS. Yes. Looking at the chemical structures of all the 

constituents of the dispersants, it is not surprising to me that these 

are not bioaccumulating. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. If they are not chemicals that tend to bioaccumulated by their nature. And so it is consistent with what you 

are seeing in the field, that there is not bioaccumulation happening 

in any great degree? 

Mr. ANASTAS. Right. The best scientific knowledge, intuition, if 

you will, would suggest that they would not. The modeling data 

and the monitoring data support that conclusion. 

Let me, if I may, Senator, just add. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Please. At this point it is just the two of 

us, so I can go well beyond my time limit, and I am happy to have 

this conversation. When somebody else appears, I will yield. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. ANASTAS. I am purposely focusing on, as I often say, the 

data, the data, the data. Because I think that it is very important 

to focus on what it is that we know, what the data is telling us 

and how we get informed by the data. I am not suggesting that we 
59 

have perfect knowledge, I am not suggesting that we don’t need 

more information and more monitoring. I am actually saying 

straight out that it is important to keep on asking these hard questions. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Let me ask a different question which relates to the combined effect of dispersants and oil. As I understand 

it you have done some studies of the dispersants by themselves and 

showed that in some circumstances they are disruptive of endocrine 

in some species, if you will, some cells. But that when you try to 

test or if you tried to test the dispersant oil combination and do the 

same endocrine disruption test, the damage of the combined oil dispersant mix is so great on the sample that you can’t pick out of 

the damage any endocrine disruption because the cell damage is so 

acute and so quick that there is nothing left to test for endocrine 

disruption. 

That strikes me as a potential signal, anyway, that whatever we 

may know about the effects of the dispersants on their own that 

there may be different health effects once the dispersants bond 

with the oil, which I understand it is their nature to do; that is 

why they work. They bond with the oil and form a sort of a connection between the oil and the water. So that a creature that is taking up the dispersant is also very likely to be taking up, to some 

degree, oil as well. And in combination the two are far more dangerous than the dispersant alone. Is that all correct? 

Mr. ANASTAS. Let me clarify, Senator. In the tests that we ran 

on the dispersants alone there was a range of tests which included 

a screening for endocrine disruption. Across the various tests for 

endocrine disruption we saw in only two of the dispersants a very 

weak signal, in one of the many tests that we ran on endocrine disruption. And it was not found to be scientifically significant for endocrine disruption. 

So I think it is important to say even in the dispersants alone, 

what we found was not scientifically significant for endocrine disruption. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. You found indication of endocrine disruption, but not scientifically significant endocrine disruption, or not 

a scientifically significant signal of endocrine disruption? 

Mr. ANASTAS. Not a scientifically significant signal of endocrine 

disruption. When we tried to use that same screening protocol for 

endocrine disruption on the oil itself and of course on the oil and 

dispersant, the structure of the tests themselves didn’t allow for 

that. The way that these tests were set up would not allow for any 

significant results on endocrine disruption. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And the reason we were told for that is because the damage to the cells is so immediate and so acute that 

you can’t pick up endocrine disruption. They are more or less destroyed, and there is nothing to test. 

Mr. ANASTAS. The way that you need to expose these cells is in 

a way and at a concentration that would not allow for the test to 

be successfully conducted. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. To go back to bioaccumulation, once you 

have combined the dispersants and the oil, and now it is being 

taken up by the bottom level food chain species together, are you 
60 

equally confident that the bioaccumulation problem is as minimal 

as it is for dispersants alone? 

Mr. ANASTAS. Well, I should certainly let my colleague from 

NOAA speak to that as well. What we are seeing is that the dispersed oil appears to be—to the degree it resides at all, it is residing as neutrally buoyant. So not at the bottom of the ocean. Our 

models are not currently able to model bioaccumulation of the oil 

plus dispersant. It is the monitoring data, the actual data that we 

are seeing, that is showing that it is not persisting in bioaccumulating. 

So the oil plus dispersant, we are not seeing, we are not detecting that in our monitoring. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And I guess that goes back to the question 

I had earlier, would you expect to be seeing it at this point, or is 

the time delay for bioaccumulation such that you would really only 

see the more pronounced effects months, years, even decades later 

as the original cohort of bottom of the food chain species got gradually eaten and began to concentrate, and then the things that ate 

them got eaten, and it concentrated another level up and so forth? 

That seems to have a time component to it, unless things are being 

eaten a lot faster than I think out there. 

Mr. ANASTAS. So the persistence of the chemicals, the oil and the 

dispersant, is what is being monitored. I should let my colleague 

from NOAA speak to what is being seen or not being seen. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Mr. Westerholm, you have been handed 

the ball. 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. And I will take it. I would go back to what 

I said earlier; it would be remiss if we said that we knew everything about this situation and would be able to address your question adequately for every species. Certainly for some of the higher 

order species we are not seeing the bioaccumulation in the tissues, 

and we might find some in the bile. Most of it is excreted. This 

would include the oil and the—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. But would you expect to yet? I mean, is 

this even the feeding season for some of the species? 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. You would expect to see it residing in—if it 

was going to bioaccumulated, you would be able to see that at a 

level, and certainly in past studies. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. What are you doing to test for that, just 

so I understand? 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. Certainly on the seafood safety side we are 

looking at the tissues and others. But we are also looking from our 

damage assessment side as to the impact that this may have on 

some of those species. 

But I will take a step back and say, other species, some of the 

one we haven’t tested, some of the deeper sea species and then also 

whether the dispersant would get to shore with oysters or some 

other creature, we may see some, we may be able to see some accumulation. But not necessarily biomagnifications in the higher order 

species. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And you are comfortable that that is a viable indicator? 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. I think that goes back to your statement earlier of how products are listed on the National Contingency Plan 
61 

and whether this should be one of the criteria for approval process 

in the future of not having it bioaccumulative. Certainly we have 

seen in other regulator practices, and EPA can speak to this, is 

that certain chemicals that would bioaccumulated have not been allowed to be used in society. I think the same thing, we should have 

a series of more constructive tests to be able to more definitively 

prove that, and then use that as part of that follow-on approval 

process. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. To go back to what we do know about the 

dispersant that Chairman Boxer referred to, which has these characteristics of hazard to humans of liver damage, internal bleeding, 

and all those sorts of things, how does that transpire? What is the 

mechanism by which damage by Corexit gets done by humans sufficient to put it onto the hazard notice but isn’t dangerous in any 

of the ways that you are describing? I am a little bit confused as 

to how it can be dangerous to humans sufficient to trigger notice 

but not dangerous with exposure. 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. There are a couple of ways that could happen, 

and depending on the chemical it certainly could be an inhalation 

hazard to humans. It could be a skin contact to humans. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. So direct exposure? 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. At a level that certain safety protocols would 

be enacted to make sure that you were wearing protective clothing 

or in a position not to be exposed in an aerial dispersant mode. So 

with that in mind—that acute toxicity and some of the impacts of 

that would be by direct exposure to humans in that regard and not 

necessarily passed through ingestion through the food chain. 

So I am sure on the MSDSs, the safety data sheets that she was 

looking at, as the hazards of those chemicals, that was for exposure 

to humans of that particular product in whatever concentration 

would show that impact. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And the reason that that acute toxicity is 

not showing up in your field studies is because the concentration 

that you are testing at is below the level that would cause it, or 

is it because the creatures you are testing are fundamentally or intrinsically more resilient than humans and don’t suffer the same 

injury when exposed to the chemical? 

Mr. ANASTAS. I would suggest that, for example, of the component that you are talking about in the Corexit, in determining a 

toxic effect, it is looking at all the possible ways that this could 

cause acute toxicity. So if something were ingested, if something 

were for instance consumed in high concentrations, then these 

types of effects may occur. 

When we are talking about releasing these substances into the 

Gulf, we do have to keep in mind that in 1 square mile of the Gulf 

at depth, we are talking about a trillion gallons of water. So those 

are very low concentrations. 

Now, the concentrations that the test species are exposed to are 

increasing concentrations until you do see the toxic effects. So they 

aren’t being exposed to high concentrations. And the species are at 

juvenile life stage. So they are supposed to be at a life stage where 

they are more sensitive to pollutants. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. The second vote now has 7 minutes remaining. And with no one else here, I am starting to feel the pres-
62 

sure of that vote. So what I will do is—ah, here is Senator Carper. 

Perfect timing. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. I will go vote and come right back. And if 

you would chair the hearing for the two witnesses here. And then 

I think we can move on to the next panel if nobody else has come 

to ask questions. 

Senator CARPER [presiding]. I ask unanimous consent to bring up 

for a vote our multi-pollutant legislation, our 3-P bill that has been 

awaiting action. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. We will get this moved, and then we will break 

for lunch. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. Again gentlemen, welcome. Good to see you. 

How is the hearing going for you so far? 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. First of all, thanks again for joining us, for your 

testimony. I want to ask—there is a woman behind us who is Committee staff who is a marine biologist. I was asking her to give me 

just a little bit of marine biology 101 with respect to these microbes 

out in the ocean that enjoy having lunch on oil spills. Just kind of 

talk about that, really in a basic, fundamental way. 

How does it work? We have the oil coming out of the ocean floor 

and have these chemical dispersants that we apply to the oil. Explain to us what happens, without getting into a lot of detail 

chemically, but what happens? How do these microbes do their 

work? How long do they live after they consume the oil? 

Just give us a little bit of a rundown on that. I just want to understand that better. 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. I will start with that one. Again, when you 

are looking at the microbes, if you think of it sort of at that bacterial level, and if you think of the oil globule as a certain circumference, they would be surrounding that oil and they would eat 

their way in, they would multiply, much like bacteria do, to continue to feed off of that. 

Now, maybe I should take a step back and say there is a lot of 

natural oil seeps in that area. Petroleum hydrocarbons have been 

there for some period of time. And it tends to have—these particular microbes tend to flourish naturally in that Gulf of Mexico 

area anyway. So they are present, and maybe that is why we are 

potentially seeing what the initial indication is, that there is an acceleration of biodegradation, maybe even more than was expected. 

The fact that you put dispersants on oil in theory, in models, will 

break them into much smaller diameter globules, which allows a 

greater surface area for a larger number of microbes. So if you 

think of one big ball, you can get so many around. But if you split 

that into 100, you can get more microbes, and that process will go 

faster. 

So to answer your question about biodegradation, it really then 

depends upon how large a piece of oil you started with before that 

is dissolved to the subset of where there is no more biodegradation 

that would occur. At that point, with nothing else to feed on, if the 

microbes don’t find anything else to feed on they themselves die, 
63 

or they would have to find something else. There is a life cycle that 

they have, too, and a multiplication that they have around the oil. 

But we know that the subsurface injection of dispersants has 

put—as well as natural dispersant, even if there was no 

dispersants applied, natural dispersion probably occurred coming 

up through the water column with anywhere between 10 to 20 percent of the oil coming off the wellhead release in that mile rise. 

Again, it also depends on the residency time and how much that 

oil weathers through the water column and on the surface. 

So unweathered oil provides a much better surface and will biodegrade faster—the microbes can eat it—than weathered oil, which 

gets to more like the tar balls and the asphalting process. So I 

guess I am evading the total question of how long it takes, but it 

really depends on the size. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you for the explanation. 

Did you want to add anything, Mr. Anastas? 

Mr. ANASTAS. Yes, thank you, Senator. Because I think it is important to recognize that we as humans might think we are very 

clever. But we are actually stealing an idea that nature has been 

doing for billions of years. Dispersion and natural dispersants are 

something that are in the Gulf. What we are doing is basically 

mimicking nature, or using biomimicry in order to try and accomplish this, try to help out, try and make the process happen faster 

than it otherwise would have without the use of added dispersants. 

Senator CARPER. So oil is dispersed in larger pieces of the oil are 

dispersed, being much smaller, the microbes have an easier opportunity to glom on and go to lunch on the oil. 

Mr. ANASTAS. That is right. 

Senator CARPER. And as the microbes consume what is there in 

the water, do they have a short life span? Do they live for days, 

weeks, months? 

Mr. ANASTAS. I don’t know the specific life span of particular microbes. But what we are talking about is, yes, they feed on these, 

and ideally, when they eat them and metabolize them they are producing carbon dioxide and water. That is the natural breakdown 

product of the oil when it is consumed and digested and metabolized. 

Senator CARPER. All right. And when the microbes die, what happens? Do they go to the bottom; do they gather in the bottom of 

the ocean? What happens? The microbes die after eating all this 

oil. Who eats the microbes? 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. I would add what Dr. Anastas just said, they 

break down the oil into component parts of carbon dioxide and others. So then you are left with organic material both with the microbe itself and what it excretes. So much like organic material 

falling to the bottom of the ocean, or suspended, depending on the 

particle size, that is what you are left with. 

Senator CARPER. As it falls to the bottom of the ocean and gathers there, what kind of threat does it pose to the marine environment? 

Mr. ANASTAS. If the microbes have consumed and metabolized 

the oil, there should be in that scenario no additional risk to the 

marine environment. 
64 

Senator CARPER. So when people ask me saying, what happened 

to all this oil, this huge amount of oil that came out of the bottom 

of the Gulf, and now it seems to be going away, some of it has 

evaporated? 

Mr. ANASTAS. Correct. 

Senator CARPER. Roughly what percent would you say has evaporated? 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. Twenty-four percent, 25 percent. 

Senator CARPER. And a good deal of it is being consumed by 

these microbes, and that—what percent would you say has been 

consumed by the microbes? As much as is being evaporated? Or 

more? 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. Well, I think you have to put that in two categories, that that has already been consumed and that that will be 

consumed. That will be the oil that doesn’t rise to the surface and 

some that actually does and that gets consumed as it goes into 

shoreline. But it could be as much as 50 percent of that which is 

dispersed and what was residual in the water column or on shorelines that are starting to be biodegraded over time. 

Senator CARPER. So if that is correct that leaves us with the last 

25 percent or so to worry about. Is that roughly right? 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. And that last 25 percent is what has been collected through the riser pipe, what has been skimmed off or what 

has burned. So ultimately some of the products in the very—even 

the tar balls over time, many of those will be the residual ones that 

could last for much longer. But most of what is in the water column and what is going to shore will start to biodegrade. 

Senator CARPER. Good. I am going to ask you a couple more 

questions before my colleagues come back and try to take this mic 

away from me. 

[Laughter.] 

Senator CARPER. I understand the EPA has been researching the 

effects of dispersants in a subsurface environment. What do the 

studies tell us, and more importantly, what do they not tell us in 

terms of the long-term consequences of using dispersants? 

Mr. ANASTAS. What we are looking to do going forward is have 

a better, deeper understanding of the long-term transport, fate, and 

exposure of these dispersants. So that means while we have some 

knowledge of how these dispersants travel in the water column and 

the various currents. Specifically how long it will take, how they 

will be metabolized, what are the breakdown products, what exposures they will give to fish and wildlife as well as humans. Those 

are some of the long-term questions that we want to have answered as we are going forward. 

Senator CARPER. Second question, what steps can the Federal 

Government take to ensure that the next generation of dispersants 

in the Gulf are greener and maybe even more environmentally 

friendly than the ones we are already using? 

Mr. ANASTAS. Senator Carper, this is a key question. It is certainly a key question for dispersants. It is a key question for the 

chemicals that we use in our daily life generally. What we have 

currently is a situation where we often are focused on characterizing the chemicals that we use in ways that we try to understand 
65 

whether they are going to cause a toxic effect to humans or the environment, if they are going to bioaccumulated and persist. 

But what we have not invested in as a scientific community are 

the insights that are needed to design the next generation of substances. This area of so-called green chemistry is a scientific approach to understanding not only the basis of the hazard that these 

chemicals cause, but more importantly how you design them so 

that they are not going to cause problems in the future. 

So applying the principles of green chemistry to dispersants is 

going to be essential. It is going to be essential in order to do this, 

to have scientists trained and understanding both the nature of the 

problems that these chemicals pose, but also the solution. 

I have often been quoted as saying that the only reason to deeply 

understand a problem is to empower its solution. And what we are 

hoping to get with a deeper understanding of the concerns that we 

have for dispersants—or really all chemicals—are the insights to 

invest intellectually and with resources to pursue green chemistry 

so that the next generation of dispersants are more environmentally benign. 

Senator CARPER. As this tragedy has unfolded, and we have dealt 

with it, and we are hearing encouraging reports in the news, with 

the ability to plug the leak and maybe to do so on a permanent 

basis, we now turn to cleaning up this mess and trying to make 

sure that the people who live in that part of our country and that 

part of our world, help them get back to their lives, what surprises—if you look back to some of the things that happened, what 

are some of the surprises that you have seen, particularly with the 

use of dispersants, but some of the surprises that you have seen 

with respect to the clean up portion here? 

Mr. WESTERHOLM. I can certainly start. One of the things that 

we have done over the years, obviously, is plan and prepare for 

what we would consider worst case scenarios. Obviously, a well 

blowout of this magnitude over this length of time was always possible, but never really figured that we would have one for this duration and have those issues. So we were really combating a major 

oil spill every day for as many days as that happened. 

I think that was the first surprise. The second piece of that obviously was it was 50 miles offshore, depending on where you went 

off from the shoreline. That created some logistical challenges for 

just the ability to respond and the equipment that went out there. 

I think that the idea of using subsea dispersants as opposed to 

surface, the first application was obviously surface, but it is not an 

unknown idea. There were some papers that were talked about earlier. But really it was not—it was technically challenging and 

unfeasible. But they came up with an innovative approach to do 

that for this time. So it was, I don’t want to say, maybe surprise 

is the wrong word, but it certainly had to put a lot of people in the 

position of making quick decisions and alert decisions. 

Then in addition, from an environmental point of view, both EPA 

and ourselves had to come up with a monitoring strategy that had 

never been in place. For years, the SMART protocol I mentioned 

earlier was used for dispersants, which basically looked at how effective they were in the water column and where we expected them 

to go, which was surface dispersants pushing them down to maybe 
66 

as much as 30 feet, maybe more like 10 feet into the water column. 

Here we were dealing with something a mile below the surface. 

So we really came up with a toxicity test with rotifers and a dissolved oxygen test to show not only efficiency but also effectiveness. 

Senator CARPER. Thank you for that response. Thank you for all 

your responses and your testimony here. 

Mr. Chairman, I have only had 13 minutes, and that is not 

enough. But I will grudgingly yield back my time. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE [presiding]. Well, these two witnesses have 

been very helpful and very informative and also been subjected to 

longer periods of questioning than most, because we have had 

these circumstances in which so many colleagues are over at the 

vote. But I think at this stage it would be appropriate to thank 

them both for their testimony, excuse this panel, and call up the 

second panel of witnesses. We will take a 2-minute recess for the 

chair change. 

Thank you both very much. 

[Recess.] 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. All right, the hearing will come back to 

order. 

I thank the witnesses for being here. Our first witness is Dr. 

Ronald J. Kendall. He is the Director of the Institute of Environmental and Human Health and Professor and Chairman of the Department of Environmental Toxicology at Texas Tech University. 

And if you think it is easy to say Toxicology at Texas Tech fast, 

it isn’t. 

His research is focused primarily on ecotoxicology, wildlife toxicology, and risk assessment. He is most welcome as a witness here. 

Thank you for your testimony, Dr. Kendall. Please proceed. 

STATEMENT OF RONALD J. KENDALL, PH.D., DIRECTOR, THE 

INSTITUTE OF ENVIRONMENTAL AND HUMAN HEALTH, AND 

PROFESSOR AND CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL TOXICOLOGY, TEXAS TECH UNIVERSITY 

Mr. KENDALL. Thank you, Chairman Whitehouse. It is a pleasure 

to be here today. 

We have already heard earlier today of estimates of more than 

200 million gallons of crude oil being released into the Gulf of Mexico as a result of the Deepwater Horizon incident. In addition, we 

have heard an estimated 1.8 million gallons of dispersant were 

used in the Gulf, and particularly in the deep water. And this is 

unprecedented. 

Corexit 9500 has been the predominant dispersant used. Though 

the application of the dispersant may very well have protected 

shorelines and parts of the Gulf Coast ecosystem, there is still an 

immense area in the Gulf that is under stress and potentially impacted from the heavy use of these dispersants. In essence, my colleagues and I who have been studying this situation believe that 

a massive ecotoxicological experiment is underway. 

We have very limited information on the environmental fate and 

transport of the mixture of dispersant and oil, particularly in the 

deep ocean. We have very little information on the ecological effects 

of this particular oil and dispersant mixture in terms of acute, 

chronic, and indirect effects to marine and coastal organisms. 
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Given the volume of oil and dispersant that has been released 

into the Gulf, we have a very poor understanding of the ultimate 

ecosystem effects. So when we bring this all together, we have a 

very challenging situation, of course, in dealing with a massive oil 

spill. Yet at the same time did we really understand the environmental toxicology of such a massive use in the deep water of a substance such as Corexit 9500? And I say we did not. 

As we looked at the environmental chemistry of the deep water 

use of the dispersant-oil mixtures, crude oil is a mixture of thousands of chemical compounds, including aromatic hydrocarbons and 

polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons. We believe—and it appears to be 

upheld with more recent research—that the use of dispersants creates the release of these toxins into the water column, and in fact 

the use of Corexit 9500 does put more hydrocarbons into the water 

column. That is essentially what we are seeing. 

Crude oil can have physical, toxic, and indirect effects. We have 

seen much evidence of oil on birds and other wildlife, and of course 

that is terrible. But in addition the use of dispersants basically disperses the oil into the water column, and the toxic components of 

oil are available to exposed organisms. These dispersants, as we 

have heard in earlier testimony, are not totally non-toxic. They 

have toxic qualities. But it is the dispersant-oil mixture and ultimate release of toxins into the water column that we believe could 

be of a concern in the ecological perspective. 

Let’s just consider some species. We have talked a lot of theory 

already today. But let’s consider the Gulf of Mexico and the many 

endangered species that live there. Take the Kemp’s ridley sea turtle, one of the most endangered species of sea turtles in the world. 

Many of them nest on the coast of Texas. And the hatchlings are 

returning to the Gulf now. They are only about 1° inches long when 

they return, by the thousands, to the Gulf. They go to the open 

Gulf and exist for years, moving in the currents, perhaps co-locating with sargassum, a seaweed. They feed opportunistically. 

And it may take many years before they may return to Texas to 

lay eggs. Therefore, if we affect their food chain or affect those 

hatchlings we may not see this for years to come. And we do know 

they can be susceptible to oil. 

Take the sperm whale. They are endangered. The females come 

to the Gulf to calve in the summer. They feed opportunistically in 

the deep water on squid, cephalopods. We have no idea what the 

deep water injection of dispersants could have done to release oil 

into the water column and impact such food supplies for endangered species. So these are questions that we may not have the answers revealed to us for years to come. 

The bluefin tuna—perhaps moving to threatened status itself— 

they come to the Gulf and spawn. The eggs float in the Gulf; they 

hatch. The larva then feed opportunistically on zooplankton. They 

co-locate with sargassum as well. If we impact the sargassum or 

impact the zooplankton we could take out portions of age classes 

of the bluefin tuna. And again, we may not see this for years to 

come. 

So again, we are conducting a massive ecotoxicological experiment, and we need research and scientific data that can be peer 
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reviewed and brought to the table to make good decisions for the 

future. 

I might add that dispersants are a tool. But they need to be fully 

researched, and we need to have the environmental toxicology data 

on them to truly apply them in the best environmental stewardship 

possible. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kendall follows:] 
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Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Dr. Kendall. That was very 

helpful. 

Our next witness is Dr. David C. Smith of the Graduate School 

of Oceanography from my home State’s University of Rhode Island. 

It is one of the jewels in the crown of our university system. We 

are delighted that David could be here. 

Welcome, Dr. Smith. 

STATEMENT OF DAVID C. SMITH, PH.D., PROFESSOR AND ASSOCIATE DEAN, GRADUATE SCHOOL OF OCEANOGRAPHY, 

UNIVERSITY OF RHODE ISLAND 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Senator. Good morning. 

I am David Smith, Professor and Associate Dean at the Graduate 

School of Oceanography. I appreciate the opportunity to testify on 

this very important subject. 

The environmental trade-offs associated with the use of 

dispersants in response to oil spills are difficult to assess, and 

therefore their use remains controversial. Dispersants reduce the 

chance oil will wash ashore and damage coastal habitats by moving 

the oil from the surface into the interior of the ocean. Dispersants 

do not remove the oil from the ocean; therefore, it is important that 

we not adopt an out of sight, out of mind attitude. 

Moving oil below the sea surface presents significant challenges 

to the organisms residing in this habitat. Impacts will be less noticeable but could be as devastating as oil washing ashore. 

Ultimately, microorganisms degrade most of the oil spilled in the 

ocean. Dispersants are presumed to speed up this process by making the oil more accessible. The rate of degradation is a function 

of many factors, including temperature, nutrient concentrations, 

and the abundance of the microorganisms that are capable of consuming the oil. 

Now, our entire knowledge of the effects of oil dispersants is from 

their application at the sea surface. The Deepwater Horizon spill 

presents a much different scenario, where the dispersants were introduced at the wellhead, approximately 1,500 meters below the 

surface. 

As we continue to [unclear] oil from the deep ocean, it is reasonable to assume that we will face similar scenarios in the future. 

Therefore there is an urgent need to understand the ultimate fate 

of the oil dispersed at depth before we continue to apply 

dispersants in this manner. 

While we have some understanding of how microorganisms respond to dispersants at the surface we know nothing of how they 

do so in the deep sea. There are far fewer microorganisms in the 

deep sea compared to the surface. This, combined with the lower 

water temperatures, will result in a slower rate of degradation, 

leading to a much more persistent plume of oil in the subsurface. 

In addition, by keeping the oil away from the surface the evaporation of the volatile fraction of the oil is eliminated, and the probability of entraining oil into the sediments is increased. If the oil 

is concentrated into the sediments a lack of oxygen will dramatically decrease the degradation rate, leading to long-term contamination of the sea floor. 
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It will be difficult to assess the changes that occur as a result 

of the oil and dispersants in the deep sea community given our limited knowledge of the pre-spill community structure, particularly 

with regard to microorganisms. Working in the deep sea presents 

many challenges, but it is essential to address these if we are to 

understand the impact of the large scale experiment that has just 

been conducted in the Gulf of Mexico. And we need to do so quickly. 

In light of our lack of knowledge of the environmental effects of 

dispersants in the ocean, the initiation of a National Research Plan 

for oil spill response is warranted. This research plan should call 

for and support peer-reviewed research in all environmental aspects of oil spill response, including the dispersal of oil in the deep 

sea. 

It is critical that the initiative address the following issues: The 

development of a set of best practices for experiments addressing 

the impact of oil and dispersants in the ocean. This will allow for 

the direct comparisons between types of dispersants, types of oils, 

and habitats as well as between laboratories conducting the research. 

The establishment of a baseline data set on environmental conditions in the water column and sea floor of oil-producing areas of 

the ocean, including biodiversity, biological production, water current profiles, and sediment characterization. 

The development of long-term ecosystem-level studies of the environmental effects of the use of dispersants, including field, 

mesocosm, and laboratory scale studies. 

The engagement of the Nation’s academic and Government research infrastructure to assist in this endeavor, including research 

vessels, undersea robotics, moored instruments, vessels of opportunity, experimental mesocosm facilities, and computer modeling 

facilities. 

The development of an online, open access data base to serve as 

a repository for the scientific community. 

And the establishment of a significant outreach effort to disseminate the results of this research to stakeholders outside the scientific community. 

These efforts should result in the ability to better predict the environmental consequences of dispersants under different scenarios 

for use in formulating specific emergency response plans. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith follows:] 
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Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Dr. Smith. 

Our next witness is Edward B. Overton. Dr. Overton is a Professor Emeritus with the Department of Environmental Sciences in 

the Louisiana State University School of Coast and Environment, 

with over 34 years of experience studying the impacts of oil spills. 

We are delighted that he is here and look forward to his testimony. 

Dr. Overton. 

STATEMENT OF EDWARD B. OVERTON, PH.D., PROFESSOR 

EMERITUS, LOUISIANA STATE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF 

ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCES, SCHOOL OF THE COAST AND 

ENVIRONMENT 

Mr. OVERTON. Senator, thank you very much. Not often does an 

academic scientist get to appear on the Late Show with David 

Letterman and testify before the U.S. Senate in the space of a few 

weeks. So this is indeed an honor for me, and quite an unusual experience, I might add. 

I find myself in an interesting position of agreeing with almost 

everything that has been said, both by the Senators in their opening comments and by my colleagues here so far. Oil, the lesson 

here is an ounce of prevention with an oil spill is worth a pound 

of cure, many pounds of cure. Clearly, what we can do to not have 

an oil spill, a deepwater oil spill, is worth an awful lot of attention. 

Having said that, we weren’t presented with an ounce of prevention; we had to come up with a pound of cure. And when you are 

talking about an oil spill, there are a couple of facts that are important to understand what happens when this oil enters the environment. First of all, this was a unique spill because it was a deepwater spill. So oil entering the water, some of it stayed down in the 

deep oceans, and it is still there in the deep oceans. It has been 

dispersed; it is moving around by currents. Most oceanographers 

suggest that that oil down in the deep oceans will be degraded, but 

it won’t come up onto the shelf an impact the coastal areas. 

Much of the oil did reach the surface. As it came up it was 

stripped of a lot of its organic chemicals as it worked its way up 

to the surface. We are seeing evidence of that now in some of the 

oily material. Oil that reached the surface, oil that enters the environment undergoes a series of weathering processes. So you are left 

with trying to clean up not just oil, but oil and all the weathered 

products. 

There are difficult decisions to be made, because as the oil 

changes, it changes its toxicity, its physical properties, its chemical 

properties. So you are trying to clean up an elusive target. 

But having said that, there are three tools in the tool box to get 

oil off the ocean surface. And those three tools are: you can use mechanical means, skimming, sucking, clean up like that. You can use 

chemical means, and the means that we were using in this spill, 

are dispersants. And you can use in situ burning. 

In a perfect world I am a big fan of skimming, because skimming 

allows you to retrieve the hydrocarbon material, and it can be recycled. So if you can skim it, you should. And it should always be 

your first preference. If the oil is thick enough to burn, it is thick 

enough to skim and recycle. So I think everybody is in favor of recycling. 
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Unfortunately, because the oil came up to the surface and spread 

out, we weren’t left with that option. And the option we’re using 

were chemical dispersants. Dispersants are a soap for oil. It dissolves oil down into the water column. As has been said many 

times before, I am not going to repeat what has already been said, 

you are clearly, clearly trading off impacts in the deep ocean with 

impacts on shore. 

One point I have not heard being made is that that dispersant 

use should always be used in deep offshore water and not near the 

shoreline. There is just no opportunity for dilution of all hydrocarbons in near-shore environments. So oil should be dispersed offshore. 

With this particular dispersant—and I think most dispersants as 

we are finding out—the dispersed oil is not any more toxic than the 

oil itself. The oil is what is causing the problem, and of course you 

are dispersing it in deep water. It is causing damage, as has been 

adequately described. And we will not know that damage—I totally, totally agree that we need to use this to understand the impacts of oil spills and dispersants. We simply cannot put this much 

oil in the environment as a grand experiment. It is out there now; 

we need to take advantage of the research opportunity and the 

long-term research opportunity to understand the environmental 

implications both in the deep ocean and at the surface. 

Having said that, use of dispersants—we are not through with 

this event yet, this sorry affair. But looking back right now, Louisiana’s 7,700 miles of contiguous coastline has been largely spared 

from heavy oiling. Seventy-seven hundred miles represents about 

40 percent of the Nation’s wetlands and is the base of the food 

chain for something on the order of 80 to 90 percent of the marine 

harvest. This is an incredibly valuable shoreline that must be protected. The use of offshore dispersants appears to have spared a lot 

of this environment. 

Out of those 7,700 miles something on the order of 200 to 300 

miles have been hit and hit pretty hard. We originally saw the pictures of coastal oiling, but it certainly could have been much worse. 

So we are not out of the woods yet. We don’t know how much 

more damage has been done. But we do know a few things, and one 

is that the damage so far is not as bad as it could have been. 

Now, we certainly need to monitor for the long-term damage. 

How long will it take species to come back? And by the way, during 

an oil spill, this acute event, the damage is done, it will take a little while for us to understand that, and a little while means years. 

But the damage has been done. We need to assess it; we need to 

spend the money. 

I have a lot more to say, but my red light is on, so I thank you 

very much for the opportunity. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Overton follows:] 
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Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you, Dr. Overton. I look forward to 

giving you a chance to have more to say during the question and 

answer period. 

Our final witness is Jackie Savitz. She is the Senior Scientist 

with Oceana. Prior to that, she served as Executive Director of the 

Coast Alliance, as an environmental policy analyst with the Environmental Working Group, and as an environmental scientist with 

the Chesapeake Bay Foundation. We are delighted to have her here 

and welcome her testimony. 

Ms. Savitz. 

STATEMENT OF JACQUELINE SAVITZ, 

SENIOR CAMPAIGN DIRECTOR, OCEANA 

Ms. SAVITZ. Thank you, Senator, and thank you so much for inviting me to be here today. 

As you know, Oceana is a global conservation organization, and 

we are dedicated to restoring and protecting the oceans. Since the 

Deepwater Horizon blowout our Nation has been shaken by an unprecedented oil spill that has directly caused 11 deaths, put many 

people out of work, shut down fisheries and threatened businesses 

that depend on the oceans. 

Marine life affected by the spill include endangered, threatened, 

and commercially important species. Many questions have arisen, 

including whether or not dispersant chemicals should be deployed. 

The answer is not an easy one, as you have heard. Once the oil hits 

the water there simply are no good ways to stop it or to clean it 

up. There are pros and cons to dispersant use and their use is 

clearly a lose-lose proposition that requires a choice between a lesser of two evils. 

If we are continually asking the oceans to take one for the team, 

we ought to be making sure we don’t repeat the same mistake. 

Since we can’t prevent, contain, or clean up oil spills without major 

ecological impacts, we need to stop offshore drilling, promote alternative energy sources, and transition oil and gas workers to the 

clean energy sector. If drilling must continue there must be effective plans for prevention, response, and clean up. But currently 

those do not exist. 

Dispersants can be effective at dissolving oil and removing it 

from the surface, where it threatens diving birds, surfacing marine 

mammals, and sea turtles. They prevent some of the oil from 

reaching land where it would wash up on beaches and marshes and 

pose risks to public health. 

However, they also help to dissolve oil in the water column, 

where fish and other marine life are continually exposed. Oil 

dispersants and their mixture can kill marine life, they can affect 

reproduction, growth, disease resistance, digestion and a long list 

of other critical life activities. Their use also prevents skimming 

and collection of meaningful amounts of oil. 

The required lesser of two evils decision is made without the benefit of a crystal ball. The science does not fully address the impacts 

on key species like corals, or sensitive life stages, or ecosystems. 

Even if we had that information, there is no calculus that can compare the ecological benefits to the ecological costs and come out 

with a right answer. It is a trade-off. The decision to use 
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dispersants may have saved some birds in marshes while increasing the impacts on fish and other marine life. How can we say 

which is more important? 

There have been many lose-lose decision. Do we use dispersants 

or not? Do we burn off the oil off the water surface or not? What 

about flaring off oil and gas with the inherent air pollution, or not 

flaring it? I could go on. 

If we are going to have to ask the oceans to take one or many 

for the team, we should in response take all necessary measures 

to make sure the situation is not repeated. That means making 

sure there are no more oil spills where dispersant chemicals are 

considered the best option. 

Since drilling has so clearly been shown to be unsafe, unpredictable, and damaging, the only way to effectively prevent this type 

of spill and its consequences is to stop offshore drilling. Oceana recommends a ban on new offshore drilling. 

Given what we know about the inadequacy of spill response, the 

side effects of dispersants, and the frequency of spills, it would be 

a tragic mistake not to use this opportunity to devise a plan to replace our oil demand and stop drilling offshore. There are clear options that could allow us to accelerate our shift to clean energy. 

We recommend that a blue ribbon panel of experts be appointed 

to engage the brightest minds to formulate a plan to fast track that 

shift to clean energy. This should include development of a clean 

energy manufacturing hub in the Gulf region to allow for a just 

transition of oil and gas workers to the clean energy jobs. 

Finally, while Oceana argues that the drilling should stop, at the 

very least no drilling permits should be approved without plans for 

spill prevention, response, and clean up that do not rely on loselose decisions and that do not make our oceans and all who depend 

on them the biggest losers. 

If there are no adequate technologies or no safe chemicals to respond to spills, then drilling simply should not be allowed. 

As far as dispersants, the only good answer is to avoid having 

to trade the health of fish for the health of marshes or the survival 

of corals for the survival of sea birds. If we fast track to clean energy we could build an energy to replace dirty and dangerous jobs 

with clean jobs, one that powers our daily lives without releasing 

carbon dioxide and contributing to climate change and one that 

stimulates our economy and provides us with exports. 

Countries like Germany and China are already making these investments. We can stick with oil and gas and import our energy 

technology from them, or we can use this opportunity to change 

course and become the exporters. We could be the Saudi Arabia of 

clean energy technology. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Savitz follows:] 
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Senator WHITEHOUSE. Thank you very much, Ms. Savitz. 

Thank you to all the witnesses for your testimony. There seems 

to be considerable agreement in certain areas, including even the 

same words being used by witnesses. The use of the dispersants 

being a grand experiment, with massive unknowns about its effect 

seems to be a common theme through all your testimony and suggests that there is both a need and a significant opportunity here 

for research. As long as we have done this, we might as well get 

out there and figure out exactly what the consequences are of it 

rather than simply let it happen without examining it. 

Let me ask Dr. Kendall and Dr. Smith what resources you see 

for conducting this research. Is BP setting up funds that will support this research? Is it being done at taxpayer expense through 

EPA? Is it up to the scientific community to go about its usual 

business and try to find funding and pursue these questions? What 

do you see as the funding sources for the research that you recommend? 

Mr. KENDALL. Senator, I would like to compliment you earlier 

this morning, exploring what we do know toxicologically about 

these dispersants, what is required to be approved. And in fact I 

agree with you totally. 

I was thinking earlier that dispersants—we can be somewhat 

synonymous with pesticides, which are so heavily regulated. The 

pesticide industry has to provide considerable data to register a 

product and use it in the environment. They provide acute data 

and chronic data in environmental chemistry. And it goes through 

a scientific peer review process. 

In fact they have to rebut the presumption of risk that that product will cause and effect in the environment. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. As I understand it, the dispersants only 

had to provide acute data, correct? 

Mr. KENDALL. Exactly. So I look at the dispersants, and right 

now, very limited information to a point where we can’t even evaluate the potential environmental toxicology. A laboratory experiment on maybe a shrimp and a fish doesn’t help us understand 

much about the environmental chemistry and effects on other parts 

of the ecosystem. 

In my opinion, and I support you totally as to your earlier questioning, I think we need to acquire more information and an appropriate regulatory process to find the best dispersants. And when we 

say they are approved, in fact we have environmental data and environmental toxicology data to say, this is in fact true. And we 

don’t have to have a situation like we are dealing with now to have 

to backfill with data after we have used millions of gallons of it in 

the Gulf. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Dr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. As far as the funding source, I think this 

should be a cost of business in extracting oil. I don’t think it is a 

mystery that what type of oil, what type of crude oil is being extracted from there, and I find it very curious that we did not have 

these tests that were just done recently with this oil with the approved list of dispersants when we have known what type of oil 

that is. I think it is essential that the oil from the different areas 

be tested specifically for their consequences on organisms that are 
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relevant to the area where it is being extracted, the type of oils 

being extracted and what are the proper dispersants. 

Just looking at this particular data set that was just released on 

the 31st, as far as a dispersant, it looks like one other was much 

better at dispersing the oil if you look at the amount of the hydrocarbons that were retained in the water. And yet its toxicity was 

about the same. 

So that should have been known beforehand. And maybe that decision could have been made to have that particular dispersant on 

hand. 

Also, I think the testing has to be done in relevant conditions. 

The oil exiting the wellhead is very hot. It is estimated to be about 

100 degrees or so, going into cold water. We don’t have data on 

that, how it affects it at that level. And EPA is asking to minimize 

the amount of dispersant used, but it is not really stated what the 

goal is. Is the goal to disperse as much oil as possible, or is it to 

minimize the ecological effect? 

So getting the right ratio of dispersant, the particular dispersant 

with the right type of oil that is being extracted, I think is critical. 

Like I say, I think that should be a cost of doing business. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Let me ask generally, sort of a jump ball, 

you heard the testimony this morning, and you may very well be 

familiar with the testing that was done by the EPA that has been 

reported out fairly recently that compared the relative toxicity of 

the different dispersants and said that they were more or less of 

a par with each other, in some cases a little bit more for one species, a little bit less for another. But they were generally comparable. 

You all are scientists, you have dedicated your lives to this kind 

of study. How complete and effective is that particular study as a 

point from which you could draw conclusions about the many different questions that you have said have been left or are unanswered at this point? And what else would need to be done to get 

a more authoritative determination on the questions that you believe we need to study? 

Dr Smith first, then Dr. Overton. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. One of the things that concerns me is 

that when these tests were done, they are short-term tests, acute 

toxicity, they don’t address long-term effects and sub-lethal effects. 

I also am concerned that—particularly I focused on the application 

of dispersants at depth. The organisms that are used were chosen 

for a good reason in that they are commonly used for this purpose, 

and that allows you to compare different experiments. But they 

have no relevance whatsoever in the deep sea. 

The fish that is used is a small estuarine fish. And the mysid at 

not at depth, either. So I would not extrapolate very far. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Dr. Overton. 

Mr. OVERTON. I would agree. I think when you are doing toxic 

testing, you have to use a standard series of testing. You can’t try 

one thing and then slip around it to get any comparative data. So 

you have to pick a species. You should pick more than one, many 

species, but clearly we didn’t have deep ocean and probably can’t 

have, because they don’t live at the surface, deep ocean species. So 

it is a real problem. 
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But having said that, the components in this dispersant biodegrade fairly rapidly. Now, that implies that the long-term impacts are minimal. Compounds that have heavy metals, compounds 

that have chlorocarbons that don’t biodegrade, tend to bioaccumulated and have long-term impacts. Non-persistent compounds, petroleum, in fact, does degrade and degrades fairly rapidly. 

My problem with all this tox testing is that oil changes so much 

from its input into the environment through its journey into the 

environment. Which point do you take to look at the efficacy testing? And even the tox, most of the time you take the most toxic 

part of the oil, that is the early fresh oil, as opposed to the weathered oil. But in some cases, where you have a really heavy crude, 

not in this spill, but in other spills like Exxon Valdez, that oil, the 

residual components may have significant toxicity. 

So it is a complex question. But we have a great opportunity to 

study if there is going to be long-term impacts, these types of 

things, from this spill. Because we simply can’t go out into our environment and release large quantities of oil. 

Now, let me get back to the funding question. Mineral Management Service has generated royalty income to the Federal Government of billions of dollars. Virtually all of that money has been 

spent on not understanding the environment. A little bit of it has. 

The old Mineral Management Service had an environmental studies program. 

But almost none of the money looked at deep ocean environments. Revenue stream is there to provide this funding. Now, it 

certainly should be part of the industry’s—if you are going to take 

on a very difficult, risky procedure, you ought to know how to respond to it, and you ought to know what the impacts are. 

But the Government ought to have some oversight. And taking 

some of that royalty money, a significant amount of that royalty 

money, and understanding how both from an engineering perspective as well as an ecological perspective what to do about it. We 

didn’t even have really good techniques to collect samples at depth. 

Most of the sampling technology was to collect plankton and animals like that, not oil. So when these samplers went down to the 

depth, they got coated with oil and we never knew whether they 

were really getting a true sample or whether it was some of the 

oil that they had passed through. 

It is incredibly complex. All of this stuff should have been developed. Also, BP has set aside something on the order of $500 million 

for understanding the long-term impacts. That is in addition to 

what NOAA’s program is. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And that gives me the opportunity to 

make a shameless plug for my National Endowment for the Oceans 

legislation, which would take some of these revenues and set them 

aside in a process that be both geographically based, so that local 

conditions could be addressed, and competitive, so that the more 

significant issues would be reviewed through a competitive grant 

process, could also be addressed. That is a bipartisan legislation 

with Senator Snowe. We are working very hard to try to get that 

incorporated into energy legislation as that moves forward. 

So I appreciate your thoughts, Dr. Overton. We are very consistent on that. 
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Starting with Ms. Savitz, all of you are experienced scientists. 

You have heard the testimony, Dr. Overton, you have already said 

so yourself, that the bioaccumulation risk is low from, as I understand it, the dispersants, low from oil and low from the dispersantoil combination. Is that something that everybody on the panel is 

comfortable with as an assessment? 

Ms. Savitz. 

Ms. SAVITZ. Yes, Senator. First of all, thank you very much for 

your legislation for the National Endowment for the Oceans. We 

support that and appreciate it. 

Just to get back to your last question quickly, in terms of whether the EPA studies are enough to draw conclusions, I certainly 

agree with Drs. Smith and Overton that they are not. Part of the 

reason for that is they are so short-term. It is a 48- or 96-hour 

study. Even if all the dispersing goes away in that period of time, 

the animal doesn’t die, that doesn’t mean that it is going to survive 

and grow and flourish and be able to escape predators. 

And of course it doesn’t answer the question of whether that animal might have hatched in the first place if it was an egg when 

it was exposed or whether the larvae would have survived. And finally, it doesn’t get to the whole ecosystem question and how is the 

ecosystem affected. But even if it is a short-term exposure, it can 

still have effects. 

And your last question on bioaccumulation, it is my understanding that these chemicals are not expected to bioaccumulated. 

But I certainly would defer to my esteemed panelists. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Dr. Overton, I think you have already said 

that. But if you want to just clarify. 

Mr. OVERTON. We know oil, for example, the polycyclic aromatic 

hydrocarbons don’t bioaccumulated. That is what people are looking for. Those are the toxic compounds. And we have enzyme systems in our bodies, as do the animals, that differentiate that. So 

I have never heard of a case where we actually saw in tissue bioaccumulation of these types of compounds, except when the fish 

was tainted; it swam through oil and there was oil on it, which is 

contamination. But that is not from a biologic process. 

Having said that, it could be some other issues. 

I will let Ron come in. 

Mr. KENDALL. Thank you, Dr. Overton. 

Senator, it is according to what kind of end points you want to 

look at. I agree with the bioaccumulation data. But many of these 

substances in oil are carcinogens. For instance, benzene. If benzene 

is released, and we are exposed. And also the polycyclic aromatic 

hydrocarbons. Yes, we do turn them over, an organism can metabolize them. But also an organism can metabolize them to be active 

as a carcinogen. In other words, able to form an adduct with DNA. 

So that to me is a consequence of chronic concern. Maybe not bioaccumulation, but just because we don’t have active bioaccumulation doesn’t mean we don’t have issues in a more chronic sense, in 

addition to the acute sense. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Anything to add, Dr. Smith? 

Mr. SMITH. No. I agree with both of them. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Let me ask a slightly different question. 

The National Contingency Plan prohibits what are called sinking 
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agents. It is my understanding that it is the nature of oil to float 

on water, that because of the effect of the dispersant, it is broken 

up into smaller particles that have less buoyancy and therefore 

stay in the water column longer, held down by thermoclines and 

currents and things like that. But that it remains inherently buoyant. And all things being equal, would ultimately come to the surface. 

At the same time, as Dr. Overton has testified, there is this elusive quality to the oil as it weathers. Does a point come at which 

the oil sinks naturally? If there is not, or even if there is, is that 

process accelerated by the use of the dispersants with the conclusion reasonably to be drawn that there will be more sinking of the 

oil as a result of the use of the dispersants? And in light of the fact 

that sinking agents are forbidden under the National Contingency 

Plan, is that a concern that we should be looking out for? 

Mr. OVERTON. Every oil spill has sinking issues associated with 

it. This is incredibly light oil; doesn’t have much of the heavy ends 

that would cause the oil to sink. The only time it can really get 

heavy enough to stay beneath the water is when it is—in stages 

where it is weathering and washing up on the shoreline it gets 

mixed down in with the sediment and detritus. I have seen several 

pictures of this gunky material that is in the little wave rows that 

are under water. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. But that shouldn’t happen in the deep sea, 

the attachment to detritus. 

Mr. OVERTON. I have heard several reports of sunken oil. We 

have yet to get a sample. I asked just yesterday at a science meeting, has anybody gotten a sample of deep oil. And the answer was 

no. So I would be very surprised, not every case, but in this very 

light oil, remember, all oil is grossly different. So you have to handle each spill on a case by case basis. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Dr. Kendall. 

Mr. KENDALL. Senator, it is really complicated. With the deep 

water release you have a very challenged environment. It is dark, 

cold, less oxygen, less microbial activity. A lot of these issues are 

very complicated because we just don’t have much data as related 

to the response of the dispersant-oil mixture in that kind of high 

pressure, cold environment. Much different than a laboratory acute 

toxicity test with a shrimp exposure. 

So in that perspective, that is what makes this so challenging 

and why it does present itself an opportunity as we think about 

continued deep water drilling, perhaps we need more information 

as to the ultimate ramifications of release of oil into the deep water 

and how we are going to manage that. Because quite frankly we 

know very little about the behavior of the oil, even dispersed in the 

deep water, where it goes and how it travels in the currents. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And in terms of the—well, I am told that 

there is some sense, perhaps even some observation and measurement that we are starting to see some of the oil dispersant mixture 

that is in the water column beginning to settle to the ocean floor. 

There it risks contaminating the benthic layer, which I don’t know 

at that depth how rich an environment it is. But is the question 

of sinking oil, assuming that that proves out under observation, a 
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particular concern that we should worry about? Or is that not 

something you would be concerned about? 

Mr. KENDALL. At this point, I have not seen the evidence that 

is occurring enough to be worried about it. Although I have seen 

evidence that oil exiting the wellhead and being hit continuously 

with dispersant has created, as it comes to the surface, many different forms of oil. We have seen all the way from mats to a 

chocolatey mousse-like substances, some floating a little below the 

surface, sheens, tar balls. So we have seen a lot of different forms 

of oil, which I think ties back to the dispersant use. 

So it is complex. I again don’t have any data to support this sinking concept. As we look at this whole scenario, this is uncharted 

territory. We need science now. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Closing words, I will let Dr. Overton say 

what he wishes. But I think the notion that these are uncharted 

waters, we need to make sure that we apply adequate science to 

it, and we really do not know yet what the long-term effects of this 

will be seem to be the themes that we can all agree with about 

where we stand right now on the dispersant use. 

Dr. Overton, what did you want to say? 

Mr. OVERTON. The glimmer of light in this darkness about deep 

sea oil is a lot of oil entering the Gulf naturally for the last millions 

of years, I have heard estimates of two Exxon Valdez size spills annually in the deep water environment. The Gulf is, of course, acclimated to do that. And the environment, actually these seeps turn 

out to be a pretty active community. The organisms evolve and live 

on it. 

So there is so much unknown that it is mind boggling. But we 

do know that the Gulf is very active and alive with two Exxon 

Valdez size spills annually for the last millions of years. That is 

way outside my area of expertise. 

But I do want to point out that it is not totally—I mean, I totally 

agree; we need a comprehensive understanding of the full impact. 

Because this is a massive, acute input. And a seep is a chronic 

input. Big, big, difference. 

But there is oil in the deep oceans. And there is some evidence 

of what is going on. But clearly put some of that royalty money 

back to use, to a good use. Thank you. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Understood. And I think another good 

closing word is a phrase that Ms. Savitz used, that we are continually asking our oceans to take one for the team. And it is getting 

to the point where, as majestic and immense as our oceans are, it 

is becoming time, as our species grows in size and environmental 

effect, to start thinking of ourselves as caretakers of our oceans and 

not just takers from our oceans. 

Whether you go to the far northern oceans and see ice sheets 

that have been there since time immemorial receding, or to the 

tropic seas, where coral reefs are dying and bleaching, to in-close 

coasts, like Narragansett Bay, where mean winter water temperatures are up 4 degrees, your colleague, Dr. Perry Jeffries, Dr. 

Smith, refers to that as a full ecosystem shift. 

So it creates dramatic changes. Our fishermen are not getting 

winter flounder any longer. They are getting scup. It is a whole 
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new market for them. It is a whole new blow to the fishing economy. 

Or to the far seas, where you see the garbage gyres in the Pacific. I think we are up to 400 dead zones now charted in our 

oceans. And a more persistent and chronic threat from acidification, as we become the most acidic ocean in 8,000 centuries. 

The oceans have taken a lot for the team. And I appreciate all 

of your work in bringing science and advocacy to bear as we approach—if not reach—a tipping point where we can no longer simply be takers but must become caretakers. So your testimony has 

been very helpful. Your work is valued. And I appreciate that you 

took the trouble to come here today. 

The hearing will be kept open for 2 weeks for my colleagues to 

submit any further questions for the witnesses that they may get 

answered in writing. And without further ado, we will be adjourned. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 12:22 p.m., the Committees were adjourned.] 

[Additional statements submitted for the record follow:] 

STATEMENT OF HON. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MARYLAND

I want to thank Chairman Boxer and Chairman Whitehouse for holding this critical hearing on dispersant use in response to the BP Deepwater Horizon oil spill. 

On April 20 of this year, the BP Deepwater Horizon exploded and began this Nation’s greatest manmade environmental disaster. This catastrophe claimed 11 lives 

and has left thousands of others in turmoil across the Gulf Coast region. Our hearts 

and prayers go out to the families of those who died in the BP Deepwater Horizon 

explosion and to the hardworking Americans whose jobs and ways of life are threatened. 

As an oil slick spread across the Gulf, threatening damage to the $2.4 billion fisheries industry as well as wetlands, beaches, and shipping routes one thing became 

painfully clear—we know a lot more about how to drill an oil well than we know 

about how to stop one from spewing oil or how to clean up the mess. 

We have all watched a series of science experiments—the top hats and the top 

kills—unfold on underwater seacams. We’ve studied the diagrams in the newspapers and looked to experts on TV to explain what’s happening 5,000 feet below 

the surface of the sea. Our hopes and expectations have gone up and down like yoyos as some attempts failed, some worked a little bit, and finally the flow of oil may 

be stopped for good. 

But it’s not just in their efforts to cap the well that responders were forced to 

make decisions on the fly with too little information about what works and what 

doesn’t. 

Since the spill began, somewhere in the neighborhood of 1.8 million gallons of 

chemical dispersants were applied in the Gulf. These chemicals break the oil into 

smaller droplets. In that form it mixes and dilutes into the water column rather 

than floating on the surface in a big slick. The rationale we’ve been given is that 

damage to the organisms in the water column is a lesser evil than damage to the 

wetlands and the birds and fish that live and breed in them. 

Sadly, there is shockingly little to back up those claims. The number of facts we 

possess about these chemicals is far outweighed by the number of unanswered questions. Here are just a few. 

• We have only this past Monday begun to get answers about how toxic these 

chemicals are when mixed with oil. 

• We do not know whether breaking the oil up makes it more or less available 

to fish and other marine animals. 

• We do not know how to track or clean up the plumes of oil that the dispersants 

have helped push under the surface. 

• We don’t know what impact these plumes will have on the ecosystem and the 

food chain of the Gulf over the long-term. 

• We have very little information about the effect of dispersants applied 5,000 

feet below the sea as this was the first time it has ever been done. 
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The constant refrain we have heard is that dispersants present us with a tradeoff: protecting the more environmentally sensitive wetlands and marshes and the 

species they nurture versus the subsurface water column. But with so little known 

about dispersants and their impact on the ecosystem as a whole, I don’t know how 

responders could have effectively evaluated the risks and come to this judgment. 

This Committee has reported an important bill that would guarantee funding to 

study and develop better response technologies, including more research into 

dispersants. I am a proud co-sponsor of Senator Lautenberg’s Safe Dispersants Act 

which would require more rigorous testing before using dispersants in the future. 

These are important legislative responses to the disparity between drilling technology and response technology. 

But while these efforts to look forward are important, we need to be sure that 

BP and its partners are held responsible for the damage dispersed oil will cause to 

the environment, much of which may not be evident until months or even years in 

the future. 

The Water and Wildlife Subcommittee that I chair has begun oversight of the 

process for assessing and repairing damage to natural resources and for holding BP 

and its partners responsible to pay for it. As we seek to understand and document 

the damage that’s been done to the Gulf, it is critical that the impacts of dispersants 

and dispersed oil are front and center. That is the only way we can be sure we will 

restore the health of the Gulf Coast region and a cherished way of life to its people. 

STATEMENT OF HON. KIRSTEN GILLIBRAND, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairwoman Boxer and Chairman Whitehouse, thank you for holding this very 

important joint hearing as this Committee continues to investigate the BP oil spill 

disaster, and in particular the unprecedented use of dispersants and the potential 

immediate and long-term effects these chemicals may have on the environment. 

I want to recognize our expert witnesses as well and look forward to receiving 

their testimony and analysis. 

One hundred and seven days since the BP Deepwater Horizon platform exploded, 

killing 11 rig workers, nearly 2 million gallons of dispersant have been used in the 

Gulf of Mexico to fight the worst environmental disaster in our Nation’s history. 

Over this time many questions have surfaced, highlighting the need to investigate 

the process used to test the safety and effectiveness of dispersants prior to their listing on the pre-approved National Contingency Plan—Product Schedule, as well as 

looking into long-term impacts that chemical dispersants may have on our marine 

and coastal habitats. 

The answers to these questions are critical as we consider possible reforms to the 

process by which these chemicals are considered for emergency response. In addition, more information will aid evaluation of the environmental trade-offs between 

use of chemical dispersants versus natural biodegradation and other oil spill response tools, such as skimming and burning. 

Madam Chair, on the heels of the release of EPA’s Phase II testing this week, 

today’s hearing will provide the Agency an opportunity to clarify what the results 

say about the immediate impacts of dispersants and what I believe is essential— 

differentiating between what we know and what we still don’t know about chemical 

dispersants. 

It is these long-term unknowns which I am most concerned about. 

In the aftermath of the horrible tragedy of 9/11, thousands of first responders, 

clean up workers, and local residents were exposed to a host of chemicals and toxic 

substances in and around Ground Zero, and the long-term effects of that exposure 

have resulted in chronic illness and even death. 

As we examine the response to this disaster and the processes and regulations 

that govern how these chemicals are approved and put to use, it is clear that much 

more data is necessary, and reforms to the regulatory system might be warranted— 

something I am hopeful this Committee will play an active role in. 

Thank you again, Madam Chair and Chairman Whitehouse, for calling this hearing, and I look forward to our witnesses’ testimony. 

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