COUNTERING 

VIOLENT 

EXTREMISM

Actions Needed to 

Define Strategy and 

Assess Progress of 

Federal Efforts

Report to Congressional Requesters

April 2017

GAO-17-300

United States Government Accountability Office
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-17-300, a report to

congressional requesters

April 2017

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM

Actions Needed to Define Strategy and Assess 

Progress of Federal Efforts

What GAO Found

As of December 2016, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department

of Justice (DOJ), Federal Bureau of Investigation, and National Counterterrorism 

Center had implemented 19 of the 44 domestically-focused tasks identified in the 

2011 Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) for countering violent extremism

(CVE) in the United States. Twenty-three tasks were in progress and no action 

had yet been taken on 2 tasks. The 44 tasks aim to address three core CVE 

objectives: community outreach, research and training, and capacity building. 

Implemented tasks include, for example, DOJ conducting CVE outreach 

meetings to communities targeted by violent extremism and DHS integrating 

CVE content into law enforcement counterterrorism training. Tasks in progress

include, for example, DHS building relationships with the social media industry 

and increasing training available to communities to counter violent extremists 

online. Tasks that had not yet been addressed include, implementing CVE

activities in prisons and learning from former violent extremists. Federal CVE

efforts aim to educate and prevent radicalization before a crime or terrorist act 

transpires, and differ from counterterrorism efforts such as collecting evidence 

and making arrests before an event has occurred.

Figure: Countering Violent Extremism is Different from Counterterrorism

The federal government does not have a cohesive strategy or process for 

assessing the overall CVE effort. Although GAO was able to determine the 

status of the 44 CVE tasks, it was not able to determine if the United States is 

better off today than it was in 2011 as a result of these tasks. This is because no 

cohesive strategy with measurable outcomes has been established to guide the 

multi-agency CVE effort. Such a strategy could help ensure that the individual 

actions of stakeholder agencies are measureable and contributing to the overall 

goals of the federal government’s CVE effort. The federal government also has 

not established a process by which to evaluate the effectiveness of the collective 

CVE effort. The CVE Task Force was established in part to evaluate and assess 

CVE efforts across the federal government, but has not established a process for 

doing so. Evaluating the progress and effectiveness of the overall federal CVE 

effort could better help identify successes, gaps, and resource needs across 

stakeholder agencies.

View GAO-17-300. For more information,

contact Diana Maurer at (202) 512-8777 or

maurerd@gao.gov.

Why GAO Did This Study

Violent extremism—generally defined

as ideologically, religious, or politicallymotivated acts of violence—has been

perpetrated in the United States by 

white supremacists, anti-government

groups, and radical Islamist entities,

among others. In 2011, the U.S.

government developed a national

strategy and SIP for CVE aimed at

providing information and resources to

communities. In 2016, an interagency

CVE Task Force led by DHS and DOJ

was created to coordinate CVE efforts.

GAO was asked to review domestic 

federal CVE efforts. This report

addresses the extent to which (1) DHS,

DOJ, and other key stakeholders

tasked with CVE in the United States

have implemented the 2011 SIP and

(2) the federal government has

developed a strategy to implement

CVE activities, and the CVE Task

Force has assessed progress. GAO

assessed the status of activities in the

2011 SIP; interviewed officials from

agencies leading CVE efforts and a

non-generalizable group of communitybased entities selected from cities with

CVE frameworks; and compared Task

Force activities to selected best

practices for multi- agency efforts.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DHS and DOJ

direct the CVE Task Force to (1)

develop a cohesive strategy with

measurable outcomes and (2) establish

a process to assess the overall

progress of CVE efforts. DHS and DOJ 

concurred with both recommendations 

and DHS described the CVE Task 

Force’s planned actions for 

implementation.
Page i GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Letter 1

Background 3

Almost Half of Planned 2011 CVE Tasks Were Implemented, 

but Work Remains 12

The Federal CVE Effort Lacks a Cohesive Strategy with 

Measureable Outcomes and a Process for Assessing Progress 16

Conclusions 20

Recommendations 21

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 22

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 26

Appendix II Violent Extremist Attacks in the United States that 

Resulted in Fatalities, September 12, 2001 through 

December 31, 2016 28

Appendix III Implementation of Tasks in the 2011 Strategic 

Implementation Plan 35

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Homeland Security 52

Appendix V GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 56

Tables

Table 1: Far Right Violent Extremist-Motivated Attacks that 

Resulted in Fatalities, September 12, 2001 through 

December 31, 2016, as reported in the U.S. Extremist 

Crime Database (ECDB) 29

Table 2: Radical Islamist Violent Extremist-Motivated Attacks that 

Resulted in Fatalities, September 12, 2001 through 

December 31, 2016, as reported in the U.S. Extremist 

Crime Database (ECDB) 33

Contents
Page ii GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Table 3: Assessment of Community Outreach Tasks in the 2011 

Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) as of December 2016 36

Table 4: Assessment of Research and Training Tasks in the 2011 

Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) as of December 2016 41

Table 5: Assessment of Capacity Building Tasks in the 2011 

Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) as of December 2016 49

Figures

Figure 1: Attacks in the United States by Domestic Violent 

Extremists from September 12, 2001 through December 

31, 2016 that Resulted in Fatalities 4

Figure 2: Number of Violent Extremist-linked Incidents and 

Resulting Fatalities in the United States from September 

12, 2001 through December 31, 2016 6

Figure 3: Countering Violent Extremism is Different from 

Counterterrorism 7

Figure 4: Timeline of Federal Countering Violent Extremism 

Milestones and Activities 11

Figure 5: Status of 2011 Strategic Implementation Plan’s 44 

Domestically-Focused Tasks 13
Page iii GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Abbreviations

CAB Community Awareness Briefings 

CREX Community Resilience Exercises

CVE Countering Violent Extremism

DOD Department of Defense

DHS Department of Homeland Security

DOJ Department of Justice

State Department of State

ECDB United States Extremist Crime Database

FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation

FEMA Federal Emergency Management Agency

FLETC Federal Law Enforcement Training Center

ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

NCTC National Counterterrorism Center

OCP Office of Community Partnerships

SLATT State and Local Anti-Terrorism Training

SIP Strategic Implementation Plan

START Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism

WORDE World Organization for Resource Development 

and Education

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Page 1 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

441 G St. N.W.

Washington, DC 20548

April 6, 2017

Congressional Requesters

Violent extremism—generally defined as supporting or committing violent 

acts to achieve political, ideological, religious, or social goals—has been 

perpetrated and promoted by a broad range of groups in the United 

States for decades. Such groups include white supremacists, antigovernment groups, and groups with extreme views on abortion, animal 

rights, the environment, and federal ownership of public lands; and radical 

Islamist entities, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), among 

others.1 The September 11, 2001, attacks account for the largest number 

of fatalities in the United States resulting from violent extremism. 

According to the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB), since the 

September 11 attacks, 85 attacks in the United States by violent 

extremists—associated with both radical Islamist and far right 

ideologies—have resulted in 225 fatalities.2

In response to this threat, in 2011, the U.S. government developed a 

national strategy and a Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) for countering 

violent extremism (CVE).3 Primarily led by the Departments of Homeland 

Security (DHS) and Justice (DOJ) through an interagency task force, the 

 1

The organization referred to as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria is alternatively known 

as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, the Islamic State, and occasionally, “Daesh.’’ 

Radical Islamist entities incorporate a militant ideology aimed at creating a worldwide 

community, or caliphate, of Muslim believers by any means necessary, including violence. 

Radical Islamist extremist groups include al-Qa’ida and ISIS, among others.

2

The U.S. ECDB is maintained by the University of Maryland National Consortium for the 

Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). The ECDB is a database of the 

attacks committed by far rightists, radical Islamists and animal and environmental rights 

extremists in the United States since 1990. It includes the names of perpetrators and 

victims and the date and location of each incident, among other types of data. The 225 

fatalities cited are victims and not perpetrators who may have died during the incident. 

START defines far right extremism as that which is motivated by a variety of far right 

ideologies and beliefs, generally favoring social hierarchy and seeking an idealized future 

favoring a particular group. Far right extremist groups include white supremacists and 

antigovernment militias, among others. START defines far left extremists as including 

those with extreme views on animal rights and the environment. 

3

In August 2011, The White House issued The National Strategy for Empowering Local 

Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States followed by The National 

Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United 

States, Strategic Implementation Plan in December 2011. The Strategic Implementation 

Plan was replaced by a new version in October 2016.

Letter
Page 2 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

federal government’s leadership in CVE is aimed at educating and 

providing resources to communities for preventing violent extremist acts.4

Specifically, CVE activities outlined in the 2011 SIP and updated in the 

2016 SIP are aimed at enhancing the ability of local police and 

community organizations—including religious, educational, and non-profit 

entities—to provide information and resources to communities targeted by 

violent extremists and individuals who may have started down a road to 

violent extremism. These activities generally aim to provide alternative 

messages and options to terrorist or violent extremist recruitment and 

radicalization efforts through civic engagement.

Given the broad scope of activities associated with CVE and the 

importance of effective programs to address domestic threats, you asked 

us to review the implementation and organization of CVE efforts. This 

report addresses the extent to which (1) DHS, DOJ, and other key 

stakeholders tasked with CVE in the United States implemented the 2011 

SIP and (2) the federal government has developed a strategy to 

implement CVE activities, and the CVE Task Force has developed a

process for assessing overall progress.

To assess the extent to which DHS, DOJ, and other key stakeholders 

tasked with CVE in the United States implemented the 2011 SIP, we 

collected information from each agency responsible for leading 44 

domestically related tasks in the 2011 SIP. Specifically, we asked for 

information—including, for example, program descriptions, internal 

progress reports, and materials distributed to the public—from each 

agency on the status of actions taken to address their assigned activities 

between December 2011 and December 2016. We assessed the 

information to determine whether each task had been implemented, was 

still in progress, or had not yet been addressed.

To determine the extent to which the federal government has developed a

strategy to implement CVE activities and the CVE Task Force has 

developed a process for assessing overall progress, we reviewed the 

2011 National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 

Extremism in the United States (National Strategy), the 2011 and 2016 

Strategic Implementation Plans for the strategy, and other documents 

 4

The following departments and agencies have responsibility for implementing the 2016 

SIP: DHS, DOJ, the Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), Education, Health and 

Human Services, and Labor, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), U.S. 

Agency for International Development, and National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).
Page 3 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

related to the creation and activities of the CVE Task Force. Specifically, 

we reviewed these documents to identify whether measurable outcomes 

and associated metrics had been defined, and compared this information 

against practices for creating effective interagency collaborative efforts 

and managing cross-cutting issues. We interviewed officials from the 

stakeholder agencies including DHS, DOJ, the Department of Education, 

the Department of Health and Human Services, the Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI), and the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to 

discuss their approaches to CVE and their roles and responsibilities as 

part of the federal CVE effort. A detailed description of our scope and 

methodology can be found in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit from October 2015 to April 2017 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

White supremacists, anti-government extremists, radical Islamist

extremists, and other ideologically inspired domestic violent extremists 

have been active in the United States for decades. Examples of attacks 

include the 1993 World Trade Center bombing by radical Islamists, in 

which 6 persons were killed; and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing of the 

Alfred P. Murrah federal building by anti-government far right individuals, 

in which 168 lives were lost. The September 11, 2001, attacks account for 

the largest number of fatalities in the United States in a single or closelyrelated attack resulting from violent extremism in recent decades. While 

the September 11, 2001, attacks were perpetrated by foreign violent 

extremists, from September 12, 2001 through December 31, 2016, 

attacks by domestic or “homegrown” violent extremists in the United 

States resulted in 225 fatalities, according to the ECDB. Of these, 106 

were killed by far right violent extremists in 62 separate incidents, and 

119 were victims of radical Islamist violent extremists in 23 separate 

incidents. Figure 1 shows the locations and number of fatalities involved 

in these incidents. A detailed list of the incidents can be found in appendix 

II. According to the ECDB, activities of far left wing violent extremist 

groups did not result in any fatalities during this period.

Background

Violent Extremists in the 

United States
Page 4 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Figure 1: Attacks in the United States by Domestic Violent Extremists from September 12, 2001 through December 31, 2016 

that Resulted in Fatalities

Note: Each circle or octagon represents a single attack with the size measuring the number of 

fatalities. The ECDB is a database that includes information on publicly known violent crimes 

committed in the United States by radical Islamist violent extremists, the violent far right, and far left 

violent extremists from 1990 through 2015. For 2016, attacks resulting in homicides by ideological 

violent extremists in the United States were provided to us by email updates from ECDB researchers. 

The ECDB includes information on the incidents themselves, as well as their perpetrators, related 

organizations, and victims. There were no attacks since 1990 by persons associated with extreme 

leftist ideologies that resulted in fatalities to non-perpetrators.

Since September 12, 2001, the number of fatalities caused by domestic 

violent extremists has ranged from 1 to 49 in a given year. As shown in 

figure 2, fatalities resulting from attacks by far right wing violet extremists 

have exceeded those caused by radical Islamist violent extremists in 10 

of the 15 years, and were the same in 3 of the years since September 12, 

2001. Of the 85 violent extremist incidents that resulted in death since 

September 12, 2001, far right wing violent extremist groups were 

responsible for 62 (73 percent) while radical Islamist violent extremists 

were responsible for 23 (27 percent). The total number of fatalities is 
Page 5 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

about the same for far right wing violent extremists and radical Islamist

violent extremists over the approximately 15-year period (106 and 119, 

respectively). However, 41 percent of the deaths attributable to radical 

Islamist violent extremists occurred in a single event—an attack at an 

Orlando, Florida night club in 2016 (see fig. 2). Details on the locations 

and dates of the attacks can be found in appendix II.
Page 6 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Figure 2: Number of Violent Extremist-linked Incidents and Resulting Fatalities in the United States from September 12, 2001 

through December 31, 2016
Page 7 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

In October 2016, the federal government defined the U.S. approach to 

countering violent extremism as proactive actions to counter efforts by 

extremists to recruit, radicalize, and mobilize followers to violence. The 

three parts of the U.S. approach to CVE efforts are: (1) empowering 

communities and civil society; (2) messaging and counter–messaging; 

and (3) addressing causes and driving factors. CVE activities are different 

from traditional counterterrorism efforts, such as collecting intelligence, 

gathering evidence, making arrests, and responding to incidents, in that 

they generally focus on preventing an individual from finding or acting out 

on a motive for committing a crime, as shown in figure 3. In February 

2015, the White House released a fact sheet stating that CVE 

encompasses the preventative aspects of counterterrorism as well as 

interventions to undermine the attraction of violent extremist movements 

and ideologies that seek to promote violence.

Figure 3: Countering Violent Extremism is Different from Counterterrorism

According to the national strategy, CVE actions intend to address the 

conditions and reduce the factors that most likely contribute to recruitment 

and radicalization by violent extremists. CVE efforts, as defined by the 

White House, are not to include gathering intelligence or performing 

investigations for the purpose of criminal prosecution. CVE efforts aim to 

address the root causes of violent extremism through community 

engagement, including:

The U.S. Approach to 

Countering Domestic 

Violent Extremism
Page 8 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

• Building awareness—through briefings on the drivers and indicators of 

radicalization and recruitment to violence. For example, U.S. 

Attorney’s and DHS offices host community outreach meetings in 

which they provide information on identifying suspicious activity.

• Countering violent extremist narratives—directly addressing and 

countering violent extremist recruitment messages, such as 

encouraging alternative messages from community groups online. For 

example, DOJ partnered with the International Association of Chiefs 

of Police to produce awareness briefs on countering online 

radicalization.

• Emphasizing community led intervention—supporting community 

efforts to disrupt the radicalization process before an individual 

engages in criminal activity. For example, the FBI aims to provide 

tools and resources to communities to help them identify social 

workers and mental health professionals who can help support at-risk 

individuals and prevent them from becoming radicalized.

Recognizing that most CVE activities occur at the community level, DHS 

and DOJ officials leading the CVE Task Force describe the federal role in 

CVE as a combination of providing research funding and training 

materials, and educating the public through activities such as DHS or 

DOJ hosted community briefings in which specific threats and warning 

signs of violent extremism are shared. According to FBI officials, these 

outreach efforts also provide an opportunity to build relationships in the 

community and help clarify the FBI’s role in engaging community 

organizations. According to DHS officials, DHS also conducts regular 

community engagement roundtables in multiple cities that provide a forum 

for communities to comment on and hear information about Department 

activities, including CVE. In addition to community meetings, education of 

the public is to occur through a multiplicity of outreach channels, including 

websites, social media, conferences, and communications to state and 

local governments, including law enforcement entities.

Since 2010, federal agencies have initiated several steps towards 

countering violent extremism. In November 2010, a National Engagement 

Task Force, led by DHS and DOJ, was established to help coordinate 

community engagement efforts to counter violent extremism. The task 

force was to include all departments and agencies involved in relevant 

community engagement efforts and focus on compiling local, national, 

and international best practices and disseminating these out to the field, 

especially to U.S. Attorneys’ Offices. The task force was also responsible 

for connecting field-based federal components involved in community 

Organization of CVE 

Programs and Initiatives 

Have Undergone Recent 

Changes
Page 9 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

engagement to maximize partnerships, coordination, and resourcesharing. According to DHS officials, the National Engagement Task Force 

disbanded in 2013.

In September 2015, DHS recognized that its CVE efforts were scattered 

across a number of components and lacked specific goals and tangible 

measures of success. DHS created the Office of Community Partnerships 

(OCP) to consolidate its programs, foster greater involvement of the 

technology sector and philanthropic efforts to support private CVE efforts, 

and to enhance DHS grant-making in the area. At the same time, federal 

agencies involved in CVE recognized that the CVE landscape had 

changed since the issuance of the national strategy and SIP in late 2011. 

According to DHS and DOJ officials, ISIS had emerged as a threat, and 

an increase in internet recruiting by violent extremist groups since 2011 

required an update to the SIP. In 2015, NCTC led a review to ensure that 

the federal government was optimally organized to carry out the CVE 

mission. According to DOJ and DHS officials leading CVE activities, the 

review validated the objectives of the 2011 strategy, but identified gaps in 

its implementation. Specifically, representatives from 10 departments and 

agencies contributing to CVE efforts identified four needs: infrastructure 

to coordinate and prioritize CVE activities across the federal government 

and with stakeholders; clear responsibility, accountability, and 

communication internally and with the public; broad participation of 

departments and agencies outside national security lanes; and a process 

to assess, prioritize, and allocate resources to maximize impact.

In response, in January 2016, a new CVE task force was created to 

coordinate government efforts and partnerships to prevent violent 

extremism in the United States. The CVE Task Force is a permanent 

interagency task force hosted by DHS with overall leadership provided by 

DHS and DOJ. Staffing is to be provided by representatives from DHS,

DOJ, FBI, NCTC, and other supporting departments and agencies. The 

Task Force is administratively housed at DHS and is to rotate leadership 

between DHS and DOJ bi-annually. The interagency CVE Task Force 

was established to: (1) synchronize and integrate whole-of-government 

CVE programs and activities; (2) conduct ongoing strategic planning; and 

(3) assess and evaluate CVE efforts.

In October 2016, the Task Force, through the White House, issued an 

updated SIP for the 2011 national strategy. The 2016 SIP outlines the 

general lines of effort that partnering agencies will aim to undertake to 

guide their coordination of federal efforts and implement the national 

strategy. These lines of effort include:
Page 10 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

• Research and Analysis: The Task Force is to coordinate federal 

support for ongoing and future CVE research. Since 2011, DHS has 

funded 98 CVE related research projects and DOJ has funded 25. 

Coordination through this line of effort aims to prevent overlap and 

duplication while identifying guidelines for future evaluations. This line 

of effort also aims to identify and share guidelines for designing, 

implementing, and evaluating CVE programs.

• Engagements and Technical Assistance: The Task Force is to 

coordinate federal outreach to and engagement with communities. 

DHS, FBI, U.S. Attorneys, and other departments regularly provide 

information to local community and law enforcement leaders. To date, 

much of the information provided has been from the individual 

perspective of each agency and its mission rather than a coordinated 

CVE mission. This line of effort aims to coordinate these outreach 

efforts to synchronize the messages that are reaching the 

communities.

• Interventions: This line of effort aims to develop intervention options to 

include alternative pathways or “off-ramps” for individuals who appear 

to be moving toward violent action but who have not yet engaged in 

criminal activity. Law enforcement officials are looking for ways to 

support community led programs, particularly when they focus on 

juveniles and others who have the potential to be redirected away 

from violence. The CVE Task Force, in coordination with DOJ and the 

FBI, aim to support local multidisciplinary intervention approaches.

• Communications and Digital Strategy: Recognizing that general CVE 

information and resources are not easily accessible by stakeholders, 

the CVE Task Force aims to create a new online platform, including a 

public website, to ensure stakeholders around the country are able to 

quickly and easily understand national CVE efforts. This platform aims 

to serve as the national digital CVE clearinghouse by centralizing and 

streamlining access to training; research, analysis, and lessons 

learned; financial resources and grant information; networks and 

communities of interest; and intervention resources.

According to the 2016 SIP, the lines of effort were developed to align with 

the three priority action areas outlined in the 2011 national strategy and 

SIP: (1) enhancing engagement with and support to local communities; 

(2) building government and law enforcement expertise for preventing 

violent extremism; and (3) countering violent extremist propaganda while 

promoting our ideals. Also in October 2016, DHS issued its own strategy 

outlining the specific actions it aims to take to meet its CVE mission. 

Figure 4 shows a timeline of federal CVE milestones and activities.
Page 11 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Figure 4: Timeline of Federal Countering Violent Extremism Milestones and Activities

Consistent with direction in the 2011 National Strategy, federal CVE 

efforts have generally been initiated by leveraging existing programs and 

without a specific CVE budget. For example, activities that address 

violence in schools or hate crimes in communities may be relevant to 

constraining or averting violent extremism, but receive funding as part of 

a different program. In fiscal year 2016, the DHS Office of Community 

Partnerships operated with a $3.1 million budget and focused on raising 

awareness of violent extremists’ threats in communities, building 

relationships with community organizations that are conducting CVE 

efforts, and coordinating CVE efforts within DHS. Additionally, DHS’s 

fiscal year 2016 appropriation included $50 million to address emergent 

CVE Funding
Page 12 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

threats from violent extremism and from complex, coordinated terrorist 

attacks.5 Of the $50 million,

• DHS awarded $10 million through a competitive grant program 

specific to CVE;

• DHS designated $1 million for a Joint Counterterrorism Workshop; 

and

• DHS designated the remaining $39 million to be competitively 

awarded under the existing Homeland Security Grant Program.

Developed to help execute the 2011 National Strategy for Empowering 

Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, the 

2011 SIP detailed federal agency roles and responsibilities for current 

and future CVE efforts. The SIP outlined 44 tasks to address CVE 

domestically and called for the creation of an Assessment Working Group 

to measure CVE’s progress and effectiveness.6 From our analysis of 

agency documentation and other evidence as to whether tasks had been 

implemented, we determined that agencies implemented almost half of 

the 44 domestically-focused tasks identified in the 2011 SIP.7 Specifically, 

from December 2011 through December 2016, federal agencies 

implemented 19 tasks, had 23 tasks in progress, and had not yet taken 

action on 2 tasks (see fig. 5 below and app. III for additional details). 

 5

See Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. F, § 543, 129 Stat. 2242, 2518-19 (2015) (providing further 

that the Secretary may transfer funds made available for emerging threats between 

appropriations for the same purpose, notwithstanding other enacted provisions that affect 

the Secretary’s authority to transfer funds). 

6

The SIP included 47 tasks and designated federal agency lead(s) responsible for 

ensuring each task was implemented. We analyzed implementation of tasks that were led 

by DHS, DOJ, FBI, and NCTC. These four agencies are responsible for domestic CVE 

and were collectively responsible for implementing 44 of the 47 tasks in the SIP. We did 

not analyze the implementation of 3 of the 47 tasks because they were international in 

scope or led by an agency outside of the four agencies responsible for domestic CVE. 

Specifically, we did not analyze the Department of Treasury’s efforts to address terrorism 

financing, the Department of Defense’s effort to provide training to military personnel, and 

the State Department’s international exchange program. We did not assess the quality of 

efforts taken related to the 44 tasks.

7

For the 44 tasks identified in the SIP, DHS, DOJ, FBI and NCTC provided information on 

the status of actions taken on the tasks for which they were the lead agencies. Some 

tasks listed multiple agencies as co-leads responsible for completion. Some agency 

responses showed their actions substantially addressed the task, while others only took 

some action for the same task. DHS, DOJ, and FBI provided technical comments on our 

assessment which we incorporated as appropriate and officials from NCTC met with us to 

discuss the information it provided.

Almost Half of 

Planned 2011 CVE 

Tasks Were 

Implemented, but 

Work Remains
Page 13 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

While progress was made in implementing the tasks, the Assessment 

Working Group was never formed according to DHS and DOJ officials 

responsible for implementing the SIP. Moreover, as of December 2016, 

there had been no comprehensive assessment of the federal 

government’s CVE efforts’ effectiveness.

Figure 5: Status of 2011 Strategic Implementation Plan’s 44 Domestically-Focused 

Tasks

The 44 domestically-oriented tasks identified in the 2011 SIP were 

focused on addressing three core CVE objectives: community outreach, 

research and training, and capacity building. Below is a description of 

progress made and challenges remaining by core CVE objective.

Community outreach aims to enhance federal engagement and support to 

local communities that may be targeted by violent extremism. For 

example, community outreach might include expanding relationships with 

local business and communities to identify or prevent violent extremism or 

integrating CVE activities into community-oriented policing efforts.

Of the 17 community outreach tasks in the SIP, we determined that 

agencies implemented 8 tasks and 9 remain in progress. In general, 

agencies implemented tasks focused on expanding CVE efforts in local 

communities and identifying ways to increase funding for CVE activities, 

Community Outreach
Page 14 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

among other things. For example, DOJ expanded CVE activities to 

communities targeted by violent extremism through a series of outreach 

meetings led by the U.S. Attorney’s offices. Further, both DHS and DOJ 

identified funding within existing appropriations to incorporate CVE into 

eligible public safety and community resilience grants.

However, community outreach tasks that remained in progress include 

tasks related to reaching communities in the digital environment. For 

example, DHS aims to build relationships with the high-tech and social 

media industry and continues to meet with officials to discuss how to 

address violent extremism online. In providing a status update on such 

activities, DHS recognized this as an area that continues to need 

attention.

Research and training relates to understanding the threat of violent 

extremism, sharing information, and leveraging it to train government and 

law enforcement officials. For example, activities under research and 

training might include funding or conducting analysis on CVE-related 

topics or developing training curriculums for CVE stakeholders.

Of the 19 research and training tasks we assessed in the SIP, we 

determined that agencies implemented 9 tasks, had 9 tasks in progress, 

and had not yet taken action on 1 task. Agencies implemented activities 

related to continuing research on CVE and integrating CVE training into 

federal law enforcement training, among other things. For example, DHS, 

through its Science and Technology Directorate, continued its research 

and reporting on violent extremist root causes and funded an open source 

database on terrorism as stated in the SIP. DHS also implemented a task 

related to integrating CVE content into counter-terrorism training 

conducted at the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. Additionally, 

NCTC implemented tasks related to expanding awareness briefings to 

state and local law enforcement, and developing and reviewing guidance 

on CVE training, while the FBI implemented a task regarding the 

completion of a CVE coordination office.

Further, tasks related to training non-security federal partners to 

incorporate CVE training remain in progress. For example, DHS was 

given responsibility for collaborating with non-security federal partners to 

build CVE training modules that can be incorporated into existing 

programs related to public safety, violence prevention, and resilience. 

DHS acknowledged this task needs attention and noted that, while initial 

steps were taken, the interagency effort needs to better define roles and 

Research and Training
Page 15 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

opportunities for future collaborations. However, agencies have not yet 

taken action on implementing CVE in federal prisons.

Capacity building tasks relate to investments of resources into 

communities to enhance the effectiveness and future sustainability of 

their CVE efforts. Capacity building might, for example, include expanding 

the use of informational briefings to a wider audience or outreach to 

former violent extremists to counter violent narratives.

Of the 8 capacity building tasks we assessed in the SIP, we determined 

that agencies implemented 2 tasks, 5 tasks were in progress, and action 

had not yet been taken on 1 task. For example, one of the implemented 

capacity building tasks included providing regular briefings on CVE to 

Congress and others. In implementing this task, DHS participated in over 

two dozen briefings and hearings for Congress.

Capacity building tasks that were in progress included brokering 

connections with the private sector and building a public website on 

community resilience and CVE, among others. DHS had, for example, 

taken steps to broker connections with the private sector. DHS officials 

also noted making initial progress with YouTube and the Los Angeles 

Police Department in developing campaigns against violent extremism, 

but recognized this as an area that continues to need attention. Despite 

progress in 7 of 8 capacity building tasks, action had not yet been taken 

on a task related to learning from former violent extremists to directly 

challenge violent extremist narratives. According to DHS officials, legal 

issues regarding access to former violent extremists are being explored 

and DOJ will lead this task moving forward.

Capacity Building
Page 16 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Although we were able to determine the status of the 44 domestically 

focused CVE tasks from the 2011 SIP, we could not determine the extent 

to which the United States is better off today as a result of its CVE effort 

than it was in 2011. That is because no cohesive strategy with 

measurable outcomes has been established to guide the multi-agency 

CVE effort towards its goals.8

Neither the 2011 SIP nor its 2016 update provides a cohesive strategy—

one that sets forth a coordinated and collaborative effort among partner 

agencies—that includes measurable outcomes. For example, the 2016 

SIP includes a task on strengthening collaboration with the private sector 

and academia to pursue CVE-relevant communications tools and 

capabilities. The task describes the benefits of such collaboration, but 

does not include any information on how the task will be implemented, 

timeframes for implementation, desired outcomes, or indicators for 

measuring progress towards those outcomes. Similarly, the 2016 SIP 

includes a task on identifying and supporting the development of 

disengagement and rehabilitation programs. While the SIP describes 

research conducted in partnership with one such program that provides 

pathways out of violent extremism, it does not include any information on 

how the federal government will identify other groups and what kind of 

 8

The National Strategy identifies the goal of CVE as, “preventing violent extremists and 

their supporters from inspiring, radicalizing, financing, or recruiting individuals or groups in 

the United States to commit acts of violence.” It also describes priority action areas for 

CVE activities under the categories of: (1) enhancing engagement with and support to 

local communities that may be targeted by violent extremists; (2) building government and 

law enforcement expertise for preventing violent extremism; and (3) countering violent 

extremist propaganda while promoting our ideals.

The Federal CVE 

Effort Lacks a 

Cohesive Strategy 

with Measureable 

Outcomes and a 

Process for 

Assessing Progress

A Cohesive CVE Strategy 

with Measurable 

Outcomes Has Not Been 

Established
Page 17 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

support they might provide. Absent defined measureable outcomes, it is 

unclear how these tasks will be implemented and how they will 

measurably contribute to achieving the federal CVE goals.

Consistent with the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, establishing a 

cohesive strategy that includes measurable outcomes can provide 

agencies with a clear direction for successful implementation of activities 

in multi-agency cross-cutting efforts.9 Participants in multi-agency efforts 

each bring different views, organizational cultures, missions, and ways of 

operating. They may even disagree on the nature of the problem or issue 

being addressed. As such, developing a mutually agreed-upon cohesive 

strategy with measureable outcomes can strengthen agencies’

commitment to working collaboratively and enhance the effectiveness of 

the CVE effort while keeping stakeholders engaged and invested.10

Absent a cohesive strategy with defined measureable outcomes, CVE 

partner agencies have been left to develop and take their own individual 

actions without a clear understanding of whether and to what extent their 

actions will reduce violent extremism in the United States. For example, 

agencies such as the Department of Education and the Department of 

Health and Human Services are listed in the SIP as two of the agencies 

with responsibility for implementing the 2016 SIP.11 However, the tasks 

for which they are listed as partners do not include measurable outcomes 

to guide implementation. As another example, in 2016 DHS issued its 

own CVE strategy for the department intended to align with the 2016 

SIP.12 It is specific to DHS components and programs, establishes goals, 

outcomes, and milestones, and states that DHS will assess progress. 

However, DHS’s CVE strategy does not demonstrate how these activities 

will integrate with the overall federal CVE effort. Further, it establishes 

 9

GAO, Managing for Results: OMB Improved Implementation of Cross-Agency Priority 

Goals, But Could Be More Transparent About Measuring Progress, GAO-16-509 

(Washington, D.C.: May 20, 2016). The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 

111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011), updated the Government Performance and results Act of 

1993 (GPRA), Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285. 

10GAO, Managing for Results: Key Considerations for Implementing Interagency 

Collaborative Mechanisms, GAO-12-1022 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2012). 

11In April 2016, CVE Task Force leaders told us that they were working to establish a 

charter outlining specific roles of stakeholder agencies but, as of December 2016, had not 

completed it.

12Department of Homeland Security Strategy for Countering Violent Extremism, Oct. 28, 

2016.
Page 18 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

goals and outcomes for only one of the many departments responsible for 

CVE. DHS and DOJ officials speaking on behalf of the CVE Task Force 

stated that, as of November 2016, they had not determined if other 

stakeholder agencies, such as DOJ, the Department of Education, or the 

Department of Health and Human Services, would be developing similar 

strategies.

In January 2016, the CVE Task Force was established as the multiagency body charged with coordinating government efforts and 

partnerships to prevent violent extremism in the United States.13 As such, 

it is best positioned to work with federal stakeholders in developing a 

cohesive strategy with measureable outcomes. More details on the CVE 

Task Force are provided in the following section. Our previous work has 

shown that agencies across the federal government have benefited from 

applying such strategies to cross cutting programs.14 By developing a 

cohesive strategy with measurable outcomes, CVE stakeholders will be 

better able to guide their efforts to ensure measurable progress is made 

in CVE.

The CVE Task Force has not established a process for assessing 

whether the federal government’s CVE efforts are working. Establishing a 

process for assessing progress is a consistent practice of successful 

multi-agency collaborative efforts we have previously reviewed. 

 13In 2015, NCTC led a multi-agency effort to identify gaps and needs remaining to be 

fulfilled in CVE. Specifically, the effort considered the 2011 CVE National Strategy and 

SIP, and agency-reported efforts at that time to address CVE concerns. The assessment 

identified four needs: infrastructure to coordinate and prioritize CVE activities across the 

federal government and with stakeholders; clear responsibility, accountability, and 

communication internally and with the public; broad participation of departments and 

agencies outside national security lanes; and a process to assess, prioritize, and allocate 

resources to maximize impact. Following the 2015 assessment, the CVE Task Force was 

created in January 2016 to coordinate federal agencies in fulfilling the CVE effort. The 

gaps and needs identified in the 2015 assessment have been an important basis for 

creating and defining the CVE Task Force’s first steps as a multi-agency collaborative 

effort.

14GAO, Managing for Results: Practices for Effective Agency Strategic Reviews, 

GAO-15-602 (Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2015).

No Process for Assessing 

Overall CVE Progress Is 

In Place
Page 19 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Moreover, such assessments can help identify successful implementation 

and gaps across agencies.15

Recognizing the need for assessing the effects of CVE activities, the 

2011 SIP described a process in which departments and agencies were 

to be responsible for assessing their specific activities in coordination with 

an Assessment Working Group. Agencies were to develop a process for 

identifying gaps, areas of limited progress, resource needs, and any 

additional factors resulting from new information on the dynamics of 

radicalization to violence. Further, the progress of the participating 

agencies was to be evaluated and reported annually to the President. 

However, according to DHS and DOJ officials, the Assessment Working 

Group was never created and the process described in the SIP was not 

developed. As a result, no process or method for assessing the federal 

CVE effort’s progress and holding stakeholders accountable was 

established.

Absent a mechanism for assessing the federal CVE effort, in 2015 NCTC, 

along with 10 federal agencies, including DHS and DOJ, undertook an 

effort to review progress agencies had made in implementing their CVE 

responsibilities. According to DHS and DOJ officials, the review, along 

with those of the supporting agencies, helped identify areas for continued 

focus and improvement in fulfilling the CVE effort. Specifically, the review 

team identified the need for clear responsibility and accountability across 

the government and with the public. It also identified the need for a 

process to assess, prioritize, and allocate resources to maximize impact, 

among other needs.

Informed by these efforts, in January 2016 the CVE Task Force was 

established as a permanent interagency task force with overall leadership 

provided by DHS and DOJ. As previously described, the task force was 

charged with coordinating government efforts and partnerships to prevent 

violent extremism in the United States. Moreover, the CVE Task Force 

was assigned responsibility for synchronizing and integrating CVE 

programs and activities and assessing and evaluating them. The CVE 

Task Force worked with its partner agencies to develop the 2016 SIP but 

did not identify a process or method for assessing whether the overall 

CVE effort is working. Instead, the SIP states that it will use prior 

 15See for example GAO, Managing for Results: Implementation Approaches Used to 

Enhance Collaboration in Interagency Groups, GAO-14-220 (Washington, D.C.: Feb 14, 

2014). Also see GAO-06-15 and GAO-12-1022.
Page 20 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

evaluations of individual programs to develop guidelines for departments 

and agencies to evaluate their own programs. Moreover, according to 

CVE Task Force officials, they do not believe that assessing the overall 

effectiveness of the federal CVE effort is their responsibility.

Moving forward with the approach identified in the 2016 SIP is likely to 

continue to limit the federal government’s understanding of progress 

made in CVE efforts to that of individual activities rather than the entirety 

of the federal CVE effort. Agencies have conducted assessments of the 

effectiveness of some individual CVE programs. However, those 

assessments do not address the overarching effectiveness of the CVE 

effort. In addition, efforts to evaluate individual CVE initiatives alone will 

not provide an overall assessment of progress made in the federal CVE 

effort. For example, DOJ funded an evaluation of a community-based 

CVE programming effort led by the World Organization for Resource 

Development and Education (WORDE). The evaluation assessed 

WORDE’s effectiveness in promoting positive social integration and 

encouraging public safety in Montgomery County, Maryland. The 

evaluation looked at community-based participation in CVE programs, 

community awareness of risk factors of radicalization to violent 

extremism, and the community’s natural inclinations in response to these 

factors. The evaluation provides some insights into how WORDE’s 

program worked in Montgomery County, Maryland, but not the overall 

federal CVE effort.

Absent a consistent process for assessing the federal CVE effort as a 

whole, the federal government lacks the information needed to truly 

assess the extent to which the WORDE effort and others have countered 

violent extremism. Further, stakeholders will be limited in their efforts to 

identify successes and gaps and allocate or leverage resources 

effectively. Given that the CVE Task Force, as a permanent interagency 

body, is charged with synchronizing and integrating CVE programs and 

activities and assessing and evaluating them, the CVE Task Force should 

establish a process for assessing overall progress in CVE, including its 

effectiveness.

Combatting violent extremism is of critical importance for the United 

States. Extremist attacks of all kinds can have perilous effects on the 

perceived safety of our nation. It is therefore imperative that the United 

States employ effective means for preventing and deterring violent 

extremism and related attacks. To help confront this critical need, in 2011 

the President issued a CVE strategy and corresponding implementation 

Conclusions
Page 21 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

plan. However, over 5 years have passed and the federal government 

has not developed a cohesive strategy among stakeholder agencies that 

provides measurable outcomes to guide the collaborative implementation 

of CVE activities. While the CVE Task Force provided a forum for 

coordination and led the effort to develop a new SIP, the plan does not 

provide stakeholder agencies with specific direction and measures to 

identify successes and gaps in the implementation of their activities. In 

the absence of a cohesive strategy, DHS has developed its own strategy, 

while no such roadmap is in place for the collaborative implementation of 

activities by all stakeholder agencies. As the entity responsible for the 

synchronization and integration of CVE programs across the government, 

the CVE Task Force is well positioned to develop a cohesive strategy that 

provides all stakeholder agencies with a clear path forward in achieving 

the federal CVE effort’s desired outcomes.

The CVE Task Force, established in part to assess and evaluate CVE 

programs, has also not established an approach for assessing overall 

progress. Without consistent measures and methodologies for evaluating 

CVE as a whole, the federal government lacks the necessary information 

needed to assess the extent to which stakeholder agencies are achieving 

their goals. Without this information, stakeholders will not be able to 

identify successes and gaps and allocate or leverage resources 

effectively. When dealing with programs and activities that are designed 

to keep Americans safe from the threat of violent extremism, agency 

leaders and policy makers need to be able to know how well the federal 

government is doing in implementing these activities. Establishing an 

approach for assessing progress of the overall CVE effort can help the 

CVE Task Force enhance understanding of progress made as a result of 

CVE.

To help identify what domestic CVE efforts are to achieve and the extent 

to which investments in CVE result in measureable success, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security and the Attorney General—as heads of 

the two lead agencies responsible for coordinating CVE efforts—should 

direct the CVE Task Force to:

1. Develop a cohesive strategy that includes measurable outcomes for 

CVE activities; and

2. Establish and implement a process to assess overall progress in CVE, 

including its effectiveness.

Recommendations
Page 22 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of Education, Health 

and Human Services, Homeland Security (DHS), and Justice (DOJ) and 

the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). In its written 

comments, reproduced in appendix IV, DHS concurred with both of our 

recommendations. In comments provided in an email from the DOJ Audit 

Liaison, DOJ also concurred with both recommendations. In addition,

DHS, DOJ, and ODNI provided technical comments which we 

incorporated as appropriate. The Departments of Education and Health 

and Human Services did not comment on the report.

DHS, in its letter, concurred with our recommendation to develop a 

cohesive strategy that includes outcomes for CVE activities. DHS also

recognized that additional strategic-level performance documentation will 

improve coordination and collaboration tasks among partner agencies, as 

well as define how cross-cutting tasks will be implemented and how they 

will measurably contribute to achieving federal CVE goals. DHS noted 

that the CVE Task Force is developing measurable outcomes to support 

and guide the development of performance, effectiveness, and 

benchmarks for federally sponsored CVE efforts. DHS stated that the 

CVE Task Force plans to report on the progress of implementing the 

2016 Strategic Implementation Plan in January 2018. DOJ also concurred 

with the recommendation in comments received by email. 

DHS also concurred with our recommendation to establish and implement 

a process to assess overall progress in CVE, including its effectiveness. 

DHS, in its comment letter, recognized that such a process will drive an 

understanding of the contributions of individual activities in the federal 

CVE effort. In DHS’s response, the department maintained that the CVE 

Task Force will not be engaged in specific evaluations of its members or 

partners, but instead will develop resource guides on methodologies and 

measures that federal and non-government partners can use in 

evaluating their own CVE efforts. As noted in our report, the CVE Task 

Force’s approach of providing guidance on evaluations might enhance 

the evaluation efforts of individual programs, but establishing a process 

that assesses progress and effectiveness across the federal CVE effort 

can provide better insight into the successes and gaps within this multiagency collaborative effort. DOJ also concurred with the recommendation 

in comments received by email.

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
Page 23 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

We are sending copies of this report to Secretary of Education, the 

Secretary of Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Homeland 

Security, the Attorney General, the Director of the Office of National 

Intelligence and appropriate congressional committees and members, 

and other interested parties. In addition, this report is available at no 

charge on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions, please contact Diana Maurer at 

(202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff that made significant contributions to this report 

are listed in appendix IV.

Diana Maurer

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues
Page 24 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

List of Congressional Requesters

The Honorable Ron Johnson

Chairman

The Honorable Claire McCaskill

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson

Ranking Member

Committee on Homeland Security

House of Representatives

The Honorable Nanette Barragán

House of Representatives

The Honorable Jose Luis Correa

House of Representatives

The Honorable Valdez Demings

House of Representatives

The Honorable Brian Higgins

House of Representatives

The Honorable Sheila Jackson-Lee

House of Representatives

The Honorable Bill Keating

House of Representatives
Page 25 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

The Honorable Jim Langevin

House of Representatives

The Honorable Donald M. Payne

House of Representatives

The Honorable Kathleen M. Rice

House of Representatives

The Honorable Cedric L. Richmond

House of Representatives

The Honorable Norma J. Torres

House of Representatives

The Honorable Filemon Vela

House of Representatives

The Honorable Bonnie Watson Coleman

House of Representatives
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 26 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

This report addresses the extent to which (1) the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and other 

key stakeholders tasked with Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) in the 

United States have implemented the 2011 Strategic Implementation Plan 

(SIP) and (2) the federal government has developed a strategy to 

implement CVE activities, and the CVE Task Force has developed a 

process for assessing overall progress.

To assess the extent to which DHS, DOJ, and other key stakeholders 

tasked with CVE in the United States implemented the 2011 SIP, we 

collected and analyzed information from each agency responsible for 

leading a task in the 2011 SIP, which included DHS, DOJ, the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National Counterterrorism Center 

(NCTC). The FBI was treated as a lead agency for reporting purposes 

because it was listed as a lead agency in the SIP. These four agencies 

were responsible for domestic CVE activities and were collectively 

responsible for implementing 44 out of the 47 tasks in the SIP. We did not 

analyze the implementation of 3 of the 47 tasks because they were 

international in scope and led by an agency outside of the four agencies 

responsible for domestic CVE. Specifically, we did not analyze the 

Department of Treasury’s efforts to address terrorism financing, the 

Department of Defense’s effort to provide training to military personnel, 

and the State Department’s international exchange program. GAO asked 

for information from each lead agency on actions taken from December 

2011 through December 2016 to address their assigned activities in the 

2011 SIP. Based on information provided, one analyst analyzed each 

agency’s action(s) to determine whether each task in the SIP had been 

implemented, was still in progress, or had not been addressed. A 

separate analyst independently reviewed each assessment and narrative.

If there was disagreement on a rating, a third analyst reviewed that 

information and made a determination on the final rating. Upon 

preliminary completion of the appendix table, GAO sent the table to DHS, 

DOJ, FBI, and NCTC and incorporated technical comments as 

appropriate. The results of this assessment are shown in appendix III.

To determine the extent to which the federal government has developed a 

strategy to implement CVE activities and the CVE Task Force has 

developed a process for assessing overall progress, we reviewed the 

National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent 

Extremism in the United States, the 2011 and 2016 Strategic 

Implementation Plans for the strategy, and other documents related to the 

creation and activities of the CVE Task Force. Specifically, we reviewed 

these documents to identify whether measurable outcomes and 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 27 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

associated metrics had been defined. We interviewed officials from the 

stakeholder agencies including DHS, DOJ, the Department of Education, 

the Department of Health and Human Services, FBI, and NCTC to 

discuss their approaches to CVE and their roles and responsibilities as 

part of the federal CVE effort. We compared the practices of the Task 

Force to selected leading practices of multi-agency collaborative efforts 

identified in prior GAO work as well as selected practices in the GPRA 

Modernization Act of 2010.1 Practices were selected for comparison 

based on their applicability to the CVE Task Force. For context and 

perspectives on how CVE activities were implemented in local areas we 

interviewed a non-generalizable group of community organizations 

selected based on their location in the three pilot cities that have adopted 

CVE frameworks: Los Angeles, California; Boston, Massachusetts; and 

Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota.

We conducted this performance audit from October 2015 to April 2017 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

 1

The GPRA Modernization Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011), 

updated the Government Performance and results Act of 1993 (GPRA), Pub. L. No. 103-

62, 107 Stat. 285.
Appendix II: Violent Extremist Attacks in the 

United States that Resulted in Fatalities, 

September 12, 2001 to December 31, 2016

Page 28 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

This appendix provides details on the violent extremist attacks in the 

United States based on the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) data 

and as described in the background section of this report. Specifically, 

tables 1 and 2 show a description, date, location and number of victim 

fatalities for each far right and radical Islamist attack between September 

12, 2001 and December 31, 2016. During this period, no persons in the 

United States were killed in attacks carried out by persons believed to be 

motivated by extremist environmental beliefs, extremist “animal liberation”

beliefs, or extremist far left beliefs. The information on these attacks, 

including the motivations of the attackers, is from the ECDB, maintained 

by National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to 

Terrorism (START), at the University of Maryland. START is a 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Center of Excellence. The 

ECDB tracks violent extremist incidents in the United States since 1990. 

For our analysis, we included the time period from September 12, 2001 

through December 31, 2016, to show violent extremist attacks that have 

occurred since the September 11, 2001 attacks. We assessed the 

reliability of this data source through review of database documentation 

and interviews with the ECDB principle investigators. We discussed 

cases with the ECDB investigators to clarify details as needed. We 

determined that this data source was sufficiently reliable for providing 

background information on the problem of violent extremism in the United 

States, including the number of attacks and fatalities by ideological 

motivation (far right or radical Islamist), year and location.

Far right violent extremist attackers are characterized by ECDB as having 

beliefs that include some or all of the following:

• Fiercely nationalistic (as opposed to universal and international in 

orientation);

• Anti-global;

• Suspicious of centralized federal authority;

• Reverent of individual liberty (especially right to own guns; be free of 

taxes);

• Belief in conspiracy theories that involve a grave threat to national 

sovereignty and/or personal liberty;

• Belief that one’s personal and/or national “way of life” is under attack 

and is either already lost or that the threat is imminent; and

Appendix II: Violent Extremist Attacks in the 

United States that Resulted in Fatalities, 

September 12, 2001 through December 31, 

2016
Appendix II: Violent Extremist Attacks in the 

United States that Resulted in Fatalities, 

September 12, 2001 to December 31, 2016

Page 29 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

• Belief in the need to be prepared for an attack either by participating 

in or supporting the need for paramilitary preparations and training or 

survivalism.

In addition, according to the ECDB, many persons having violent extreme 

far right views express support for some version of white supremacy, the 

Ku Klux Klan, and neo-Nazism.

According to the ECDB, attackers with violent radical Islamist beliefs were 

generally those who professed some form of belief in or allegiance to the

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), al-Qa’ida, or other (radical) Islamistassociated terrorist entities. ECDB’s determination of these beliefs are 

based on statements made by attackers prior to, during, or after their 

attacks that showed a belief in violent extremist interpretations of Islam, 

or evidence gathered by police and other sources about the attackers.

According to the ECDB, all information in the database is collected from 

publicly available sources, including mass media reports. ECDB analyzes 

this information using a standardized and consistent methodology to 

characterize each attack in terms of the ideological motivation. In 

addition, ECDB rates the confidence in this assessment of ideological 

motivations using standard definitions of the factors that lead a 

confidence level on a scale from 0 to 4, where 0 is the lowest level of 

confidence and 4 is the highest level of confidence. During our reliability 

assessment, it was determined that the far right-motivated attacks 

included 12 incidents where there was unclear evidence about the 

motivation of the attacker; these 12 were excluded from our analysis.

Table 1: Far Right Violent Extremist-Motivated Attacks that Resulted in Fatalities, September 12, 2001 through December 31, 

2016, as reported in the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB)

Summary of ECDB 

Incident Description Date City State

Number 

of Victim 

Deaths

White Supremacist member of Aryan 

Brotherhood killed a man

9/15/2001 Mesquite Texas 1

Same white supremacist as previous case but 

another victim a few weeks later

10/4/2001 Mesquite Texas 1

White supremacist murdered an African American 3/21/2002 Portland Oregon 1

White supremacist skinhead murdered a 

transgender person 

4/10/2002 El Paso Texas 1

Far right violent extremists murdered 3 fast food 

workers (one Native American and two Hispanic) 

5/19/2002 Mesa Arizona 3

Neo-Nazi murdered a gay man 6/12/2002 Tucson Arizona 1
Appendix II: Violent Extremist Attacks in the 

United States that Resulted in Fatalities, 

September 12, 2001 to December 31, 2016

Page 30 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Summary of ECDB 

Incident Description Date City State

Number 

of Victim 

Deaths

Anti-government “Sovereign Citizen” murdered an 

Ohio police officer

8/2/2002 Massillon Ohio 1

Two white supremacist skinheads murdered a 

man 

8/30/2002 Las Vegas Nevada 1

White supremacist skinhead beat a man to death 

outside a diner 

9/1/2002 St. Louis Missouri 1

White supremacist murdered bisexual man 12/14/2002 Salinas California 1

White supremacist gang murdered a homeless 

man as part of a gang initiation

3/23/2003 Tacoma Washington 1

Anti-government militiaman shot and killed a 

Michigan state trooper 

7/7/2003 Fremont Michigan 1

White supremacist shot and killed 6 co-workers at 

Lockheed Martin Plant

7/8/2003 Meridian Mississippi 6

Neo-Nazi killed sex-offender priest 8/23/2003 Shirley Massachusetts 1

Anti-government “constitutionalist” killed 2 in 

standoff over land 

12/8/2003 Abbeville South Carolina 2

White supremacist killed a man while “hunting 

down Mexicans”

1/9/2004 Dateland Arizona 1

White supremacists murdered two homeless men 4/15/2005 Hingham Massachusetts 2

Six white supremacist inmates beat another 

prisoner to death

10/14/2005 Kingman Arizona 1

White supremacist skinhead murdered an African 

American woman

12/16/2005 Mays Landing New Jersey 1

Neo-Nazi murdered a gay man 3/23/2006 New Port Richey Florida 1

White supremacist inmate killed his African 

American cellmate

11/13/2006 Chipley Florida 1

White supremacist murders Hispanic man in 

convenience store after argument

7/2/2007 Lubbock Texas 1

White supremacist murdered Lubbock, TX police 

officer 

8/15/2007 Brandon Florida 1

Two white supremacists murdered a homeless 

man 

9/3/2007 Reno Nevada 1

Two white supremacists murdered a gay man as 

gang initiation rite

10/26/2007 Goldsby Oklahoma 1

Skinhead gang murdered an Hispanic man 12/4/2007 Yucaipa California 1

Middle school skinhead student shot and killed 

gay peer

2/12/2008 Oxnard California 1

White supremacist teens beat a Hispanic man to 

death 

7/12/2008 Shenandoah Pennsylvania 1

Anti-government violent extremist killed 2 at 

Tennessee Valley Unitarian Universalist Church 

7/27/2008 Knoxville Tennessee 2
Appendix II: Violent Extremist Attacks in the 

United States that Resulted in Fatalities, 

September 12, 2001 to December 31, 2016

Page 31 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Summary of ECDB 

Incident Description Date City State

Number 

of Victim 

Deaths

White man obsessed with Nazism murdered an 

African American man and a Hispanic man 

8/1/2008 Bristol Pennsylvania 2

White supremacist teens murdered an 

Ecuadorian immigrant 

11/8/2008 Patchogue New York 1

Two anti-government violent extremists planted a 

bomb inside a bank, killing 2

12/12/2008 Woodburn Oregon 2

Far rightist murdered a homeless man 1/19/2009 Woodstock Illinois 1

White supremacist killed 2 immigrants 1/21/2009 Brockton Massachusetts 1

Same perpetrator as previous case in Brockton, 

MA killed a homeless man later the same day

1/21/2009 Brockton Massachusetts 1

Neo-Nazi murdered Wesleyan University Jewish 

student 

5/6/2009 Middleton Connecticut 1

White supremacists murdered 2 immigrants in 

home invasion

5/30/2009 Arivaca Arizona 2

Anti-government Sovereign Citizen murdered 

abortion provider Dr. George Tiller 

5/31/2009 Wichita Kansas 1

White supremacist killed Holocaust museum 

guard 

6/10/2009 Washington District of 

Colombia

1

White supremacist and associate killed a child 

molester

6/30/2009 Carmichael California 1 

White supremacist murdered his stepfather to 

gain “street cred”

7/28/2009 Paradise California 1

White supremacist murdered a convicted sex 

offender 

8/28/2009 N. Palm Springs California 1

Two white supremacist skinheads shoot at 

interracial couple and killed female

10/3/2009 Phoenix Arizona 1

Anti-government violent extremist flew a small 

plane into an Austin, TX office building with U.S. 

Internal Revenue Service (IRS) office in it to 

protest the IRS and the government

2/18/2010 Austin Texas 1

Neo-Nazi killed an African American man 3/29/2010 South Huntington Pennsylvania 1

White supremacist shot and wounded 4 women 

then killed a man

4/20/2010 Wichita Falls Texas 1

Two Sovereign Citizen members killed two police 

officers 

5/21/2010 West Memphis Arkansas 2

Prison gang white supremacists murdered 

another inmate for not objecting to having an 

African American cellmate

3/1/2011 Atlanta Georgia 1

White supremacist teenagers run over and kill an 

African American man in a motel parking lot

6/26/2011 Jackson Mississippi 1

Two white supremacists murdered a 53-year old 

African American man

10/4/2011 Eureka California 1
Appendix II: Violent Extremist Attacks in the 

United States that Resulted in Fatalities, 

September 12, 2001 to December 31, 2016

Page 32 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Summary of ECDB 

Incident Description Date City State

Number 

of Victim 

Deaths

Same perpetrators as previous case in Eureka, 

CA; perpetrators killed a teenager they thought 

was Jewish

10/7/2011 Corvallis Oregon 1

Neo-Nazi killed 6 at a Sikh temple in Wisconsin 8/5/2012 Oak Creek Wisconsin 6

Two neo-Nazis and a third associate murdered a 

local drug-dealer 

1/9/2013 Verona Kentucky 1

Anti-government “survivalist” boarded a school 

bus with a gun and demanded a student be given 

to him; he then shot and killed the bus driver 

1/29/2013 Midland City Alabama 1

Two white supremacists killed a husband and 

wife because the husband was a sex offender 

7/21/2013 Jonesville South Carolina 2

Anti-government extremist kills Transportation 

Security Administration officer at Los Angeles 

International Airport 

11/1/2013 Los Angeles California 1

White supremacist shot and killed 2 at a Jewish 

Community Center 

4/13/2014 Overland Park Kansas 2

Same perpetrator as previous attack in Overland 

Park; perpetrator murdered another person at a 

Jewish retirement center later the same day

4/13/2014 Leawood Kansas 1

Anti-government married couple killed 2 officers 

during shooting rampage on Las Vegas strip

6/8/2014 Las Vegas Nevada 2

Same perpetrators as previous attack in Las 

Vegas; perpetrators murdered another person 

later the same day

6/8/2014 Las Vegas Nevada 1

Anti-government extremist Eric Frein murdered a 

state trooper.

9/12/2014 White Haven Pennsylvania 1

White supremacist Dylann Roof shot and killed 9 

African Americans in a shooting at an African 

American church in Charleston, SC

6/17/2015 Charleston South Carolina 9

Right-wing extremist opened fire and killed 2 

young women among patrons during an Amy 

Schumer movie 

7/23/2015 Lafayette Louisiana 2

White supremacist shot and killed 9 at his 

community college 

10/1/2015 Roseburg Oregon 9

Anti-government survivalist extremist killed 3 at 

Planned Parenthood clinic including a responding 

police officer

11/27/2015 Colorado Springs Colorado 3

Number of 

incidents: 62

Total 

victims: 106

Source: U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) maintained by START at the University of Maryland. | GAO-17-300

Note: Attacks committed by the same perpetrators on the same day and in proximate locations and 

time were counted as one attack.
Appendix II: Violent Extremist Attacks in the 

United States that Resulted in Fatalities, 

September 12, 2001 to December 31, 2016

Page 33 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Table 2: Radical Islamist Violent Extremist-Motivated Attacks that Resulted in Fatalities, September 12, 2001 through 

December 31, 2016, as reported in the U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB)

Summary of ECDB 

Incident Description Date City State

Number of 

Victim Deaths 

Washington, D.C. Beltway sniper attack prior to 

D.C. attacks; shot and killed 1 person in state of 

Washington

2/16/2002 Tacoma Washington 1

Washington, D.C. Beltway sniper attack prior to 

D.C. attacks; shot and killed 1 person in Arizona

3/19/2002 Tucson Arizona 1

Radical Islamist violent extremist killed 2 at Los 

Angeles International Airport El Al ticket counter 

7/4/2002 Los Angeles California 2

Washington, D.C. Beltway sniper attack prior to 

D.C. attacks; shot and killed 1 person in Atlanta, 

GA

9/21/2002 Atlanta Georgia 1

Washington, D.C. Beltway sniper attack prior to 

D.C. attacks; shot and killed 1 person in 

Montgomery, AL, 19 hours after attack in Atlanta, 

GA

9/21/2002 Montgomery Alabama 1

Washington, D.C. Beltway sniper attack prior to 

D.C. attacks; shot and killed 1 person in Baton 

Rouge, LA

9/23/2002 Baton Rouge Louisiana 1

Washington, D.C. Beltway sniper attack 10/2/2002 Wheaton Maryland 1

Washington, D.C. Beltway sniper attack 10/3/2002 Rockville Maryland 1

Washington, D.C. Beltway sniper attack 10/3/2002 Aspen Hill Maryland 1

Washington, D.C. Beltway sniper attack 10/3/2002 Silver Spring Maryland 1

Washington, D.C. Beltway sniper attack 10/3/2002 Kensington Maryland 1

Washington, D.C. Beltway sniper attack 10/3/2002 Washington District of 

Columbia

1

Washington, D.C. Beltway sniper attack 10/9/2002 Manassas Virginia 1

Washington, D.C. Beltway sniper attack 10/11/2002 Spotsylvania County Virginia 1

Washington, D.C. Beltway sniper attack 10/14/2002 Fairfax County Virginia 1

Washington, D.C. Beltway sniper attack 10/22/2002 Aspen Hill Maryland 1

Perpetrator kills 1 at the Jewish Federation of 

Greater Seattle

7/28/2006 Seattle Washington 1

Perpetrator kills 1 and injures 18 in hit-and-run 

driving spree in San Francisco and Fremont, CA

8/29/2006 Fremont California 1

Salt Lake City, UT Trolley Square Shooting 2/12/2007 Salt Lake City Utah 5

Perpetrator killed one army solider outside of a 

military recruiting center in Little Rock, AR

6/1/2009 Little Rock Arkansas 1

Nidal Malik Hasan kills 12 soldiers and 1 civilian at 

Fort Hood, TX

11/5/2009 Fort Hood Texas 13

Boston bomber Tamerlan Tsarnaev helped murder 

3 persons four years before Boston bombing

9/11/2011 Waltham Massachusetts 3
Appendix II: Violent Extremist Attacks in the 

United States that Resulted in Fatalities, 

September 12, 2001 to December 31, 2016

Page 34 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Summary of ECDB 

Incident Description Date City State

Number of 

Victim Deaths 

Reshad Riddle, a convert to Islam, murdered his 

father

3/24/2013 Ashtabula Ohio 1

Boston bomber brothers Tamerlan Tsarnaev and 

Dzhokhar Tsarnaev planted two bombs at the 

Boston Marathon, killing 3 

4/15/2013 Boston Massachusetts 3

Tsarnaev brothers shot and killed a Massachusetts 

Institute of Technology security officer 

4/18/2013 Cambridge Massachusetts 1

Incident 1 in a series of related murders: 

perpetrator shot and killed a man in a drive by 

shooting

4/27/2014 Seattle Washington 1

Incident 2 in a series of related murders: 

perpetrator shot and killed 2 men in Seattle leaving 

a gay club

6/1/2014 Seattle Washington 2

Incident 3 in a series of related murders: 

perpetrator shot and killed a man in a drive by 

shooting and killed a college student

6/25/2014 West Orange New Jersey 1

Justin Nojan Sullivan, a convert to Islam, murdered 

his neighbor

12/18/2014 Morganton North Carolina 1

Perpetrator opened fire on two military installations 

in Chattanooga, TN, killing 5

7/16/2015 Chattanooga Tennessee 5

San Bernardino, CA shooting spree: Syed Farook 

and Tashfeen Malik shoot up office party, killing 14 

and injuring 22

12/2/2015 San Bernardino California 14

Orlando Night Club shooting. Omar Mateen killed 

49 

6/12/2016 Orlando Florida 49

Number of 

Incidents: 23

Total 

Victims: 119

Source: U.S. Extremist Crime Database (ECDB) maintained by START at the University of Maryland. | GAO-17-300

Note: All 10 attacks by the Washington, D.C. beltway sniper that occurred in the Washington, D.C. 

region are counted as 1 incident. All 5 attacks by the Washington, D.C. beltway sniper that occurred 

in the months before the Washington, D.C. attacks are counted as individual attacks.
Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 

2011 Strategic Implementation Plan

Page 35 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

In August 2011, the White House issued the National Strategy for 

Empowering Local Partners to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United 

States followed by The National Strategy for Empowering Local Partners 

to Prevent Violent Extremism in the United States, Strategic 

Implementation Plan (SIP) in December 2011. The SIP designated the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the Department of Justice 

(DOJ), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and the National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) as leads or partners for the 44 

domestically-focused tasks identified in the 2011 SIP.1 From December 

2011 through December 2016, federal agencies implemented 19 tasks, 

had 23 tasks in progress, and had not yet taken action on 2 tasks. The 

tasks fall under three categories: community outreach, research and 

training, and capacity building.

The SIP identified 18 community outreach tasks to be implemented by 

federal agencies. Community outreach aims to enhance federal 

engagement and support to local communities that may be targeted by 

violent extremism. For example, community outreach might include 

expanding relationships with local business and communities to identify or 

prevent violent extremism or integrating CVE activities into communityoriented policing efforts.

 1

For the 44 tasks identified in the SIP, DHS, DOJ, FBI and NCTC provided information on 

the status of actions taken on the tasks for which they were the lead agencies. Some 

tasks listed multiple agencies as co-leads responsible for implementation. Some agency 

responses showed their actions substantially addressed the task, while others only took 

some action for the same task. DHS, DOJ, and FBI provided technical comments on our 

assessment which we incorporated as appropriate and officials from NCTC met with us to 

discuss the information it provided.

Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 

2011 Strategic Implementation Plan
Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 

2011 Strategic Implementation Plan

Page 36 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Table 3: Assessment of Community Outreach Tasks in the 2011 Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) as of December 2016

Tasks in SIP

Lead 

Agency Task DHS DOJ FBI NCTC Status Summary

1 The Department of Justice (DOJ) 

will incorporate more U.S.

Attorney’s Offices as engagement 

leads in the field building on the 

initial U.S. Attorney-led effort.

DOJ

✔ - ✔ - -

DOJ officials stated that they 

increased the number of U.S. 

Attorney’s Offices as engagement 

leads within their districts and their 

activities with respect to violent 

extremism.

2 The National Task Force will (1) 

disseminate regular reports on best 

practices in community 

engagement to local government 

officials, law enforcement, U.S. 

Attorneys, and fusion centers; (2) 

work with departments and 

agencies to increase support to 

U.S. Attorney-led engagement 

efforts in the field; and (3) closely 

coordinate federal engagement 

efforts with communities targeted 

by violent extremism radicalization.

DOJ & 

DHS

➲ ➲ ✔ - -

While the National Task Force, led 

by the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) and DOJ, dissolved 

in 2013, agencies demonstrated 

that they worked with other federal 

partners to increase their support 

of U.S. Attorney-led engagement 

efforts and coordinated federal 

efforts with communities targeted 

by violent extremism as described 

in the task. The National 

Engagement Task Force drafted 

best practices for community 

engagement which was not 

disseminated.

✔ Implemented

➲ In Progress

✖ Not yet addressed

- Not a lead agency 
Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 

2011 Strategic Implementation Plan

Page 37 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Tasks in SIP

Lead 

Agency Task DHS DOJ FBI NCTC Status Summary

3 In consultation with federal and 

local partners, the National Task 

Force and U.S. Attorney’s Offices 

will facilitate, where appropriate, 

the inclusion of communities that 

may be targeted by violent 

extremist radicalization into broader 

engagement forums and programs 

that involve other communities.

DOJ & 

DHS

➲ ➲ ✔ - -

DHS stated without continued 

inter-agency support the National 

Task Force dissolved in 2013; 

however, individual agencies have 

continued their inclusion of 

communities that may be targeted 

by violent extremist radicalization 

efforts. For example, the DHS Civil 

Rights Civil Liberties Office 

expanded its engagement to other 

communities before the National 

Task Force dissolved. DOJ 

increased outreach and inclusion 

efforts by U.S. Attorney’s Offices 

participation in cross-cultural 

events such as hosting an 

Interfaith Community Group and a 

Hate Crimes Outreach Summit, as

well as a cooperative agreement 

with the World Organization for 

Resource Development and 

Education in Montgomery County 

Maryland. 

4 U.S. Attorneys will coordinate 

closely with local government 

officials, law enforcement, 

communities, and civil society to 

enhance outreach events and 

initiatives.

DOJ

✔ - ✔ - -

Through their participation in 

developing Countering Violent 

Extremism (CVE) frameworks in 

three pilot cities, DOJ coordinated 

with federal, state, local, and 

community partners to enhance 

outreach events and initiatives. 

5 In fiscal year (FY) 2012, DHS 

Office for Civil Rights and Civil 

Liberties (CRCL) CRCL plans on 

expanding its quarterly community 

engagement roundtables to a total 

of 16. CRCL is also in the process 

of implementing a campus youth 

community engagement plan, 

through which it will engage with 

young adults on the topic of violent 

extremism.

DHS

✔ ✔ - - -

DHS’s CRCL, expanded youth 

specific engagement programs and 

implemented Syrian and Somali 

American engagement plans.

6 Depending on local circumstances, 

and in consultation with the Federal

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and 

other agencies as appropriate, U.S. 

Attorneys will coordinate any 

expanded engagement specific to 

CVE with communities that may be 

targeted by violent extremist 

radicalization.

DOJ

✔ - ✔ - -

U.S. Attorneys coordinated 

expanded CVE activities to 

communities that may be targeted 

by violent extremism. These efforts 

include hosting or coordinating 

events such as a town hall meeting 

with Muslim and Arab leaders, and 

hosting a roundtable with the 

Somali community.
Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 

2011 Strategic Implementation Plan

Page 38 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Tasks in SIP

Lead 

Agency Task DHS DOJ FBI NCTC Status Summary

7 A FBI CVE Coordination Office will 

be established and, as part of its 

activities, will coordinate with the 

National Task Force on CVEspecific education and awareness 

modules. These modules will be 

developed and implemented, in 

part, by leveraging some of the 

FBI’s existing programs and 

initiatives.

FBI

➲ - - ➲ -

The FBI established and staffed 

the CVE office in 2012 and 

assigned the office to the 

Counterterrorism Division in 2013. 

FBI CVE products were jointly 

prepared with the National Task 

Force partner agencies or 

distributed for their comment.

8 DHS will oversee an online portal 

to support engagement by 

government officials and law 

enforcement with communities 

targeted by violent extremist 

radicalization, which will be used to 

share relevant information and 

build a community of interest. The 

portal will be accessible to 

government officials and law 

enforcement involved in overseas 

and domestic CVE and community 

engagement efforts to share best 

practices.

DHS

✔ ✔ - - -

DHS launched a web portal in 

2012 that has almost 4,900 users 

as of March 2016 and that is 

accessible to government and law 

enforcement officials involved in 

overseas and domestic CVE and 

community engagement efforts.

9 DOJ will expand the efforts of the 

Building Communities of Trust 

(BCOT) initiative to help facilitate 

trust between law enforcement and 

community leaders. This dialogue 

could include local issues, as well 

as CVE.

DOJ

✔ - ✖ - -

DOJ deferred responsibility of this 

task to DHS. DHS expanded the 

BCOT initiative through 21 

separate events nationwide from 

December 2011 through February 

2016.

10 The United States Government will 

build a digital engagement capacity 

in order to expand, deepen, and 

intensify our engagement efforts. 

Where possible, virtual 

engagement will build on real world 

engagement activities and 

programs.

DHS

➲ ➲ - - -

DHS is continuing to build 

relationships with the high-tech 

and social media industry including 

recent meetings with senior 

administration officials and support 

of a government sponsored 

university competition designed to 

counter violent extremist 

narratives, but recognized this as 

an area that needs attention.
Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 

2011 Strategic Implementation Plan

Page 39 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Tasks in SIP

Lead 

Agency Task DHS DOJ FBI NCTC Status Summary

11 The federal government will help 

broker agreements on partnerships 

to counter violent extremism 

between communities and local 

government and law enforcement 

to help institutionalize this locally 

focused approach.

DHS

➲ ➲ - - -

DHS collaborated with local 

stakeholders in three cities to 

develop frameworks that aim to 

address issues facing their 

communities. While not leads for 

this activity, DOJ, FBI, and the 

National Counterterrorism Center 

(NCTC) helped partnerships 

through their participation in the 

three city pilot program.

12 DHS and DOJ will work to increase 

support for local, community-led 

programs and initiatives to counter 

violent extremism, predominantly 

by identifying opportunities within 

existing appropriations for 

incorporating CVE as an eligible 

area of work for public safety, 

violence prevention, and 

community resilience grants.

DHS & 

DOJ

✔ ✔ ✔ - -

DHS updated its grant language to 

include CVE activities and has 

awarded training grants in FY13, 

FY14, and FY15. U.S. Attorney’s 

Offices have researched ways to 

increase funding for CVE including 

funding for community summits 

and events, youth programs, 

research partners, and written 

materials or brochures.

Additionally, DOJ has partnered 

with the Virginia Center for Policing 

Innovation to develop and deliver a 

national training program providing 

law enforcement officers with the 

knowledge and skills necessary to 

effectively integrate community 

policing into their homeland 

security efforts.

13 DHS is working to increase funding 

available to integrate CVE into 

existing community-oriented 

policing efforts through FY12 

grants.

DHS

✔ ✔ - - -

DHS expanded its grant language 

to support law enforcement CVE 

efforts under Urban Area Security 

Initiative grants.

14 DHS is establishing a Homeland 

Security Advisory Committee FaithBased Community Information 

Sharing Working Group to 

determine how the Department 

can: (1) better share information 

with faith communities; and (2) 

support the development of faithbased community information 

sharing networks.

DHS

➲ ➲ - - -

DHS established a faith-based 

advisory committee in 2012, and is 

working with agencies within the 

department to determine new 

tasks.
Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 

2011 Strategic Implementation Plan

Page 40 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Tasks in SIP

Lead 

Agency Task DHS DOJ FBI NCTC Status Summary

15 DHS is developing its Hometown 

Security webpage to include 

resources such as training 

guidance, workshop reports, and 

information on CVE for both the 

general public and law 

enforcement.

DHS

➲ ➲ - - -

DHS created a webpage with 

information on training guidance, 

pilot city information and other 

relevant CVE information,

however, this content is not 

housed on the Hometown Security 

Webpage as stated in the SIP.

16 The Treasury will expand its 

community outreach regarding 

terrorism financing issues. 

Treasury N/A - - - -

17 Depending on local circumstances 

and in consultation with the FBI, 

U.S. Attorneys will coordinate, as 

appropriate, any efforts to expand 

connections and partnerships at 

the local level for CVE, supported 

by the National Task Force where 

needed.

DOJ

➲ - ➲ - -

DOJ expanded partnerships with 

local stakeholders for CVE by 

expanding local U.S. Attorney’s 

Office participation in the three city 

pilot program.

18 Departments and agencies will 

expand engagement with the 

business community by educating 

companies about the threat of 

violent extremism and by 

connecting them to community civic 

activists focused on developing 

CVE programs and initiatives.

DHS

➲ ➲ - - -

DHS highlighted one successful 

partnership between YouTube and 

the City of Los Angeles, CA. They 

also stated efforts are ongoing to 

include the high-tech sector and 

philanthropic community. 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Counterterrorism Center. | 

GAO-17-300

The SIP identified 20 research and training tasks to be implemented by 

federal agencies. Research and training relates to understanding the 

threat of violent extremism, sharing information, and leveraging it to train 

government and law enforcement officials. We analyzed implementation 

of 19 research and training tasks in the SIP to determine the extent they 

had been implemented by the responsible agency(s).
Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 

2011 Strategic Implementation Plan

Page 41 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Table 4: Assessment of Research and Training Tasks in the 2011 Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) as of December 2016

Tasks in SIP

Lead 

Agency Task DHS DOJ FBI NCTC Status Summary

1 Expand analysis in five priority 

areas 

1. The role of the Internet in 

radicalization to violence and 

how virtual space can be 

leveraged to counter violent 

extremism.

2. Single-actor terrorism (so 

called “lone wolves”), including 

lessons learned from similar 

phenomena such as a school 

shooters.

3. Disengagement from terrorism 

and violent extremism.

4. Non-al-Qa’ida related 

radicalization to violence and 

anticipated future violent 

extremist threats.

5. Preoperational indicators and 

analysis of known case 

studies of extremist violence in 

the United States.

DHS, 

FBI,

NCTC, 

State

➲ ➲ - ➲ ✔

The Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) expanded analysis 

in most areas; and has a program in 

progress to address the role of the 

Internet in radicalization to violence 

and how virtual space can be 

leveraged to counter violent 

extremism. The Federal Bureau of 

Investigation (FBI) expanded 

analysis in some areas of this task, 

including the creation of behavioral 

indicator cards, which depict 

mobilization and disengagement 

however there is no information on 

how the FBI expanded analysis on 

single-actor terrorism. The National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 

expanded their analysis in all areas. 

While not a lead for this task, the 

Department of Justice (DOJ) 

supported these efforts through 

research funded by the National 

Institute of Justice. While the 

Department of State (State) was 

also a lead for this activity, we did 

not request a response from the 

department because it is outside the 

scope of this review.

2 Continue DHS Science &

Technology Directorate’s (S&T) 

support for research on countering 

the threat of extremist violence.

DHS

✔ ✔ - - -

DHS has a research program on 

Countering Violent Extremism 

(CVE) related topics and has 

released numerous reports on 

violent extremist root causes, and 

funded an open source databases 

on terrorism. For example DHS S&T 

funded the U.S. Extremist Crime 

Database (ECDB) which tracks 

extremist activity in the U.S. and 

released a report in 2012 regarding 

the hot spots of terrorism and other 

crimes.

✔ Implemented

➲ In Progress

✖ Not yet addressed

- Not a lead agency 
Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 

2011 Strategic Implementation Plan

Page 42 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Tasks in SIP

Lead 

Agency Task DHS DOJ FBI NCTC Status Summary

3 Continue DHS collaboration with 

the FBI, the Bureau of Prisons, and 

NCTC to: (1) improve awareness 

of the risk of violent extremism in 

correctional systems; (2) enhance 

screening of new inmates to detect 

individuals associated with violent 

extremist organizations; (3) 

improve detection of recruitment 

efforts within the correctional 

environment; and (4) increase 

information sharing, as 

appropriate, with federal, state, and 

local law enforcement about 

inmates who may have adopted 

violent extremist beliefs and are 

being released.

DHS

✖ ✖ - - -

DHS piloted a course related to 

violent extremism in prisons with the 

Orange County Sheriff’s Office; 

however no additional information 

was identified to determine if 

specific elements of this task were 

met. DHS recognized this task as 

an area that needs attention.

4 Complete the creation of the FBI 

CVE Coordination Office to help 

assess and leverage existing 

Bureau efforts to better understand 

and counter violent extremism.

FBI

✔ - - ✔ -

The FBI established and staffed the 

CVE Office in 2012 and assigned 

the office to the Counterterrorism 

Division in 2013. In 2015 the FBI 

realigned the CVE Office and 

changed from an office to a Section 

which now resides directly under the 

Deputy Director to have a broader 

cross-programmatic impact within 

the FBI.

5 Build lines of research specifically 

to support non-security federal 

partners. 

DHS/

NCTC

➲ ➲ - - ✔

DHS completed one report and one 

additional report is in progress. 

However, DHS did not provide 

information on how these efforts are 

supporting non-security partners as 

stated in the SIP. NCTC supports 

non-federal security partners by 

publishing CVE related material in a 

variety of formats including a 

magazine and weekly unclassified 

document that gets sent to nonfederal security partners. While not 

a lead for this task, DOJ supported 

these efforts by research funded by 

the National Institute of Justice.
Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 

2011 Strategic Implementation Plan

Page 43 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Tasks in SIP

Lead 

Agency Task DHS DOJ FBI NCTC Status Summary

6 Development of an analytic team 

focused on supporting local 

government and law enforcement 

CVE practitioners and increased 

production of analysis at 

appropriate classification levels.

DHS

✔ ✔ - - -

DHS assembled a team and 

participates in multiple inter-agency 

efforts to share relevant CVE 

information. Additionally a team 

within DHS produces CVE 

information at all classification levels 

and provides briefings to nontraditional CVE stakeholders, state 

and local law enforcement, and 

DHS senior leadership.

7 Development of practitionerfriendly summaries of current 

research and literature reviews 

about the motivations and 

behaviors associated with singleactor terrorism and disengagement 

from violent extremism.

DHS

✔ ✔ - - -

DHS S&T developed over 70 CVE 

projects including those related to 

single-actor terrorism.

8 Review of information-sharing 

protocols to identify ways of 

increasing dissemination of 

products to state, local, and tribal 

authorities.

DHS, 

DOJ, 

FBI, 

NCTC

➲ ➲ ➲ ✔ ✔

DHS reviewed its information 

sharing protocols and shares 

products and other reports with 

fusion centers and local officials. 

DOJ participated in a review of the 

State and Local Anti-Terrorism 

Training (SLATT) Program and the 

effectiveness of the SLATT website. 

While the SLATT website is an 

important mechanism to 

disseminate information, a review of 

the program found that a review of 

the website would be important to 

determine outreach and usage.

The FBI reviewed information 

sharing practices and moved its 

CVE office to an office within the 

FBI whose primary mission is to 

improve the quality and timeliness 

of information to state, local, tribal, 

and territorial law enforcement.

An office in NCTC focuses solely on 

dissemination of products at lower 

classification levels and produces a 

weekly article with relevant CVE 

information.
Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 

2011 Strategic Implementation Plan

Page 44 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Tasks in SIP

Lead 

Agency Task DHS DOJ FBI NCTC Status Summary

9 Expansion of briefings and 

information sharing about violent 

extremism with state and local law 

enforcement and government.

DHS/ 

FBI, 

NCTC

➲ ➲ - ✔ ✔

DHS reported their efforts as “in 

progress” and have increased the 

number of unclassified products. 

Additionally they have coordinated 

and facilitated national-level 

communication and outreach efforts 

with state, local, tribal, and territorial 

partners. The FBI hosted local and 

federal officials to learn about CVE 

policy and hosted a CVE 

conference. They also briefed more 

than a dozen police departments 

and numerous police organizations 

including the Major County Sheriff’s 

Association, Major City Chiefs 

Association, and the International 

Association of Chiefs of Police 

among others. NCTC participated in 

awareness briefings with 

government officials as well as 

educators and community 

members.

10 Departments and agencies are 

taking steps to identify training 

materials that may not meet 

internal standards and to improve 

processes for creating and 

reviewing such materials. Some 

departments are consulting with 

outside experts with established 

reputations to evaluate the content 

and training review process. 

Guidance on CVE-related training 

is being developed and will be 

issued, both across the 

organizations and to field 

components. Some departments 

may issue this as part of broader 

training guidance.

ALL

✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔

Agencies took steps to develop and 

review guidance on CVE training. 

DHS completed an internal review 

and issued CVE training guidance in 

2011. Additionally DHS hired two 

contractors to solicit feedback from 

internal and external stakeholders 

and to gather and create an hour 

training session. DOJ senior 

leadership sent information to U.S. 

Attorneys containing five 

overarching principles to guide 

DOJ’s training efforts and to ensure 

that the communities DOJ serves 

are respected. The FBI reached out 

to prominent academics, 

researchers and others to solicit 

feedback on FBI goals and 

strategies. NCTC co-led an interagency working group on training 

which reviewed all CVE related 

training throughout the government.
Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 

2011 Strategic Implementation Plan

Page 45 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Tasks in SIP

Lead 

Agency Task DHS DOJ FBI NCTC Status Summary

11 DHS, via the Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Center, 

(FLETC) is in the process of 

developing a CVE curriculum to be 

integrated into existing training 

programs for federal law 

enforcement. The curriculum will 

give federal law enforcement a 

better understanding of CVE and 

how to more effectively leverage 

existing local partnerships.

DHS

✔ ✔ - - -

DHS reported that FLETC 

integrated CVE content into their 

counter terrorism training

12 DHS is in the process of 

establishing an internal committee 

to review all directly funded and 

issued DHS training on cultural 

competency, engagement, CVE, 

and counterterrorism. The 

committee will be responsible for 

reviewing any new content, 

evaluating experts, and 

establishing quality control. The 

Federal Emergency Management 

Agency (FEMA) will incorporate the 

recently released Informational 

Bulletin and training guidance into 

FY12 grant guidance and will also 

leverage existing mechanisms to 

hold grantees and sub-grantees 

accountable.

DHS

✔ ✔ - - -

DHS completed an internal review 

and issued CVE training 

development guidance in 2011. A 

sub-Interagency Policy Committee 

on CVE training was established. 

Members of the group coordinated, 

among other things, training 

guidance, events, and grants to 

ensure inter-agency cohesion and 

quality control. 
Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 

2011 Strategic Implementation Plan

Page 46 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Tasks in SIP

Lead 

Agency Task DHS DOJ FBI NCTC Status Summary

13 DHS, in partnership with the Los 

Angeles Police Department and 

the National Consortium for 

Advanced Policing, is developing a 

CVE curriculum that includes a 16-

hour continuing education module 

for executive and frontline officers, 

as well as a 30-minute module that 

will be introduced at police 

academies. Both will be certified by 

the Police Officers Standards and 

Training Council. In October 2011 

the Major Cities Chiefs Association 

passed a motion to adopt and 

implement the DHS CVE 

curriculum, which will be piloted 

with state and local law 

enforcement in San Diego by the 

end of 2011. By 2013, DHS seeks 

to: (1) implement the curriculum 

across the country on a regional 

basis; (2) develop a national 

network of trainers and subject 

matter experts who can administer 

the training and keep it current; 

and (3) build an online component 

for the curriculum.

DHS

➲ ➲ - - -

DHS launched a CVE pilot program 

that aimed to develop CVE 

curriculum for local stakeholders in 

2012 and shared curriculum via a 

DHS-FBI web portal. The program 

was not implemented across the 

country and a national network of 

trainers was not established.

14 DHS, via FLETC, will update 

current federal training programs to 

integrate the CVE curriculum for

federal law enforcement in the 

coming year.

DHS

✔ ✔ - - -

DHS updated its counter-terrorism 

training to include CVE specific 

modules.

15 DHS is working with European law 

enforcement partners to share best 

practices and case studies to 

improve training, community 

policing, and operational 

information sharing.

DHS

➲ ➲ - - -

DHS states this task is ongoing and 

been reprioritized under the SIP. 

Additionally DHS developed joint 

products with international lawenforcement and collaborated with 

bilateral and multilateral efforts such 

as in the Global Counterterrorism 

Forum and eight international 

summits. Participation and findings 

were reported regularly to the DHS 

CVE Working group; however, DHS 

did not provide information on how 

these efforts improve training, 

community policing, and operational 

information sharing as stated in the 

SIP.
Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 

2011 Strategic Implementation Plan

Page 47 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Tasks in SIP

Lead 

Agency Task DHS DOJ FBI NCTC Status Summary

16 DHS Civil Rights and Civil Liberties 

is expanding and institutionalizing 

its CVE and cultural competence 

training curricula to further 

enhance the material and its 

effectiveness.

DHS

✔ ✔ - - -

DHS expanded training efforts 

utilizing tools such as the 

Community Awareness Briefings 

(CAB) and Community Resilience 

Exercises (CREX) which are tools 

designed to help communities build 

awareness and understanding of 

violent extremism and to catalyze 

community efforts to respond to 

them.

17 The Interagency Working Group on 

Training will facilitate a “train the 

trainer program” to increase the 

reach of CVE training.

DHS, 

NCTC

➲ ➲ - - ✔

As of February 2016, DHS has been 

working to develop train-the-trainers 

curricula to enable law enforcement 

partners to deliver Community 

Awareness Briefings to law 

enforcement audiences. DHS 

acknowledged this task was in 

progress. NCTC co-led the train-the 

trainer program.

18 The Interagency Working Group on 

Training will facilitate the 

development of an online training 

program that provides professional 

development credit for a broad 

range of professions, particularly 

those involved with public safety, 

violence prevention, and resilience. 

This will help build a basic 

understanding of CVE among a 

broad cross-section of 

stakeholders who have related 

mandates.

DHS, 

NCTC

➲ ✖ - - ✔

DHS has several online CVE 

training efforts under development 

as a result of the Interagency 

Working Group including a webbased awareness level training for 

state, local and tribal territory law 

enforcement line officers, 

supervisors, and training academy 

directors. These efforts are currently 

under development and outside the 

scope of our review. NCTC 

participated in the creation and 

review of this online training that 

occurred under the auspices of the 

interagency Working Group on 

Training, before the establishment 

of the Task Force.

19 The Interagency Working Group on 

Training will collaborate with nonsecurity partners, such as the 

Department of Education, to build 

CVE training modules that can be 

incorporated, as appropriate, into 

existing programs related to public 

safety, violence prevention, and 

resilience. These modules will be 

crafted in a way that is relevant to 

the specific audiences and their 

missions. Only trainers who have 

undergone CVE-specific training 

will deliver training programs that 

include CVE modules.

DHS

➲ ➲ - - -

DHS recognized this task as 

needing attention and that while 

initial steps were made in the 3-pilot 

cities the interagency effort needs to 

better define roles and opportunities 

for future collaborations. No 

additional action to address this 

activity was identified.
Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 

2011 Strategic Implementation Plan

Page 48 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Tasks in SIP

Lead 

Agency Task DHS DOJ FBI NCTC Status Summary

20 The Department of Defense’s 

(DOD) training programs and 

curricula will be informed by the 

work of the Interagency Working 

Group on Training, as appropriate. 

Additionally, DOD is conducting a 

review of CVE-related curricula 

and will make revisions and 

adjustments as necessary.

DOD

N/A - - - -

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Counterterrorism Center. | 

GAO-17-300

The SIP identified 9 capacity building tasks to be implemented by federal 

agencies. Capacity building might include outreach to former violent 

extremists to counter violent narratives. We analyzed the implementation 

of 8 capacity building tasks in the SIP to determine the extent to which 

they had been implemented by the responsible agency(s).
Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 

2011 Strategic Implementation Plan

Page 49 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Table 5: Assessment of Capacity Building Tasks in the 2011 Strategic Implementation Plan (SIP) as of December 2016

Tasks in SIP

Lead 

Agency Task DHS DOJ FBI NCTC Status Summary

1 Expanding efforts to raise 

community awareness about the 

threat of radicalization to violence, 

building from the experience of the 

Community Awareness Briefing 

(CAB), and adapting those 

materials for different audiences 

where appropriate.

DHS 

DOJ, 

FBI, 

NCTC

✔ ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔

The Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) updated the CAB 

and adapted the briefings to 

different audiences. Department of 

Justice (DOJ) officials stated that 

the U.S. Attorneys have hosted 

several briefings and two U.S. 

Attorneys have developed their 

own community awareness 

briefings over 2 years. The Federal 

Bureau of Investigation (FBI) met 

with more than 100 non-federal 

groups and briefed them on their 

proposed critical thinking tools and 

educational resources. The FBI 

incorporated feedback and 

launched Countering Violent 

Extremism (CVE) awareness tools 

for public use tailored to focus on 

foreign fighter recruitment and use 

of social media. The National 

Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) 

stated the CAB has been tailored 

to focus on foreign fighter 

recruitment and use of social 

media.

2 Learning from former violent 

extremists, specifically those who 

can speak credibly to counter 

violent narratives, provide insights 

to government, and potentially 

catalyze activities to directly 

challenge violent extremist 

narratives.

DHS

✖ ✖ - - -

DHS stated this task needed 

attention and that DOJ is now 

responsible for the task. DOJ did 

not provide a response to this task 

at the time of our review.

In March 2017, DOJ noted that it 

has worked with cooperating 

defendants, including those who 

have traveled to or attempted to 

travel to join ISIS, in order to learn 

from their experiences and is 

exploring whether there may be 

appropriate opportunities for these 

individuals to speak publicly, as 

well as circumstances in which 

such defendants may offer their 

assistance toward CVE efforts.

✔ Implemented

➲ In Progress

✖ Not yet addressed

- Not a lead agency 
Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 

2011 Strategic Implementation Plan

Page 50 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Tasks in SIP

Lead 

Agency Task DHS DOJ FBI NCTC Status Summary

3 Providing grants to counter violent 

extremist narratives and 

ideologies, within authorities and 

relevant legal parameters, by 

reprioritizing or increasing the 

flexibility of existing funding.

DHS

➲ ➲ - - -

DHS recognized this task needed 

attention and in 2016 DHS 

developed a grant program. As of 

December 2016, award notices for 

these grants had not been issued. 

4 Brokering connections between 

private sector actors, civil society, 

and communities interested in 

countering violent extremist 

narratives.

DHS

➲ ➲ - - -

DHS noted initial progress with 

YouTube and the Los Angeles 

Police Department sponsorship of 

a university challenge where 

students develop campaigns 

against violent extremism. DHS 

recognized this task needed 

attention and that these efforts can 

be expanded.

5 Promoting international exchange 

programs to build expertise for 

countering violent extremist 

narratives.

State

N/A - - - -

6 Increasing technical training to 

empower communities to counter 

violent extremists online, including 

the development of training for 

bloggers.

DHS

➲ ➲ - - -

DHS reported that it expanded a 

public-private partnership to 

establish a university student 

challenge to develop online 

campaigns. DHS recognized this 

task as needing attention and that

these efforts can be expanded.

7 Providing regular briefings to 

Congress, think tanks, and 

members of the media. 

DHS

✔ ✔ - - -

DHS has expanded briefings and 

hearings and delivered over two 

dozen briefings and hearings to 

Congress. 

8 Creating programs to directly 

engage the public on the issue.

ALL

➲ ➲ ➲ ✔ ✔

DHS reported that they have held 

dozens of events to discuss CVE, 

but a direct DHS-wide CVE public 

engagement campaign is needed. 

DHS recognized this task as 

needing attention and considered 

this to be an ongoing task. DOJ 

highlighted a CVE summit that 

brought members of the SIP Pilot 

sites to discuss CVE issues with 

members of the community. The 

FBI hosts forums that open 

dialogue, outline their mission and 

activities, and create awareness of 

threats that may impact the 

community. NCTC stated the CAB 

is presented to a wide range of 

audiences. 
Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 

2011 Strategic Implementation Plan

Page 51 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Tasks in SIP

Lead 

Agency Task DHS DOJ FBI NCTC Status Summary

9 Building a public website on 

community resilience and CVE.

DHS

➲ ➲ - - -

DHS stated the CVE website was 

launched in 2012 and updated in 

2015 but recognized that an online 

platform that encourages 

stakeholder interaction is still 

needed. According to DHS, the 

CVE Task Force launched the 

CVE Task Force website 

(www.dhs.gov/cve) in 2017 to bring 

together publicly-available 

information on the U.S.

Government’s response to violent 

extremism.

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Justice, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the National Counterterrorism Center. | 

GAO-17-300
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 52 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Appendix IV: Comments from the 

Department of Homeland Security
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 53 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 54 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department 

of Homeland Security

Page 55 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism
Appendix III: Implementation of Tasks in the 

2011 Strategic Implementation Plan

Page 56 GAO-17-300 Countering Violent Extremism

Diana Maurer, (202) 512-8777 or maurerd@gao.gov

In addition to the individual named above, Joseph Cruz (Assistant 

Director), Eric Hauswirth, Kevin Heinz, Tyler Kent, Thomas Lombardi, 

Jonathan Tumin, Amber Sinclair, and Adam Vogt made significant 

contributions to the report.

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

(100400)
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