[Cite as Tayse v. Erdos, 2023-Ohio-1542.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

SCIOTO COUNTY

JIMMY LEE TAYSE, :

:

Plaintiff-Appellant, : Case No. 22CA3993

: 

v. : 

: DECISION AND

RONALD ERDOS, WARDEN, : JUDGMENT ENTRY

:

Defendant-Appellee. :

_____________________________________________________________

APPEARANCES:

Jimmy Lee Tayse, Lucasville, Ohio, Appellant, pro se.

Dave Yost, Attorney General of Ohio, and Stephanie Watson, Principal Assistant 

Attorney General, Columbus, Ohio, for Appellee.

_____________________________________________________________ 

Smith, P.J.

{¶1} This is an appeal from a Scioto County Common Pleas Court judgment 

denying Jimmy Tayse’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus as being both 

procedurally deficient and barred by res judicata. On appeal, Tayse raises four 

assignments of error contending 1) that the trial court erred and abused its 

discretion in granting the respondent’s motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B); 2) 

that his case number CR-2007-04-1285 is void as the Summit County Court of 

Common Pleas jurisdiction was not invoked on or before April 27, 2007, when the 

case was commenced; 3) that a void judgment may be challenged at any time; and 
Scioto App. No. 22CA3993 2

4) that Chapter 2725 of the Ohio Revised Code prescribes a basic summary 

procedure for bringing a habeas corpus action. However, because we conclude the 

trial court properly dismissed Tayse’s habeas petition on procedural grounds and 

because Tayse’s current appeal is also procedurally deficient, we must dismiss the 

current appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, as determined by the trial court 

and as further discussed below, Tayse’s petition is barred by res judicata in light of 

the fact that it’s a successive petition. Accordingly, we do not reach the merits of 

Tayse’s arguments and the appeal is dismissed. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶2} Because Tayse has not provided this Court with the entire criminal 

record of this case, including the underlying criminal record from his convictions 

in the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, we take judicial notice of the facts 

of this matter as set forth in his first, direct appeal, as follows: 

A.C. went grocery shopping with her sixteen-month-old 

daughter, S.C., the day before Easter 2007 at a Giant Eagle store 

near her home in a suburb of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. At close 

to 10:30 a.m., after she loaded her baby and her groceries into 

her Jeep Grand Cherokee, A.C. locked the doors and walked to 

the nearby cart-return. As she headed back to her Jeep, she 

noticed a man approaching, but assumed he was intending to 

enter a neighboring car. Just as A.C. unlocked the doors and sat 

down in the driver's seat, James Tayse slipped into the seat 

directly behind her. He leaned over and put a small kitchen knife 

up to the side of S.C.'s neck and ordered her mother to “[d]rive, 

or I'll cut her.” He told A.C. that he needed to get out of town 

because he was going away for life. Mr. Tayse kept the knife to 
Scioto App. No. 22CA3993 3

S.C.'s neck until the Jeep reached the main road, then he crawled 

up into the front passenger's seat and held the knife on his lap.

A.C. told Mr. Tayse that she did not have cash for the toll road, 

and he told her to stop at an ATM. A.C. withdrew $200 from her 

bank account using a drive-up ATM at a bank in Harmarville, 

Pennsylvania. She handed the money directly to Mr. Tayse. 

They got on the Pennsylvania Turnpike, and Mr. Tayse warned 

her “not to speed and not to do anything stupid to get [them] 

caught.” A.C. testified that, when she was approaching the toll 

booth operator at the end of the Pennsylvania Turnpike, Mr. 

Tayse again warned her not to do anything stupid. At that time, 

she glanced over at Mr. Tayse and found that, for the first time, 

the knife was not visible.

They followed Interstate 76 until Mr. Tayse told her to take an 

exit. He told her that she was to pay for a room at the America's 

Best Value Inn at Route 43 in Brimfield Township, Ohio. Mr. 

Tayse insisted on carrying the baby into the motel lobby. 

According to A.C., Mr. Tayse “said he did have the knife under 

[the baby's] jacket and not to do anything stupid.” A.C. testified 

that she complied and did not attempt to alert the sole worker at 

the desk because “[Mr. Tayse] had a knife to [her] child.” Once 

inside the motel room, Mr. Tayse emptied his pockets, including 

the knife, onto the nightstand and lay down on the bed watching 

television while A.C. tried to get her daughter to drink some 

milk.

Soon Mr. Tayse approached A.C. and said, “[p]ut [S.C.] down 

and take off all your clothes.” Although A.C. begged him not to 

make her, Mr. Tayse insisted that she perform oral sex on him. 

After that, he raped her vaginally. After ordering her to clean 

him up and take a shower, he demanded oral sex again.

After that, Mr. Tayse started going through A.C.'s purse looking 

for more money and credit cards. He ordered her to remove her 

jewelry, and he turned off her cellular telephone. They returned 

to the Jeep where Mr. Tayse again ordered her to drive. He told 

her to stop at a BP gas station on Grant Street in Akron. A.C. 

testified that Mr. Tayse carried her baby and stood behind her 
Scioto App. No. 22CA3993 4

while she used an ATM to withdraw money from her account. 

She was unable to withdraw more than $100 at that time. She 

gave the money to Mr. Tayse. When they returned to the Jeep, 

he told her they had to find a way to get more money. They 

stopped at a check cashing store in Cuyahoga Falls, but the teller 

refused to cash A.C.'s $1500 check. The woman suggested they 

try the bank inside the local Giant Eagle.

At Giant Eagle, Mr. Tayse again carried the baby into the 

store. They tried unsuccessfully to cash the check at the service 

desk and then at the bank counter. In an attempt to stall inside 

the store, A.C. claimed she needed diapers. While they were 

waiting in line, Mr. Tayse told her to buy five $100 American 

Express gift cards. She gave the cards to him. They returned to 

the Jeep, and A.C. drove toward Cleveland until Mr. Tayse told 

her to take an exit. They drove deep into a residential 

neighborhood before Mr. Tayse ordered her to stop the car and 

get out. He allowed her to get her child from the backseat before 

he drove the Jeep out of sight.

The next day, while driving in Cleveland, a woman who had 

heard about the incident on television spotted A.C.'s Jeep Grand 

Cherokee and called the police. Cleveland police officers in two 

separate vehicles pursued the Jeep, using lights and sirens, 

through deep snow on icy roads. The two police cars attempted 

at one point to trap the Jeep, but Mr. Tayse accelerated and turned 

a corner. The police officers and witnesses testified that the Jeep 

fishtailed around a corner onto a residential street, bouncing off 

the curbs on either side, before slamming into a parked car and 

rebounding to strike another car parked on the opposite side of 

the street. Both of the parked cars were heavily damaged, and an 

occupant of one of them was injured. Mr. Tayse jumped from 

the Jeep and tried to flee on foot, but was quickly caught by the 

officers.

State v. Tayse, 9th Dist. Summit No. 23978, 2009-Ohio-1209, ¶ 4-10, appeal not 

accepted, 129 Ohio St.3d 1453, 2011-Ohio-4217, 951 N.E.2d 1049, motion for 

reconsideration denied, 129 Ohio St.3d 1508, 2011-Ohio-5358, 955 N.E.2d 389.
Scioto App. No. 22CA3993 5

{¶3} As further set forth by the Ninth District Court of Appeals, Tayse “was 

convicted of committing 14 crimes along the way, including felonious assault and 

multiple counts of kidnapping, rape, and aggravated robbery with sexually violent 

predator and repeat violent offender specifications.” Tayse at ¶ 1. “He was also 

convicted of grand theft, disrupting public services, and failure to comply with a 

signal or order of a police officer.” Id. On direct appeal, Tayse challenged four of 

his five convictions for aggravated robbery, his convictions for the sexually violent 

predator specifications in each rape count, his convictions for felonious assault, 

disrupting public services, as well as his convictions on the repeat violent offender 

specifications. Id. at ¶ 2. He also argued the trial court erred in overruling his 

motion for acquittal on the charge of failure to comply with a signal or order of a 

police officer based upon his challenge to venue. Id. The Ninth District Court of 

Appeals affirmed Tayse’s convictions for aggravated robbery, felonious assault, 

the sexually violent predator specifications, the repeat violent offender 

specifications, and the conviction for failure to comply with a signal or order of a 

police officer. Id. at ¶ 3. However, the court reversed Tayse’s conviction for 

disrupting public services, finding that it was based upon insufficient evidence. Id. 

Because Tayse did not challenge the sentences imposed for his crimes, the 

appellate court did not reference or include the sentences in its decision. 
Scioto App. No. 22CA3993 6

{¶4} Tayse filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the Scioto County 

Court of Common Pleas on March 18, 2022, claiming that he was being illegally 

detained and was entitled to immediate release. In response, the State filed a 

“motion to dismiss and/or motion for summary judgment.” The motion argued that 

Tayse’s substantive claims were not cognizable in habeas and that the petition was 

procedurally deficient on numerous grounds. More specifically, the State argued 

Tayse’s petition failed to comply with the mandatory filing requirements set forth 

in both R.C. 2725.04(D) and R.C. 2969.25(A), and that Tayse was not entitled to 

immediate release because his maximum prison term had not expired. The State 

attached exhibits to its motion demonstrating that Tayse had filed two previous 

habeas petitions in other jurisdictions in Ohio, both of which unsuccessfully 

challenged his underlying indictment. Thus, the State argued that the current 

petition was barred by res judicata. The record indicates that the trial court granted 

the State’s motion to dismiss, however, it based the dismissal on procedural 

grounds without reaching the merits of the petition. More specifically, the State 

dismissed Tayse’s petition based upon the following grounds: 1) the failure to 

attach an affidavit of prior litigation as required by R.C. 2969.25(A); 2) the failure 

to attach commitment papers as required by R.C. 2725.04(D); and 3) the doctrine 

of res judicata, to the extent that the doctrine bars the filing of successive petitions 

for writs of habeas corpus. 
Scioto App. No. 22CA3993 7

{¶5} In attempting to delineate the factual and procedural history of this 

matter as part of our review on appeal, we must note that because Tayse failed to 

attach a copy of his commitment papers to his underlying petition for a writ of 

habeas corpus and has further failed to provide this Court with the record related to 

his underlying convictions, the nature and length of the prison terms imposed upon 

Tayse are unclear. However, we note that according to the Ohio Department of 

Rehabilitations and Corrections website, of which we are permitted to take judicial 

notice, Tayse is currently incarcerated and is serving a definite term of 52 years, an 

additional term of 9 years, a term of 30 years to life, and has an expected release 

date of April 11, 2080. See Small v. Collins, 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 20CA1, 2021-

Ohio-301, ¶ 15, citing Bradley v. Hooks, 4th Dist. Ross No. 16CA3576, 2017-

Ohio-4105, fn. 2 (noting that courts can take judicial notice of public records 

available on the internet). 

{¶6} Not only did Tayse fail to attach a copy of his commitment papers to 

his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as required by R.C. 2725.04(D), he also

failed to comply with the requirements of R.C. 2969.25(A)(1)-(4), which requires 

that an inmate who files a civil action or appeal against a government entity or 

employee must file an affidavit that contains a description of each civil action or 

appeal the inmate has filed in the previous five years. Thus, not only does this 
Scioto App. No. 22CA3993 8

Court lack a full understanding Tayse’s current length and term of incarceration, it 

also lacks a complete understanding of the procedural history of this matter. 

{¶7} In its consideration of Tayse’s petition, the Scioto County Court of 

Common Pleas observed that although Tayse filed an affidavit as to his prior civil 

actions, he “failed to provide any of the information that is required by statute[]” in 

that he claimed “in his affidavit that he ha[d] filed zero prior civil actions, or 

appeals.” The trial court then went on to take judicial notice of seven other prior 

civil actions that appear to have been filed by Tayse in the previous five years, two 

of which appear from the record to have been prior petitions for writs of habeas 

corpus, one of which was filed in Ross County and the other was filed in Warren 

County. 

{¶8} Despite this Court’s lack of a complete understanding of the history of 

the case presently before us due to the procedural deficiencies of the petition, the 

trial court’s dismissal of Tayse’s petition is now directly before us on appeal and 

Tayse has set forth four assignments of error for our review.

ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE 

RESPONDENT’S MOTION TO DISMISS UNDER CIV. 

RULE 12(B) WHICH IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

II. CASE # CR-2007-04-1285 IS VOID AS THE SUMMIT 

COUNTY COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 

JURISDICTION WAS NOT INVOKED ON OR BEFORE 

4-27-07 WHEN THE CASE WAS COMMENCED.
Scioto App. No. 22CA3993 9

III. A VOID JUDGMENT MAY BE CHALLENGED AT ANY 

TIME.

IV. CHAPTER 2725 OF THE OHIO REVISED CODE 

PRESCRIBES A BASIC SUMMARY PROCEDURE FOR 

BRINGING A HABEAS CORPUS ACTION.

Standard of Review

{¶9} As set forth above, the State moved to dismiss Appellant’s petition 

below for failure to state a claim and the trial court granted the State’s motion and 

dismissed the petition. “A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon 

which relief can be granted tests the sufficiency of the complaint.” VolbersKlarich v. Middletown Mgt., Inc., 125 Ohio St.3d 494, 2010-Ohio-2057, 929 

N.E.2d 434, ¶ 11. In order for a court to dismiss a complaint under Civ.R. 

12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, it must 

appear beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the 

claim that would entitle the plaintiff to the relief sought. Ohio Bur. Of Workers' 

Comp. v. McKinley, 130 Ohio St.3d 156, 2011-Ohio-4432, 956 N.E.2d 814, ¶ 12; 

Rose v. Cochran, 4th Dist. Ross No. 11CA3243, 2012-Ohio-1729, ¶ 10. 

{¶10} When a trial court considers a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, it 

must review only the complaint, accepting all factual allegations contained in the 

complaint as true and making all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 

party. State ex rel. Talwar v. State Med. Bd. of Ohio, 104 Ohio St.3d 290, 2004-
Scioto App. No. 22CA3993 10

Ohio-6410, 819 N.E.2d 654, ¶ 5; Perez v. Cleveland, 66 Ohio St.3d 397, 399, 613 

N.E.2d 199 (1993); Estate of Sherman v. Millhon, 104 Ohio App.3d 614, 617, 662 

N.E.2d 1098 (10th Dist.1995). Furthermore, the trial court “cannot rely on 

evidence or allegations outside the complaint to determine a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) 

motion.” State ex rel. Fuqua v. Alexander, 79 Ohio St.3d 206, 207, 680 N.E.2d 

985 (1997). This same standard applies in cases involving claims for extraordinary 

relief, including habeas corpus. Boles v. Knab, 130 Ohio St.3d 339, 2011-Ohio5049, 958 N.E.2d 554, ¶ 2 (“Dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a 

claim was warranted because after all factual allegations of Boles's petition were 

presumed to be true and all reasonable inferences therefrom were made in his 

favor, it appeared beyond doubt that he was not entitled to the requested 

extraordinary relief in habeas corpus”). 

{¶11} “Appellate courts review de novo a dismissal for the failure to state a 

claim.” Hammond v. Perry, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 12CA27, 2013-Ohio-3683, ¶ 

11, citing Allen v. Bryan, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 12CA15, 2013-Ohio-1917, ¶ 7; 

Barley v. Hearth & Care of Greenfield, L.L.C., 4th Dist. Highland No. 12CA13, 

2013-Ohio-279, ¶ 11. “In other words, an appellate court affords no deference to a 

trial court's decision and, instead, applies its own, independent review to determine 

if the Civ.R. 12(B)(6) requirements were satisfied.” Hammond at ¶ 11, citing 

McDill v. Sunbridge Care Ents., Inc., 4th Dist. Pickaway No. 12CA8, 2013-Ohio-
Scioto App. No. 22CA3993 11

1618. ¶ 10; Estep v. State, 4th Dist. Ross No. 09CA3088, 2009-Ohio-4349, ¶ 5. 

Appellate courts also review de novo a dismissal of a habeas corpus petition based 

upon the failure to comply with the statutory filing requirements. See Robinson v. 

State, 166 Ohio St.3d 476, 2012-Ohio-3865, 187 N.E.3d 508, ¶ 7. 

Habeas Corpus

{¶12} Habeas corpus petitions are governed by R.C. 2725. They are 

available to a person who is “unlawfully restrained of his liberty * * * to inquire 

into the cause of such imprisonment, restraint, or deprivation.” R.C. 2725.01. “An 

individual may petition for a writ of habeas corpus if his maximum sentence has 

expired and he is being held unlawfully.” Nedea v. Cook, 4th Dist. Hocking No. 

15CA12, 2015-Ohio-3668, ¶ 8, citing State v. Wilburn, 4th Dist. Lawrence No. 

98CA47, 1999 WL 1281507 (Dec. 22, 1999) and Frazier v. Strickrath, 42 Ohio 

App.3d 114, 115-116, 536 N.E.2d 1193 (4th Dist.1988); see also Bradley v. Hooks, 

4th Dist. Ross No. 16CA3576, 2017-Ohio-4105, ¶ 10. 

{¶13} A habeas corpus petition must conform to certain statutory 

requirements. R.C. 2725.04 states that a petition must be signed and verified, and 

it must specify: (A) that the petitioner is imprisoned or restrained of his liberty; 

(B) the name of the person restraining the petitioner, if known; (C) the place the 

petitioner is imprisoned or restrained, if known; and (D) it must include a copy of 

the commitment papers, if the commitment papers can be obtained without 
Scioto App. No. 22CA3993 12

impairing the efficiency of the remedy. A petitioner's failure to attach all pertinent 

commitment papers renders the petition fatally defective. State ex rel. Miller v. 

May, 161 Ohio St.3d 8, 2020-Ohio-3248, 160 N.E.3d 707, ¶ 9. See also Tucker v. 

McAninch, 82 Ohio St.3d 423, 696 N.E.2d 595 (1998) (affirming this court's 

dismissal of a habeas corpus petition where petitioner did not attach all the relevant 

commitment papers); Workman v. Shiplevy, 80 Ohio St.3d 174, 685 N.E.2d 231 

(1997). 

{¶14} Additionally, R.C. 2969.25(A)(1)-(4) requires that an inmate who 

files a civil action or appeal against a government entity or employee must file an 

affidavit that contains a description of each civil action or appeal the inmate has 

filed in the previous five years. (Emphasis added). A failure to comply with the 

provisions of R.C. 2969.25 requires the dismissal of an action in habeas corpus. 

See Fuqua v. Williams, 100 Ohio St.3d 211, 2003-Ohio-5533, 797 N.E.2d 982. 

Legal Analysis

{¶15} As set forth above, Tayse failed to attach a copy of his commitment 

papers to his petition as required by R.C. 2725.04(D). Tayse stated as follows in 

his underlying petition:

Now the Petitioner has not and cannot produce a copy of the 

commitment or cause of detition [sic] as none exist. There is not 

even a warrant to arrest on file in the State of Ohio there is 

absolutely no record of the Petitioner ever being accused, 

arrested or charged.
Scioto App. No. 22CA3993 13

{¶16} The Supreme Court of Ohio recently explained the effect of a 

petitioner’s failure to attach commitment papers in State ex rel. Miller as follows:

Failure to attach the relevant commitment papers is fatally 

defective to a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Dailey v. 

Wainwright, 156 Ohio St.3d 510, 2019-Ohio-2064, 129 N.E.3d 

444, ¶ 5. Absent a petition that complies with R.C. 2725.04(D), 

“there is no showing of how the commitment was procured and 

there is nothing before the court on which to make a determined 

judgment except, of course, the bare allegations of [the] 

petitioner's application.” Bloss v. Rogers, 65 Ohio St.3d 145, 

146, 602 N.E.2d 602 (1992).

State ex rel. Miller at ¶ 9.

{¶17} Here, the trial court found that in taking judicial notice of the previous 

petitions filed by Tayse, it was apparent that those filings included copies of his 

commitment papers. The court further found that the failure to attach his 

commitment papers to his present petition rendered the court “unable to conduct a 

full review of the petition” and that such failure required dismissal under R.C. 

2725.04(D).

{¶18} Tayse essentially argues on appeal that his convictions are void 

because a valid indictment was not filed commencing the action back in 2007 and 

that because his convictions are void, his commitment papers either do not exist or 

he was not required to file them. However, a review of a journal entry issued by 

the Ross County Court of Common Pleas on December 28, 2015, in Case No. 

15CI360―a time-stamped copy of which was attached to the State’s motion to 
Scioto App. No. 22CA3993 14

dismiss―reveals that Tayse’s prior Ross County petition was addressed on the 

merits and was not dismissed based upon procedural grounds. The Ross County 

court referenced in its journal entry that Tayse was currently “incarcerated in the 

Ross Correctional Institution pursuant to a Judgment Entry issued by the Summit 

County Court of Common Pleas” and that Tayse was “sentenced to an indefinite 

term of thirty (30) years to life in prison.” Thus, a review of the Ross County 

Common Pleas Court journal entry leads to the conclusion that Tayse must have 

attached his commitment papers to his prior petition. 

{¶19} Further, even if we were to reach the merits of Tayse’s argument that 

some sort of deficiency rendered the indictment invalid to the extent it affected the 

original trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction and further rendered his judgment 

of conviction void, we have not been provided a copy of the trial court record 

related to Tayse’s underlying criminal convictions. As such, Tayse’s allegations of 

voidness and lack of jurisdiction are unsupported and cannot not be reviewed even 

if Tayse’s petition were not plagued with procedural deficiencies. In the absence 

of any evidence to support Tayse’s bare allegations regarding defects in his 

underlying indictment and lack of subject matter jurisdiction of the Summit County 

Court of Common Pleas, the failure to attach all of his commitment papers as 

required by R.C. 2725.04(D) is fatally defective.
Scioto App. No. 22CA3993 15

{¶20} Next, with respect to the affidavit required to be filed R.C. 

2969.25(A)(1)-(4), a review of the record indicates that although Tayse 

purportedly filed such an affidavit below, he inaccurately claimed that he had filed 

zero prior civil actions. As set forth above, the trial court listed seven different 

civil filings that Tayse appears to have initiated in the five years leading up the 

filing of his petition. In compiling its list, the trial court took judicial notice of 

filing information readily available on the internet to which it was entitled to take 

judicial notice. Thus, although Tayse filed an affidavit purporting to satisfy the 

requirements of R.C. 2969.25(A)(1)-(4), the affidavit was at best inaccurate, and at 

worst, misleading and false. 

{¶21} Moreover, according to the plain language of the statute, Tayse was 

required to file another affidavit along with his appeal to this Court, however, he 

did not. As a result, his appeal is procedurally defective and must be dismissed. 

Small v. Collins, supra, at ¶ 16, citing Robinson v. Miller, 148 Ohio St.3d 429, 

2016-Ohio-7828, 71 N.E.3d 255, ¶ 7 (“The requirements of R.C. 2969.25 are 

‘ “mandatory, and failure to comply with them subjects an inmate’s action to 

dismissal.” ’ ”), quoting Hazel v. Knab, 130 Ohio St.3d 22, 2011-Ohio-4608, 955 

N.E.2d 378, ¶ 1, in turn quoting State ex rel. White v. Bechtel, 99 Ohio St.3d 11, 

2003-Ohio-2262, 788 N.E.2d 634, ¶ 5.
Scioto App. No. 22CA3993 16

Res Judicata

{¶22} The trial court also dismissed Tayse’s petition on res judicata 

grounds. The doctrine of res judicata generally states as follows:

[A] final judgment of conviction bars a convicted defendant who 

was represented by counsel from raising and litigating in any 

proceeding except an appeal from that judgment, any defense or 

any claimed lack of due process that was raised or could have 

been raised by the defendant at the trial, which resulted in that 

judgment of conviction, or on an appeal from that judgment. 

State v. Perry, 10 Ohio St.2d 175, 176, 226 N.E.2d 104, paragraph nine of the 

syllabus (1967).

{¶23} This Court has observed, however, that the Supreme Court of 

Ohio has previously “recognized that habeas corpus actions are typically 

exempt from res judicata because ‘ “[c]onventional notions of finality of 

litigation have no place where life or liberty is at stake.” ’ ” Lloyd v. 

Robinson, 4th Dist. Ross No. 14CA3462, 2015-Ohio-1331, ¶ 12-13 (also 

holding, however, that res judicata applied to bar successive petitions for 

habeas corpus), quoting Natl. Amusements, Inc. v. Springdale, 53 Ohio St.3d 

60, 63, 558 N.E.2d 1178 (1990), in turn quoting Sanders v. United States, 

373 U.S. 1, 8, 83 S.Ct. 1068, 10 L.Ed.2d 148 (1963); see also Patterson v. 

Bracy, 2019-Ohio-747, 132 N.E.3d 1115, ¶ 21 (“Under Ohio law, habeas 

corpus proceedings are exempt from res judicata”). 
Scioto App. No. 22CA3993 17

{¶24} Here, the trial court referenced Tayse’s prior filings of writs of

habeas corpus in both Ross and Warren counties as grounds for its 

application of the doctrine of res judicata, noting that the doctrine applies to 

bar the filing of successive petitions. Our review of the record verifies the 

trial court’s finding that Tayse had filed at least two prior petitions for 

habeas corpus before filing his current petition. Thus, his most recent 

petition is barred by the doctrine of res judicata as a successive petition. 

{¶25} With respect to the merits of Tayse’s arguments, as set forth above, 

this Court could not review the merits of the arguments even if we were so inclined 

because Tayse has not provided us with the trial court record related to his Summit

County, Ohio convictions. Moreover, we take this opportunity to note that in 

conducting our de novo review of the trial court’s dismissal of Tayse’s petition, we 

have discovered that after Tayse filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the 

Scioto County Court of Common Pleas on March 18, 2022, he filed an identical 

petition in the Supreme Court of Ohio on May 27, 2022. The petition filed in the 

Supreme Court, which was a verbatim copy of the petition filed in Scioto County, 

was dismissed by the Court on July 19, 2022. Tayse v. Erdos, 167 Ohio St.3d 

1456, 2022-Ohio-2446, 190 N.E.3d 633. The decision issued by the Supreme 

Court was titled as a “merit decision[] without opinion[]” and was a sua sponte 

dismissal. Id. Tayse then sought reconsideration of the sua sponte dismissal on 
Scioto App. No. 22CA3993 18

the merits, which was denied after providing a hearing. See Tayse v. Erdos, 167 

Ohio St.3d 1529, 2022-Ohio-3322, 195 N.E.3d 172. Thus, the Supreme Court of 

Ohio has considered a petition identical to the one presently before this Court and 

determined that it should be sua sponte dismissed. Had Tayse filed a proper 

affidavit containing a description of each civil action or appeal filed in the previous 

five years, this information would have been included in the affidavit.

Expiration of Maximum Sentence

{¶26} Finally, as noted by the State in its motion to dismiss and though not 

mentioned by the trial court, Tayse is not entitled to extraordinary relief because it 

does not appear that his maximum sentence has expired. As set forth above, an 

individual may only petition for a writ of habeas corpus if his maximum sentence 

has expired and he is being held unlawfully. Nedea v. Cook, supra, at ¶ 8 and 

Bradley v. Hooks, supra, at ¶ 10. Because Tayse has not provided this Court with 

a copy of his commitment papers, there is no information in the record before us 

on appeal that definitively provides the length of Tayse’s prison terms. However, 

as noted above, the Ohio Department of Corrections website contains public 

information of which we are entitled to take judicial notice and it indicates that 

Tayse appears to be currently serving a definite prison term of 52 years, a 9-year 

term on his repeat violent offender specifications convictions, and an additional 
Scioto App. No. 22CA3993 19

term of 30 years to life. He is not expected to be released from prison until 2080. 

As a result, Tayse has not demonstrated that his maximum sentence has expired. 

Conclusion

{¶27} To summarize, because Tayse’s failure to comply with the procedural 

requirements set forth above were fatally deficient to his petition, and because his 

petition was a successive petition barred by res judicata, we cannot conclude that 

the trial court erred in dismissing his petition on procedural grounds. Further, 

because Tayse also failed to attach an affidavit required by R.C. 2969.25(A)(1)-(4) 

to his current appeal and has not demonstrated that his maximum sentence has 

expired, his appeal to this Court is also procedurally deficient and must be 

dismissed. Accordingly, the present appeal is hereby dismissed.

APPEAL DISMISSED.
Scioto App. No. 22CA3993 20

JUDGMENT ENTRY

It is ordered that the APPEAL BE DISMISSED and costs be assessed to 

Appellant.

The Court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.

It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this Court directing the 

Scioto County Common Pleas Court to carry this judgment into execution.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 

27 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.

Abele, J. and Hess, J. concur in Judgment and Opinion.

For the Court,

__________________________________

Jason P. Smith 

Presiding Judge

NOTICE TO COUNSEL

Pursuant to Local Rule No. 14, this document constitutes a final 

judgment entry and the time period for further appeal commences from the 

date of filing with the clerk.