alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Exhibit 32.1



CERTIFICATION PURSUANT TO

18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,

AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO

SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002



In connection with the quarterly report of Discovery Oil, Ltd, (the "Company") on Form 10-Q for the period ending September 30, 2008, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Andrew V. Ippolito, President and Chairman of the Board of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350, as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that:



(1)

The report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934; and



(2)

The information contained in the report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the Company.





/s/ Andrew V. Ippolito

By  __________________________________

Andrew V. Ippolito

President, Chairman of the Board

Date:  November 14, 2008
§ 585.418 How will BOEM issue a suspension? ( a ) BOEM will issue a suspension order orally or in writing.
( b ) BOEM will send you a written suspension order as soon as practicable after issuing an oral suspension order.
( c ) The written order will explain the reasons for its issuance and describe the effect of the suspension order on your lease or grant and any associated activities. BOEM may authorize certain activities during the period of the suspension, as set forth in the suspension order.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION

To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

United States Court of Appeals

For the Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

Argued August 7, 2013

Decided August 9, 2013

Before

FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Chief Judge

DANIEL A. MANION, Circuit Judge

MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge

No. 12-3218

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

JOSE LUIS MACIEL,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United 

States District Court for the 

Northern District of Illinois, 

Eastern Division.

No. 10 CR 652

Amy J. St. Eve, Judge.

Order

Jose Luis Maciel was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment after a jury convicted 

him of distributing cocaine and related offenses. This is the low point of the 188 to 235 

month range the district court calculated under the Sentencing Guidelines. Maciel’s sole 

appellate argument is that the district judge should have treated him as a minor participant in the offense, which would have reduced his offense level. U.S.S.G. §3B1.2. He did 

not request this reduction in the district court, however, and the judge did not commit 

plain error by deciding not to raise the possibility herself.

A reduction under §3B1.2 depends on a conclusion that the defendant is substantially less culpable than the average participant in the offense. See United States v. Leiskunas, 

656 F.3d 732, 739 (7th Cir. 2011). Maciel was a major-league courier. The evidence at trial documented his delivery of 20 kilograms of cocaine on one occasion and 45 kilos on 

another. He was a long-distance truck driver who added drugs to the manifest of legit-
No. 12-3218 Page 2

imate cargo, receiving $2,000 for his services after each delivery. Evidence in the record 

shows that he dealt directly with the top of an organized drug-distribution network and 

transported cocaine regularly; the prosecutor’s decision to stop with proof of two episodes does not imply that these were the limit of his responsibility.

Couriers have received reductions under §3B1.2 when the evidence shows that they 

were bit players. The situation of Victor Diaz-Rios, to whom Maciel delivered the 45-

kilo shipment, illustrates. We concluded that Diaz-Rios was eligible for a reduction 

(though not necessarily entitled to it) because that delivery was a one-off deal for him, 

and he did not know the type or quantity of drugs he received. United States v. DiazRios, 706 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2013). Maciel was a regular, was trusted with million-dollar 

cargos, and knew exactly what he was carrying. If he had requested a reduction under 

§3B1.2, the district judge would have been entitled to say no, for these and other reasons. See, e.g., United States v. Saenz, 623 F.3d 461, 468 (7th Cir. 2010); United States v. 

Gonzales, 534 F.3d 613, 617 (7th Cir. 2008); United States v. Mendoza, 457 F.3d 726, 729–30 

(7th Cir. 2006). It follows that the district judge did not commit plain error when she accepted the presentence report’s calculation, in the absence of any request by the defendant for a reduction under §3B1.2.

AFFIRMED
<TABLE> <S> <C>

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<NAME>                        THE DELTONA CORPORATION
       
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<EPS-PRIMARY>                        (.09)
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</TABLE>
Exhibit 31-33**SECTION 302 CERTIFICATION**I, Anthony F. Earley, Jr., certify that: 1. I have reviewed this Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended June 30, 2007 of TheDetroit Edison Company;  2. Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a materialfact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light ofthe circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to theperiod covered by this report;  3. Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial informationincluded in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition,results of operations and cash flows of the registrant as of, and for, the periodspresented in this report;  4. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing andmaintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e)and 15d-15(e)) for the registrant and have: a. Designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused suchdisclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensurethat material information relating to the registrant, including its consolidatedsubsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularlyduring the period in which this report is being prepared;  b. Omitted pursuant to SEC Release Nos. 33-8238 and 34-47986.  c. Evaluated the effectiveness of the registrant’s disclosure controls andprocedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness ofthe disclosure controls and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by thisreport based on such evaluation; and  d. Disclosed in this report any change in the registrant’s internalcontrol over financial reporting that occurred during the registrant’s most recentfiscal quarter (the registrant’s fourth fiscal quarter in the case of an annualreport) that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect,the registrant’s internal control over financial reporting; and 5. The registrant’s other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our mostrecent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the registrant’sauditors and the audit committee of the registrant’s board of directors (or personsperforming the equivalent functions): a. All significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design oroperation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likelyto adversely affect the registrant’s ability to record, process, summarize andreport financial information; and  b. Any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or otheremployees who have a significant role in the registrant’s internal control overfinancial reporting.         /s/ ANTHONY F. EARLEY, JR. Date: August 14, 2007  Anthony F. Earley, Jr.   Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
§ 57.22226 Testing for methane (IV mines). Tests for methane shall be conducted in the mine atmosphere by a competent person— ( a ) At least once each shift prior to starting work in each face and raise; and
( b ) Upon initial release of gas into the mine atmosphere from boreholes.
| Date of report (Date of earliest event reported):  October 22, 2010 |
|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|                                                                          |
| EDCI Holdings, Inc.                                                           |
| (Exact name of registrant as specified in its charter)                        |
|                                                                          |
| Delaware                                                                      | 001-34015 | 26-2694280 |
| (State or other jurisdiction of incorporation)                                | (Commission File Number) | (IRS EmployerIdentification No.) |
|                                                                          |   |   |
| 11 East 44th Street, New York, New York                                       | 10017 |
| (Address of principal executive offices)                                      | (Zip Code) |
|                                                                          |   |
| (646) 401-0084                                                                |
| (Registrant’s telephone number, including area code)                    |
|                                                                          |   |
|                                                                          |
| (Former name or former address, if changed since last report)                 |

|  ̈ | Written communications pursuant to Rule 425 under the Securities Act (17 CFR 230.425)                  |
|--------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
|   |                                                                                                   |
|  ̈ | Soliciting material pursuant to Rule 14a-12 under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14a-12)                 |
|   |                                                                                                   |
|  ̈ | Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 14d-2(b) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.14d-2(b)) |
|   |                                                                                                   |
|  ̈ | Pre-commencement communications pursuant to Rule 13e-4(c) under the Exchange Act (17 CFR 240.13e-4(c)) |

|   | Exhibit No. |   | Description                          |
|--------|-------------|--------|--------------------------------------|
|   | 99.1        |   | Press Release dated October 22, 2010 |

|                              | EDCI Holdings, Inc. |
|-----------------------------------|---------------------|
| Date:  October 22, 2010 |                |   |
|                              |                |   |
|                              | By:                 | /s/ Matthew K. Behrent |
|                              |                | Printed Name: Matthew K. Behrent |
|                              |                | Title: Executive Vice President Corporate Development |
Second Order filed October 24, 2017. 

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

____________

NO. 14-17-00760-CV

____________

IN THE INTEREST OF R.P.R. JR., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 314th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2016-04660J

SECOND ORDER

This is an appeal from a judgment terminating the parental rights of 

appellant, Mother. In her notice of appeal, Mother requests the appointment of 

counsel because of her indigent status.

In Texas, there is a statutory right to counsel for indigent persons in parental 

termination cases. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 107.013(a)(1) (West Supp. 2016); 

see also In re M.S., 115 S.W.3d 534, 544 (Tex. 2003). If an indigent parent 

requests appointment of an attorney to appeal a judgment terminating his or her 

parental rights, the trial court must determine the issue of indigence. See Tex. Fam. 

Code Ann. § 263.405(e) (West 2014). If the court finds the parent to be indigent, 
or the parent is presumed indigent, the court must appoint counsel to represent the 

parent on appeal. Id.; In re K.M., 98 S.W.3d 774, 776 (Tex. App. Fort Worth 2003, 

no pet.). 

On October 3, 2017, we ordered the judge of the 314th District Court to 

immediately conduct a hearing to determine whether appellant desires to prosecute

this appeal, and, if so, whether appellant is indigent and, thus entitled to a free 

record and appointed counsel on appeal. We ordered that the transcribed record of 

the hearing, and supplemental clerk’s record containing findings of fact and 

conclusions of law be filed with the clerk of this court on or before October 23, 

2017. To date, this court has not received the requested record.

Appeals in parental termination cases and child protection cases are to be 

brought to final disposition within 180 days of the date the notice of appeal is 

filed. See Tex. R. Jud. Admin. 6.2(a) (effective May 1, 2012). Accordingly, we 

issue this second order. 

We ORDER the judge of the 314th District Court to immediately conduct a 

hearing, via teleconference if necessary, to determine whether appellant desires to 

prosecute this appeal, and, if so, whether appellant is indigent and, thus entitled to 

a free record and appointed counsel on appeal. The judge shall appoint an appellate 

counsel for appellant if necessary. The judge shall see that a record of the hearing 

is made, shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law, and shall order the 

trial clerk to forward a record of the hearing and a supplemental clerk’s record 

containing the findings and conclusions. The transcribed record of the hearing, and 

supplemental clerk’s record shall be filed with the clerk of this court on or before 

November 3, 2017.

PER CURIAM
SOUTH COAST AIR QUALITY MANAGEMENT DISTRICT

(Adopted Oct. 5, 1979)(Amended March 7, 1980)(Amended Sept. 10, 1982)

(Amended July 12, 1985)(Amended June 28, 1990)

(Amended December 7, 1995)

RULE 1313. PERMITS TO OPERATE

(a) Change of Operator

The Executive Officer or designee shall exempt from the provisions of this rule any facility which is a

continuing operation, without modification or change in operating conditions, when a permit to operate is

required solely because of permit renewal, change in operator, or a change in Rule 219 (Equipment Not

Requiring a Permit).

(b) No Permit to Construct Issued

For new or modified sources or facilities which are constructed without the required Permit to Construct, the

application for a Permit to Operate shall, for the purpose of this rule, be considered an application for a Permit

to Construct. The Executive Officer or designee shall deny the Permit to Operate unless the new or modified

facility complies with all provisions of Regulation XIII. All offsets must be obtained within 90 days after

notice from the Executive Officer or designee that offsets are required.

(c) Additional Offsets

The Permit to Operate shall be denied if it is determined that actual emissions are greater than previously

calculated when the Permit to Construct was issued, unless additional offsets are obtained within 90 days after

notice from the Executive Officer or designee that offsets are required to mitigate the increase.

(d) Start-Up

For a new source or modification which will be a replacement, in whole or part, for an existing source on the

same or contiguous property, a maximum of 90 days may be allowed as a start-up period for simultaneous

operation of the subject sources.

(e) Permit Conditions

The Executive Officer or designee shall require as a condition for the issuance of any Permit to Operate for a

new or modified facility, that the facility and any offset facility be operated consistent with any conditions

imposed on their respective Permit to Construct.

(f) Major Facility Permit Condition Limitation Relaxation

Any major source that has taken a permit condition limiting a source's mass emissions in order to avoid NSR

since August 1980 shall be subject to provisions of Regulation XIII if such permit condition is removed or

relaxed in any way.

(g) Emission Limitation Permit Conditions

Every permit shall have the following conditions:

SCAQMD 1313 - PERMITS TO OPERATE https://yosemite.epa.gov/r9/r9sips.nsf/AgencyProvision/5D340A87832...

1 of 2 6/8/2016 7:58 AM
1. Identified BACT conditions;

2. Monthly maximum emissions from the permitted source.

SCAQMD 1313 - PERMITS TO OPERATE https://yosemite.epa.gov/r9/r9sips.nsf/AgencyProvision/5D340A87832...

2 of 2 6/8/2016 7:58 AM
#### The People of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Talmadge Grant, Appellant.

Appeal by defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Queens County, rendered September 10, 1958 after a jury trial, convicting him of burglary in the third degree and petit larceny, and sentencing him, as a third felony offender, to serve a term of 10 to 20 years. The defendant contends that the verdict of the jury was contrary to the weight of evidence, that the charge to the jury was improper and that the sentence was excessive. Judgment affirmed. No opinion. Beldock, P. J., Kleinfeld, Brennan, Rabin and Hopkins, JJ., concur.
#### Thomas Lizak, Appellant, v. Roger Boucher, Respondent.

Judgment unanimously reversed on the law and facts and a new trial granted, with costs to the appellant to abide the event. Memorandum: A new trial is required because of deficiencies in the charge. At the close of the evidence a close question of fact was presented as to negligence and contributory negligence. Plaintiff testified that in the early evening he was walking four or five feet from his left edge of a paved suburban road. It was the version of defendant that he was driving at 25 miles an hour when he was “ blinded ” by the headlights of approaching cars. He admittedly failed to see plaintiff until the instant of impact, but insisted that appellant was on the paved portion of the highway. The court first charged a portion of subdivision 5 of section 82 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, but this had little or no relevancy and may have given the jury the impression that defendant had “the right of way”. The court correctly charged the provisions of subdivision 6 of section 85 of the same law, which defined the duty of plaintiff as a pedestrian. The court, however, failed to charge the pertinent provision found in the last sentence of subdivision 1 of section 67 of the law, which defined the duty of defendant as a motorist approaching a pedestrian, who, according to respondent’s testimony, was on the “traveled portion of the highway”. The fact that defendant, according to his version, did not see plaintiff would not make the statutory provision less applicable, because "headlights often shine in an operator’s eyes in night driving; and if a driver cannot see he ought to stop or take the usual risks of liability”. *(Miller*v. *Hine,*281 App. Div. 387, 389-390.) In addition, the jury should have been instructed that pursuant to these statutory provisions plaintiff had a right to walk upon the paved portion of the highway, but if it should be found that there was an adjoining shoulder or other area off the pavement available to pedestrians, the jury should consider under all the circumstances whether or not it was contributory negligence to walk on the paved portion of the road. *(Babbidge*v. *Pohl,*11 A D 2d 612; *Aschmutat*v. *State of New York,*12 A D 2d 844; *Novak*v. *State of New York,*199 Misc. 588, 591.) (Appeal from judgment of Onondaga Trial Term which found for defendant for no cause of action in an automobile negligence action.) Present—Williams, P. J., Bastow, Goldman, McClusky and Henry, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-6936
GEORGE E. BATTEN, Plaintiff - Appellant, versus R. D. MILLER, Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Terrence W. Boyle, District Judge. (CA-96-380-5-BO-3) Submitted: September 20, 1996 Decided: October 2, 1996 Before NIEMEYER, HAMILTON, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges. Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion. George E. Batten, Appellant Pro Se. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. See Local Rule 36(c).2 PER CURIAM: Appellant noted this appeal outside the thirty-day appeal period established by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1), failed to obtain an extension of the appeal period within the additional thirty-day period provided by Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5), and is not entitled to relief under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(6). The time periods established by Fed. R. App. P. 4 are "mandatory and jurisdictional." Browder v. Director, Dep't of Corrections , 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978) (quoting United States v. Robinson , 361 U.S. 220, 229 (1960)). The district court entered its order on May 14, 1996; Appellant's notice of appeal was filed on June 18, 1996. Appellant's failure to note a timely appeal or obtain an extension of the appeal period deprivesthis court of jurisdiction to consider this case. We therefore dismiss the appeal. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
EXHIBIT 10.3

                   ALASKAN CABLE REGISTRATION RIGHTS AGREEMENT
               [see Exhibit A to Alaskan Cable Purchase Agreement]







                                                         REGISTRATION STATEMENT
                                                                         II-625