J-S05011-21

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

ANDREW HOLDER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 891 EDA 2020

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 12, 2020

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-51-CR-0004884-2017

BEFORE: BOWES, J., LAZARUS, J., and McLAUGHLIN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED MAY 25, 2021

Andrew Holder appeals from the judgment of sentence of seventeen and 

one-half to thirty-five years of imprisonment imposed following non-jury 

convictions of third-degree murder, burglary, and conspiracy. We affirm.

The trial court offered the following detailed summary of the underlying 

facts established at Appellant’s trial:

On the evening of January 3, 2017, Marcella Vance watched 

movies with her cousin, Jessica Kidd, and her paramour, the 

decedent Darryl “Kwan” Curtis, in the back room of her apartment

located at 8029 Erdrick Street in Northeast Philadelphia. Vance 

shared the apartment with her roommate Nashieta Noland, who 

was present in the front room with her paramour, the codefendant

Jamal Washington. At approximately 8:30 p.m., Vance left the 

apartment to drive Kidd home. Shortly thereafter, both Noland 

and Washington left the apartment, leaving the decedent alone 

inside. 

Between 7:52 p.m. and 8:24 p.m., Washington received 

multiple phone calls from and individual named Robert Thorogood 

and [Appellant]. At 8:24 p.m., Washington called [Appellant].
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[Appellant], who was wearing a global position-tracking electronic

monitor while under the supervision of the Pennsylvania State 

Parole Board, travelled to the area of 8029 Erdrick Street. There, 

he and an unidentified individual met Washington, and all three

walked in the direction of the apartment, which [Appellant]

entered at 9:35 p.m., armed with a pistol. Inside, [Appellant]

searched a safe inside Noland’s room and encountered the 

decedent inside Vance’s bedroom. There, he shot and killed the 

decedent. 

Detective Thorsten Lucke, an expert in both video 

surveillance recovery and cell phone data extraction, recovered 

video surveillance recordings from private residences at 8052 and

8045 Erdrick Streets, along with video recorded from a church 

located at the corner of W[e]lsh and Erdrick Streets. Surveillance 

footage recovered from the corner of Erdrick and W[e]lsh Streets 

depicted two vehicles make a left-hand turn from W[e]lsh Street 

onto Erdrick, in the direction of the apartment. The camera 

located at 8052 Erdrick Street captured video of [Appellant],

Washington, and another individual walking down Erdrick Street 

at 9:32 p.m. towards the decedent’s location, before disappearing 

from view. At 9:34 p.m., the cameras at 8052 Erdrick Street 

recorded . . . Washington speaking on a cellular device while 

walking back towards Welsh Street, away from the crime scene. 

At 9:38 p.m., both cameras captured [Appellant], armed with a 

pistol, running away from the murder scene with the unidentified 

individual, with an object consistent with a backpack seen carried 

in the frame. [Appellant]’s positive identity was captured as he 

ran past the camera located at 8052 Erdrick Street at 9:39 p.m.

Vance, who had dropped Kidd off at her home before 

purchasing dinner and cigarettes at other locations, called the 

decedent at 9:48 p.m. but received no response. Upon entering 

the apartment less than fifteen minutes later, Vance discovered 

the decedent’s body lying in a pool of blood in the back bedroom. 

After attempting to give CPR, both Vance and her upstairs 

neighbors called 911. Philadelphia Police Sergeant Conway and 

Officer Theodore Brown answered a radio call for an unresponsive 

male and discovered the decedent’s body on location. The 

decedent was pronounced dead at the scene at 10:19 p.m.

Forensic pathologist Dr. Lindsay Simon performed the 

decedent’s autopsy and determined that the cause of death was a 

single gunshot wound to the head, and the manner of death was 
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homicide. The projectile entered the decedent’s head above the 

right eyebrow, traveled through his skull and brain, before exiting 

behind the left ear, causing immediate incapacitation and death. 

There was no soot or stippling discovered on the body to 

determine the distance of the shooter. 

After calling the police, Vance called Noland, described the 

bloody crime scene, and asked her to return to the apartment. 

Washington also returned to the apartment upon Noland’s

request. All three spoke to detectives at the scene and traveled 

to the Police Administration Building where they each provided 

statements, and Washington surrendered his cell phone for further 

investigation. 

Officer Brown inspected the apartment and observed 

misplaced items in Noland’s bedroom, including a gun-cleaning kit 

and boxes of unfired projectiles, but did not find any signs of

forced entry. At 1:10 a.m. on December 4, 201[7], Officer Brian 

Stark of the Crime Scene Unit arrived at the location and 

recovered forty-nine bullets of different brands that had been 

previously stored in Vance’s safe. A fired projectile was 

discovered inside a dresser drawer in Vance’s bedroom, 

demonstrating that the projectile was fired inside the room. 

Officer Stark also recovered five latent fingerprints from the crime 

scene, which he submitted for review. Patrick Raytek, a forensic 

scientist with the police department’s latent print unit, examined 

all five latent prints and determined that a print lifted from the 

ammunition box matched [Appellant].

On the morning [after the shooting], Vance returned to the 

apartment and discovered a fired cartridge casing (“FCC”) on the 

floor between her bed and nightstand. Vance further noticed that 

the decedent’s backpack, which usually contained valuable coins, 

comic books and possibly narcotics, was missing from her 

bedroom. After contacting the police, she returned to the Police 

Administration Building and provided a second statement, wherein 

she explained that her ex-husband, Stacy Strange, previously 

kept a firearm in the searched safe, but that the firearm had been 

removed from the home prior to the shooting. She further noted 

that the safe did not contain valuables. 

Later that morning, [Appellant]’s State Parole Officer . . . 

Jacqueline Vaughn discovered an email alerting her that the 

battery charge of [Appellant’s] GPS ankle monitor had fallen below
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the alert threshold at 8:51 p.m. on the night of the shooting and 

went into violation at 9:21 p.m. for failure to charge the device. 

Because the monitor was in violation, it recorded [Appellant’s] 

location every fifteen seconds. Vaughn cross-referenced the GPS 

information with a map of the city. Her analysis demonstrated 

that, starting at 9:00 p.m., [Appellant] traveled from Wissahickon

Avenue and onto Roosevelt Boulevard, towards the crime scene. 

GPS records further revealed that [Appellant] arrived on Erdrick 

Street at 9:32 p.m., and remained until 9:44 p.m. The GPS

monitor tracked [Appellant]’s location as he returned home 

between 9:44 p.m. and 10:11 p.m., whereupon he began 

charging the device above the alert threshold. 

The next day, Vaughn watched a news program reporting 

the decedent[’]s murder in his apartment on Erdrick Street. After 

reviewing her report showing [Appellant] at the location at the 

time of the shooting, Vaughn contacted homicide detectives. 

David Webb, an account manager with Attendi Electronic 

Monitoring, the company that manufactures and stores records for 

[Appellant]’s GPS monitor, reviewed the data associated with 

[Appellant]’s device from the night of the murder. In his analysis, 

Webb noted that, while the device can pinpoint a user’s location 

to within a ten foot range of accuracy, movement of that device, 

or interference by entering a building, can decrease that range of 

accuracy to an inconclusive level of 100 feet. 

GPS location records kept in the course of ordinary business 

demonstrated that at 9:31:35 p.m., [Appellant]’s device recorded 

his location at 8077 Erdrick Street. At 9:32:35 p.m., [Appellant]

was walking outside 8068 Erdrick Street, towards the decedent’s 

location at 8029 Erdrick Street at a speed of three miles per hour. 

[Appellant] continued past 8054 Erdrick Street before reaching 

8025 Erdrick Street at 9:34:35 p.m. At 8025 Erdrick Street, the 

device’s range of accuracy decreased to fifty-six feet, indicating 

that [Appellant] was inside a building. Between 9:35:38 p.m. and 

9:37:35 p.m., the device identified [Appellant]’s location at 8029

Erdrick Street, with decreasing ranges of accuracy from seventynine feet, to ninety-three feet, and ultimately reaching 

inconclusive levels beyond 100 feet, demonstrating his presence 

inside a building. By 9:40 p.m., the device began recording 

[Appellant]’s location moving away from 8029 Erdrick Street with 

increasing levels of accuracy, before being plugged in at 10:11 

p.m., and coming to rest at 11:57 p.m. 
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Detective Lucke completed a call detail record report on the 

cellular device attributed to Washington on June 7, 2017, which 

revealed a series of phone calls between his device and those

attributed to [Appellant] and Thorogood. At 7:53 p.m., Thorogood 

placed a call to Washington, lasting fifteen seconds. At 7:54 and 

7:57 p.m., [Appellant] left voicemails with Washington, who 

responded with an outgoing call to [Appellant] at 8:24. 

Washington and [Appellant] next communicated at 9:21 p.m., 

before the instant shooting. Washington next placed several calls 

to [Appellant] between 9:40 p.m. and 9:41 p.m., and again 

between 10:01 p.m. and 10:09 p.m. that evening. In total, 

Washington’s device recorded twenty-six communications

between devices associated with Washington and [Appellant], all 

of which occurring within the time frame immediately before and 

after the murder. 

Detective Lucke’s analysis further revealed that, in the 

aftermath of the instant shooting, Washington deleted from his 

cell phone all records of his communications with [Appellant] and 

Thorogood that evening. Cell phone data extraction permitted 

Detective Lucke to recover some, but not all, of their 

communications. 

Detective James Dunlap, an expert in cellular tower 

analysis, reviewed data from towers located at 8046 Erdrick Street 

and .6 miles away from the crime scene on Interstate-95, and

identified numerous connection[s] between Washington’s device 

and those towers between 8:04 p.m. and 9:54 p.m. on the night 

of the murder. Additional connections depicted Washington’s

device making two connections at a tower located at Rhawn Street 

and Roosevelt Boulevard, 1.5 miles away from the crime scene. 

Nine connections between 10:06 p.m. and 10:10 p.m. show the 

device travelling along Roosevelt Boulevard before making a 

connection with the tower at 1831 West Allegheny Avenue, which 

is associated with Washington’s home address at 1931 West 

Willard Street. Analysis of the device associated with [Appellant]

(215-880-7871) showed that it connected to the tower associated 

with the crime scene numerous times between 9:25 p.m. and

10:08 p.m. Analysis of the device associated with Thorogood 

revealed that the device was not in the area of the crime scene 

. . . at the time of the shooting.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/22/20, at 2-7 (citations omitted).
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Appellant was arrested and charged with murder and other crimes. He 

and co-defendant Washington elected to waive their rights to a jury trial and 

proceeded to a bench trial. On December 4, 2019, the trial court found 

Appellant guilty of third-degree murder, burglary, and conspiracy to commit 

burglary. The court sentenced Appellant as indicated above on February 12, 

2020. Appellant filed a timely post-sentence motion, which the trial court 

promptly denied. 

On March 3, 2020, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial 

court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement of errors 

complained of on appeal, and Appellant timely complied.1 The trial court 

thereafter authored a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, and this appeal is ripe for 

disposition.

Appellant presents the following questions for our review:

1. Whether the evidence presented at Appellant’s trial was 

insufficient to sustain the verdicts of guilty for murder in the 

third degree, burglary, and conspiracy to commit burglary.

2. Whether the verdict of guilty for third degree murder, 

burglary, and conspiracy to third degree murder was against 

the weight of the evidence, and as such, requires a new trial.

3. Whether the Commonwealth violated the rule promulgated 

in Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1969)[,] by 

failing to disclose the material evidence of Mr. Gerald 

Morison’s address prior to trial such that there was a 

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1 While the statement was not filed within twenty-one days of the trial court’s 

order, it was timely filed pursuant to our Supreme Court’s orders concerning 

the COVID-19 statewide judicial emergency. 
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reasonable possibility that had this evidence been disclosed 

the result at trial would have been different.

4. Whether the sentence imposed by the trial court was an 

abuse of discretion.

Appellant’s brief at 6-7 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

We begin with Appellant’s sufficiency challenges, mindful of the 

following:

Because a determination of evidentiary sufficiency presents a 

question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope 

of review is plenary. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, 

we must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial and all 

reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, viewed in the light most 

favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, were sufficient 

to prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. 

[T]he facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth 

need not preclude every possibility of innocence. It is within the 

province of the fact-finder to determine the weight to be accorded 

to each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the 

evidence. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving 

every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence. Moreover, as an appellate court, we may not re-weigh 

the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder.

Commonwealth v. Williams, 176 A.3d 298, 305-06 (Pa.Super. 2017) 

(citations and quotation marks omitted). 

We first address together Appellant’s challenges to the evidence 

underlying his burglary and conspiracy convictions. The burglary statute 

provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

A person commits the offense of burglary if, with the intent to 

commit a crime therein, the person:

(1)(i) enters a building or occupied structure, or separately 

secured or occupied portion thereof, that is adapted for 
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overnight accommodations in which at the time of the offense 

any person is present and the person commits, attempts or 

threatens to commit a bodily injury crime therein[.]

18 Pa.C.S. § 3502(a)(1)(i). “To sustain a burglary conviction, the 

Commonwealth is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 

offender entered the premises with the contemporaneous intent of committing 

a crime therein, at a time when he or she was not licensed or privileged to 

enter.” Commonwealth v. Jacoby, 170 A.3d 1065, 1078 (Pa. 2017). A 

burglary is complete the moment the residence is entered. See, e.g., 

Commonwealth v. Tavarez, 174 A.3d 7, 13 (Pa.Super. 2017). 

The crime of conspiracy “requires proof of three elements: 1) an 

agreement, 2) shared criminal intent, and 3) an overt act.” Commonwealth 

v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 479 (Pa.Super. 2018). We have elucidated:

An explicit or formal agreement to commit crimes can seldom, if 

ever, be proved and it need not be, for proof of a criminal 

partnership is almost invariably extracted from the circumstances 

that attend its activities. Thus, a conspiracy may be inferred 

where it is demonstrated that the relation, conduct, or 

circumstances of the parties, and the overt acts of the coconspirators sufficiently prove the formation of a criminal 

confederation. The conduct of the parties and the circumstances 

surrounding their conduct may create a web of evidence linking 

the accused to the alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. 

Even if the conspirator did not act as a principal in committing the 

underlying crime, [he] is still criminally liable for the actions of his 

co-conspirators taken in furtherance of the conspiracy.

Commonwealth v. Gross, 232 A.3d 819, 839 (Pa.Super. 2020) (en banc) 

(cleaned up). 
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Appellant argues that the evidence “was insufficient as a matter of law 

to sustain the verdict of [conspiracy to commit] third-degree murder because 

there was no direct evidence to substantiate that Appellant entered into an 

agreement with his co-defendant and the unidentified individual to murder the 

decedent in the 8029 Erdrick Street property.” Appellant’s brief at 31-32. 

Likewise, he asserts that there was no evidence, such as forced entry, to 

suggest that he entered the residence “with felonious intent.” Id. at 30.

Appellant contends that the evidence, “at best, demonstrates that 

Appellant may have been in the immediate area . . . and briefly communicated 

with his co-defendant via cell phone during the relevant time period.” Id. at 

34. While acknowledging that his fingerprints were found inside the 

apartment, Appellant cites the lack of forensic evidence in the bedroom where 

the decedent was killed as suggesting that Appellant was “merely present” 

when someone else murdered the decedent. Id. at 35. In sum, Appellant’s 

position is that it was “purely speculative” for the fact-finder to conclude that 

Appellant “had colluded with [co-defendant] Washington or the unknown male 

to murder the decedent.” Id. at 34-35. 

Appellant’s claim fails for several reasons. First, Appellant was not 

convicted of conspiracy to commit murder. On the record, the trial court 

indicated it found Appellant guilty of conspiracy without indication of the 

conspiracy’s objective. See N.T. Trial, 12/4/19, at 60. However, the trial 

court’s written verdict sheet clearly indicates that it found Appellant guilty of 
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“conspiracy – burglary.” Trial Disposition and Dismissal Form, 12/4/19 

(capitalization omitted). Hence, Appellant’s arguments that the evidence at 

trial did not prove that he colluded with one or more other people to murder 

the decedent are inapposite.

Second, direct evidence is not required to prove conspiracy or any other 

crime. See, e.g., Gross, supra at 839 (“[A] conspiracy may be inferred 

where it is demonstrated that the relation, conduct, or circumstances of the 

parties, and the overt acts of the co-conspirators sufficiently prove the 

formation of a criminal confederation. The conduct of the parties and the 

circumstances surrounding their conduct may create a web of evidence linking 

the accused to the alleged conspiracy beyond a reasonable doubt. (cleaned 

up)); Williams, supra at 306 (“The Commonwealth may sustain its burden 

of proving every element of the crime by means of wholly circumstantial 

evidence.”). 

Third, the evidence was sufficient that Appellant conspired with codefendant Washington for Holder to enter the apartment at 8029 Erdrick 

Street and commit a felony therein. As the trial court explained:

This court’s guilty verdict was reached on the strength of 

overwhelming evidence that [Appellant] conspired with 

Washington to burglarize 8029 Erdrick Street. [Appellant] began 

communicating with Washington shortly after most inhabitants of 

the apartment had left. Data extracted from [Appellant]’s GPS 

monitor demonstrated that immediately after communicating with 

Washington, [Appellant] proceeded to travel to 8029 Erdrick 

Street. Upon arriving near that location, video surveillance 

evidence depicted Washington escorting [Appellant] and an 

unidentified individual towards the apartment.
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Both GPS data and fingerprint evidence recovered from 

inside the apartment demonstrate that [Appellant] entered the 

apartment on the night of the shooting. In its investigation of the 

instant shooting, investigators were unable to recover the 

decedent’s backpack, which possibly contained valuables and 

narcotics, evidences [Appellant]’s intention to commit the crime 

of theft upon entering the apartment. The discovery of documents 

that were removed from Vance’s safe further demonstrates 

[Appellant]’s intent to commit theft inside the abode. Because of 

clear evidence demonstrating intent to commit a crime therein, 

both the conspiracy and the burglary were completed the moment 

[Appellant] entered the home. The evidence at trial was therefore 

sufficient to support the conspiracy and burglary charges, and the 

sufficiency claims fail.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/22/20, at 12-13 (unnecessary capitalization omitted). 

The trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record.2 

Therefore, we conclude that the evidence that Appellant, co-defendant, and 

another man approached the residence together following co-defendant 

Washington’s communications, that Appellant entered the residence, rifled 

through belongings, and removed some, supports Appellant’s burglary and 

conspiracy convictions. See Commonwealth v. Donohue, 62 A.3d 1033, 

1037 (Pa.Super. 2013) (holding unexplained presence of defendant’s 

fingerprints in burglarized residence was alone sufficient to support burglary 

conviction); Commonwealth v. Rayner, 153 A.3d 1049, 1056 (Pa. Super. 

____________________________________________

2 We additionally note that co-defendant Washington’s act of attempting to 

erase all communications with Appellant from his cell phone after the incident 

suggests that the communications would evidence the parties’ collective guilt. 

Accord Commonwealth v. Paddy, 800 A.2d 294, 319 (Pa. 2002) 

(“[A]ttempts by a defendant to suppress evidence are admissible to 

demonstrate his or her consciousness of guilt.”). 
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Ct. 2016) (holding evidence of conspiracy sufficient where three men entered 

apartment and rob resident and forensic evidence identified the defendant as 

one of them). 

We next turn to Appellant’s challenge to the evidentiary sufficiency of 

his murder conviction. Regarding the elements of murder in the third degree, 

our Supreme Court has explained:

To convict a defendant of the offense of third[-]degree 

murder, the Commonwealth need only prove that the defendant 

killed another person with malice aforethought. This Court has 

long held that malice comprehends not only a particular ill-will, 

but also a wickedness of disposition, hardness of heart, 

recklessness of consequences, and a mind regardless of social 

duty, although a particular person may not be intended to be 

injured.

Commonwealth v. Fisher, 80 A.3d 1186, 1191 (Pa. 2013) (cleaned up). 

Appellant argues that his murder conviction cannot stand “because 

there was no evidence that Appellant was physically inside the rear bedroom 

when the homicide was committed.” Appellant’s brief at 23. He maintains 

that, “even if Appellant was present in the property located at 8029 Erdrick 

Street, Appellant was merely present when the decedent was killed by [codefendant] Washington and/or the unknown male.” Id. 

The trial court addressed Appellant’s arguments as follows:

The Commonwealth presented more than sufficient 

evidence to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [Appellant]

maliciously shot and murdered the decedent. On the night of the

shooting, [Appellant] wore a GPS monitoring device which, due to 

his failure to maintain a sufficient charge, recorded [Appellant]’s 

location every fifteen seconds, as he travelled across Philadelphia 

towards the decedent’s apartment. Inconclusive data caused by 
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interference with the GPS monitor indicated that [Appellant] was 

indoors at or near the location of 8029 Erdrick Street. Later 

investigation recovered one of [Appellant]’s fingerprints from a 

box of projectiles located inside 8029 Erdrick Street, proving that 

[Appellant] was inside the apartment. Neither Vance nor Noland, 

who resided in that apartment, had met or interacted with 

[Appellant] prior to the night of the shooting, and were not 

present in the domicile to grant [Appellant] access immediately 

before the shooting.

Video surveillance footage recovered along Erdrick Street 

depicted [Appellant] wearing a GPS tracking device and carrying 

an object while running away from the residence, which this court 

concluded was a firearm. An autopsy of the decedent’s body 

revealed that he was killed by one gunshot wound to the head, 

resulting in instant death. This evidence is sufficient to support 

[Appellant]’s third-degree murder conviction.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/22/20, at 11-12. 

Again, the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the certified 

record. We agree that the evidence that Appellant fled the scene with a 

firearm distinguishes this case from those in which the Commonwealth merely 

proved that the defendant was present at the scene of the crime. Cf., e.g., 

In Interest of J.B., 189 A.3d 390, 417 (Pa. 2018) (holding that evidence 

that a shotgun was found in juvenile’s bedroom was insufficient to support 

delinquency adjudication for murder, where the decedent was discovered in 

the family’s unlocked house forty-five minutes after the juvenile left for school 

and the weapon contained no physical evidence of the shooting; evidence was 

equally consistent with juvenile’s guilt or innocence). 

Moreover, as the Commonwealth notes, the evidence supports 

Appellant’s conviction on a complicity theory even if co-defendant Washington 
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or the third, unidentified man was the one who actually fired the fatal shot. 

See Commonwealth’s brief at 12 (citing Commonwealth v. Roebuck, 32 

A.3d 613, 624 (Pa. 2011) (“[A] conviction for murder of the third degree is 

supportable under complicity theory where the Commonwealth proves the 

accomplice acted with the culpable mental state required of a principal actor, 

namely, malice.”). See also Commonwealth v. King, 990 A.2d 1172, 1179 

(Pa.Super. 2010) (affirming murder conviction on theory of conspiracy liability 

where the evidence that demonstrated that the defendant agreed with the 

shooter to commit the robbery in question, the defendant knew that the 

shooter had a gun, and that the shooting was a probable result of the 

robbery). Thus, we discern no reason to disturb Appellant’s murder 

conviction.

Next, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his request 

for a new trial based upon the weight of the evidence. The following legal 

principles apply to our review:

Appellate review of a weight claim is a review of the [trial court’s] 

exercise of discretion, not of the underlying question of whether 

the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Because the trial 

judge has had the opportunity to hear and see the evidence 

presented, an appellate court will give the gravest consideration 

to the findings and reasons advanced by the trial judge when 

reviewing a trial court’s determination that the verdict is against 

the weight of the evidence. One of the least assailable reasons 

for granting or denying a new trial is the lower court’s conviction 

that the verdict was or was not against the weight of the evidence 

and that a new trial should be granted in the interest of justice.
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Commonwealth v. Clay, 64 A.3d 1049, 1054-55 (Pa. 2013) (cleaned up). 

This standard applies even when the trial judge was also the finder of fact. 

See Commonwealth v. Konias, 136 A.3d 1014, 1022 (Pa.Super. 2016) 

(reviewing exercise of discretion rather than weight of the evidence in appeal 

from non-jury verdict). 

The trial court addressed Appellant’s claim as follows:

[T]the Commonwealth presented significant physical evidence, 

cell tower data, phone extraction data, and video evidence 

demonstrating that [Appellant] conspired with Washington to 

enter 8029 Erdrick Street, where he ultimately shot and killed the 

decedent. GPS tracking and fingerprint evidence was sufficient to 

prove that [Appellant] was inside the home, searching for and 

ultimately removing valuables. Both the conspiracy and the 

underlying act of burglary were completed once [Appellant]

crossed the threshold into the apartment. Video evidence clearly 

depicted [Appellant], armed with a pistol, running away from 8029 

Erdrick Street immediately after the instant shooting. Every 

parcel of this demonstrative evidence went uncontested at trial. 

Accordingly, the weight of the evidence tips the scale wholly in 

favor of the third-degree murder, burglary, and conspiracy 

convictions, and the instant claim fails.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/22/20, at 14-15.

Appellant offers no claim or discussion of how the trial court’s denial of 

his weight claim was an abuse of discretion. Instead, he reasserts the same 

sufficiency challenges that we have already rejected and suggests that the 

evidence should have been resolved in his favor. Accordingly, no relief is due. 

See Commonwealth v. Soto, 202 A.3d 80, 97 (Pa.Super. 2018) (denying 

relief on weight claim that was based “on the same arguments that he raised 

in support of his challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence” and the 
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suggestion of “an interpretation of the trial evidence in a light most favorable 

to him”). 

Appellant next claims that the trial court erred in denying relief on his 

Brady claim. “This issue presents a question of law, for which our standard 

of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. 

Bagnall, 235 A.3d 1075, 1084 (Pa. 2020). Our Supreme Court summarized 

the law relevant to the adjudication of such claims as follows:

The law governing alleged Brady violations is well-settled. 

In Brady, the United States Supreme Court held that the 

suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an 

accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is 

material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the good 

faith or bad faith of the prosecution. The Supreme Court 

subsequently held that the duty to disclose such evidence is 

applicable even if there has been no request by the accused, and 

that the duty may encompass impeachment evidence as well as 

directly exculpatory evidence. Furthermore, the prosecution’s 

Brady obligation extends to exculpatory evidence in the files of 

police agencies of the same government bringing the prosecution. 

On the question of materiality, the Court has noted that such 

evidence is material if there is a reasonable probability that, had 

the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the 

proceeding would have been different. The materiality inquiry is 

not just a matter of determining whether, after discounting the 

inculpatory evidence in light of the undisclosed evidence, the 

remaining evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s conclusions. 

Rather, the question is whether the favorable evidence could 

reasonably be taken to put the whole case in such a different light 

as to undermine confidence in the verdict. Thus, there are three 

necessary components that demonstrate a violation of the Brady

strictures: the evidence was favorable to the accused, either 

because it is exculpatory or because it impeaches; the evidence 

was suppressed by the prosecution, either willfully or 

inadvertently; and prejudice ensued.

Commonwealth v. Lambert, 884 A.2d 848, 853-54 (Pa. 2005) (cleaned up).
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Appellant contends that the Commonwealth committed a Brady 

violation by willfully failing to disclose the address of potential witness Gerald 

Morrison. See Appellant’s brief at 39. The trial court denied relief on the 

claim, holding that Appellant demonstrated neither that the Commonwealth 

suppressed evidence, nor that he was prejudiced. It explained as follows:

At trial, the defense called witness Kyle Page, who testified that 

on February 4, 2017, he received a text message from Morrison. 

Detective Jeffrey Burke interviewed Page and read the text 

message, which said that Morrison shot “that dude D” in the 

Holmesburg section of Philadelphia four weeks prior, matching the 

date and general location of the instant murder. On October 31, 

2020, in preparation for the instant trial, [Detective] Burke spoke 

to Morrison at his known address, and documented the interview 

on his activity sheet, which was provided to the defense. 

On the last day of trial, defense counsel informed this Court 

that he intended to subpoena Morrison, but Morrison’s address 

was missing from the activity sheet, preventing him from doing 

so. In response, the Commonwealth explained that Morrison’s 

name was included in discovery, which was provided to counsel at 

the time the matter was scheduled for trial. The Commonwealth 

had not subpoenaed Morrison for trial, and until Detective Burke’s 

testimony the day before, the defense had not requested 

Morrison’s address.

Based on the totality of the above circumstances, it is clear 

that the Commonwealth did not suppress Morrison’s address to 

prevent his testimony, and [Appellant] cannot demonstrate 

prejudice. Morrison was identified as a potential witness within 

discovery, granting the defense an opportunity to interview him 

in preparation for trial. Though the copy of the activity sheet did 

not include Morrison’s address, the address could have been 

obtained by defense counsel upon request, and defense counsel 

did not make such a request until after trial commenced.

Moreover, [Appellant] fails to show how Morrison’s 

testimony would have altered the result of the proceeding. While 

examining witness Page on direct, the defense elicited that 

Morrison sent Page an incriminating message one month after the 
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shooting. Through its examination of Detective Burke, the 

defense further elicited the contents of that message, which 

implied that Morrison took credit for killing an individual named D 

at the time and location of the instant homicide.

This [c]ourt balanced the possibility of Morrison’s 

involvement with the other direct and circumstantial evidence 

presented at trial. While video evidence establishes that 

[Appellant] arrived at 8029 Erdrick Street with an unidentified 

individual, having Morrison possibly identified as that individual 

would not alter the instant verdict, as video surveillance evidence 

identifying [Appellant], GPS data tracking him, and fingerprint 

recovery identifying him as having been present in the home, all 

unequivocally establish [Appellant]’s involvement in and guilt of

the instant offense. Not only did the absence of Morrison’s 

address-information that was readily available to the defense 

upon request-from discovery fail to change the outcome of this

case, but it fails to tarnish the fairness of the trial itself. For those 

reasons, the instant claim fails.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/22/20, at 9-10 (citations omitted). 

We conclude that the trial court’s analysis is sound. The case law relied 

upon by Appellant in supporting his claim relates to instances in which the 

Commonwealth failed to disclose the very existence of a potentiallyexculpatory witness. See Appellant’s brief at 40-41 (discussing 

Commonwealth v. Moose, 602 A.2d 1265, 1271 (Pa. 1992) (finding Brady 

violation where Commonwealth did not disclose identity of witness until the 

day of trial, and failed to disclose before the defendant’s conviction the fact

that it had offered the witness leniency in exchange for his cooperation). 

Here, it is undisputed that the Commonwealth timely identified Morrison 

as a potential witness. It was Appellant’s failure to follow up on the 

information duly supplied by the Commonwealth that resulted in his inability 
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to procure a statement or testimony from Morrison. Appellant tacitly concedes 

in his brief that his real claim sounds in ineffectiveness of counsel for his failure 

to investigate Morrison. See Appellant’s brief at 42. However, as Appellant 

acknowledges, that claim is properly raised not on direct appeal, but in postconviction collateral proceedings. Id. at 42 n.4 (citing Commonwealth v. 

Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 728 (Pa. 2002)). As Appellant has not established that 

he suffered prejudice as a result of the Commonwealth’s suppression of 

favorable evidence, his Brady claim does not warrant relief. 

In his final issue, Appellant seeks to challenge the discretionary aspects 

of his sentence. The following legal principles govern our consideration of his 

claim:

An appellant is not entitled to the review of challenges to the 

discretionary aspects of a sentence as of right. Rather, an 

appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence 

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction. We determine whether the 

appellant has invoked our jurisdiction by considering the following 

four factors: 

(1) whether appellant has filed a timely notice of 

appeal; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved 

at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify 

sentence; (3) whether appellant’s brief has a fatal 

defect; and (4) whether there is a substantial question 

that the sentence appealed from is not appropriate 

under the Sentencing Code.

Commonwealth v. Lucky, 229 A.3d 657, 663-64 (Pa.Super. 2020) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). 

Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and preserved the issue in a 

timely post-sentence motion seeking reconsideration of his sentence. 
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Appellant’s brief does not contain a statement of reasons relied upon for his 

challenge to the discretionary aspects of his sentence as required by Pa.R.A.P. 

2119(f). However, since the Commonwealth has not objected, we decline to 

find waiver on that basis. Rather, we shall consider whether Appellant has 

raised a substantial question. See Commonwealth v. Kiesel, 854 A.2d 530, 

533 (Pa.Super. 2004) (“[W]hen the appellant has not included a Rule 2119(f) 

statement and the appellee has not objected, this Court may ignore the 

omission and determine if there is a substantial question that the sentence 

imposed was not appropriate. . . .”). 

Appellant contends that the trial court improperly “focus[ed] solely on 

Appellant’s alleged role in the crime alone . . . instead of examining all the 

sentencing factors set forth in 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b)[3]including Appellant’s 

demonstrable need for mental health rehabilitation and drug counseling for 

his deep-rooted childhood trauma.” Appellant’s brief at 48. We conclude that 

Appellant has presented a substantial question warranting our review. See, 

____________________________________________

3 This statute provides, in relevant part:

the court shall follow the general principle that the sentence 

imposed should call for total confinement that is consistent with 

section 9725 (relating to total confinement) and the protection of 

the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on 

the life of the victim and on the community, and the rehabilitative 

needs of the defendant. The court shall also consider any 

guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted by the 

Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing . . . .

42 Pa.C.S. § 9721.
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e.g., Commonwealth v. Derrickson, 242 A.3d 667, 680 (Pa.Super. 2020) 

(finding substantial question presented by claim that the sentence was based 

solely on the seriousness of the crime without consideration of all relevant 

factors). Accordingly, we proceed to review the merits of Appellant’s 

sentencing challenge.

“When reviewing sentencing matters, this Court must accord the 

sentencing court great weight as it is in the best position to view the 

defendant’s character, displays of remorse, defiance or indifference, and the 

overall effect and nature of the crime.” Commonwealth v. Edwards, 194 

A.3d 625, 637 (Pa.Super. 2018) (cleaned up). “We cannot re-weigh the 

sentencing factors and impose our judgment in the place of the sentencing 

court.” Commonwealth v. Macias, 968 A.2d 773, 778 (Pa.Super. 2009). 

Hence, we review the sentencing court’s sentencing determination for an 

abuse of discretion. 

In this context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an 

error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish, by 

reference to the record, that the sentencing court ignored or 

misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of 

partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly 

unreasonable decision.

Commonwealth v. Antidormi, 84 A.3d 736, 760 (Pa.Super. 2014). 

While its discretion is broad, “the trial court’s discretion is not 

unfettered.” Commonwealth v. Coulverson, 34 A.3d 135, 144 (Pa.Super. 

2011). “When imposing sentence, a court is required to consider the particular 

circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant. In 
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considering these factors, the court should refer to the defendant’s prior 

criminal record, age, personal characteristics and potential for rehabilitation.” 

Antidormi, supra at 761 (citations and quotation marks omitted). “And, of 

course, the court must consider the sentencing guidelines.” Coulverson, 

supra at 144 (cleaned up). The sentence “should call for confinement that is 

consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it 

relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the 

rehabilitative needs of the defendant.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b). 

The trial court addressed Appellant’s sentencing challenge as follows:

This court imposed standard range sentences of seventeen 

and one-half to thirty-five years of imprisonment for third-degree 

murder and five to ten years of imprisonment for burglary. In 

imposing these sentences, this court considered every factor 

required under the sentencing code and imposed a sentence that 

was not only necessary for the protection of the public, but one 

that also reflected the significant threat [Appellant] posed to the 

community. This court reviewed [Appellant]’s presentence and 

mental health reports, which revealed that he had previously been 

convicted of two unrelated drug offenses. While [Appellant] 

suffered from no significant medical or mental health issues that 

would interfere with sentencing, this court did note that 

[Appellant] suffered from a significantly traumatizing childhood, 

having witnessed his uncle’s murder at the age of five and 

suffering sexual abuse that went unreported to family members. 

This court also considered testimony from Nora Holder, 

[Appellant]’s wife, and Dontay Holder, his brother.

This court was obligated to balance these considerations 

with the gravity of the instant offense. The evidence 

unequivocally demonstrated that [Appellant] entered the 

decedent’s home and sought to steal valuables before 

encountering the decedent, whereupon he shot him once in the 

head, killing him instantly. [Appellant] performed this action while 

wearing a GPS ankle monitor pursuant to his supervision under 

the Pennsylvania State Parole Board. This fact alone 
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demonstrates [Appellant]’s unwillingness to comport his behavior 

to that of a responsible citizen, and his complete disregard for the 

rehabilitative efforts taken by the criminal justice system to aid 

him in living a productive life. [Appellant]’s brazen flouting of the 

court system’s previous efforts gave this court serious pause in 

considering the applicable penalty in this matter, and ultimately 

precluded any significant show of mercy for this far more serious, 

subsequent offense. This court’s imposition of a standard range 

sentence is a sign of lenience in this matter. Accordingly, 

[Appellant] fails to demonstrate that this court abused its 

discretion in imposing sentence, and this court’s sentence should 

not be disturbed.

Trial Court Opinion, 6/22/20, at 16-17 (citations and unnecessary 

capitalization committed).

Our review of the record supports the trial court’s contentions and belies 

those of Appellant. First, because the court studied the presentence 

investigation report, we presume that it properly considered and weighed all 

relevant sentencing factors. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kitchen, 162 

A.3d 1140, 1147 (Pa.Super. 2017). Additionally, the record confirms that the 

trial court fully assessed the relevant factors, restating in open court the 

information pertinent to Appellant’s history and rehabilitative needs, as well 

as entertaining Appellant’s witnesses and his allocution, in which Appellant

offered sympathy and condolences to the decedent’s family but denied that 

he had anything to do with the murder. See N.T. Sentencing, 2/12/20, at 80-

109.

Upon this record, we discern no indication that “the sentencing court 

ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for reasons of partiality, 

prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.” 
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Antidormi, supra at 760. The trial court clearly considered all pertinent 

sentencing factors, including the sentencing guidelines, and imposed 

concurrent, standard-range sentences. Such was not an abuse of discretion, 

and no relief is due. 

Judgment of sentence affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/25/2021